The findings contained in this report are based on the results of an academic wargame conducted at the United States Army War College 18-19 February 2015. Except where expressly indicated, the ideas presented are derived from the comments of the wargame participants (with their agreement to ‘non-attribution’). The views contained in this report are intended to inform senior Army and Defense leaders including, but not confined to, members of the Army Staff, Geographic Combatant Commands and Army Service Component Commands. This report does not express the policies or official views of the US Government, the US Department of Defense or the US Army.

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Report on Strategic Wargame 15-03: China Futures

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Executive Summary

The US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership and Development conducted China Futures, an unclassified Strategic Wargame to develop insights regarding potential collegial and competing interests between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to inform US national security decision-maker’s long-term planning efforts. The wargame focused on identifying interests in Africa and Latin America, and sought to relate them to the Asia-Pacific region and other regions of the world. For Africa, players identified 18 interests. The prevention or containment of pandemic disease is the only interest considered vital for both the US and the PRC. As for Latin America, players identified a total of 21 interests, with the PRC having no identified vital interests. But for the US, two vital interests were cited: (1) that no hostile power operates in, or could project power from the Latin American region; and (2) that open trade, investments, and the free flow of resources endure. The wargame revealed eight key findings:

1. For the United States and the Peoples Republic of China, the actions and activities identified in Africa and Latin America present almost no risk of initiating armed conflict for the foreseeable future.

2. Any major conflict between the US and the PRC would likely result in “mutually assured economic destruction.”

3. The PRC’s interests in Africa and Latin America are primarily related to economic activities and goals.

4. Politics within the PRC drives Chinese interests in Africa and Latin America.

5. The requirement to protect citizens and assets around the world is becoming more important to the PRC.

6. Disagreements exist in both regions between the US and the PRC over local governance practices versus local regime stability.

7. US Pacific Command (PACOM) may have difficulty addressing the actions and activities of a globalizing PRC that occur outside of the PACOM area of responsibility.

8. Latin America is more influential than Africa.

The general consensus of the China Futures wargame players is that Landpower capabilities should be employed to establish a presence in both regions to improve our understanding of PRC intentions and facilitate cooperative actions. Furthermore, if the US seeks to build leverage, it should consider Landpower capabilities as a way to advance partner interests in response to increased presence and activity of other foreign entities. For either region, foreign military financing and sales and humanitarian assistance planning to support civil and military authorities would be advantageous endeavors.
Introduction

The United States National Security Strategy addresses China’s rise in economic and military power, and how it will have a significant impact on future global relations. It states that the US must “…develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity… around the world.” Even as the US anticipates competition, it nonetheless “…reject[s] the inevitability of confrontation.” The China Futures Strategic Wargame supports our national strategy by responding to concerns about China’s growing influence around the world.

The purpose of China Futures was to develop insights regarding potential collegial and competing interests between the US and the Peoples Republic of China in Latin America and Africa. To accomplish this, the wargame had four objectives:

A. To identify and classify interests that impact PRC and US posture.
B. To provide insights regarding how PRC and US interests in Latin America and Africa may impact US assets, interests, and partners globally.
C. To describe changes to the environment that may impact future planning efforts.
D. To provide ideas on the potential use of Landpower.

Methodology

This wargame considered a global view with a focus on Latin America and Africa. The intent was to examine how the PRC’s global reach and influence is expanding in these regions, and how such activities could impact concerns within the Asia-Pacific region. All players possessed a core competency in either Latin America, Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, or policy-making in global geopolitical affairs. They were assigned into either an Africa group or Latin America group, where they deliberated PRC and US actions and interests. The following research questions were introduced during the game:

1. How can US Landpower be employed outside of the PACOM AOR to support and improve the strategic re-balance to the Asia-Pacific?
2. What is the role of Land Forces in shaping the relationship between the US and the PRC?
3. Will the US and the PRC be partners, or adversaries, or both?
4. What are the potential policy shifts we may see in the PRC and the US based on political, economic, demographic, and climate trends and changes?

The wargame process is depicted in Figure 1. China Futures began with a description of conditions and trends of a future world in 2030 (see Appendix 1, China Futures scenario). The analytical phase of the wargame started with recognizing and discussing PRC and US actions and activities in Africa and Latin America. Then, each group worked to identify and classify interests.
of the PRC and US. Each interest was first classified as either Vital, Important, or Peripheral.\(^2\) The interests were then classified as collegial, competing, or mutually exclusive. The players examined the likely actions and activities of the US and the PRC to aid in determining whether an interest was collegial, competing, or mutually exclusive. Once the interests were categorized, injects were introduced to change the strategic environment. Then, previously identified interests were reviewed to see if categorizations or priorities changed.

