STREAMLINING NATIONAL SECURITY WORKSHOP

The Homeland Group

By Professor Bert Tussing and Colonel Peter Menk

This paper presents the discussions, issues, and recommendations developed by a working group on Homeland Security during a workshop on Streamlining National Security, which was conducted at the U.S. Army War College from 5 to 7 September 2001.

Over the past decade, even as the international security environment underwent significant change, U.S. national security organizations remained relatively unchanged. After his election, President Bush directed his national security team to undertake a sweeping review of future strategies and their supporting structures. That still on-going review is intended to identify what changes may be required to ensure that the numerous and varied organizations, structures, and processes associated with the creation and execution of U.S. national security policies and procedures are effective, efficient, and affordable.

Within that context, more than sixty subject matter experts representing state and federal agencies, the private sector, and academia met at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, September 5–7, 2001, for a workshop conducted by the Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership to explore challenges and opportunities associated with the concept of Streamlining National Security Overseas and in the Homeland. Specifically, workshop participants, working through pre-set issues, explored concepts for restructuring certain areas within existent national security organizations, looking for methods that would contribute to improved effectiveness and efficiency within these organizations. Ultimately, workshop participants developed consensus views on certain issues and developed new issues to be further explored in future forums.

Distinguished speakers opened the workshop with background presentations examining innovation in the U.S. Army in the 1920s and 1930s, the process of U.S. defense reform in the 1980s, and the factors that stimulate advocates of streamlining our national security organizations today. Subsequently, the workshop split into two working groups to examine organizations and processes; one group looked at Homeland Security, the other, Overseas operations. Afterwards, both groups came back together for a final plenary session.

The Homeland Security group employed over thirty subject matter experts to address required initiatives. A scenario constructed for the group posited a series of dilemmas for the National Security Council arising out of a civil war in a neighboring
state and an opportunist major-power adversary. The dilemmas included a bio-terrorism threat, an orchestrated mass refugee flow across our borders, cyberterrorism, and the threat of substantial para-military operations within our borders. The scenario challenged the concept that terrorism within the territorial U.S. is a criminal act and not an act of war.

This paper summarizes the findings of the Homeland Security group. A similar CSL paper is available regarding the Overseas sessions of the workshop.

**A Multi-tiered Requirement**

The forum began with the central realization that territorial security is a *national*, not *federal*, responsibility. The integration of state and local efforts with federal response mechanisms is essential to an efficient and effective response to either the threat of or the results of domestic terrorism. Attendees further realized that the most pervasive and enduring effect would be realized by an international effort—as opposed to a unilateral effort on the part of the United States—to deter, prevent, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Accordingly, deliberations at the workshop were divided among discussion groups devoted to international, federal, and state and local considerations.

**International**

Both the biological threat and the forced refugee flow portions of the scenario led participants to call for assistance and support from an international coalition. Participants suggested that such actions would “get out ahead” of the perpetrators, initiating a worldwide humanitarian condemnation of the threats, even before their implementation, and turning the perpetrators into international pariahs.

Participants called for a two-phased policy approach to the WMD threat posed by the scenario. The first phase would call for the development of a Consequence Management Protocol (in this case, a “Bio” protocol), designed to network the combined detection and containment capabilities of the world community. The second phase would call for a “bio-threat response treaty,” with the implication of a military response to the employment, or threat of employment, of biological agents. Attendees suggested that the first measure represented more of a humanitarian approach to the overall problem and would therefore draw quicker support. In turn, however, they suggested that the proposed treaty and the military response it implied would be a natural extension to the former commitment.

In terms of infrastructure, attendees called for strengthening existing partnerships with the United Nations and for expanding existing agreements with such regional organizations as the OAS and ASEAN. In addition, participants called for the development of formal relationships between the Department of State and nongovernmental organizations whose functional focus could include humanitarian interests, environmental protection, and other concerns jeopardized by WMD terrorism.

**Federal**

Discussions began on the basis of two “realizations,” neither of which were necessarily intuitive to the predominantly military mix of the assembly. First, the Department of Defense, in most instances, will not be “in charge” of homeland security functions; its primary role will be in support of other lead federal agencies. Second, the interagency process of dealing with homeland security will call for partnerships among agencies that, heretofore, have had little to no traditional interaction.

Building on that foundation, the attendees suggested a three-step process in reframing the infrastructure to deter, defend against and respond to the multi-faceted aspects of threats against the domestic front.¹ The first step is to construct a comprehensive national strategy for homeland security, identifying the roles and missions of the diverse agencies of the federal government, addressing components of the domestic threat, and coordinating federal, state, and local efforts in times of crisis. The second step is to establish a central organization in charge of overseeing homeland security functions within the Executive Branch of the government, bringing a centralized focus and authority, including budgetary appointment, to the

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¹ These suggestions were in keeping with a number of recent studies and legislative initiatives. Chief among the studies are the Gilmore Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Bremer Commission, and the CSIS’ Homeland Defense Project. Chief among the legislative initiatives were H.R. 1192 sponsored by Rep Ike Skelton of Missouri; H.R. 525, sponsored by Rep Wayne Gilchrest of Maryland; and Rep ‘Mac’ Thornberry of Texas.
disparate efforts of the numerous (more than forty) agencies currently involved in some aspect of domestic preparedness. An individual appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate would head this agency, providing both the authority and responsibility those actions entail. Step three would call for that office, in cooperation with both the Justice Department and the National Intelligence Council, to conduct a comprehensive threat-risk assessment of the vulnerability to terrorist attack within the United States and of the appropriate capabilities available and required to overcome that vulnerability. From this measured analysis, the nation would be better prepared to construct a reasonable “all-threat” response within the confines of what will always be a resource-constrained environment.

