The Day After: The Army in a Post-Conflict Iraq

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“We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends”.

U.S. National Security Strategy
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Background

The world’s geostrategic environment, dramatically influenced by terrorism, continues to undergo change marked by a wide array of economic, technical, societal, religious, cultural, and physical challenges. Nowhere is this more apparent than in recent calls by the United States for regime change in Iraq. And assuming a regime change does occur, forced by ground combat in a “coalition of the willing” led by the U.S., the most challenging and important phase of the operation may not be the actual combat, but the post-conflict requirements that follow. Determining the role of the Army “the day after” and beyond in Iraq is critical to understanding the ability of the United States to continue the Global War on Terror while preparing for other unforeseen future contingencies.

This issue paper summarizes the results of several post-conflict requirements symposia sponsored by the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership over a period of three years and considers these results in light of the Army’s Title 10 responsibilities in post-conflict Iraq. In particular, it provides an outline of the general resource requirements for the major subordinate commands (MACOMs) of the Army who are responsible for planning and executing these responsibilities. Additionally, it considers the impact of other ongoing operations and plausible future operations that may drive risk management decisions by the MACOMs as they plan and execute tasks required by the strategic environment in Iraq and the region.

The Strategic Stage

As a means to examine the Army’s Title 10 responsibilities, as they pertain to post conflict strategic requirements in Iraq, a plausible scenario is outlined below:

A “coalition of the willing” ousts Saddam Hussein (and close advisors) in a relatively swift (6-8 weeks) and decisive military effort. Both sides experience casualties as combat moves through urban areas. Republican and Special Guard units are destroyed or rendered combat ineffective. Collateral damage is limited. Most Iraqi oil wells and infrastructure escape in tact and have been secured by coalition forces. As coalition forces, the preponderance of which are US Army, transition to post-conflict they’re faced with a very unstable environment. The government, police, and judiciary are relatively dysfunctional due to the purging of top
leadership and no emerging replacements. Some Iraqi military units are operating at will and conducting guerrilla attacks throughout the country. Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish tribal leaders are ruling respective areas and are initiating frequent skirmishes in an effort to expand their power base. Second tier technical and professional leaders (public and private) remain in place and are attempting to resume normalcy. The general populace passively cooperates as coalition forces attempt to stabilize the situation, restore order, distribute massive humanitarian aid and restore normalcy.

Studies indicate a post-conflict Iraq US Army requirement of 65,000-80,000 personnel plus additional coalition forces. The US led, UN supported, military occupation is expected to last a minimum of five years and possibly as many as ten with a measured withdrawal and handover to appropriate UN agencies and entities. Further, all current Army commitments are expected to remain in place to include fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), obligations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the requirement to support Combatant Commander plans (i.e. execute a major combat operation in North Korea).

**Army Roles and Missions**

*Toppling Saddam Hussein would be the easy task. Creating a stable, pro-Western Iraq would be the difficult job. So before the administration sets off on a march to Baghdad, it needs to have a plan to win the peace as well as to win the war.*

Ivo H. Daadler & James M. Lindsay

Given this strategic environment, a dominant ground force is vital for setting the conditions in order to obtain the desired end-state (new regime, disarmed WMD program, stable, pro-West Iraq). During the post conflict phase, the Army will set the conditions by providing forces primarily for two of the four major post-conflict strategic requirement areas: security; and social and economic well-being (humanitarian relief operations). One can expect that the Army will be in a supported role for security matters and a supporting role for the humanitarian relief effort.

Security encompasses all aspects of public, collective and individual safety, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions. In the most pressing sense, it concerns securing the lives of citizens from immediate and large-scale violence and restoring the state’s ability to maintain territorial integrity allowing reestablishment of the rule of law.¹

Post conflict Iraq security tasks may include: control of belligerents; territorial security; protection of the populace; protection of key individuals, infrastructure, and institutions; and reform of indigenous security institutions. If one “peels the onion” on each of these security tasks, he will find that each comprises a subset of security tasks. For example, the control of belligerents task includes: implement and maintain the ceasefire; enforce the peace agreement and support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Territorial security includes border and boundary control, movement, and points of entry. The tasks associated with protection of the populace include non-combatants, maintaining public order and clearance of unexploded ordnance. The protection of key individuals, infrastructure and institutions include private institutions and individuals, critical infrastructure, military infrastructure, and public institutions. The reform of local security institutions includes national armed forces and non-military security forces. Initial studies indicate well over 100 essential services that the Army must provide or support.²

Even though initially supported by coalition forces and later by appropriate UN entities, the Army will need to deploy and employ a significant force to conduct post-conflict requirements. Once the ground forces have stabilized the environment and achieved a degree of order, a dominant ground force presence remains essen-

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² Ibid.
tial until disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former Iraqi soldiers is accomplished and rule of law is established.