**Findings – Africa**

**Interests.** The Africa group identified 18 interests between the US and PRC, of which 12 were shared, four were unique to the PRC, and two were unique to the US (Figure 2). *Preventing or containing the spread of pandemic disease* was the only interest classified as vital for both the US and PRC. The other 17 interests were considered either important or peripheral, with the group drawing marginal distinctions between them.

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\(^2\) Vital - If unfulfilled, will have immediate consequences for critical national interests; Important – If unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect critical national interests; Peripheral – If unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect critical national interests. "The U.S. Army War College Methodology for Determining Interests and Levels of Intensity," by H. Richard Yarger and George F. Barber, (Carlisle Barrack: U.S. Army War College, 1997).
The 12 shared interests listed in Figure 2 have the greatest potential to be collegial depending on changing conditions or other interests between the US and the PRC. As an example of a collegial interest, the US and PRC might cooperate on noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in support of the shared interest to protect personnel and facilities.

**Figure 2. PRC and US Interests – Africa Group**

**Key Findings for Africa**

**Containment of pandemic disease is the only vital interest identified in Africa.** US interest in containing the spread of pandemic disease is well known. As the PRC expands trade in Africa, more Chinese citizens will be traversing the African continent, and travelling to other regions of the world with greater frequency, which could exacerbate the potential for the spreading of infectious diseases worldwide.

**US and PRC interests in Africa will be heavily influenced by their bilateral relationship.** The PRC would prefer to work with the US to address disputes and avoid direct conflict. The core of the US-PRC bilateral relationship is determined by events in Asia and the Asia-Pacific regions. The PRC’s efforts to secure resources in Africa are unlikely to be a source of conflict with the United States. Opportunities exist for greater US-PRC cooperation.

**Africa and Europe are intertwined.** Africa (especially North Africa) is important to European countries because of historical ties and the potential for destructive consequences brought on by pandemic disease, migration of refugees, and terrorism. Therefore, any threat to Europe is of interest to the US. The PRC has no such relations with Europe.
The requirement for China to protect personnel and facilities in Africa will intensify. PRC dependence on natural resources could increase PRC investment in infrastructure to support larger numbers of Chinese citizens in Africa. Increased political and economic instability, crime, transnational terrorism, ethnic violence, pandemic disease or natural disasters would likely create masses of displaced PRC nationals. The PRC will need to figure out how it protects its growing number of citizens against the potential hazards of working in Africa. At what point does a NEO become un-achievable because there are too many Chinese citizens to evacuate? If the PRC cannot achieve a NEO, what are the alternatives?

Changes to the Environment in 2030. The Africa group was presented with three predetermined scenario injects that altered the base scenario for the wargame. The three injects (bold text) and the Africa group’s responses are described below.

Regional violence and instability in Sudan causes the PLA to deploy into South Sudan to ensure the safety of PRC citizens and their access to production facilities. This scenario was viewed as plausible only if the number of PRC citizens threatened by the situation was sizable enough to impact domestic political calculations. In this case, the PRC would feel compelled to act like a great power capable of protecting its citizens abroad to avoid embarrassment in Beijing. The PRC would likely follow three measures: 1) would only intervene with military force at the invitation of the local government; 2) give notification well ahead of their military movements into the area to avoid damage to the U.S.-Sino relationship; 3) would prefer to be invited in as part of a multinational force to stabilize the region.

The PRC formally declares that it will treat the area identified as the nine-dash line as Chinese territorial waters and the PLA deploys to enforce the declaration. Such a high risk, high stakes type of maneuver is unlikely in the next 30 years. Such a scenario would put the PRC into a state of war with Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries in the region. It is more likely that the PRC would declare the nine-dash line as its territory, then at the most opportune time move forces onto the islands. The PRC would then revise the history of the region and work to negotiate terms. The impact of this scenario could lead to a crisis in the Asia-Pacific of a magnitude that might cause the PRC to abandon its interests in Africa altogether.

