Strategic Cyberspace Operations Primer

18 December 2023

Gregory D. Hillebrand, Assistant Professor
Bill Ault, Senior Military Analyst
Middle States Accreditation

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The text is a synthesis and interpretation of existing National, Defense, Joint, and Service systems, processes, and procedures, and will be updated in accordance with changes in policy and doctrine.
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Foreword

1. This publication provides a primer for U.S. Army War College students to understand design, planning, and execution of cyberspace operations at combatant commands (CCMDs), joint task forces (JTFs), and joint functional component commands. It combines U.S. Government Unclassified and Releasable to the Public documents into a single primer.

2. This primer follows the operational design methodology and the joint planning process (JPP) detailed in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning and applies these principles to the cyberspace domain found in Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations. However, this publication is not to be cited, copied, or used in lieu of doctrine or other official publications.

The U.S. Army War College Strategic Cyberspace Operations Primer contains six chapters:

Chapter 1 provides an introduction to cyberspace operations.

Chapter 2 includes a review of operational design doctrine and applies these principles to the cyberspace domain.

Chapter 3 reviews the joint planning process and identifies cyberspace operations planning concerns.

Chapter 4 describes cyberspace operations during the execution of joint operations.

Chapter 5 provides an overview of cyberspace operations in the homeland.

Appendix A provides an overview of cyberspace policies, strategies, and guidance.

Appendix B includes a description of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, Joint, and Service cyberspace organizations.

3. This publication was compiled and edited by Mr Bill Ault and Assistant Professor Gregory D. Hillebrand.

4. Several changes from the previous volume (dated 6 September 2022) include the 2022 National Security Strategy, the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy (2 March 2023), 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary, 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (6 Feb 2023), the US Cyber Command Commander's 2023 Posture Statement (7 March 2023), and the Department of State’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP) (9 June 2023). There have been numerous policy and strategy updates since the last version was published. This document attempts to capture the relevant changes in one location for easy reference.

5. This document is based on U.S. policy and doctrine and will be updated on a routine basis to reflect changes in guidance. We encourage comments to improve this primer – send recommended changes to:

Center for Strategic Leadership
ATTN: Strategic Concepts and Doctrine Division
650 Wright Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Strategic competition has fundamentally changed the character of warfare…from acute threats, pacing challenges, mis/disinformation and advancements in artificial intelligence, our adversaries continue to challenge international norms and laws.”

— GEN Paul M. Nakasone, Commander, USCYBERCOM

1. This primer follows the operational design methodology and the joint planning process (JPP) and applies these principles to the cyberspace domain. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace operations (CO) are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.2 Commanders must develop the capability to direct operations in the cyber domain since strategic mission success increasingly depends on freedom of maneuver in cyberspace.3

2. The President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide strategic direction by communicating broad objectives and issue-specific guidance to the Department of Defense (DOD). It provides the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and operations of the Joint Staff (JS), Combatant Commands (CCMDs), Services, joint forces, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other DOD agencies. It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force. Strategic direction identifies a desired military objective or end state, national-level planning assumptions, and national-level limitations.4 At the operational level, joint planning translates national level guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives and attaining the military end state. Plans translate the broad intent provided by a strategy into operations; successful operations achieve the strategy's objectives.5

3. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) use strategic guidance and direction to prepare command strategies focused on their command's specific capabilities and missions to link national strategic guidance to theater or functional strategies and joint operations. The command strategy, like national strategy, identifies the command's broad, long-range objectives that

2 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Cyberspace Operations, Joint Publication 3-12 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as of 19 December 2022), I-1.
4 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 December 2020), II-5.
5 JP 5-0, xii.
contribute to national security. The command strategy provides the link between national strategic guidance and joint planning.\(^6\)

4. Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace. During joint planning, CO are integrated into the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) plans, using the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)-directed global integration process, and synchronized with other operations across the competition continuum.\(^7\) Commanders integrate CO into their campaigns and operations at all levels. Their plans should address how to effectively integrate cyberspace capabilities, counter adversaries’ use of cyberspace, identify and secure mission-relevant cyber terrain, access key terrain in cyberspace, operate in a denied environment, efficiently use limited cyberspace assets, and pair operational requirements with cyberspace capabilities.\(^8\)

5. CDRUSCYBERCOM plans, executes, and assesses CO based on a strategy of persistent engagement in cyberspace, employing a continuous operational tempo to seize and maintain the initiative required to compete to set favorable security conditions in and through the Information Environment (IE) that secure, defend, and advance US strategic goals.\(^9\)

6. CCDRs and Services use CO to create effects in and through cyberspace.\(^10\) The pace of CO requires significant pre-operational collaboration and constant vigilance after initiation, for effective coordination and deconfliction throughout the operational environment (OE).\(^11\)

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\(^6\) JP 5-0, xvii.
\(^7\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Cyberspace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-12 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as of 19 December 2022), ix.
\(^8\) JP 3-12, xvi.
\(^9\) JP 3-12, xvi.
\(^10\) JP 3-12, II-1.
\(^11\) JP 3-12, xvii.
Chapter 2: Design

I. Operational Design

1. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*, describes operational design and the joint planning process (JPP). Operational art and operational design enable **understanding**. Understanding is more than just knowledge of the capabilities and capacities of the relevant actors or the scope and nature of the operational environment (OE); it provides context for decision making and how the many facets of the problem are likely to interact, enabling commanders and planners to identify hazards, threats, consequences, opportunities, and risk. **Operational art** is the cognitive approach used by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is inherent in all aspects of operational design. **Operational design** is the analytical framework that underpins planning. Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE as a complex interactive system. Operational design is interwoven with the planning process to fill in gaps in guidance and information and provide a framework in which to plan, enabling planners to address the complexity of the OE, support mission analysis and COA development, and develop a concept of operations with the highest likelihood of success.\(^{12}\)

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\(^{12}\) JP 5-0, IV-1.

\(^{13}\) JP 5-0, III-10.
a. Operational design requires recurring touch points between the commander and staff in developing an understanding of the strategic environment and OE, higher-level guidance, defining the problem to be solved, and developing an operational approach. The components have characteristics that exist outside of each other and are not necessarily sequential. However, an understanding of the OE and problem must be established prior to developing operational approaches and is critical in conducting mission analysis and in providing planning guidance. As commanders and staffs develop their operational approach, they account for how information impacts the OE and the inherent informational aspects of activities. In doing so, joint force planners consider how information is used by, and affects the behavior of friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences across the competition continuum.\textsuperscript{14}

b. The general methodology in operational design is:

1. Understand the strategic direction and guidance.
2. Understand the strategic environment (e.g., policies, diplomacy, and politics) and the related contested environments.
3. Understand the OE and relevant contested environments.
4. Define the problem (create a shared understanding; planning with uncertainty).
5. Identify assumptions needed to continue planning (strategic and operational assumptions).
6. Develop options (the operational approach).
7. Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization).
8. Refine the operational approach(es).

c. Iteration and reexamination of earlier work is essential to identify how later decisions affect earlier assumptions and to fill in gaps identified during the process.\textsuperscript{15}

II. Strategic Direction and Cyberspace.

1. The President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military to pursue national interests within legal and constitutional limitations. They generally communicate strategic direction through written documents but may communicate by any means available.\textsuperscript{16} Direction from strategic guidance documents can be vague, incomplete, outdated, or conflicting. This is due to the different times at which they may have been produced, changes in personnel that result in differing opinions or policies, and the staffing process where compromises are made to achieve agreement within the documents. During planning, commanders and staffs must read the directives and synthesize the contents into a concise statement.\textsuperscript{17} Strategic guidance is essential to operational art and design. In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate objectives. It should define what constitutes victory or success (\textit{ends}) and identify available forces, resources, and authorities

\textsuperscript{14} JP 5-0, IV-2.
\textsuperscript{15} JP 5-0, IV-2 – 3.
\textsuperscript{16} JP 5-0, II-1
\textsuperscript{17} JP 5-0, IV-3
(means) to achieve strategic objectives. The operational approach (ways) of employing military capabilities to achieve the objectives (ends) is for the supported commander to develop and propose, although policy or national positions may limit options available to the commander. Connecting resources and tactical actions to strategic ends is the responsibility of the operational commander.\textsuperscript{18}

2. National Security Strategy: In October 2022, the Biden Administration issued the National Security Strategy. This conveys President Biden’s vision for how America will engage with the world, and to provide guidance for departments and agencies to align their own policies, strategies, and actions.

a. Securing Cyberspace:

(1) Our societies, and the critical infrastructure that supports them, from power to pipelines, is increasingly digital and vulnerable to disruption or destruction via cyber attacks. Such attacks have been used by countries, such as Russia, to undermine countries’ ability to deliver services to citizens and coerce populations. We are working closely with allies and partners, such as the Quad, to define standards for critical infrastructure to rapidly improve our cyber resilience and building collective capabilities to rapidly respond to attacks. In the face of disruptive cyber attacks from criminals, we have launched innovative partnerships, to expand law enforcement cooperation, deny sanctuary to cyber criminals and counter illicit use of cryptocurrency to launder the proceeds of cybercrime. As an open society, the United States has a clear interest in strengthening norms that mitigate cyber threats and enhance stability in cyberspace. We aim to deter cyber attacks from state and non state actors and will respond decisively with all appropriate tools of national power to hostile acts in cyberspace, including those that disrupt or degrade vital national functions or critical infrastructure. We will continue to promote adherence to the UN General Assembly-endorsed framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which recognizes that international law applies online, just as it does offline.\textsuperscript{19}

3. National Cybersecurity Strategy: In March 2023, the Biden Administration also published the National Cybersecurity Strategy detailing the comprehensive approach directed by the administration to better secure cyberspace and ensure the United States is in the strongest possible position to realize all the benefits and potential of our digital future.

a. The United States will reimagine cyberspace as a tool to achieve our goals in a way that reflects our values: economic security and prosperity; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; trust in our democracy and democratic institutions; and an equitable and diverse society. To realize this vision fundamental shifts in how roles, responsibilities, and resources in cyberspace are required:

(1) We must rebalance the responsibility to defend cyberspace by shifting the burden for cybersecurity away from individuals, small businesses, and local governments, and onto the organizations that are most capable and best-positioned to reduce risks for all of us.

\textsuperscript{18} JP 5-0, IV-4.
We must realign incentives to favor long-term investments by striking a careful balance between defending ourselves against gent threats today and simultaneously strategically planning for and investing in a resilient future.

The strategy recognizes that government must use all tools of national power in a coordinated manner to protect our national security, public safety, and economic prosperity.

a. **Vision.** Our rapidly evolving world demands a more intentional, more coordinated, and more well-resourced approach to cyber defense. We face a complex threat environment, with state and non-state actors developing and executing novel campaigns to threaten our interests. At the same time, next generation technologies are reaching maturity at an accelerating pace, creating new pathways for innovation while increasing digital interdependencies. This strategy sets out a path to address these threats and secure the promise of our digital future. Its implementation will protect our investments in rebuilding America’s infrastructure, developing our clean energy sector, and re-shoring America’s technology and manufacturing base. Together with our allies and partners, the United States will make our digital ecosystem:

1. **Defensible**, where cyber defense is overwhelmingly easier, cheaper, and more effective;
2. **Resilient**, where cyber incidents and errors have little widespread or lasting impact; and,
3. **Values-aligned**, where our most cherished values shape—and are in turn reinforced by—our digital world.

b. The administration has already taken steps to secure cyberspace and our digital ecosystem, including the National Security Strategy, Executive Order 14028 (Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity), National Security Memorandum 5 (Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control Systems, M-22-09 (Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero-Trust Cybersecurity Principles), and National Security Memorandum 10 (Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems). Expanding on these efforts, the strategy recognizes that cyberspace does not exist for its own end but as a tool to pursue our highest aspirations.

c. **Approach.** This strategy seeks to build and enhance collaboration around five pillars:

1. **Defend Critical Infrastructure** – We will give the American people confidence in the availability and resilience of our critical infrastructure and the essential services it provides, including by:
   - Expanding the use of minimum cybersecurity requirements in critical sectors to ensure national security and public safety and harmonizing regulations to reduce the burden of compliance;
   - Enabling public-private collaboration at the speed and scale necessary to defend critical infrastructure and essential services; and,
   - Defending and modernizing Federal networks and updating Federal incident response policy

2. **Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors** – Using all instruments of national power, we will make malicious cyber actors incapable of threatening the national security or public safety of the United States, including by:
• Strategically employing all tools of national power to disrupt adversaries;
• Engaging the private sector in disrupting activities through scalable mechanisms; and,
• Addressing the ransomware threat through a comprehensive Federal approach and in lockstep with our international partners.

(3) **Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience** – We will place responsibility on those within our digital ecosystem that are best positioned to reduce risk and shift the consequences of poor cybersecurity away from the most vulnerable in order to make our digital ecosystem more trustworthy, including by:

• Promoting privacy and the security of personal data;
• Shifting liability for software products and services to promote secure development practices; and,
• Ensuring that Federal grant programs promote investments in new infrastructure that are secure and resilient.

(4) **Invest in a Resilient Future** – Through strategic investments and coordinated, collaborative action, the United States will continue to lead the world in the innovation of secure and resilient next-generation technologies and infrastructure, including by:

• Reducing systemic technical vulnerabilities in the foundation of the Internet and across the digital ecosystem while making it more resilient against transnational digital repression;
• Prioritizing cybersecurity R&D for next-generation technologies such as postquantum encryption, digital identity solutions, and clean energy infrastructure; and,
• Developing a diverse and robust national cyber workforce.

(5) **Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals** – The United States seeks a world where responsible state behavior in cyberspace is expected and reinforced and where irresponsible behavior is isolating and costly, including by:

• Leveraging international coalitions and partnerships among like-minded nations to counter threats to our digital ecosystem through joint preparedness, response, and cost imposition;
• Increasing the capacity of our partners to defend themselves against cyber threats, both in peacetime and in crisis; and,
• Working with our allies and partners to make secure, reliable, and trustworthy global supply chains for information and communications technology and operational technology products and services.\(^{20}\)

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4. National Defense Strategy: In October 2022, the Department of Defense (DOD) published an unclassified overview of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) that sets forth how the U.S. military will meet growing threats to vital national security interests and to a stable and open international system.

a. The strategy identifies four top-level defense priorities that the Department must pursue to strengthen deterrence:

   (1) Defend the homeland.

   (2) Deter strategic attacks against the United States, our Allies, and our partners.

   (3) Deter aggression and be prepared to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the Department’s pacing challenge.

   (4) Ensure future military advantage by building a resilient Joint Force and defensive ecosystem.

b. The Department of Defense will advance these priorities through a strategic approach of Integrated Deterrence, Campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.

c. Our central charge is to develop, combine, and coordinate our strengths to maximum effect. This is the core of integrated deterrence, a centerpiece of the 2022 NDS. Integrated deterrence means using every tool at the Department’s disposal, in close collaboration with our counterparts across the U.S. Government and with Allies and partners, to ensure that potential foes understand the folly of aggression. The Department will align policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence – tailored to specific competitors and challenges and coordinated and synchronized inside and outside the Department.

d. The Department will also campaign day-to-day to gain and sustain military advantages, counter acute forms of our competitors’ coercion, and complicate our competitor’s military preparations. Campaigning is not business as usual – it is the deliberate effort to synchronize the Department’s activities and investments to aggregate focus and resources to shift conditions in our favor. Through campaigning, the Department will focus on the most consequential competitor activities that, if left unaddressed, would endanger our military advantages now and in the future.

e. Competitor strategies seek to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in the American way of war, including by creating anti-access/area-denial environments; developing conventional capabilities to undertake rapid interventions; posing all-domain threats to the U.S. homeland in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power


22 2022 NDS, IV.
and counter regional aggression; and using the cyber and space domains to gain operational, logistical, and information advantages.\textsuperscript{23}

f. As all major powers develop multi-domain approaches, the United States and our Allies and partners will face new dilemmas for deterrence and managing escalation risk. One challenge arises from advances in non-nuclear capabilities, including in the cyber, space, air, and undersea domains, that likely will create complex and unpredictable pathways for conflict escalation, especially where collective experience, common understandings, and established norms of behavior (such as cyber and space) are lacking. A related challenge is the lack of collective experience and potential limited understanding of the interplay between nuclear and non-nuclear strategic capabilities in shaping a crisis or conflict.\textsuperscript{24}

f. Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone methods – coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for U.S. military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the U.S. Government. The PRC employs state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its Allies and partners. Russia employs disinformation, cyber, and space operations against the United States and our Allies and partners, and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries. Other state actors, particularly North Korea and Iran, use similar if currently more limited means. The proliferation of advanced missiles, uncrewed aircraft systems, and cyber tools to military proxies allows competitors to threaten U.S. forces, Allies, and partners, in indirect and deniable ways.

g. Campaigning initiatives will provide a range of options to oppose select, acute forms of coercion carried out by competitors. We will conduct cyberspace operations to degrade competitors' malicious cyber activity and to prepare cyber capabilities to be used in crisis or conflict. Tailored information operations can be used to support and in some instances lead the Department's response. In campaigning, the Department will carefully evaluate and manage escalation risks.

5. 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy: In May 2023, the Department of Defense released an updated, but classified, Cyber Strategy establishing how the Department will operate in and through cyberspace to protect the American people and advance the defense priorities of the United States.

a. The Department confronts an increasingly contested cyberspace:

(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) represents the Department’s pacing challenge in the cyber domain. The PRC has made significant investments in military cyber capabilities and empowered a number of proxy organizations to pursue malicious cyber activities against the United States.

(2) Russia poses and acute threat in cyberspace, evidenced by its malign influence efforts against the United States and repeated cyber attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.

\textsuperscript{23} 2022 NDS, 4.
\textsuperscript{24} 2022 NDS, 6.
North Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations remain persistent cyber threats.

Transnational Criminal Organizations represent a unique threat in cyberspace due to their technical aptitude and often close alignment with the foreign policy objectives of their host governments.

b. Informed by real world events and experience the 2022 strategy builds upon the previous 2018 strategy and shapes the Department’s approach to the cyber domain.

1. The Department will maximize its cyber capabilities in support of integrated deterrence, employing cyberspace operations in concert with other instruments of national power.

2. The Department will campaign in and through cyberspace below the level of armed conflict to reinforce deterrence and frustrate adversaries.

3. Finally, the Department recognizes that the United States’ global network of Allies and partners represents a foundational advantage in the cyber domain that must be protected and reinforced.

c. The fact sheet for the strategy defines four lines of effort:

1. Defend the Nation. The Department will campaign in and through cyberspace to generate insights about malicious cyber actors, as well as defend forward to disrupt and degrade these actor’s capabilities and supporting ecosystems. Additionally, DoD will work with its interagency partners to leverage all available authorities to enable the cyber resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure and to counter threats to military readiness.

2. Prepare to Fight and Win the Nation’s Wars. The Department will ensure the cybersecurity of the DoD Information Network and will further invest in the Joint Force’s cyber resilience. Additionally, the Department will use cyberspace operations to generate asymmetric advantages in support of the Joint Force’s plans and operations.

3. Protect the Cyber Domain with Allies and Partners. The Department will assist U.S. Allies and partners in building their cyber capacity and capability, as well as expand avenues of potential cyber cooperation. DoD will continue to conduct hunt forward operations to build cyber resiliency and will reinforce state behavior by encouraging adherence to international law and internationally recognized cyberspace norms.

4. Build Enduring Advantages in Cyberspace. The Department will optimize the organizing, training, and equipping of the Cyber Operations Forces and Service-retained cyber forces. Furthermore, DoD will invest in the enablers of cyberspace operations, including intelligence, science and technology, cybersecurity, and culture.25

III. Cyberspace Strategic Environment.

1. After analyzing the strategic guidance, commanders and planners build an understanding of the strategic environment. This forms boundaries within which the operational approach must fit. Some considerations are:

   a. What actions or planning assumptions will be acceptable given the current U.S. policies and the diplomatic and political environment?

   b. What impact will U.S. activities have on third parties (focus on military impacts but identify possible political, economic, or commercial ramifications that may impact third-party willingness to support US activities including, but not limited to, access, basing, and overflight decisions)?

   c. What are the current national strategic objectives of the United States Government (USG)? Are the objectives expected to be long lasting or short-term only? Could they result in unintended consequences (e.g., is there sufficient time to develop strong controls so that weapons provided to a nation will not be used for unintended purposes)?

2. Within the OE, strategic-level considerations may include global factors such as international law; the capability of adversary/enemy diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities to influence domestic and world opinion; adversary and friendly organizations and institutions; and the capability and availability of national and commercial transportation, space capabilities, and information technology.

3. Policy on Deterring Adversaries and Better Protecting the American People from Cyber Threats. In 2017, the Department of State (DOS) drafted a report that included a strategy and policies for deterring malicious cyber activities:

   a. The United States remains in a strong position to deter cyber attacks that would constitute a use of force because traditional tools of deterrence – including the responsive use of kinetic force – remain effective and potent. However, there are significant challenges in deterring the substantial increase in malicious state-sponsored cyber activity occurring below the threshold of the use of force.

   b. Deterrence by denial through defense and protection of critical infrastructure and other sensitive computer networks and ensuring efficient mitigation and timely recovery from malicious cyber activities must be foundational to the U.S. deterrence approach.

   c. The desired end states of U.S. deterrence efforts will be:

      (1) A continued absence of cyber attacks that constitute a use of force against the United States, its partners, and allies.

      (2) A significant, long-lasting reduction in destructive, disruptive, or otherwise destabilizing malicious cyber activities directed against U.S. interests that fall below the threshold of the use of force.

   d. Key elements of the approach will include:

      (1) Creating a policy for when the United States will impose consequences.

26 JP 5-0, IV-5.
27 JP 5-0, IV-5.
(2) Developing a range of consequences.
(3) Conducting policy planning for imposing these consequences.
(4) Building partnerships.  

**IV. Cyberspace Operational Environment.**

1. The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains, and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Understanding the OE helps the commander to better identify the problem; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how these actions affect achieving the military end state.  

2. The ability to operate in cyberspace has emerged as a vital national security requirement. The growing impact of information warfare on military operations further increases the importance of cyberspace. As technological capabilities and instantaneous access to information continue to grow, the opportunities for real-time communication and information sharing expand. These capabilities are vital to economic and national development. However, reliance on these capabilities demands protection of the networks and information. Adversary activity in cyberspace could threaten the United States’ dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains as they become increasingly interconnected and dependent on cyberspace technology.  

3. **Unique Cyberspace Capabilities and Characteristics.** Cyberspace is a global enabler for expedient, dynamic information exchange impacting all aspects of life. It allows instantaneous information flow across the globe for financial transactions as well as the movement and tracking of products and goods. However, it also allows adversaries to access this information and disrupt vital operations from any location. Cyberspace is difficult to regulate due to ease of accessibility. From a military perspective, cyberspace activities rarely require movement of forces, allowing engagement from extended stand-off ranges. It also enables the influence of populations that are inaccessible through the other domains.

   a. **Can be reverse engineered:** Unlike munitions, which are normally destroyed upon use, cyberspace activities include code that can be saved, analyzed, and recoded for use against allies or friendly nations. Planners must account for the possibility of a “cyber ricochet” in which cyber activities are turned against the originator or other unintended targets through reverse engineering.

   b. **No Single National/International Ownership:** While someone owns each physical component of cyberspace, the whole of cyberspace is not under any single nations’ or

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29 JP 5-0, IV-6.


entities’ complete control. The infrastructure is a disparate combination of public and private networks without standardized security or access controls. This arrangement enables free information flow, but the lack of controls hinders global accountability, standardization, and security. The traditional concept of territorial integrity can be unclear due to the nature of cyberspace.

c. Lack of Cooperation/Collaboration: The lack of international laws and regulations governing the environment complicates responses to actions in this domain. The difficulty in tracing the source of a cyber attack makes them easily deniable, especially if conducted by individual "hackers." Further hindering collaboration is the tendency to deny that a cyberspace attack has occurred to prevent loss of trust in an organization's cyber security measures.

d. Low Cost: Cyberspace is the most affordable domain through which to attack the United States. Viruses, malicious code, and training are readily available over the Internet at no cost. Adversaries can develop, edit, and reuse current tools for network attacks. Inexpensive tools and training allow an adversary to compete without costly ships, aircraft, or missiles. Furthermore, an adversary can impose significant financial burdens on nations that rely heavily on cyberspace by forcing them to invest in cyberspace defense. Currently, "military-grade" cyberspace capabilities remain too expensive for most malign actors, but they can buy relatively inexpensive services of professional hackers.

e. Volatile: Successful cyberspace attacks depend on vulnerabilities within the adversary's network. Identifying these vulnerabilities and creating cyberspace capabilities sometimes require great expense. If an adversary discovers their network’s vulnerability and closes it, the cyberspace attack technique is rendered immediately and unexpectedly useless despite the development expense. For this reason, great care must be taken to prevent alerting adversaries to vulnerabilities in their networks.

f. Speed: Cyberspace operations occur quickly. However, preparation for those operations is often extensive. An intense study of the adversary’s network may be required to learn system specifications and understand patterns of life. Therefore, a cyberspace unit operating on one adversary's networks may not be able to shift focus to another target without substantial preparation.

g. Unintentional cascading effects: Another unique characteristic of cyberspace is the potential for unintended cascading effects. Capabilities and munitions in the natural domains lose momentum the greater distance from impact. However, physical distance means very little in cyberspace. While cyberspace capabilities are developed and evaluated in computer labs and cyberspace ranges, there can never be complete assurances as to how a capability will behave or where it might spread when introduced to the great expanse of cyberspace.\textsuperscript{32}

h. Layers: To aid in the planning and execution of cyberspace operations, cyberspace is sometimes visualized in three layers. These layers are interdependent, but each layer has unique attributes that affect operations. Cyberspace operations generally traverse all three layers of cyberspace but may target effects at one or more specific layers. Planners must consider the challenges and opportunities presented by each layer of cyberspace.

cyberspace as well as the interactions amongst the layers. Figure 1-2 depicts the relationship between the three cyberspace layers.

(1) The **physical network layer** consists of the information technology (IT) devices and infrastructure in the physical domains that provide storage, transport, and processing of information within cyberspace, to include data repositories and the connections that transfer data between network components. The physical network components include the hardware and infrastructure such as computing devices, storage devices, network devices, and
wired and wireless links. Components of the physical network layer require physical security measures to protect them from damage or unauthorized access, which, if left vulnerable, could allow a threat to gain access to both systems and critical data. Every physical component of cyberspace is owned by a public or private entity. The physical layer often crosses geo-political boundaries and is one of the reasons that cyberspace operations require multiple levels of joint and unified action partner coordination. Cyberspace planners use knowledge of the physical location of friendly, neutral, and adversary information technology systems and infrastructures to understand appropriate legal frameworks for cyberspace operations and to estimate impacts of those operations.

(2) The **logical network layer** consists of those elements of the network related to one another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network, based on the logic programming (code) that drives network components (i.e., the relationships are not necessarily tied to a specific physical link or node, but to their ability to be addressed logically and exchange or process data). Nodes in the physical layer may logically relate to one another to form entities in cyberspace not tied to a specific node, path, or individual. Web sites hosted on servers in multiple physical locations where content can be accessed through a single uniform resource locator or web address provide an example. This may also include the logical programming to look for the best communications route, instead of the shortest physical route, to provide the information requested.

(3) The **cyber-persona layer** is a view of cyberspace created by abstracting data from the logical network layer using the rules that apply in the logical network layer to develop descriptions of digital representations of an actor or entity identity in cyberspace, known as a cyber-persona. Cyber-personas are not confined to a single physical or logical location and may link to multiple physical and logical network layers. When planning and executing cyberspace operations, staffs should understand that one actor or entity (use) may have multiple cyber-personas, using multiple identifiers in cyberspace. These various identifiers can include different work and personal emails and different identities on different Web forums, chatrooms, and social network sites. For example, an individual’s account on a social media website, consisting of the username and digital information associated with that username, may be just one of that individual’s cyber-personas. Conversely, multiple different users may share a single cyber-persona or set of cyber-personas. Planners must understand that enemy use of cyber-personas can make attributing responsibility for cyberspace actions difficult.33

4. **Cyberspace Location and Ownership.** Maneuver in cyberspace is complex and generally not observable. Therefore, staffs that plan, execute, and assess CO benefit from language that describes cyberspace based on location or ownership in a way that aids rapid understanding of planned operations and required authorities.

   a. **Blue Cyberspace** denotes US cyberspace (i.e., areas in cyberspace owned or controlled by the United States Government [USG] or a US person) and other areas of cyberspace DoD is ordered to protect. This can include allied or partner nations cyberspace, which is temporarily considered blue cyberspace for the duration of the ordered protection activity. Although DoD has standing orders to protect only the Department of Defense information network (DODIN), cyberspace forces prepare, on order, to defend USG or other blue cyberspace, including cyberspace related to critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) of the United States and partner nations.

   b. **Red Cyberspace** refers to those portions of cyberspace owned or controlled by, or on behalf of, an adversary or enemy. In this case, ‘controlled’ means more than simply ‘having a presence on,’ since threats may have clandestine access to elements of cyberspace where their presence is undetected and without apparent impact to the operation of the system. Here, ‘controlled’ means the ability to direct the operations of a link or node of cyberspace, to the exclusion of others.

   c. **Gray Cyberspace.** Refers to all cyberspace that does not meet the description of either "blue" or "red" is referred to as "gray" cyberspace.

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34 JP 3-12, I-3.
5. **DOD Cyberspace.** The DODIN is the set of DoD-owned and DoD-leased information capabilities and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone. This includes communications and computing systems, and national security systems. The DODIN comprises all of DoD cyberspace, including the classified and unclassified global networks (e.g., NIPRNET, SIPRNET, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System) and many other components. The DODIN includes common enterprise service networks, intelligence networks operated by DoD components, stand-alone mission and weapon systems, other special-purpose networks, DoD-owned smartphones, radio frequency identification tags, industrial control systems, isolated laboratory networks, and platform information technology (PIT) operated by or on behalf of DoD components. PIT is the hardware and software that is physically part of, dedicated to, or essential in real time to the mission performance of special-purpose systems, including weapons systems. DoD also increasingly relies on commercial and governmental ‘cloud’ services for on-demand data processing, data storage, and application hosting provided over the Internet, without active management by the DoD user. Nearly every military and civilian employee of DoD uses the DODIN to accomplish some portion of their mission or duties. To enable unity of action for DODIN protection, USCYBERCOM divides the DODIN into areas of operations in which joint or Service commanders and agency and field activity directors maintain accountability over cyberspace assigned to them and into sectors that overlap the areas of operations to group portions of the DODIN based on the missions and functions they serve.\(^{35}\)

**V. Defining the Problem: Threats and Challenges in Cyberspace.**

1. Defining the problem is essential to addressing the problem. It involves understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue that are the essence of a complex, ill-defined problem. Defining the problem begins with a review of the tendencies and potentials of the relevant actors and identifying the relationships and interactions among their respective desired conditions and objectives. The problem statement articulates how the operational variables can be expected to resist or facilitate transformation of current conditions and how inertia in the OE can be leveraged to enable the desired conditions to achieve the objectives.\(^{36}\) The Joint Force Commander faces a unique set of persistent challenges executing CO and other operations in a constantly evolving, complex, and volatile global security environment characterized by contested norms of behavior in cyberspace and persistent disorder. To address these challenges, the JFC integrates CO with operations in all domains to support the DoD and CJCS global integration processes.

2. **Cyber Threats.** Cyberspace threats originate from states and their surrogates, criminal enterprises, individuals, and accidents and natural hazards, which together create a persistently contested environment in which the joint force plans and executes joint operations. USCYBERCOM follows a strategic approach of persistent engagement in cyberspace to preclude and defeat threats from malicious cyberspace activity (MCA).

   a. **Nation State Threat.** This threat is potentially the most dangerous because of nation-state access to resources, personnel, and time that may not be available to others. Some nations may employ cyberspace capabilities to gain strategic advantage over the United States. Nation-state threats involve adversaries; enemies; and potentially, in the case of espionage, even multinational partners. Nation-states may conduct operations

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\(^{35}\) JP 3-12, I-4 – 5.
\(^{36}\) JP 5-0, IV-11.
directly or may outsource them to third parties, including front companies, patriotic hackers, or other surrogates, to achieve their objectives. Indirect or outsourced nation-state threat actors and their surrogates often operate in hidden or protected networks to mitigate risks to themselves and help confuse attribution.

b. Non-State Threats. Non-state threats to the JFC’s mission come from formal and informal organizations operating in cyberspace. These organizations are not bound by national borders and include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which may simply be working at cross-purposes to the joint force, and illegitimate organizations such as criminal organizations, violent extremist organizations, or other enemies and adversaries. Non-state threats use cyberspace to raise funds, communicate with target audiences and each other, recruit, plan operations, undermine confidence in governments, conduct espionage, and conduct cyberspace attacks. National or transnational criminal organizations steal information for their own use, including selling it to raise capital, and target financial institutions for fraud and theft of funds. Criminals often engage in cybercrime by targeting bank customers through fraud and business e-mail compromise rather than by stealing directly from banks. They also conduct cyberspace attacks using ransomware to acquire funds and may be part of a blended threat when they are used as surrogates by nation-states or non-state threats to conduct cyberspace attacks or espionage.

c. Individual Actors or Small Group Threat. Even individuals or small groups can threaten, attack, or exploit cyberspace, enabled by affordable and readily available techniques, technologies, and software or by authorized access in the case of insider threats. Their intentions are as varied as the number of groups and individuals involved. Ethical hackers may share vulnerability information with the DoD Vulnerability Disclosure Program, but, more frequently, these accesses are used with malicious intent. Some threats are politically motivated and use unauthorized access to spread their message. These small-scale threats can be co-opted by more sophisticated threats, such as criminal organizations or nation-states, often without their knowledge, to execute operations while concealing the identity of the threat/sponsor and creating plausible deniability.

d. Accidents or Natural Hazards. The physical infrastructure of cyberspace is routinely disrupted by equipment failure, operator errors, industrial accidents, and natural disasters. These unpredictable events can have greater impact on joint operations than the actions of enemies. Recovery from accidents and hazardous incidents can be complicated by the requirement for significant coordination external to DoD and/or the temporary reliance on back-up systems or continuity of operations arrangements with which operators may not be proficient.37

3. Challenges. In addition to the threats mentioned above, the commander must address significant cyberspace challenges when defining the problem and producing an operational approach.

   a. Anonymity and Difficulties with Attribution. Attribution of threats in cyberspace is crucial to initiating a defensive response external to the protected cyberspace beyond that authorized as basic self-defense. The most challenging aspect of attributing actions in cyberspace is connecting a particular cyber-persona or action to a named individual, group, or nation-state with sufficient confidence and verifiability to hold them

37 JP 3-12, I-12 – 14.
accountable. This effort requires significant analysis and, often, collaboration with non-cyberspace agencies or organizations. The nature of cyberspace, government policies, and laws, both domestic and international, present challenges to determining the exact origin of cyberspace threats. The ability to hide the sponsor and/or the threat behind a particular MCA makes it difficult to determine how, when, and where to respond. The anonymity of the Internet, combined with applications and technology intended to hide the identity of users, makes attribution a challenge for the foreseeable future. Effective information sharing with intergovernmental, private-sector, and international partners can assist with the attribution challenge.

b. Geography Challenges. Unlike the physical domains, cyberspace has no stateless maneuver space; it is all owned by someone. Therefore, when US military forces maneuver in gray and red cyberspace, mission and policy requirements may require clandestine maneuver, without the knowledge of the state where the infrastructure is located. Because CO can often be executed remotely, through a virtual presence enabled by wired or wireless access, many CO do not require physical proximity to the target but use remote actions to create effects. This represents an increase in operational reach not available in the physical domains. This use of global reach applies equally to both external missions in gray and red cyberspace, as well as internal missions in blue cyberspace. When remote access is not possible or preferable, cyberspace forces deploy to conduct expeditionary CO in the physical domains. The cumulative effects of some CO may extend beyond the initial target, a joint operations area (JOA), or outside of a single area of responsibility (AOR). Because of these transregional considerations, the requirement for global integration, and the need for high demand forces and capabilities, some CO are coordinated, integrated, and synchronized using centralized execution from a location remote from the supported commander. Depending upon the geographic scope of the effect and amount of coordination required, CDRUSCYBERCOM may be a supported or supporting commander.

c. Technology Challenges. Using a cyberspace capability that relies on exploitation of technical vulnerabilities in the target may reveal its functionality and compromise the capability’s effectiveness for future missions. This has implications for both external missions in gray and red cyberspace and internal missions in blue cyberspace. Cyberspace capabilities without hardware components can be replicated for little or no cost. This means, once discovered, these capabilities are widely available to adversaries and enemies, in some cases before protective measures in the DODIN can be updated to account for the new threat. In addition, since similar technologies share similar vulnerabilities, a single threat may be able to exploit multiple targets at once using the same malware or exploitation tactic. Computer programs such as malware can be modified (or designed to automatically self-modify), complicating efforts to detect and eradicate it. The IoT, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and continued evolution of current technology (e.g., “6G” [sixth generation] mobile communications) and other developments will challenge and potentially disrupt the OE, requiring the joint force to remain agile and adaptable.

d. Private Industry and Public Infrastructure. Many of DoD’s critical functions and operations rely on contracted commercial assets, including Internet service providers (ISPs) and global supply chains, over which DoD and its forces have no direct authority. This includes both data storage services and applications provided from a cloud computing architecture. Cloud computing enables DoD to consolidate infrastructure, leverage commodity IT functions, and eliminate functional redundancies while improving
continuity of operations. However, the overall success of these initiatives depends upon well-executed risk mitigation and protection measures, defined and understood by both DoD components and industry. Dependency on commercial Internet providers means DoD coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other interagency partners, and the private sector is essential to establish and maintain the security of DoD’s information. DoD supports DHS, which leads interagency efforts to identify and mitigate cyberspace vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical infrastructure. Sector risk management agencies, in coordination with DHS, assess sector risk, including identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks, considering physical and cyberspace security threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. DoD has the lead for improving security of the defense industrial base (DIB) sector, which includes major sector contractors and major contractor support to operations, regardless of corporate nation of domicile, and continues to support the development of whole-of-government approaches for DIB risk management. The global technology supply chain affects mission-critical aspects of the DoD enterprise, and the resulting IT risks can be effectively mitigated only through public-private-sector cooperation, such as the DoD’s DIB Cybersecurity Program.38

4. Assessment of Cyberspace Threats. In February 2023, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) released an updated Annual Threat Assessment. Rapidly emerging or evolving technologies continue to have the potential to disrupt traditional business and society with both positive and negative outcomes, while creating unprecedented vulnerabilities and attack surfaces, making it increasingly challenging to predict the impact of such challenges on the global landscape.39

a. Transnational Threats. Transnational threats interact in a complex system along with more traditional threats such as strategic competition, often reinforcing each other and creating compounding and cascading risks to U.S. national security. Increasing interconnections among countries – ranging from supply chains to social media – also have created new opportunities for transnational interference and conflict.

  (1) New technologies – particularly in the fields of AI and biotechnology – are being developed and are proliferating faster than companies and governments can shape norms, protect privacy, and prevent dangerous outcomes. The convergence of emerging technologies is likely to create potentially breakthrough technologies not foreseeable by examining narrow science and technology areas, which could lead to the rapid development of asymmetric threats to U.S. interests.

    a. The convergence of capabilities in high performance computing, big data, and machine learning – each a critical enabler across multiple domains – could have broad yet unidentified consequences across military, commercial, and basic research applications with relevance to national defense, economic security, and political stability.

    b. Large-scale simulation and the accumulation and analysis of massive amounts of data are revolutionizing many areas of science and

38 JP 3-12, I-14 – I-16.
engineering research with the potential to influence the future battlefield and shape political discourse through disinformation operations. Our adversaries increasingly view data as a strategic resource. They are focused on acquiring and analyzing data – from personally identifiable information on U.S. citizens to commercial and government data – that can make their espionage, influence, kinetic and cyber attack operations more effective; advance their exploitation of the U.S. economy; and give them strategic advantage over the United States.

c. Foreign intelligence services are adopting cutting-edge technologies – from advanced cyber tools to unmanned systems to enhanced technical surveillance equipment – that improve their capabilities and challenge U.S. defenses. Much of this technology is available commercially, providing a shortcut for previously unsophisticated services to become legitimate threats.40

(2) Supercomputers. Advances in semiconductors and high-performance computing are driving military and technological breakthroughs, but also are heightening the risk of technology surprise because high-performance computers will help address longstanding research and development hurdles. Our adversaries’ advances in semiconductors and high-performance computing could result in future challenges to our military and technological sectors.

a. China may now have to exascale systems using older generation, domestically designed processors – neither of which have been officially acknowledged or subject to independent benchmarks – and plans to build more by 2025. Exascale computers are capable of solving massive scientific challenges that would have been impossible with previous generation supercomputers.

b. As of June 2022, China had 173 of the world’s most powerful supercomputers, a third more than the United States, which accounted for 128 supercomputers.41

(3) Cybercrime. Transnational organized ransomware actors continue to improve and execute high-impact ransomware attacks, extorting funds, disrupting critical services, and exposing sensitive data. While important services and critical infrastructure such as health care, schools, and manufacturing continued to experience attacks – with a large portion occurring in the United States – an increasing number of ransomware attacks observed in 2022 also targeted governments worldwide.

a. Major cybercrime groups have diversified ransomware business models, including new forms of extortion, such as threats to release captured data alongside encryption of data, and have improved the ability of their malware to affect a wider range of technical targets such as virtual machine hosts and network storage devices.

b. Ransomware groups sometimes cease operations in response to high-profile attention, law enforcement action, or disruption of infrastructure,

40 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, (2023), 26.
41 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, (2023), 27.
although group members also find ways to later rebrand, reconstitute, or renew their activities following these disruptions. They also may question or curb attacks against target sets that prove most resilient in refusing to pay the demanded ransoms.

b. China probably currently represents the broadest, most active, and persistent espionage threat to U.S. Government and private-sector networks. China’s cyber pursuits and its industry’s export of related technologies increase the threats of aggressive cyber operations against the U.S. homeland, suppression of the free flow of information in cyberspace – such as U.S. web content – that Beijing views as threatening to the CCP’s hold on power, and the expansion of technology-driven authoritarianism globally.

(1) If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide. Such a strike would be designed to deter U.S. military action by impeding U.S. decisionmaking, inducing societal panic, and interfering with the deployment of U.S. forces.

- China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems.

(2) China leads the world in applying surveillance and censorship to monitor its population and repress dissent. Beijing conducts cyber intrusions that are targeted to affect U.S. and non-U.S. citizens beyond its borders – including journalists, dissidents, and individuals it views as threats – to counter views it considered critical of CCP narratives, policies, and actions.

- China’s cyber espionage operations have included compromising telecommunications firms, providers of managed services and broadly used software, and other targets potentially rich in follow-on opportunities for intelligence collection, attack, or influence operations.

c. Russia. The Ukraine war was the key factor in Russia’s cyber operations prioritization in 2022. Although its cyber activity surrounding the war fell short of the pace and impact we had expected, Russia will remain a top cyber threat as it refines and employs its espionage, influence, and attack capabilities. Russia views cyber disruptions as a foreign policy lever to shape other countries’ decisions.

- Russia is particularly focused on improving its ability to target critical infrastructure, including underwater cables and industrial control system, in the United States as well as in allied and partner countries, because.

d. Iran’s growing expertise and willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations make it a major threat to the security of the U.S. and allied networks and data. Iran’s opportunistic approach to cyber attacks makes critical infrastructure owners in the United

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42 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, (2023), 31.
43 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, (2023), 10.
44 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, (2023), 15.
States susceptible to being targeted by Tehran, particularly when Tehran believes that it must demonstrate it can push back against the United States in other domains. Recent attacks against Israeli targets show that Iran is more willing than before to target countries with stronger capabilities.\(^{45}\)

e. **North Korea**'s cyber program poses a sophisticated and agile espionage, cybercrime, and attack threat. Pyongyang's cyber forces have matured and are fully capable of achieving a range of strategic objectives against diverse targets, including a wider target set in the United States. Pyongyang probably possesses the expertise to cause temporary, limited disruptions of some critical infrastructure networks and disrupt business networks in the United States.

(1) North Korea's cyber program continues to adapt to global trends in cybercrime by conducting cryptocurrency heists, diversifying its range of financially motivated cyber operations, and continuing to leverage advanced social engineering techniques.

In one heist in 2022, Pyongyang stole a record $625 million from a Singapore-based blockchain technology firm.

Beyond Pyongyang's cybercrime efforts, cyber actors linked to North Korea have conducted espionage efforts against a range of organizations, including media, academia, defense companies, and governments in multiple countries. North Korea continues to conduct cyber espionage to obtain technical information almost certainly intended to advance Pyongyang's military and WMD programs.\(^{46}\)

f. **Insider Threats.** While much of our intelligence is focused on external threats, the U.S. must be aware of threats from within.

(1) In 2010, Army PFC Manning was found not guilty of the most serious charge of knowingly aiding the enemy, but was convicted on 20 other specifications related to the misappropriation of hundreds of thousands of intelligence documents sent to WikiLeaks. Prosecutors alleged that Manning downloaded some 470,000 Significant Activity (SIGACT) reports (from Iraq and Afghanistan) from SIRPNET.\(^{47}\)

(2) In 2013, Edward J. Snowden, was charged with violations of: Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information; Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Communication; and Theft of Government Property.\(^{48}\)

(3) In 2015, a former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission employee pleaded guilty to an attempted spear-phishing cyber attack on Department of Energy computers to compromise, exploit and damage U.S. government computer systems that contained sensitive nuclear weapon-related information with the

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\(^{45}\) *Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, (2023), 19.

\(^{46}\) *Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, (2023), 21.


intent of allowing foreign nations to gain access to that information or to damage essential systems.\(^\text{49}\)

(4) In 2017, Reality Leigh Winner, a federal contractor from Augusta, GA, was charged with (and later pleaded guilty to) removing classified material from a government facility and mailing it to a news outlet.\(^\text{50}\)

(5) In 2018, a former U.S. Air Force intelligence specialist has been charged with betraying her oath to protect and defend the United States by delivering sensitive national defense information to the Iranian government, according to an indictment unsealed by the Department of Justice. Monica Witt, who served in the Air Force from 1997 through 2008 and then with a cleared defense contractor until 2010, is charged alongside four Iranians who allegedly used information provided by Witt in a cyber campaign to target and compromise other U.S. security personnel.\(^\text{51}\)

(6) In 2023, a federal grand jury indicted Jack Teixeira, a Massachusetts Air National Guard member accused of posting secret and sensitive military documents on social media, on six counts related to his retention and transmission of those documents. The case involved the largest public leak of classified intelligence since 2006 WikiLeaks, which led to the publication of millions of emails, documents, and other sensitive materials online from 2006 to 2021.\(^\text{52}\)

5. Cyberspace Threat Techniques. Adversaries use a myriad of cyberspace techniques to accomplish their objectives. Some of these are:

a. Brute-Force Attack. In a traditional brute-force attack, a malicious actor attempts to gain unauthorized access to a single account by guessing the password. This can quickly result in a targeted account getting locked-out, as commonly used account-lockout policies allow three to five bad attempts during a set period of time.

(1) Password-Spray Attack. During a password-spray attack (also known as the "low-and-slow" method), the malicious actor attempts a single password against many accounts before moving on to attempt a second password, and so on. This technique allows the actor to remain undetected by avoiding rapid or frequent account lockouts.

(2) Email applications are also targeted. In those instances, malicious actors would have the ability to utilize inbox synchronization to (1) obtain unauthorized access to the organization's email directly from the cloud; (2) subsequently download user mail to locally stored email files; (3) identify the entire company's


email address list; and/or (4) surreptitiously implements inbox rules for the forwarding of sent and received messages.\textsuperscript{53}

b. **Cryptojacking** occurs when malicious cyber actors effectively hijack the processing power of the victim devices and systems by exploiting vulnerabilities – in webpages, software, and operating systems – to illicitly install cryptomining software on victim devices and systems. With the cryptomining software installed, the malicious cyber actors earn cryptocurrency.

(1) **Cryptocurrency** is a digital currency used as a medium of exchange, similar to other currencies. Unlike other currencies, cryptocurrency operates independently of a central bank and uses encryption techniques and blockchain technology to secure and verify transactions.

(2) **Cryptomining** (cryptocurrency mining) is the way in which cryptocurrency is earned. Individuals mine cryptocurrency by using cryptomining software to solve complex mathematical problems involved in validating transactions. Each solved equation verifies a transaction and earns a reward paid out in the cryptocurrency.\textsuperscript{54}

c. **Denial-of-Service (DoS)** is an attack that occurs when a malicious cyber threat actor prevents legitimate users from accessing information systems, devices, or other network resources. A denial-of-service condition is accomplished by flooding the targeted host or network with traffic until the target cannot respond or simply crashes, preventing access for legitimate users. The most common method of attack occurs when an attacker floods a network server with traffic. In this type of DoS attack, the attacker sends several requests to the target server, overloading it with traffic. These service requests are illegitimate and have fabricated return addresses, which mislead the server when it tries to authenticate the requestor. As the junk requests are processed constantly, the server is overwhelmed, which causes a DoS condition to legitimate requestors.

d. **Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)** attacks occur when multiple machines are operating together to attack one target. DDoS attackers often leverage the use of a botnet – a group of hijacked internet-connected devices to carry out large scale attacks.

(1) **Command and Control.** Attackers take advantage of security vulnerabilities or device weaknesses to control numerous devices using command and control software. Once in control, an attacker can command their botnet to conduct DDoS on a target. In this case, the infected devices are also victims of the attack.

(2) **Botnets** – made up of compromised devices – may also be rented out to other potential attackers. Often the botnet is made available to "attack-for-hire" services, which allow unskilled users to launch DDoS attacks.

(3) **Internet of Things (IoT).** DDoS attacks have increased in magnitude as more and more devices come online through the Internet of Things. IoT devices often use default passwords and do not have sound security postures, making

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them vulnerable to compromise and exploitation. Infection of IoT devices often goes unnoticed by users, and an attacker could easily compromise hundreds of thousands of these devices to conduct a high-scale attack without the device owners' knowledge.55

e. **Malicious Code** is unwanted files or programs that can cause harm to a computer or compromise data stored on a computer. Various classifications of malicious code include: viruses, worms, and Trojan horses.

   (1) **Viruses** have the ability to damage or destroy files on a computer system and are spread by sharing an already infected removable media, opening malicious email attachments, and visiting malicious web pages.

   (2) **Worms** are a type of virus that self-propagates from computer to computer. Its functionality is to use all of your computer’s resources, which can cause your computer to stop responding.

   (3) **Trojan Horses** are computer programs that are hiding a virus or a potentially damaging program. It is not uncommon that free software contains a Trojan horse making a user think they are using legitimate software. Instead the program is performing malicious actions on your computer.