While the current NGO presence in Iraq is limited due to the sanction regime there are an extensive number of NGOs and PVOs poised to provide humanitarian relief assistance when the war ends. Post-conflict humanitarian requirements will increase dramatically. In many cases, the Army will be the only entity capable of providing much needed assistance and the required security aspects of the relief effort. The challenge for the Army will be their integration into and synchronization with the overall humanitarian effort to include assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons, food security and distribution, and medical support. Further, as the security environment improves and restoration occurs, assistance to help rebuild local communities and support for elections will be required.

**Army Title 10 Requirements**

*“War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study and mediation is necessary to conduct it well”.*

Fredrick the Great

Experts disagree as to the required time frame needed to accomplish the post conflict strategic requirements, particularly the governance and justice aspects, but all agree it won’t be measured in months, but years. That being the case, and given other Army long-term requirements, another large scale, multi-year commitment for the Army has profound implications for not only the active component but the reserve component as well. Several Title 10 functional areas (mobilizing, training, recruiting, equipping, and maintaining) will be impacted, in the short, mid and long term, and require considerable study prior to conflict initiation. Tasks must be identified, resources evaluated, priorities established and risks assessed.

As the Army “right sized” following the Cold War, it became prudent to employ Army Reserve Component support for worldwide commitments such as the Balkans, support that continues today. Further, more than 30,000 Army Reserve personnel are currently supporting the GWOT. A majority of functions and services being performed by Reserve Component organizations in support of the Balkans and the GWOT are the same that will be required in a post-conflict Iraq scenario. Keep in mind, approximately 66% of all combat support and combat service support units are in the Reserve Component. Further, many military occupational specialties and organizations that are in high demand for winning the war on terrorism are of low density based on previous strategies. The resultant stress on the army mobilization function (manpower, material, mobilization stations, training base, logistics support, medical support and transportation support) and long-term effects on recruiting require proactive analysis.

Equally challenging will be training the force, particularly unit training. A quick look at recent history reveals that mission success is directly attributable to training readiness prior to deployment. The current administration expects a rapid response to warfighting requirements from Army units and Army transformation objectives reflect this requirement. Army units won’t have time to get ready for war—they must stay ready. On the other hand, the administration has repeatedly downplayed the role of peacekeeping for the Nation’s military. The tasks associated with peacekeeping will be the same tasks necessary to be performed in a post-conflict environment. If prioritized, commanders will likely place warfighting tasks higher on their list (understandably) to the detriment of post conflict training readiness.

Additionally, there may be long-term effects resulting in the need to adjust aspects of force development (doctrine, training, leader development, organization, material and soldiers) in order to ensure the optimum force integration (man the force, equip the force, train the force, sustain the force, deploy the force, station the force, fund the force and maintain the force). In order to equip and maintain a large, dominate ground

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force for a multi-year period, supply, maintenance, services and facilities must be expanded to deploy and sustain the force. Logistics functions necessary to equip, deploy and maintain a force will be challenged with performing (during pre and post hostilities) material maintenance actions required to keep equipment and material in a serviceable condition, restore it to serviceability or upgrade its functional utility upon redeployment to home station while still supporting ongoing worldwide operations.

Conclusion

As the Army contemplates ground force requirements needed to support a Presidential decision to intervene militarily in Iraq, it is wise to plan for a multi-year commitment with a large, dominate ground force and to study in detail the implications, short, mid and long term, on the Army’s ability to perform its Title 10 responsibilities. A start point is the determination of the myriad tasks the Army will perform in a post-conflict Iraq. Given these tasks Army Major Commands (MACOMs) can determine resource requirements and assess risk. Due to the expected nature of this commitment and other ongoing and unanticipated operations, and the need to simultaneously transform, it is imperative that there is a periodic, systematic review of the post-conflict strategic requirements on Title 10 functional areas to identify potential challenges, achieve economies of scale and promote efficiencies.

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