Egypt requests Military Assistance from the PRC to impart international recognition during a transition of government and provide equipment and training to the Egyptian military. This scenario was only plausible if there were some significant changes in Egypt such as a serious souring of US-Egyptian relations. The US reaction to such an event would be a function of the type of military assistance that Egypt requested. The US would be more concerned if the PRC provided such weapons as air defense missiles. This scenario is more likely to happen in Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, or Tanzania.
Findings – Latin America

Interests. The Latin American group identified 21 interests between the US and PRC, of which 11 were shared, four were unique to the PRC, and six were unique to the US (Figure 3). Two vital interests were identified and applied only to the US: (1) ensuring that no hostile power operates in, or could project power from the Latin American region; and (2) that open trade, investments, and the free flow of resources endure. Due to Latin America’s geographic location, the 19 remaining interests were classified as important to the US. For the PRC, the group identified three of the shared interests as important: access to resources (foodstuffs), access to markets, and logistics infrastructure. The remainder of interests were seen as peripheral to the PRC. As in Africa, the Latin America group sensed that shared interests had potential to be collegial or competing depending on changing conditions or other interests between the US and the PRC.

Key Findings for Latin America

For China, there are no vital interests in Latin America. Under current conditions there is little risk that any interest could trigger a military conflict between the US and the PRC. The region is of greater importance to the US regarding international trade and political credibility. However, the PRC may consider Latin America as a long-term investment if other regions around the world are unable to meet the China’s needs for energy, minerals and food.
Trade with the PRC is a vital interest for Latin American countries; it is a peripheral interest for the PRC. The PRC represents the largest export market for many Latin American countries for a number of commodities and high-tech manufactured goods. All Latin American countries benefit directly and indirectly from Chinese trade and investments. By contrast, Latin America only accounts for approximately 7 percent of overall trade with China.

If there is conflict with the PRC in the Asia-Pacific region, then PRC assets, resources, and associates across Latin America could be adapted for military purposes. The PRC is partnering with BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa – to establish banks and financial-aid services, road systems, railroads, power plants, oil refineries, and other infrastructure projects that alter the political landscape and social fabric of every country in the region. The PRC might use this growing access and influence as leverage in a future conflict.

The PRC perceives US activities and actions in the Asia-Pacific as a deliberate encirclement, and could be attempting a similar strategy in Latin America. The PRC’s close economic partnership with members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) is a potential counter-balance to US interests in the Asia-Pacific. Seventy-five percent of China’s trade in the region is with ALBA countries. Such partnerships could give the PLA access to the region that would threaten US interests if hostilities erupt in Asia.

The Nicaragua and Panama Canals are important issues. With the management and operation of the Panama Canal and construction of the Nicaragua Canal in the hands of Hong Kong based companies, the PRC could wield significant economic power in the region. Guarantees for US shipping and access through the Nicaragua canal are not anticipated without significant costs.

Latin American nations would prefer not to choose between the US and the PRC in a disagreement or dispute. Some Latin American countries might be willing to work with a PRC that supplies arms and engineering support while looking the other way regarding Rule of Law and human rights violations. In the long run, most Latin American nations would prefer a cooperative relationship with both the US and the PRC as a strategic hedge, thereby yielding more favorable economic arrangements while securing a de-facto geostrategic safety net.

Changes to the Environment in 2030. The Latin America group was presented with six predetermined scenario injects that altered the base scenario for the wargame. The six injects (bold text) and the Latin America group’s responses are described below.

The US and EU agree to initiate economic sanctions against the PRC in response to continued human rights violations. Sanctions could have an immediate negative impact on the US financial system as a result of a lack of PRC trade and services. On the other hand, in response to restricted US and EU markets, PRC trade and investments could increase in Latin America and other areas around the world. Economic sanctions could also undermine the legitimacy of the ruling PRC government and stoke Chinese nationalism. PRC investors have large enough foreign-exchange reserves to weather any sanctions over a sustained period of time.
The Free Trade of the Americas Agreement is signed and enacted eliminating trade barriers amongst all countries in the Americas, excluding Cuba, resulting in reduced interest amongst Latin American countries to maintain the PRC as their primary trading partner. The PRC would likely pursue aggressive trade agreements to counter the policy. The PRC would also likely increase investment in state-backed companies rather than state-owned companies to take advantage of the agreement. The agreement would have little impact on mineral extraction because of how the PRC structures its operations. Also, this agreement could lead to one Latin American currency, which could be favorable to US interests.