   (4) **Malicious Data Files** are non-executable files – such as a Microsoft Word document, an Adobe PDF, a ZIP file, or an image file – that exploit weaknesses in the software program used to open it. Attackers frequently use malicious data files to install malware on a victim’s system, commonly distributing the files via email, social media, and websites.56

f. **Ransomware** is a type of malicious software cyber actors use to deny access to systems or data. It is frequently delivered through spearphishing emails and targets critical data and systems for the purpose of extortion. Ransomware often attempts to spread to shared storage drives and other accessible systems. The malicious cyber actor holds systems or data hostage until a ransom is paid. If payment is received, the cyber actor will purportedly provide an avenue for the victim to regain access to the system or data. If the demands are not met, the system or encrypted data remains unavailable, or the data may be deleted.57

g. A **Rootkit** is a piece of software that can be installed and hidden on your computer without your knowledge. It may be included in a larger software package or installed by an attacker who has been able to take advantage of a vulnerability on your computer or has convinced you to download it. Rootkits are not necessarily malicious, but they may hide malicious activities. If a Rootkit has been installed, the user may not be aware that their computer has been compromised, and traditional anti-virus software may not be able to detect the malicious programs. Attackers may be able to access information, monitor your actions, modify programs, or perform other functions on your computer.

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without being detected. Attackers are also creating more sophisticated programs that update themselves so that they are even harder to detect.\(^58\)

h. **Social Engineering Attacks.** An attacker uses human interaction (social skills) to obtain or compromise information about an organization or its computer systems.

1. **Phishing** is a form of social engineering that uses email or malicious websites to solicit personal information by posing as a trustworthy organization. Phishing emails are crafted to appear as though they have been sent from a legitimate organization or known individual. These emails often entice users to click on a link or open an attachment containing malicious code. After the code is run, your computer may become infected with malware.

2. **Vishing** is the social engineering approach that leverages voice communication. This technique can be combined with other forms of social engineering that entice a victim to call a certain number and divulge sensitive information. Advanced vishing attacks can take place completely over voice communications by exploiting Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) solutions and broadcasting services. VoIP easily allows caller identity (ID) to be spoofed.

3. **Smishing** is a form of social engineering that exploits Short Message Service (SMS) or text messages. Text messages can contain links to such things as webpages, email addresses, or phone numbers that when clicked may automatically open a browser window or email message or dial a number. This integration of email, voice, text message, and web browser functionality increases the likelihood that users will fall victim to engineered malicious activity.\(^59\)

i. **Spyware** collects information from a computing system without user consent. Spyware can capture keystrokes, screenshots, authentication credentials, personal email addresses, web form data, internet usage habits, and other personal information. The data is often delivered to online attackers who sell it to others or use it themselves for marketing or spam or to execute financial crimes or identity theft.

1. **Key Loggers** capture keyboard events and record the keystroke data before it is sent to the intended application for processing. Like most other spyware capture technologies, software based keyloggers can turn their capture on or off based on keywords or events.

2. **Network Traffic** is another valuable source of data. Data commonly extracted from network captures includes user names, passwords, email messages, and web content. In some cases, entire files can be extracted and reconstructed from the captured streams.\(^60\)

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\(^{58}\) Understanding Hidden Threats: Rootkits and Botnets, linked from Cal Poly Information Security, [https://security.calpoly.edu/content/practices/rootkits_botnets](https://security.calpoly.edu/content/practices/rootkits_botnets).


j. **Wireless Threats.** A wireless-enabled laptop can expose the user to a number of security threats.

1. **Evil Twin Attacks.** The attacker gathers information about a public access point, then sets up his or her own system to impersonate the real access point. The attacker will use a broadcast signal stronger than the one generated by the real access point. Unsuspecting users will connect using the stronger, bogus signal. Because the victim is connecting to the internet through the attacker's system, it's easy for the attacker to use specialized tools to read any data the victim sends over the internet.

2. **Wireless Sniffing.** Many public access points are not secured, and the traffic they carry is not encrypted. This can put your sensitive communications or transactions at risk. Because your connection is being transmitted "in the clear," malicious users can use "sniffing" tools to obtain sensitive information such as passwords, bank account numbers, and credit card numbers.

3. **Peer-to-Peer Connections.** Many laptop computers can create ad hoc networks if they are within range of one another. These networks enable computer-to-computer connections. An attacker with a network card configured for ad hoc mode and using the same settings as the victim’s computer may gain unauthorized access to sensitive files. An unsecured wireless network combined with unsecured file sharing can spell disaster. Under these conditions, a malicious user could access any directories and files you have allowed for sharing.  

VI. **Cyberspace Assumptions.**

1. Commanders and staff should review strategic guidance and direction to see if any assumptions are imposed on the planning process. Where there is insufficient information or guidance, the commander and staff identify assumptions to assist in framing solutions. At this stage, assumptions address strategic and operational gaps that enable the commander to develop the operational approach.

2. **Characteristics of Cyberspace Capabilities.** While cyberspace is complex and ever changing, cyberspace capabilities, whether devices or computer programs, must reliably create the intended effects. However, cyberspace capabilities are developed based on environmental assumptions and expectations about the operating conditions that will be found in the OE. These conditions may be as simple as the type of computer operating system being used by an adversary or as complex as the exact serial number of the hardware or version of the software installed, what system resources are available, and what other applications are expected to be running (or not running) when the cyberspace capability activates on target. These expected conditions should be well documented by the capability developer and are important for planners and targeting personnel to understand as capability limitations. The extent to which the expected environmental conditions of a target cannot be confirmed through Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) sources represents an increased level of risk associated with using the capability. All other factors being equal, cyberspace capabilities that

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have the fewest environmental dependencies and/or allow the operator to reconfigure the capability are preferred.\textsuperscript{63}

\section*{VII. Cyberspace Actions and the Operational Approach.}

1. The operational approach is a commander’s description of the broad actions the force can take to achieve an objective in support of the national objective or attain a military end state. It provides the foundation for the commander’s planning guidance to the staff and other partners by providing the commander’s visualization of how the joint force's operations will transform current conditions into the desired conditions – the way the commander envisions the OE at the conclusion of operations to support national objectives. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the OE and the problem facing the commander.\textsuperscript{64}

2. \textit{Operations ‘In’, ‘Through’, and ‘External’ to Cyberspace}. When developing an operational approach, commanders should synchronize actions ‘in’ and ‘through’ cyberspace with other activities to achieve the desired objectives. Actions ‘in’ cyberspace are typically offensive and defensive operations that deny an adversary’s use of resources or manipulate an adversary’s information, information systems, or networks. On the other hand, the military operates ‘through’ cyberspace on a routine basis as it conducts joint functions: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information. These joint functions comprise related capabilities and activities grouped together to help commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct operations (see Figure 2-3).\textsuperscript{65}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{cyberspace_actions.png}
\caption{Operations In, Through, and External to Cyberspace}
\end{figure}

3. \textbf{U.S. Military Dependence on Cyberspace}. Commanders must be aware that U.S. military forces are critically dependent on networks and information systems to conduct operations.

\textsuperscript{63} JP 3-12, IV - 3.
\textsuperscript{64} JP 5-0, IV-14.
\textsuperscript{65} JP 3-12, II-9 – 10.
Nearly every conceivable component within DOD is networked. These networked systems and components are inextricably linked to the Department’s ability to project military force and the associated mission assurance. Over the past decades, DOD developed its Full Spectrum Dominance doctrine that envisioned information superiority to great advantage as a force multiplier. The power of this doctrine and its near total reliance on information superiority led to networking almost every conceivable component within DOD, with frequent networking across the rest of government, commercial and private entities, and coalition partners in complex, intertwined paths. While proving incredibly beneficial, these ubiquitous IT capabilities have also made the United States increasingly dependent upon safe, secure access and the integrity of the data contained in the networks. A weakness of the implementation of this doctrine is its focus on functionality, connectivity, and cost of information superiority over security – similar to the development of the Internet.

4. Cyberspace Vulnerabilities. The performance of U.S. military forces has demonstrated the superiority of networked systems coupled with kinetic capabilities and well-trained forces. Adversaries have discovered that the same connectivity and automation that provides great advantage to the United States, is also a weakness that presents an opportunity to undermine U.S. capabilities in a very asymmetric way. The network attack tools that are available on the commercial market are available to our adversaries. In addition, adversaries with financial means will invest to improve those tools and build more capable weapons to attack U.S. military systems and national infrastructure.  

5. Cyberspace Missions. All actions in cyberspace that are not simply cyberspace-enabled activities are taken as part of one of three cyberspace missions: DODIN operations, defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) (see Figure 2-4). These three mission types, conducted under various sources of authority, comprehensively cover the activities of the cyberspace forces. Cyberspace missions are categorized as DODIN operations, DCO, or OCO based only on the intent or objective, not on the cyberspace actions executed, the type of military authority used, the forces assigned to the mission, or the cyberspace capabilities employed. The successful execution of CO requires integration, synchronization, and simultaneity of these missions.

a. DOD Information Network (DODIN) Operations. The DODIN operations mission is to secure, configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain DOD cyberspace to create and preserve the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the DODIN. This mission includes cyberspace security actions that address vulnerabilities of the DODIN or specific segments of the DODIN to prevent exploitation and operation of red teams and other forms of security evaluation testing. DODIN operations also include a variety of cyberspace system operation actions like the set-up of tactical networks by expeditionary forces to extend existing networks, maintenance actions, and other non-security actions necessary for the sustainment of the DODIN. DODIN operations are network-focused and threat agnostic: the cyberspace forces and workforce undertaking this mission endeavor to prevent all MCA from negatively impacting a particular network or system they are assigned to secure. They are threat-informed and use all available intelligence about specific threats to improve the security posture of the network. DODIN operations are organized using the DODIN areas of operations and sectors established by USCYBERCOM and controlled by JFHQ-DODIN. DODIN operations is a

standing mission, and although many DODIN operations activities are regularly scheduled events, they cannot be considered routine since their aggregate effect establishes the framework on which most DOD missions ultimately depend. The fundamental cyberspace action types of a DODIN operations mission are cyberspace security and cyberspace system operations.

b. Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO). DCO missions are executed to defend blue cyberspace from imminent or active threats in cyberspace. Specifically, they are missions intended to preserve the ability to utilize blue cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, cyberspace-enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent malicious cyberspace activities (MCA). This distinguishes DCO missions, which defeat specific threats that have bypassed, breached, or are threatening to breach security measures, from DODIN operations, which endeavor to secure DOD cyberspace from all threats in advance of any specific threat activity. DCO missions are conducted in response to specific threats of attack, exploitation and leverage information from maneuver, intelligence collection, counterintelligence (CI), law enforcement (LE), and other sources as required to enable mission assurance. DCO include maneuver to gain or retain an advantageous position, including fires when authorized, against cyberspace threats emanating from outside the protected cyberspace. The goal of DCO is to defeat the threat of a specific adversary and/or return a compromised network to a secure and functional state. DCO protect cyberspace capabilities and services, including data, networks, cyberspace-enabled devices PIT, and other designated systems. DCO halt a threat’s offensive initiative, sustain or regain friendly initiative, and, if required, create conditions for a counteroffensive. The two types of DCO are:

(1) DCO Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM). DCO-IDM are the form of DCO mission where authorized cyberspace defensive actions occur within the defended network or portion of cyberspace. DCO-IDM include risk- and intelligence-driven internal threat hunting for advanced and/or persistent threats, as well as the active internal countermeasures and responses to eliminate and mitigate these threats. Cyberspace Protection Team (CPT) operations on Mission Relevant Terrain in cyberspace (MRT-C) in response to indications of MCA, or before specific indicators of compromise exists, are an example of DCO-IDM. DCO-IDM also include active and passive internal countermeasures to defeat and mitigate the MCA. DCO-IDM of the DODIN is directed and synchronized by JFHQ-DODIN using a framework of DODIN areas of operations and sectors established by USCYBERCOM.

(2) DCO Response Actions (DCO-RA). DCO-RA are the form of DCO mission where actions are taken external to the defended network or portion of cyberspace without the permission of the owner of the affected system. DCO-RA missions may rise to the level of use of force, with physical damage or destruction of enemy systems, depending on broader operational context, such as the existence or imminence of open hostilities, the degree of certainty in attribution of the threat, the damage the threat has caused or is expected to cause, and national policy considerations. DCO-RA missions, especially when they occur before an imminent threat has a chance to act, are defending forward in support of the persistent engagement strategic approach. As a self-defense mission, the authorizing official determines whether the exigence of the threat and other circumstances justify the use of cyberspace exploitation and/or cyberspace attack.
c. DCO-IDM and DCO-RA in Defense of Non-DoD Cyberspace. While DCO often focuses on protecting the DODIN, which includes all of DoD Cyberspace, military cyberspace forces prepare to defend any US or other blue cyberspace when ordered. DoD operations rely on many non-DoD segments of cyberspace, including private-sector and mission-partner networks. Security of this cyberspace is the responsibility of the resource owners, which may include other USG departments and agencies, private sector entities, and partner nations. CPTs defend forward when they deploy for expeditionary DCO-IDM missions to hunt for threats in gray or red cyberspace, at the invitation of a foreign government. These hunt forward operations (HFO) allow the United States to gain insight on MCA before it directly threatens US cyberspace.

d. Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO). OCO are CO missions intended to project power in and through gray and red cyberspace through actions taken in support of CCDR or national objectives. OCO may exclusively target enemy cyberspace functions or create first-order effects in cyberspace to initiate carefully controlled cascading denial effects into the physical domains to affect weapon systems, C2 processes, logistics nodes, and other high-value targets. All CO missions conducted outside of blue cyberspace with a commander’s intent other than to defend blue cyberspace from an ongoing or imminent cyberspace threat are OCO missions. Depending upon the circumstances, OCO may be conducted under the same or similar external mission authorities as DCO-RA but are not directed at imminent threats in cyberspace, although OCO can include missions to defend against non-cyberspace attack actions, including those that rise to the level of use of force, with physical damage or destruction of enemy systems. Specific effects created depend on the broader operational context, such as the existence or imminence of open hostilities and national policy considerations. All external missions require a properly coordinated military order and careful consideration of scope, rules of engagement (ROE), and measurable objectives. The fundamental cyberspace actions of an OCO mission are cyberspace exploitation and/or cyberspace attack.67
6. **Cyberspace Actions.** Execution of any DODIN operations, DOC, or OCO mission requires completion of specific actions that employ cyberspace capabilities to create effects in cyberspace. All cyberspace mission objectives are achieved by the combination of one or more of five cyberspace actions, which are defined exclusively by the types of effects they create. As with the CO missions, the actions described below are only the primary categories of CO actions. CO planners and operators establish and use multiple subordinate activities under each of these five categories. The cyberspace actions are:

a. Cyberspace System Operation. Cyberspace system operation actions are taken as part of the DODIN operations mission by communications and IT units and personnel to ensure specific segments of DoD cyberspace remain in operation to support user missions. These actions include non-security activities required for system administration, help desk functions, configuring and reconfiguring networks and system components, management of telecommunications infrastructure, extending networks...
into new locations, and actions taken to meet periodic or emergent requirements for maintenance and repairs to cyberspace hardware components to maintain system availability. Cyberspace system operation actions comprise the bulk of the DODIN operations mission.

b. **Cyberspace Security.** Cyberspace security actions are part of the DODIN operations mission taken within protected cyberspace to reduce its vulnerability to MCA, including preventing unauthorized access to, exploitation of, or damage to computers; electronic communications systems; and other IT, including PIT, as well as the information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Cyberspace security actions are risk-informed and network-focused, occurring in advance of a specific threat. Cyberspace security actions protect by reducing or eliminating vulnerabilities that may be exploited by a threat and/or by implementing measures to prevent MCA. Examples of cyberspace security actions include increasing password strength, enforing two-factor authentication, installing a software patch to remove vulnerabilities, encrypting stored data, training users on cybersecurity policy best practices, restricting access to suspicious websites, and blocking traffic on unused router ports. Cyberspace security is enabled by, but does not include physical security measures.

c. **Cyberspace Defense.** Cyberspace defense actions are taken during DCO-IDM missions, within protected cyberspace, to discover and defeat specific threats that breach, threaten to breach, or are suspected to have breached the cyberspace security measures, to include actions that detect, characterize, fix, contain, clear, and recover/restore from MCA, including malware or the unauthorized activities of authorized users. The CCMD, Service, or DoD agency that provides or operates the network is generally authorized to take these defensive actions except in cases when they would negatively impact networks or systems outside the responsibility of the respective CCMD, Service, or agency. In some cases, CPTs are ordered to reinforce locally assigned forces for execution of cyberspace defense actions. JFHQ-DODIN directs and synchronizes all defensive actions that impact more than one CCMD or have impacts outside the responsibility of the network owner. Cyberspace defense actions are the only primary component action of DCO-IDM missions, although there are many subordinate types of defensive actions. Since both security and defense actions are crucial to safeguarding blue cyberspace, these actions are collectively referred to as protection.

c. **Cyberspace Exploitation.** Cyberspace exploitation actions are a primary component of OCO and DCO-RA missions and include many types of subordinate actions in gray or red cyberspace that do not create cyberspace attack effects. Cyberspace exploitation actions include access creation, military intelligence activities, maneuver, information collection, and other enabling actions required to prepare for future military operations through activities like gaining and maintaining unauthorized access to adversary networks, systems, and nodes of military value; maneuvering to positions of advantage; and positioning cyberspace capabilities to facilitate follow-on actions. Some of these cyberspace exploitation actions are considered **attack-specific preparations** if there is no possible explanation or purpose for them other than to enable a follow-on cyberspace attack. Cyberspace exploitation supports current and future operations through collection of information, including mapping red and gray cyberspace to support situational awareness; discovering vulnerabilities; enabling joint intelligence preparation of the environment, warning, and joint target development; and supporting the planning, execution, and assessment of military operations throughout the OE. Cyberspace
exploitation actions are deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies IAW national policy.

d. **Cyberspace Attack.** Cyberspace attack actions create noticeable denial effects (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) in cyberspace or use manipulation in cyberspace that leads to denial effects in the physical domains. Cyberspace of use manipulation in cyberspace that leads to denial effects in the physical domains. Cyberspace attack actions are a form of fires, taken when authorized as part of an OCO or DCO-RA mission. They are coordinated and deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies; are carefully synchronized with planned fires in the physical domains; and, except when specifically intended to result in physically destructive denial effects, do not rise to the level of armed attack or use of force under current international law. They include actions to:

(1) **Deny.** To prevent access to, operation of, or availability of a target function by a specified level for a specified time, by:

- **Degrade.** To deny access to, or operation of, a target to a level represented as a percentage of capacity. Level of degradation is specified. If a specific time is required, it can be specified.
- **Disrupt.** To completely but temporarily deny access to, or operation of, a target for a period of time. A desired start and stop time are normally specified. Disruption can be considered a special case of degradation where the degradation level is 100 percent.
- **Destroy.** To completely and irreparably deny access to, or operation of, a target. Destruction maximizes the time and amount of denial. However, destruction is scoped according to the span of a conflict, since many targets, given enough time and resources, can be reconstituted.

(2) **Manipulate to Create Physical Effects.** This form of cyberspace attack controls or changes information, computers, information systems, and/or networks to create physical denial effects that may rise to the level of use of force or armed attack. Manipulation uses an enemy’s information resources to create physical denial effects that may not at first appear to have been initiated from cyberspace, by employing deception, decoying, conditioning, spoofing (using forged identity, falsification, and other similar techniques against computer-controlled systems. The targeted computer system may seem to operate normally until secondary or tertiary physical effects reveal evidence of the logical first order effect.  

**VIII. Identifying Cyberspace Decisions and Decision Points.**

1. During planning, commanders inform leadership of the decisions that will need to be made, when they will have to be made, and the uncertainty and risk accompanying decisions and delay. This provides military and civilian leaders a template and warning for the decisions in advance and helps facilitate collaboration with interagency partners and allies to develop alternatives and exploit opportunities short of escalation. The decision matrix also identifies the

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69 JP 3-12, II-5 – 8.
expected indicators needed in support of operation assessment and intelligence requirements and collection plans.\textsuperscript{70}

2. **Interagency Considerations.** When appropriate, commanders coordinate and integrate their \textsuperscript{71} CO with interagency partners during planning and execution. Effective integration of interagency considerations is vital to successful military operations, especially when the joint force conducts shaping, stabilization, and transition to civil authority activities.

3. **Multinational Considerations.** Collective security is a strategic objective of the United States, and joint planning is frequently accomplished within the context of planning for multinational operations. Despite the potential for increased risk inherent in relying on others, the complexity of cyberspace and the enormous variety of its threats means the United States does rely on partnerships to protect its cyberspace and to achieve CO external mission objectives. There is no single doctrine for multinational action, and each alliance of coalition develops its own protocols and plans. US planning for joint operations accommodates and complements such protocols and plans for potential use of US cyberspace forces to protect MNF networks. Commanders also anticipate and incorporate mission partner planning factors, such as their domestic laws, regulations, and operational limitations on the use of various cyberspace capabilities and tactics.\textsuperscript{72}

**IX. Refining the Cyberspace Operational Approach.**

1. Throughout the planning processes, commanders and their staffs conduct formal and informal discussions at all levels of the chain of command. These discussions help refine assumptions, limitations, and decision points that could affect the operational approach and ensure the plan remains feasible, acceptable, and suitable. The commander adjusts the operational approach based on feedback from the formal and informal discussions at all levels of command and other information.\textsuperscript{73}

2. **Intelligence Gain/Loss (IGL).** Maneuver and fires in red and gray cyberspace could potentially compromise intelligence collection sources and methods. To the maximum extent practicable, an IGL assessment is required prior to executing such actions. The IGL assessment and stakeholder equity deconfliction are conducted IAW national policy guidance and can be complicated by the array of non-DOD USG and multinational partners operating in cyberspace. JFCs use IGL analysis to weigh the risks of conducting the CO versus achieving the desired objective via other methods.\textsuperscript{74}

3. **Targeting.** The overall joint targeting cycle and target development process applies generally to targeting in support of CO. However, coordination for certain OCO and DCO-RA missions, is unique to CO and applies to many aspects of the joint targeting cycle. Therefore, CO planners and decision makers often use a targeting process specifically adapted to their circumstance. The focus is on creating effects that accomplish targeting-related tasks and that support achievements of objectives, not on using a particular cyberspace capability simply because it is available. Targets that can be accessed in cyberspace are developed, vetted, and validated within the established joint targeting process. Specific considerations for joint targeting in and through cyberspace include that:

\textsuperscript{70} JP 5-0, IV - 16 -17.
\textsuperscript{71} JP 5-0, IV - 24.
\textsuperscript{72} JP 3-12, IV - 25.
\textsuperscript{73} JP 5-0, IV - 17.
\textsuperscript{74} JP 3-12, IV - 8.
(a) Cyberspace capabilities are a viable option for engaging some targets;
(b) For some targets, using a cyberspace capability may be the preferred approach, since they may offer low probability of detection and/or no associated physical damage;
(c) Higher-order effects on targets in cyberspace may ultimately impact elements of the DODIN (e.g., taking out a key Internet node upon which an enemy and the DODIN both rely); and
(d) Planning cross-domain synchronization of fires requires consideration of security classifications of some cyberspace capabilities.

Although targets paired with cyberspace capabilities can often be engaged with no permanent damage, due to the interconnectedness of cyberspace, the effects of CO may cross geographical boundaries and, if not carefully planned, may have unanticipated effects. As a result, engaging targets in and through cyberspace requires close coordination within DoD and with interagency and multinational partners. Every target has a distinct intrinsic or acquired characteristics (i.e., physical, functional, cognitive, environmental, and temporal) that form the basis for detection, location, and identification; for determining target value within the target system; and for classification for future surveillance, analysis, strike, and assessment. The challenge in joint targeting for CO is to identify, correlate, coordinate, and deconflict multiple activities occurring across the physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona layers. This requires a C2 capability that can operate at the tempo of CO and can rapidly integrate impacted stakeholders.™

4. Risk Concerns. Commanders should continuously seek to minimize risks to the joint force, as well as to friendly and neutral nations, societies, and economies, caused by use of cyberspace. Coordinated joint force operations benefit from the use of various cyberspace capabilities, including unclassified websites and Internet hosted applications used for communication efforts with audiences internal and external to DOD.™

X. Developing Cyberspace Planning Guidance.

1. The commander provides a summary of the OE and the problem, along with a visualization of the operational approach, to the staff and to other partners through commander's planning guidance. As time permits, the commander may be able to apply operational design to think through the campaign or operation before the staff begins JPP. In this case, the commander provides initial planning guidance to help focus the staff in mission analysis. Commanders should continue the analysis to further understand and visualize the OE as the staff conducts mission analysis. Upon completing analysis of the OE, the commander issues planning guidance, as appropriate, to help focus the staff efforts.™

2. Commanders integrate CO into their campaigns and operations at all levels. Their plans should address how to effectively integrate cyberspace capabilities, counter adversaries' use of cyberspace, identify and secure MRT-C, access key terrain in cyberspace, operate in a denied environment, efficiently use limited cyberspace assets, and pair operational requirements with cyberspace capabilities. The commander provides initial planning guidance, which may specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize the movement of forces within the commander's authority, and direct other actions as necessary. Supporting CO plans

75 JP 3-12, IV – 9-10.
76 JP 3-12, IV-21.
77 JP 5-0, IV-17.
and concept of operations (CONOPS) describe the role and scope of CO in the commander’s effort and address how CO support the execution of the supported plan. If requested by a commander, CDRUSCYBERCOM provides assistance, via the supporting CO-IPE, in integrating cyberspace forces and capabilities into the commander’s plans, orders, and assessments.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{78} JP 3-12, IV-1.
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Chapter 3: Planning

I. Joint Planning Process (JPP)

1. Planning. Plans translate the broad intent provided by a strategy into operations; successful operations achieve the strategy's objectives. The effects of operations, successful or otherwise, change the strategic environment and the operational environment (OE). To maintain a competitive advantage, the joint force should constantly evaluate effects and objectives, align them with strategic objectives, and verify that they are still relevant and feasible. Joint forces, through their assessments, identify when their actions begin to negatively affect the OE and change their operations and activities to create the desired effects and better align actions and objectives.  

2. Operational Design. Operational design and JPP are complementary tools of the overall planning process. The commander, supported by the staff, gains an understanding of the OE, defines the problem, and develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation through the application of operational design during the initiation step of JPP.  

3. JPP. JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs); select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The application of operational design provides the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations. JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission (see Figure 3-1).  

![Joint Planning Process Steps](image)

Figure 3-1: Joint Planning Process

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79 JP 5-0, I-2.
80 JP 5-0, III-4.
81 JP 5-0, III-10.
82 JP 5-0, III-11.
II. Cyberspace Operations Planning

1. Planning Integration. Commanders integrate cyberspace operations (CO) into their campaigns and operations at all levels. Their plans should address how to effectively integrate cyberspace capabilities, counter adversaries’ use of cyberspace, identify and secure MRT-C, access key terrain in cyberspace, operate in a denied environment, efficiently use limited cyberspace assets, and pair operational requirements with cyberspace capabilities. The commander provides initial planning guidance, which may specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize the movement of forces within the commander’s authority, and direct other actions as necessary. Supporting CO plans and concept of operations (CONOPS) describe the role and scope of CO in the commander’s effort and address how CO support the execution of the supported plan.

2. Planning Considerations. Although CO planners are presented the same operational design considerations and challenges as planners for operations in the physical domains, there are some unique considerations for planning CO. For instance, because of unforeseen linkages in cyberspace, higher-order effects of some CO may be more difficult to predict. This may require more branch and sequel planning. Further, while many elements of cyberspace can be mapped geographically, a full understanding of an adversary’s disposition and capabilities in cyberspace involves understanding the target, not only at the underlying physical network layer but also at the logical network layer and cyber-persona layer, including profiles of system users and administrators and their relationship to adversary critical factors. For planning internal operations within Department of Defense (DOD) cyberspace, DOD Information Network (DODIN) operations and Defensive Cyberspace Operations – Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM) planners require a clear understanding of the alignment of DODIN areas of operations and sectors and their assigned protection priorities based on mission-essential tasks and identification of MRT-C; which friendly forces or capabilities might be targeted by an adversary; what DODIN vulnerabilities are most likely to be targeted and the potential effects of the adversary’s action; and the applicable domestic, foreign, and international laws and USG policy. Threats in cyberspace may be nation-states, non-state groups, or individuals, and the parts of cyberspace they control are not necessarily within the geographic borders associated with the threat’s nationality or proportional to their geopolitical influence. A criminal element, a politically motivated group, or even a well-resourced individual may have a greater presence and capability in cyberspace than do many nations. Moreover, many adversaries operate cyberspace capabilities from portions of cyberspace geographically associated with the United States or owned by a U.S. entity. Each of these factors complicates the planning of CO.

3. Planning Timelines. For external missions, it is essential Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) and DCO Response Actions (DCO-RA) planners understand the authorities required to execute the specific CO actions proposed. The applicable authorities may vary depending upon the phase of the operation. This includes accounting for the lead time required to obtain the necessary intelligence to define the correct target; develop target access; confirm the appropriate authorities; complete necessary coordination, including interagency coordination and/or synchronization; and to verify the cyberspace capability matches the intended target using the results of technical assurance evaluations. The internal missions of DODIN operations and DCO-IDM are conducted continuously across the competition continuum as an enduring campaign. For internal missions, the timelines for planners are impacted by other factors, including levels of automation available to manage network posture, availability of security solutions from commercial providers and their licensing requirements, and operational considerations that may impact a defender’s ability to maneuver or take systems off-line to better manage their protection. However, the planning fundamentals remain the same, and
4. **Cyberspace Planning and JPP.** Cyberspace operations capability considerations and options are integrated into JPP, just like all other joint capabilities and functions.

   a. **Planning Initiation (Step 1).** Joint planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in support of national objectives or in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authority – the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) – initiates planning by deciding to develop military options. Commanders also initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority.  

   (1) Cyberspace planners begin updating cyberspace operations specific running estimates, especially the status of friendly forces, available capabilities, and key civil considerations when employing cyberspace operations.  

   (2) Key Outputs:  

      - Updated to cyberspace operations relevant running estimate.  
      - Consolidation of other relevant cyberspace operations tools and references.  

   b. **Mission Analysis (Step 2).** The commander and staff develop a restated mission statement that allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates and planning efforts for higher headquarters’ concurrence. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission.  

   (1) Cyberspace planners gather, analyze, and synthesize information to understand the current conditions of the operational environment an emphasis on the cyberspace domain within the information environment. Cyberspace planners collaborate with the intelligence staff to help analyze the effect of enemy capabilities in cyberspace operations. Through analysis of higher headquarters plans and guidance they determine specified and implied cyberspace operations and related tasks. The planners examine the current task organization of cyberspace assets, command and support relationships for augmentation, and status of current cyberspace capabilities and their limitations. They also analyze the capabilities of adjacent, joint, mission partners, and civilian organizations operating within the unit’s area of operation. This analysis results in the determination of whether the unit has the assets needed to complete all identified tasks and to identify other cyberspace resources required to fulfill those tasks for mission success. Cyberspace planners inform the commander of resource gaps that need forwarding to higher headquarters and any deviations necessary from the standard task organization to consider when developing planning guidance.

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83 JP 3-12, IV-1 – IV-3.  
84 JP 5-0, III-12.  
85 FM 3-12, A-3.  
86 JP 5-0, III-13.
(2) Key Outputs:

- Understanding of the unit’s cyberspace operations and related task, purpose, and contribution to the mission.
- Understanding of the available cyberspace assets and timeline.
- Understanding of cyberspace operations and missions of adjacent, supporting, and supported units in the assigned area of operations.
- Attaining full awareness of the assigned area of operations, including mission partners.
- Identifying critical gaps in cyberspace and the information environment within the assigned area of operations.
- Listing of initial cyberspace operations related intelligence requirements used for priority intelligence requirements, modified obstacle overlays, threat overlays, identifying high value target, aspects of terrain, unrefined event templates and matrices.
- Identifying specified, implied, and essential tasks used for the recommended mission statement.
- Determining assets needed to complete specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- Determining additional cyberspace operations resources required (forward to higher headquarters).
- Staying abreast of deviations from normal task organization changes for staff to assist the commander in developing planning guidance for courses of actions development.
- Awareness of cyberspace operations related constraints placed by higher command.
- Developing cyberspace operations related assumptions, including threat cyberspace capabilities operating in the area of operations, necessary for planning.
- Identifying elements of cyberspace operations that require risk management mitigation.
- Identifying cyberspace operations related gaps in provided information for commander’s critical information requirements and development of the information collection plan.
- Updating cyberspace operations relevant running estimates.
- Synchronizing and integrating cyberspace capabilities for information related activities.
• Establishing standards for measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of cyberspace operations in development of course of action criteria.\textsuperscript{87}

c. **Course of Action (COA) Development (Step 3).** A COA is a potential way (solution, method) to accomplish the assigned mission. Staffs develop multiple COAs to provide commanders with options to attain the military end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. All COAs must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. Planners can vary COAs by adjusting the use of joint force capabilities in the physical domains, information environment (including cyberspace), and electromagnetic spectrum throughout the OE.\textsuperscript{88}

(1) Cyberspace planners contribute to COA development by developing varying methods to integrate and synchronize the conduct of cyberspace operations using operational and tactical art within the commander’s intent and planning guidance in support of the concept of operations and scheme of maneuver.

(2) **Key Outputs:**

- Integration and validation of an effective scheme of cyberspace operations for each proposed course of action.
- Rough ration of the friendly-to.enemy cyberspace capabilities.
- Identification of known vulnerabilities in friendly cyberspace capabilities.
- Identification of types of cyberspace capabilities required to support related tasks and purposes of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.
- Updated cyberspace related running estimates and intelligence preparation of the battlefield products.
- Cyberspace related statements and sketches for courses of action:
  - Provide task organization of supporting cyberspace forces.
  - Describe how cyberspace supports the broad concept of operations and scheme of maneuver.\textsuperscript{89}

d. **COA Analysis, Wargaming, Comparison, and Approval (Steps 4, 5, and 6).** COA analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that enable the commander and staff to tentatively evaluate COA validity and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. The commander and staff analyze each COA separately according to the commander’s guidance. COA analysis is a valuable use of time that ensures COAs are valid. **Wargaming** is a primary means for this analysis. Once COA analysis is complete, the staff determines which COA performs best against the established evaluation criteria. The commander reviews the criteria list and adds or deletes, as required. COAs are not compared with each other.

\textsuperscript{87} FM 3-12, A-3 – A-6.
\textsuperscript{88} JP 5-0, III-32.
\textsuperscript{89} FM 3-12, A-7 & A-9.
within any one criterion, but rather, they are individually evaluated against the criteria that are established by the staff and commander. Their individual performances are then compared to enable the staff to recommend a preferred COA to the commander.

Finally, the staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. The commander, upon receiving the staff’s recommendation, combines personal analysis with the staff recommendation, resulting in a selected COA.90

(1) Cyberspace planners refine their CO scheme, ensuring that it nests with the scheme of maneuver. Planners will provide recommendations for consideration during the COA comparison process. The best COA must first be ethical, and then the most effective and efficient possible. The commander will issue final planning guidance including refined commander's intent, commander’s critical information requirements, and any additional guidance on priorities.

(2) Key Outputs
   - Refined scheme of cyberspace operations for each course of action.
   - Refined intelligence preparation of the battlefield products used for targeting and overlays.
   - Additional input to the commander’s critical information requirements.
   - Submitted requests for additional cyberspace assets.
   - Updated cyberspace operations running estimate.
   - Updated assumptions.91

e. Plan or Order Development (Step 7). During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed plan or Operations Order (OPORD) by refining the initial Concept of Operations (CONOPS) associated with the approved COA. During CONOPS development, the commander determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA, and resources and authorities available. The commander must assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. Commanders and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated desired and undesired effects that influence planning at every juncture.92

(1) The staff turns the approved COA into orders with a clear, concise concept of operations and supporting information. Cyber planners are responsible for publishing appropriate annexes, finalizing the CO running estimate and requests for effects.93

90 JP 5-0, III-45 – 59.
91 FM 3-12, A-11.
92 JP 5-0, III-63 – III-64.
93 FM 3-12, A-13.
5. Integrating Cyberspace Considerations into IPB. As an essential part of the information environment, there is a massive global dependence on the cyberspace domain for information exchange. With this dependence and the associated inherent vulnerabilities, the cyberspace domain must be considered during each step of the IPB process.94

   a. Understanding the OE is fundamental to all joint operations, including CO. Intelligence may be derived from information gained during military operations in cyberspace or from other sources. All-source intelligence support to CO utilizes the same intelligence process used by all other military operations, with unique attributes necessary for support of CO planning. The process includes:

      (1) Planning and direction, to include identification of target vulnerabilities to enable continuous planning and direction of counterintelligence (CI) activities to protect against espionage, sabotage, and attacks against U.S. citizens/facilities and continuously examining mission success criteria and associated metrics to assess the impact of CO and inform the commander's decisions.

      (2) Tasking collection sensors with access to information about cyberspace.

      (3) Processing and exploitation of collected data, including identification of useful information from collected data, either real-time or after-the-fact.

      (4) Analysis of information and production of intelligence products.

      (5) Dissemination and integration of intelligence related to cyberspace to the consumer.

      (6) Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality.95

   b. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). During mission analysis, the joint force staff identifies PIRs about the threat and other relevant aspects of the OE. Based upon the PIRs, the intelligence staff develops more specific essential elements of information (EEIs), indicators, and specific information requirements to inform the commander's decision making. Information requirements related to cyberspace include such things as network infrastructures and status, readiness of the threat's equipment and personnel, and unique cyberspace signature identifiers such as hardware/software/firmware versions and configuration files. The resulting requirements are met through a combination of military intelligence and national intelligence sources, including open sources.96

6. Planning Insights. Gaining insight and understanding of available cyberspace capabilities, from the experts listed above, enables planners to merge these capabilities with the other domains.

   a. Avoid symmetric thinking. Merely because the adversary attacks through cyberspace, does not restrict us to solely cyberspace response options. Commanders and staffs should consider attacking the Cyberspace physical layer as well as conducting operations 'in' cyberspace.

95 JP 3-12, II-11 – II-12.
96 JP 3-12, IV-7.
b. **Identify potential cyberspace needs early.** Cyberspace capabilities require long approval chains and, sometimes, long development timelines. Identify needs early in the planning process and set cyberspace planners working to secure the necessary permissions.

c. **Tailor requests for cyberspace operations.** Given cyberspace operations’ global nature and potential for cascading effects, authorities rarely grant broad permissions. Planners should craft requirements which are specific (used only in certain situations, limited in duration, and limited networks affected). By requesting a discrete operation, planners increase the likelihood of approval and, potentially, shorten approval time. Planners should coordinate and socialize desired cyber activities with the interagency (IA) as early as possible in planning.

d. **Conducting cyberspace damage assessment is often difficult.** A friendly cyberspace operator may report mission accomplishment. However, unlike physical munitions, there will not be a blast crater to verify results. Planners must use other ways to measure success of a cyberspace operation. One approach is to layer assessments. For example, if a cyberspace operator reports disarming an adversary through cyberspace, probe the adversary’s system with a remotely piloted vehicle before launching a risky major assault.

e. **All cyberspace operations require branch plans to accomplish similar effects.** Because OCO are often disapproved and susceptible to failure, planners must understand the intent of those cyberspace operations and develop a branch plan to accomplish that intent through other domains. Similarly, joint staff officers must understand that most of today’s operating systems are vulnerable to attack. The Joint Force should prepare to operate with degraded cyberspace capabilities.

f. **Many cyberspace capabilities are classified** to avoid exposing vulnerabilities. Lack of sufficient security clearances will hinder a planner’s ability to integrate cyberspace capabilities. To mitigate this challenge, lead planners should include cyberspace experts in planning team meetings to inform them of the plan’s objectives and intent. This enables planners to discreetly integrate classified capabilities while informing only those with the appropriate clearance and need-to-know.97

7. **Cyberspace Planning Support.** The pace of CO requires significant pre-operational collaboration and constant vigilance after initiation, for effective coordination and deconfliction throughout the OE. Keys to this synchronization are maintaining cyberspace situational awareness and assessing the potential impacts to the joint force of any planned CO, including the protection posture of the DODIN, changes from normal network configuration, or observed indications of malicious activity. The timing of planned CO should be determined based on a realistic assessment of their ability to create effects and support operations throughout the OE. This may require use of cyberspace capabilities in earlier phases of an operation than the use of other types of capabilities. Effective planners and operators understand how other operations within the OE may impact the CO.98

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97 *Cross Domain Synergy in Joint Operations*, 55-56.
III. Cyberspace in Operations Orders (U.S. Army Doctrine)

1. **OPLANS, OPORDs, FRAGORDs, and WARNORDs** include cyberspace operations information in various paragraphs and Annex C and Annex H. In OPLANS, OPORDs, and FRAGORDs, the scheme of CEMA is discussed in paragraphs 3.g. (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities); and 5.g. (Signal). In WARNORDs, cyberspace operations is in paragraph 5.g. (Signal).

2. **Paragraph 3.g. (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities)** describes how CEMA supports the concept of operations and refers the reader to Appendix 12 (Cyber Electromagnetic Activities) of Annex C (Operations) and Annex H (Signal) as required. Subdivision of Appendix 12 of Annex C and Annex H into the following cyberspace operations and EW-related information is as follows:

   (1) Annex C – Operations, Appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) - CEWO
   - Tab A – Offensive Cyberspace Operations.
   - Tab B – Defensive Cyberspace Operations.
   - Tab C – Electromagnetic Attack.
   - Tab D – Electromagnetic Protection.
   - Tab E – Electromagnetic Support.

   - Appendix 1 – DODIN Operations.
   - Appendix 2 – Voice, Video, and Data Network Diagrams.
   - Appendix 3 – Satellite Communications.
   - Appendix 4 – Foreign Data Exchanges.
   - Appendix 6 – Information Services.

3. **Appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) to Operations Plans and Orders** describes the cyberspace operations and EW divisions (EA, EP, and ES) supporting the commander’s concept of operations. The CEWO is overall responsible for publishing Appendix 12 of Annex C and oversees the CEMA section in assisting the G-6 or
S-2 with the development of Appendixes 1 and 6 of Annex H. Appendix 12 describes the scheme of cyberspace operations and EW related constraints from higher headquarters.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{99} FM 3-12, A-14 & A-15.
Intentionally Blank
I. Execution

1. Execute Order (EXORD). Execution begins when the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) authorizes the initiation of a military operation or other activity. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues an EXORD or other authorizing directive to initiate or conduct military operations.\(^\text{100}\)

2. Planning During Execution Planning continues as execution begins, with an initial emphasis on producing the Operations Order (OPORD) if one does not yet exist. As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current operations (see Figure 4-1).\(^\text{101}\) Effective planning enables transition. Integrated staff effort during planning ensures the plan is a team effort and the knowledge gained across the staff in the planning process is shared and retained. This staff work assists in identifying changes in the operational environment (OE) and guidance, speeding transition to execution.\(^\text{102}\) Planning is conducted based on assumed forces and resources. Upon a decision to execute, these assumptions are replaced by the facts of actual available forces and resources. Disparities between planning assumptions and the actual OE conditions at execution drive refinement or adaptation of the plan or order. Figure 4-0 depicts handoff from planning to execution at the Joint Staff level.\(^\text{103}\)

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Figure 4-0: Operation Plan or Concept Plan Handoff to Operations\(^\text{104}\)

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\(^{100}\) JP 5-0, II-14.
\(^{101}\) JP 3-33, VII-16.
\(^{102}\) JP 5-0, VII-1.
\(^{103}\) JP 5-0, VII-3.
\(^{104}\) JP 5-0, VII-4.
a. The plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) focuses on future plans. The timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of command, type of operation, commander's desires, and other factors. Typically, the emphasis of the future plans effort is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation or the next phase of the campaign.

b. Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (future operations planning). The timeframe of focus for future operations planning varies according to the factors listed for future plans, but the period typically is more near-term than the future plans timeframe. Future planning normally occurs in the J-5 or joint planning group (JPG), while future operations planning normally occurs in the operations directorate (J-3).

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c. Finally, current operations planning addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This occurs in the joint operations center or J-3.

3. During execution, accomplishment of the plan's tasks will be monitored and measured for how successfully each objective was completed, along with the input of new data and information as it is obtained to allow selection of branches or sequels, if applicable, or the plan to be modified as necessary. Execution of a plan does not end the planning process. The staff may reenter the planning cycle at any point to receive new guidance, provide an in-progress review (IPR), modify the plan, decide if and when to execute branches or sequels, or terminate the operation. Planning also continues for future operations.  

II. Cyberspace Operations during Execution.

1. Execution. Although cyberspace operations (CO) planners are presented the same operational design considerations and challenges as planners for operations in the physical domains, there are some unique considerations for planning CO. For instance, because of unforeseen linkages in cyberspace, higher-order effects of some CO may be more difficult to predict. This may require more branch and sequel planning. Further, while many elements of cyberspace can be mapped geographically, a full understanding of an adversary's disposition and capabilities in cyberspace involves understanding the target, not only at the underlying physical network layer but also at the logical network layer and cyber-persona layer, including profiles of system users and administrators and their relationship to adversary critical factors. For planning internal operations within Department of Defense (DoD) cyberspace, DoD Information Network (DODIN) operations and Defensive Cyberspace Operations – Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM) planners require a clear understanding of which friendly forces or capabilities might be targeted by an adversary; what DODIN vulnerabilities are most likely to be targeted and the potential effects of the adversary's action; the mission assurance risks involved; and an understanding of applicable domestic, foreign, and international laws and United States Government (USG) policy. Threats in cyberspace may be nation-states, non-state groups, or individuals, and the parts of cyberspace they control are not necessarily within the geographic borders associated with the threat's nationality or proportional to their geopolitical influence. A criminal element, a politically motivated group, or even a well-resourced individual may have a greater presence and capability in cyberspace than do many nations. Moreover, many adversaries operate cyberspace capabilities from portions of cyberspace geographically associated with the United States or owned by a U.S. entity. Each of these factors complicates the planning of CO.  

2. Legal Considerations. DOD conducts CO in compliance with U.S. domestic law, applicable international law, and relevant USG and DOD policies. Laws applicable to military activities in the United States also apply to cyberspace. DoD Cyberspace forces generally operate either on the DODIN or, when properly authorized, in gray and red cyberspace, or other blue cyberspace, when, for example conducting hunt forward operations or defense support of civil authorities under appropriate authority. Each CO mission has unique legal considerations. Before conducting CO, commanders, planners, and operators require clear understanding of the relevant legal framework to ensure compliance with laws and policies. It is essential

107 JP 3-12, IV-2.
commanders, planners, and operators consult with legal counsel during planning and execution of CO. (see Appendix A: DOD Law of War Manual excerpt).\textsuperscript{108}

3. **Cyberspace Authorities.** Authorities for specific types of military CO are established within SecDef policies, including DOD instructions, directives, and memoranda, as well as in EXORDs and OPORDs authorized by the President or SecDef and subordinate orders issued by commanders approved to execute the subject missions. These include the directive authority for cyberspace operations (DACO), established by CJCS EXORD, that enables CDRUSCYBERCOM’s DOD-wide integrated and synchronized protection of the DODIN (see Figure 4-2).

### Key Titles of United States Code Related to Cyberspace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States Code (USC)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Key Focus</th>
<th>Principal Organization</th>
<th>Role in Cyberspace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title 6</td>
<td>Domestic Security</td>
<td>Homeland security</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
<td>Security of United States cyberspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 10</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>National defense</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Man, train, and equip United States forces for military operations in cyberspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 14</td>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>Homeland security and law enforcement</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security in peacetime, and Navy during wartime at direction of Congress</td>
<td>Crime prevention and apprehension of criminals operating in cyberspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 18</td>
<td>Crimes and Criminal Procedure</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
<td>Crime prevention, apprehension, and prosecution of criminals operating in cyberspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 32</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>National defense and civil support training and operations in the United States</td>
<td>State Army National Guard, State Air National Guard</td>
<td>Domestic consequence management (if activated for federal service, the National Guard is integrated into the Title 10, USC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 40</td>
<td>Public Buildings, Property, and Works</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer roles and responsibilities</td>
<td>All federal departments and agencies</td>
<td>Establish and enforce standards for acquisition and security of information technologies. Defines National Security Systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 44</td>
<td>Public Printing and Documents</td>
<td>Handling of public records</td>
<td>All Federal departments and agencies</td>
<td>Includes Federal Information Security Modernization Act, the Foundation of cybersecurity policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 50</td>
<td>War and National Defense</td>
<td>A broad spectrum of military, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence activities</td>
<td>Commands, Services, and agencies under the Department of Defense and intelligence community agencies aligned under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence</td>
<td>Establishes War Powers Resolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4-2: United States Code-Based Authorities**\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{108} JP 3-12, III-13.

\textsuperscript{109} JP 3-12, III-3.
4. Command and Control of Cyberspace Forces. Clearly established command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective employment of forces, and CO require unity of command and unity of effort. However, the complex nature of CO, where cyberspace forces can be simultaneously providing actions at the global level and at the theater or Joint Operations Area (JOA) level, requires adaptive command and control (C2) structures. CO require constant and detailed coordination between theater and global operations, creating a dynamic C2 framework that can adapt to the constant changes, emerging threats, and unknowns. Certain CO functions, including protection of the DODIN against global cyberspace threats, lend themselves to centralized planning and execution to meet multiple, near-instantaneous requirements for response. Centrally controlled CO should be integrated and synchronized with the CCDR’s regional or local CO, conducted by forces assigned to, attached to, or in support of the CCDR, as directed in the (U) Global Force management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). For these reasons, there may be times when C2 of forces executing simultaneous global CO and theater CO is conducted using supported/supporting command relationships under separate, but synchronized, chains of command. CO are integrated and synchronized by the supported commander into their CONOPS, detailed plans and orders, and specific joint operations. (see Figure 4-3).

a. C2 for Global CO. CDRUSCYBERCOM is the supported commander for transregional and global CO and manages day-to-day global CO even while acting as supporting commander for one or more CCDR’s operations. For a specific CO mission, the support relationships are established in an EXORD, OPORD, or establishing directive. A supported relationship for CO does not exempt either command from coordinating actions with affected commanders prior to conducting an operation. Regardless of the approach employed for any particular operation, unless otherwise specified by the President of SecDef, C2 for CO is implemented IAW current CJCS CYBER C2 EXORD and other relevant orders to help ensure effective coordination and synchronization of joint forces and to provide a common construct for JFCs to execute their mission within a global context. JFHQ-DODIN centrally coordinates and directs global DODIN operations and DCO-IDM when these operations have the potential to impact the integrity of operational readiness of multiple DoD components. Although execution of many actions may be decentralized, CDRUSCYBERCOM is the supported commander for CO to secure, operate, and defend the DODIN and, when ordered, to defend other US critical cyberspace assets, systems, and functions. As the DODIN continues to migrate toward a common architecture standard, routine cyberspace security actions for global networks will continue shifting to centralized locations, such as JFHQ-DODIN Operations Center.

b. C2 for CO Supporting CCMDs. CCDRs are supported for CO in their area of responsibility (AOR) or for their transregional responsibilities, with CDRUSCYBERCOM supporting as necessary. These CO comprise actions intended to have effects localized within a Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC’s) AOR or a transregional functional responsibility. These could be cyberspace security and defense actions internal to a theater DODIN segment or external actions, such as cyberspace exploitation or cyberspace attack against a specific enemy capability. In addition to the theater segments of global networks, CCMD-level DODIN operations and DCO-IDM include the protection of stand-alone and tactical networks and computers used exclusively by the CCMD. For example, CCMD-level maneuvers in cyberspace include activities to reposition capabilities to enhance threat detection in specified areas, focus cyberspace forces activity in areas linked to specific operational branches and sequels to keep the adversary at risk, or activate stand-by tactical cyberspace capabilities to transition friendly C2 to more secure locations. Such CO maneuvers are vital when a
CCDR’s systems are under attack to the degree that subsets of the DODIN are degraded, compromised, or lost. In such operations, the supported CCDR coordinates, through their USCYBERCOM CO-Integrated Planning Element (CO-IPE), with their associated theater network operations and security center, supported by JFHQ-DODIN and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), to restore the affected cyberspace. The supported CCDR also integrates, synchronizes, and normally directs CO actions in red and gray cyberspace, including fires, with other lethal and nonlethal effects, for which they may use assigned, attached, or supporting cyberspace forces. CCDRs develop and coordinate their requirements for such effects with the CO-IPE and supporting JFHQ-C, for deconfliction and prioritized execution. When a CCDR establishes a subordinate force (e.g., a joint task force), the cyberspace unit(s) assigned to support that force is (are) determined by the CCDR’s mission requirements in coordination with CDRUSCYBERCOM.\footnote{JP 3-12, III-12-13}

5. Cyberspace Organizations and Forces. CCMDs secure, operate, and defend tactical and constructed DODIN segments within their commands and AORs. They integrate cyberspace operations into plans (e.g., CCMD campaign plans, concept plans, and operational plans); integrate cyberspace capabilities into military operations as required; and work closely with the joint force, USCYBERCOM, Service Cyberspace Components (SCCs), and DOD agencies to create fully integrated capabilities.\footnote{JP 3-12, III-8} (Appendix B provides an overview of U.S. cyberspace organizations).

a. Combatant Command (CCMD) Cyberspace Operations Support Staffs. CCDRs size and structure their CO support staff to best support their mission and requirements. This staff, supported by a USCYBERCOM CO-IPE, coordinates CO requirements and capabilities throughout their planning, intelligence, operations, assessment, and readiness processes to integrate and synchronize CO with other military operations. Additionally, as necessary and in partnership with USCYBERCOM, the CCMD coordinates regionally with interagency and multinational partners. Via their supporting JFHQ, the CCMD:

(1) Combines inputs from USCYBERCOM with information about CCMD tactical and/or constructed networks to develop a regional/functional situational awareness/common operational picture (COP) tailored to CCMD requirements.

