

Issue Paper

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Wargaming Homeland Security and Army Reserve Component Issues

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Background

The President of the United States directed that the first priority of our national security policy is to defend the homeland from terrorist attacks. In response, Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to consolidate homeland security and civil support under a single organization and the Department of Defense (DoD) established Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to consolidate under a single command homeland defense and civil support. As a result, within DoD, both Active and Reserve Component forces face a growing list of what seems like ever-expanding missions. NORTHCOM, DoD's principle agent to focus on these missions faces many challenges especially regarding the expanded roles expected of reserve component forces. As a result of this new national priority the challenge for the Reserve Components (RC) is two-fold. The same units directed to wage the ever-increasing and extensive overseas commitments to fight the war on terrorism may also be directed to simultaneously protect critical infrastructure and provide response to domestic incidents. Due to these conflicting and complementary priorities, discussions now abound concerning the proper organization and mission alignment of both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

This paper documents issues identified with the current missions and structures of the Army Reserve Components and of Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) homeland security missions through the prism of two senior service college war games: the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE), and the Joint Land, Aerospace and Sea Simulation (JLASS) Exercise¹. In September 2002, as part of the preparation to more accurately portray the Army Reserve Component and associated NORTHCOM homeland security issues within these exercises, the USAWC conducted a workshop entitled "Portraying the Army Reserve Components in Army War Games and Exercises." This workshop brought together high-level and senior service college war gamers and members of the Army Guard and Army Reserve leadership to examine how the Reserve Component roles and missions². Although the result of this workshop led to many improvements the portrayal of Reserve Component forces remains a continuing effort in order to maintain

¹ JLASS is a joint military exercise involving students attending the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Naval War College, the Air War College, the Marine War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). ² An Issue Paper concerning the workshop entitled "Portraying the Army Reserve Components in Army War Games and Exercises" was published and may be accessed at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp.

currency with their evolving readiness posture.

Homeland Security Play in Wargaming

Since September 11, 2001 all national games and simulations contain a homeland security element. Correctly understanding and portraying the response to a homeland threat or attack remains a great challenge to all organizations because the homeland security structure is still evolving and lacks the clarity and definition associated with traditional national security responses. Both the SCE and JLASS reflected scenarios that replicate current reality projected into the future. Each portrayed a world in which major overseas conflicts competed with significant incidents within the continental United States for employment of Reserve Component assets. Although both SCE and JLASS are student war games focusing primarily on student educational objectives, many of the insights gained provide the basis for future modeling and evaluation that will lead to greater Reserve Component efficiencies and enhanced homeland security effectiveness.

The USAWC's SCE portrays scenarios covering sixteen major and minor situations; twelve of which occur overseas and four of which occur within the homeland. The SCE homeland security scenarios include a major disaster (earthquake), a series of attacks by domestic and foreign terrorists, and a major terrorist attack in a southern port. In addition, NORTHCOM is faced with responding to a terrorist chemical attack in Canada. The JLASS exercise portrays four scenarios; three overseas and one in the homeland. The JLASS homeland security scenario is focused on state directed terrorist attacks within the U.S. in conjunction with their conventional war against the U.S. overseas. As a result of these concurrent crises, students must prioritize and balance the need to employ Reserve forces in support of three major contingency operations against significant demands for Reserve Component support from local and state government.

Priorities: Homeland Security Versus International Defense

Both exercises clearly demonstrated that securing the homeland while prosecuting the Nation's wars overseas will place significant strains on military capabilities, especially within the Reserve Component. The key issue is: if the first priority of the United States is homeland security (HLS), do overseas efforts become the second priority? A follow-up question may be: should not DoD's support to protect the homeland concentrate on offensive actions overseas? If so, even with homeland security being the first priority a majority of DoD forces will be focused overseas. This complicates the situation for the National Guard who serves two masters—the President and the State Governors. Given the ever-increasing likelihood that National Guard forces could be needed both at home and overseas in a multiple-crisis situation, a review of our overall national strategy, with a goal of identifying appropriate and dedicated forces for both priorities, should be considered. Reserve Component time, energy, and resources directed at one focus instead of two related, but distinctly separate missions may lead to greater efficiencies and even more importantly, greater effectiveness.

A Role for NORTHCOM?

The establishment of NORTHCOM is based on the Cold War combatant command model of major commands such as U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Within the wargames there evolved a significant debate on whether this new command is the right organization or even necessary.

The debate continues and may come down to the question of: "Do we need a Combatant Command to fulfill the stated NORTHCOM mission?" Is the solution that DoD's Reserve Components are responsible for the

homeland security command organizations and missions, while the active duty forces maintain responsibility for overseas defense missions? If so, does this mean that the Active Components and the Reserve Component become completely separate entities, in which case only the President or Congress can authorize the Active Component to task the Governors to provide Reserve Component forces for overseas missions. Another alternative envisions the National Guard tasked as the exclusive military component for HLS, while the Reserves would exclusively support DoD's active component forces, again with only the President or Congress -empowered to shift National Guard forces to support Active Component forces. The challenge for the National Guard and Reserve forces to be responsible for two distinct and growing missions sets may become overwhelming, especially when long-term mobilizations lead to recruitment and retention difficulties.

Initial Game Findings

- 1. Critical homeland security plans, policies and procedures are still being debated and have not been finalized by national and state decision makers. The interaction of the DHS, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for HLS, and NORTHCOM is still developing and is, therefore, very difficult to portray in a realistic manner.
- 2. Both Active and Reserve Component forces are being severely taxed by both overseas and homeland security commitments.

Recommendations

- 1. As decisions are being made on homeland security plans, policies and procedures war game developers, designers, and executors must quickly integrate them into high-level war games.
- 2. Pending Active and Reserve Component force structure changes need to be wargamed to review the changes on both homeland and overseas missions.
- 3. A review needs to be conducted through wargaming of the present command and control (C2) organizations that are supporting both homeland and overseas security requirements to determine whether more streamlined structures can be used to protect our nation's overall safety and security.
- 4. A separate, HLS-specific, experiential war game be conducted in order to assist in defining HLS roles and missions, and that these methods and techniques be replicated for proper portrayal in subsequent national-level war games.
- 5. Distributed information nodes to support wargaming be established within selected DoD and DHS organizations to support both student and real world players' education and training objectives.

The Way Ahead

U.S. Army War College students, through future iterations of SCE and JLASS, will learn and examine the issues surrounding homeland security organizations and the military's role and gain insights and lessons learned for pertinent DoD and DHS planners. It is anticipated that the results of these efforts and of

other events, such as the annual USAWC/RC workshops, will assist the DoD, DHS, and other relevant government agencies in focusing on the goals of establishing more efficient and effective procedures for homeland security as we combat terrorism, secure the homeland, and bring peace to the nation.

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The views expressed in this report are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect official policy or position of the United States Army War College, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the Department of State. Further, these views do not reflect uniform agreement among workshop participants. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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