The tragic events of September 11, 2001 set in motion a series of events aimed at eradicating the terrorist organizations responsible for carrying out the dreadful attacks of that day. The full spectrum of military operations that resulted has moved the Department of Defense, and especially the Army, to a greater understanding of the roles and requirements for conventional and special operations forces (SOF) in the emerging geostrategic environment. The use of both conventional and SOF soldiers—their assistance to native Afghan forces, their close coordination with U.S. military air assets, and the diplomacy they displayed in gaining the confidence of the Afghan leaders—was key to U.S. success in the fight to oust the Taliban and destroy Al Qaeda.

To review the Army’s performance in the military operations since 11 September, specifically Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Noble Eagle (NE), the United States Army G-3 sponsored the Army’s OEF/NE Initial Impressions Conference, hosted and conducted at Collins Hall 26-29 August 2002. Seeking to identify what went right, what went wrong, and what could be improved, the conference examined each of the Army’s seven core competencies, Shape the Security Environment, Prompt Response, Mobilize the Army, Forcible Entry Operations, Sustained Land Dominance, Support to Civil Authorities, and Information Operations, in the context of OEF and NE operations.

Conferences represented select Army major commands, including U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Central, U.S. Army Pacific, and U.S. Army Special Operations Command, as well as the United States Army War College, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Army Center of Military History, the United States Military Academy, and The Army Staff. Representatives from the interagency community and RAND also participated. Deliberations incorporated the results of after action reviews conducted by units at all levels.

The conference produced four key findings:

- The Army demonstrated considerable proficiency in all six of its core competencies during the first year of the global war on terrorism,
- The global war on terrorism demands the increased levels of agility and innovation envisioned at the core of the Army’s future Objective Force,
- Some technological challenges are limiting current operational capabilities, and
- Some force structure and manning issues are impacting operations and the force.

Details on these findings can be found in the initial post conference report on CSL’s publications web page at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/indexasp.

The Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC is preparing the final conference report, which will be published after staffing with participating major commands and key participants and final approval by the Army G3.

Role of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in the Army War College’s Exercises and Wargames

By LTC Thomas P. Murray
Department of the Army Support Branch

From September 23 to 26, 2002, the Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a workshop entitled The Role of the National Guard and Army Reserve in Army Exercises. The purpose of this workshop was to improve understanding of Army National Guard and Army Reserve roles and issues in the national security environment and how those roles and issues are portrayed in exercises at the Army War College and throughout the Army. The eighty-four participants included senior officers and general officers from the Active Component, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve, as
well as exercise developers from the Army War College, Training and Doctrine Command, Northern Command, Forces Command, Joint Forces Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense-Reserve Affairs, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Joint Staff, 1st Army, 5th Army, Marine Corps Reserve, Department of the Army-Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate, Booz-Allen-Hamilton, and RAND. LTG Roger C. Schultz, Director of the Army National Guard, delivered the keynote address, which emphasized the One Army concept. BG Michael Beasley, commander of the 88th Regional Support Command, who presented remarks on the Army Reserve’s current and future contributions to national defense, represented chief of the Army Reserve, LTG James R. Helmiy.

The workshop was composed of briefings provided by the staffs of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of the Army Reserve. The briefings considered the constitutional framework related to the National Guard and the laws and regulatory and policy guidelines for disaster response, including the roles and responsibilities of the Governors and the Adjutants General. Other briefings focused on definitions and terminology as well as on the various categories of National Guard duty, to include state active duty (SAD), Title-32, and Title-10 (Federal active duty). Knowledge of the distinctions between the various National Guard duty statuses is critically important in planning for and executing disaster/WMD consequence management response. Still other briefings examined the evolving Homeland Security arena, Emergency Management Compacts between states, FEMA roles and responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan and the Stafford Act, tiered response for disaster consequence management, the role of the CONUSAs, and briefings on exercise scenarios for the War College’s Strategic Crisis Exercise. Briefings were followed by participant breakout group discussions to examine four of the twenty-three scenarios in the Strategic Crisis Exercise.

An area of intense discussion involved the availability of Reserve Component forces given the competing needs of homeland security, disaster response missions, and requirements for major combat operations. The workshop increased the knowledge level of all participants and contributed to furthering the concept of the United States Army. Products from this workshop will include an issues paper, which CSL will make available on its website, providing the most valuable insights to improve the Army National Guard and Army Reserve play during wargames and exercises.

An immediate canvas of the participants indicated great success in improving the understanding of Army National Guard and Army Reserve roles and procedures. That success should lead to better, more realistic exercises in the future. An additional long-term benefit will be an Army leadership that is better informed and better educated on the roles and responsibilities of the Reserve Component in the evolving national security environment.