(2) Facilitates, through USCYBERCOM, coordination and deconfliction of CCDR-directed CO which may impact or conflict with other DOD or other USG cyberspace activities or operations within the AOR. As early as possible in the planning process, provide USCYBERCOM with sufficient information about CCDR-planned CO to enable deconfliction with other USG CO.

b. USCYBERCOM Cyberspace Operations – Integrated Planning Element (CO-IPE). Integrate within a CCDR’s CO planning staff to provide direct support CO expertise and reachback capability to USCYBERCOM. CO-IPEs, under the supervision of their CCMD-associated joint force headquarters (JFHQ), have direct liaison authorized to all USCYBERCOM components to support the CCDR. CO-IPEs are staffed by the SCCs and are co-located with each CCMD for full integration into their staffs, as determined by the CCDR. They are forward extensions of the JFHQ-C that supports their CCMD and of JFHQ-DODIN, except for the United States Transportation Command CO-IPE, which is
solely an extension of the JFHQ-DODIN. CO-IPEs provide a CCDR with CO planners and other subject matter experts required to support development of CCMD requirements for CO and to assist CCMD planners with coordinating, integrating, and deconflicting CO.\textsuperscript{112} USCYBERCOM CO-IPEs are organized to meet individual CCMD requirements and facilitate planning and coordination of all three cyberspace missions, as required. CO-IPEs remain in direct support of and are integrated with CCMD CO planning staff to provide a bridge for USCYBERCOM and its subordinate JFHQ to enable theater and global integration of cyberspace forces and operations.\textsuperscript{113}

c. Mission-Tailored Forces. CDRUSCYBERCOM and commanders of CMF units tailor their assigned cyberspace forces, additional CO support personnel, and cyberspace capabilities, as required to support mission requirements. These tailored forces can take a variety of forms, from a small CPT mission element to a named JTF. They are task-organized and operate for the duration of the crisis/contingency or other operation or until redeployed by CDRUSCYBERCOM in coordination with the supported CCDR. In addition to USCYBERCOM/CMF elements, the Services and United States Special Operations Command tailor retained/assigned cyberspace forces as required to support mission requirements.\textsuperscript{114}

d. Joint Force Headquarters – Department of Defense Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN). In coordination with all CCDRs and other DOD components, JFHQ-DODIN conducts the operational-level planning, direction, integration, synchronization, and execution of DODIN operations and DCO-IDM missions to defend the DODIN. Maintains support relationships, as established by CDRUSCYBERCOM, with all CCDRs for theater/functional DODIN operations and DCO-IDM. Commander, JFHQ-DODIN, is supported for global DODIN operations and DCO-IDM, and CCDRs are supported for DODIN operations and DCO-IDM with effects contained within their assigned AOR or functional mission area. JFHQ-DODIN exercises DACO over all DOD components as delegated by CDRUSCYBERCOM, using DODIN areas of operations and sectors to organize cyberspace security and cyberspace defense actions. Exercises OPCON of assigned CPTs.\textsuperscript{115}

e. Department of Defense Cyber Operations Forces (DoD COF). The DoD COF will consist of “Units organized, trained, and equipped to conduct offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) operations.” There are five operational groups that are specifically categorized as DoD COF.

(1) Group 1. Cyber Mission Forces (CMF). The three elements of the CMF and mission support functions are:

a. Cyber Protection Force (CPF). The CPF conducts cyberspace operations (CO) for internal protection of the DoD Information Network (DODIN) or other blue cyberspace, when directed. The CPF is composed of Cyberspace Protection Teams (CPTs) organized, trained, and equipped to defend assigned cyberspace in coordination with and in

\textsuperscript{112} JP 3-12, IV-8.
\textsuperscript{113} JP 3-12, IV-17 – IV-18.
\textsuperscript{114} JP 3-12, IV-15 – IV-16.
\textsuperscript{115} JP 3-12, III-7.
support of segment owners, cybersecurity service providers (CSSPs), and users.

b. **Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF).** The CNMF conducts CO to defeat significant cyberspace threats to the DODIN and, when ordered, to defeat significant cyberspace threats to the Nation. The CNMF comprises various numbered national mission teams (NMTs), associated national support teams (NSTs), and national-level CPTs for protection of non DODIN blue-force cyberspace terrain.

c. **Cyber Combat Mission Force (CCMF)** The CCMF conducts CO to support the missions, plans, and priorities of the geographic and functional CCDRs. The CCMF comprises various numbered combat mission teams (CMTs) and associated combat support teams (CSTs).

(2) **Group 2. USCYBERCOM Subordinate Command Elements.** The subordinate headquarters (HQ) of USCYBERCOM execute Command and Control (C2) of the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF) and other cyberspace forces, including the Cyber National Mission Force-Headquarters (CBMF-HQ), the Joint Force Headquarters – Department of Defense Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN), the Joint Force Headquarters – Cyberspace (JFHQ-C), the Service Component Commands (SCC) HQs, Cyberspace Operations-Integrated Planning Elements (CO-IPEs), and those Service-retained forces dedicated to managing the Joint Cyber Common Access Platform.

(3) **Group 3. DoD Component Network Operations Centers and Cyber Security Service Providers (CSSP).** Units designated by the Secretaries of Military Departments, in coordination with other DoD Component Heads, to conduct cyberspace operations in support of DODIN Operations, including DCO and internal defensive measures.

(4) **Group 4. Special Capability Providers.** Any force purposely organized to execute OCO or DCO response actions.

(5) **Group 5. Specially Designated Units.** Any force designated by the President or the Secretary of Defense as part of the DoD COF for the purpose of conducting activities in support of specific cyberspace operations.

f. **Joint Force Headquarters – Cyberspace (JFHQ-C).** As a part of the Cyberspace Mission Force (CMF), USCYBERCOM designated each service’s cyberspace component (AFCYBER, ARCYBER, MARFORCYBER, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command) as a Joint Force Headquarters–Cyberspace (JFHQ-C) and directed each one to support specific combatant commands. These headquarters analyze, plan, and execute CO missions in general support of the CCDRs. Focus on supporting commander’s critical information requirements, providing expertise regarding feasibility of courses of action, and integrating CO into CDDR plans and orders. Exercise OPCON of assigned CPTs, CMTs, and CSTs.

(1) **JFHQ-C Marine Forces Cyber Command** supports U.S. Special Operations Command.


(3) **JFHQ-C Fleet Cyber Command** supports U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command.
6. **Synchronization of Cyberspace Operations.** The pace of CO requires significant pre-operational collaboration and constant vigilance after initiation, for effective coordination and deconfliction throughout the OE. Keys to this synchronization are maintaining cyberspace situational awareness and assessing the potential impacts to the joint force of any planned CO, including the protection posture of the DODIN, changes from normal network configuration, or observed indications of malicious cyber activity (MCA). The timing of planned CO should be determined based on a realistic assessment of their ability to create effects and support operations throughout the OE. This may require use of cyberspace capabilities in earlier phases of an operation than the use of capabilities that create physical effects. Effective planners and operators understand how other operations within the OE may impact the CO. For example, the

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117 JP 3-12, IV-14.
joint force uses fire support coordination measures in air, land, and maritime operations to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. CO deconfliction and coordination efforts with other operations should include similar measures.

a. Deconfliction. For CO, deconfliction is the act of coordinating the employment of cyberspace capabilities to create effects with applicable DOD, interagency, and multinational partners to ensure operations do not interfere, inhibit, or otherwise conflict with each other. The commander's intended effects in cyberspace, and the capabilities planned to create these effects, require deconfliction with other commands and agencies that may have equities in the same area of cyberspace. *CDRUSCYBERCOM is the DoD focal point for department and interagency deconfliction of all actions proposed for OCO and DCO-RA missions. Commander, JFHQ-DODIN, is the focal point for interagency deconfliction of global DODIN operations and DODIN DCO-IDM activities which may affect more than one DoD component.*

b. Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) Factors

(1) EMS Dependencies. Advancements in technology, including expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the ever-increasing shift to mobile technologies, have progressively increased EMS complexity within the OE. This has significant implications for CO. The JFC uses a joint electromagnetic spectrum operations cell (JEMSOC) to coordinate elements of CO, space operations, electromagnetic warfare (EW), navigation warfare, various forms of EMS-dependent information collection, and C2. Although these activities can be integrated with other information activities as part of synchronizing OIE, *the offensive aspects of CO, space operations, and EW operations are often conducted under different specific authorities.* Therefore, synchronizing information activities that use the EMS is a complex process that requires awareness and foresight. Additionally, plans that assume access to the EMS for effects in cyberspace should consider contingencies for when bandwidth or interference issues preclude access to the required portion of the EMS.

(2) Fires In and Through the EMS. Cyberspace attack, EA, and offensive space operations are deconflicted through the JEMSOC to maximize the impact of each type of fires. Uncoordinated EA may significantly impact EMS-enabled cyberspace attack actions and vice versa. To minimize overlap, the primary responsibility for cyberspace attack coordination between USCYBERCOM and the joint force, including EMS-enabled cyberspace attack, occurs between the applicable JFHQ-C and CO-IPEs in coordination with the CCMD CO staff.

(3) Integration of Cyberspace Fires. In crisis and conflict, cyberspace attack capabilities, although they can be used in a stand-alone context, are generally most effective when integrated with other fires. Some examples of integrating cyberspace fires are disruption of enemy air defense systems using EMS-enabled cyberspace attack; insertion of messages into enemy leadership's communications, degradation/disruption of enemy space-based and ground-based precision navigation and timing systems, and disruption of enemy C2. Effects in cyberspace can be created at the strategic, operational, or tactical level, in any phase of the military operation, and coordinated with other fires to create maximum effect on target. Integrated fires are not necessarily simultaneous fires, since the timing of cyberspace attack effects may be most advantageous when placed before or after the effects of lethal fires. Each
engagement presents unique considerations, depending upon the level and nature of the enemy's dependencies upon cyberspace. Supporting fires in cyberspace may be used in a minor role, or they can be a critical component of a mission when used to enable air, land, maritime, space, and special operations. Forces operating in the physical domains cannot use fires in cyberspace to best advantage unless ensure synchronization of physical and virtual actions, clearly understand the type and timing of planned effects in cyberspace, and comprehensively assess cross-domain effects. Properly prepared and timed cyberspace attack can create effects that cannot be created any other way. Poorly timed fires in cyberspace can be useless, or even worse, interfere with an otherwise effective mission.  

7. **Cyberspace Targeting.** The purpose of joint targeting is to integrate and synchronize fires (the use of weapon systems or other actions to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target) into joint operations. Joint targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate capability to them, considering operational requirements. Integrating and synchronizing planning, execution, and assessment are pivotal to the success of joint targeting. The overall joint targeting cycle and development process apply generally to targeting in support of CO. The Review and Approval Process for certain OCO and DCO-RA missions is unique to CO and applies to many aspects of the joint targeting cycle. Therefore, CO planners and decision makers often use a targeting process specifically adapted to the circumstance.

   a. **Joint Targeting In and Through Cyberspace.** Planning and targeting staffs develop and select targets in and through cyberspace based on the commander's objectives rather than on the capabilities available to achieve them. The focus is on creating effects that accomplish targeting-related tasks and objectives, not on using a particular cyberspace capability simply because it is available. Targets that can be accessed in cyberspace are developed, vetted, and validated within the established joint targeting process. Specific considerations for joint targeting in and through cyberspace include that:

   1. cyberspace capabilities are a viable option for engaging some targets;
   2. For some targets, using a cyberspace capability may be the preferred approach, since they may offer low probability of detection and/or no associated physical damage;
   3. Higher-order effects on targets in cyberspace may ultimately impact elements of the DODIN (e.g., taking out a key Internet node upon which an enemy and the DODIN both rely); and
   4. Planning cross-domain synchronization of fires requires consideration of security classifications of some cyberspace capabilities.

   b. Although targets paired with cyberspace capabilities can often be engaged with no permanent damage, due to the interconnectedness of cyberspace, the effects of CO may cross geographical boundaries and, if not carefully planned, may have unanticipated effects. As a result, engaging targets in and through cyberspace requires close coordination within DoD and with interagency and multinational partners. Every target has distinct intrinsic or acquired characteristics (i.e., physical, functional, cognitive, environmental, and temporal) that form the basis for detection, location, and

   

identification; for determining target value within the target system; and for classification for future surveillance, analysis, strike, and assessment. The challenge in targeting for CO is to identify, correlate, coordinate, and deconflict multiple activities occurring across the physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona layers. This requires a C2 capability that can operate at the tempo of CO and can rapidly integrate impacted stakeholders.

(1) **Physical network Layer Target Features.** The physical network layer is the medium where the data travels. It includes wired (e.g., land and undersea cable) and wireless (e.g., radio, radio-relay, cellular, satellite) transmission means. It is a point of reference for determining geographic location and the applicable legal framework.

(2) **Logical Network Layer Target Features.** The logical network layer provides an alternate view of the target, abstracted from its physical location, and referenced from its logical position in cyberspace. This position is often represented through a network address (e.g., internet protocol [IP] address). It depicts how nodes in the physical domains address and refer to one another to form entities in cyberspace. The logical network layer is the first point where the connection to the physical domains may be lost. Joint targeting in the logical layer requires the logical identity and logical access to the target to have a direct effect.

(3) **Cyber-Persona Layer Target Features.** The cyber-persona layer, the aggregate of an individual's or group's online identity(ies), and an abstraction of logical network layer data, holds important implications for joint forces in terms of positive target identification and affiliation and activity attribution. Cyber-personas are created to group information together about targeted actors in order to organize analysis, planning, and intelligence reporting. Because cyber-personas can be complex, with elements in many virtual locations but often not linked to a single physical location or form, sufficient intelligence collection and analysis capabilities are required for the joint forces to gain insight and situational awareness required to enable effective joint targeting of a cyber-persona. Ultimately, cyber-personas will be linked to features that will be engaged in either the logical or physical network layers.

c. **Target Access.** Cyberspace forces develop access to targets or target elements in cyberspace by using cyberspace exploitation actions. This access can then be used for various purposes, ranging from information collection to maneuver and to targeting nomination. Not all accesses are equally useful for military operations. For instance, the level of access required to collect information from a targeted system may not be sufficient to create a cyberspace attack effect. Developing access to targets in or through cyberspace follows a process which can often take significant time. In some cases, remote access is not possible or preferable, and close proximity may be required, using expeditionary CO. Such operations are key to addressing the challenge of closed networks and other systems that are virtually isolated. Expeditionary CO are often more regionally and tactically focused and can include units of the CMF or special operations forces. All target access efforts in cyberspace require coordination with the Intelligence Community (IC) for deconfliction in accordance with national policy and to illuminate potential IGL concerns. If direct access to the target is unavailable or undesired, sometimes a similar or partial effect can be created by indirect access using a related target that has higher-order effects on the desired target. Some denial of service cyberspace attacks leverage this type of indirect access.
d. Target Development, Nomination, and Synchronization. CO use standard target nomination processes, but target folders should include unique cyberspace aspects (e.g., hardware and software configurations, IP address, identifying features of a cyber-persona) of the target. Development of this data is imperative to understand and characterize how elements targetable through cyberspace are relevant to the commander’s objective. This data also enables the planner to match an appropriate cyberspace capability against a particular target. Component commanders, national agencies, supporting commands, and/or the JFC planning staff nominate targets to the targeting staff for development and inclusion on the joint target list (JTL). Once placed on the JTL, commanders in receipt of an EXORD with relevant objectives and ROE can engage the target with organic forces (if within a component commander’s assigned area of operations and consistent with any restrictions) or nominate the target to CDRUSCYBERCOM for action by other joint force components and other organizations. For pursuing targets with a global presence, some CCDRs also maintain globally integrated target lists to enable more effective coordination across AORs.

e. Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs). A TST is a validated joint target of such high priority to friendly forces that the commander designates it for immediate engagement because it poses (or will soon pose) a threat to friendly forces or is a highly lucrative, fleeting target. TSTs are normally engaged dynamically. However, to be successfully engaged, they require considerable planning and preparation within the joint targeting cycle. Engaging TSTs in cyberspace is difficult in most situations, because they are likely to cross AORs and require detailed joint, interagency, and/or multinational planning efforts. Being prepared to engage a TST from within cyberspace requires early coordination between cyberspace planners, operators, and the supported commander to ensure appropriate cyberspace capability and required access are available.¹¹⁹

8. Assessment of Cyberspace Operations. Assessment measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the OE and the progress of CO and compare them to their vision and intent. Measuring this progress toward the end state, and delivering timely, relevant, and reliable feedback into the planning process to adjust operations during execution, involves deliberately comparing the forecasted effects of CO with actual outcomes to determine the overall effectiveness of cyberspace force employment. More specifically, assessment is a commander-led activity that enables determination of progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, or performing tasks. Commanders assess the risks of conducting specific CO against their expected effects. The assessment process for external CO missions begins during planning and includes measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) of fires and other effects in cyberspace, as well as their contribution to the larger operation or objective. Historically, combat assessment has emphasized the battle damage assessment component of measuring physical and functional damage, but this approach does not always accurately characterize the entirety of an effect’s impact, particularly with respect to CO. The effects of CO are often created outside the scope of battle and often do not create physical damage. Assessing the impact of effects of CO requires battle damage assessment analysis and assessment of physical, functional, and target system components. However, the higher-order effects of cyberspace actions are often subtle, and assessment of second- and third-order effects can be difficult. Therefore, assessment of fires in and through cyberspace frequently requires significant intelligence collection and analysis efforts. Incorporating pre-strike and post-strike assessment

¹¹⁹ JP 3-12, IV-9 – 11.
for CO into the existing joint force staff processes increases the likelihood that all objectives are met.\textsuperscript{120}

III. Cyber Effects Request Format (U.S. Army Doctrine)

1. Cyber-Enabled Effects. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective and an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. The use of effects in planning can help commanders determine the tasks required to achieve objectives. The commander and planners continue to develop and refine desired effects throughout JPP. Monitoring progress toward creating desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout execution.\textsuperscript{121}

a. Execution of any DODIN operations, DCO, or OCO mission requires completion of specific actions that employ cyberspace capabilities to create effects in cyberspace. All cyberspace mission objectives are achieved by the combination of one or more of five cyberspace actions, which are defined exclusively by the types of effects they create.\textsuperscript{122}

(1) Cyberspace System Operation. Actions taken as part of the DODIN operations mission to ensure specific segments of DoD cyberspace remain in operation to support missions.

(2) Cyberspace Security. Actions that are part of DODIN operations mission taken within protected cyberspace to reduce its vulnerability.

(3) Cyberspace Defense. Actions taken during DCO-IDM missions, within protected cyberspace, to discover and defeat specific threats.

(4) Cyberspace Exploitation. Actions taken during

(5) Cyberspace Attack. Attack actions that create noticeable denial effects (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) in cyberspace.\textsuperscript{123}

CO integrated with operations in other domains create coordinated and synchronized effects required to support mission accomplishment; however, CO may also be used to produce stand-alone tactical, operational, or strategic effects to achieve objectives.\textsuperscript{124}

b. CO use links and nodes located in the physical domains and perform logical functions to create effects first in cyberspace and then, as needed, in the physical domains. Critical links and nodes are identified by planners for increased protection, including physical security when necessary, to ensure freedom of maneuver in both cyberspace and the physical domains. Effects are the results, outcomes, consequences, and state changes resulting from an action. Some cyberspace actions, carefully controlled to create cascading effects, can enable lethal and nonlethal effects in the physical domains. Likewise, activities in the physical domains can create effects in and through cyberspace by affecting the physical infrastructure of the portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) that enable CO.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{120} JP 3-12, IV-22.
\textsuperscript{121} JP 5-0, IV-27 – 29.
\textsuperscript{122} JP 3-12, xi.
\textsuperscript{123} JP 3-12, II-5 – II-7.
\textsuperscript{124} JP 3-12, I-1.
\textsuperscript{125} JP 3-12, I-2.
c. Because CO can often be executed remotely, through a virtual presence enabled by wired or wireless access, many CO do not require physical proximity to the target but use remote actions to create effects, which represents an increase in operational reach not available in the physical domains. This use of global reach applies equally to both external operations in red and gray cyberspace, as well as internal protection effects in blue cyberspace. When remote access is not possible or preferable, cyberspace forces deploy to conduct expeditionary CO in the physical domains. The cumulative effects of some CO may extend beyond the initial target, a joint operations area (JOA), or outside of a single area of responsibility (AOR). Because of transregional considerations and the requirement for high-demand forces and capabilities, some CO are coordinated, integrated, and synchronized using centralized execution from a location remote from the supported commander. Depending upon the geographic scope of the effect and amount of coordination required CDRUSCYBERCOM may be a supported or supporting commander.\textsuperscript{126}

d. Overlaps among military, other government, corporate, and private activities on shared networks in cyberspace make the evaluation of probable cascading, compounding, and collateral effects particularly important when targeting for CO. The effects can ripple through an affected system, sometimes cascading through its links with related systems that were not evident to the planner. Cascading effects sometimes travel through systems subordinate to the one targeted but can also move laterally to peer systems or up to higher-level systems. Compounding effects are an aggregation of various levels of effects that have interacted in ways that may be intended or may have been unforeseen. Collateral effects, including collateral damage, are the incidental effects of military operations on persons and property that were not the intended targets of the action. Depending on the strategic and operational situation, an order or applicable ROE may limit CO to only those actions likely to result in no or low levels of collateral effects.\textsuperscript{127}

2. Requests for Cyberspace Support. Corps and below units do not have organic cyberspace capabilities to conduct DCO-IDM, DCO-RA, or OCO missions. The G-3 or S-3 requests support through higher headquarters. Planning and targeting staffs develop and select targets in and through cyberspace based on the commander’s objectives rather than on the capabilities available to achieve them. The focus is on creating effects that accomplish targeting-related tasks and that support achievement of objectives, not on using a particular cyberspace capability simply because it is available.\textsuperscript{128}

Note: USCYBERCOM does not accept the Army cyber effects request format (CERF). The staff uses a Request for Support (RFS) to request OCO support in a joint environment. JTF headquarters and their subordinate units must become familiar with the RFS or any other standardized requesting format established by USCYBERCOM and the CCMD before requesting support. The joint force land component command, converts all CERFs received from Army forces to RFS formats before forwarding to the JTF headquarters.

a. Requesting Offensive Cyberspace Operations Support (Echelon Corps and Above - ARMY). For OCO missions, the CEMA working group identifies targets that have met the established targeting selection standards during the targeting process and

\textsuperscript{126} JP 3-12, I-12.
\textsuperscript{127} JP 3-12, IV-3 - IV-4.
\textsuperscript{128} JP 3-12, IV-9.
aligned with the commander’s targeting guidance. Once approved, the fires support element adds these targets to the unit’s high payoff target list with all other identified non-cyberspace related targets. The CEMA working group will also make recommendations to the no-strike list and restricted target list that supports the commanders targeting guidance.

Combat mission teams provide OCO capabilities to corps and below units per request through RFS process. Upon the commander’s approval, the CEMA section submits an RFS along with the high payoff target list, no-strike list, and restricted target list, to higher headquarters through the joint force land component command, to the JTF headquarters as nominations for the joint targeting cycle and joint no-strike list or restricted target list. Targets that require OCO-related tasks should include such data as known IP addresses, if possible, known physical locations, and any known cyber-personas associated with the target.

Once the JTF headquarters approves the OCO related targets identified in the corps’ high payoff target list, they will add them to the joint targeting cycle. The JTF headquarters then continues the RFS process to receive OCO support from JFHQ-C. (Figure 3-2 illustrates the routing process for requesting OCO support for corps and below)129

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129 FM 3-12, E-1 – E-3.
b. Requesting Defensive Cyberspace Operations Support. Corps and below units do not have organic DCO-IDM capabilities and must request for DCO-IDM related tasks through the RFS process. DCO-IDM support is necessary for threats on the DODIN-A beyond the scope or abilities of organic cyberspace forces conducting cyberspace security. Units request DCO-IDM as a reactive measure to defend against a cyberspace threat. The G6 or S-6 coordinates with the G-3 or S-3 to develop an RFS requesting DCO-IDM support.

Upon commander’s approval, the RFS is submitted, validated, and channeled to higher headquarters through the joint force land component command, to JTF headquarters until it reaches the CCMD’s joint cyberspace center. The requesting unit additionally informs a cybersecurity service provider (Defense Information Systems Agency or NETCOM) of the cyberspace threat. The JTF headquarters routes the RFS; the cybersecurity service provider also notifies JFHQ-DODIN of the identified cyberspace threat. The CCMD has organic CCMD CPTs that conduct DCO-IDM in friendly cyberspace. CCDRs have directive authority for cyberspace operations that authorizes DCO-IDM missions within their assigned AOR without requesting authorization from USCYBERCOM.

The CCMD CPTs primary focus is employing DCO-IDM throughout the AOR and may be unavailable to provide support to requesting corps and below units. If the CCMD CPTs are unavailable, the joint cyberspace center forwards the RFS through the cyberspace operations-integrated planning element to the JFHQ-DODIN through the USCYBERCOM portal. The cyberspace operations-integrated planning element provides situational awareness of all DCO-IDM missions conducted in the AOR to USCYBERCOM.

NOTE: When a cybersecurity service provider becomes aware of a threat on the DODIN, it forwards the information to JFHQ-DODIN. The JFHQ-DODIN uses the notice from the cybersecurity service provider to begin the process of employing a CPT (either DODIN or service) before receiving the RFS through the routing channels. However, the requesting unit is still responsible for both initiating the RFS process and informing a cybersecurity service provider. (Figure 3-2 illustrates the routing process for requesting DCO-IDM support for corps and below)
c. Requesting Defensive Cyberspace Operations Support for Non-Department of Defense Friendly Cyberspace. An RFS requesting assistance for a threat detected on a critical network located in non-DODIN friendly cyberspace is sent to the CNMF-HQs to employ a national CPT to conduct DCO-DIM. National CPTs only conduct DCO-DIM in non-DODIN friendly cyberspace. Non-DODIN friendly cyberspace includes critical networks in which mission partners perform cyberspace operations and areas of cyberspace where the Secretary of Defense orders the DoD to protect. CNMF-HQ has directive authority for cyberspace operations that allow it to conduct DCO-DIM in non-DODIN friendly cyberspace without authorization from USCYBERCOM. However, CNMF-HQ is responsible for ensuring USCYBERCOM maintains situational awareness on all DCO-IDM missions.

d. Defensive Cyberspace Operations-Response Actions Support. CNMFs, consisting of national mission teams and NSTs assigned to CNMF-HQ, conduct DCO-RA missions upon requests from CPTs (at any echelon) when a more progressive defensive approach goes outside of the DODIN and into neutral and enemy cyberspace. DCO-RA may rise to the level of force resulting in physical damage or destruction of enemy systems depending on the broader operational context. DCO-RA tactics have many similarities to OCO requiring coordinated military orders and careful consideration of scope, rules of engagement, and measurable objectives. For these reasons, CNMF-HQ must attain validation and authorization from USCYBERCOM to conduct DCO-RA.
missions. (Figure 3-3 illustrates the routing process for requesting DCO-IDM support for non-DODIN friendly cyberspace and DCO-RA support.)

![Diagram of routing process for defensive cyberspace operations—internal defensive measures (non-Department of Defense information network) and defensive cyberspace operations—response actions support.]

**Fig 3-3**: Routing process for defensive cyberspace operations—internal defensive measures (non-Department of Defense information network) and defensive cyberspace operations—response actions support.

3. **Requests for Cyberspace Support (Echelon Corps and Below)**. The Cyber Effects Request Form (CERF) is the format corps and below units use to request cyberspace support. Support in response to a CERF may come from joint cyberspace forces such as the combat mission teams, from other joint or Service capabilities, or Service-retained cyberspace forces.

   a. During the operations process at echelons corps and below, the commander and staff identify the effects desired in and through cyberspace to support operations against specific targets. If the requesting and higher echelons determine that a current capability is insufficient, the commander and staff approve and process the CERF. The routing process continues to each echelon until the CERF reaches the joint force land component command where it is converted into an RFS, and forwarded to the JTF headquarters. The CERF approval process at echelons corps and below follow these steps:

   - Identify targets of cyberspace effects

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130 FM 3-12, E-1 – E-6.
• Verify if organic capabilities can create desired effects.
• Approve target for cyberspace effects.
• Forward to next higher Army echelon for deconfliction and synchronization.
• Verify if other organic capabilities can create desired effects if organic cyberspace capabilities do not exist.
• If current capabilities fulfill the requirement, synchronize operations.
• If current capabilities do not fulfill the requirement, approve target for cyberspace effects.
• Forward to next higher Army echelon for approval until CERF enters the joint process.
• Synchronize operation with cyberspace effect (if possible).

b. Cyber Effects Request Format Preparation. Although the requesting unit may not have the specific target network topology information, it should provide current target information. The approval process for cyberspace effects may take longer than other targeting capabilities. Each of the three sections in the cyber effects request are described below in bullet format. The requesting unit provides all information from the bullet lists below to higher headquarters through the CEMA working group or other designated targeting processes.

Cyber Effects Request Format Section 1 Requesting Unit Information. Section 1 of the CERF requests the following unit information -

• **Supported Major Command.** Enter the major command authorized to validate and prioritize the CERF. For Army units at corps level and below, this entry will commonly include the geographic or functional combatant command.

• **Date.** Enter the date the requesting unit submitted the CERF to higher headquarters.

• **Time Sent.** Enter the time the requesting unit submitted the CERF to higher headquarters.

• **Requesting Unit.** Enter the name of the requesting unit.

• **By.** Enter the rank, last, and the first name of the requesting unit’s point of contact that time stamped and processed the CERF.

• **Point of Contact.** Enter the rank, last, and the first name of the requesting unit’s point of contact. Also, enter the phone number and email.

• **Classification.** Enter the overall classification of the document. Ensure classification markings are applied to each section and supporting documentation.
Cyber Effects Request Format Section 2 Supported Operation Information. Section 2 of the CERF requests the following supported operation information –

- **Supported OPLAN/CONPLAN/Order.** Describe key details within the plan that the requested cyberspace effect(s) will support.

- **Supported Mission Statement.** Describe the unit’s essential key task(s) and the purpose that the requested effect(s) will support.

- **Supported Commander’s Intent.** Describe key information within the commander’s end state that the requested effect(s) will support.

- **Supported Commander’s End State.** Describe key information within the commander’s end state that the requested effect(s) will support.

- **Supported Concept of Operations.** Describe key information within the concept of operations that the requested effect(s) will support.

- **Supported Objective (strategic, operational, and tactical).** Describe the supported objective(s) that the requested effect(s) will directly support.

- **Supported Tactical Objective/Task.** Describe the tactical objectives and tasks that the requested effect(s) will directly or indirectly support.

Cyber Effects Request Format Section 3 Computer Network Operations. Section 3 of the CERF requests the following computer network operations and specific information –

- **Type of Target**
  - Indicate *scheduled* if specific dates, times, and or supporting conditions are known.
  - Indicate *on-call* if trigger events or supporting conditions are known.

- **Target Priority.**
  - Indicate emergency if the target requires immediate action. Indicate priority if the target requires a degree of urgency.
  - Indicate routine if the target does not require immediate action or a degree of urgency beyond standard processing.

- **Target Name.** Enter the name of the target as codified in the Modernized Integrated Database.

- **Target Location.**
  - Provide the target location.
  - Disregard if the request is for DCO-IDM.

- **Target Description.**
  - Provide the target description.
- Describe the network node(s) wherein specific activities are to support DCO-IDM.

**Desired Effect.**
- Enter deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, or manipulate for OCO.
- Provide timing as less than 96 hours, 96 hours or 90 days, or greater than 90 days.

**Target Function.** Enter target(s) primary function and additional functions if known.

**Target Significance.** Describe why the target(s) is important to the enemy's or adversary’s target system(s) or value in addition to its functions and expectations.

**Target Details.** Describe additional information about the target(s) if known. This information should include any relevant device information such as type, number of users; activity; friendly actors in the area of operations; and surrounding/adjacent/parallel devices.

**Concept of Cyberspace Operations.**
- Describe how the requested effect(s) would contribute to the commander's objectives and overall operations concept.
- Include the task, purpose, method, and end state.
- Describe the intelligence collection plan and specific assessment plan if known.
- Provide a reference to key directives and orders.

**Target Expectation Statement.** According to CJCSI 3370.01C, Enclosure D describes how the requested effect(s) will impact the target system(s). This description must address the following questions:
- How will the target system(s) be affected if the target’s function is neutralized, delayed, disrupted, or degraded? (Two examples are operational impact and psychological impact.)
- What is the estimated degree of impact on the target system(s)?
- What is the functional recuperation time estimated for the target system(s) if the target’s function is neutralized, delayed, disrupted, or degraded?
- What distinct short-term or long-term military or political advantage/disadvantage do we expect if the target’s function is neutralized, delayed, disrupted, or degraded?
What is the expected enemy or adversary reaction to affecting the target’s function?\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{131} FM 3-12, E-7-E-9.
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Chapter 5: Operations in the Homeland

"The United States faces persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private sector, and ultimately the American people’s security and privacy. The Federal Government must improve its efforts to identify, deter, protect against, detect, and respond to these actions and actors."

—President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 132

I. Department of Defense Missions in the Homeland

1. Strategy. General strategic guidance is provided in the latest high-level policy documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy (NMS), the National Cybersecurity Strategy, and the DoD Cyber Security Strategy.

2. Missions. DOD is the lead federal agency (LFA) for defending against traditional external threats or aggression (e.g., nation-state conventional forces or weapons of mass destruction attack) and against external asymmetric threats that are outside of the scope of HS operations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the LFA for homeland security (HS), and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the LFA for maritime homeland security (MHS). By law, DOD is responsible for two missions in the homeland: homeland defense (HD) and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). DOD also supports HS and may be required to participate in emergency preparedness (EP).

   a. Homeland Defense (HD). HD is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats, as directed by the President. DoD executes HD by detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating threats from actors of concern as far forward from the homeland as possible. HD is executed across the active, layered defense construct composed of the forward regions, the approaches, and the homeland. Commander, U.S. Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), are the supported commanders for HD in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs), with all other combatant commanders (CCDRs) as supporting commanders. 133

   b. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). DSCA is support provided by U.S. federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, reserve and National Guard (NG) forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the governor[s] of the affected state[s], elect and request to use those forces under Title 32, United States Code [USC], Section 502) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement (LE) support, and other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events.

   c. Homeland Security (HS). HS is an integrated concept developed as a result of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US. HS is the intersection of evolving threats and hazards with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense,
emergency response, LE, customs, border control, and immigration. It is a widely distributed and diverse national enterprise comprised of the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners, individuals, families, and communities to maintain critical HS capabilities. DOD supports HS operations through DSCA and by providing DOD forces and capabilities to USCG maritime homeland security operations (MHS).

d. Emergency Preparedness (EP). EP includes measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation’s institutions from all types of hazards through five preparedness mission areas under the National Response Framework (NRF). These five mission areas are prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.\textsuperscript{134}

3. Interagency/Intergovernmental Coordination. Within the homeland, HD, DSCA, and HS require pre-event and ongoing coordination with inter-organizational and multinational partners to integrate capabilities and facilitate unified action. In this complex environment, there are numerous threats across multiple jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state, local, and tribal) that are addressed by a diverse group of actively involved stakeholders (e.g., international organizations, multinational partnerships, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], and the private sector). DOD plans and prepares to operate in concert with other U.S. Government (USG) entities. (see Figure 5-1).\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{134} JP 3-27, I-2
\textsuperscript{135} JP 3-27, I-3 & A-2
Figure 5-1: Relationships Between Homeland Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and Homeland Security Missions

Legend

| CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| FAA | Federal Aviation Administration |
| NORAD | North American Aerospace Defense Command |
| ROE | rules of engagement |
| RUF | rules for the use of force |
| USG | United States Government |

1. ballistic missile defense
2. DOD support for disaster relief
3. CBRN response
4. airport security and critical infrastructure/key resources
5. maritime homeland security and DOD forces* (less than 48 hours)
6. FAA support to DOD (NORAD)
7. emergency preparedness
8. support to law enforcement
9. National Guard state active duty (in exceptional circumstances)
10. Cybersecurity
11. maritime homeland defense
12. maritime homeland security & DOD forces* (48 hours or more)

* DOD forces attached to Coast Guard under tactical control.
** Standing RUF and RUF may differ for each state’s National Guard forces – National Guard forces will use state RUF while in Title 32, US Code, or state active duty status.

- Prevent terrorism/enhance security
- Secure/manage our borders
- Administer/enforce immigration
- Safeguard/secure cyberspace
- Ensure disaster resilience
II. Critical Infrastructure

1. Critical infrastructure can be described as those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the US that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. DoD’s portion of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors is the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). The DIB sector is the worldwide industrial complex that enables research and development, as well as design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and component parts, to meet US military requirements.\textsuperscript{136}

2. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): *Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience* advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. PPD-21 identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors and designates responsibility to various Federal Government departments and agencies to serve as Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) for each of the critical infrastructure sectors:

   1) **Chemical Sector** – Department of Homeland Security
   2) **Commercial Facilities Sector** – Department of Homeland Security
   3) **Communications Sector** – Department of Homeland Security
   4) **Critical Manufacturing Sector** – Department of Homeland Security
   5) **Dams Sector** – Department of Homeland Security
   6) **Defense Industrial Base Sector** – Department of Defense
   7) **Emergency Services Sector** – Department of Homeland Security
   8) **Energy Sector** – Department of Energy
   9) **Financial Services Sector** – Department of the Treasury
   10) **Food and Agriculture Sector** – Department of Agriculture and Department of Health and Human Services
   11) **Government Facilities Sector** – Department of Homeland Security and General Services Administration
   12) **Healthcare and Public Health Sector** – Department of Health and Human Services
   13) **Information Technology Sector** – Department of Homeland Security
   14) **Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector** – Department of Homeland Security
   15) **Transportation Systems Sector** – Department of Homeland Security and Department of Transportation
   16) **Water and Wastewater Systems Sector** – Environmental Protection Agency\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{136} JP 3-28, IV-3 – IV-4.
III. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program

1. DOD Responsibilities. The Defense Production Act of 1950, Executive Order 12919, and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5000.60 focus primarily on ensuring adequate industrial capacity in support of national security. In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 identified national defense as a special function in the context of critical infrastructure protection. The July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the February 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, and HSPD-7 identify the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) as a critical infrastructure sector and designate DoD as the Sector Specific Agency (SSA). The DIB Sector provides products and services that are essential to mobilize, deploy, and sustain military operations. Within DOD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, ASD (HDHA), is assigned as the lead official for providing policy, guidance, oversight, and resource advocacy for these roles.138

   a. Federal Department. As a Federal department, DOD has both departmental and national responsibilities. Departmental responsibilities include the identification, prioritization, assessment, remediation, and protection of defense critical infrastructure and key resources. Additionally, all Federal departments and agencies work with State and local governments and the private sector to "prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit" critical infrastructure and key resources.

   b. Sector-Specific Agency. As the SSA for the Defense Industrial Base, DOD has the responsibilities to:

      (1) Collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector, including key persons and entities in their infrastructure sector;
      (2) Conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector;
      (3) Encourage risk-management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources; and
      (4) Support sector-coordinating mechanisms:
          • to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources; and
          • to facilitate sharing of information about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.139

IV. Cyberspace Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense

1. DOD Cyber Strategy. The first defense priority established in the 2022 National Defense Strategy is that of defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). In cyberspace, the Department will harness outward-facing capabilities to enable internal defense, identifying and mitigating threats before they can harm the American people. We will enable domestic cyber defense in coordination with interagency partners.\footnote{Lloyd J. Austin, 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy: Summary (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September, 2023), 6.} For cyberspace, the vulnerability and complex interrelationship of national and international networks require closely coordinated action among the military, other USG entities, and the private sector, at all levels. DISA, the Services, and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) are the DoD front line of defense. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the responsibility for securing US cyberspace at the national level by protecting non-DoD USG networks against cyberspace exploitation and attacks. Within DHS, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is tasked to protect USG network systems from malicious cyberspace activity.

   a. While the Department of Defense is the Sector Risk Management Agency for the DIB, other departments and agencies serve as such for energy, information technology, and other key sectors. These departments and agencies lead Federal risk management efforts for each of these critical infrastructure sectors. As a result, the Department has limited means to directly advance its policy vis-à-vis the cybersecurity of non-Defense Industrial Base (DIB) sectors.

   b. The Department, in particular, lacks the authority to employ military forces to defend private companies against cyber attacks. It may do so only if directed by the President, or (1) if the secretary of Defense or other appropriate DoD official approves a request for defense support of civil authorities from the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or another appropriate lead Federal agency; (2) at the invitation of such a company; and (3) in coordination with the relevant lead or Federal authority.\footnote{Lloyd J. Austin, 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy: Summary (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September, 2023), 7.} Given this – and the limited circumstances in which military cyber forces would be asked to defend civilian critical infrastructure – the Department will not posture itself to defend every private sector network. The Department can and will posture to enable better insights against foreign malicious cyber threats to disrupt foreign cyber threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, and to support requests for assistance from Federal civilian agencies or the private sector through appropriate channels.

   c. The Department will fully leverage the National Guard with its unique separate statuses as both a Federal and state-level entity to facilitate partnerships between the Federal Government and state, local, territorial, and tribal governments to support and augment cyber defense responses. We will continue to improve and expand coordination across the Federal Government and clearly communicate our priorities to interagency partners.\footnote{Lloyd J. Austin, 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy: Summary (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September, 2023), 7.}

2. Unified Action. Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and alignment of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Participants can include multinational forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, interorganizational partners, and even private commercial
partners. For cyberspace, the vulnerability and complex interrelationship of national and international networks require closely coordinated action among the military, other USG entities, and the private sector, at all levels. DISA, the Services, and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) are the DoD front line of defense. DHS has the responsibility for securing US cyberspace at the national level by protecting non-DoD USG networks against cyberspace exploitations and attacks. Within DHS, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is tasked to protect USG network systems from malicious cyberspace activity.  

![Figure 5-2: National Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities](image)

3. Command and Control (C2) of Cyberspace Operations. The homeland is a unique theater of operations for US forces and is subject to special requirements. The Service components to USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM work with DHS, other interagency partners, and civil authorities to support HS, which compliments some aspects of HD. The Services and Service components also support security cooperation activities with North American Partners to help build cooperative military defense as part of the effort to secure the approaches and ensure defense of the homeland in-depth.

The HS/HD C2 structure will depend on early identification of the responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities of the USG organizations which support HS/HD, plus the additional considerations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and multinational forces. The resulting complexity of C2, mission planning, and operational execution should drive early identification of the desired end states and necessary collaboration with the operational partners.

As stipulated in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM have specified tasks for HD activities. They are responsible for planning,

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142 JP 1, Vol 1, III-3; JP 3-27, II-3.
organizing, and executing HD operations within their respective AORs. Other CCDRs support them and contribute to the protection of the US homeland either through actions within their own AORs (forward regions and approaches) or through global responsibilities assigned in the UCP. However, cyberspace is a unique and evolving global domain. In that respect the CCDRs have specific responsibilities.

a. **CDRUSCYBERCOM.** CDRUSCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities for OCO, DCO, and DODIN operations, including CO to enable actions in the physical domains; facilitates freedom of action in cyberspace; and denies the same to adversaries. USCYBERCOM supports HD CO in collaboration with USNORTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, and DHS by coordinating activities within the required AOR and assisting with expertise and capabilities directed and made available.

b. **CDRUSCYBERCOM synchronizes planning for CO, to include DODIN operations and defense to secure, operate, and defend DoD cyberspace and, when ordered defends US critical cyberspace assets, systems, and functions. Directs DODIN operations and defense in coordination with CJCS, Services, and CCMDs. Coordinates with other CCMDs and appropriate USG departments and agencies prior to the creation of effects in cyberspace that cross AORs in response to malicious cyberspace activity. USCYBERCOM normally provides CO-IPEs to CCMDs to support CO during operations and exercises to liaison as required.**

(1) plans and executes global CO as directed. As the coordinating authority for planning CO, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, deconflicts, and conducts activities to:

a) Direct the security, operations, and defense of the DODIN.

b) Prepare to, and when directed conduct military CO in gray and red cyberspace, in support of national objectives.

c) Provide situational awareness, warning, assessment, and defense against significant foreign cyberspace threats to the United States and its interests.

d) Advocate for cyberspace capabilities.

(2) Exercises COCOM of the CMF and other cyberspace forces as assigned.

(3) Deconflicts cyberspace exploitation and cyberspace attack actions IAW national and DoD policy. Deconflicts influence operations within cyberspace.

(4) **As directed by SecDef, serves as the supported commander for CO in coordination with affected CCDRs. If the scope of the CO spans multiple CCMD AORs, CDRUSCYBERCOM is the supported commander. For theater-specific events USCYBERCOM may be designated a supporting or supported commander depending on the order issued. CCDRs are supported or supporting, as appropriate for theater/functional DODIN operations and DCO-IDM.**
(5) Leverages IC sensors and directs DODIN sensors, as appropriate, to establish and share comprehensive situational awareness of red, gray, and blue cyberspace in support of assigned missions and CCDRs requirements.

(6) Coordinates with the IC, CCMDs, Services, DoD agencies and activities, and multinational partners to facilitate development of improved access to gray and red cyberspace to support planning and operations.

(7) As directed, provides military representation to USG departments and agencies, US commercial entities, and international organizations for cyberspace matters.

(8) Notifies the CCMDs of ongoing or developing cyberspace threats and anomalies to reduce potential risks and effectively integrate systems, networks, services, and EMS usage and to ensure compliance with DoD-mandated DODIN configuration standards.

(9) Performs analysis of threats to the DODIN, including threat analysis of the MCA. In coordination with CCMDs, changes the global protection posture of the DODIN, as warranted by threat assessments. Serves as supported commander for DCO-IDM response to global cybersecurity threat events.

(10) Plans for and, as directed coordinates or executes DCO to defend US CI/KR and other blue cyberspace.

(11) In coordination with CCMDs, annually recommends cyberspace force mission alignment, through the JS, to SecDef for approval.

(12) As joint force provider for CO, identifies and recommends global join sourcing solutions to the CJCS, in coordination with the Services and other CCMDs, and supervises implementation of sourcing decisions.

(13) As joint force trainer for SecDef-designated “cyberspace operations forces:"
   a) Establishes and maintains training and certification standards
   b) Develops instructions and orders for provisioning and training
   c) Conducts and supports CO in joint training exercises

(14) Develops recommendations to the CJCS regarding strategy, policy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for CO and the joint employment of cyberspace forces.

(15) Plans, conducts, and provides oversight of cybersecurity policy inspections IAW Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8530.01, Cybersecurity Activities Support to DoD Information Network Operations, and conducts public key infrastructure audits IAW DODI 8520.02, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling.

(16) Is dual-hatted as the Director, National Security Agency/Central Security Service.
c. Other CCDRs:

(1) Secure, operate, and defend tactical and constructed DODIN segments within their commands and AORs.

(2) Integrate CO into plans (e.g., CCMD campaign plans, concept plans, and operations plans); integrate cyberspace capabilities into military operations as required; and work closely with the joint force, USCYBERCOM, SCCs, and DoD agencies to create fully integrated capabilities.

(3) In coordination with USCYBERCOM, as required through their respective JFHQ-C and CO-IPE, orchestrate planning efforts for CO, designate the desired effects of CO, and determine the timing and tempo for CO conducted in support of their missions. CCDRs with functional responsibilities direct DODIN operations and DCO-IDM over DODIN segments under their control, consistent with those responsibilities.

(4) CCDRs with an assigned AOR prioritize and request theater-specific DCO-IDM in response to compromises of DODIN security in coordination with JFHQ-DODIN through the unified command theater network control center or equivalent organization. For cybersecurity events that have been categorized as a global event by USCYBERCOM, CDRUSCYBERCOM is the supported commander for the DCO-IDM, and other CCDRs support response efforts and tasking from JFHQ-DODIN.

(5) Serve as a focal point for in-theater DODIN operations that integrate multinational partners.

(6) Plan for communications system support of operations that may be directed by SecDef and ensure the interoperability of DoD forces with non-DoD mission partners in terms of equipment, procedures, and standards.

(7) Retain authority to approve or deny DoD component-initiated modifications to the DODIN that impact in-theater operations only.

(8) In coordination with the DoD asset owner, heads of DoD components, and DoD infrastructure sector lead agents, CCDTs with an assigned AOR act to prevent the loss, degradation, or other denial of DoD-owned Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) within their AORs. Act only in coordination with the CJCS and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation for non-DoD-owned DCI.

(9) In coordination with CDRUSCYBERCOM, advocate for cyberspace capabilities and resources needed to support the CCDR’s missions.

(10) Provide users of the EMS with regulatory and operational guidance in the use of required frequencies for CO IAW coordinated agreements between US forces and PNs.