Participants addressed the need for policy changes in several areas. Measures to fulfill intelligence requirements for domestic operations, currently restricted by law, marked one area of discussion. The need to better integrate, and as necessary declassify, intelligence for dissemination to meet federal, state, and local requirements was another area, as was the need to meld not only “traditional,” but criminal, and even medical intelligence into a national network designed to serve both interagency and intergovernmental (i.e., federal, state, and local) requirements. This fed into further discussions on the need to inform the public at large—not only at the time of a given occurrence, in order to mitigate the consequences—but also to educate the public ahead of time with respect to potential domestic threats and responses to the same. This call for information and education recommended a partnership between the government and private media to provide the most accessible and pervasive means of reaching the American people in a state of emergency.

From a solely military perspective, attendees identified three areas of contention that merited further investigation. The first area had to do with potential changes in the organizational paradigm of the National Guard. Some participants questioned whether the posture of the Guard, generally mirroring the structure, capabilities, and mission of the active component, would reflect the best utilization of the Guard in the new era. Several attendees supported the recommendation that the Guard should take on homeland security within the United States as a primary mission; in that regard, some suggested that the Guard could develop unique “Homeland Security skills” (not unlike the Guard’s WMD-CST’s), which could also be configured in “exportable packages” should a requirement surface overseas. Other participants opined that, while the Guard could/should be prepared to execute the homeland security mission, it should not be at the expense of the component’s traditional “national reserve” mission.

The second area of contention had to do with the military’s continuing policy of locating so much of the nation’s combat support and combat service support capabilities in the Reserves. While acknowledging the political advantages of mobilizing the public’s support along with the Reserves whenever those forces were committed, participants wondered if continuing a policy that requires a significant Reserve call up for every significant application of the nation’s military power was either necessary or prudent.

In an interesting contrast, participants warned against routinely employing active duty forces in domestic environs. Two reasons were offered for this guarded approach. First, the idea of the armed forces exercising any degree of jurisdiction over American citizens summons up a historic revulsion in the nation’s collective psyche, and should therefore be avoided in all but the most extreme circumstances—such as war. Second, by routinely tying our active duty component to the domestic mission, we may jeopardize their ability to maintain an overseas operational capability; the ability to “fight and win our Nation’s wars” should also be a primary focus for our forces.

A final, overarching observation from the Federal working group was that, while there is much that needs to be done in bolstering our domestic security stance, our first step should be a complete assessment of existing capabilities, and those capabilities must be made known across the interagency and intergovernmental spectrum of responsibilities. Finding the “fault lines” will only be possible by identifying, and exercising our strengths.

**State and Local**

The State working group reflected the same need for assessment in their opening position. States and municipalities must first assess the capabilities contained within their own infrastructures. From there they may more accurately ascertain the “gaps” they need to fill and those they need help filling.

Reinforcing the observations and recommendations from the Federal working group, the State and local group paid particular attention to the need for intergovernmental cooperation, and the group called for frequent and wide-ranging exercises involving federal, state, and local entities to develop the type of “routine response” that will be required in an emergency. Attendees
went further in contending that a compelling requirement exists to create a DOD and state training and exercise program devoted to homeland security. This would serve to familiarize state officials with the capacity of the military’s support mechanism, and it would familiarize the military with state needs.

The subject of coordinating and reconciling state and federal interests stimulated significant discussion during the workshop. Given a national emergency, some participants voiced concern over retaining control of state assets (to include the National Guard) during a crisis. Participants held that agreements between state, local, and federal agencies would have to be made regarding retention of unity of command within the state during a crisis, and that these agreements would reflect experience generated by frequent interaction long before a crisis occurs. Similarly, the importance of emergency management assistance compacts (EMACs) between states, particularly within a given region, was frequently conveyed. Concern over the possibility of a President being too quick to federalize assets was also raised. Some participants suggested that now might be the time to investigate occasions when (in direct contrast) a state authority might assume command and control of federal, Title 10 forces.

Conclusion

Current deliberations in Washington bear witness to the fact that defense of the homeland may require new policies, new infrastructure, and even new laws. But before any of these are approached, a full understanding of existing capabilities and of their integration within current interagency and intergovernmental structures may mark the truest and most prudent course for us to follow on our journey back to homeland security.

The Center for Strategic Leadership will pursue the development and examination of these issues through various venues and forums. It is hoped that the efforts of the participants at this workshop and in follow-on efforts will ultimately contribute to a significantly improved U.S. national security structure.

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