Regional violence and instability in the region causes the PLA to deploy into Venezuela to ensure the safety of PRC citizens and their access to production facilities. The PRC would prefer to be invited into the country by the legitimate authorities. The PLA would be most likely to enter Venezuela as part of a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation. The PRC would cautious in how it handle any deployment of the PLA. A deployment of PLA forces could promote recognition of the PRC as a global power, further establishing PRC presence and influence in the region. Finally, PLA actions might place in doubt the operating principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

The PRC formally declares that it will treat the area identified as the nine-dash line as Chinese territorial waters and the PLA deploys to enforce the declaration. The US would not accept any denial of the freedom of navigation that might accompany such a decision. A sizable military response (naval and air) to challenge PRC control of the South China Sea might result in the PRC using its economic and political influence to attempt to shut down a series of ports in Latin America, or use “checkbook diplomacy” by making, for example, a large beef purchase from Argentina. With almost any military response, insurance rates on shipping would almost certainly rise and would result in higher costs for trade with the PRC. PRC global trade would likely suffer.

The PRC establishes a basing agreement and facilities for the PLA Navy and PLA Air force forces within Nicaragua. The likelihood of this happening, absent a crisis that threatens Chinese citizens, would depend on the US-Sino relationship and anticipated US reaction. Otherwise, this action would most likely be connected to a wider conflict related to the Asia-Pacific region.

The PRC completes upgrades to an airbase in the Nanji Islands in order to secure its territorial integrity (base is 300km from the Senkaku Islands). Upgrades allow for fixed wing operations for the PLA-Navy. This action would create a crisis as Japan would likely see the upgraded airbase as a threat to sea lines of communication in the region. The US would possibly apply intense diplomatic pressure toward Japan and the PRC to de-escalate tensions. PRC relationships in Latin America could clash with Japan’s relationships in Latin America accelerating competition between Japan and the PRC for resources throughout Latin America. This might cause the crisis to escalate and draw in South Korea and India because of potential conflicts with their interests, such as access to Latin American oil.
Key Findings shared by both Africa and Latin America

For the United States and the Peoples Republic of China, the actions and activities identified in Africa and Latin America present almost no risk of initiating armed conflict for the foreseeable future. The US-PRC bilateral relationship is determined by events in the Asia-Pacific region. Issues such as the status of Taiwan, the Sino-Japanese competition, the collapse of the North Korean regime, or various territorial disputes will determine the status and direction of the U.S.-PRC relationship in regions beyond the Asia-Pacific. If the US and the PRC get embroiled in a new “Cold War”, the interest-value calculus discussed in this wargame could change.

Any major conflict between the US and the PRC would likely result in “mutually assured economic destruction.” A major Sino-US conflict would significantly disrupt the global economy resulting in significant “blowback” to both the US and the PRC. Factors that could be catalysts to a significant conflict include a coup d’état of the government of a major nation-state, a natural or man-made disaster (tsunami, accidental nuclear discharge), or scarcity of vital resources.

The PRC’s interests in Africa and Latin America are primarily related to economic activities and goals. The PRC’s chief tool to shape or engage with both regions is through corporate and business ventures. “Business drives the train, not the State.” However, the PRC controls the deployment of military forces, which are involved in significant business activities. PRC economic interests include infrastructure development (refineries, ports, roads, electrical grids, etc.), trade agreements (government and corporate), energy supplies (oil, natural gas), minerals (lithium, copper, gold, cobalt, etc.), and market access (manufacturing, commodities, etc.).

Politics within the PRC drives Chinese interests in Africa and Latin America. The core interest for the PRC is internal domestic politics. Domestic stability and regime preservation are the highest priorities for Chinese leaders. Therefore, all actions and activities beyond the Asia-Pacific region are driven by, and secondary to, internal PRC politics.

The requirement to protect citizens and assets around the world is becoming more important to the PRC. The PRC has a long-standing practice of non-interference in the domestic and foreign policies of foreign nations. In addition, PRC policy has been that the protection of PRC citizens working overseas were not the responsibility of the PRC government. However, as the number of PRC citizens working overseas increases, this policy appears to be changing. PRC credibility could be at stake if a large number of its citizens are threatened or harmed overseas.

Disagreements exist in both regions between the US and the PRC over local governance practices versus local regime stability. The US and PRC have differing visions of how to achieve stability in frail nation-states that possess natural resources. US business practices operate effectively under established rules of law and the absence of corruption. The US government is concerned with human rights. The PRC appears to be unconcerned with the actions of government in power as long as the political environment allows PRC corporations to have special advantages or earn profits.