(11) In coordination with CDRUSCYBERCOM, conduct CO within assigned AORs.
(12) In coordination with CDRUSCYBERCOM, ensure CO security cooperation activities and cyberspace capability development actions support DoD priorities, goals, and objectives and are consistent with USCYBERCOM and CCDR responsibilities.

d. CDRUSINDOPACOM and CDRUSNORTHCOM. In addition to responsibilities noted above (“Other CCDRs”) these CCDRS fulfill specific CO responsibilities related to Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and homeland defense in coordination with CDRUSCYBERCOM.

(1) CDRUSNORTHCOM. As directed by the President, CDRUSNORTHCOM conducts military operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR utilizing forces to detect, deter, or defeat an incursion into US sovereign territory. CDRUSNORTHCOM has COCOM over United States Army, United States Air Force, United States Space Force, United States Navy, and United States Marine Corps Service component command headquarters and operational control (OPCON) over the theater special operations command (TSOC). When forces are OPCON to the command for HD operations, the deployment order or execute order (EXORD), will normally establish command relationships. CDRUSNORTHCOM, normally designated a supported commander for HD, determines the appropriate C2 structure to employ these forces. CDRUSNORTHCOM may retain direct C2 of forces as the JFC, designate an existing joint task force (JTF) commander or, establish a new subordinate JTF. CDRUSNORTHCOM and subordinate JTF commanders will normally organize forces around a joint construct with functional component commanders. However, CDRUSNORTHCOM may conduct HD operations using any combination of subordinate JFCs and functional component, Service component, single-Service task force (normally assigned to the Service component), or specific operational forces necessary to accomplish the mission.

(2) CDRUSINDOPACOM. CDRUSINDOPACOM integrates and synchronizes military activities across the competition continuum to defend the homeland against attacks and aggression. These activities include the protection of the domestic population; the critical infrastructure of the United States and its territories; and the domestic population and critical infrastructure of the sovereign nations, commonly called freely associated states, under the Compact of Free Association in the USINDOPACOM AOR. USINDOPACOM also contributes to the integrated, layered defense-in-depth of the western approaches to CONUS and Alaska. CDRUSINDOPACOM is the supported commander for HD within the USINDOPACOM AOR. Support relationships are coordinated among CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities such as against threats from outside the AOR (e.g., USINDOPACOM supporting USNORTHCOM or USINDOPACOM and USNORTHCOM supporting USCYBERCOM).
CDRUSINDOPACOM may be tasked to support the collaborative federated architecture for targeting required by CDRUSNORTHCOM.\textsuperscript{143}

4. Cyberspace Operations Forces and Missions. Defending the nation is paramount among USCYBERCOM missions. It means defending military systems, networks, and the critical infrastructure that enables national security. Every Combatant Command’s operational plan across the Department of Defense assumes that commanders will be able to leverage data and communicate orders and information rapidly and securely across the battlefield. In this regard USCYBERCOM plays a crucial role in dense of military systems, networks, and data.

a. The Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) was established as a subordinate unified command on December 19, 2022. Since 2018, the CNMF has deployed hunt forward teams numerous times to a number of countries to work on networks in gray and red cyberspace, generating insights and imposing costs on common adversaries. These partner-enabled ‘defend forward’ operations exposed malicious cyber activity by China, Russia, Iran and cyber criminals; made partner-nation networks more secure; increased global cybersecurity partnerships; led to the public release of more than 90 malware samples for analysis by the cybersecurity community and ultimately kept us safer at home. In competition there is not substitute for sharing accurate, timely, actionable intelligence to expose adversarial activity.\textsuperscript{144}

b. Whole of Nation Effort. USCYBERCOM manages only a portion of the "whole-of-nation" effort required to defend America’s critical infrastructure. The Command works with civilian agencies under their authorities to help protect national critical infrastructure and to prepare for scenarios in which U.S. military action to defend the nation may be required. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is the lead for cyber-related investigations and law enforcement, while the DHS takes the lead for national protection and recovery from cyber incidents. The Command is expanding its ties with the Reserves and the National Guard. Cyber response teams operating under Guard authorities can perform a variety of missions in support of state, local, and private entities (which operate independently under their own authorities). Recent legislation to incentivize information sharing will also help the Command and DOD to work more closely with the private sector in mitigating threats outside of government and military systems. The federal government has created a framework for implementing official channels to share information and clarifying the lanes in the road for U.S. government assistance to the private sector.\textsuperscript{145}

5. Defense Industrial Base (DIB). The DIB develops, manufactures, and maintains sensitive technologies vital to the defense of the Nation. Safeguarding the technical information used for the design and manufacture of these technologies is critical. Malicious cyber actors routinely target the DIB. Their malicious cyber activity imposes high opportunity cost, drawing resources

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{143} JP 3-27, II-6, II-10, II-13-II-14.
\end{flushright}
and attention from these companies’ core missions. These attacks also complicate the Department’s acquisition processes, raising costs for the Government and U.S. taxpayers.\textsuperscript{146}

DOD has the lead for improving security of the DIB sector, which includes major sector contractors and major contractor support to operations regardless of corporate country of domicile and continues to support the development of whole-of-government approaches for its risk management. The global technology supply chain affects mission-critical aspects of the DOD enterprise, and the resulting IT risks can only be effectively mitigated through public-private sector cooperation. DOD partners with the DIB to increase the security of information about DOD programs residing on or transiting DIB unclassified networks. The Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) serves as DOD’s operational focal point for voluntary cyberspace information sharing, and mandatory incident reporting. In addition, DOD is strengthening its acquisition regulations to require consideration of applicable cybersecurity policies during procurement of all DODIN components to reduce risks to joint operations.\textsuperscript{147}

To ensure DIB security, the Department will continue to convene government and industry officials and leverage public-private partnerships. We will invest in rapid information sharing and analysis and will develop a comprehensive approach for the identification, protection, detection, response, and recovery of critical DIB elements, thereby ensuring the reliability and integrity of critical weapons systems and production nodes.

Beyond information-sharing efforts, the Department will also align DIB contract incentives with DoD cybersecurity requirements. Toward this end, the Department will continue implementation of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Program, which requires companies to certify compliance with information security standards in order to receive certain priority contracts. We will complement this program with other efforts to increase active defense measures and improve data protection across the DIB, such as provision of no-cost cybersecurity services to qualifying companies. These services protect against the most common adversary exploitation vectors and reflect the Department’s continued partnership with small-to-medium-sized companies.\textsuperscript{148}

6. Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) Protection. U.S. adversaries regularly use malicious cyber activity to target our critical infrastructure. In crisis, they will seek to hinder U.S. military mobilization, sow chaos, and harm the American people. The Department will support whole-of-Government efforts to raise U.S. cybersecurity standards in order to increase resilience and make it more difficult for adversaries to disrupt these essential services.

Consistent with the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Department will leverage all legally available contractual mechanisms, resources, and operational arrangements to improve the cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastructure systems. We will expand public-private partnerships to ensure that DoD resources, expertise, and intelligence are made available to support key private sector initiatives. We will also draw upon the private sector’s technical expertise and analytic capabilities to identify foreign-based cyber activity and mitigate vulnerabilities on a global scale.\textsuperscript{149}

CI/KR consist of the infrastructure and assets vital to the nation’s security, governance, public health and safety, economy, and public confidence. In accordance with the National

\textsuperscript{146} 2023 \textit{DOD Cyber Strategy Summary}, 8.
\textsuperscript{147} JP 3-12, I-16 – 17.
\textsuperscript{148} 2023 \textit{DOD Cyber Strategy Summary}, 8.
\textsuperscript{149} 2023 \textit{DOD Cyber Strategy Summary}, 7.
Infrastructure Protection Plan, DOD is designated as the sector risk management agency for the DIB. DOD provides cyberspace analysis and forensics support via the DIB Cybersecurity and Information Assurance Program and DC3. Concurrent with its national defense and incident response missions, DOD may be directed to support DHS and other USG departments and agencies to help ensure all sectors of cyberspace CI/KR are available to support national objectives.

a. Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI). DCI is a subset of CI/KR that includes DOD and non-DOD assets essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. CCDRs with an assigned AOR have the responsibility to prevent the loss or degradation of DCI within their AORs and coordinate with the DOD asset owner, heads of DOD components, and defense infrastructure sector lead agents to fulfill this responsibility. As the lead agent of the DODIN sector of the DCI, the Commander, Joint Force Headquarters-DODIN (JFHQ-DODIN), is responsible for matters pertaining to the identification, prioritization, and remediation of critical DODIN infrastructure issues. Likewise, DOD coordinates and integrates, when necessary, with DHS for support of efforts to protect the DIB.\(^{150}\)

b. Private Industry and Public Infrastructure. Many of DOD’s critical functions and operations rely on contracted commercial assets, including Internet service providers (ISPs) and global supply chains, over which DOD and its forces have no direct authority. This includes both data storage services and applications provided from a cloud computing architecture. Cloud computing enables DOD to consolidate infrastructure, leverage commodity IT functions, and eliminate functional redundancies while improving continuity of operations. However, the overall success of these initiatives depends upon well-executed risk mitigation and protection measures, defined and understood by both DOD components and industry. Dependency on commercial Internet providers means DOD coordination with DHS, other interagency partners, and the private sector is essential to establish and maintain security of DOD’s information. DOD supports DHS, which leads interagency efforts to identify and mitigate cyberspace vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical infrastructure.\(^{151}\)

c. Critical Infrastructure Owners’ Responsibilities. DOD cannot, however, foster resilience in organizations that fall outside of its authority. In order for resilience to succeed as a factor in effective deterrence, other agencies of the government must work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and the private sector more broadly to develop resilient and redundant systems that can withstand a potential attack. Effective resilience measures can help convince potential adversaries of the futility of commencing cyberattacks on U.S. networks and systems.\(^{152}\)

e. DOD Policy.

(1) Coordinate, Train, Advise, and Assist (CTAA). DOD Policy authorizes CTAA cyber support and services provided incidental to military training to organizations and activities and for National Guard personnel use of DOD information networks, software, and hardware for State cyberspace activities. DOD CTAA cyber support and services do NOT include:

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\(^{150}\) JP 3-12, III-2.
\(^{151}\) JP 3-12, I-15 – 16.
\(^{152}\) DOD Cyber Strategy, 10-11.
• Offensive Cyberspace Operations or Defensive Cyberspace Operations – Response Actions.

• Support for civilian law enforcement purposes.

(2) Consult. Outside the context of CTAA training activities, DOD Components (including National Guard units serving in a title 32 U.S. Code, duty status) may consult with government entities and with public and private utilities, critical infrastructure owners, the DIB, and other non-governmental entities to protect DOD information networks, software, and hardware, enhance DOD cyber situational awareness, provide for DOD mission assurance requirements, and in order to provide cybersecurity unity of effort.\textsuperscript{153}

(3) Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response (DSCIR). DOD policy authorizes DSCIR within the framework of DSCA. DSCIR may include direct on-location support, remote support, or a combination of both as appropriate. DSCIR may be provided using DOD military personnel, DOD civilian personnel, and DOD contractor personnel (including National Guard units serving in a title 32 U.S. Code, duty status). Requests for assistance for DSCIR will be considered only if they include:

• Written acknowledgment that the entity receiving federal support understands that the federal support may include DOD support, which would be provided through the lead federal agency.

• Written permission for DOD to access appropriate information and information systems (e.g., applicable hardware, software, networks, servers, IP addresses, and databases).\textsuperscript{154}

• (Note) DTM expired September 19, 2023 – waiting for new issuance

V. Department of Homeland Security Cyberspace Responsibilities

1. DHS has the responsibility to secure U.S. cyberspace, at the national level, by protecting non-DOD USG networks against cyberspace intrusions and attacks, including actions to reduce and consolidate external access points, deploy passive network defenses and sensors, and define public and private partnerships in support of national cybersecurity policy.

2. DHS protects USG network systems from cyberspace threats and partners with government, industry, and academia, as well as the international community, to make cybersecurity a national priority and a shared responsibility.

3. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to PPD-41, United States Cyber Incident Coordination, DHS is the lead federal agency for cyberspace incident asset


response. For significant cybersecurity incidents external to the DODIN and Intelligence Community (IC) networks, DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the lead federal agency for technical assistance and vulnerability mitigation. \textsuperscript{155}

**VI. Department of Justice (DOJ) Cyberspace Responsibilities**

1. DOJ, including the FBI, leads counterterrorism and CI investigations and related LE activities associated with government and commercial CI/KR. DOJ investigates, defeats, prosecutes, and otherwise reduces foreign intelligence, terrorist, and other cyberspace threats to the nation’s CI/KR. The FBI is the lead agency for significant cybersecurity incident threat response activities, except those that affect the DODIN or the IC. Given the ability of malicious cyberspace activity to spread, investigation of serious cybersecurity threats to the DODIN are coordinated with the FBI.

2. The FBI also conducts domestic collection, analysis, and dissemination of cybersecurity threat information and operates the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, a multi-agency focal point for coordinating, integrating, and sharing pertinent information related to cybersecurity threat investigations, with representation from DHS, the IC, DOD, and other agencies as appropriate. \textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{155} JP 3-12, III-12–13.
\textsuperscript{156} JP 3-12, III-13.
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Appendix A includes:

I. U.S. Strategy and Policy
   - 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS)
   - National Intelligence Strategy (NIS)
   - 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy
   - Presidential Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity
   - Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

II. Department of State Cyberspace Policy
    - Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace
    - Recommendations to the President on Protecting American Cyber Interests through International Engagement
    - Recommendations to the President on Deterring Adversaries and Better Protecting the American People from Cyber Threats

III. Department of Homeland Security Strategy and Guidance
     - CISA Cybersecurity Strategic Plan
     - Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

IV. Department of Justice Cyber Strategy and Guidance
    - DOJ 2022 Comprehensive Cyber Review
    - FBI Cyber Strategy

V. Department of Defense Strategy
    - 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy
    - National Military Strategy (NMS)
    - 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)
    - 2022 DoD Zero Trust Strategy
    - 2023 Posture Statement of GENERAL Paul M. Nakasone

VI. U.S. Cyber Law Guidance
    - DoD General Counsel Remarks and U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference
- National Position of the United States of America Cyberspace (2020)
- DoS Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategy 2023
- International Cyber Law Considerations

VII. Artificial Intelligence
- Executive Order, October 2023
- DoD Artificial Intelligence Strategy, June 2023
I. U.S. Strategy and Policy

A. 2022 National Security Strategy (excerpts)

Our Enduring Vision

We face two strategic challenges. The first is that the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next. The second is that while this competition is underway, people all over the world are struggling to cope with the effects of shared challenges that cross borders—whether it is climate change, food insecurity, communicable diseases, terrorism, energy shortages, or inflation.

This National Security Strategy lays out our plan to achieve a better future of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world. Our strategy is rooted in our national interests: to protect the security of the American people; to expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. We can do none of this alone and we do not have to. Most nations around the world define their interests in ways that are compatible with ours. We will build the strongest and broadest possible coalition of nations that seek to cooperate with each other, while competing with those powers that offer a darker vision and thwarting their efforts to threaten our interests.157

Overview of Our Strategic Approach.

Our goal is clear—we want a free, open, prosperous, and secure international order. We seek an order that is free in that it allows people to enjoy their basic, universal rights and freedoms. It is open in that it provides all nations that sign up to these principles an opportunity to participate in, and have a role in shaping, the rules. It is prosperous in that it empowers all nations to continually raise the standard of living for their citizens. And secure, in that it is free from aggression, coercion and intimidation. Achieving this goal requires three lines of effort. We will:

1) invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence;
2) build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and
3) modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland.

Our approach encompasses all elements of national power—diplomacy, development cooperation, industrial strategy, economic statecraft, intelligence, and defense—and is built on several key pillars.

First, we have broken down the dividing line between foreign policy and domestic policy. We understand that if the United States is to succeed abroad, we must invest in our innovation and industrial strength, and build our resilience, at home.

Second, our alliances and partnerships around the world are our most important strategic asset and an indispensable element contributing to international peace and stability. Strong alliances and our traditional security partnerships not only deter aggression they provide a platform for mutually beneficial cooperation that strengthens the international order. The United States is a
global power with global interests. If one region descends into chaos or is dominated by a hostile power, it will detrimentally impact our interests in the others.

Third, this strategy recognizes that the PRC presents America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge. Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally but it lacks the across the spectrum capabilities of the PRC. Iran interferes in the internal affairs of neighbors, proliferates missiles and drones through proxies, is plotting to harm Americans, including former officials, and is advancing a nuclear program beyond any credible civilian need. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to expand its illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs.

Fourth, we will avoid the temptation to see the world solely through the prism of strategic competition and will continue to engage countries on their own terms. We will pursue an affirmative agenda to advance peace and security and to promote prosperity in every region.

Fifth, we recognize that globalization has delivered immense benefits for the United States and the world but an adjustment is now required to cope with dramatic global changes such as widening inequality within and among countries, the PRC’s emergence as both our most consequential competitor and one of our largest trading partners, and emerging technologies that fall outside the bounds of existing rules and regulations.

Finally, the community of nations that shares our vision for the future of international order is broad and includes countries on every continent. We share in common a desire for relations among nations to be governed by the UN Charter; for the universal rights of all individuals—political, civil, economic, social and cultural—to be upheld; for our environment, air, oceans, space, cyberspace and arteries of international commerce to be protected and accessible for all; and for international institutions, including the United Nations, to be modernized and strengthened to better address global challenges and deliver more tangible benefits for our citizens.

**Investing in our National Power to Maintain a Competitive Edge.**

To outcompete our rivals and tackle shared challenges, America will need to maintain and refine its competitive edge by making critical domestic investments. In an interconnected world, there is no bright line between foreign and domestic policy.

**Implementing a Modern Industrial and Innovation Strategy.**

The private sector and open markets have been, and continue to be, a vital source of our national strength and a key driver of innovation. We are identifying and investing in key areas where private industry, on its own, has not mobilized to protect our core economic and national security interests, including bolstering our national resilience. We are securing our critical infrastructure, advancing foundational cybersecurity for critical sectors from pipelines to water, and working with the private sector to improve security defenses in technology products. We are securing our supply chains, including through new forms of public-private collaboration, and using public procurement in critical markets to stimulate demand for innovation.

We are also protecting our investments and bolstering their resilience through tracking, attributing, and defending against the activities of malicious actors in cyberspace. And we are countering intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, and other attempts to degrade our technological advantages by enhancing investment screening, export controls, and counterintelligence resources.
Modernizing and Strengthening Our Military

The American military is the strongest fighting force the world has ever known. America will not hesitate to use force when necessary to defend our national interests. But we will do so as the last resort and only when the objectives and mission are clear and achievable, consistent with our values and laws, alongside non-military tools, and the mission is undertaken with the informed consent of the American people.

Our approach to national defense is described in detail in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Our starting premise is that a powerful U.S. military helps advance and safeguard vital U.S. national interests by backstopping diplomacy, confronting aggression, deterring conflict, projecting strength, and protecting the American people and their economic interests. Amid intensifying competition, the military’s role is to maintain and gain warfighting advantages while limiting those of our competitors. The military will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the PRC as its pacing challenge. We will make disciplined choices regarding our national defense and focus our attention on the military’s primary responsibilities: to defend the homeland, and deter attacks and aggression against the United States, our allies and partners, while being prepared to fight and win the Nation’s wars should diplomacy and deterrence fail. To do so, we will combine our strengths to achieve maximum effect in deterring acts of aggression—an approach we refer to as integrated deterrence. We will operate our military using a campaigning mindset—sequencing logically linked military activities to advance strategy-aligned priorities.

The war in Ukraine highlights the criticality of a vibrant Defense Industrial Base for the United States and its allies and partners. It must not only be capable of rapidly manufacturing proven capabilities needed to defend against adversary aggression, but also empowered to innovate and creatively design solutions as battlefield conditions evolve. As emerging technologies transform warfare and pose novel threats to the United States and our allies and partners, we are investing in a range of advanced technologies including applications in the cyber and space domains, missile defeat capabilities, trusted artificial intelligence, and quantum systems, while deploying new capabilities to the battlefield in a timely manner. Incorporating allies and partners at every stage of defense planning is crucial to meaningful collaboration.
Out - Competing China and Constraining Russia

China

The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. The PRC is investing in a military that is rapidly modernizing, increasingly capable in the Indo-Pacific, and growing in strength and reach globally – all while seeking to erode U.S. alliances in the region and around the world.

Our strategy toward the PRC is threefold: 1) to invest in the foundations of our strength at home - our competitiveness, our innovation, our resilience, our democracy, 2) to align our efforts with...
our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause, and 3) compete responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.

Russia

Over the past decade, the Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. This culminated in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to topple its government and bring it under Russian control. Russia has also interfered brazenly in U.S. politics and worked to sow divisions among the American people.

While some aspects of our approach will depend on the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, a number of elements are already clear. First, the United States will continue to support Ukraine in its fight for its freedom, we will help Ukraine recover economically, and we will encourage its regional integration with the European Union. Second, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory and will continue to build and deepen a coalition with allies and partners to prevent Russia from causing further harm to European security, democracy, and institutions. Third, the United States will deter and, as necessary, respond to Russian actions that threaten core U.S. interests, including Russian attacks on our infrastructure and our democracy. Fourth, Russia’s conventional military will have been weakened, which will likely increase Moscow’s reliance on nuclear weapons in its military planning. The United States will not allow Russia, or any power, to achieve its objectives through using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons.

Shaping the Rules of the Road

Since 1945, the United States has led the creation of institutions, norms, and standards to govern international trade and investment, economic policy, and technology. These mechanisms advanced America’s economic and geopolitical aims and benefited people around the world by shaping how governments and economies interacted—and did so in ways that aligned with U.S interests and values. These mechanisms have not kept pace with economic or technological changes, and today risk being irrelevant, or in certain cases, actively harmful to solving the challenges we now face—from insecure supply chains to widening inequality to the abuses of the PRC’s nonmarket economic actions. We are endeavoring to strengthen and update the UN system and multilateral institutions generally. Nowhere is this need more acute than in updating the rules of the road for technology, cyberspace, trade, and economics.

Technology

Technology is central to today’s geopolitical competition and to the future of our national security, economy and democracy. U.S. and allied leadership in technology and innovation has long underpinned our economic prosperity and military strength. In the next decade, critical and emerging technologies are poised to retool economies, transform militaries, and reshape the world. The United States is committed to a future where these technologies increase the security, prosperity, and values of the American people and like-minded democracies.

To achieve these goals, the digital backbones of the modern economy must be open, trusted, interoperable, reliable, and secure. That requires working with a broad range of partners to advance network infrastructure resilience in 5G and other advanced communication technologies, including by promoting vendor diversity and securing supply chains.

Securing Cyberspace

Our societies, and the critical infrastructure that supports them, from power to pipelines, is increasingly digital and vulnerable to disruption or destruction via cyber attacks. Such attacks have been used by countries, such as Russia, to undermine countries’ ability to deliver services to citizens and coerce populations. We are working closely with allies and partners, such as the
Quad, to define standards for critical infrastructure to rapidly improve our cyber resilience, and building collective capabilities to rapidly respond to attacks. In the face of disruptive cyber attacks from criminals, we have launched innovative partnerships, to expand law enforcement cooperation, deny sanctuary to cyber criminals and counter illicit use of cryptocurrency to launder the proceeds of cybercrime. As an open society, the United States has a clear interest in strengthening norms that mitigate cyber threats and enhance stability in cyberspace. We aim to deter cyber attacks from state and non state actors and will respond decisively with all appropriate tools of national power to hostile acts in cyberspace, including those that disrupt or degrade vital national functions or critical infrastructure. We will continue to promote adherence to the UN General Assembly-endorsed framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which recognizes that international law applies online, just as it does offline.

Conclusion
We are confident that the United States, alongside our allies and partners, is positioned to succeed in our pursuit of a free, open, prosperous, and secure global order. With the key elements outlined in this strategy, we will tackle the twin challenges of our time: out-competing our rivals to shape the international order while tackling shared challenges, including climate change, pandemic preparedness, and food security, that will define the next stage of human history. We will strengthen democracy across the world, and multilateral institutions, as we look to the future to chart new and fair rules of the road for emerging technology, cybersecurity, and trade and economics. And we will do all this and more by leveraging our considerable advantages and our unparalleled coalition of allies and partners.
B. 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy (excerpts)

Digital technologies today touch nearly every aspect of American life. Cybersecurity is essential to the basic functioning of our economy, the operation of our critical infrastructure, the strength of our democracy and democratic institutions, the privacy of our data and communications, and our national defense.

This strategy recognizes that robust collaboration, particularly between the public and private sectors, is essential to securing cyberspace. It also takes on the systemic challenge that too much of the responsibility for cybersecurity has fallen on individual users and small organizations. By working in partnership with industry; civil society; and State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, we will rebalance the responsibility for cybersecurity to be more effective and more equitable. We will realign incentives to favor long-term investments in security, resilience, and promising new technologies. We will collaborate with our allies and partners to strengthen norms of responsible state behavior, hold countries accountable for irresponsible behavior in cyberspace, and disrupt the networks of criminals behind dangerous cyberattacks around the globe. And we will work with the Congress to provide the resources and tools necessary to ensure effective cybersecurity practices are implemented across our most critical infrastructure.

We must ensure the Internet remains open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure—anchored in universal values that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Digital connectivity should be a tool that uplifts and empowers people everywhere, not one used for repression and coercion. As this strategy details, the United States is prepared to meet this challenge from a position of strength, leading in lockstep with our closest allies and working with partners everywhere who share our vision for a brighter digital future.

Introduction

We have learned hard lessons and made significant progress in the collaborative defense of our digital ecosystem. Every day, cyber defenders foil state-backed attacks and prevent criminal plots around the world. But the underlying structural dynamics of the digital ecosystem frustrate their efforts. Its components remain prone to disruption, vulnerable to exploitation, and are often co-opted by malicious actors.

We must make fundamental changes to the underlying dynamics of the digital ecosystem, shifting the advantage to its defenders and perpetually frustrating the forces that would threaten it. Our goal is a defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them, where sensitive or private information is secure and protected, and where neither incidents nor errors cascade into catastrophic, systemic consequences. In creating these conditions, we can and must seize the opportunity to instill our most cherished values, as embodied by the Declaration for the Future of the Internet (DFI) and by the Freedom Online Coalition.

This strategy will position the United States and its allies and partners to build that digital ecosystem together, making it more easily and inherently defensible, resilient, and aligned with our values. By the end of this decisive decade, we will achieve these outcomes so we can confidently take bold leaps into a digitally-enabled future that benefits us all.
Strategic Environment

Emerging Trends

The world is entering a new phase of deepening digital dependencies. Software and systems are growing more complex, providing value to companies and consumers but also increasing our collective insecurity. Too often, we are layering new functionality and technology onto already intricate and brittle systems at the expense of security and resilience. The widespread introduction of artificial intelligence systems—which can act in ways unexpected to even their own creators—is heightening the complexity and risk associated with many of our most important technological systems.

The Internet continues to connect individuals, businesses, communities, and countries on shared platforms that enable scaled business solutions and international exchange. But this accelerating global interconnectivity also introduces risks. An attack on one organization, sector, or state can rapidly spill over to other sectors and regions, as happened during Russia’s 2017 “NotPetya” cyberattack on Ukraine, which spread across Europe, Asia, and the Americas, causing billions of dollars in damage. The potential cost of attacks like this will only grow as interdependencies increase.

Digital technologies increasingly touch the most sensitive aspects of our lives, providing convenience, but also creating new, often unforeseen risks. Next-generation interconnectivity is collapsing the boundary between the digital and physical worlds, and exposing some of our most essential systems to disruption. Our factories, power grids, and water treatment facilities, among other essential infrastructure, are increasingly shedding old analog control systems and rapidly bringing online digital operational technology (OT). Advanced wireless technologies, IoT, and space-based assets—including those enabling positioning, navigation, and timing for civilian and military uses, environmental and weather monitoring, and everyday Internet-based activities from banking to telemedicine—will accelerate this trend, moving many of our essential systems online and making cyberattacks inherently more destructive and impactful to our daily lives.

Malicious Actors

Malicious cyber activity has evolved from nuisance defacement, to espionage and intellectual property theft, to damaging attacks against critical infrastructure, to ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled influence campaigns designed to undermine public trust in the foundation of our democracy. Once available only to a small number of well-resourced countries, offensive hacking tools and services, including foreign commercial spyware, are now widely accessible. These tools and services empower countries that previously lacked the ability to harm U.S. interests in cyberspace and enable a growing threat from organized criminal syndicates.

The governments of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other autocratic states with revisionist intent are aggressively using advanced cyber capabilities to pursue objectives that run counter to our interests and broadly accepted international norms. Their reckless disregard for the rule of law and human rights in cyberspace is threatening U.S. national security and economic prosperity.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) now presents the broadest, most active, and most persistent threat to both government and private sector networks and is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Over the last ten years, it has expanded cyber operations beyond intellectual property theft to become our most advanced strategic competitor with the capacity to threaten U.S. interests and dominate emerging technologies critical to
global development. Having successfully harnessed the Internet as the backbone of its surveillance state and influence capabilities, the PRC is exporting its vision of digital authoritarianism, striving to shape the global Internet in its image and imperiling human rights beyond its borders.

For more than two decades, the Russian government has used its cyber capabilities to destabilize its neighbors and interfere in the domestic politics of democracies around the world. Russia remains a persistent cyber threat as it refines its cyber espionage, attack, influence, and disinformation capabilities to coerce sovereign countries, harbor transnational criminal actors, weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships, and subvert the rules-based international system. Like its 2017 “NotPetya” attack, Russia’s cyberattacks in support of its 2022 brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine have resulted in irresponsible spillover impacts onto civilian critical infrastructure in other European countries.

The governments of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are similarly growing in their sophistication and willingness to conduct malicious activity in cyberspace. Iran has used cyber capabilities to threaten U.S. allies in the Middle East and elsewhere, while the DPRK conducts cyber activities to generate revenue through criminal enterprises, such as through the theft of cryptocurrency, ransomware, and the deployment of surreptitious information technology (IT) workers for the purposes of fueling its nuclear ambitions. Further maturation of these capabilities could have significant impacts on U.S., allied, and partner interests.

The cyber operations of criminal syndicates now represent a threat to the national security, public safety, and economic prosperity of the United States and its allies and partners. Ransomware incidents have disrupted critical services and businesses across the country and around the world, from energy pipelines and food companies, to schools and hospitals. Total economic losses from ransomware attacks continue to climb, reaching billions of U.S. dollars annually. Criminal syndicates often operate out of states that do not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement and frequently encourage, harbor, or tolerate such activities. These and other malicious cyber activities continue to threaten Americans across society, including disproportionately affecting those without the resources necessary to protect themselves, recover, or seek recourse.

Our Approach

This strategy seeks to build and enhance collaboration around five pillars: (1) Defend Critical Infrastructure, (2) Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors, (3) Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience, (4) Invest in a Resilient Future, and (5) Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals.

To realize the vision these pillars lay out, we will make two fundamental shifts in how the United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources in cyberspace.

Rebalance the Responsibility to Defend Cyberspace

The most capable and best-positioned actors in cyberspace must be better stewards of the digital ecosystem. Today, end users bear too great a burden for mitigating cyber risks. Individuals, small businesses, state and local governments, and infrastructure operators have limited resources and competing priorities, yet these actors’ choices can have a significant impact on our national cybersecurity. A single person’s momentary lapse in judgment, use of an outdated password, or errant click on a suspicious link should not have national security consequences. Our collective cyber resilience cannot rely on the constant vigilance of our smallest organizations and individual citizens.
Instead, across both the public and private sectors, we must ask more of the most capable and best-positioned actors to make our digital ecosystem secure and resilient. In a free and interconnected society, protecting data and assuring the reliability of critical systems must be the responsibility of the owners and operators of the systems that hold our data and make our society function, as well as of the technology providers that build and service these systems. Government’s role is to protect its own systems; to ensure private entities, particularly critical infrastructure, are protecting their systems; and to carry out core governmental functions such as engaging in diplomacy, collecting intelligence, imposing economic costs, enforcing the law, and, conducting disruptive actions to counter cyber threats. Together, industry and government must drive effective and equitable collaboration to correct market failures, minimize the harms from cyber incidents to society’s most vulnerable, and defend our shared digital ecosystem.

**Realign Incentives to Favor Long-Term Investments**

Our economy and society must incentivize decision-making to make cyberspace more resilient and defensible over the long term. Balancing short-term imperatives against a long-term vision will be no easy task. We must defend the systems we have now, while investing in and building toward a future digital ecosystem that is more inherently defensible and resilient.

This strategy outlines how the Federal Government will use all tools available to reshape incentives and achieve unity of effort in a collaborative, equitable, and mutually beneficial manner. We must ensure that market forces and public programs alike reward security and resilience, build a robust and diverse cyber workforce, embrace security and resilience by design, strategically coordinate research and development investments in cybersecurity, and promote the collaborative stewardship of our digital ecosystem. To achieve these goals, the Federal Government will focus on points of leverage, where minimally invasive actions will produce the greatest gains in defensibility and systemic resilience.

The Federal Government is making generational investments in renewing our infrastructure, digitizing and decarbonizing our energy systems, securing our semiconductor supply chains, modernizing our cryptographic technologies, and rejuvenating our foreign and domestic policy priorities. The United States has an opportunity to rebalance the incentives necessary to lay a stronger, more resilient foundation on which to build the future of our digital ecosystem.

**Building on Existing Policy**

…forward-leaning efforts have laid the foundation upon which this strategy is built. It was developed alongside the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy by a broad interagency team and through a months-long consultation process with the private sector and civil society. It is informed by and implements the values of the DFI, the Freedom Online Coalition, and other long-standing efforts to realize a democratic vision for our digital ecosystem. It carries forward the foundational direction of Executive Order (EO) 14028, “Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” National Security Memorandum (NSM) 5, “Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control Systems,” NSM 8, “Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, Department of Defense (DoD), and Intelligence Community Systems,” and other executive actions. It integrates cybersecurity into the once-in-a-generation new investments made by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the Inflation Reduction Act, the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act, and EO 14017, “America’s Supply Chains.”

This strategy also builds on the work of prior administrations. It replaces the 2018 National Cyber Strategy but continues momentum on many of its priorities, including the collaborative defense of the digital ecosystem. The Administration remains committed to enhancing the security and resilience of U.S. space systems, including by implementing Space Policy Directive
5, “Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems.” The Administration also continues to implement critical efforts to secure next-generation technologies, including through the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative and the National Strategy to Secure 5G, among other existing policies and initiatives.


Pillar One – Defend Critical Infrastructure

Defending the systems and assets that constitute our critical infrastructure is vital to our national security, public safety, and economic prosperity. The American people must have confidence in the availability and resilience of this infrastructure and the essential services it provides. We aim to operationalize an enduring and effective model of collaborative defense that equitably distributes risk and responsibility, and delivers a foundational level of security and resilience for our digital ecosystem.

Strategic Objective 1.1: Establish Cybersecurity Requirements to Support National Security and Public Safety

The American people must have confidence in the critical services underpinning their lives and the nation’s economy. While voluntary approaches to critical infrastructure cybersecurity have produced meaningful improvements, the lack of mandatory requirements has resulted in inadequate and inconsistent outcomes.

Establish Cybersecurity Regulations to Secure Critical Infrastructure

The Federal Government will use existing authorities to set necessary cybersecurity requirements in critical sectors.

Strategic Objective 1.2: Scale Public-Private Collaboration

Defending critical infrastructure against adversarial activity and other threats requires a model of cyber defense that emulates the distributed structure of the Internet.

CISA is the national coordinator for critical infrastructure security and resilience. In this role, CISA coordinates with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) to enable the Federal Government to scale its coordination with critical infrastructure owners and operators across the United States. SRMAs have day-to-day responsibility and sector-specific expertise to improve security and resilience within their sectors. In turn, SRMAs support individual owners and operators in their respective sectors who are responsible for protecting the systems and assets they operate. Information sharing and analysis organizations (ISAOs), sector-focused information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs), and similar organizations facilitate cyber defense operations across vast and complex sectors.

We must complement human-to-human collaboration efforts with machine-to-machine data sharing and security orchestration. Realizing this model will enable real-time, actionable, and multi-directional sharing to drive threat response at machine speed. In partnership with the private sector, CISA and SRMAs will explore technical and organizational mechanisms to enhance and evolve machine-to-machine sharing of data.
Strategic Objective 1.3: Integrate Federal Cybersecurity Centers

The Federal Government must coordinate the authorities and capabilities of the departments and agencies that are collectively responsible for supporting the defense of critical infrastructure. Federal Cybersecurity Centers serve as collaborative nodes that fuse together whole-of-government capabilities across the homeland defense, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, economic, and military missions.

Strategic Objective 1.4: Update Federal Incident Response Plans and Processes

The private sector is capable of mitigating most cyber incidents without direct Federal assistance. When Federal assistance is required, the Federal Government must present a unified, coordinated, whole-of-government response. Organizations targeted by cyber threats must know which government agencies to contact for what purposes. The Federal Government must provide clear guidance on how private sector partners can reach Federal agencies for support during cyber incidents and what forms of support the Federal Government may provide.

Consistent with Presidential Policy Directive 41, “United States Cyber Incident Coordination,”—which defines lead roles for the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in threat, asset, and intelligence response efforts, respectively—CISA will lead a process to update the subordinate National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) to strengthen processes, procedures, and systems to more fully realize the policy that “a call to one is a call to all.” When any Federal agency receives a request for assistance, the agency will know what support the wider Federal Government can provide, how to contact the right Federal agencies that can provide such support, and have access to effective information sharing mechanisms. Because most Federal responses take place through field offices, the NCIRP will bolster coordination at the local level, taking lessons from the successes of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

Strategic Objective 1.5: Modernize Federal Defenses

The Federal Government requires secure and resilient information, communications, and operational technology and services to perform its duties. In its first months, this Administration set a new strategic direction for Federal cybersecurity, publishing EO 14028, “Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” which led to the release of NSM 8, “Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, the Defense Department, and Intelligence Community Systems,” and the OMB Federal zero trust architecture strategy.

Collectively Defend Federal Civilian Agencies

Federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agencies are responsible for managing and securing their own IT and OT systems. With different agency structures, missions, capabilities, and resourcing, FCEB cybersecurity outcomes vary.

OMB, in coordination with CISA, will develop a plan of action to secure FCEB systems through collective operational defense, expanded availability of centralized shared services, and software supply chain risk mitigation.

Modernize Federal Systems

The Federal Government must replace or update IT and OT systems that are not defensible against sophisticated cyber threats. The OMB zero trust architecture strategy directs FCEB agencies to implement multi-factor authentication, encrypt their data, gain visibility into their entire attack surface, manage authorization and access, and adopt cloud security tools. These and other cybersecurity goals cannot be achieved unless Federal IT and OT systems are modernized so they are capable of leveraging critical security technologies.
Defend National Security Systems

National security systems (NSS) store and process some of the Federal Government’s most sensitive data and must be secured against a wide range of cyber and physical threats, including insider threats, cyber criminals, and the most sophisticated nation-state adversaries. The Director of the NSA, as the National Manager for NSS, will coordinate with OMB to develop a plan for NSS at FCEB agencies that ensures implementation of the enhanced cybersecurity requirements of NSM-8.

Pillar Two – Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors

The United States will use all instruments of national power to disrupt and dismantle threat actors whose actions threaten our interests. These efforts may integrate diplomatic, information, military (both kinetic and cyber), financial, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities. Our goal is to make malicious actors incapable of mounting sustained cyber-enabled campaigns that would threaten the national security or public safety of the United States.

Strategic Objective 2.1: Integrate Federal Disruption Activities

Disruption campaigns must become so sustained and targeted that criminal cyber activity is rendered unprofitable and foreign government actors engaging in malicious cyber activity no longer see it as an effective means of achieving their goals.

*The Department of Defense’s strategic approach of defending forward* has helped generate insights on threat actors, identify and expose malware, and disrupt malicious activity before it could affect its intended targets. Informed by lessons learned and the rapidly-evolving threat environment, DoD will develop an updated departmental cyber strategy aligned with the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and this National Cybersecurity Strategy. DoD’s new strategy will clarify how U.S. Cyber Command and other DoD components will integrate cyberspace operations into their efforts to defend against state and non-state actors capable of posing strategic-level threats to U.S. interests, while continuing to strengthen their integration and coordination of operations with civilian, law enforcement, and intelligence partners to disrupt malicious activity at scale.

…DoD and the Intelligence Community are committed to bringing to bear their full range of complementary authorities to disruption campaigns.

Strategic Objective 2.2: Enhance Public-Private Operational Collaboration to Disrupt Adversaries

The private sector has growing visibility into adversary activity. This body of insight is often broader and more detailed than that of the Federal Government, due in part to the sheer scale of the private sector and its threat hunting operations, but also due to the rapid pace of innovation in tooling and capabilities. Effective disruption of malicious cyber activity requires more routine collaboration between the private sector entities that have unique insights and capabilities and the Federal agencies that have the means and authorities to act.

Strategic Objective 2.3: Increase The Speed and Scale of Intelligence Sharing and Victim Notification

The timely sharing of threat intelligence between Federal and non-Federal partners enhances collaborative efforts to disrupt and dismantle adversaries. Open-source cybersecurity intelligence and private sector intelligence providers have greatly increased collective awareness of cyber threats, but national intelligence that only the government can collect remains invaluable.
The Federal Government will increase the speed and scale of cyber threat intelligence sharing to proactively warn cyber defenders and notify victims when the government has information that an organization is being actively targeted or may already be compromised.

**Strategic Objective 2.4: Prevent Abuse of U.S.-Based Infrastructure**

**Strategic Objective 2.5: Counter Cybercrime, Defeat Ransomware**

**Pillar Three – Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience**

**Strategic Objective 3.1: Hold the Stewards of Our Data Accountable**

**Strategic Objective 3.2: Drive the Development of Secure IoT Devices**

**Strategic Objective 3.3: Shift Liability For Insecure Software Products and Services**

**Strategic Objective 3.4: Use Federal Grants and Other Incentives to Build in Security**

**Strategic Objective 3.5: Leverage Federal Procurement to Improve Accountability**

**Strategic Objective 3.6: Explore a Federal Cyber Insurance Backstop**

**Pillar Four – Invest in a Resilient Future**

**Strategic Objective 4.1: Secure the Technical Foundation of the Internet**

**Strategic Objective 4.2: Reinvigorate Federal Research and Development for Cybersecurity**

**Strategic Objective 4.3: Prepare for our Post-Quantum Future**

**Strategic Objective 4.4: Secure Our Clean Energy Future**

**Strategic Objective 4.5: Support Development of a Digital Identity Ecosystem**

**Strategic Objective 4.6: Develop a National Strategy To Strengthen our Cyber Workforce**

**Pillar Five – Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals**

The United States seeks a world where responsible state behavior in cyberspace is expected and rewarded and where irresponsible behavior is isolating and costly. To achieve this goal, we will continue to engage with countries working in opposition to our larger agenda on common problems while we build a broad coalition of nations working to maintain an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.

**Strategic Objective 5.1: Build Coalitions To Counter Threats to Our Digital Ecosystem**

**Strategic Objective 5.2: Strengthen International Partner Capacity**

As we build a coalition to advance shared cybersecurity priorities and promote a common vision for the digital ecosystem, the United States will strengthen the capacity of like-minded states across the globe to support these goals. We must enable our allies and partners to secure critical infrastructure networks, build effective incident detection and response capabilities, share cyber threat information, pursue diplomatic collaboration, build law enforcement capacity and effectiveness through operational collaboration, and support our shared interests in cyberspace by adhering to international law and reinforcing norms of responsible state behavior.
To accomplish this goal, the United States will marshal expertise across agencies, the public and private sectors, and among advanced regional partners to pursue coordinated and effective international cyber capacity-building and operational collaboration efforts. Within the law enforcement community, DOJ will continue to build a more robust cybercrime cooperation paradigm through bilateral and multilateral engagement and agreements, formal and informal cooperation, and providing international and regional leadership to strengthen cybercrime laws, policies, and operations. DoD will continue to strengthen its military-to-military relationships to leverage allies’ and partners’ unique skills and perspectives while building their capacity to contribute to our collective cybersecurity posture. The Department of State will continue to coordinate whole-of-government efforts to ensure Federal capacity building priorities are strategically aligned and further U.S., allied, and partner interests.

**Strategic Objective 5.3: Expand U.S. Ability to Assist Allies and Partners**

**Strategic Objective 5.4: Build Coalitions To Reinforce Global Norms of Responsible State Behavior**

**Strategic Objective 5.5: Secure Global Supply Chains for Information, Communications, and Operational Technology Products and Services**
C. Presidential Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity

On 12 May 2021, President Biden signed an Executive Order aimed at strengthening cybersecurity. The following is the Fact Sheet that provides an overview of the order (the Executive Order can be found at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-improving-the-nations-cybersecurity/):

**FACT SHEET: President Signs Executive Order Charting New Course to Improve the Nation’s Cybersecurity and Protect Federal Government Networks**

Today, President Biden signed an Executive Order to improve the nation’s cybersecurity and protect federal government networks. Recent cybersecurity incidents such as SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange, and the Colonial Pipeline incident are a sobering reminder that U.S. public and private sector entities increasingly face sophisticated malicious cyber activity from both nation-state actors and cyber criminals. These incidents share commonalities, including insufficient cybersecurity defenses that leave public and private sector entities more vulnerable to incidents.

This Executive Order makes a significant contribution toward modernizing cybersecurity defenses by protecting federal networks, improving information-sharing between the U.S. government and the private sector on cyber issues, and strengthening the United States’ ability to respond to incidents when they occur. It is the first of many ambitious steps the Administration is taking to modernize national cyber defenses. However, the Colonial Pipeline incident is a reminder that federal action alone is not enough. Much of our domestic critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, and those private sector companies make their own determination regarding cybersecurity investments. We encourage private sector companies to follow the Federal government’s lead and take ambitious measures to augment and align cybersecurity investments with the goal of minimizing future incidents.

Specifically, the Executive Order the President is signing today will:

**Remove Barriers to Threat Information Sharing Between Government and the Private Sector.** The Executive Order ensures that IT Service Providers are able to share information with the government and requires them to share certain breach information. IT providers are often hesitant or unable to voluntarily share information about a compromise. Sometimes this can be due to contractual obligations; in other cases, providers simply may be hesitant to share information about their own security breaches. Removing any contractual barriers and requiring providers to share breach information that could impact Government networks is necessary to enable more effective defenses of Federal departments, and to improve the Nation’s cybersecurity as a whole.

**Modernize and Implement Stronger Cybersecurity Standards in the Federal Government.** The Executive Order helps move the Federal government to secure cloud services and a zero-trust architecture, and mandates deployment of multifactor authentication and encryption with a specific time period. Outdated security models and unencrypted data have led to compromises of systems in the public and private sectors. The Federal government must lead the way and increase its adoption of security best practices, including by employing a zero-trust security model, accelerating movement to secure cloud services, and consistently deploying foundational security tools such as multifactor authentication and encryption.

**Improve Software Supply Chain Security.** The Executive Order will improve the security of software by establishing baseline security standards for development of software sold to the government, including requiring developers to maintain greater...
visibility into their software and making security data publicly available. It stands up a concurrent public-private process to develop new and innovative approaches to secure software development and uses the power of Federal procurement to incentivize the market. Finally, it creates a pilot program to create an "energy star" type of label so the government – and the public at large – can quickly determine whether software was developed securely. Too much of our software, including critical software, is shipped with significant vulnerabilities that our adversaries exploit. This is a long-standing, well-known problem, but for too long we have kicked the can down the road. We need to use the purchasing power of the Federal Government to drive the market to build security into all software from the ground up.

Establish a Cybersecurity Safety Review Board. The Executive Order establishes a Cybersecurity Safety Review Board, co-chaired by government and private sector leads, that may convene following a significant cyber incident to analyze what happened and make concrete recommendations for improving cybersecurity. Too often organizations repeat the mistakes of the past and do not learn lessons from significant cyber incidents. When something goes wrong, the Administration and private sector need to ask the hard questions and make the necessary improvements. This board is modeled after the National Transportation Safety Board, which is used after airplane crashes and other incidents.

Create a Standard Playbook for Responding to Cyber Incidents. The Executive Order creates a standardized playbook and set of definitions for cyber incident response by federal departments and agencies. Organizations cannot wait until they are compromised to figure out how to respond to an attack. Recent incidents have shown that within the government the maturity level of response plans vary widely. The playbook will ensure all Federal agencies meet a certain threshold and are prepared to take uniform steps to identify and mitigate a threat. The playbook will also provide the private sector with a template for its response efforts.

Improve Detection of Cybersecurity Incidents on Federal Government Networks. The Executive Order improves the ability to detect malicious cyber activity on federal networks by enabling a government-wide endpoint detection and response system and improved information sharing within the Federal government. Slow and inconsistent deployment of foundational cybersecurity tools and practices leaves an organization exposed to adversaries. The Federal government should lead in cybersecurity, and strong, Government-wide Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) deployment coupled with robust intra-governmental information sharing are essential.

Improve Investigative and Remediation Capabilities. The Executive Order creates cybersecurity event log requirements for federal departments and agencies. Poor logging hampers an organization’s ability to detect intrusions, mitigate those in progress, and determine the extent of an incident after the fact. Robust and consistent logging practices will solve much of this problem.

D. National Security Memorandum on Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure

On 28 July 2021, President Biden signed the National Security Memorandum on Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control Systems.

Protection of our Nation’s critical infrastructure is a responsibility of the government at the Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial levels and of the owners and operators of that infrastructure. The cybersecurity threats posed to the systems that control and operate the critical infrastructure on which we all depend are among the most significant and growing issues confronting our Nation. The degradation, destruction, or malfunction of systems that control this infrastructure could cause significant harm to the national and economic security of the United States.

Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of my Administration to safeguard the critical infrastructure of the Nation, with a particular focus on the cybersecurity and resilience of systems supporting National Critical Functions, defined as the functions of Government and the private sector so vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on national security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof.

Sec. 2. Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Initiative. Accordingly, I have established an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Initiative (Initiative), a voluntary, collaborative effort between the Federal Government and the critical infrastructure community to significantly improve the cybersecurity of these critical systems. The primary objective of this Initiative is to defend the United States’ critical infrastructure by encouraging and facilitating deployment of technologies and systems that provide threat visibility, indications, detection, and warnings, and that facilitate response capabilities for cybersecurity in essential control system and operational technology networks. The goal of the Initiative is to greatly expand deployment of these technologies across priority critical infrastructure.

Sec. 3. Furthering the Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Initiative. The Initiative creates a path for Government and industry to collaborate to take immediate action, within their respective spheres of control, to address these serious threats. The Initiative builds on, expands, and accelerates ongoing cybersecurity efforts in critical infrastructure sectors and is an important step in addressing these threats. We cannot address threats we cannot see; therefore, deploying systems and technologies that can monitor control systems to detect malicious activity and facilitate response actions to cyber threats is central to ensuring the safe operations of these critical systems. The Federal Government will work with industry to share threat information for priority control system critical infrastructure throughout the country.

(a) The Initiative began with a pilot effort with the Electricity Subsector, and is now followed by a similar effort for natural gas pipelines. Efforts for the Water and Wastewater Sector Systems and Chemical Sector will follow later this year.

(b) Sector Risk Management Agencies, as defined in section 9002(a)(7) of Public Law 116-283, and other executive departments and agencies (agencies), as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, shall work with critical infrastructure stakeholders and owners and operators to implement the principles and policy outlined in this memorandum.