The key areas and issues identified for future workshops include Reserve Component roles and missions, training, homeland security, interoperability issues between the Active Component, the Reserve Component, and the civilian first responder community, organization, capabilities, mobilization, pre- and post-mobilization training requirements, and deployment and employment of Reserve Component forces both domestically and overseas.

Project Decatur
By LTC Bob Hesse
Joint and Multinational Initiatives Branch

Typically, American strategists see opponents and ask how they can influence either the leadership (e.g. Hitler, Tojo, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden), or the nation-state as a whole (e.g. Germany, Japan, Iraq). While these perspectives are useful and may offer interesting and important insights, they have limitations. Against terrorists, for example, the nation-state focus is simply not relevant; against many opponents, the “leadership” is more amorphous and distributed than it has been in the past. Recognition of these limitations was the catalyst for initiating Project Decatur.

The Project Decatur series is a co-sponsored (Science Applications International Corporation and Joint Warfare Analysis Center) research project designed to identify, test, and assess concepts of operations for exploiting terrorist network vulnerabilities identified during the earlier MacDuff workshops, which examined “what insights the organizational sciences (and related disciplines) offer to the conduct of military operations against terrorist organizations.”

Project Decatur participants used Social Network Analysis (SNA), a product of MacDuff workshops, as a means to obtain game objectives. Social network analysis is the mapping and measuring of relationships and flows between people, groups, organizations, computers, and other information/knowledge processing entities.

The first game, held in July, included participants from academia and the military. The game developed basic concepts and prospects for exploiting network vulnerabilities at the strategic and operational levels. The second game, held 17-18 Sep, focused on two objectives:

- generating, exploring, and assessing concepts of operations for interdicting a notional terrorist network from a Joint Task Force (JTF) perspective;
- capturing concepts for military actions at the operational level, to cause network disruption, and the cognitive processes underlying the generation of these operational concepts.

During the second game, participants were organized into three Joint Task Force planning teams, each charged with developing three courses of action (COAs) for exploiting a notional terrorist network. Per the JTF commander’s planning guidance, each eight to ten person planning team developed three distinct COAs for attacking a terrorist network: 1) along geographic seams, 2) at key nodes, and 3) along functional seams. Each of the three moves concluded with a plenary session in which the teams out-briefed the other teams on their courses of action, compared and contrasted the different COAs, identified outstanding issues, and offered recommendations.

Although SNA modeling is a mature area of study, it is in its infancy as a tool for identifying vulnerabilities and exploiting terrorist networks. Initial feedback from the Decatur participants indicates that as SNA modeling of terrorist networks matures it has real potential to be a valuable tool when used in conjunction with other intelligence preparation of the battlefield tools.

The third and final game of Project Decatur will focus on the employment of non-military instruments of national power to exploit terrorist network vulnerabilities and is slated for 29-30 Oct.

Eisenhower Series—Drucker Conference
By Professor Jim McCallum
U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

On behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), the Peter F. Drucker Foundation and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute
cosponsored a conference on Civil-Military Relations, 31 July - 1 August 2002. This conference was part of the 2002 Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series, whose theme is “National Security for the 21st Century – Anticipating Challenges; Seizing Opportunities; Building Capabilities.”

The Drucker Conference, focusing on identifying challenges and improving civil-military relations in complex contingencies, was organized to accomplish two objectives:

- Provide a forum for attendees to exchange information regarding capabilities provided by their service, agency, or organization; share lessons learned from past civil-military operations; and recommend process changes or improvements to better achieve future joint civil-military objectives.

Thirty seminar participants represented a broad spectrum of experienced non-governmental organizations (NGO), international organizations (IO), the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Army, other services, foreign militaries, and academia, as well as the Army Staff.

Twice during the conference, attendees were divided into working groups to explore subjects, develop guidelines on how better to approach issues, and examine the challenges and opportunities associated with civil-military relationships.

The working groups prepared the following recommendations intended to improve civil-military relationships:

- Major agencies should organize an “external activities staff” (e.g., external to the mandate) appropriate to the situation;
- Relief & Development must be synchronized by the mandating agency;
- Pre-deployment education and training is required for all participants;
- Mutually respectful relationships should be established “off the record,” in an ad hoc manner with civilian, military, media, and local people through informal social meetings;
- NGOs should be present at military pre-deployment training and at the Civil Affairs qualification course;
- Reach out to local expatriates and locals during pre-deployment training;
- Pre-tests should be conducted using local citizens to insure cultural acceptability of information (e.g. the message must be in the language/vernacular of the audience);
- All must understand the operational environment;
- Mobile Civil-Military Operations Centers should be established to enhance contacts with people/groups located outside population/government centers;
- Partners (NGOs, IOs, Military) should “network” prior to and during deployment to build professional relationships and associations.

COL George Oliver, Director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, concluded the seminar by summarizing the results of the workgroup deliberations.