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3 It is not known whether this policy of the PRC is the result bureaucratic disadvantages or willful restraint.
US Pacific Command (PACOM) may have difficulty addressing the actions and activities of a globalizing PRC that occur outside of the PACOM area of responsibility. The US military’s regionally aligned commands are too focused on regional specific activities to effectively address a PRC that can manage actions across the globe. PACOM could have a difficult time justifying the use of military resources outside of its area of responsibility unless effective coordination is made between adjacent Combatant Commands and across all the elements of national power.

Latin America is more influential than Africa. Impacts from the scenario injects indicate that if the US-PRC relationship becomes hostile, Latin America will have a far greater influence on global economic and political interactions than will Africa. In addition, if a crisis between the US and the PRC occurs somewhere else in the world, the economic and political impacts on Latin American nations could be far more severe than on African nations. Given its geopolitical relationship to the United States, Latin America will account for a great many unforeseen second and third-order effects that could significantly impact US actions and activities around the world.

Implications for Landpower

Africa

The US has no ground forces assigned to Africa Command. If the US wants leverage it should consider employing Landpower capabilities as a way to support partner interests in response to increased presence and activities of other foreign entities. The absence of infrastructure (roads, railroads, bridges, and communications) in much of the interior of the continent significantly impedes operational reach. The top recommendations for inclusion in a Landpower engagement strategy within Africa are:

1. Policy-makers should consider introducing sustained Landpower capabilities into Africa to achieve national goals and advance US and partner interests.
2. US ground forces should work to establish, develop and then sustain multi-lateral mil-to-mil relationships with African countries to achieve common goals and advance mutual interests.
3. US military and civilian commands and agencies need more authorities and discretion to obtain resources and develop, amend, and carry out counterterrorist strategies and policies.
4. Increased land force presence would allow for improved situational awareness and understanding of the operational environment.

Establishing a permanent US ground force footprint in Africa would communicate US intent to commit to regional partners to support training, assist in countering criminal and terrorist activities, and allow for staging areas to address and respond to crises and disasters. Two effective ways to establish relationships could be foreign military financing and sales, and humanitarian assistance planning to support civil and military authorities.
Latin America

The US military has a long tradition of military activity throughout Latin America. What is new and evolving is the increase in PRC military activities across the region. The PRC is building military relationships and engaging in a wide range of security cooperation and assistance. In response, the US can work to maintain a strong presence in the region and establish a relationship with the PLA to help provide regional stability. Any level of cooperation in training or other engagements between the two powers could improve mutual understanding and mitigate false perceptions. Landpower activities should be focused to counter malignant influences. The US will need to reexamine laws that restrict the US military’s ability to work with foreign militaries involved in human rights abuses if the US desires greater engagement in the region. Any US absence in the region could lead to the PRC filling the void. Recommendations for inclusion in a Landpower engagement strategy for Latin America are:

1. Increase counter-narcotics cooperation with our partners, and seek out new partners to fight narcoterrorism.
2. Exploit Foreign Military Financing and increase Foreign Military Sales to build new partnerships and solidify current relationships to include training and professional military education opportunities.
3. Conduct integrated training with the PRC beginning with joint humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations.
4. Re-constitute Civil Affairs units to manage foreign engagement efforts, bolster military support to civil and military authorities, and support Special Operations Forces to build partner capacity.

Concluding Remarks and Issues for Further Study

The goal of the China Futures wargame was to provide insights regarding US and PRC interests, and how Landpower could support U.S. national strategy, in two regions that border the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility. This report highlights ways that U.S. Landpower can be a contributing force to shape the geopolitical landscape, help de-escalate crises, and perhaps deter aggression. There is a compelling need to continue the examination into PRC activities and interests, not only in Latin America and Africa, but in other regions of the world so that we can avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations.

The U.S. Army War College intends to continue its wargaming activities to “develop and test alternative ways of achieving [US] strategic objectives.” Fully accomplishing this goal will require complementary and supplementary efforts by the broader national security community.