Sec. 4. Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Performance Goals. Cybersecurity needs vary among critical infrastructure sectors, as do cybersecurity practices. However, there is a need for baseline cybersecurity goals that are consistent across all critical infrastructure sectors, as well
as a need for security controls for select critical infrastructure that is dependent on control systems.

(a) Pursuant to section 7(d) of Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013 (Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce (through the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology) and other agencies, as appropriate, shall develop and issue cybersecurity performance goals for critical infrastructure to further a common understanding of the baseline security practices that critical infrastructure owners and operators should follow to protect national and economic security, as well as public health and safety.

(b) This effort shall begin with the Secretary of Homeland Security issuing preliminary goals for control systems across critical infrastructure sectors no later than September 22, 2021, followed by the issuance of final cross-sector control system goals within 1 year of the date of this memorandum. Additionally, following consultations with relevant agencies, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue sector-specific critical infrastructure cybersecurity performance goals within 1 year of the date of this memorandum. These performance goals should serve as clear guidance to owners and operators about cybersecurity practices and postures that the American people can trust and should expect for such essential services. That effort may also include an examination of whether additional legal authorities would be beneficial to enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, which is vital to the American people and the security of our Nation.

Sec. 5. General Provisions.

(a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations, where funding assistance may be required to implement control system cybersecurity recommendations.

(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

II. Department of State Cyberspace Policy

A. Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace

The Department of State released the following joint statement on 23 September 2019.

The following text is a joint statement affirmed by these countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace

Information technology is transforming modern life, driving innovation and productivity, facilitating the sharing of ideas, of cultures, and promoting free expression. Its benefits have brought the global community closer together than ever before in history. Even as we recognize the myriad benefits that cyberspace has brought to our citizens and strive to ensure that humanity can continue to reap its benefits, a challenge to this vision has emerged. State and non-state actors are using cyberspace increasingly as a platform for irresponsible behavior from which to target critical infrastructure and our citizens, undermine democracies and international institutions and organizations, and undercut fair competition in our global economy by stealing ideas when they cannot create them.

Over the past decade, the international community has made clear that the international rules-based order should guide state behavior in cyberspace. UN member states have increasingly coalesced around an evolving framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace (framework), which supports the international rules-based order, affirms the applicability of international law to state-on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, and the development and implementation of practical confidence building measures to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber incidents. All members of the United Nations General Assembly have repeatedly affirmed this framework, articulated in three successive UN Groups of Governmental Experts reports in 2010, 2013, and 2015.

We underscore our commitment to uphold the international rules-based order and encourage its adherence, implementation, and further development, including at the ongoing UN negotiations of the Open Ended Working Group and Group of Governmental Experts. We support targeted cybersecurity capacity building to ensure that all responsible states can implement this framework and better protect their networks from significant disruptive, destructive, or otherwise destabilizing cyber activity. We reiterate that human rights apply and must be respected and protected by states online, as well as offline, including when addressing cybersecurity.

As responsible states that uphold the international rules-based order, we recognize our role in safeguarding the benefits of a free, open, and secure cyberspace for future generations. When necessary, we will work together on a voluntary basis to hold states accountable when they act contrary to this framework, including by taking measures that are transparent and consistent with international law. There must be consequences for bad behavior in cyberspace.

We call on all states to support the evolving framework and to join with us to ensure greater accountability and stability in cyberspace.

Source: https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-advancing-responsible-state-behavior-in-cyberspace/.
B. Protecting American Cyber Interests through International Engagement

In collaboration with colleagues across the federal government, the Department of State produced *Recommendations to the President on Protecting American Cyber Interests through International Engagement*. The following is an excerpt of the document:

**The U.S. Vision for Cyberspace and Approach to Cyberspace Policy**

U.S. national security interests, continued U.S. economic prosperity and leadership, and the continued preeminence of liberal democratic values hinge on the security, interoperability, and resilience of cyberspace. U.S. innovation, economic growth, and competitiveness depend on global trust in the Internet and confidence in the security and stability of the networks, platforms and services that compose cyberspace. The global nature of cyberspace necessitates robust international engagement and collaboration to accomplish U.S. government goals. Accordingly, the U.S. government pursues international cooperation in cyberspace to promote its vision of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet that fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, and economic prosperity, while respecting privacy and guarding against disruption, fraud, and theft. Through international engagement, the U.S. government seeks to ensure that the Internet and other connected networks and technologies remain valuable and viable tools for future generations.

**U.S. Objectives for Cyberspace Policy**

Through cooperation with foreign partners and allies, and engagement with all stakeholders as appropriate, the United States will pursue the following five objectives and corresponding actions to achieve its vision for cyberspace:

1. Increase international stability and reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of cyberspace by:
   a. Promoting international commitments regarding what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable state behavior in cyberspace from all states and how international law applies to cyberspace;
   b. Developing and implementing cyber confidence building measures (CBMs) in bilateral and regional security venues; and,
   c. Promoting a new cooperative framework in support of cyber deterrence and cost imposition on malicious state actors and state-sponsored malicious activity.

2. Identify, detect, disrupt, and deter malicious cyber actors; protect, respond to, and recover from threats posed by those actors; and enhance the resilience of the global cyber ecosystem, including critical infrastructure, by:
   a. Enhancing information sharing, including through automation and Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) channels;
   b. Managing cyber crises and responding effectively to significant cyber incidents;
   c. Improving cooperation to manage systemic cyber risk in an evolving global environment and strengthening public-private international cooperation to protect and build resilience in critical infrastructure;
   d. Promoting cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development globally to address current and future cybersecurity challenges;
   e. Prioritizing robust law enforcement cooperation;
f. Advancing military cyber cooperation; and,
g. Furthering cooperation on sensitive cyber intelligence issues with our partners and allies.

3. Uphold an open and interoperable Internet where human rights are protected and freely exercised and where cross-border data flows are preserved by:
   a. Defending access to an open and interoperable Internet in multilateral and international fora where it is challenged;
   b. Leveraging the existing coalition of like-minded countries that works to advance Internet freedom through diplomatic coordination; and,
   c. Supporting global Internet freedom programs that fund civil society organizations on technology development, digital safety training, policy advocacy, and applied research.

4. Maintain the essential role of non-governmental stakeholders in how cyberspace is governed by:
   a. Promoting the existing multistakeholder Internet governance system to manage key Internet resources and oppose new top-down or intergovernmental mechanisms for Internet governance; and,
   b. Supporting the continued development, adoption, and use of interoperable, voluntary, consensus-based industry-driven technical standards.

5. Advance an international regulatory environment that supports innovation and respects the global nature of cyberspace by:
   a. Preserving a flexible, risk-management approach to cybersecurity in the global marketplace;
   b. Rejecting undue market access restrictions, including data localization requirements;
   c. Advocating for a fair and competitive global market for U.S. businesses;
   d. Encouraging private sector innovation to address security risks across the digital ecosystem; and,
   e. Maintaining a strong and balanced intellectual property protection system that includes adequate and effective enforcement of intellectual property rights, while promoting innovation.

C. Deterring Adversaries and Better Protecting the American People from Cyber Threats

In collaboration with colleagues across the federal government, the Department of State produced Recommendations to the President on Deterring Adversaries and Better Protecting the American People from Cyber Threats. The following is an excerpt of the document:

Assessment of Deterring Malicious Cyber Activities as a Policy Challenge

Strategies for deterring malicious cyber activities require a fundamental rethinking. Cyber capabilities can be used to carry out malicious acts in peacetime, periods of increasing international tensions, crisis situations as well as during armed conflicts. Both state actors and numerous non-state actors possess such capabilities.

Although the United States has achieved important successes in recent years in promoting a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, the continued prevalence of state-sponsored cyber incidents that rise to the level of a national security concern has demonstrated that the framework is necessary but not sufficient to protect against cyber threats. To achieve the stability necessary to maintain and promote the U.S. vision for an "open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet," the United States and its likeminded partners must be able to deter destabilizing state conduct in cyberspace.

The United States remains in a strong position to deter cyber attacks that would constitute a use of force because traditional tools of deterrence – including the responsive use of kinetic force – remain effective and potent. However, there are significant challenges in deterring the substantial increase in malicious state-sponsored cyber activity occurring below the threshold of the use of force. This report proposes developing a broader menu of consequences that the United States can swiftly impose following a significant cyber incident, and taking steps to help resolve attribution and policy challenges that limit U.S. flexibility to act.

In addition, the U.S. government must seek to deter malicious non-state actors. The U.S. government can impose significant consequences on such actors, but their strength as a deterrent partially depends on the actors’ certainty that they will become subject to those consequences. Challenges related to attribution, obtaining evidence located abroad, and seeking extradition, expulsion, or foreign prosecution, impact U.S. efforts to deter malicious non-state cyber actors.

Strategic Options

Deterrence by denial through defense and protection of critical infrastructure and other sensitive computer networks and ensuring efficient mitigation and timely recovery from malicious cyber activities must be foundational to the U.S. deterrence approach. The United States will continue to enhance its efforts to deny adversaries the benefits of their malicious cyber activities.

At the same time, the United States recognizes that network defense alone will not be sufficient to deter determined and sophisticated state-sponsored adversaries. The United States will also undertake a new effort to increase deterrence of state actors through cost imposition and other measures.

The desired end states of U.S. deterrence efforts will be:

- A continued absence of cyber attacks that constitute a use of force against the United States, its partners, and allies; and
• A significant, long-lasting reduction in destructive, disruptive, or otherwise destabilizing malicious cyber activities directed against U.S. interests that fall below the threshold of the use of force.

The President already has a wide variety of cyber and non-cyber options for deterring and responding to cyber activities that constitute a use of force. Credibly demonstrating that the United States is capable of imposing significant costs on those who carry out such activities is indispensable to maintaining and strengthening deterrence.

With respect to activities below the threshold of the use of force, the United States should, working with likeminded partners when possible, adopt an approach of imposing swift, costly, and transparent consequences on foreign governments responsible for significant malicious cyber activities aimed at harming U.S. national interests. Key elements of the approach will include:

1. **Creating a policy for when the United States will impose consequences**: The policy should provide criteria for the types of malicious cyber activities that the U.S. government will seek to deter. The outlines of this policy must be communicated publicly and privately in order for it to have a deterrent effect.

2. **Developing a range of consequences**: The United States should prepare a menu of options for swift, costly, and transparent consequences below the threshold of the use of force that it can impose, consistent with U.S. obligations and commitments, following an incident that merits a strong response that can have downstream deterrent effects. As the United States develops these options, it should assess and seek to minimize the potential risks and costs associated with each of them.

3. **Conducting policy planning for imposing these consequences**: In addition to developing consequences themselves, the United States should conduct interagency policy planning for the time periods leading up to, during, and after the imposition of consequences. Such planning, which should include the development of appropriate interagency response procedures, will help ensure consistent responses to different incidents and assist in managing the risk of escalation.

4. **Building partnerships**: The imposition of consequences would be more impactful and send a stronger deterrent message if it were carried out in concert with partners. Partner states could, on a voluntary basis, support each other’s responses to significant malicious cyber incidents, including through intelligence sharing, buttressing of attribution claims, public statements of support for responsive actions taken following an incident, and/or actual participation in the imposition of consequences against perpetrator governments.

As the United States further strengthens its ability to respond to states’ malicious cyber activities, it should develop tailored strategies for deterring each of its key adversaries in cyberspace.

Non-state actors are susceptible to both deterrence by cost-imposition and deterrence by denial. However, because certain actors, including terrorists, may not be as sensitive to the threat of cost imposition, the United States must also focus on increasing the operational cost and complexity for non-state actors to achieve their goals, including through efforts to prevent and disrupt access to malicious cyber capabilities.

III. Department of Homeland Security Strategy and Guidance

A. The Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released this strategy on 15 May 2018. The Cybersecurity Strategy Fact Sheet is provided below, the full document can be found at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-Cybersecurity-Strategy_1.pdf.


INTRODUCTION

We depend upon cyberspace for daily conveniences, critical services, and economic prosperity. At the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, we believe that cyberspace can be made secure and resilient. DHS works with key partners across the Federal government, State and local governments, industry, and the international community to identify and manage national cybersecurity risks. The DHS Cybersecurity Strategy sets out five pillars of a DHS-wide risk management approach and provides a framework for executing our cybersecurity responsibilities and leveraging the full range of the Department’s capabilities to improve the security and resilience of cyberspace.

Reducing our national cybersecurity risk requires an innovative approach that fully leverages our collective capabilities across the Department and the entire cybersecurity community. DHS will strive to better understand our national cybersecurity risk posture, and engage with key partners to collectively address cyber vulnerabilities, threats, and consequences. We will build on ongoing efforts to reduce and manage vulnerabilities of federal networks and critical infrastructure to harden them against attackers. We will reduce threats from cyber criminal activity through prioritized law enforcement intervention. We will seek to mitigate the consequences from cybersecurity incidents that do occur. Finally, we will engage with the global cybersecurity community to strengthen the security and resiliency of the overall cyber ecosystems by addressing systemic challenges like increasingly global supply chains; by fostering improvements in international collaboration to deter malicious cyber actors and build capacity; by increasing research and development, and by improving our cyber workforce.

Through these efforts we seek to create a safe and secure cyberspace for the American people and protect the open, interoperable, secure and resilient Internet.

DHS CYBERSECURITY GOALS

Pillar I Risk Identification

Goal 1: Assess Evolving Cybersecurity Risks.

We will understand the evolving national cybersecurity risk posture to inform and prioritize risk management activities.

Pillar II Vulnerability Reduction


We will reduce vulnerabilities of federal agencies to ensure they achieve an adequate level of cybersecurity.

Goal 3: Protect Critical Infrastructure.

We will partner with key stakeholders to ensure that national cybersecurity risks are adequately managed.
Pillar III Threat Reduction

Goal 4: Prevent and Disrupt Criminal Use of Cyberspace.
We will reduce cyber threats by countering transnational criminal organizations and sophisticated cyber criminals.

Pillar IV Consequence Mitigation

Goal 5: Respond Effectively to Cyber Incidents.
We will minimize consequences from potentially significant cyber incidents through coordinated community-wide response efforts.

Pillar V Enable Cybersecurity Outcomes

Goal 6: Strengthen the Security and Reliability of the Cyber Ecosystem.
We will support policies and activities that enable improved global cybersecurity risk management.

Goal 7: Improve Management of DHS Cybersecurity Activities.
We will execute our departmental cybersecurity efforts in an integrated and prioritized way.

OUR CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY IN ACTION

- In October 2017, DHS issued Binding Operational Directive 18-01, mandating that Federal agencies take specific steps to enhance email and web security, including the deployment of DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance).
- During the 2017 WannaCry worldwide malware attack, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) partnered with other agencies and industry to assist U.S. hospitals to ensure their systems were not vulnerable, and issued a public technical alert to assist defenders with defeating this malware.
- In January 2018, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and the Department of Justice in Las Vegas indicted 36 individuals for their roles in the Infraud Organization, an internet-based criminal enterprise engaged in the large scale acquisition and sale of stolen credit card data and identity documents. This organization was responsible for the loss in excess of $530 million. The HSI investigation has led to the recovery of over 4.3 million compromised credit card account numbers.
- In July 2017, the United States Secret Service, through a synchronized international law enforcement operation, affected the arrest of a Russian national alleged to have operated BTC-e. From 2011 to 2017, BTC-e is alleged with facilitating over $4 billion worth of bitcoin transactions worldwide for cyber criminals engaging in computer hacking, identity theft, ransomware, public corruption, and narcotics distribution. Researchers estimate approximately 95% of ransomware payments were laundered through BTC-e.
- In October 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) stood up the Office of Cyberspace Forces, to organize, man, train, and equip the USCG cyberspace operational workforce and develop cyberspace operational policy to operate, maintain, defend, and secure USCG systems and networks, enable USCG operations through cyberspace capabilities, and protect the Maritime Transportation System from cyber threats.

B. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

The National Institute of Standards and Technology released and updated version (2.0) of their framework for public comment by November 2023 on 8 August 2023 to drive a 2024 release. The following is an excerpt of the executive summary from the current version 1.1 document. Full versions of all documents and further discussion can be found at: https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework.

Executive Summary

The United States depends on the reliable functioning of critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems, placing the Nation's security, economy, and public safety and health at risk. Similar to financial and reputational risks, cybersecurity risk affects a company's bottom line. It can drive up costs and affect revenue. It can harm an organization's ability to innovate and to gain and maintain customers. Cybersecurity can be an important and amplifying component of an organization's overall risk management.

To better address these risks, the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014158 (CEA) updated the role of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to include identifying and developing cybersecurity risk frameworks for voluntary use by critical infrastructure owners and operators. Through CEA, NIST must identify "a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance based, and cost-effective approach, including information security measures and controls that may be voluntarily adopted by owners and operators of critical infrastructure to help them identify, assess, and manage cyber risks." This formalized NIST's previous work developing Framework Version 1.0 under Executive Order (EO) 13636, "Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity" (February 2013), and provided guidance for future Framework evolution. The Framework that was developed under EO 13636, and continues to evolve according to CEA, uses a common language to address and manage cybersecurity risk in a cost-effective way based on business and organizational needs without placing additional regulatory requirements on businesses.

The Framework focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the organization's risk management processes. The Framework consists of three parts: the Framework Core, the Implementation Tiers, and the Framework Profiles. The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and informative references that are common across sectors and critical infrastructure. Elements of the Core provide detailed guidance for developing individual organizational Profiles. Through use of Profiles, the Framework will help an organization to align and prioritize its cybersecurity activities with its business/mission requirements, risk tolerances, and resources. The Tiers provide a mechanism for organizations to view and understand the characteristics of their approach to managing cybersecurity risk, which will help in prioritizing and achieving cybersecurity objectives.

While this document was developed to improve cybersecurity risk management in critical infrastructure, the Framework can be used by organizations in any sector or community. The Framework enables organizations – regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or

cybersecurity sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to improving security and resilience.

The Framework provides a common organizing structure for multiple approaches to cybersecurity by assembling standards, guidelines, and practices that are working effectively today. Moreover, because it references globally recognized standards for cybersecurity, the Framework can serve as a model for international cooperation on strengthening cybersecurity in critical infrastructure as well as other sectors and communities.

The Framework offers a flexible way to address cybersecurity, including cybersecurity’s effect on physical, cyber, and people dimensions. It is applicable to organizations relying on technology, whether their cybersecurity focus is primarily on information technology (IT), industrial control systems (ICS), cyber-physical systems (CPS), or connected devices more generally, including the Internet of Things (IoT). The Framework can assist organizations in addressing cybersecurity as it affects the privacy of customers, employees, and other parties. Additionally, the Framework’s outcomes serve as targets for workforce development and evolution activities.

The Framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing cybersecurity risk for critical infrastructure. Organizations will continue to have unique risks – different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances. They also will vary in how they customize practices described in the Framework. Organizations can determine activities that are important to critical service delivery and can prioritize investments to maximize the impact of each dollar spent. Ultimately, the Framework is aimed at reducing and better managing cybersecurity risks.

To account for the unique cybersecurity needs of organizations, there are a wide variety of ways to use the Framework. The decision about how to apply it is left to the implementing organization. For example, one organization may choose to use the Framework Implementation Tiers to articulate envisioned risk management practices. Another organization may use the Framework’s five Functions to analyze its entire risk management portfolio; that analysis may or may not rely on more detailed companion guidance, such as controls catalogs. There sometimes is discussion about "compliance" with the Framework, and the Framework has utility as a structure and language for organizing and expressing compliance with an organization’s own cybersecurity requirements. Nevertheless, the variety of ways in which the Framework can be used by an organization means that phrases like "compliance with the Framework" can be confusing and mean something very different to various stakeholders.

The Framework is a living document and will continue to be updated and improved as industry provides feedback on implementation. NIST will continue coordinating with the private sector and government agencies at all levels. As the Framework is put into greater practice, additional lessons learned will be integrated into future versions. This will ensure the Framework is meeting the needs of critical infrastructure owners and operators in a dynamic and challenging environment of new threats, risks, and solutions.

Expanded and more effective use and sharing of best practices of this voluntary Framework are the next steps to improve the cybersecurity of our Nation’s critical infrastructure – providing evolving guidance for individual organizations while increasing the cybersecurity posture of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and the broader economy and society.

IV. Department of Justice Cyber Strategy and Guidance

A. DOJ Comprehensive Cyber Review

The following is an excerpt from the July 2022 Comprehensive Cyber Review https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1520341/download:

Executive Summary

In May 2021, Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco directed the Department of Justice to conduct a comprehensive review of the Department's cyber-related activities and to develop actionable recommendations to enhance and expand the Department's efforts. This report summarizes the findings from that review. It evaluates many different facets of the Department's cyber capabilities, both "offensive" (i.e., how it investigates, prosecutes, and combats cyber threats) and "defensive" (i.e., how it protects its own networks from continuous malicious cyber activity). It also evaluates the Department's engagement with various governmental and private-sector partners; its preparation for emerging technologies; and the ways in which it is building and retaining its cyber workforce for the future.

As stated in the memorandum announcing the review, the focus has been on actionable recommendations to enhance and expand the Department's efforts against fast-changing cyber threats. To that end, the review has already made a number of interim recommendations that Department leadership has accepted and implemented. These include:

- The creation of the National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team (NCET) within the Department's Criminal Division, which focuses on combating illicit uses of cryptocurrency.
- The launch of the Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative (CCFI) by the Department's Civil Division. The CCFI uses the Department's authorities under the False Claims Act to pursue civil actions against government grantees and contractors—including those under contract with the Department of Justice—who fail to meet cybersecurity obligations.
- The development of a new Cyber Fellowship within the Department, designed to foster a new generation of prosecutors and attorneys equipped to handle emerging cybercrime and cyber-based national security threats.
- The rollout of additional cybersecurity measures designed to improve the Department's email security. These measures included mandatory Departmentwide encryption training for Department personnel and additional technical measures to protect against phishing and related techniques.

Disruption, Accountability, and Deterrence. The threats in cyberspace evolve with unmatched speed. For the Department to disrupt these attacks and hold accountable those responsible, it will need to move with almost unprecedented agility. This past year has shown the Department moving to keep pace with evolving cyber threats. For example, even before the series of significant ransomware attacks during 2021, the Department began to accelerate its focus on the threat through the creation of the Ransomware and Digital Extortion Task Force. Today, the Department is investigating over 100 different ransomware variants and ransomware groups that have caused billions of dollars in damage. The Department also had some notable successes in the last year, including the recovery of approximately $2.3 million in ransom paid to the Colonial Pipeline attackers; the recovery of ransom keys that the Department used to assist victims of the Kaseya ransomware attack; and the arrests of multiple individuals suspected of being involved in these and other significant attacks.
The Department has also quickly adapted to the continued threat of cryptocurrency’s illicit uses. While the Department for years has traced cryptocurrency in investigations and combated money laundering involving cryptocurrency, in the last year it has taken additional steps to strengthen its institutional expertise on digital currency. The newly created NCET is now staffed with a Director and more than a dozen prosecutors with backgrounds in money laundering, computer crimes, regulatory policy, forfeiture, and other relevant areas. Additionally, the FBI has created the Virtual Asset Unit (VAU), a new partnership between the FBI’s Criminal Investigative and Cyber Divisions that will merge their respective expertise in cryptocurrency.

The Department continues to play a unique and critical role in addressing almost every cyber threat. And as many recent examples show, the Department can be impactful against these threats even before prosecution and arrest. Last year saw the Department successfully deploy a number of novel means of disrupting threats, including the seizure of ransomware payments (including the aforementioned Colonial Pipeline seizure) and the court-authorized removal of malware from hundreds of infected computers. These successes should serve as "proof of concept" and renew the Department's commitment to using its full suite of tools to disrupt cyber threats. One point of emphasis to come out of this review, however, is that the Department can significantly amplify its own efforts by working more closely with its partners and allies – those elsewhere in the U.S. Government; those in like-minded nations; those in state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and those in the private sector. Given the transnational nature of significant cyber threats – and the fact that many are state-sponsored or state-sanctioned – the Department needs to couple its own tools with those of its partners.

For this reason, the Department will designate an experienced Department prosecutor to serve as the first-ever Cyber Operations International Liaison (COIL), whose responsibility will be to work with applicable Department components and European allies to increase the tempo of or otherwise enable operations and other disruptive actions against top-tier cyber actors, including charges, arrests, extraditions, asset seizures, and the dismantlement of infrastructure.

The Department has a proven track record of working with these partners, but it can further improve its coordination, including through some recommendations proposed in this report. One recommendation is to require all prosecutors handling significant cyber investigations with transnational links to consult with attorneys in the Department's Criminal Division (CRM) and National Security Division (NSD) who have experience and training in working with the relevant partners to ensure a multi-front response to an ongoing threat. Another recommendation is to continue to assign Department personnel to other Departments that have different authorities and tools; based on a recommendation during this review, for example, a Department attorney for the first time was seconded to the Defense Department's Cyber Command in an effort to increase interagency partnerships. The collective goal of these recommendations is to ensure that the Department's thinking about whole-of-government and international campaigns is more proactive and begins as early as possible in an investigation.

**Strengthening the Department’s Defenses and Building Resilience.** While the Department plays a key role in defending others from malicious cyber activity, it must also ensure that its networks and systems are properly defended from a continuous barrage of state-sponsored and criminal attacks. Since the December 2020 breach linked to the global SolarWinds supply-chain compromise and related breaches of Microsoft Office 365 (O365) systems, the Department has redoubled its efforts to remediate against that intrusion and protect against another significant compromise.

The Department's own internal review of its preparedness coincided with the issuance of "Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity" (E.O. 14028), which sets forth new measures that all federal departments and agencies must take to improve the U.S.
Government’s collective cybersecurity. This review’s assessment of the Department’s "cyberdefenses" focused on how the Department could better follow the directives set forth in E.O. 14028, including specific multi-factor authentication, data-at-rest encryption, logging, and cloud computing standards. However, a number of additional areas were flagged as areas where the Department could improve its practices in order to increase its cybersecurity. These included the Department’s electronic communications practices (including email and document-transfer practices), mobile device security, and contractor cybersecurity requirements. For each area identified, this report recommends steps to avoid unnecessary exposure to another significant cyber incident.

The review also concluded that the Department would benefit from updated response plans to a significant cyber intrusion into its own systems. The review found, for example, that the existing policies for the information security team had not been updated to include the lessons learned from the December 2020 breach. The review also concluded that planning should not just be limited to information security personnel and privacy officers, but rather involve the leadership of all offices and divisions within the Department. To that end, the review recommended that separate cyber-incident response materials (called the Justice Cyber Incident Playbook) be prepared for the Department’s leadership, so that the response to cyber incidents will involve those who understand the operational significance of a breach and can direct relevant personnel to take remedial actions.

**Ensuring Policies and Workforce Reflect the Department’s Priorities and Values.** This review considered two other important sets of issues that will be critical as the Department positions itself for the future: how it will deal with emerging technologies, and what can be done to ensure the Department has a qualified and supported workforce.

Many offices and divisions within the Department already spend significant time and effort identifying the impact of new technologies, considering their impact on civil liberties, public safety, competition, or the Department’s own investigative capabilities. Too often, however, these efforts to evaluate technologies are siloed, such that the cross-cutting expertise across the Department has not been leveraged. To that end, the report focuses on developing ways to take an interdisciplinary approach to evaluating new technologies.

The review recommends that this work start with an Emerging Technology Board, whose responsibility will be to ensure that the Department evaluates the implications of new technology by enlisting the diverse expertise across the Department. This Board will help coordinate disparate efforts to avoid duplication, as well as ensure that all stakeholders within the Department have a chance to consider these important issues.

When it comes to its own use of these technologies, the Department also needs to ensure that it has appropriate frameworks in place to avoid misuse of new technologies. Based on a recommendation from this review, for example, the Department recently completed the Principles for the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence, which will serve as a way for the Department to ensure that artificial intelligence is deployed appropriately, whether assisting in personnel decisions or identifying suspects in an investigation. The report identifies other areas for similar focus in the future.

Finally, the report considers ways in which the Department can build its cyber workforce for the future. Whether a systems engineer, cyber prosecutor, cyber policy expert, special agent, or analyst, Department employees are talented and will continue to receive job offers from other agencies and the private sector. The risk of personnel attrition is heightened by the fact that other departments within the U.S. Government have recently begun to offer more competitive salaries to cyber experts. In many cases, hiring offices within the Department do not appear to be aware of similar authorities. As a first step, therefore, the review recommends that hiring
offices receive information and instruction on available and under-utilized incentives for some of the most competitive positions.

**Note.** This report builds on the Department's prior work to address cyber challenges, including the *2018 Report of the Attorney General's Cyber Digital Task Force* and the *2020 Cryptocurrency Enforcement Framework*, and therefore does not repeat many of the overviews of the Department's work or legislative recommendations that have not yet been enacted by Congress. A central goal of the Comprehensive Cyber Review is to identify concrete and actionable ways the Department can draw on the full range of its criminal, civil, national security, and administrative authorities and resources to confront the multidimensional cyber challenge. Many of the recommendations contained in this report reflect practices and efforts already underway within the Department, led by career attorneys, agents, analysts, and others, and reflect lessons learned in numerous individual cases.

B. FBI Cyber Strategy

The following is an excerpt from the FBI’s Cyber Strategy:

Vision

For over a century, the FBI has been investigating crimes and collecting intelligence to protect the American public. As threats have evolved, so has our strategy. The FBI’s new cyber strategy not only focuses on how we will confront the unique challenges faced in cyberspace, but also why we pursue our cyber mission: so the American people have safety, security, and confidence in a digitally connected world.

Safety is knowing that criminal and nation state actors are being held to account for targeting and compromising U.S. citizens, companies, and organizations. Accountability may come in a variety of forms ranging from indictments and red notices to sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or cyber operations.

Security is receiving actionable alerts about system and network vulnerabilities, derived from intelligence that only the FBI and its partners can provide. It means notifying targeted entities before they experience a breach and providing them with the tools and information necessary to defend themselves. We are committed to sharing as much as possible as quickly as possible so the public is alerted and prepared.

Confidence is knowing that the federal government is combatting these threats with fierce urgency and that if you become a victim, you will receive the attention you deserve. The FBI is working 24/7 and in tandem with the rest of the federal government and industry to break down walls and attack the cyber threat as a united front. Our strategy drives us, but our vision inspires us. Together we’ll fight to make it our reality.

Mission

Our Focus – what we do every day. To impose risk and consequences on cyber adversaries through unique authorities, world-class capabilities, and enduring partnerships, building on a century of innovation

Our Promise – compassion as we seek justice. In pursuing our mission, we recognize that we will encounter unique and novel issues related to privacy and handling of sensitive data. We will always treat victims with dignity and respect, protecting their privacy and data, and rigorously adhering to the U.S. Constitution, applicable laws, regulations, and policies, and the FBI’s Core Values.

Unique Authorities. The FBI uses criminal and counterintelligence authorities to combat cyber criminals and foreign actors who use global infrastructure to compromise US networks.

Leading Cyber Threat Response. The FBI leads the U.S. Government’s response to significant cyber incidents by investigating, collecting evidence and intelligence, identifying additional victims, and pursuing disruption opportunities.

Using Law Enforcement Authorities to Have Broad Impact. Computer intrusion is a crime, whether it’s done for personal profit or on behalf of a foreign government. The FBI uses legal process to obtain evidence that enables FBI and partner agencies to identify virtual infrastructure, shut down dark markets, expose adversaries’ tools, and disrupt malicious activity.

Assembling the Domestic Intelligence Picture. The FBI is the nation’s lead domestic intelligence agency. FBI intelligence on cyber threats and intrusions into US networks helps identify those responsible—the first step towards holding them accountable.
Coordinating Through the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF).
Led by the FBI, the NCIJTF brings together more than 30 co-located agencies from the Intelligence Community and law enforcement in threat-focused mission centers to synchronize actions against cyber adversaries for maximum impact.

World-Class Capabilities. The FBI adapts to cyber threats by using innovative investigative techniques, developing cutting-edge analytic tools, and recruiting the next generation of the cyber workforce.

Recovering Assets to Assist Victims. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)’s Recovery Asset Team culls through thousands of public complaints to assist victims in recovering hundreds of millions of dollars lost to cyber crime.

Multidisciplinary Threat Teams. Squads of cyber-trained Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Computer Scientists, Data Analysts, and Digital Operations Specialists in FBI offices nationwide engage, assess, investigate, and respond to cyber threats in their communities.

Responding to Incidents with the Cyber Action Team. The FBI’s Cyber Action Team is a rapid response technical investigative team distributed nationally to deploy and provide technical assistance to assist in the most complex intrusions and cyber incidents.

Enduring Partnerships. The FBI uses our unique role not only to pursue our own actions but also to enable our partners to defend networks, attribute malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take the fight to adversaries overseas.

Trust-Based Relationships. With 56 U.S. field offices, hundreds of satellite offices, and liaisons around the world, the FBI has global reach that extends to our communities. The FBI works alongside the public and private sectors in unique hubs built on long-term relationships to share and act on threat information.

Enabling Industry Action. The FBI works with government, industry, and academia through nonprofit organizations like the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) and the National Defense Cyber Alliance (NDCA) to identify and disrupt cyber crime and national security threats.

Serving as the Indispensable U.S. Government Partner. While law enforcement and counterintelligence actions are at the core of the FBI’s mission, we can more significantly impact the threat when we sequence and coordinate our actions with domestic and international partners. Our information, access, and relationships are not only for FBI use; they are resources for others to leverage.

Cross-Border Partnerships to Address a Global Threat. FBI Cyber Assistant Legal Attachés in countries around the world work closely with international counterparts to share information, coordinate action, and seek justice for victims of cyber crime.

V. Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance

A. 2023 DOD Cyber Strategy

DOD released and updated Cyber Strategy in September 2023. The following is the summary in its entirety. The summary in pdf can be found at: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/12/2003299076/-1/-1/1/2023_DOD_Cyber_Strategy_Summary.PDF.

Introduction

The Internet enables global connectivity, communication, and innovation. It has brought increased prosperity to the United States, inaugurating new industries and revitalizing old ones. It has also helped to ensure the superiority of the Joint Force, strengthening our ability to coordinate and quickly adapt to dynamic circumstances. In this decisive decade, the success of our Nation depends upon a free, open, and secure cyberspace.

The United States is challenged by malicious cyber actors who seek to exploit our technological vulnerabilities and undermine our military's competitive edge. They target our critical infrastructure and endanger the American people. Defending against and defeating these cyber threats is a Department of Defense (DoD) imperative.

The classified 2023 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy establishes how the Department will operate in and through cyberspace to protect the American people and advance the defense priorities of the United States. It implements the priorities of the 2022 National Security Strategy, 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy. It builds upon and supersedes the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy. This unclassified summary is intended to present the overarching priorities of the 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy and should not be considered exhaustive. The scope of this document is limited to the cyber domain; it does not establish policy for the Department's operations in the information environment.

The 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy is grounded in real-world experience. Since 2018, the department has conducted a significant number of cyberspace operations through its policy of defending forward, actively disrupting malicious cyber activity before it can affect the U.S. Homeland. This strategy is further informed by Russia's 2022 war on Ukraine, which has seen a significant use of cyber capabilities during armed conflict. In this saturated cyber battlefield, military operations conducted by states and non-state proxies have collided with the cyber defense efforts of numerous private sector actors. The conflict has demonstrated the character of war in the cyber domain. Its lessons will shape the maturation of our cyber capabilities.

The Department's experiences have shown that cyber capabilities held in reserve or employed in isolation render little deterrent effect on their own. Instead, these military capabilities are most effective when used in concert with other instruments of national power, creating a deterrent greater than the sum of its parts. In this way, cyberspace operations represent an indispensable element of U.S. and Allied military strength and form a core component of integrated deterrence.

The Department will also use cyberspace operations for the purpose of campaigning, undertaking actions to limit, frustrate, or disrupt adversaries' activities below the level of armed conflict and to achieve favorable security conditions. By persistently engaging malicious cyber actors and other malign threats to U.S. interests in cyberspace, U.S. Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM) will support Department-wide campaigns to strengthen deterrence and gain advantages. As it campaigns in cyberspace, the Department will remain closely attuned to adversary perceptions and will manage the risk of unintended escalation.

Our global Allies and partners are foundational to the 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy. The United States' diplomatic and defense relationships represent a force multiplier that extends into cyberspace, enabling rapid coordination and awareness of emerging threats. To this end, we will improve our effectiveness and security in cyberspace by fostering a community of cyber-capable nations with shared interests and values. By combining international engagement with significant institutional reforms and technological investments in emerging cyber capabilities, the Department will build enduring advantages in cyberspace.

As the Department’s cyber capabilities evolve, so do those of our adversaries. Both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia have embraced malicious cyber activity as a means to counter U.S. conventional military power and degrade the combat capability of the Joint Force. The PRC in particular sees superiority in cyberspace as core to its theories of victory and represents the Department's pacing challenge in cyberspace. Using cyber means, the PRC has engaged in prolonged campaigns of espionage, theft, and compromise against key defense networks and broader U.S. critical infrastructure, especially the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). Globally, malicious cyber activity continues to grow in both volume and severity, impacting the U.S. Homeland and placing Americans at risk.

In order to address current and future cyber threats, the Department will pursue four complementary lines of effort:

1. **Defend the Nation.** The Department will campaign in and through cyberspace to generate insights about cyber threats. We will defend forward, disrupting and degrading malicious cyber actors' capabilities and supporting ecosystems. The Department will work with its interagency partners to leverage available authorities to enable the defense of U.S. critical infrastructure and counter threats to military readiness.

2. **Prepare to Fight and Win the Nation's Wars.** The Department will campaign in and through cyberspace to advance Joint Force objectives. We will ensure the cybersecurity of the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) and conduct defensive cyberspace operations in order to protect it. The Department will enhance the cyber resilience of the Joint Force and ensure its ability to fight in and through contested and congested cyberspace. We will utilize the unique characteristics of cyberspace to meet the Joint Force’s requirements and generate asymmetric advantages.

3. **Protect the Cyber Domain with Allies and Partners.** Our global Allies and partners represent a foundational strategic advantage for the United States. We will build the capacity and capability of U.S. Allies and partners in cyberspace and expand avenues of potential cyber cooperation. We will continue hunt forward operations and other bilateral technical collaboration, working with Allies and partners to illuminate malicious cyber activity on their networks. We will reinforce responsible state behavior by encouraging adherence to international law and internationally recognized cyberspace norms.

4. **Build Enduring Advantages in Cyberspace.** The Department will pursue institutional reforms to build advantages that will persist for decades to come. We will optimize the organizing, training, and equipping of the Cyberspace Operations Forces and Service-retained cyber forces. We will ensure the availability of timely and actionable intelligence in support of cyberspace operations and explore the intersection
of emerging technologies and cyber capabilities. We will foster a culture of cybersecurity and cyber awareness, investing in the education, training, and knowledge development of personnel across the defense enterprise.

As cyber threats grow and intensify, every soldier, sailor, airman, marine, guardian, coast guardsman, DoD civilian, and contractor is responsible for exercising cyber awareness and helping to manage the risk of the Department.

At the same time, senior leaders of the Department, Military Departments and Services, and the Joint Warfighting community must work together with counterparts across other Federal departments and agencies to build a robust and integrated cyber capability: one that is ready and available to respond rapidly across the spectrum of conflict.

National Defense Strategy Priorities

The 2022 NDS establishes four defense priorities:

➢ Defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC;
➢ Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners;
➢ Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary – prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, and then the Russian challenge in Europe; and,
➢ Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

These priorities will guide the Department’s plans, programs, policies, and operations across all theaters and domains, including cyberspace, in the years to come. The 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy outlines how our cyber enterprise will adjust its missions and supporting activities to advance these priorities.

A Contested Cyberspace

Numerous state and non-state actors have come to see cyber means as a powerful force multiplier, core to achieving their objectives. U.S. adversaries seek to use malicious cyber to achieve asymmetric advantages, targeting U.S. critical infrastructure and degrading U.S. military superiority. These activities threaten the safety, security, and prosperity of the American people.

People’s Republic of China

The 2022 NDS directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the PRC as the pacing challenge. This is as true in cyberspace as in other joint warfighting domains.

The PRC seeks advantages in cyberspace in order to facilitate its emergence as a superpower with commensurate political, military, and economic influence. By exercising effective state control over businesses with large market share in the telecommunications, commercial hardware and software, and cybersecurity industries, the PRC tries to shape the global technology ecosystem. It exports dangerous cyber capabilities to like-minded nations and works to accelerate the rise of digital authoritarianism around the globe. Its efforts abroad are complemented by material strengths at home: a large technology industry and workforce, capable counterintelligence and cybersecurity systems, and an array of proxy organizations empowered to pursue malicious cyber activity.
The PRC poses a broad and pervasive cyber espionage threat. It routinely conducts malicious cyber activity against the United States as well as our Allies and partners. It steals technology secrets and undermines the DIB in an effort to erode U.S. military advantage. It undertakes cyber intrusion and surveillance efforts against individuals living beyond its borders, including U.S. citizens, whom it considers enemies of the state.

This malicious cyber activity informs the PRC's preparations for war. The PRC's theories of victory rest on the use of cyber means to degrade the combat capability of the Joint Force, as well as that of our Allies and partners. The PRC has undertaken significant military modernization and reorganization efforts in pursuit of this goal. In the event of conflict, the PRC likely intends to launch destructive cyber attacks against the U.S. Homeland in order to hinder military mobilization, sow chaos, and divert attention and resources. It will also likely seek to disrupt key networks which enable Joint Force power projection in combat.

**Russia**

Russia remains an acute threat to the United States in cyberspace. Russia has undertaken malign influence efforts against the United States that aim to manipulate and undermine confidence in U.S. elections. Russia targets U.S. critical infrastructure as well as that of Allies and partners. It continues to refine its espionage, influence, and attack capabilities.

In Russia's war on Ukraine, Russian military and intelligence units have employed a range of cyber capabilities to support kinetic operations and defend Russian actions through a global propaganda campaign. Russia has repeatedly used cyber means in its attempts to disrupt Ukrainian military logistics, sabotage civilian infrastructure, and erode political will. While these efforts have yielded limited results, this is due largely to the resilience of Ukrainian networks and support from the international community. In a moment of crisis, Russia is prepared to launch similar cyber attacks against the United States and our Allies and partners.

**North Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations**

North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations remain persistent threats to the United States. They demonstrate varying levels of sophistication in their malicious cyber activity.

North Korea pursues a range of espionage and criminal objectives in cyberspace. It has undertaken significant malicious cyber activity related to ransomware and the compromise of cryptocurrency wallets. Cyber actors linked to North Korea have conducted espionage operations against a range of targets related to media, academia, defense companies, and governments, spanning multiple countries.

Iran's aggression and sponsorship of illicit activities extends into cyberspace. Iran has used malicious cyber activity to conduct espionage, interfere in political processes, and punish actors that Iran deems hostile to its interests. During the 2020 U.S. election cycle, Iran demonstrated the use of novel tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in its malign influence efforts against the United States. Iran's malicious cyber activity against the U.S., Israel, and other nations indicates an increased willingness to target countries with comparatively stronger warfighting capabilities.

Violent extremist organizations have seen their capabilities largely degraded by more than two decades of counterterrorism operations conducted by the United States and our Allies and partners. While these actors effectively used social media for the purposes of recruitment, propaganda, and command and control, they have not yet demonstrated the ability to conduct significant or sustained malicious cyber activity against the United States.
Transnational Criminal Organizations

U.S. interests in cyberspace are also threatened by profit-motivated transnational criminal organizations: ransomware gangs, hacktivists, and state-sponsored cyber mercenaries. Small groups of experienced hackers, harnessing sophisticated TTPs, are capable of achieving cyber effects similar to those caused by professional intelligence and military services.

The actions of these transnational criminal organizations often align with the interests of their host nations. These malicious cyber actors target the DIB and other U.S. critical infrastructure, as well as government functions at the Federal, state, and local levels. Ostensibly independent hackers in the PRC, for instance, target U.S. companies that produce technology relevant to the PRC’s military priorities. Russia, Iran, and North Korea all provide safe havens to ransomware gangs and their own state employees involved in cybercrime. These criminal enterprises cause billions of dollars in direct and calculable losses to the United States each year and disrupt critical services worldwide. They increasingly threaten U.S. national security.

Defend the Nation

The first defense priority established in the 2022 NDS is that of defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC. In cyberspace, the Department will harness outward facing capabilities to enable internal defense, identifying and mitigating threats before they can harm the American people. We will enable domestic cyber defense in coordination with interagency partners.

Generate Insights about Cyber Threats

The Department will continue to persistently engage U.S. adversaries in cyberspace, identifying malicious cyber activity in the early stages of planning and development. We will track the organization, capabilities, and intent of malicious cyber actors. We will leverage these insights to bolster the cyber resilience of the Nation and will coordinate with interagency partners to publicize this information as circumstances permit.

Disrupt and Degrade Malicious Cyber Actors

The Department will continue to defend forward by disrupting the activities of malicious cyber actors and degrading their supporting ecosystems. These operations will be primarily conducted by USCYBERCOM, leveraging its authorities and in close coordination with other departments and agencies as well as our global Allies and partners. The Department has executed a number of such cyberspace operations under this policy since 2018, notably in the defense of U.S. elections. Lessons learned from these operations inform our pursuit of new capabilities and shape our approach to risk management.

These operations will support the strategic approach outlined in the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, in which the Department’s cyberspace operations may complement concurrent actions by the diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence communities, among others. Together, these actions will support a whole-of-Government effort to reduce the perceived and actual utility of malicious cyber activity and render cybercrime unprofitable.

Enable Defense of U.S. Critical Infrastructure

U.S. adversaries regularly use malicious cyber activity to target our critical infrastructure. In crisis, they will seek to hinder U.S. military mobilization, sow chaos, and harm the American people. The Department will support whole-of-Government efforts to raise U.S. cybersecurity standards in order to increase resilience and make it more difficult for adversaries to disrupt these essential services.
Consistent with the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Department will leverage all legally available contractual mechanisms, resources, and operational arrangements to improve the cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastructure systems. We will expand public-private partnerships to ensure that DoD resources, expertise, and intelligence are made available to support key private sector initiatives. We will also draw upon the private sector’s technical expertise and analytic capabilities to identify foreign-based malicious cyber activity and mitigate vulnerabilities on a global scale.

The Department will fully leverage the National Guard with its unique separate statuses as both a Federal and state-level entity to facilitate partnerships between the Federal Government and state, local, territorial, and tribal governments to support and augment cyber defense responses. We will continue to improve and expand coordination across the Federal Government and clearly communicate our priorities to interagency partners.

Protect the Defense Industrial Base

The DIB develops, manufactures, and maintains sensitive technologies vital to the defense of the Nation. Safeguarding the technical information used for the design and manufacture of these technologies is critical. Malicious cyber actors routinely target the DIB. Their malicious cyber activity imposes a high opportunity cost, drawing resources and attention from these companies' core missions. These attacks also complicate the Department's acquisition processes, raising costs for the Government and U.S. taxpayers.

To ensure DIB cybersecurity, the Department will continue to convene government and industry officials and leverage public-private partnerships. We will invest in rapid information-sharing and analysis and will develop a comprehensive approach for the identification, protection, detection, response, and recovery of critical DIB elements, thereby ensuring the reliability and integrity of critical weapons systems and production nodes.

Beyond information-sharing efforts, the Department will also align DIB contract incentives with DoD cybersecurity requirements. Toward this end, the Department will continue implementation of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Program, which requires companies to certify compliance with information security standards in order to receive certain priority contracts. We will complement this program with other efforts to increase active defense measures and improve data protection across the DIB, such as provision of no-cost cybersecurity services to qualifying companies. These services protect against the most common adversary exploitation vectors and reflect the Department's continued partnership with small-to-medium-sized companies.

DoD Authorities and Homeland Defense

While the Department of Defense is the Sector Risk Management Agency for the DIB, other departments and agencies serve as such for energy, information technology, and other key sectors. These departments and agencies lead Federal risk management efforts for each of these critical infrastructure sectors. As a result, the Department has limited means to directly advance its policy objectives vis-à-vis the cybersecurity of non-DIB sectors.

The Department, in particular, lacks the authority to employ military forces to defend private companies against cyber attacks. It may do so only if directed by the President, or (1) if the Secretary of Defense or other appropriate DoD official approves a request for defense support of civil authorities from the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or another appropriate lead Federal agency; (2) at the invitation of such a company; and (3) in coordination with the relevant local or Federal authority. Given this—and the limited circumstances in which military cyber forces would be asked to defend civilian critical infrastructure—the Department will not posture itself to defend every private sector network.
The Department can and will posture to enable better insights against foreign malicious cyber threats, to disrupt foreign cyber threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, and to support requests for assistance from Federal civilian agencies or the private sector through appropriate channels.

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DIB Cybersecurity

The Department serves as the Sector Risk Management Agency for the DIB. In this role, the Department interfaces with DIB companies, monitors and prioritizes threats, oversees incident management, and provides technical assistance, among other duties. The Department’s DIB cybersecurity initiatives include the DIB Cybersecurity Program, the DoD Cyber Crime Center’s DoD-DIB Collaborative Information Sharing Environment, National Security Agency’s Cybersecurity Collaboration Center, and the Enduring Security Framework. The DIB Cybersecurity Program alone sustains a voluntary partnership with over 1,000 DIB companies and has shared roughly 600,000 cyber threat incident indicators since its establishment in 2008.

Prepare to Fight and Win the Nation’s Wars

The Department will use cyberspace operations to enable and empower the Joint Force. These efforts will unfold in multiple ways: through persistent campaigning below the level of armed conflict, through cyber defense and the fostering of cyber resilience, and through support of campaign and contingency planning.
Advance Joint Force Objectives

The Department will campaign in and through cyberspace to reinforce deterrence objectives while achieving informational and military advantages. Our adversaries will be made to doubt the efficacy of their military capabilities as well as the belief that they can conduct unattributed coercive actions against the United States. As the Department campaigns in cyberspace for this purpose, we will develop offensive and defensive options to support the Joint Force so that it is ready to respond rapidly across the spectrum of conflict.

Defend the DODIN

The Department will be resilient against malicious cyber activity and ready to operate in congested and contested cyberspace. This effort will be grounded in our defense of the DoDIN

Defining the DODIN

*The Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) comprises the Department’s electronic information systems and associated processes used to collect, process, store, transmit, and manage this information. The DODIN includes mission-critical information technology and weapons systems as well as critical infrastructure that is owned or leased by the Department.*

The Department will address vulnerabilities in the DODIN and correct issues of insufficient risk management and monitoring. To frustrate future malicious cyber activity, we will implement Zero Trust architectures and their associated cybersecurity technologies, as well as modernize our cryptographic algorithms across weapons systems, data links, and networks.

Furthermore, the Department will increase unity of effort between defensive cyberspace and DODIN operations by integrating the visibility, capabilities, and operations or relevant mission elements. We will align intelligence, acquisition and sustainment, and other functions to ensure that the DODIN can rapidly adapt to counter evolving cyber threats.

Build Cyber Resilience in the Joint Force

The Department will enhance cyber resilience of the Joint Force and ensure its ability to fight in and through contested and congested cyberspace. We will prioritize those cyber capabilities that support the Joint Force’s military mission assurance and commit to training the force to operate amid network and warfighting platform degradation.