The Drucker Conference accomplished its objectives. The recommendations prepared by the participants helped to set the stage for the Eisenhower National Security Seminar panel exploring “Relation-ships among NGOs, IOs, and the Military” held at the Ronald Reagan Center, Washington, D.C., 26-27 Sep 02.

Institutionalization Of The Strategic Planning Process In Honduras

By Professor B.F. Griffard
Joint and Multinational Initiatives Branch

A nation’s professional military education (PME) system is a critical tool for institutionalizing sustainable processes that reinforce the proper roles for the political, economic, social, and military sectors in transitional democracies. The U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), employing its Democratization Initiatives Support Simulation, supports the U.S. Southern Command’s initiatives in this arena.

The Democratization Initiatives Support Simulation (DISS) is a political-military simulation that employs the strategic planning process to address the national security and national military strategy development process. CSL’s Professor B.F. Griffard, in collaboration with the National Defense College of Honduras (CDN), conducted CDN 2007, a DISS event, at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, August 12-15, 2002. Participants included the thirty-two member CDN student population and eight members of the CDN faculty. The student and faculty population included twenty military officers (Army, Air Force, and Navy) and twenty civilians from government and the private sector.

Previous DISS collaborations with the CDN were CDN 2003, conducted in 1998, and FEN 2005, conducted in 1999. Conducted at the request of the Commander, U.S. Military Group, Honduras, as part of the Traditional Combattant Commander Activities (TCA) Program, all three events reinforced the dynamics of seminar-based instruction and the processes used to define the armed forces’ roles and missions while promoting civilian participation in national security development and management. Participants address respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law, sustainable development and sound environmental practices, military subordination to civilian leadership and military professionalization initiatives, and economic growth and prosperity in the information intensive twenty-first century.

CDN 2007 validated the importance of iterative DISS events with counterpart national senior military colleges. As a result of the three DISS events, the CDN has upgraded its curriculum to include effective instruction on the strategic planning process and its application in the development of a national military strategy. This same progress was witnessed in the curriculum of the Paraguayan War College after DISS events in that country in 1997, 1998, and 1999. However, the continuing political instability in Paraguay stymied institutionalization of the process. Honduras has enjoyed greater stability and is reaping the benefits in its efforts to institutionalize the strategic planning process in order to provide greater rigor in its highest level of professional military education. As a result of the improved basic curriculum, CDN 2007 was an advanced learning experience for the participants.

Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course

By COL Dale Eikmeier
Joint and Multinational Initiatives Branch

The Center for Strategic Leadership supported the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course (JFOWC) 10-13 September 2002 at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, by providing two team chiefs for the control teams. Colonel Dale Eikmeier and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hesse from the Operations and Gaming Division served as Joint Campaign Planning, Landpower, and Army
The purpose of JFOWC is to provide an instructional vehicle for General and Flag officers to facilitate their study of joint and combined operational planning and warfare. The course uses a plausible but not necessarily true-to-life scenario to stimulate seminar discussions on theater-level warplanning and warfighting and on decisionmaking in a large immature theater.

Specific objectives for this year’s JFOWC included the following:

- Translation of strategic policy guidance into operational terms and tasks;
- Development and execution of a theater campaign plan;
- Appreciation of the implications of command of joint and coalition forces;
- Practice the military decision-making process at the theater level.

The seminar comprised two Blue teams containing three player cells each. Each team examined a different conceptual intelligence architecture called TPXX and TPXX-B. Player cells in each team examined the architectures from the perspectives of national level policy, operations at the joint task force level, and the homeland security mission. Teams then discussed the merits of the architectures and provided issues and insights in a plenary session. Colonel Dale Eikmeier and Colonel Mark Van Drie from the Center for Strategic Leadership supported the Schriever II Space Intelligence Seminar as operations subject matter experts in the Joint Task Force cells.

While specific details of the TPXX, and TPXX-B intelligence architectures are classified, the following is a simplified and unclassified description of the concepts.

Both architectures envision the processing and storage of all source intelligence in large computer databases that are accessible by users at all levels and that allow for collaboration among users. The goal is to remove “stovepipes” and allow a consumer to have access to all intelligence related to a specific subject. For example, a user would be able to access imagery, Signals Intelligence, Measurement and Signals Intelligence, Human Intelligence, and other reports on a particular subject without having to go to National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and other agencies. The goal is a one-stop shopping center for intelligence.

Perhaps the most important insight was that our current “WWII, Cold War” security and intelligence system must be replaced with a system more compatible with information age technology and emerging non-state threats. Homeland security posed the greatest difficulty for the intelligence community. The problem of how to design an architecture that allows for multilevel classification—local, state, and federal agencies such as Justice and Treasury—into an intelligence network/database, while balancing security and accessibility remains unsolved. Finally, a continuing theme was the need to have one agency/person responsible and accountable for intelligence—the need to break and throw away rice bowls.