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4 See the Honorable Mr. Chuck Hagel in his Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense ET. Al., SUBJECT: The Defense Innovation Initiative, November 15, 2014.
With respect to Latin America and Africa, the wargame players identified the following issues that require further examination:

- What factors might drive the PRC to take unilateral military intervention in Africa or Latin America?
- What might be the Chinese response to a failing state in Africa or Latin America?
- What are PLA military power projection capabilities into Africa?
- What are PLA military power projection capabilities into Latin America?
- What can the US do now, and over the next 20 years, to prepare for crises that could involve a more influential, and potentially more aggressive PRC?
- What are the potential policy shifts we may see in the PRC and the US based on changes in climate, demographics, and political and economic circumstances?
- To what extent can land forces’ activities and actions positively influence conditions in Latin America or Africa resulting from changes in climate, demographics, and political and economic circumstances?
- What actions and capabilities must the US and its partners work to develop, in Africa and Latin America over the next 30 years, to prepare for contingencies that include non-combatant evacuation operations, failing states, natural disasters, or anti-access/area-denial actions?
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Appendix 1. *China Futures* Scenario

**China Future – 2030**

The world is characterized as a multi-polar system of states and non-state actors. The stability of the international system is being challenged by three prevailing trends: the growing influence of non-state actors possessing lethal technologies, competition for scarce resources, and the growth of economic and military strength of several nation-states relative to the US and China. The United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) continue to be significant actors on the world stage, but neither is a hegemon in global affairs. China's economic growth is keeping pace with leading economies, as the PRC remains strongly competitive in the global marketplace as buyer and seller of goods, products, and services. Seven nation-states have emerged to take a more prominent role in the international system: India, Japan, Germany, France, Brazil, Russia, and the United Kingdom. However, the PRC and the US remain the top two nations in economic and military strength.

The PRC’s governing and power arrangements remain largely unchanged from what existed in 2015, even as its overseas interests and investments continued to increase in scale and scope, especially in Africa and Latin America.

With the world’s population surpassing 8 billion people, demand for food, water, energy sources, and raw materials has increased, as available supplies have not kept pace with demand. In several large countries (China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia), the population of their middle class has enlarged and continues to grow, thereby increasing global consumer consumption. Six demographic trends continue to determine the relative conditions and relations among countries: 1) aging; 2) migration; 3) growing urbanization; 4) strains on water and food resources; 5) reduced availability of essential raw materials, including key minerals (copper, lithium), and forest-based material; 6) shrinking availability of fossil fuels. The global availability of raw mineral deposits has decreased relative to increased demand, putting significant pressures on leading countries and their associated multi-national corporations to maintain economic growth and competitiveness. In the European Union alone, over 60 million jobs are dependent on a sustainable supply of raw materials. Globally, key economic sectors such as automotive, aerospace, and renewable energy require such raw

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1 For discussion and implications of the future multi-polar world, see National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030, December 2012, p. iv.
2 When measuring relative influence in four general categories: economic, military, diplomatic, and informational.
3 See Global Trends 2030, pp. 100-105.
materials for the continued development of modern environmentally friendly technologies and the maintenance of their industrial base.  

Scarce resources that are found in Africa and Latin America (such as Copper and Lithium) continue to be sought after at an increasing rate and importance.

With a fragmented international system comes increased risk of interstate conflict over resource competition. Three factors converge to increase the chance of armed conflict: the shifting relative power among nation-states, competition over vital resources (water, food, minerals), and “a wider spectrum of more accessible instruments of war.”

The PRC military, in both capacity and technological sophistication, has advanced to the point of being able to challenge the US militarily. Regional actors in the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America continue to be concerned by PRC’s rise, as they are forced to weigh their loyalties and business transactions between the two largest powers. US defense spending continues to decline in relation to GDP, and support to Partner nations continues to steadily decline relative to the Chinese. Therefore, many state actors see China as an alternative economic and political partner to the United States.

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5 Global Trends 2030, pp. 60-62

6 Global Trends 2030, p. 61. Text from this source was re-worded in this scenario.
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Appendix 2. Players

Mr. Brent Bankus
LCDR Gary Buzzell
LTC Kwok Chiu
Dr. Conrad Crane
LTC Steve Cunningham
Dr. Devin Ellis
Dr. R. Evan Ellis
Mr. Dan Flynn
COL Barry Gaertner
Ms. Nicole Kenaston
LTC Eric Kiss
Dr. David Lai
Col Thomas Marble
MAJ Dave McCaughrin
Dr. William Norris
Dr. Jim North
Mr. David Reynolds
MAJ Adam Riggs
MAJ Jeremy Sauer
Dr. Andrew Scobell
COL Thomas Sheperd
LtCol William “Russ” Speigle
Dr. Michael Spangler
Dr. Michael Swaine