Support Joint Force Plans and Operations

The Department will continue to integrate cyberspace operations in its campaign and contingency planning as part of integrated deterrence. We will further refine this approach, developing options that utilize the unique characteristics of cyberspace to meet the Joint Force’s requirements and generate asymmetric advantages. This will include the pursuit of cross-domain effects during large-scale combat operations.

Protect the Cyber Domain with Allies and Partners

The Department will maximize its effectiveness in cyberspace by combining its efforts with those of Allies and Partners. This approach relies upon building the cyber capability and capacity of Allies and partners. It requires a mix of internal institutional reforms and external partner engagement.

Build Cyber Capacity and Develop Capability in Allies and Partners

The Nation’s constellation of diplomatic and defense relationships represents a foundational strategic advantage. In cyberspace, the capabilities of Allies and partners combine with those of
the United States to enable timely information sharing and interoperability as well as contribute to our collective security. However, this interdependence also introduces risk as some cyber actors target the networks of Allies and partners with the ultimate objective of compromising U.S. systems. To address this, the Department will prioritize efforts to increase the effectiveness of Allies and partners in cyberspace. Doing so will protect the shared and open Internet. It will also strengthen the security of the United States.

In some cases, the Department will work toward this goal by augmenting partner capacity, expanding partners’ access to cybersecurity infrastructure and maturing their cybersecurity workforce through combined training events and exercises. In other cases, we will develop partner capability, enabling a function that a partner needs but does not yet have, including particular knowledge and capabilities. The Department will enhance our relationship with our most cyber-capable Allies and partners at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. We will expand the total number of partners with whom we engage and integrate these efforts with the wider security cooperation enterprise.

**Expand Avenues of Cyber Cooperation**

The Department will address institutional barriers that inhibit cooperation in cyberspace and better leverage security cooperation tools to advance DoD’s defense priorities. We will emphasize the timely sharing of information that Allies and partners may use to increase the effectiveness of combined cyberspace operations and enhance collective cybersecurity efforts. We will share our best practices regarding vulnerability mitigation, workforce development, and operational planning while seeking to learn from the best practices of our Allies and partners.

Through both DoD’s security cooperation authorities and collaboration with other Federal departments and agencies that can provide opportunities to engage private sector partners, we will respond to requires from global Allies and partners seeking cybersecurity assistance from U.S. experts.

**Continue Hunt Forward Operations and Bilateral Technical Collaboration**

Since 2018, the Department has regularly worked with our Allies and partners to help identify vulnerabilities on their government-operated networks. These operations and assessments, conducted by USCYBERCOM, have aided U.S. cybersecurity preparedness, contributed to the warfighting capability of the Joint Force, and established or enhanced strong information-sharing relationships with a number of nations, including Ukraine. They have also bolstered the cyber resilience of Allies and partners by exposing hostile TTPs and malware.

We will continue to conduct these operations in the years ahead, illuminating adversary actions in cyberspace and frustrating the designs of malicious cyber actors. Our efforts will bolster collective cybersecurity and improve relationships with Allies and partners.

**Reinforce Norms of Responsible Behavior in Cyberspace**

The Department will reinforce norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace. By strengthening this shared normative framework, we will intensify the international scrutiny faced by malicious cyber actors and help constrain the activity of U.S. adversaries in cyberspace.

In pursuit of this goal, we will support the efforts of the Department of State to foster global consensus on cyberspace norms. We will stand ready to expose and contest behavior inconsistent with such norms and international law, coordinating across the U.S. Government and with our global Allies and partners.
Build Enduring Advantages in Cyberspace

The Department cannot advance its defense priorities without a ready, capable, and informed Joint Force – one prepared to operate as fluently in cyberspace as any other joint warfighting domain. To achieve this end, we will build enduring advantages that support and enable the full range of cyber activities.

Invest in the Cyber Workforce

Our most important cyber capability is people: those with the talent, creativity, and sense of mission necessary to defend the Nation in cyberspace. The Department will prioritize reforms to our cyber workforce and improve the retention and utilization of our cyber operators. In so doing, we will assess diverse alternatives for sizing, structuring, organizing and training the Cyberspace Operations Forces and their relationship to Service-retained cyber forces.

The Department will proactively identify cyber talent with experience in the DIB, commercial information technology sector, academia, Intelligence Community, and military. We will ensure that incentive programs are adequately resourced and target specific desired skills for hiring and retention. Where we cannot hire desired skills directly, we will leverage rotational programs and enhance collaboration with the private sector to ensure the Department’s access to relevant talent.

The Department will also empower the Services to implement effective talent management and career progression for the cyber workforce. We will encourage the development of expertise via options including extended tour commitments or repeat tour requirements, rotations within mission areas, and career progression models that reward development of such skills. The Department will also explore greater use of reserve components as a way to share talent with the private sector, like those adopted in National Guard cyber units.

Prioritize Intelligence Support for Cyber Operations

The Department will prioritize necessary reforms to meet the intelligence needs of the cyberspace operations community. We will address cyber requirements through continued improvements to the business practices, human capital management, and organization of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. We will reduce barriers to information sharing and ensure broader access to technical data consistent with applicable law, policies and procedures. The Department will generally address gaps, ambiguities, and policy issues to enable intelligence activities in support of cyberspace operations.

Develop and Implement New Cyber Capabilities

The Department will oversee the development and application of new technologies to expand our cyber capabilities. We will prioritize technologies that can confound malicious cyber actors and prevent them from achieving their objectives in and through cyberspace. These include Zero Trust architectures and their associated cybersecurity technologies, advanced endpoint monitoring capabilities, tailored data collection strategies, enhanced cyber forensics, automated data analytics, and systems that enable network automation, network restoration, and network deception.

The Department will engage with its science and technology community, which has produced numerous technologies that support cyberspace operations. We will take steps to align the technology development process with the strategy and objectives of the wider cyber enterprise and ensure that these activities are informed by relevant intelligence.

Finally, the Department will study the application of autonomous and artificial intelligence-driven cyber capabilities. We will develop principles for the responsible adoption of such technologies
in alignment with the 2022 DoD Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway.

**Foster Cyber Awareness**

Cyberspace operations may be the responsibility of a relatively small number of cyber professionals, but cyber risk is a challenge shared across the defense enterprise. This is evidenced by malicious cyber actors’ efforts to compromise the networks and infrastructure upon which the Joint Force relies. This is also evidenced by the malicious cyber actors’ targeting of individual members of the Joint Force for the purposes of stealing sensitive personal information, threatening individual security and military readiness.

The Department will take action to foster a culture of cybersecurity and cyber awareness. We will establish an expectation that senior military and civilian leaders possess a baseline fluency in cybersecurity issues. The Department will develop, fund, and implement technical curricula across different levels of professional military and civilian educations, emphasizing General Officer and Senior Executive Service leadership courses. More broadly, we will ensure that service members of all ranks are appropriately informed about cyber issues, incorporating cyber education requirements into the curricula of commissioning sources and enlisted training programs.

**Conclusion**

Cyberspace has grown far beyond its origins as a U.S. defense research project. Static, text-driven websites and file-sharing protocols have given way to the dynamic, mobile, and ubiquitous environment we know today. The Internet now forms the connective tissue for two thirds of the world’s population. It is also under attack by those who seek to undermine a secure and open cyberspace and threaten the security of the United States.

The Department will defend the interests of the United States and protect the shared digital environment. We will defend forward, disrupting and degrading malicious cyber actors, and help ensure the resilience of the homeland with all tools at our disposal. We will use cyberspace to fight and win the Nation’s wars, supporting and advancing the objectives of the Joint Force.

We will bolster the cyber capability and capacity of our Allies and partners and reinforce norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace. Throughout it all, we will build enduring advantages in the cyber domain.

With a robust and integrated cyber capability, the Department will be ready to respond rapidly across the spectrum of conflict. We will deter and de-escalate where we can. In all other cases, we will prevail.
B. Commander, USCYBERCOM Congressional Testimony

The following excerpt is from the Statement of General Paul M. Nakasone, Commander United States Cyberspace Command, before the 117th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee on 5 April 2022:

Let me begin by acknowledging the dedicated service of our Service members and civilians at USCYBERCOM. Their mission is to plan and execute global cyber operations, activities and missions to defend and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. Our three lines of operation are to:

- Provide mission assurance for the Department of Defense by directing the security, operation and defense of Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN), including DoD's critical infrastructure;
- Help deter and defeat strategic threats to the United States and its national interests; and
- Assist Combatant Commanders to achieve their objectives in and through cyberspace.

U.S. Cyber Command directs operations through its components. These include the Cyber National Mission Force-Headquarters (CNMF-HQ), Joint Force Headquarters-DoD Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN, the commander for which is dual-hatted as the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency) and Joint Task Force Ares. They work with our Joint Force headquarters elements, the commanders for which are dual-hatted with one of the Services' cyber components (Army Cyber Command, Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet, Air Force Cyber/16th Air Force and Coast Guard Cyber Command). The Command currently comprises 133 teams across the Cyber Mission Force (CMF), approximately 6,000 Service members, including National Guard and Reserve personnel on active duty. The CMF is due to grow by 14 teams over the next five years.

USCYBERCOM is postured to execute its missions and meet both the nation's near-term and enduring strategic challenges in cyberspace. I shall address the Command's role in the crisis caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and then speak to our preparedness for persistent threats and in meeting our long-term pacing challenge, China. As the Commander of USCYBERCOM and Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), I have learned that the Command's linkage with NSA is essential to achieving critical outcomes for the nation in both cyber and intelligence operations. The dual-hatted command relationship improves planning, resource allocation, risk mitigation, and unity of effort. It allows us to operate with speed, agility, and mission effectiveness that we could not achieve without it. This is critical to meeting the strategic challenges of our adversaries as they grow in sophistication, aggressiveness and scope of operations.

Strategic Challenges

Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated Moscow's determination to violate Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, forcibly impose its will on its neighbors and challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia's military and intelligence forces are employing a range of cyber capabilities, to include espionage, influence and attack units, to support its invasion and to defend Russian actions with a worldwide propaganda campaign.

U.S. Cyber Command (with NSA) has been integral to the nation's response to this crisis since Russian forces began deploying on Ukraine's borders last fall. We have provided intelligence on the building threat, helped to warn U.S. government and industry to tighten security within critical infrastructure sectors, enhanced resilience on the DODIN (especially in Europe),
accelerated efforts against criminal cyber enterprises and, together with interagency members, Allies, and partners, planned for a range of contingencies. Coordinating with the Ukrainians in an effort to help them harden their networks, we deployed a hunt team who sat side-by-side with our partners to gain critical insights that have increased homeland defense for both the United States and Ukraine. In addition, USCYBERCOM is proactively ensuring the security and availability of strategic command and control and other systems across the Department. We have also crafted options for national decision makers and are conducting operations as directed.

When Moscow ordered the invasion in late February, we stepped up an already high operational tempo. We have been conducting additional hunt forward operations to identify network vulnerabilities. These operations have bolstered the resilience of Ukraine and our NATO Allies and partners. We provided remote analytic support to Ukraine and conducted network defense activities aligned to critical networks from outside Ukraine – directly in support of mission partners. In conjunction with interagency, private sector and Allied partners, we are collaborating to mitigate threats to domestic and overseas systems.

These measures were made possible by the patient investments in cyberspace operations capabilities and capacity over the last decade, as well as by the lessons that we as a Department and a nation have learned from operational experience. The current crisis is not over, but I am proud of the response of our people and confident in their ability to deliver results no matter how long it lasts. Their grit and ingenuity have been inspiring.

Shifting to longer-term considerations, I note that our operations are planned and executed in accord with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. Underpinning our work is Integrated Deterrence. We provide combat-capable forces in cyberspace that engage in active campaigning to disrupt adversary actions, demonstrate capabilities and resolve, shape adversary perceptions and gain warfighting advantages should deterrence fail. Integrated Deterrence is multi-partner, multi-domain, multi-theater and multi-spectrum, requiring us to compete every day in cyberspace against military and intelligence actors seeking to undermine our nation’s strength and strategic advantages.

Cyberspace is a dynamic and inter-connected domain where near-peer adversaries seek to exploit gaps and seams between our organizations and authorities. Such adversaries use a variety of cyber means to compromise our systems, distort narratives and disseminate misinformation. These actions threaten our national interests by impairing the safety and security of our citizens, stealing intellectual property and personal information while seeking to undermine the legitimacy of our institutions. Our adversaries have demonstrated sophisticated cyber-attack capabilities for use in competition, crisis and conflict, but I am confident that USCYBERCOM is well postured to meet those challenges.

China is our pacing challenge, which I see as both a sprint and a marathon. China’s military modernization over the past several years threatens to erode deterrence in the western Pacific, which requires immediate steps to redress. At the same time, China is an enduring strategic challenge that is now global in scope. Beijing is exerting influence worldwide through its rising diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power. China is a challenge unlike any other we have faced. I have therefore created a China Outcomes Group under joint USCYBERCOM and NSA leadership to ensure proper focus, resourcing, planning, and operations to meet this challenge. Although we recognize that much of our effort will be in support of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, China is a global challenge. The success of our efforts will depend in part on the resilience and capabilities of regional and worldwide partners. We are building operating relationships and also dedicating long-term work to enhance their cybersecurity and cyberspace operations forces.
Iran and North Korea are cyber adversaries growing in sophistication and willingness to act. Despite our strengthened focus on China, we are maintaining our ability to counter these threats. Tehran has increased ransomware operations, the targeting of critical infrastructure, and influence campaigns (including in our 2020 elections). We support U.S. Central Command in its efforts against Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq and Syria (as we also did in the withdrawal from Afghanistan last summer). North Korea uses its cyber actors to generate revenue through criminal enterprises, such as hacking-for-hire and theft of cryptocurrency. USCYBERCOM works with the Departments of State and Treasury to stem Pyongyang’s campaigns.

The scope, scale and sophistication of these threats is rising. The United States faced major cybersecurity challenges over the last year, beginning with the SolarWinds supply-chain compromise but extending to incidents involving software compromises that affected companies like Colonial Pipeline, Microsoft, JBS, Kaseya, and Apache. In each instance, our Command worked through CNMF and other components to provide insights to our homeland security and law enforcement partners, who are the nation’s first line of defense for U.S. systems and networks.

Ransomware can have strategic effects as America saw in the disruption of Colonial Pipeline’s systems. CNMF has taken numerous actions over the past year to combat ransomware in close partnership with law enforcement, interagency, industry, and foreign partners to disrupt and degrade the operations of ransomware groups attacking our nation’s critical infrastructure. CNMF and NSA enabled whole-of-government actions targeting ransomware actors, passing key insights in near-real time. CNMF was a key partner in the whole-of-government effort to disrupt and impose costs against those who targeted Colonial Pipeline.

USCYBERCOM (with JFHQ-DODIN) also defended the DODIN against cyber threats and helped ensure that disruptions to its systems and data remained inconsequential and brief. We continue to innovate in enhancing DODIN defenses and countering adversary threats; indeed, we must, because our adversaries are agile and adaptive. Key to this effort is building resilience in our systems and platforms while preparing the Department, the other Combatant Commands and Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies to operate even in degraded cyber environments.

U.S. Cyber Command Posture for the Future

Our success against these growing challenges is a result of sustained efforts and investments, not to mention a lot of hard work. I should add that that work over the last two years took place under COVID-19 mitigations. USCYBERCOM has been on-mission, running operations and exercises with the joint force and domestic and foreign partners throughout the pandemic, with negligible workforce transmission and slight impact to operations. We will continue to prioritize workplace safety, workforce confidence, and mission continuity.

We see 2022 as a year of opportunity to make progress in several areas that will enhance USCYBERCOM’s capabilities and contributions to national security. With this in mind, I have established the following priorities for our Command:

- Readiness;
- Operations in Defense of the Nation;
- Integrated Deterrence;
- Recruiting, Retention and Training; and
- Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture and Enhanced Budget Control

Readiness is priority one. It is foundational to the success of operations in defense of the nation and Integrated Deterrence. USCYBERCOM has made progress despite challenges. We
improved our ability to monitor the status of our cyber mission forces down to the team, mission element and individual levels. Across the Department, USCYBERCOM is responsible for setting standards for all of DoD's Cyberspace Operations Forces. We work to provide commanders with the situational awareness they require to assess risks and make informed decisions, not just in operations but in maintaining force readiness as a whole. We will work with the Services this year to ensure the progress we have made over the past year continues.

Second, along with our interagency partners, we defended the nation's recent elections against foreign interference and are preparing to support the defense of this year's midterms through the combined efforts of USCYBERCOM and NSA. We anticipate that our adversaries will continue using their military and intelligence elements to affect our democracy. Thus I appointed a USCYBERCOM general officer and an NSA senior executive to oversee election security in 2022. This is an enduring, no-fail mission for USCYBERCOM.

Interagency partnerships are crucial in these efforts. Working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has demonstrated that we are much stronger together. Indeed, no single agency can defend the nation on its own. USCYBERCOM imposes costs on threat actors and provides insights to domestic and foreign partners to mitigate and respond to malign activity, enabling each to act under its respective authorities. We will continue to collaborate with our domestic partners across the federal government and the states to share best practices and expertise.

Our adversaries also target our economy. DIB companies are on the frontlines in cyberspace and are constantly targeted by malicious cyber actors. Over the past year, we have deepened our relationships with private industry through voluntary information sharing. Since the nation’s critical infrastructure and systems are largely in private hands, these relationships have directly enhanced our operations, in addition to the security of their commercial systems.

Third, supporting the national priority of Integrated Deterrence means preparing for crisis and conflict while campaigning in competition across the full spectrum of cyber operations. It also means building the strategic partnerships that enable the defense of U.S. systems and networks beyond the DODIN and the DIB. Our foreign partnerships begin with our "Five Eye" Allies – the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The circle of partnership has been enlarged in recent years as we enhanced existing relationships with allies and forged new ones with several nations, especially in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

Fourth is building a skilled workforce through recruitment, training, and retention. Talent is key to preserving our competitive edge against our adversaries. USCYBERCOM has improved its civilian hiring with the use of its congressionally-granted Cyber Excepted Service (CES) authorities, which allow us to offer competitive compensation packages for high-demand expertise. In addition, a diverse, talented workforce that expands equity and inclusiveness is an enduring goal. To recruit and retain a skilled military workforce, we are also grateful for the authorities Congress has granted the Services to offer flexible promotion and commissioning avenues in support of the CMF.

Partnerships with academia will aid in engaging the future cyber workforce and enriching the strategic dialogue about cyber. Our new Academic Engagement network began last year and comprises 93 institutions, including 10 minority-serving institutions, across 40 states and the District of Columbia, as of March 25, 2022. Interest in partnering with USCYBERCOM is strong and growing.

Training and proficiency are improving through our mission simulation capabilities, particularly the Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE). The PCTE is helping us mature cyber
operations tradecraft, enhance individual proficiencies and enable faster attainment of team certification and collective training in maneuvers such as Exercise CYBER FLAG.

The Reserve Component is critical to protecting the nation in cyberspace. As a result of the partnership between USCYBERCOM and the National Guard Bureau during the 2020 election, Guard units could rapidly share information on malicious cyber activity with state and local authorities. Members of the National Guard and Reserve often have private-sector experience in fields of strong interest to USCYBERCOM. In addition, the ability of the National Guard and Reserve to hire cyber talent has been especially helpful in retaining the contributions of Service members who decide to leave active duty upon completion of their commitment; members can transfer to a part-time status.

Our final priority is guiding the Department's investments in cyberspace capability through the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture (JCWA) and Enhanced Budget Control. JCWA consolidates and standardizes the Department's cyberspace operations capabilities, enabling us to integrate data from missions and monitoring to help commanders gauge risk, make timely decisions and act against threats at speed and scale. The Department is building JCWA and advancing the Cyber Mission Force's capabilities for conducting the full spectrum of cyberspace operations.

USCYBERCOM is grateful to this Committee and Congress for granting us Enhanced Budget Control over resources dedicated to the Cyber Mission Force. With this authority, USCYBERCOM will improve direction, control and synchronization of investments for cyber operations across the Department of Defense.

Conclusion

U.S. Cyber Command views 2022 as a year of significant opportunity for building our capabilities against the five priorities above. Our overarching goal is to build a Command that is ready and capable at providing options and conducting operations in defense of the nation with wider partnerships and world-class talent, all linked through the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture. These elements will be essential to our nation's security as it faces an array of adversaries who are expanding the scope, scale and sophistication of their operations against us, and will be critical to developing the right mission posture to meet the unprecedented challenge of China.

The men and women at U.S. Cyber Command are grateful for the support this Committee has given to our Command. We can only succeed with a strong partnership with Congress.

VI. U.S. Cyber Law Guidance

A. DOS Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace

The following excerpt is from a presentation by Brian J. Egan, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, made at Berkeley Law School, CA on 10 November 2016 [https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264303.htm]:

This is a fitting place to discuss the topic I am here to speak about today – the importance of international law and stability in cyberspace – just across the Bay from Silicon Valley, home to many of the world’s largest and most innovative information technology companies. The remarkable reach of the Internet and the ever-growing number of connections between computers and other networked devices are delivering significant economic, social, and political benefits to individuals and societies around the world. In addition, an increasing number of States and non-State actors are developing the operational capability and capacity to pursue their objectives through cyberspace. Unfortunately, a number of those actors are employing their capabilities to conduct malicious cyber activities that cause effects in other States’ territories. Significant cyber incidents – including many that are reportedly State-sponsored – frequently make headline news.

In light of this, it is reasonable to ask: could we someday reach a tipping point where the risks of connectivity outweigh the benefits we reap from cyberspace? And how can we prevent cyberspace from becoming a source of instability that could lead to inter-State conflict?

I don’t think we will reach such a tipping point, but how we maintain cyber stability in order to preserve the continued benefits of connectivity remains a critical question. And international law, I would submit, is an essential element of the answer.

Existing principles of international law form a cornerstone of the United States’ strategic framework of international cyber stability during peacetime and during armed conflict. The U.S. strategic framework is designed to achieve and maintain a stable cyberspace environment where all States and individuals are able to realize its benefits fully, where there are advantages to cooperating against common threats and avoiding conflict, and where there is little incentive for States to engage in disruptive behavior or to attack one another.

There are three pillars to the U.S. strategic framework, each of which can help to ensure stability in cyberspace by reducing the risks of misperception and escalation. The first is global affirmation of the applicability of existing international law to State activity in cyberspace in both peacetime and during armed conflict. The second is the development of international consensus on certain additional voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace during peacetime, which is of course the predominant context in which States interact. And the third is the development and implementation of practical confidence-building measures to facilitate inter-State cooperation on cyber-related matters. I’ll address two of these pillars—international law and voluntary, non-binding norms—in greater detail today.

International Law

In September 2012, my predecessor, Harold Koh, delivered remarks on “International Law in Cyberspace” at U.S. Cyber Command’s Legal Conference. It says a lot about where we were four years ago that the first two questions Koh addressed in his speech were as fundamental as: “Do established principles of international law apply to cyberspace?” and “Is cyberspace a law-free zone, where anything goes?” (So as not to leave you hanging, the answers to those questions are an emphatic “yes” and “no” respectively!)

We have made significant progress since then. One prominent forum in which these issues are discussed is the United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that deals with
cyber issues in the context of international security. The GGE is a body established by the UN Secretary-General with a mandate from the UN General Assembly to study, among other things, how international law applies to States’ cyber activities, with a view to promoting common understandings. In 2013, the 15-State GGE recognized the applicability of existing international law to States’ cyber activities. Just last year, the subsequent UN GGE on the same topic, expanded to include 20 States, built on the 2013 report and took an additional step by recognizing the applicability in cyberspace of the inherent right of self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 2015 GGE report also recognized the applicability of the law of armed conflict’s fundamental principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction to the conduct of hostilities in and through cyberspace. With other recent bilateral and multilateral statements, including that of the leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) States in 2015, we have seen an emerging consensus that existing international law applies to States’ cyber activities.

Recognizing the applicability of existing international law as a general matter, however, is the easy part, at least for most like-minded nations. Identifying how that law applies to specific cyber activities is more challenging, and States rarely articulate their views on this subject publicly. The United States already has made some efforts in this area, including by setting forth views on the application of international law to cyber activities in Koh’s 2012 speech and also in the U.S. submission to the 2014–15 UN GGE, both of which are publicly available in the Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law. The U.S. Department of Defense also has presented its views on aspects of this topic in its publicly available Law of War Manual. But more work remains to be done.

Increased transparency is important for a number of reasons. Customary international law, of course, develops from a general and consistent practice of States followed by them out of a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. Faced with a relative vacuum of public State practice and opinio juris concerning cyber activities, others have sought to fill the void with their views on how international law applies in this area. The most prominent and comprehensive of these efforts is the Tallinn Manual project. Although this is an initiative of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, it is neither State-led nor an official NATO project. Instead, the project is a non-governmental effort by international lawyers who first set out to identify the international legal rules applicable to cyber warfare, which led to the publication of "Tallinn Manual 1.0" in 2013. The group is now examining the international legal framework that applies to cyber activities below the threshold of the use of force and outside of the context of armed conflict, which will result in the publication of "Tallinn Manual 2.0" by the end of this year.

I commend the Tallinn Manual project team on what has clearly been a tremendous and thoughtful effort. The United States has unequivocally been in accord with the underlying premise of this project, which is that existing international law applies to State behavior in cyberspace. In this respect, the Tallinn Manuals will make a valuable contribution to underscoring and demonstrating this point across a number of bodies of international law, even if we do not necessarily agree with every aspect of the Manuals.

States must also address these challenging issues. Interpretations or applications of international law proposed by non-governmental groups may not reflect the practice or legal views of many or most States. States’ relative silence could lead to unpredictability in the cyber realm, where States may be left guessing about each other’s views on the applicable legal framework. In the context of a specific cyber incident, this uncertainty could give rise to misperceptions and miscalculations by States, potentially leading to escalation and, in the worst case, conflict.

To mitigate these risks, States should publicly state their views on how existing international law applies to State conduct in cyberspace to the greatest extent possible in international and
domestic forums. Specific cyber incidents provide States with opportunities to do this, but it is equally important – and often easier – for States to articulate public views outside of the context of specific cyber operations or incidents. Stating such views publicly will help give rise to more settled expectations of State behavior and thereby contribute to greater predictability and stability in cyberspace. This is true for the question of what legal rules apply to cyber activity that may constitute a use of force, or that may take place in a situation of armed conflict. It is equally true regarding the question of what legal rules apply to cyber activities that fall below the threshold of the use of force and take place outside of the context of armed conflict.

Although many States, including the United States, generally believe that the existing international legal framework is sufficient to regulate State behavior in cyberspace, States likely have divergent views on specific issues. Further discussion, clarification, and cooperation on these issues remains necessary. The present task is for States to begin to make public their views on how existing international law applies.

In this spirit, and building on Harold Koh's remarks in 2012 and the United States' 2014 and 2016 submissions to the UN GGE, I would like to offer some additional U.S. views on how certain rules of international law apply to States' behavior in cyberspace, beginning first with cyber operations during armed conflict, and then turning to the identification of voluntary, non-binding norms applicable to State behavior during peacetime.

Cyber Operations in the Context of Armed Conflict

Turning to cyber operations in armed conflict, I would like to start with the U.S. military's cyber operations in the context of the ongoing armed conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter informed Congress in April 2016, U.S. Cyber Command has been asked "to take on the war against ISIL as essentially [its] first major combat operation […] The objectives there are to interrupt ISIL command-and-control, interrupt its ability to move money around, interrupt its ability to tyrannize and control population[s], [and] interrupt its ability to recruit externally."

The U.S. military must comply with the United States' obligations under the law of armed conflict and other applicable international law when conducting cyber operations against ISIL, just as it does when conducting other types of military operations during armed conflict. To the extent that such cyber operations constitute "attacks" under the law of armed conflict, the rules on conducting attacks must be applied to those cyber operations. For example, such operations must only be directed against military objectives, such as computers, other networked devices, or possibly specific data that, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Such operations also must comport with the requirements of the principles of distinction and proportionality. Feasible precautions must be taken to reduce the risk of incidental harm to civilian infrastructure and users. In the cyber context, this requires parties to a conflict to assess the potential effects of cyber activities on both military and civilian infrastructure and users. Not all cyber operations, however, rise to the level of an "attack" as a legal matter under the law of armed conflict. When determining whether a cyber activity constitutes an "attack" for purposes of the law of armed conflict, States should consider, among other things, whether a cyber activity results in kinetic or non-kinetic effects, and the nature and scope of those effects, as well as the nature of the connection, if any, between the cyber activity and the particular armed conflict in question.

Even if they do not rise to the level of an "attack" under the law of armed conflict, cyber operations during armed conflict must nonetheless be consistent with the principle of military
necessity. For example, a cyber operation that would not constitute an "attack," but would nonetheless seize or destroy enemy property, would have to be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Additionally, even if a cyber operation does not rise to the level of an "attack" or does not cause injury or damage that would need to be considered under the principle of proportionality in conducting attacks, that cyber operation still should comport with the general principles of the law of war.

Other international legal principles beyond the rules and principles of the law of armed conflict that I just discussed are also relevant to U.S. cyber operations undertaken during armed conflict. As then-Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan said in his September 2011 remarks at Harvard Law School, "[i]nternational legal principles, including respect for a State’s sovereignty […] impose important constraints on our ability to act unilaterally […] in foreign territories." It is to this topic—the role played by State sovereignty in the legal analysis of cyber operations—that I'd like to turn now.

**Sovereignty and Cyberspace**

In his remarks in 2012, Harold Koh stated that "States conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the sovereignty of other States, including outside the context of armed conflict." I would like to build on that statement and offer a few thoughts about the relevance of sovereignty principles to States' cyber activities.

As an initial matter, remote cyber operations involving computers or other networked devices located on another State's territory do not constitute a per se violation of international law. In other words, there is no absolute prohibition on such operations as a matter of international law. This is perhaps most clear where such activities in another State's territory have no effects or de minimis effects.

Most States, including the United States, engage in intelligence collection abroad. As President Obama said, the collection of intelligence overseas is "not unique to America." As the President has also affirmed, the United States, like other nations, has gathered intelligence throughout its history to ensure that national security and foreign policy decisionmakers have access to timely, accurate, and insightful information. Indeed, the President issued a directive in 2014 to clarify the principles that would be followed by the United States in undertaking the collection of signals intelligence abroad.

Such widespread and perhaps nearly universal practice by States of intelligence collection abroad indicates that there is no per se prohibition on such activities under customary international law. I would caution, however, that because "intelligence collection" is not a defined term, the absence of a per se prohibition on these activities does not settle the question of whether a specific intelligence collection activity might nonetheless violate a provision of international law.

Although certain activities—including cyber operations—may violate another State's domestic law, that is a separate question from whether such activities violate international law. The United States is deeply respectful of other States' sovereign authority to prescribe laws governing activities in their territory. Disrespecting another State's domestic laws can have serious legal and foreign policy consequences. As a legal matter, such an action could result in the criminal prosecution and punishment of a State's agents in the United States or abroad, for example, for offenses such as espionage or for violations of foreign analogs to provisions such as the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. From a foreign policy perspective, one can look to the consequences that flow from disclosures related to such programs. But such domestic law and foreign policy issues do not resolve the independent question of whether the activity violates international law.
In certain circumstances, one State's non-consensual cyber operation in another State's territory could violate international law, even if it falls below the threshold of a use of force. This is a challenging area of the law that raises difficult questions. The very design of the Internet may lead to some encroachment on other sovereign jurisdictions. Precisely when a non-consensual cyber operation violates the sovereignty of another State is a question lawyers within the U.S. government continue to study carefully, and it is one that ultimately will be resolved through the practice and opinio juris of States.

Relatedly, consider the challenges we face in clarifying the international law prohibition on unlawful intervention. As articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its judgment on the merits in the Nicaragua Case, this rule of customary international law forbids States from engaging in coercive action that bears on a matter that each State is entitled, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely, such as the choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system. This is generally viewed as a relatively narrow rule of customary international law, but States' cyber activities could run afoul of this prohibition. For example, a cyber operation by a State that interferes with another country's ability to hold an election or that manipulates another country's election results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention. For increased transparency, States need to do more work to clarify how the international law on non-intervention applies to States' activities in cyberspace.

Some may ask why it matters where the international community draws these legal lines. Put starkly, why does it matter whether an activity violates international law? It matters, of course, because the community of nations has committed to abide by international law, including with respect to activities in cyberspace. International law enables States to work together to meet common goals, including the pursuit of stability in cyberspace. And international law sets binding standards of State behavior that not only induce compliance by States but also provide compliant States with a stronger basis for criticizing—and rallying others to respond to—States that violate those standards. As Harold Koh stated in 2012, "[i]f we succeed in promoting a culture of compliance, we will reap the benefits. And if we earn a reputation for compliance, the actions we do take will earn enhanced legitimacy worldwide for their adherence to the rule of law." Working to clarify how international law applies to States' activities in cyberspace serves those ends, as it does in so many other critical areas of State activity.

Before leaving the topic of sovereignty, I'd like to address one additional related issue involving a State's control over cyber infrastructure and activities within, rather than outside, its territory. In his 2012 speech, Koh observed that "[t]he physical infrastructure that supports the Internet and cyber activities is generally located in sovereign territory and is subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial State." However, he went on to emphasize that "[t]he exercise of jurisdiction by the territorial State, however, is not unlimited; it must be consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights obligations."

I want to underscore this important point. Some States invoke the concept of State sovereignty as a justification for excessive regulation of online content, including censorship and access restrictions, often undertaken in the name of counterterrorism or "countering violent extremism." And sometimes, States also deploy the concept of State sovereignty in an attempt to shield themselves from outside criticism.

So let me repeat what Koh made clear: Any regulation by a State of matters within its territory, including use of and access to the Internet, must comply with that State's applicable obligations under international human rights law.

There is no doubt that terrorist groups have become dangerously adept at using the Internet and other communications technologies to propagate their hateful messages, recruit adherents, and urge followers to commit violent acts. This is why all governments must work together to
target online criminal activities – such as illicit money transfers, terrorist attack planning and 
coordination, criminal solicitation, and the provision of material support to terrorist groups. U.S. 
efforts to prevent the Internet from being used for terrorist purposes also focus on criminal 
activities that facilitate terrorism, such as financing and recruitment, not on restricting expressive 
content, even if that content is repugnant or inimical to our core values.

Such efforts must not be conflated with broader calls to restrict public access to or censor the 
Internet, or even – as some have suggested – to effectively shut down entire portions of the 
Web. Such measures would not advance our security, and they would be inconsistent with our 
values. The Internet must remain open to the free flow of information and ideas. Restricting the 
flow of ideas also inhibits spreading the values of understanding and mutual respect that offer 
one of the most powerful antidotes to the hateful and violent narratives propagated by terrorist 
groups.

That is why the United States holds the view that use of the Internet, including social media, in 
furtherance of terrorism and other criminal activity must be addressed through lawful means that 
respect each State’s international obligations and commitments regarding human rights, 
including the freedom of expression, and that serve the objectives of the free flow of information 
and a free and open Internet. To be sure, the incitement of imminent terrorist violence may be 
restricted. However, certain censorship and content control, including blocking websites simply 
because they contain content that criticizes a leader, a government policy, or an ideology, or 
because the content espouses particular religious beliefs, violates international human rights 
law and must not be engaged in by States.

State Responsibility and the "Problem of Attribution" in Cyberspace

I have been talking thus far about States’ activities and operations in cyberspace. But as many 
of you know, it is often difficult to detect who or what is responsible for a given cyber incident. 
This leads me to the frequently raised and much debated "problem of attribution" in cyberspace.

States and commentators often express concerns about the challenge of attribution in a 
technical sense – that is, the challenge of obtaining facts, whether through technical indicators 
or all-source intelligence, that would inform a State’s determinations about a particular cyber 
incident. Others have raised issues related to political decisions about attribution – that is, 
considerations that might be relevant to a State’s decision to go public and identify another 
State as the actor responsible for a particular cyber incident and to condemn that act as 
unacceptable. These technical and policy discussions about attribution, however, should be 
distinguished from the legal questions about attribution. In my present remarks, I will focus on 
the issue of attribution in the legal sense.

From a legal perspective, the customary international law of state responsibility supplies the 
standards for attributing acts, including cyber acts, to States. For example, cyber operations 
conducted by organs of a State or by persons or entities empowered by domestic law to 
exercise governmental authority are attributable to that State, if such organs, persons, or 
entities are acting in that capacity.

Additionally, cyber operations conducted by non-State actors are attributable to a State under 
the law of state responsibility when such actors engage in operations pursuant to the State’s 
instructions or under the State’s direction or control, or when the State later acknowledges and 
adopts the operations as its own.

Thus, as a legal matter, States cannot escape responsibility for internationally wrongful cyber 
acts by perpetrating them through proxies. When there is information – whether obtained 
through technical means or all-source intelligence – that permits a cyber act engaged in by a 
non-State actor to be attributed legally to a State under one of the standards set forth in the law
of state responsibility, the victim State has all of the rights and remedies against the responsible State allowed under international law.

The law of state responsibility does not set forth explicit burdens or standards of proof for making a determination about legal attribution. In this context, a State acts as its own judge of the facts and may make a unilateral determination with respect to attribution of a cyber operation to another State. Absolute certainty is not – and cannot be – required. Instead, international law generally requires that States act reasonably under the circumstances when they gather information and draw conclusions based on that information.

I also want to note that, despite the suggestion by some States to the contrary, there is no international legal obligation to reveal evidence on which attribution is based prior to taking appropriate action. There may, of course, be political pressure to do so, and States may choose to reveal such evidence to convince other States to join them in condemnation, for example. But that is a policy choice – it is not compelled by international law.

**Countermeasures and Other "Defensive" Measures**

I want to turn now to the question of what options a victim State might have to respond to malicious cyber activity that falls below the threshold of an armed attack. As an initial matter, a State can always undertake unfriendly acts that are not inconsistent with any of its international obligations in order to influence the behavior of other States. Such acts – which are known as acts of retorsion – may include, for example, the imposition of sanctions or the declaration that a diplomat is persona non grata.

In certain circumstances, a State may take action that would otherwise violate international law in response to malicious cyber activity. One example is the use of force in self-defense in response to an actual or imminent armed attack. Another example is that, in exceptional circumstances, a State may be able to avail itself of the plea of necessity, which, subject to certain conditions, might preclude the wrongfulness of an act if the act is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.

In the time that remains, however, I would like to talk about a type of State response that has received a lot of attention in discussions about cyberspace: countermeasures. The customary international law doctrine of countermeasures permits a State that is the victim of an internationally wrongful act of another State to take otherwise unlawful measures against the responsible State in order to cause that State to comply with its international obligations, for example, the obligation to cease its internationally wrongful act. Therefore, as a threshold matter, the availability of countermeasures to address malicious cyber activity requires a prior internationally wrongful act that is attributable to another State. As with all countermeasures, this puts the responding State in the position of potentially being held responsible for violating international law if it turns out that there wasn't actually an internationally wrongful act that triggered the right to take countermeasures, or if the responding State made an inaccurate attribution determination. That is one reason why countermeasures should not be engaged in lightly.

Additionally, under the law of countermeasures, measures undertaken in response to an internationally wrongful act performed in or through cyberspace that is attributable to a State must be directed only at the State responsible for the wrongful act and must meet the principles of necessity and proportionality, including the requirements that a countermeasure must be designed to cause the State to comply with its international obligations – for example, the obligation to cease its internationally wrongful act – and must cease as soon as the offending State begins complying with the obligations in question.
The doctrine of countermeasures also generally requires the injured State to call upon the responsible State to comply with its international obligations before a countermeasure may be taken – in other words, the doctrine generally requires what I will call a “prior demand.” The sufficiency of a prior demand should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular circumstances of the situation at hand and the purpose of the requirement, which is to give the responsible State notice of the injured State’s claim and an opportunity to respond.

I also should note that countermeasures taken in response to internationally wrongful cyber activities attributable to a State generally may take the form of cyber-based countermeasures or non-cyber-based countermeasures. That is a decision typically within the discretion of the responding State and will depend on the circumstances.

Voluntary, Non-Binding Norms of Responsible State Behavior in Peacetime

In the remainder of my remarks, I’d like to discuss very briefly another element of the United States’ strategic framework for international cyber stability: the development of international consensus on certain additional voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace that apply during peacetime.

Internationally, the United States has identified and promoted four such norms:

- First, a State should not conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, or other confidential business information with the intent of providing competitive advantages to its companies or commercial sectors.

- Second, a State should not conduct or knowingly support online activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use of critical infrastructure to provide service to the public.

- Third, a State should not conduct or knowingly support activity intended to prevent national computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) from responding to cyber incidents. A State also should not use CSIRTs to enable online activity that is intended to do harm.

- Fourth, a State should cooperate, in a manner consistent with its domestic and international obligations, with requests for assistance from other States in investigating cyber crimes, collecting electronic evidence, and mitigating malicious cyber activity emanating from its territory.

These four U.S.-promoted norms seek to address specific areas of risk that are of national and/or economic security concern to all States. Although voluntary and non-binding in nature, these norms can serve to define an international standard of behavior to be observed by responsible, like-minded States with the goal of preventing bad actors from engaging in malicious cyber activity. If observed, these measures – which can include measures of self-restraint – can contribute substantially to conflict prevention and stability. Over time, these norms can potentially provide common standards for responsible States to use to identify and respond to behavior that deviates from these norms. As more States commit to observing these norms, they will be increasingly willing to condemn the malicious activities of bad actors and to join together to ensure that there are consequences for those activities.

It is important, however, to distinguish clearly between international law, on the one hand, and voluntary, non-binding norms on the other. These four norms identified by the United States, or the other peacetime cyber norms recommended in the 2015 UN GGE report, fall squarely in the voluntary, non-binding category. These voluntary, non-binding norms set out standards of expected State behavior that may, in certain circumstances, overlap with standards of behavior that are required as a matter of international law. Such norms are intended to supplement
existing international law. They are designed to address certain cyber activities by States that occur outside of the context of armed conflict that are potentially destabilizing. That said, it is possible that if States begin to accept the standards set out in such non-binding norms as legally required and act in conformity with them, such norms could, over time, crystallize into binding customary international law. As a result, States should approach the process of identifying and committing to such non-binding norms with care.

In closing, I wanted to highlight a few points. First, cyberspace may be a relatively new frontier, but State behavior in cyberspace, as in other areas, remains embedded in an existing framework of law, including international law. Second, States have the primary responsibility for identifying how existing legal frameworks apply in cyberspace. Third, States have a responsibility to publicly articulate applicable standards. This is critical to enable an accurate understanding of international law, in the area of cyberspace and beyond. I hope that these remarks have furthered this goal of transparency, and highlighted the important role of international law, and international lawyers, in this important and dynamic area.

B. DOD Domestic and International Cyber Law Considerations

The following is an excerpt from a speech by Paul C. Ney, Jr., DOD General Counsel, at the U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference on 2 March 2020 [https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/DOD-general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/]:

DOD General Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference

I have two objectives today. First, I'll offer a snapshot of how we in DOD are integrating cyberspace into our overall national defense strategy. Second, I will summarize the domestic and international law considerations that inform the legal reviews that DOD lawyers conduct as part of the review and approval process for military cyber operations. We at DOD now have considerable practice advising on such operations and are accordingly in a position to begin to speak from experience to some of the challenging legal issues that cyber operations present.

To set the scene, when I talk about "cyberspace," I am referring to "the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers." Physically, and logically, the domain is in a state of perpetual transformation. It enables the transmission of data across international boundaries in nanoseconds – controlled much more by individuals or even machines than by governments – spreading ideas to disparate audiences and, in some cases, the generating of physical effects in far-flung places.

1. Today's Cyber Threat Environment and DOD's Response

As we enter the third decade of the twenty-first century, people are imagining, developing, and creating new technologies and devices at a faster rate than ever before. These new technologies update on a near daily basis – think of the software update that your phone automatically uploaded today.

Sophisticated technologies are now a part of nearly all aspects of military operations, creating opportunities and challenges. A recent Brookings paper makes the point well:

By … building Achilles' heels into everything they operate, modern militaries have created huge opportunities for their potential enemies. The fact that everyone is vulnerable … is no guarantee of protection.

Constantly changing vulnerabilities exist not only within our Armed Forces but also in the private and public sectors, which provide critical support to our operations. This includes contractors that manage networks and other services; the defense industrial base that is the foundation of the United States' military strength; and critical public infrastructure upon which the entire country, including the Armed Forces, relies for water, electricity, and transportation.

From a strategic competition perspective, too, cyberspace is increasingly dynamic and contested, including as a warfighting domain. In the past few years, other nations, in part to make up for gaps in conventional military power vis-à-vis the United States, have developed cyber strategies and organized military forces to conduct operations in cyberspace. China's Strategic Support Force, for example, provides its People's Liberation Army with cyberwarfare capabilities to "establish information dominance in the early stages of a conflict to constrain [U.S.] actions … by targeting network-based [command and control] … logistics, and commercial activities." Russia consistently uses cyber capabilities for what it calls "information confrontation" during peacetime and war. All of this is unsurprising because cyber is a relatively cheap form of gaining real power, especially for impoverished adversaries like North Korea: a cyber operation can require nothing more than a reasonably skilled operator, a computer, a network connection, and persistence.
A key element of the U.S. military's strategy in the face of these cyber-threats is to "defend forward." Implementing this element of the strategy begins with "continuously engaging and contesting adversaries and causing them uncertainty wherever they maneuver" – which we refer to as "persistent engagement." "Persistent engagement recognizes that cyberspace's structural feature of interconnectedness and its core condition of constant contact creates a strategic necessity to operate continuously in cyberspace." As General Nakasone has said, "If we find ourselves defending inside our own networks, we have lost the initiative and the advantage." In short, the strategy envisions that our military cyber forces will be conducting operations in cyberspace to disrupt and defeat malicious cyber activity that is harmful to U.S. national interests.

Cyber operations are also becoming an integral part of other military operations. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes, "Success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology first, but rather to the one that better integrates it and adapts its way of fighting." For example, during operations in Iraq in 2017, U.S. forces used cyber and space capabilities to disrupt communications to and from the enemy's primary command post, forcing the enemy to move to previously unknown backup sites, thereby exposing their entire command-and-control network to U.S. kinetic strikes. Operations like this will become increasingly common.

Because of the complexity and dynamism of the domain and the threat environment, the need for persistent engagement outside U.S. networks, and the critical advantage that cyber operations provide our Armed Forces, DOD must develop, review, and approve military cyber operations at so-called "warp-speed." To this end, the U.S. Government has made meaningful strides. You heard in 2018 that the President had issued National Security Presidential Memorandum-13, United States Cyber Operations Policy, or "NSPM-13" for short, which allows for the delegation of well-defined authorities to the Secretary of Defense to conduct time-sensitive military operations in cyberspace. Congress also has clarified that the President has authority to direct military operations in cyberspace to counter adversary cyber operations against our national interests and that such operations, whether they amount to the conduct of hostilities or not, and even when conducted in secret, are to be considered traditional military activities and not covert action, for purposes of the covert action statute.

Even as the United States takes action to secure its vital national interests and to support its Allies and partners in this complex environment, it is a Nation dedicated to the rule of law. Consequently, we must ensure that our efforts are not only effective but also consistent with law and wider U.S. Government efforts to promote stability in cyberspace and adherence to the rules-based international order. DOD lawyers have an important role to play as the Department develops and executes cyber operations to meet these mandates.

Let me turn now to providing you a sense of how DOD lawyers analyze proposed military cyber operations for compliance with domestic and international law.

2. Framework for Legal Analysis

To evaluate the legal sufficiency of a proposed military cyber operation, we employ a process similar to the one we use to assess non-cyber operations. We engage our clients to understand the relevant operational details: What is the military objective we seek to achieve? What is the operational scheme of maneuver and how does it contribute to achieving that objective? Where is the target located? Does the operation involve multiple geographic locations? What is the target system used for? How will we access it? What effects – such as loss of access to data – will we generate within that system? How will those effects impact the system's functioning? Which people or processes will be affected by anticipated changes to the system's functioning? Are any of those likely to be impacted civilians or public services? Answers to these questions will drive the legal analysis.
A. U.S. Domestic Law

Let's take up considerations of U.S. domestic law first. We begin with the foundational question of domestic legal authority to conduct a military cyber operation. The domestic legal authority for the DOD to conduct cyber operations is included in the broader authorities of the President and the Secretary of Defense to conduct military operations in defense of the nation. We assess whether a proposed cyber operation has been properly authorized using the analysis we apply to all other operations, including those that constitute use of force. The President has authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution to direct the use of the Armed Forces to serve important national interests, and it is the longstanding view of the Executive Branch that this authority may include the use of armed force when the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the operations do not rise to the level of "war" under the Constitution, triggering Congress's power to declare war. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long affirmed the President's power to use force in defense of the nation and federal persons, property, and instrumentalities. Accordingly, the President has constitutional authority to order military cyber operations even if they amount to use of force in defense of the United States. Of course, the vast majority of military operations in cyberspace do not rise to the level of a use of force; but we begin analysis of U.S. domestic law with the same starting point of identifying the legal authority.

In the context of cyber operations, the President does not need to rely solely on his Article II powers because Congress has provided for ample authorization. As I noted earlier, Congress has specifically affirmed the President's authority to direct DOD to conduct military operations in cyberspace. Moreover, cyber operations against specific targets are logically encompassed within broad statutory authorizations to the President to use force, like the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which authorizes the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those he determines were involved in the 9/11 attacks or that harbored them. Congress has also expressed support for the conduct of military cyber operations to defend the nation against Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian "active, systematic, and ongoing campaigns of attacks" against U.S. interests, including attempts to influence U.S. elections.

In addition to questions of legal authority, DOD lawyers advise on the Secretary of Defense's authority to direct the execution of military cyber operations as authorized by the President and statute, "including in response to malicious cyber activity carried out against the United States or a United States person by a foreign power," and to conduct related intelligence activities. Our lawyers ensure that U.S. military cyber operations adhere to the President's specific authorizations as well as the generally applicable NSPM-13.

After concluding that the operation has been properly authorized, DOD lawyers assess whether there are any statutes that may restrict DOD's ability to conduct the proposed cyber operation and whether the operation may be carried out consistent with the protections afforded to the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. To illustrate, I am going to talk about two statutes and the First Amendment as examples of laws that we may consider, depending on the specific cyber operation to be conducted.

First, let's look at federal criminal provisions in Title 18 of the U.S. Code that prohibit accessing certain computers and computer networks "without authorization" or transmitting a "program, information, code, or command" that intentionally causes "any impairment to the integrity or availability" of the computer or data on it -- provisions found in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or "CFAA," as amended. These provisions contain exceptions for lawfully authorized activities of law enforcement agencies and U.S. intelligence agencies but do not refer to U.S. military cyber operations. Common sense and long-accepted canons of statutory interpretation suggest, however, that the CFAA will not constrain appropriately authorized DOD cyber operations.
The CFAA was enacted to protect U.S. Government computers and critical banking networks against thieves and hackers, not vice versa; it expresses no clear indication of congressional intent to limit the President from directing military actions; and the more recent statutes I mentioned earlier specifically authorize or reaffirm the President's authority to direct DOD to conduct operations in cyberspace. In light of these considerations, it would be unreasonable and counterintuitive to interpret the CFAA as restricting properly authorized military cyber operations abroad against foreign actors.

Second, DOD lawyers typically analyze whether the proposed cyber operation may be conducted as a traditional military activity – or "TMA" – such that it would be excluded from the approval and oversight requirements applicable to covert action under the Covert Action Statute. Because the statute does not define TMA, we look to the legislative history and a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 that clarifies that in general clandestine military activities in cyberspace constitute TMA for purposes of the Covert Action Statute, and reaffirms established congressional reporting requirements for military cyber operations.

Third, DOD lawyers must assess whether a proposed operation will impact the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. The practical reality of cyberspace today is that U.S. military cyber operations aimed at disrupting an adversary's ability to put information online or to distribute it across the worldwide web have the potential to affect U.S. persons' rights and civil liberties in ways that operations in physical domains do not.

Let me give you a concrete example. A core part of DOD's mission to defend U.S. elections consists of defending against covert foreign government malign influence operations targeting the U.S. electorate. The bulk of DOD's efforts in this area involve information-sharing and support to domestic partners, like the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. But what about a U.S. military cyber operation to disrupt a foreign government's ability to disseminate covertly information to U.S. audiences via the Internet by pretending that the information has been authored by Americans inside the United States? Can we conduct such an operation in a manner that contributes to the defense of our elections but avoids impermissible interference with the right of free expression under the First Amendment – including the right to receive information? The analysis often turns on the specifics of the proposed operation – but, in short, we believe we can.

Few precedents address this issue directly; but, U.S. case law does provide a framework with at least three key strands. First, there are judicial decisions that stand for the proposition that the U.S. Government, in carrying out certain appropriately authorized activities, may incidentally burden the right to receive information from foreign sources without violating the First Amendment. Second, courts have recognized a compelling government interest in protecting U.S. elections from certain types of foreign influence – especially when that influence is exercised covertly. Third, government action based on the content of the speech will be suspect.

In light of these precedents, DOD lawyers analyzing particular cyber operations for First Amendment compliance will consider a number of factors, including: whether the operation is targeting the foreign actors seeking to influence U.S. elections covertly rather than the information itself; the extent to which the operation may be conducted in a "content neutral" manner; and, the foreign location and foreign government affiliation of the targeted entity.

We at DOD realize that military involvement in protecting U.S. elections is a sensitive mission, even when conducted in compliance with First Amendment protections and consistent with congressional intent. Virtually any military involvement in U.S. elections implicates the bedrock premise of maintaining civilian control of the military and our long tradition of keeping the military out of domestic politics. Accordingly, in assessing proposed operations related to elections,
DOD lawyers pay particular attention to whether the proposed operation may be conducted consistent with legal and regulatory limits on the use of official positions to influence or affect the results of U.S. elections or to engage in, or create the appearance of engaging in, partisan politics.

B. International Law

Those are some highlights of U.S. domestic law considerations that may be implicated by proposed military cyber operations; let me turn now to international law.

We recognize that State practice in cyberspace is evolving. As lawyers operating in this area, we pay close attention to States' explanations of their own practice, how they are applying treaty rules and customary international law to State activities in cyberspace, and how States address matters where the law is unsettled. DOD lawyers, and our clients, engage with our counterparts in other U.S. Government departments and agencies on these issues, and with Allies and partners at every level – from the halls of the United Nations to the floors of combined tactical operations centers – to understand how we each apply international law to operations in cyberspace. Initiatives by non-governmental groups like those that led to the Tallinn Manual can be useful to consider, but they do not create new international law, which only states can make. My intent here is not to lay out a comprehensive set of positions on international law. Rather, as I have done with respect to domestic law, I will tell you how DOD lawyers address some of the international law issues that today's military cyber operations present.

I will start with some basics. It continues to be the view of the United States that existing international law applies to State conduct in cyberspace. Particularly relevant for military operations are the Charter of the United Nations, the law of State responsibility, and the law of war. To determine whether a rule of customary international law has emerged with respect to certain State activities in cyberspace, we look for sufficient State practice over time, coupled with opinio juris – evidence or indications that the practice was undertaken out of a sense that it was legally compelled, not out of a sense of policy prudence or moral obligation.

As I discussed a few minutes ago, our policy leaders assess that the threat environment demands action today – our clients need our advice today on how international legal rules apply when resorting to action to defend our national interests from malicious activity in cyberspace, notwithstanding any lack of agreement among States on how such rules apply. Consequently, in reviewing particular operations, DOD lawyers provide advice guided by how existing rules apply to activities in other domains, while considering the unique, and frequently changing, aspects of cyberspace.

First, let’s discuss the international law applicable to uses of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." At the same time, international law recognizes that there are exceptions to this rule. For example, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense a State may use force that is necessary and proportionate to respond to an actual or imminent armed attack. This is true in the cyber context just as in any other context.

Depending on the circumstances, a military cyber operation may constitute a use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and customary international law. In assessing whether a particular cyber operation – conducted by or against the United States – constitutes a use of force, DOD lawyers consider whether the operation causes physical injury or damage that would be considered a use of force if caused solely by traditional means like a missile or a mine. Even if a particular cyber operation does not constitute a use of force, it is important to keep in mind that the State or States targeted by the operation may disagree, or at least have a different perception of what the operation entailed.
Second, the international law prohibition on coercively intervening in the core functions of another State (such as the choice of political, economic, or cultural system) applies to State conduct in cyberspace. For example, "a cyber operation by a State that interferes with another country’s ability to hold an election" or that tampers with "another country's election results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention." Other States have indicated that they would view operations that disrupt the fundamental operation of a legislative body or that would destabilize their financial system as prohibited interventions.

There is no international consensus among States on the precise scope or reach of the non-intervention principle, even outside the context of cyber operations. Because States take different views on this question, DOD lawyers examining any proposed cyber operations must tread carefully, even if only a few States have taken the position publicly that the proposed activities would amount to a prohibited intervention.

Some situations compel us to take into consideration whether the States involved have consented to the proposed operation. Because the principle of non-intervention prohibits "actions designed to coerce a State … in contravention of its rights," it does not prohibit actions to which a State voluntarily consents, provided the conduct remains within the limits of the consent given.

Depending on the circumstances, DOD lawyers may also consider whether an operation that does not constitute a use of force could be conducted as a countermeasure. In general, countermeasures are available in response to an internationally wrongful act attributed to a State. In the traditional view, the use of countermeasures must be preceded by notice to the offending State, though we note that there are varying State views on whether notice would be necessary in all cases in the cyber context because of secrecy or urgency. In a particular case it may be unclear whether a particular malicious cyber activity violates international law. And, in other circumstances, it may not be apparent that the act is internationally wrongful and attributable to a State within the timeframe in which the DOD must respond to mitigate the threat. In these circumstances, which we believe are common, countermeasures would not be available.

For cyber operations that would not constitute a prohibited intervention or use-of-force, the Department believes there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual cyber operations in another State's territory. This proposition is recognized in the Department’s adoption of the "defend forward" strategy: "We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict." The Department's commitment to defend forward including to counter foreign cyber activity targeting the United States – comports with our obligations under international law and our commitment to the rules-based international order.

The DOD OGC view, which we have applied in legal reviews of military cyber operations to date, shares similarities with the view expressed by the U.K. Government in 2018. We recognize that there are differences of opinion among States, which suggests that State practice and opinio juris are presently not settled on this issue. Indeed, many States’ public silence in the face of countless publicly known cyber intrusions into foreign networks precludes a conclusion that States have coalesced around a common view that there is an international prohibition against all such operations (regardless of whatever penalties may be imposed under domestic law).

Traditional espionage may also be a useful analogue to consider. Many of the techniques and even the objectives of intelligence and counterintelligence operations are similar to those used in cyber operations. Of course, most countries, including the United States, have domestic laws against espionage, but international law, in our view, does not prohibit espionage per se even
when it involves some degree of physical or virtual intrusion into foreign territory. There is no anti-espionage treaty, and there are many concrete examples of States practicing it, indicating the absence of a customary international law norm against it. In examining a proposed military cyber operation, we may therefore consider the extent to which the operation resembles or amounts to the type of intelligence or counterintelligence activity for which there is no per se international legal prohibition.

Of course, as with domestic law considerations, establishing that a proposed cyber operation does not violate the prohibitions on the use of force and coercive intervention does not end the inquiry. These cyber operations are subject to a number of other legal and normative considerations.

As a threshold matter, in analyzing proposed cyber operations, DOD lawyers take into account the principle of State sovereignty. States have sovereignty over the information and communications technology infrastructure within their territory. The implications of sovereignty for cyberspace are complex, and we continue to study this issue and how State practice evolves in this area, even if it does not appear that there exists a rule that all infringements on sovereignty in cyberspace necessarily involve violations of international law.

It is also longstanding DOD policy that U.S. forces will comply with the law of war "during all armed conflicts however such conflicts are characterized and in all other military operations." Even if the law of war does not technically apply because the proposed military cyber operation would not take place in the context of armed conflict, DOD nonetheless applies law-of-war principles. This means that the jus in bello principles, such as military necessity, proportionality, and distinction, continue to guide the planning and execution of military cyber operations, even outside the context of armed conflict.

DOD lawyers also advise on how a proposed cyber operation may implicate U.S. efforts to promote certain policy norms for responsible State behavior in cyberspace, such as the norm relating to activities targeting critical infrastructure. These norms are non-binding and identifying the best methods for integrating them into tactical-level operations remains a work in progress. But, they are important political commitments by States that can help to prevent miscalculation and conflict escalation in cyberspace. DOD OGC, along with other DOD leaders, actively supports U.S. State Department-led initiatives to build and promote this framework for responsible State behavior in cyberspace. This includes participation in the UN Group of Governmental Experts and an Open-Ended Working Group on information and communications technologies in the context of international peace and security. These diplomatic engagements are an important part of the United States' overall effort to protect U.S. national interests by promoting stability in cyberspace.

Of course, the real work of analyzing specific military cyber operations in light of the domestic and international legal considerations I have mentioned falls to judge advocates and civilian attorneys at the tactical and operational levels – which is to say, many of you. As one of my predecessors, Jennifer O’Connor, noted in a speech in 2016, military operations – including cyber operations – are subject to a rigorous targeting process that involves both policy and legal reviews to ensure that specific operations are conducted consistent with the relevant authorization, domestic and international law, and any additional restraints imposed by the applicable orders. Particularly in areas like this one, in which not only the law but the domain itself is constantly evolving, I am extremely proud of the legal work many of you do for the Department of Defense and am humbled every day by your dedication to our Nation's defense.

16.1 INTRODUCTION This Chapter addresses the law of war and cyber operations. It addresses how law of war principles and rules apply to relatively novel cyber capabilities and the cyber domain.

As a matter of U.S. policy, the United States has sought to work internationally to clarify how existing international law and norms, including law of war principles, apply to cyber operations.¹ Precisely how the law of war applies to cyber operations is not well-settled, and aspects of the law in this area are likely to continue to develop, especially as new cyber capabilities are developed and States determine their views in response to such developments.²

16.1.1 Cyberspace as a Domain. As a doctrinal matter, DOD has recognized cyberspace as an operational domain in which the armed forces must be able to defend and operate, just like the land, sea, air, and space domains.³

Cyberspace may be defined as “[a] global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”⁴

16.1.2 Description of Cyber Operations. Cyberspace operations may be understood to be those operations that involve “[t]he employment of cyber space capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.”⁵ Cyber operations: (1) use cyber capabilities, such as computers, software tools, or networks; and (2) have a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.

16.1.2.1 Examples of Cyber Operations. Cyber operations include those operations that use computers to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. Cyber operations can be a form of advance force operations, which precede the main effort in an objective area in order to prepare the objective for the main assault. For example, cyber operations may include reconnaissance (e.g., mapping a network), seizure of supporting positions (e.g., securing access to key network systems or nodes), and pre-emplacement of capabilities or weapons (e.g., implanting cyber access tools or malicious code). In addition, cyber operations may be a method of acquiring foreign intelligence unrelated to specific military objectives, such as understanding technological developments or gaining information about an adversary's military capabilities and intent.
16.1.2.2 Examples of Operations That Would Not Be Regarded as Cyber Operations. Cyber operations generally would not include activities that merely use computers or cyberspace without a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. For example, operations that use computer networks to facilitate command and control, operations that use air traffic control systems, and operations to distribute information broadly using computers would generally not be considered cyber operations. Operations that target an adversary's cyberspace capabilities, but that are not achieved in or through cyberspace, would not be considered cyber operations. For example, the bombardment of a network hub, or the jamming of wireless communications, would not be considered cyber operations, even though they may achieve military objectives in cyberspace.

16.1.3 Cyber Operations – Notes on Terminology. DOD doctrine and terminology for cyber operations continue to develop.

16.1.3.1 "Cyber" Versus "Cyberspace" as an Adjective. The terms "cyber" and "cyberspace" when used as an adjective (e.g., cyber-attack, cyber defense, cyber operation) are generally used interchangeably.

16.1.3.2 Cyber Attacks or Computer Network Attacks. The term "attack" often has been used in a colloquial sense in discussing cyber operations to refer to many different types of hostile or malicious cyber activities, such as the defacement of websites, network intrusions, the theft of private information, or the disruption of the provision of Internet services.

Operations described as "cyber attacks" or "computer network attacks," therefore, are not necessarily "attacks" for the purposes of applying rules on conducting attacks during the conduct of hostilities. Similarly, operations described as "cyber attacks" or "computer network attacks" are not necessarily "armed attacks" for the purposes of triggering a State's inherent right of self-defense under jus ad bellum.

16.2 APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WAR TO CYBER OPERATIONS

Specific law of war rules may apply to cyber operations, even though those rules were developed before cyber operations were possible. When no more specific law of war rule or other applicable rule applies, law of war principles provide a general guide for conduct during cyber operations in armed conflict.

16.2.1 Application of Specific Law of War Rules to Cyber Operations. Specific law of war rules may be applicable to cyber operations, even though these rules were developed long before cyber operations were possible.

The law of war affirmatively anticipates technological innovation and contemplates that its existing rules will apply to such innovation, including cyber operations. Law of war rules may apply to new technologies because the rules often are not framed in terms of specific technological means. For example, the rules on conducting attacks do not depend on what type of weapon is used to conduct the attack. Thus, cyber operations may be subject to a variety of law of war rules depending on the rule and the nature of the cyber operation. For example, if the physical consequences of a cyber attack constitute the kind of physical damage that would be caused by dropping a bomb or firing a missile, that cyber attack would equally be subject to the same rules that apply to attacks using bombs or missiles.

Cyber operations may pose challenging legal questions because of the variety of effects they can produce. For example, cyber operations could be a non-forcible means or method of conducting hostilities (such as information gathering), and would be regulated as such under rules applicable to non-forcible means and methods of warfare. Other cyber operations could be used to create effects that amount to an attack and would be regulated under the rules on
conducting attacks. Moreover, another set of challenging issues may arise when considering whether a particular cyber operation might be regarded as a seizure or destruction of enemy property and should be assessed as such.

16.2.2 Application of Law of War Principles as a General Guide to Cyber Operations. When no specific rule applies, the principles of the law of war form the general guide for conduct during war, including conduct during cyber operations. For example, under the principle of humanity[,] suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose must be avoided in cyber operations.

Certain cyber operations may not have a clear kinetic parallel in terms of their capabilities and the effects they create. Such operations may have implications that are quite different from those presented by attacks using traditional weapons, and those different implications may well yield different conclusions.

16.3 CYBER OPERATIONS AND JUS AD BELLUM

Cyber operations may present issues under the law of war governing the resort to force (i.e., jus ad bellum).

16.3.1 Prohibition on Cyber Operations That Constitute Illegal Uses of Force Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Cyber operations may in certain circumstances constitute uses of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law. For example, if cyber operations cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means, would be regarded as a use of force under jus ad bellum, then such cyber operations would likely also be regarded as a use of force. Such operations may include cyber operations that: (1) trigger a nuclear plant meltdown; (2) open a dam above a populated area, causing destruction; or (3) disable air traffic control services, resulting in airplane crashes. Similarly, cyber operations that cripple a military's logistics systems, and thus its ability to conduct and sustain military operations, might also be considered a use of force under jus ad bellum. Other factors, besides the effects of the cyber operation, may also be relevant to whether the cyber operation constitutes a use of force under jus ad bellum.

Cyber operations that constitute uses of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law must have a proper legal basis in order not to violate jus ad bellum prohibitions on the resort to force.

16.3.2 Peacetime Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities. International law and long-standing international norms are applicable to State behavior in cyberspace, and the question of the legality of peacetime intelligence and counterintelligence activities must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Generally, to the extent that cyber operations resemble traditional intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, such as unauthorized intrusions into computer networks solely to acquire information, then such cyber operations would likely be treated similarly under international law. The United States conducts such activities via cyberspace, and such operations are governed by long-standing and well-established considerations, including the possibility that those operations could be interpreted as a hostile act.

16.3.3 Responding to Hostile or Malicious Cyber Operations. A State's inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, may be triggered by cyber operations that amount to an armed attack or imminent threat thereof. As a matter of
national policy, the United States has expressed the view that when warranted, it will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as it would to any other threat to the country.  

Measures taken in the exercise of the right of national self-defense in response to an armed attack must be reported immediately to the U.N. Security Council in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.  

16.3.3.1 Use of Force Versus Armed Attack. The United States has long taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force. Thus, any cyber operation that constitutes an illegal use of force against a State potentially gives rise to a right to take necessary and proportionate action in self-defense.  

16.3.3.2 No Legal Requirement for a Cyber Response to a Cyber Attack. There is no legal requirement that the response in self-defense to a cyber armed attack take the form of a cyber action, as long as the response meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality.  

16.3.3.3 Responses to Hostile or Malicious Cyber Acts That Do Not Constitue Uses of Force. Although cyber operations that do not constitute uses of force under jus ad bellum would not permit injured States to use force in self-defense, those injured States may be justified in taking necessary and appropriate actions in response that do not constitute a use of force. Such actions might include, for example, a diplomatic protest, an economic embargo, or other acts of retorsion.  

16.3.3.4 Attribution and Self-Defense Against Cyber Operations. Attribution may pose a difficult factual question in responding to hostile or malicious cyber operations because adversaries may be able to hide or disguise their activities or identities in cyberspace more easily than in the case of other types of operations. A State’s right to take necessary and proportionate action in self-defense in response to an armed attack originating through cyberspace applies whether the attack is attributed to another State or to a non-State actor.  

16.3.3.5 Authorities Under U.S. Law to Respond to Hostile Cyber Acts. Decisions about whether to invoke a State’s inherent right of self-defense would be made at the national level because they involve the State’s rights and responsibilities under international law. For example, in the United States, such decisions would generally be made by the President.

The Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. forces have addressed the authority of the U.S. armed forces to take action in self-defense in response to hostile acts or hostile intent, including such acts perpetrated in or through cyberspace.  

16.4 CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY  
The law of neutrality may be important in certain cyber operations. For example, under the law of neutrality, belligerent States are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral States. Because of the interconnected nature of cyberspace, cyber operations targeting networked information infrastructures in one State may create effects in another State that is not a party to the armed conflict.  

16.4.1 Cyber Operations That Use Communications Infrastructure in Neutral States. The law of neutrality has addressed the use of communications infrastructure in neutral States, and in certain circumstances, these rules would apply to cyber operations.  

The use of communications infrastructure in neutral States may be implicated under the general rule that neutral territory may not serve as a base of operations for one belligerent against another. In particular, belligerent States are prohibited from erecting on the territory of a neutral State any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea, or from using any installation of this kind established by them before the armed conflict
on the territory of a neutral State for purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages. However, merely relaying information through neutral communications infrastructure (provided that the facilities are made available impartially) generally would not constitute a violation of the law of neutrality that belligerent States would have an obligation to refrain from and that a neutral State would have an obligation to prevent. This rule was developed because it was viewed as impractical for neutral States to censor or screen their publicly available communications infrastructure for belligerent traffic. Thus, for example, it would not be prohibited for a belligerent State to route information through cyber infrastructure in a neutral State that is open for the service of public messages, and that neutral State would have no obligation to forbid such traffic. This rule would appear to be applicable even if the information that is being routed through neutral communications infrastructure may be characterized as a cyber weapon or otherwise could cause destructive effects in a belligerent State (but no destructive effects within the neutral State or States).

16.5 CYBER OPERATIONS AND JUS IN BELLO

This section addresses *jus in bello* rules and cyber operations.

16.5.1 Cyber Operations That Constitute "Attacks" for the Purpose of Applying Rules on Conducting Attacks. If a cyber operation constitutes an attack, then the law of war rules on conducting attacks must be applied to those cyber operations. For example, such operations must comport with the requirements of distinction and proportionality.

For example, a cyber attack that would destroy enemy computer systems could not be directed against ostensibly civilian infrastructure, such as computer systems belonging to stock exchanges, banking systems, and universities, unless those computer systems met the test for being a military objective under the circumstances. A cyber operation that would not constitute an attack, but would nonetheless seize or destroy enemy property, would have to be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.

16.5.1.1 Assessing Incidental Injury or Damage During Cyber Operations. The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks in which the expected loss of life or injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack, would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.

For example, in applying this prohibition to cyber operations, it might be important to assess the potential effects of a cyber attack on computers that are not military objectives, such as private, civilian computers that hold no military significance, but that may be networked to computers that are valid military objectives.

In assessing incidental injury or damage during cyber operations, it may be important to consider that remote harms and lesser forms of harm, such as mere inconveniences or temporary disruptions, need not be considered in assessing whether an attack is prohibited by the principle of proportionality. For example, a minor, brief disruption of Internet services to civilians that results incidentally from a cyber attack against a military objective generally would not need to be considered in a proportionality analysis. In addition, the economic harms in the belligerent State resulting from such disruptions, such as civilian businesses in the belligerent State being unable to conduct e-commerce, generally would not need to be considered in a proportionality analysis.

Even if cyber operations that constitute attacks are not expected to result in excessive incidental loss of life or injury or damage such that the operation would be prohibited by the principle of proportionality, the party to the conflict nonetheless would be required to take feasible precautions to limit such loss of life or injury and damage in conducting those cyber operations.
16.5.2 Cyber Operations That Do Not Amount to an "Attack" Under the Law of War. A cyber operation that does not constitute an attack is not restricted by the rules that apply to attacks. Factors that would suggest that a cyber operation is not an "attack" include whether the operation causes only reversible effects or only temporary effects. Cyber operations that generally would not constitute attacks include:

- defacing a government webpage;
- a minor, brief disruption of Internet services;
- briefly disrupting, disabling, or interfering with communications; and
- disseminating propaganda.

Since such operations generally would not be considered attacks under the law of war, they generally would not need to be directed at military objectives, and may be directed at civilians or civilian objects. Nonetheless, such operations must not be directed against enemy civilians or civilian objects unless the operations are militarily necessary. Moreover, such operations should comport with the general principles of the law of war.

For example, even if a cyber operation is not an "attack" or does not cause any injury or damage that would need to be considered under the principle of proportionality in conducting attacks, that cyber operation still should not be conducted in a way that unnecessarily causes inconvenience to civilians or neutral persons.

16.5.3 Duty to Take Feasible Precautions and Cyber Operations. Parties to a conflict must take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of incidental harm to the civilian population and other protected persons and objects. Parties to the conflict that employ cyber operations should take precautions to minimize the harm of their cyber activities on civilian infrastructure and users.

The obligation to take feasible precautions may be of greater relevance in cyber operations than other law of war rules because this obligation applies to a broader set of activities than those to which other law of war rules apply. For example, the obligation to take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of incidental harm would apply to a party conducting an attack even if the attack would not be prohibited by the principle of proportionality. In addition, the obligation to take feasible precautions applies even if a party is not conducting an attack because the obligation also applies to a party that is subject to attack.

16.5.3.1 Cyber Tools as Potential Measures to Reduce the Risk of Harm to Civilians or Civilian Objects. In some cases, cyber operations that result in non-kinetic or reversible effects can offer options that help minimize unnecessary harm to civilians. In this regard, cyber capabilities may in some circumstances be preferable, as a matter of policy, to kinetic weapons because their effects may be reversible, and they may hold the potential to accomplish military goals without any destructive kinetic effect at all.

As with other precautions, the decision of which weapon to use will be subject to many practical considerations, including effectiveness, cost, and "fragility," i.e., the possibility that once used an adversary may be able to devise defenses that will render a cyber tool ineffective in the future. Thus, as with special kinetic weapons, such as precision-guided munitions that have the potential to produce less incidental damage than other kinetic weapons, cyber capabilities usually will not be the only type of weapon that is legally permitted.

16.5.4 Prohibition on Improper Use of Signs During Cyber Operations. Under the law of war, certain signs may not be used improperly. These prohibitions may also be applicable during cyber operations. For example, it would not be permissible to conduct a cyber attack or to attempt to disable enemy internal communications by making use of communications that initiate non-hostile relations, such as prisoner exchanges or ceasefires.
Similarly, it would be prohibited to fabricate messages from an enemy’s Head of State falsely informing that State’s forces that an armistice or cease-fire had been signed.67

On the other hand, the restriction on the use of enemy flags, insignia, and uniforms only applies to concrete visual objects; it does not restrict the use of enemy codes, passwords, and countersigns.68 Thus, for example, it would not be prohibited to disguise network traffic as though it came from enemy computers or to use enemy codes during cyber operations.

16.5.5 Use of Civilian Personnel to Support Cyber Operations. As with non-cyber operations, the law of war does not prohibit States from using civilian personnel to support their cyber operations, including support actions that may constitute taking a direct part in hostilities.69

Under the GPW, persons who are not members of the armed forces, but who are authorized to accompany them, are entitled to POW status.70 This category was intended to include, inter alia, civilian personnel with special skills in operating military equipment who support and participate in military operations, such as civilian members of military aircrews.71 It would include civilian cyber specialists who have been authorized to accompany the armed forces.

Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities forfeit protection from being made the object of attack.72

16.6 LEGAL REVIEW OF WEAPONS THAT EMPLOY CYBER CAPABILITIES

DOD policy requires the legal review of the acquisition of weapons or weapon systems.73 This policy would include the review of weapons that employ cyber capabilities to ensure that they are not per se prohibited by the law of war.74 Not all cyber capabilities, however, constitute a weapon or weapons system. Military Department regulations address what cyber capabilities require legal review.75

The law of war does not prohibit the development of novel cyber weapons. The customary law of war prohibitions on specific types of weapons result from State practice and opinio juris demonstrating that a type of weapon is illegal; the mere fact that a weapon is novel or employs new technology does not mean that the weapon is illegal.76

Although which issues may warrant legal analysis would depend on the characteristics of the weapon being assessed, a legal review of the acquisition or procurement of a weapon that employs cyber capabilities likely would assess whether the weapon is inherently indiscriminate.77 For example, a destructive computer virus that was programmed to spread and destroy uncontrollably within civilian Internet systems would be prohibited as an inherently indiscriminate weapon.78

End Notes:

1 See, e.g., United States Submission to the U. N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2014 – 15), 1 (“But the challenge is not whether existing international law applies to State behavior in cyberspace. As the 2012 – 13 GGE affirmed, international law does apply, and such law is essential to regulating State conduct in this domain. The challenge is providing decision-makers with considerations that may be taken into account when determining how existing international law applies to cyber activities. Despite this challenge, history has shown that States, through consultation and cooperation, have repeatedly and successfully applied existing bodies of law to new technologies. It continues to be the U.S. view that all States will benefit from a stable international ICT [information and communication technologies] environment in which existing international law is the foundation for responsible State behavior in cyberspace.”); Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, 9 (May 2011) (“The development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not require a
reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding state behavior — in times of peace and conflict — also apply in cyberspace. Nonetheless, unique attributes of networked technology require additional work to clarify how these norms apply and what additional understandings might be necessary to supplement them. We will continue to work internationally to forge consensus regarding how norms of behavior apply to cyberspace, with the understanding that an important first step in such efforts is applying the broad expectations of peaceful and just interstate conduct to cyberspace.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, 7-8 (Nov. 2011) ("The United States is actively engaged in the continuing development of norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, making clear that as a matter of U.S. policy, long-standing international norms guiding state behavior also apply equally in cyberspace. Among these, applying the tenets of the law of armed conflict are critical to this vision, although cyberspace’s unique aspects may require clarifications in certain areas. ").

2 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 464-65 (2002) ("The international community ordinarily does not negotiate treaties to deal with problems until their consequences have begun to be felt. This is not all bad, since the solution can be tailored to the actual problems that have occurred, rather than to a range of hypothetical possibilities. One consequence, however, is that the resulting law, whether domestic or international, may be sharply influenced by the nature of the events that precipitate legal developments, together with all their attendant policy and political considerations. ... Similarly, we can make some educated guesses as to how the international legal system will respond to information operations, but the direction that response actually ends up taking may depend a great deal on the nature of the events that draw the nations’ attention to the issue. If information operations techniques are seen as just another new technology that does not greatly threaten the nations’ interests, no dramatic legal developments may occur. If they are seen as a revolutionary threat to the security of nations and the welfare of their citizens, it will be much more likely that efforts will be made to restrict or prohibit information operations by legal means. These are considerations that national leaders should understand in making decisions on using information operations techniques in the current formative period, but it should also be understood that the course of future events is often beyond the control of statesmen.").

3 William J. Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 97, 101 (Sept./Oct. 2010) ("As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare. Although cyberspace is a man-made domain, it has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space. As such, the military must be able to defend and operate within it.").

4 JOINT PUBLICATION 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, GL-4 (Feb. 5, 2013) ("(U) Cyberspace. A global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.").

5 JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, Joint Operations (Aug. 11, 2011) ("cyberspace operations. The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.").

6 Refer to § 16.5.1 (Cyber Operations That Constitute "Attacks" for the Purpose of Applying Rules on Conducting Attacks).

7 Refer to § 16.3.3 (Responding to Hostile or Malicious Cyber Operations).

8 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 3 (Dec. 2012) ("Cyberspace is not a 'law-free' zone where anyone can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraint. Think of it this way. This is not the first time that technology has changed and that international law has been asked to deal with those changes. In particular, because the tools of conflict are constantly evolving, one relevant body of law — international humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict — affirmatively anticipates technological innovation, and contemplates that its existing rules will apply to such innovation.").

9 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) , reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 3 - 4 (Dec. 2012) ("In analyzing whether a cyber operation would constitute a use of force, most commentators focus on whether the direct physical injury and property damage resulting from the cyber event looks like that which would be considered a use of force if produced by kinetic weapons. For example, cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force. ... Only a moment’s reflection makes you realize that this is common sense: if the
physical consequences of a cyber attack work the kind of physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber attack should equally be considered a use of force.”).

10 Refer to § 5.26 (Non-Forcible Means and Methods of Warfare). 11 Refer to § 5.5 (Rules on Conducting Assaults, Bombardments, and Other Attacks).

12 Refer to § 5.17 (Seizure and Destruction of Enemy Property).

13 Refer to § 2.1.2.2 (Law of War Principles as a General Guide).

14 Refer to § 2.3 (Humanity).

15 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 7 (Dec. 2012) (“I have also noted some clear-cut cases where the physical effects of a hostile cyber action would be comparable to what a kinetic action could achieve: for example, a bomb might break a dam and flood a civilian population, but insertion of a line of malicious code from a distant computer might just as easily achieve that same result. As you all know, however, there are other types of cyber actions that do not have a clear kinetic parallel, which raise profound questions about exactly what we mean by ‘force.’”).

16 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 490 (2002) (“In the process of reasoning by analogy to the law applicable to traditional weapons, it must always be kept in mind that computer network attacks are likely to present implications that are quite different from the implications presented by attacks with traditional weapons. These different implications may well yield different conclusions.”).

17 Refer to § 1.11 (Jus ad Bellum).

18 U.N. C HARTER art. 2(4).

19 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 H ARVARD I NTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 3 (Dec. 2012) (“Cyber activities may in certain circumstances constitute uses of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law.”)

20 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 4 (Dec. 2012) (“Commonly cited examples of cyber activity that would constitute a use of force include, for example, (1) operations that trigger a nuclear plant meltdown, (2) operations that open a dam above a populated area causing destruction, or (3) operations that disable air traffic control resulting in airplane crashes.”).

21 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 483 (2002) (“Even if the systems attacked were unclassified military logistics systems, an attack on such systems might seriously threaten a nation’s security. For example, corrupting the data in a nation’s computerized systems for managing its military fuel, spare parts, transportation, troop mobilization, or medical supplies may seriously interfere with its ability to conduct military operations. In short, the consequences are likely to be more important than the means used.”).

22 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 4 (Dec. 2012) (“In assessing whether an event constituted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors including the context of the event, the actor perpetrating the action (recognizing challenging issues of attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects and intent, among other possible issues.”).

23 Refer to § 1.11.3 (Prohibition on Certain Uses of Force).

24 Refer to § 16.1 (Introduction).


27 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 4 (Dec. 2012) (“Question 4: May a state ever respond to a computer network attack by exercising a right of national self-defense? Answer 4: Yes. A state’s national right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, may be triggered by computer network activities that amount to an armed attack or imminent threat thereof.”); Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, 10 (May 2011) (“Right of Self-Defense: Consistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace.”).

28 Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, 14 (May 2011) (“When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our military treaty partners. We reserve the right to use all necessary means — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic — as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests. In so doing, we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad international support whenever possible.”).

29 Refer to § 1.11.5.6 (Reporting to the U.N. Security Council).

30 Refer to § 1.11.5.2 (Use of Force Versus Armed Attack).

31 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 H ARVARD I NTERNATIONAL L AW JOURNAL ONLINE, 7 (Dec. 2012) (“To cite just one example of this, the United States has for a long time taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force. In our view, there is no threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an “armed attack” that may warrant a forcible response. But that is not to say that any illegal use of force triggers the right to use any and all force in response — such responses must still be necessary and of course proportionate.”).

32 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) reprinted in 54 H ARVARD I NTERNATIONAL L AW JOURNAL ONLINE, 4 (Dec. 2012) (“There is no legal requirement that the response to a cyber armed attack take the form of a cyber action, as long as the response meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality.”).

33 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 482 (2002) (“There is also a general recognition of the right of a nation whose rights under international law have been violated to take countermeasures against the offending state, in circumstances where neither the provocation nor the response involves the use of armed force. For example, an arbitral tribunal in 1978 ruled that the United States was entitled to suspend French commercial air flights into Los Angeles after the French had suspended U.S. commercial air flights into Paris. Discussions of the doctrine of countermeasures generally distinguish between countermeasures that would otherwise be violations of treaty obligations or of general principles of international law (in effect, reprisals not involving the use of armed force) and retortions – actions that may be unfriendly or even damaging, but which do not violate any international legal obligation. The use of countermeasures is subject to the same requirements of necessity and proportionality as apply to self-defense.”).

34 Refer to § 18.17 (Retorsion).

35 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE , Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934 , 4 (Nov. 2011) (“The same technical protocols of the Internet that have facilitated the explosive growth of cyberspace also provide some measure of anonymity. Our potential adversaries, both nations and non-state actors, clearly understand this dynamic and seek to use the challenge of attribution to their strategic advantage. The Department recognizes that deterring malicious actors from conducting cyber attacks is complicated by the difficulty of verifying the location from which an attack was launched and by the need to identify the attacker among a wide variety and high number of potential actors.”).

36 United States Submission to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2012-2013, 2 (“As the United States noted in its 2010 submission to the GGE, the following established principles would apply in the context of an armed attack, whether it originated through cyberspace or not: • The right of self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack applies whether the attacker is a State actor or a non-State actor”). Refer to § 1.11.5.4 (Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors).
37 See, e.g., CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, 6(b)(1) (June 13, 2005), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 95 (2007) (“Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.”).

38 Refer to § 15.3.1 (Neutral Rights).

39 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 6 (Dec. 2012) (“States conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the sovereignty of other states, including outside the context of armed conflict. The physical infrastructure that supports the Internet and cyber activities is generally located in sovereign territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial state. Because of the interconnected, interoperable nature of cyberspace, operations targeting networked information infrastructures in one country may create effects in another country. Whenever a state contemplates conducting activities in cyberspace, the sovereignty of other states needs to be considered.”).

40 Refer to § 15.5 (Prohibition on the Use of Neutral Territory as a Base of Operations).

41 Refer to § 15.5.3 (Prohibition Against Establishment or Use of Belligerent Communications Facilities in Neutral Territory).

42 Refer to § 15.5.3.1 (Use of Neutral Facilities by Belligerents Not Prohibited).

43 Colonel Borel, Report to the Conference from the Second Commission on Rights and Duties of Neutral States on Land, in JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, 543 (1917) (“We are here dealing with cables or apparatus belonging either to a neutral State or to a company or individuals, the operation of which, for the transmission of news, has the character of a public service. There is no reason to compel the neutral State to restrict or prohibit the use by the belligerents of these means of communication. Were it otherwise, objections of a practical kind would be encountered, arising out of the considerable difficulties in exercising control, not to mention the confidential character of telegraphic correspondence and the rapidity necessary to this service. Through his Excellency Lord Reay, the British delegation requested that it be specified that ‘the liberty of a neutral State to transmit messages, by means of its telegraph lines on land, its submarine cables or its wireless apparatus, does not imply that it has any right to use them or permit their use in order to render manifest assistance to one of the belligerents’. The justice of the idea thus stated was so great as to receive the unanimous approval of the Commission.”).

44 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, 8 (Nov. 2011) (“The issue of the legality of transporting cyber ‘weapons’ across the Internet through the infrastructure owned and/or located in neutral third countries without obtaining the equivalent of ‘overflight rights.’ There is currently no international consensus regarding the definition of a ‘cyber weapon.’ The often low cost of developing malicious code and the high number and variety of actors in cyberspace make the discovery and tracking of malicious cyber tools difficult. Most of the technology used in this context is inherently dual-use, and even software might be minimally repurposed for malicious action.”); Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 489 (2002) (“There need be less concern for the reaction of nations through whose territory or communications systems a destructive message may be routed. If only the nation’s public communications systems are involved, the transited nation will normally not be aware of the routing such a message has taken. Even if it becomes aware of the transit of such a message and attributes it to the United States, there would be no established principle of international law that it could point to as being violated. As discussed above, even during an international armed conflict international law does not require a neutral nation to restrict the use of its public communications networks by belligerents. Nations generally consent to the free use of their communications networks on a commercial or reciprocal basis. Accordingly, use of a nation’s communications networks as a conduit for an electronic attack would not be a violation of its sovereignty in the same way that would be a flight through its airspace by a military aircraft.”).

45 Refer to § 5.5 (Rules on Conducting Assaul ts, Bombardments, and Other Attacks).

46 Refer to § 5.6 (Discrimination in Conducting Attacks); § 5.12 (Proportionality – Prohibition on Attacks Expected to Cause Excessive Incidental Harm).

47 Refer to § 5.7 (Military Objectives).

48 Refer to § 5.17.2 (Enemy Property – Military Necessity Standard).
military authorities planning an attack. One obvious consideration is that a military force that goes into a protracted recognition that the has garnered little support among nations and has been strongly rejected by the United States. There is broad precision must select a response that will do minimal damage. This is a variant of the argument that a nation


64 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 490 (2002) (Another possible implication of a defender's technological prowess may arise when a nation has the capacity for graduated self-defense measures. Some may argue that a nation having such capabilities must select a response that will do minimal damage. This is a variant of the argument that a nation possessing precision-guided munitions must always use them whenever there is a potential for collateral damage. That position has garnered little support among nations and has been strongly rejected by the United States. There is broad recognition that the risk of collateral damage is only one of many military considerations that must be balanced by military authorities planning an attack. One obvious consideration is that a military force that goes into a protracted
conflict with a policy of always using precision-guided munitions whenever there is any potential for collateral damage will soon exhaust its supply of such munitions. Similarly, military authorities must be able to weigh all relevant military considerations in choosing a response in self-defense against computer network attacks. These considerations will include the probable effectiveness of the means at their disposal, the ability to assess their effects, and the "fragility" of electronic means of attack (i.e., once they are used, an adversary may be able to devise defenses that will render them ineffective in the future)."

65 Refer to § 5.24 (Improper Use of Certain Signs).

66 Refer to § 12.2 (Principle of Good Faith in Non-Hostile Relations).

67 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 473 (2002) ("Perfidy: It may seem attractive for a combatant vessel or aircraft to avoid being attacked by broadcasting the agreed identification signals for a medical vessel or aircraft, but such actions would be a war crime. Similarly, it might be possible to use computer 'morphing' techniques to create an image of the enemy's chief of state informing his troops that an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been signed. If false, this would also be a war crime.").

68 Refer to § 5.23.1.5 (Use of Enemy Codes, Passwords, and Countersigns Not Restricted).

69 Refer to § 4.15.2.2 (Employment in Hostilities).

70 Refer to § 4.15 (Persons Authorized to Accompany the Armed Forces).

71 Refer to § 4.15 (Persons Authorized to Accompany the Armed Forces).

72 Refer to § 5.9 (Civilians Taking a Direct Part in Hostilities).

73 Refer to § 6.2 (DOD Policy of Reviewing the Legality of Weapons).

74 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 6 (Dec. 2012) ("States should undertake a legal review of weapons, including those that employ a cyber capability. Such a review should entail an analysis, for example, of whether a particular capability would be inherently indiscriminate, i.e., that it could not be used consistent with the principles of distinction and proportionality. The U.S. Government undertakes at least two stages of legal review of the use of weapons in the context of armed conflict: first, an evaluation of new weapons to determine whether their use would be per se prohibited by the law of war; and second, specific operations employing weapons are always reviewed to ensure that each particular operation is also compliant with the law of war.").


76 Refer to § 6.2.1 (Review of New Types of Weapons).

77 Refer to § 6.7 (Inherently Indiscriminate Weapons).

78 United States Submission to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2012-2013, 3 ("Weapons that cannot be directed at a specific military objective or whose effects cannot be controlled would be inherently indiscriminate, and per se unlawful under the law of armed conflict. In the traditional kinetic context, such inherently indiscriminate and unlawful weapons include, for example, biological weapons. Certain cyber tools could, in light of the interconnected nature of the network, be inherently indiscriminate in the sense that their effects cannot be predicted or controlled; a destructive virus that could spread uncontrollably within civilian internet systems might fall into this category. Attacks using such tools would be prohibited by the law of war.").

Source:
VIII. Artificial Intelligence

A. Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.

Issued October 30, 2023

The Executive Order directs the following actions:

New Standards for AI Safety and Security

As AI’s capabilities grow, so do its implications for Americans’ safety and security. With this Executive Order, the President directs the most sweeping actions ever taken to protect Americans from the potential risks of AI systems:

- Require that developers of the most powerful AI systems share their safety test results and other critical information with the U.S. government. In accordance with the Defense Production Act, the Order will require that companies developing any foundation model that poses a serious risk to national security, national economic security, or national public health and safety must notify the federal government when training the model, and must share the results of all red-team safety tests. These measures will ensure AI systems are safe, secure, and trustworthy before companies make them public.

- Develop standards, tools, and tests to help ensure that AI systems are safe, secure, and trustworthy. The National Institute of Standards and Technology will set the rigorous standards for extensive red-team testing to ensure safety before public release. The Department of Homeland Security will apply those standards to critical infrastructure sectors and establish the AI Safety and Security Board. The Departments of Energy and Homeland Security will also address AI systems’ threats to critical infrastructure, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and cybersecurity risks. Together, these are the most significant actions ever taken by any government to advance the field of AI safety.

- Protect against the risks of using AI to engineer dangerous biological materials by developing strong new standards for biological synthesis screening. Agencies that fund life-science projects will establish these standards as a condition of federal funding, creating powerful incentives to ensure appropriate screening and manage risks potentially made worse by AI.

- Protect Americans from AI-enabled fraud and deception by establishing standards and best practices for detecting AI-generated content and authenticating official content. The Department of Commerce will develop guidance for content authentication and watermarking to clearly label AI-generated content. Federal agencies will use these tools to make it easy for Americans to know that the communications they receive from their government are authentic—and set an example for the private sector and governments around the world.

- Establish an advanced cybersecurity program to develop AI tools to find and fix vulnerabilities in critical software, building on the Biden-Harris Administration’s ongoing...
AI Cyber Challenge. Together, these efforts will harness AI’s potentially game-changing cyber capabilities to make software and networks more secure.

- Order the development of a National Security Memorandum that directs further actions on AI and security, to be developed by the National Security Council and White House Chief of Staff. This document will ensure that the United States military and intelligence community use AI safely, ethically, and effectively in their missions, and will direct actions to counter adversaries’ military use of AI.

Protecting Americans’ Privacy

Without safeguards, AI can put Americans’ privacy further at risk. AI not only makes it easier to extract, identify, and exploit personal data, but it also heightens incentives to do so because companies use data to train AI systems. To better protect Americans’ privacy, including from the risks posed by AI, the President calls on Congress to pass bipartisan data privacy legislation to protect all Americans, especially kids, and directs the following actions:

- Protect Americans’ privacy by prioritizing federal support for accelerating the development and use of privacy-preserving techniques—including ones that use cutting-edge AI and that let AI systems be trained while preserving the privacy of the training data.

- Strengthen privacy-preserving research and technologies, such as cryptographic tools that preserve individuals’ privacy, by funding a Research Coordination Network to advance rapid breakthroughs and development. The National Science Foundation will also work with this network to promote the adoption of leading-edge privacy-preserving technologies by federal agencies.

- Evaluate how agencies collect and use commercially available information—including information they procure from data brokers—and strengthen privacy guidance for federal agencies to account for AI risks. This work will focus in particular on commercially available information containing personally identifiable data.

- Develop guidelines for federal agencies to evaluate the effectiveness of privacy-preserving techniques, including those used in AI systems. These guidelines will advance agency efforts to protect Americans’ data.

Advancing Equity and Civil Rights

Irresponsible uses of AI can lead to and deepen discrimination, bias, and other abuses in justice, healthcare, and housing. The Biden-Harris Administration has already taken action by publishing the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights and issuing an Executive Order directing agencies to combat algorithmic discrimination, while enforcing existing authorities to protect people’s rights and safety. To ensure that AI advances equity and civil rights, the President directs the following additional actions:

- Provide clear guidance to landlords, Federal benefits programs, and federal contractors to keep AI algorithms from being used to exacerbate discrimination.
• Address algorithmic discrimination through training, technical assistance, and coordination between the Department of Justice and Federal civil rights offices on best practices for investigating and prosecuting civil rights violations related to AI.

• Ensure fairness throughout the criminal justice system by developing best practices on the use of AI in sentencing, parole and probation, pretrial release and detention, risk assessments, surveillance, crime forecasting and predictive policing, and forensic analysis.

Standing Up for Consumers, Patients, and Students

AI can bring real benefits to consumers—for example, by making products better, cheaper, and more widely available. But AI also raises the risk of injuring, misleading, or otherwise harming Americans. To protect consumers while ensuring that AI can make Americans better off, the President directs the following actions:

• Advance the responsible use of AI in healthcare and the development of affordable and life-saving drugs. The Department of Health and Human Services will also establish a safety program to receive reports of—and act to remedy – harms or unsafe healthcare practices involving AI.

• Shape AI’s potential to transform education by creating resources to support educators deploying AI-enabled educational tools, such as personalized tutoring in schools.

Supporting Workers

AI is changing America’s jobs and workplaces, offering both the promise of improved productivity but also the dangers of increased workplace surveillance, bias, and job displacement. To mitigate these risks, support workers’ ability to bargain collectively, and invest in workforce training and development that is accessible to all, the President directs the following actions:

• Develop principles and best practices to mitigate the harms and maximize the benefits of AI for workers by addressing job displacement; labor standards; workplace equity, health, and safety; and data collection. These principles and best practices will benefit workers by providing guidance to prevent employers from undercompensating workers, evaluating job applications unfairly, or impinging on workers’ ability to organize.

• Produce a report on AI’s potential labor-market impacts, and study and identify options for strengthening federal support for workers facing labor disruptions, including from AI.

Promoting Innovation and Competition

America already leads in AI innovation—more AI startups raised first-time capital in the United States last year than in the next seven countries combined. The Executive Order ensures that we continue to lead the way in innovation and competition through the following actions:

• Catalyze AI research across the United States through a pilot of the National AI Research Resource—a tool that will provide AI researchers and students access to key AI resources and data—and expanded grants for AI research in vital areas like healthcare and climate change.
• Promote a fair, open, and competitive AI ecosystem by providing small developers and entrepreneurs access to technical assistance and resources, helping small businesses commercialize AI breakthroughs, and encouraging the Federal Trade Commission to exercise its authorities.

• Use existing authorities to expand the ability of highly skilled immigrants and nonimmigrants with expertise in critical areas to study, stay, and work in the United States by modernizing and streamlining visa criteria, interviews, and reviews.

Advancing American Leadership Abroad

AI's challenges and opportunities are global. The Biden-Harris Administration will continue working with other nations to support safe, secure, and trustworthy deployment and use of AI worldwide. To that end, the President directs the following actions:

• Expand bilateral, multilateral, and multistakeholder engagements to collaborate on AI. The State Department, in collaboration, with the Commerce Department will lead an effort to establish robust international frameworks for harnessing AI's benefits and managing its risks and ensuring safety. In addition, this week, Vice President Harris will speak at the UK Summit on AI Safety, hosted by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

• Accelerate development and implementation of vital AI standards with international partners and in standards organizations, ensuring that the technology is safe, secure, trustworthy, and interoperable.

• Promote the safe, responsible, and rights-affirming development and deployment of AI abroad to solve global challenges, such as advancing sustainable development and mitigating dangers to critical infrastructure.

Ensuring Responsible and Effective Government Use of AI

AI can help government deliver better results for the American people. It can expand agencies’ capacity to regulate, govern, and disburse benefits, and it can cut costs and enhance the security of government systems. However, use of AI can pose risks, such as discrimination and unsafe decisions. To ensure the responsible government deployment of AI and modernize federal AI infrastructure, the President directs the following actions:

• Issue guidance for agencies’ use of AI, including clear standards to protect rights and safety, improve AI procurement, and strengthen AI deployment.

• Help agencies acquire specified AI products and services faster, more cheaply, and more effectively through more rapid and efficient contracting.

• Accelerate the rapid hiring of AI professionals as part of a government-wide AI talent surge led by the Office of Personnel Management, U.S. Digital Service, U.S. Digital Corps, and Presidential Innovation Fellowship. Agencies will provide AI training for employees at all levels in relevant fields.

As we advance this agenda at home, the Administration will work with allies and partners abroad on a strong international framework to govern the development and use of AI. The
Administration has already consulted widely on AI governance frameworks over the past several months—engaging with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, the UAE, and the UK. The actions taken today support and complement Japan’s leadership of the G-7 Hiroshima Process, the UK Summit on AI Safety, India’s leadership as Chair of the Global Partnership on AI, and ongoing discussions at the United Nations.

The actions that President Biden directed today are vital steps forward in the U.S.’s approach on safe, secure, and trustworthy AI. More action will be required, and the Administration will continue to work with Congress to pursue bipartisan legislation to help America lead the way in responsible innovation.

Sources:
B. Department of Defense 2023 Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy.

Issued June 27, 2023

The Deputy Secretary of Defense published the 2023 DoD Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) Adoption Strategy on November 2, 2023, unifying previous strategic guidance and enabling stronger alignment and synchronization to scale advanced capabilities for use across the enterprise. The Strategy was developed by the Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO) and describes the approach to improving the organizational environment within which DoD leaders and warfighters will be able to make rapid, well-informed decisions by expertly leveraging high-quality data, advanced analytics, and AI for enduring decision advantage.

Decision advantage is a competitive condition characterized by the following outcomes:

• Battlespace awareness and understanding
• Adaptive force planning and application
• Fast, precise, and resilient kill chains
• Resilient sustainment support
• Efficient enterprise business operations

Agile, user-focused, product-centric development is essential to achieving these outcomes because humans and machines will work together in the responsible, effective employment of data, analytics, and AI-enabled capabilities.

The Department’s agile approach to adoption (Figure 1) ensures a tight feedback loop between technology developers and users through a continuous cycle of iteration, innovation, and improvement of solutions that enable decision advantage. Practicing agility and learning by doing will accelerate deployment speed—measured in hours or days, not months or years. Creating effective, iterative feedback loops among developers, users, subject matter experts, and test and evaluation (T&E) experts will ensure capabilities are more stable, secure, ethical, and trustworthy.

Figure 1: Employing an Agile Approach to Adoption to Scale Decision Advantage Outcomes
Background

The DoD has been investing in AI and responsibly fielding data- and AI-enabled systems for over 60 years. Today, data, analytics, and AI technologies are increasingly available to DoD Components and providing value to our service members.

Alongside industry’s advancements, DoD has for years made steady and swift improvements to its data foundation and analytics capabilities: experimenting with AI through research and development, integrating these technologies into business and warfighting functions, and laying the foundation for their use at scale. As our investment, experimentation, and innovation continues and accelerates, our task now is to drive the diffusion of these technologies across the enterprise.

This 2023 DoD Data, Analytics, and AI Adoption Strategy builds upon and supersedes the 2018 AI Strategy and the 2020 Data Strategy to continue the Department’s digital transformation.

The urgency of the strategic environment and the scale at which the Department must operate are formidable. The Department is well-positioned to excel because it has established a foundation of strategic guidance informed by lessons learned from hands-on initiatives over the last several years.

Key Points

• The Strategy employs an agile approach to adoption that prioritizes speed of delivery, continuous learning, and responsible development

• Accelerating the adoption of advanced data, analytics, and artificial intelligence technologies presents an unprecedented opportunity to equip Department leaders at all levels with the data they need to make better decisions faster, from the boardroom to the battlefield.

• Realizing the full promise of data, analytics, and AI is not the exclusive responsibility of a single organization or program. It requires a concerted effort by every unit, leader, servicemember and our partners and allies across the globe.

• As a result of implementing this Strategy, DoD leaders and warfighters will be able to make rapid, well-informed decisions by expertly leveraging high-quality data, advanced analytics, and AI as part of a continuous, outcome-driven, and user-focused development, deployment, and feedback cycle. The Department will focus strategic efforts on several interdependent goals that support the DoD AI Hierarchy of Needs. The AI Hierarchy of Needs is a pyramid with quality data as its foundation, because all analytic and AI capabilities require trusted, high-quality data.

The next layer in the Hierarchy is insightful analytics, the foundational models and visualizations required for DoD leaders to understand their domains and the key variables impacting outcomes in those domains.

At the top of the pyramid is Responsible AI, the Department’s dynamic approach to the design, development, and use of AI capabilities that is consistent with the DoD AI Ethical Principles.

Around the pyramid are enablers, such as digital talent management, that help sustain the Hierarchy of Needs.
The Department’s scale and warfighting mission are unique, but organizations from all sectors have overcome similar challenges and have harnessed the benefits of digital transformation. DoD leaders will have access to high quality data, advanced analytics, and AI capabilities to make timely and well-informed decisions to defend the homeland, deter aggression, and win in conflict. Our military competitors are integrating these same technologies for their own advantage. We cannot afford to wait and, moreover, we cannot succeed alone. This strategy’s approach embraces the need for speed, agility, learning, and responsibility. Pursuing this agile approach and focusing activities on the goals outlined in this strategy will allow the Department to adopt data, analytics, and AI enabled capabilities at the pace and scale required to build enduring decision advantage. If we confront our challenges holistically and refuse to accept the status quo, we will accelerate data, analytics, and AI adoption and continuously deploy creative solutions for the defense, security, and prosperity of the American people.

Sources:
Fact Sheet: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/02/2003333301/-1/-1/1/DAAIS_FACTSHEET.PDF

Full Strategy: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/02/2003333300/-1/-1/1/DOD_DATA_ANALYTICS_AI_ADOPTION_STRATEGY.PDF.

Appendix B: U.S. Cyberspace Organizations
Appendix B includes:

IX. Department of State
   - Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP)

X. Department of Homeland Security
   - Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

XI. Department of Defense
   - National Security Agency (NSA)
   - Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO)
   - Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

XII. Joint Organizations
   - U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
   - Joint Spectrum Center (JSC)
   - Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)

XIII. Service Organizations
   - Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER)
   - Marine Corps Forces Cyber (MARFORCYBER)
   - Navy U.S. Fleet Cyber / U.S. TENTH Fleet (FCC-C10F)
   - Air Forces Cyber / 16th Air Force
   - Coast Guard Cyber

I. Department of State – Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP)

Ensuring the security of cyberspace is fundamental to protecting America’s national security and promoting the prosperity of the American people. Cyberspace is an integral component of all facets of American life, including the country’s economy and defense. Yet private and public entities still struggle to secure their systems, and adversaries have increased the frequency and sophistication of their malicious cyber activities.

In partnership with other countries, the Department of State is leading the U.S. government’s efforts to promote an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and innovation.

The Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP) leads and coordinates the Department’s work on cyberspace and digital diplomacy to encourage responsible state behavior in cyberspace and advance policies that protect the integrity and security of the infrastructure of the Internet, serve U.S. interests, promote competitiveness, and uphold democratic values.

Mission. The Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP) promotes U.S. national and economic security by leading, coordinating, and elevating foreign policy on cyberspace and digital technologies. It builds partnerships to shape the international environment so Americans and people everywhere can prosper. CDP strives for a world in which ever person can access...
the opportunities that come with digital connectivity to build thriving economies and societies and works to counter challenges to this vision from authoritarian states.

The CDP bureau includes four policy units: International Cyberspace Security (ICS), International Information and Communications Policy (ICP), Digital Freedom (DFU), and Strategic Planning and Communications Unit (SPC).

**International Cyberspace Security (ICS)**

The International Cyberspace Security team leads the Department’s efforts to promote cyberspace stability and security and protect U.S. national security interests in cyberspace. We lead diplomatic engagement on international cyberspace security in multilateral, regional, and bilateral forums and work with like-minded states to execute coordinated responses to malicious cyber activity. We counter adversaries in cyberspace by working with interagency and international partners, coordinate the Department’s participation in foreign policy deliberations concerning cyber operations, and leverage foreign assistance funding to build cybersecurity capacity globally. We also plan and execute whole-of-government cybersecurity dialogues with international partners and advance cyber policy priorities in regional organizations.

**International Information and Communications Policy (ICP)**

The International Information and Communications Policy team enables a connected, innovative, and secure digital economy that reflects the United States’ collective interests and values. We promote competitive and secure networks, including 5G, and protect telecom services and infrastructure through licensing, sanctions enforcement, and supply chain security. We support a multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance, international technical standards that promote an innovative digital economy, and the trustworthy use of related digital technologies. We encourage cross-border data flows that allow for the protection of privacy and personal data. ICP partners with U.S. businesses, civil society, and foreign governments and promotes U.S. leadership on digital issues in multilateral institutions to achieve these goals.

**Digital Freedom (DFU)**

The Digital Freedom Team leads the coordination of the Department’s work at the nexus of privacy, security, human rights, and civic engagement, complementing a long legacy of U.S. global leadership in promoting Internet Freedom. We work with partners to address online safety issues and defend against efforts to legitimize and adopt repressive and authoritarian practices in cyberspace. We ensure that values considerations are integrated into cyberspace and digital policies and advance a vision for digital technologies that supports enduring U.S. values.

**Strategic Planning and Communications Unit (SPC)**

This office is responsible for the Bureau’s strategic planning, public diplomacy, media, legislative affairs activities, and manages its foreign assistance programs via the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP).

II. Department of Homeland Security – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the operational lead for federal cybersecurity and the national coordinator for critical infrastructure security and resilience. CISA is designed for collaboration and partnership and has a layered mission to reduce risk to the nation’s cyber and physical infrastructure.

Mission. Lead the National effort to understand, manage and reduce risk to our cyber and physical infrastructure.

Vision. A secure and resilient critical infrastructure for the American people

CISA’s Strategic Plan identifies four goals and seeks to drive change in these key areas

1. Cyber Defense - Lead national effort to ensure the defense and resilience of cyberspace.

   - Serving as America’s cyber defense agency, CISA will spearhead the national effort to defend against cyber threat actors that target U.S. critical infrastructure, federal and SLTT (State, Local, Tribal, Territorial) governments, the private sector, and the American people. CISA will lean forward in their cyber defense mission toward collaborative, proactive risk reduction working with their many partners. It is CISA’s responsibility to help mitigate the most significant cyber risks to the country’s National Critical Functions, both as risks emerge and before a major incident occurs.

2. Risk Reduction and Resilience - Reduce risks to, and strengthen resilience of America’s critical infrastructure.

   - Safety and security depend on the ability of critical infrastructure to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and to withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. CISA coordinates a national effort to secure and protect against critical infrastructure risks. This national effort is centered around identifying which systems and assets are truly critical to the nation, understanding how they are vulnerable, and taking action to manage and reduce risks to them. CISA servers as a key partner to critical infrastructure owners and operators nationwide to help reduce risks and build their security capacity to withstand new threats and disruptions, whether from cyberattacks to natural hazards and physical threats.

3. Operational Collaboration - Strengthen the whole-of-nation operational collaboration and information sharing

   - The core of CISA’s mission is partnership and collaboration. Securing the nation’s cyber and physical infrastructure is a shared responsibility. CISA is challenging traditional ways of doing business and actively working with government, industry, academic, and international partners to move toward more forward-leaning, action-oriented collaboration. They are also committed to growing and strengthening the Agency’s regional presence to more effectively deliver the assistance stakeholders need.

4. Agency Unification - Unification as One CISA through integrated functions, capabilities, and workforce

   - Fundamental to future success is people. CISA is building a culture of excellence based on core values and core principles that prize teamwork and collaboration, innovation and inclusion, ownership and empowerment, and
transparency and trust. As one team unified behind a shared mission, CISA will “work smart” to operate in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

III. Department of Defense

A. National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)

Mission. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) leads the U.S. Government in cryptography that encompasses both signals intelligence (SIGINT) insights and cybersecurity products and services and enables computer network operations to gain a decisive advantage for the nation and our allies.

The Central Security Service (CSS) provides timely and accurate cryptologic support, knowledge, and assistance to the military cryptologic community, while promoting partnership between the NSA and the cryptologic elements of the Armed Forces.

Combat Support

NSA is part of the U.S. Department of Defense serving as a combat support agency. Supporting our military service members around the world is one of the most important things that we do. NSA analysts, linguists, engineers and other personnel deploy to Afghanistan and other hostile areas to provide actionable SIGINT and cybersecurity support to warfighters on the front lines.

We provide intelligence support to military operations through our signals intelligence activities, while our cybersecurity personnel, products and services ensure that military communications and data remain secure, and out of the hands of our adversaries.

We provide wireless and wired secure communications to our warfighters and others in uniform no matter where they are, whether traveling through Afghanistan in a Humvee, diving beneath the sea, or flying into outer space. Our cybersecurity mission also produces and packages the codes that secure our nation’s weapons systems.

Additionally, we set common protocols and standards so that our military can securely share information with our allies, NATO and coalition forces around the world. Interoperability is a key to successful joint operations and exercises.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). NSA is responsible for providing foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT) to our nation’s policy-makers and military forces. SIGINT plays a vital role in our national security by providing America’s leaders with critical information they need to defend our country, save lives, and advance U.S. goals and alliances globally. SIGINT is intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets, such as communications systems, radars, and weapons systems that provides a vital window for our nation into foreign adversaries’ capabilities, actions, and intentions.

Our SIGINT mission is specifically limited to gathering information about international terrorists and foreign powers, organizations, or persons. NSA produces intelligence in response to formal requirements levied by those who have an official need for intelligence, including all departments of the Executive Branch of the United States Government.

At NSA, we must keep pace with advances in the high-speed, multifunctional technologies of today’s information age. The ever-increasing volume, velocity and variety of current signals make the production of relevant and timely intelligence for military commanders and national policy-makers more challenging and exciting than ever. Modern telecommunications technology poses significant challenges to the SIGINT mission, and many languages are used around the world that are of interest to our military and national leaders. Thus, NSA is required to maintain a wide variety of language capabilities as well. Successful SIGINT depends on the skills of language professionals, mathematicians, analysts, and engineers, to name just a few.

The critical thinking and vitality required to accomplish our strategic goals depend on a diverse workforce, divergent points of view, and a fully-inclusive environment. NSA has a strong
tradition of employing dedicated, highly-qualified people who are deeply committed to maintaining the nation's security. While technology will obviously continue to be a key element of our future, NSA recognizes that technology is only as good as the people creating it and the people using it.

**Cybersecurity.** NSA Cybersecurity prevents and eradicates threats to U.S. national security systems with a focus on the Defense Industrial Base and the improvement of our weapons’ security. At its core, NSA Cybersecurity aims to defeat the adversary through the seven core missions and functions:

- Provide intelligence to warn of malicious cyber threats and information U.S. Government (USG) policy
- Develop integrated Nuclear Command & Control Systems threat, vulnerability, risk, and cryptographic products & services
- Release integrated threat, assessment, and mitigation/protection products for the Department of Defense (DoD) and USG customers
- Execute high-assurance cryptography and security engineering
- Offer combined defense/offence operations with key government partners
- Enable the defense of the agency’s networks in coordination with NSA’s Chief Information Officer
- Promote information sharing to support the agency’s cybersecurity mission

By leveraging our elite technical capability, we develop advisories and mitigations on evolving cybersecurity threats designed to defend the nation and secure the future. As we release new advisories and technical guidance, we archive all releases to ensure anyone who needs the information to protect their systems has access to them.

Education is the backbone of building strong cybersecurity professionals and informed citizens.

**Cybersecurity Collaboration Center**

The NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) is how the NSA scales intel-driven cybersecurity through open, collaborative partnerships. The CCC works with industry, interagency, and international partners to harden the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, operationalize NSA’s unique insights on nation-state cyber threats, jointly create mitigations guidance for emerging activity and chronic cybersecurity challenges, and secure emerging technologies.

Sources: [https://www.nsa.gov/about/](https://www.nsa.gov/about/).
B. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO)

The Department of Defense Chief Information Officer is the Principal Staff Assistant and senior Information Technology advisor to the Secretary of Defense. This role includes overseeing many national security and defense business systems, managing information resources, and finding efficiencies. It is responsible for all matters relating to the Department’s information enterprise, including:

- Communications
- Spectrum management
- Network policy and standards
- Information systems
- Cybersecurity
- Positioning, navigation, and timing policy
- DoD information enterprise that supports DoD command and control


Vision. To Deliver an Information Dominant Domain to Defeat our Nation's Adversaries

Key Focus Areas. Cloud, Communications, Cybersecurity, Enabling Artificial Intelligence, and Data.

DOD CIO includes the following organizations:

Deputy Chief Information Officer for Command, Control, and Communications (DCIO C3). Provides expertise and broad guidance on policy, programmatic, and technical issues relating to C3 to integrate and synchronize DoD-wide communications and infrastructure programs and efforts to achieve and maintain information dominance for the Department.

DCIO C3 also manages efforts defining DoD policies and strategies for design, architecture, interoperability standards, capability development, and sustainment of critical C2 and communications for nuclear and non-nuclear strategic strike, integrated missile defense, and Defense and National Leadership Command Capabilities. Its sub organizations include Spectrum Policy and Programs; C3, including military and commercial SATCOM and Positioning, Navigation, and Timing; and National Leadership Command Capabilities.

This organization focuses on several DoD CIO top priorities, including empowering data access for DoD personnel through mobile devices and networks as well as sharing scarce spectrum resources with partners across industry and government. These efforts are critical to empowering secure, efficient, effective information technology for the Warfighter, because they look toward the future of accessing and utilizing information.

Deputy Chief Information Officer for Cyber Security (DCIO CS). Provides expert policy, technical, program, and Defense-wide oversight on all aspects and matters related to DoD Cybersecurity. The office overseas the integration of Defense-wide programs to protect the Department's critical infrastructure against advanced persistent threats, and assures coordination of cybersecurity standards, policies, and procedures with other federal agencies, coalition partners, and industry. The DCIO CS priority is to support the Department's Cyber Strategy and DoD CIO's Vision to deliver an information dominant domain to defeat our Nation's adversaries. Policies and programs are designed to:
1. Ensure the Joint Force can achieve its missions in a contested cyberspace environment
2. Strengthen the Joint Force ability to conduct cyberspace operations that enhance U.S. military advantages
3. Supports the defense of U.S. critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity that alone, or as part of a campaign, could cause a significant cyber incident
4. Secure DoD information and systems against malicious cyber activity, including DoD information on non-DoD-owned networks
5. Expand DoD cyber cooperation with interagency, industry, and international partners.

Deputy Chief Information Officer for Information Enterprise (DCIO IE). Establishes information technology (IT) policy and guidance for the infrastructure components of the DoD Information Enterprise to include networks, compute, and software. In this capacity, the DCIO IE organization oversees and manages ongoing enterprise IT capabilities as well as Department-wide modernization and reform initiatives. These capabilities and initiatives must enable the seamless and secure use of data to solidify an operational advantage, establish a more reliable and resilient IT foundation in support of a more mobile and remote workforce, and ensure the continued evolution of IT in a manner that is both mission impactful and fiscally responsible.

The organization executes critical activities to both maintain and modernize the DoD Information Enterprise. Among the activities covered are network optimization across Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, cloud and software modernization adoption across the Department, and better implementation of collaboration and productivity capabilities across the defense workforce. In partnership with the other DCIOs and DoD Components at large, the efforts of the DCIO IE team are foundational to achieving successful IT outcomes across a diverse range of operational missions and ensures that information remains one of our nation's greatest sources of power.

DCIO IE's directorates include DoD Information Network Modernization, focused on advancing DoD communications capabilities globally; Enterprise Capabilities, focused on driving adoption of proven infrastructure technologies (e.g., cloud and modern software development); and the Cloud Computing Program Office (CCPO), focused on the acquisition and execution of enterprise cloud programs.

As digital capabilities become increasingly critical in mission success, the DCIO IE organization will continue to press and act on priorities that ensure the Department's military edge.

Deputy Chief Information Officer for Resources and Analysis (DCIO R&A). Responsible for enabling DoD CIO to manage the Department's information technology spending, ensuring that DoD gets the most out of every dollar and that the Warfighter has the tools to do the mission. The Department's IT & cyberspace budget request for fiscal year 2018 was nearly $42 billion, which includes warfighting, command, control, and communications systems; computing services; enterprise services, like collaboration and e-mail; and business systems.

DCIO R&A is the focal point for the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPB&E) process, DoD CIO's congressional issues, and administration and management. Its sub organizations include Resource, Program, and Budget, which covers issues such as overseeing DoD IT & Cyberspace budget for the Office of Management and Budget and Congress; Administration and Management, which includes personnel management and congressional support; and Cyber Workforce which implements DoD efforts to transform the cyberspace workforce in support of U.S. national security priorities.
This organization underpins all of DoD CIO's priority areas by managing and overseeing the Department's IT & cyberspace budget to help the DoD CIO provide strategy, leadership, and guidance to create a unified information management and technology vision for the Department. This helps ensure that warfighters have the right IT/cyber, secure communications equipment, and capabilities that they need to execute their missions.

C. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

Overview: DISA is a combat support agency of the DOD. The agency is composed of more than 7,000 military and civilian employees and we provide, operate and assure command, control, information-sharing capabilities and a globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure in direct support to joint warfighters, national-level leaders and other mission and coalition partners across the full spectrum of military operations.

Mission: To conduct DOD Information Network (DODIN) operations for the joint warfighter to enable lethality across all warfighting domains in defense of our Nation.

Vision: To be the trusted provider to connect and protect the warfighter in cyberspace.

Strategic Objective: The current environment of great power competition requires our agency to deliver capability to the warfighter with a velocity of action to win. We must evolve our organizational design and operating processes to align with next generation capabilities, defend against new cyberspace threats and increase lethality for our warfighters while ensuring the best value.

Lines of Effort (LOE)

The actions in support of our lines of effort will implement, sustain and evolve the global network infrastructure and unified capabilities to provide information superiority to the President, the Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders, senior leadership, military services, defense agencies and the warfighter. The challenges posed in the strategic objective are addressed through our lines of effort (LOE):

- prioritize command and control,
- drive force readiness through innovation,
- leverage data as a center of gravity,
- harmonize cybersecurity and the user experience and
- empower the workforce.

Key focus areas throughout these LOEs include improving efficiency and effectiveness, reducing time to deliver solutions, cutting costs, standardizing services and implementing capability both internally and for our mission partners. New LOEs or actions may be added when necessary to support an agile approach and to achieve our shared vision.

DISA’s Mission Partner Support: The Mission Partner Engagement Office and Engagement Executives are DISA’s principal representatives to the mission partners – receiving their requests, reaching out to them, advocating for their issues and providing a conduit for their feedback to DISA.

As the information technology (IT) combat support agency, DISA is committed to providing enterprise-level IT capabilities and services to the nation’s warfighters, national-level leaders, and mission and coalition partners.

The DISA Director is also the Commander of the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) DOD Information Network (DODIN), which maintains command and control (C2) of defensive cyber operations.

DISA delivers hundreds of IT support and service capabilities to our mission partners. These capabilities are captured in our online service catalog, https://disa.mil (accessed through each
Regardless of the IT service or support need, DISA has the capacity to host, support, engineer, test or acquire IT services.

Additionally, in order to optimize DOD’s world-class enterprise infrastructure, DISA is focused on providing enterprise services, unified capabilities and mobility options to support DOD operations anywhere, anytime. Through enterprise security architectures, smart computing options and other leading-edge IT opportunities, DISA remains committed to its role of the IT provider to meet our defense needs.

DISA has organized its workforce to optimally support and work with leaders and partners in the White House, Pentagon, military services, combatant commands, and defense and federal agencies, as well as coalition partners across the globe.

Through the White House Communications Agency (WHCA), DISA provides direct telecommunications and IT support to the president, vice president, their staff, and the U.S. Secret Service.

DISA also has a significant presence in the Pentagon with a support cadre in the Joint Staff Support Center (JSSC) providing direct support to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces; the Joint Chiefs of Staff comprised of the senior ranking officers from each military service; and the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff J6 for command, control, communications, computers/cyber (C4) represents the joint warfighter in support of C4 requirements validation and capability development processes while ensuring joint interoperability. The J6 also partners with DISA as the department evolves the Joint Information Environment (JIE) with the development and promulgation of enterprise services and the enhancement of the enterprise information infrastructure.

DISA has a field office co-located with and directly supporting each of the nine unified combatant commands.

**Joint Information Environment (JIE):** As the department evolves the Joint Information Environment, the lines between components will blur. The matrixed organization evolving the JIE illustrates the department's technological way ahead. The current organization includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO), DoD CIO, Joint Staff J6, CYBERCOM, military services, intelligence community and National Guard.

The JCS chairman and each of the service chiefs have endorsed JIE as a military imperative. The Deputy Management Action Group, a part of DCMO that considers department-wide management and business issues, has endorsed the JIE's viability to efficiently address budget issues, the threat vector and the need to be dominant in the information operations.

The management of JIE is conducted through the JIE Executive Committee, which is tri-chaired by the DoD CIO, Joint Staff J6 and the CYBERCOM commander who also serves as the initiative's operational sponsor.

In execution, there are three lines of operation: governance, operations, and technical synchronization. We have been given responsibility for the technical aspects of JIE and leads the JIE Technical Synchronization Office (JTSO), which includes agency staff, as well as representation from the military services, intelligence community and National Guard.

IV. Joint Organizations

A. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)

Mission: Direct, Synchronize, and Coordinate Cyberspace Planning and Operations – to Defend and Advance National Interests – in Collaboration with Domestic and International Partners

USCYBERCOM’s refined priorities address global strategic challenges and enhance the command’s posture in cyberspace. The USCYBERCOM strategy is driven by people, partnerships and by delivering a decisive advantage to “Own the Domain.”

Focus: The Command has three main focus areas:

- Defending the DoDIN
- Providing support to combatant commanders for execution of their missions around the world
- Strengthening our nation’s ability to withstand and respond to cyber attack.

The Command unifies the direction of cyberspace operations, strengthens DoD cyberspace capabilities, and integrates and bolsters DoD’s cyber expertise. USCYBERCOM improves DoD’s capabilities to operate resilient, reliable information and communication networks, counter cyberspace threats, and assure access to cyberspace. USCYBERCOM is designing the cyber force structure, training requirements and certification standards that will enable the Services to build the cyber force required to execute our assigned missions. The command also works closely with interagency and international partners in executing these critical missions.

Organization: USCYBERCOM executes its mission through the military service cyber components.

- Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER)
- Fleet Cyber Command / Tenth Fleet (FLTCYBER)
- Sixteenth Air Force / Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER)
- Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER)

Forces: The Cyber Mission Force (CMF), authorized in 2012, originally consisted of 133 teams, with a total of almost 6,200 military and civilian personnel.

CMF teams come in several types:

- National Mission Force teams defend the nation by seeing adversary activity, blocking attacks, and maneuvering to defeat them.
- Combat Mission Force teams conduct military cyber operations in support of combatant commands.
- Cyber Protection Teams defend the DoD Information Network, protect priority missions, and prepare cyber forces for combat.

Combatant Command Support. USCYBERCOM also aligned the Cyber Mission Force in support of Joint Force operations. CMF teams supported combatant commands under USCYBERCOM’s Joint Force Headquarters:

- MARFORCYBER supports U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).
• ARCYBER supports U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).

• FLTCYBER supports U.S. Indo–Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), U.S. Southern Command (USOUTHCOM), and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM).

• AFCYBER supports U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

All 133 teams of the CMF achieved IOC in 2016, the threshold capacity whereby the units could execute their fundamental missions. The CMF reached Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2018, when all CMF units had reached their projected full strength. At the time of the announcement, the CMF had about 5,000 military and civilian personnel across the 133 teams.

USCYBERCOM added two components:

• The Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) in 2014. The CNMF is a joint element focused on cyberspace operations to deter, disrupt, and if necessary, defeat adversary cyber and malign influence actors.

• The Joint Force Headquarters–DoD Information Network (JFHQ-DoDIN) in 2015. JFHQ-DoDIN's mission is to oversee the day-to-day operation of DoD's networks and mount an active defense of them, securing their key cyber terrain and being prepared to neutralize any adversary who manages to bypass their perimeter defenses. The JFHQ-DoDIN commander is dual–hatted as the director of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

• USCYBERCOM added JTF-Ares to combat terrorist threats in 2016.

Sources: https://www.cybercom.mil/ and https://www.cybercom.mil/About/History/.
B. Joint Spectrum Center (JSC)

**Vision:** Be the premier and trusted provider of enterprise electromagnetic spectrum tools, capabilities, services, data and applied engineering.

**Mission:** Provide direct support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and Military Departments (MILDEPs) to enable trusted, efficient and effective use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum Enterprise (operations, services, data, tools/capabilities), Applied Engineering, Acquisition and Analysis, and the mitigation of Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) in support of our national security and military objectives.

**Mission Sets:**
- Direct Combatant Command and Joint Task Force Support
- Strategic Spectrum Planning – National and International
- Enterprise capabilities & services – Enables effective global spectrum operations and information dominance
- Engineering center of excellence – SME’s, experience and tools required to address the complex technical and operational issues associated with spectrum operations and the mitigation of electromagnetic effects

**Lines of Effort:**
- **Operations**
  - Worldwide Deployable Spectrum Teams
  - On Call Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (EMI)
  - Support to Information Ops/Special Technical Ops & Electronic Warfare
  - Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation on Ordinance Mitigation
  - Electromagnetic Environment (EME) Analysis
  - Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Analysis
  - Battlefield Training and Ops Support/Management
  - Joint Electromagnetic Operations & Visualization
  - Mobile Service Provider/FIRSTNet Support
- **Modeling and Simulation**
  - E3 Assessment & Spectrum Survivability/Supportability
  - DOD Equipment Acquisition & Test Assessments
  - EMS Battlefield Management Operation Picture
- **Database/Standards Development, Management & Maintenance**
  - Collect and maintain SM, E3, and HERO data
  - Develop DOD E3 technical standards
  - Operate and maintain the DOD Frequency Resource Record System (FRRS)
  - Manage the configuration and maintenance of SXXI
  - Parametric Data Integration & Distribution
- **Capability Development**
  - Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS) Suite of Tools Development
  - Develop Spectrum E3 Modeling and Simulation Capabilities
  - Develop analytical E3 algorithms and tools to support spectrum operations, management and E3 Engineering
  - Research and efficiently/effectively integrate Spectrum technologies

C. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)

Mission: On order, JCSE immediately deploys to provide enroute, early entry, scalable C4 support to the Regional Combatant Commands, Special Operations Command, and other agencies as directed; on order, provides additional C4 services within 72 hours to support larger CJTF/CJSOTF Headquarters across the full spectrum of operations.

Capabilities: As a joint Airborne/deployable communications organization, JCSE capabilities include:

- Expeditionary – can deploy in hours
- Early entry for a 40-seat joint command and control node
- Commercial-air transportable
- Seamlessly scales support from an early-entry package to a full joint force headquarters
- Access to a full range of DoD and commercial networks
- A robust 24/7 reach-back capability

JCSE’s rapid-deployment capability and lightweight-equipment footprint enable timely, secure and reliable communications service delivery during all phases of joint force headquarters operations.

Source: https://www.jecc.ustranscom.mil/Subordinate-Commands/JCSE/.
V. Service Organizations

A. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER)

U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) is the supporting Army headquarters under United States Cyber Command. ARCYBER operates and defends Army networks and delivers cyberspace effects against adversaries to defend the nation.

Mission. U.S. Army Cyber Command integrates and conducts cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, and information operations, ensuring decision dominance and freedom of action for friendly forces in and through the cyber domain and the information dimension, while denying the same to our adversaries.

Priorities.

- Operate and aggressively defend the Department of Defense Information Network. This is our most critical and complex priority.
- Deliver cyberspace effects – both defensive and offensive – against global adversaries.
- Rapidly develop and deploy cyberspace capabilities to equip our force for the future fight against a resilient, adaptive adversary.
- Defend military networks, secure Army weapons platforms, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure

Organization. Subordinate Army cyber units include:

OPERATE:

U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)

Headquartered at Fort Huachuca, AZ, NETCOM leads global operations for the Army’s portion of the DODIN, ensuring freedom of action in cyberspace while denying the same to our adversaries in support of multi-domain operations. The command configures, operates, extends, maintains, and sustains the DODIN-A.

DEFEND:

Cyber Protection Brigade

The Cyber Protection Brigade hunts against specified threats to deny and deter enemy offensive cyber operations. An operational brigade and two battalion warfighting headquarters providing mission command to assigned cyber forces in competition and conflict, supported by the Army’s premier signal battalion dedicated to cyber operational support.

91st Cyber Brigade

91st Cyber Brigade is the Army National Guard’s first, and only, cyber brigade. The primary mission of the brigade is to provide training and readiness oversight for these units, as well as operational command and control when needed. The brigade is a strategic asset to U.S. Cyber Command and Army Cyber Command.

U.S. Army Reserve Cyber Protection Brigade

U.S. Army Reserve Cyber Protection Brigade is subordinate to the 335th Signal Command (Theater). The USAR-CPB is charged with providing trained and ready Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) to conduct Cyberspace Operations from home station or on location in support of Army, Combatant Commands, Department of Defense, and Interagency operations worldwide.
ATTACK: ARCYBER delivers integrated offensive cyberspace effects and electromagnetic warfare and information operations capabilities against global adversaries.

Joint Force Headquarters – Cyber (JFHQ-C). provides offensive cyberspace operations to geographic combatant commands: USCENTCOM, USAFRICOM, and USNORTHCOM.

780th Military Intelligence Brigade (Cyber) provides teams to support National and Combatant Command offensive cyberspace operations requirements and maintain the Army’s cyberspace operations infrastructure.

11th Cyber Battalion. Trains and deploys Expeditionary Cyber Teams (ECTs) to augment corps and below units. The ECTs provide offensive Cyber, IO, and EW capability not currently fielded to tactical units.

INFLUENCE: ARCYBER integrates information, electromagnetic warfare, and cyberspace operations to influence relevant actors. Communicates or obscures locations, capabilities, and intent of Army forces to influence adversary decision calculus or behavior.

1st Information Operations Command (IOC). the Army’s only Active Component Information Operations brigade, trains and deploys IO Field Support Teams (FSTs) and provides planning support including Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and IO’s core synchronization and integration functions.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. Supports the Army and Joint Force with strategic, operational, and tactical civil affairs, military information support, and information operations capabilities across the range of military operations.

151st Theater IO Group. Only Theater Information Operations Group in the U.S. Army Reserve. Composed of mostly Army Reserve Soldiers in two battalions based out of Parks Reserve Forces Training Area (Camp Parks), Fort George G. Meade, and Fort Totten. The command’s Soldiers bring civilian expertise, education, and qualifications not found among regular active duty Soldiers.

71st Theater IO Group. (Texas Army National Guard) deploy modular teams to provide IO planning, synchronization, execution and assessment capabilities to designated Army Service Component Commanders (ASCC) to support the employment of information as an element of combat power across the range of military operations.

56th Theater IO Group. (Washington Army National Guard) deploys a Geographic Task Force to Homeland Security Region 1 and Homeland Security Region 2 in order to support local responders and mitigate loss of life.

Cyber Protection Brigade (CPB) known as the Hunter Brigade, is the Army’s premier cyber force. The CPB hunts against specified threats to deny and deter enemy offensive cyber operations. To do this, the CPB employs small teams of highly trained professionals operating in Mission Elements, supported by Analytic Support Cells, to hunt adversaries across the Army’s Unified Network.
INFORM: Fusing traditional and non-traditional intelligence for a shared understanding.

Cyber Military Intelligence Group (CMIG)

Supports ARCYBER operations, Multi-Domain Operations, and army information advantage by providing intelligence to Cyber Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Information Operations that will enable Information Dominance while operating, defending, and influencing in the Information Dimension (ID).

B. Marine Corps Forces Cyber (MARFORCYBER)

Mission.

1. Commander, Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (COMMARFORCYBERCOM), as the Marine Corps service component commander for the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM), represents Marine Corps capabilities and interests; advises CDRUSCYBERCOM on the proper employment and support of Marine Corps forces; and coordinates deployment, employment, and redeployment planning and execution of attached forces.

- Enables full spectrum cyberspace operations, to include the planning and direction of Marine Corps Enterprise Network Operations (MCEN Ops), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) in support of Marine Corps, Joint and Coalition Forces, and the planning and, when authorized, direction of offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) in support of Joint and Coalition Forces, in order to enable freedom of action across all warfighting domains and deny the same to adversarial forces.

- Has direct operational control of Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group (MCCYWG) and Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations Group (MCCOG) to support mission requirements and tasks. Additionally, the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC) will be in direct support of MARFORCYBER for full spectrum cyber operations.

MARFORCYBER Subordinate Units.

1. Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations Group (MCCOG). MCCOG executes Marine Corps Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) Operations and Marine Corps Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) in order to enhance freedom of action across warfighting domains, while denying the efforts of adversaries to degrade or disrupt this advantage through cyberspace. Key MCCOG tasks include:

- Provide Cyberspace Operations (CO) Support to Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs)
- Plan and Direct Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) Operations
- Plan and Direct Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO)

2. Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group (MCCYWG). MCCYWG organizes, trains, equips, provides administrative support, manages readiness of assigned forces, and recommends certification and presentation of Cyber Mission Force (CMF) Teams to U.S. Cyber Command. The MCCYWG plans and conducts full spectrum cyberspace operations as directed by COMMARFORCYBER in support of service, combatant command, joint, and coalition requirements. Key MCCYWG tasks include:

- Conduct personnel management to organize and assign individuals to work roles and place them in work centers to ensure operational readiness of CMF Teams
- Ensure all personnel are trained in accordance with USCYBERCOM Joint Cyberspace Training and Certification Standards and equipped to perform all duties and tasks outlined in the MARFORCYBER Mission Essential Task List (METL)
- Plan for and, when authorized, conduct OCO including computer network exploitation (CNE), cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and operational preparation of the environment (OPE)
- Plan and conduct designated DCO in response to threats against the MCEN, supported combatant command (COCOM) designated networks, and the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN)
- Advise COMMARFORCYBER on force employment considerations
- Provide subject matter expertise for operational planning requirements

C. Navy U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC) / U.S. TENTH Fleet (C10F)

U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC)/U.S. TENTH Fleet (C10F) has grown into an operational force composed of more than 19,000 Active and Reserve Sailors and civilians organized into 26 active commands, 40 Cyber Mission Force units, and 29 reserve commands around the globe. U.S. Fleet Cyber Command reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations as an Echelon II command and is responsible for Navy information network operations, offensive and defensive cyberspace operations, space operations and signals intelligence. As such, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command serves as the Navy component command to U.S. Cyber Command, the Navy space component to U.S. Strategic Command, and the Navy's Service Cryptologic Component Commander under the National Security Agency/Central Security Service. U.S. TENTH Fleet is the operational arm of Fleet Cyber Command and executes its mission through a task force structure similar to other warfare commanders. In this role, TENTH Fleet provides operational direction through the command's Maritime Operations Center located at Fort George Meade, MD.

Fleet Cyber Command

Mission. The mission of Fleet Cyber Command is to plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, direct, and conduct the full spectrum of cyberspace operational activities required to ensure freedom of action across all of the Navy’s warfighting domains in, through, and from cyberspace, and to deny the same to the Navy’s adversaries.

Vision. Fleet Cyber Command's vision is to conduct operations in and through cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and space to ensure Navy and Joint/Coalition freedom of action and decision superiority while denying the same to our adversaries. We will win in these domains through our collective commitment to excellence and by strengthening our alliances with entities across the US government, Department of Defense, academia, industry, and our foreign partners.

Tenth Fleet

Mission: The mission of Tenth Fleet is to plan, monitor, direct, assess, communicate, coordinate, and execute operations to enable command and control and set the conditions for subordinate commands by:

- Serving as the numbered fleet for U.S. Fleet Cyber Command and exercise operational control over U.S. Fleet Cyber Command-assigned forces.
- Directing and delivering desired tactical and operational effects in and through cyberspace, space and the electromagnetic spectrum to Navy commanders worldwide and ensure successful execution of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command-assigned mission areas.

D. 16th Air Force / Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER)

The Sixteenth Air Force (Air Forces Cyber) is headquartered at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, focuses on information warfare in the modern age. Information warfare requires integrating: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance; Cyber Warfare; Electromagnetic Warfare; Weather; Public Affairs; and Information Operations capabilities. 16th Air Force ensures that our Air Force and Nation are fast, resilient, and fully integrated in competition, crisis, and conflict by incorporating Information Warfare at operational and tactical levels, capitalizing on the value of information by leading the charge for uniquely-21st century challenges in the highly dynamic, seamless, and global information domain.

Mission. Converge capabilities to generate information warfare outcomes for combatant commanders and air components.

Vision. Empowered Airmen delivering outcomes for the Nation

Lines of Effort. Generate Insights, Compete Now, Prepare for Crisis and Conflict.

Organization. Sixteenth Air Force operates globally across nine wings and one center presenting capabilities to generate insights on our adversaries while simultaneously ensuring and having the capabilities and the capacity to persistently engage and respond appropriately to threats today, in the future, and across the competition continuum.

Roles and Responsibilities. The 16th Air Force commander has unique and distinct roles and responsibilities. 16th Air Force is responsible to:

- The Director, National Security Agency / Chief, Central Security Service, as the Air Force's authority for matters involving the conduct of cryptologic activities, including the spectrum of missions related to tactical war-fighting and national-level operations.
- The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, as a Defense Intelligence Component, for performing foreign intelligence missions and functions, and providing intelligence oversight of those missions and functions.
- Air Combat Command and the air components for organizing, training, and equipping; and force presentation of assigned forces.
- U.S. Cyber Command and the U.S. Air Force for building, extending, operating, securing, and defending the Air Force portion of the Department of Defense information network.
- U.S. Cyber Command as the Commander of Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR), for presentation of cyber forces to other cyber components as directed.

These responsibilities, unified under a single commander, are the cornerstone of 16th Air Force's ability to converge on problems and generate outcomes on strategic competition. It is the integration of the various operational capabilities and access to global data, leveraged against specific problems, with the appropriate organic authorities, and acting by, with and through partners, that forms the foundation of information warfare.

Source: https://www.16af.af.mil/.
E. Coast Guard Cyber Command

Mission.

- **Defend Coast Guard Cyberspace**: Operate and maneuver the Coast Guard Enterprise Mission Platform to assure Coast Guard mission execution in all domains, while aggressively defending our part of the DOD Information Network (DODIN).

- **Enable Coast Guard Operations**: Enable Coast Guard operations at sea, in the air, on land and space by delivering effects in and through cyberspace.

- **Protect Maritime Transportation System (MTS)**: Protect maritime critical infrastructure by delivering effects and capabilities in and through cyberspace.

**Vision.** Ensure the security of our cyberspace, maintain superiority over our adversaries, and safeguard our Nation's critical maritime infrastructure.

**Lines of Effort.** U.S. Coast Guard actions are organized into three lines of effort: (1) Defend and Operate the Enterprise Mission Platform; (2) Protect the Marine Transportation System; and (3) Operate In and Through Cyberspace. These efforts will be underpinned by development and sustainment of a skilled workforce, intelligence driven operations, and domestic and international partnerships to achieve unity of effort.

**CGCYBER Departments.**

- **Cyber Intelligence (CGCC-2)**. The CGCYBER Intelligence Department, CGCC-2, provides intelligence support internally to the CGCYBER Operations Department (CGCC-3), CGCYBER / Deputy CGCYBER, and Planning and Policy Department (CGCC-5). CGCC-2 also collaborates with Coast Guard Intelligence components, Intelligence Community (IC) components, and to leadership within Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DOD), and Coast Guard, as requested.

- **Operations Department (CGCC-3)**. CGCYBER Operations Department consists of CGCC-33 Network Operations and Security Center, and CGCC-35 Future Operations Division. CGCC-3 is also the parent command of the Cyber Protection Team, the Cybersecurity Operations Center, and the Maritime Cyber Readiness Branch. Mission elements of CGCC-3 include the Cyber Protection Team (CPT), the Cybersecurity Operations Center (CSOC), and the Maritime Cyber Readiness Branch (MCRB). The CPT is the Coast Guard's deployable unit responsible for offering cybersecurity services to the Marine Transportation System (MTS). MCRB is a component of CGCYBER that focuses on cybersecurity in the commercial maritime transportation community.

- **Assessment and Authorization (CGCC-AA)**. CGCC-AA is responsible for establishing processes for all A&A functions in order to standardize how the Coast Guard conducts assessments and authorizations for Coast Guard (CG) Information Technology (IT).

- **Operations Support.** The CGCYBER Operations Support Department provides Administrative, Budget / Resources, Security, and Training & Exercises support.

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Glossary

Terms are taken from the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (August 2023), JP 3-12 Joint Cyberspace Operations (19 December 2022), FM 3-12 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare (August 2021), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) web site (https://niccs.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-career-resources/vocabulary#letter-d).

adversary – A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.

active defense – The employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy.

area of responsibility (AOR) — The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.

battle damage assessment (BDA) — The estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of fires.

CCDR — Combatant Commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President.

CCMD — Combatant Command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CCMF – Cyber Combat Mission Force.

CERF — Cyber Effects Request Format.

CJCS — Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CMF — Cyber Mission Force.

CMT — Combat Mission Team.

CO-IPE – Cyberspace Operations-Integrated Planning Element

command and control (C2) — The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) Specific information identified by the commander as being essential to facilitate timely decision making.

concept of operations (CONOPS) — A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources.

counterintelligence (CI) — Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.

course of action (COA) — 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission.
cyber-persona – The combined features comprising the digital representation of an actor or entity in cyberspace used for intelligence analysis and reporting and for planning operations related to that entity.

cyberspace – A global domain within the information environment consisting of the independent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

cyberspace attack – actions taken in and through cyberspace that create denial (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) or manipulation effects in cyberspace and are considered a form of fires.

cyberspace capability – A device or computer program, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace.

cyberspace defense – Actions taken within protected cyberspace to defeat specific threats that have breached or are threatening to breach cyberspace security measures.

cyberspace exploitation – Actions taken in cyberspace to gain intelligence, maneuver, collect information, or perform other enabling actions required to prepare for future military operations.

cyberspace operations (CO) — The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.

Cyberspace security – Actions taken within cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference.

cybersecurity — the art of protecting networks, devices, and data from unauthorized or criminal use and the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.

cyberspace superiority — The degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary.

cyberspace system operation – actions taken within the Department of Defense information network to ensure it operates in support of its user’s mission including all non-security actions to administer, configure, update, extend, maintain, or repair it.

data mining — the process of techniques used to analyze large sets of existing information to discover previously unrevealed patterns or correlations.

defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) — Missions to preserve the ability to utilize and protect blue cyberspace capabilities and data by defeating on-going or imminent malicious cyberspace activity.

defensive cyberspace operations internal defensive measures (DCO-IDM) — A defensive cyberspace operations mission in which defense actions occur within the defended portion of cyberspace.

defensive cyberspace operations response actions (DCO-RA) — A defensive cyberspace operations mission executed external to the defended network or portion of cyberspace without the permission of the owner of the affected system.

denial of service attack (DOS) — A cyber attack designed to disrupt network service, typically by overwhelming the system with millions of requests every second causing the network to slow down or crash.

Department of Defense information networks (DODIN) — The set of information capabilities and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone.

deterrence – The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.

DOD Information Network (DODIN) Operations — Operations to secure, configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain Department of Defense cyberspace to create and preserve the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the Department of Defense information network.

directive authority for cyberspace operations (DACO). The authority to issue orders and directives to all Department of Defense components to execute global Department of Defense information network operations and defensive cyberspace operations internal defensive measures.

denial of service attack (DoS) — A type of cyberattack targeting a specific application or website with the goal of exhausting the target system’s resources, which, in turn, renders the target unreachable or inaccessible, denying legitimate users access to the service.

distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) – a denial of service attack is categorized as a distributed DOS attack when the overloading traffic originates from more than one attacking machine operating in concert.

electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) — Coordinated military actions to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic environment.

electromagnetic spectrum superiority — That degree of control in the electromagnetic spectrum that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while affecting the threat's ability to do the same.

electromagnetic warfare (EW) — Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.

e-mail spoofing — 1. Faking the sending address of a transmission to gain illegal [unauthorized] entry into a secure system. 2. the deliberate inducement of a user or resource to take incorrect action. (note: impersonating, masquerading, piggybacking, and mimicking are forms of spoofing).

execute order (EXORD) — 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed.

expeditionary cyberspace operations – cyberspace operations that require the deployment of cyberspace forces within the physical domains.

firewall — a hardware/software device or a software program that limits network traffic according to a set of rules of what access is and is not allowed or authorized.

hacker — an unauthorized user who attempts to or gains access to an information system.

hacktivist — These are combinations of hackers and activists. They usually have a political motive for their activities, and identify that motivation by their actions, such as defacing opponents’ websites with counterinformation or disinformation.
information environment (IE) — The aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information.

intelligence — 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The organizations engaged in such activities.

intelligence requirement (IR) — 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces.

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) — 1. An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. 2. The organizations of assets conducting such activities.

J-1 — manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff; manpower and personnel staff section.

J-2 — intelligence directorate of a joint staff; intelligence staff section.

J-3 — operations directorate of a joint staff; operations staff section.

J-4 — logistics directorate of a joint staff; logistics staff section.

J-5 — plans directorate of a joint staff; plans staff section.

J-6 — communications system directorate of a joint staff; command, control, communications, and computer systems staff section.

JFHQ-C — Joint Force Headquarters-Cyberspace.

JFHQ-DODIN — Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Networks.

joint fires element (JFE) — An optional staff element that provides recommendations to the operations directorate to accomplish fires planning and synchronization.

joint force commander (JFC) — A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force.

joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) — A prioritized list of targets approved and maintained by the joint force commander.

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) — The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process.

joint operations area (JOA) — The airspace, land area, and maritime area defined by a combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander directs military operations to accomplish a specific mission.

joint planning process (JPP) — An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a campaign or joint operation plan or order.
**joint targeting coordination board (JTCB)** — A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance, synchronization, and priorities, and approving the joint integrated prioritized target list.

**joint target list (JTL)** — A consolidated list of validated targets of military significance without restrictions within a joint force commander’s operational area.

**joint task force (JTF)** — A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

**keylogger** — A software program or hardware device that is used to monitor and log each of the keys a user types into a computer keyboard.

**line of effort (LOE)** — In the context of planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.

**line of operation (LOO)** — A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s).

**logic bomb** — a set of instructions secretly incorporated into a program so that if a particular condition is satisfied they will be carried out, usually with harmful effects.

**malware (short for malicious software)** — software that compromises the operational of a system by performing an unauthorized function or process.

**measure of effectiveness (MOE)** — an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time.

**measure of performance (MOP)** — an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.

**military deception (MILDEC)** — Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

**military information support operations (MISO)** — Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.

**navigation warfare (NAVWAR)** — Deliberate defensive and offensive action to assure and prevent positioning, navigation, and timing information through coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare operations.

**Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)** — A global, multi-segment network used by the Department of Defense.

**offensive cyberspace operations (OCO)** — missions intended to project power in and through cyberspace.
**operational art** – the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgement – to develop strategies campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.

**operational environment (OE)** — the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

**operational preparation of the environment (OPE)** — The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operational areas to set conditions for mission execution.

**operation order (OPORD)** — A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

**operation plan (OPLAN)** — A complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list.

**operations in the information environment (OIE)** — Military actions involving the integrated employment of multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior.

**packet sniffers** — a piece of hardware or software that monitors network traffic. It can also be called a packet analyzer, protocol analyzer, or network analyzer.

**ransomware** — a malware designed to deny a user or organization access to files on their computer

**reachback** — The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed.

**rules of engagement (ROE)** — Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

**SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET)** — The worldwide SECRET-level packet switch network that uses high-speed Internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Network circuitry.

**signals intelligence (SIGNT)** — 1. A category of intelligence comprising all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted, individually or in combination. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals.

**spam** — the abuse of electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately send unsolicited bulk messages.

**spyware** — Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed into an information system without the knowledge of the system user or owner.

**special operations forces (SOF)** — Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.

**TTP** — tactics, techniques, and procedures.

**time-sensitive target (TST)** — A joint force commander validated target or set of targets requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces.
**trojan horse** — a computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program.

**virus** — a computer program that can replicate itself, infect a computer without permission or knowledge of the user, and then spread or propagate to another computer.

**worm** — a self-replicating, self-propagating, self-contained program that uses networking mechanisms to spread itself.

**zombie** — internet computers infected with malicious code known as ‘bots’ (short for robots) that secretly connect to websites or chatrooms where they can be controlled remotely.