EXAMINING TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMY RESERVE AND ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

By Lieutenant Colonel John Traylor, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Murray and Professor James Kievit

INTRODUCTION

In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, new organizations — such as the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the proposed Department of Homeland Security — are emerging to focus on protecting U.S. territory and population, and large numbers of the U.S. military’s Reserve Components (RC) have been mobilized to perform domestic security missions. Meanwhile, over the past decade numerous overseas national security demands also have greatly increased deployments of the RC. The combined impact of these new organizations and simultaneous domestic and international demands raise potential issues which should be examined regarding future RC roles, responsibilities, structures, and activities as the Army prepares and executes its proposed transformation to an Objective Force.

On September 23-26, the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) hosted a workshop with 85 senior Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) leaders in order to develop an improved understanding of Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (AR) in the emergent national security environment so as to better portray them in U.S. Army War College and other Army activities and exercises. CSL Issues Paper 11-02, “Properly Portraying the Army Reserves in Army Analytical and Educational Events,” highlights the insights from that event related to better educating future Army leaders. This second paper identifies selected unresolved RC issues that surfaced during the workshop which appear to deserve additional study.

Participants included general and senior officers from the AC, the ARNG, the AR, and also military and civilian representatives from a variety of other DOD organizations and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Information briefings by ARNG, AR, and FEMA subject matter experts were followed by participant breakout group periods for dialogue and issue determination. A concluding plenary session allowed the breakout groups to share their findings with all participants.

**ISSUE QUESTIONS**

During the workshop, participants identified Reserve Component involvement in homeland security, as well as issues in the areas of training, organization, and mobilization as distinctly impacting the Reserve Components as the Army transforms. The specific selected questions provided here reflect an earnest attempt to begin productive dialogue related to those issues in order to assist in examining potential policies for the future.

**Homeland Security (HLS):** Congress will soon pass a new homeland security bill authorizing a Homeland Security Department complete with newly defined powers and responsibilities. What are the proper roles of the ARNG and AR in homeland security and homeland defense? How will RC elements be integrated within the NORTHCOM structure as it evolves? Specifically, what will NORTHCOM’s role be with respect to the utilization of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams? How do the states support NORTHCOM in its HLS mission, and vice-versa? What are the possible command relationships between AC forces or RC forces federalized under Title 10 and RC forces federally funded for state use under Title 32? Under what circumstances, if any, could or should Title 10 elements be under the operational control of Title 32 authorities? What are the proper roles of the state Adjutant General (TAG), State Area Command, and Reserve Support Command in HLS operations? What is the required logistics structure to support HLS? What is the best way to integrate or replicate private sector, non-governmental and private voluntary organizations’ capabilities? What are the possible and best solutions to equipment interoperability problems at every level between the military services and civil authorities? As HLS competes for resources, what will be the impact of regional Combatant Commander demands for high demand and low-density capabilities found only in the RC?

**Training:** Changes to Army RC roles and missions have an immediate second-order effect on training. For example, post-September 11 activities identified the need for a more realistic look at certain homeland security skill sets, e.g. force protection, physical security training, military police, security supervision, non-lethal capabilities, use of force training/deadly force in a civilian environment, etc., as more non-military police units took an increased security role at airports, seaports, borders, and other critical infrastructure. Therefore, as mission requirements change, what are the appropriate training times (pre and post mobilization) for both the ARNG and AR? Once ascertained, how does the mobilization decision-making process ensure recognition of those times? Additionally, should post-mobilization training requirements for deployments within and outside the continental United States, and for traditional and nontraditional missions, differ? If so, what are the impacts on response time(s) and deliberate planning? Redeploying forces from certain operations will require unique post mobilization training with impacts on both ARNG/AR command and

---

1 Participants were drawn from both National Guard Bureau (NGB) and from various state ARNG organizations.

2 Participants were drawn from the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) and from various US Army Reserve Command (USARC) organizations.
control and on individual Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification. What is required to ensure necessary synchronization at National Guard Bureau, OCAR/USARC, Training and Doctrine Command, and Continental US Army levels to ensure the State Area Commands and Reserve Support Commands continue to provide capable and deployable forces while simultaneously taking advantage of advances in training technology. Can we shorten the training cycle without compromising training quality? What approaches to AC and RC integration will improve training and readiness, and maximize all components’ capabilities? What are the requirements for and how can the RC become more engaged in joint operations, training, education, and qualification billets?

Organization: With increasing and competing demands on both AR and ARNG to meet domestic and overseas requirements, members of the workshop clearly felt the need for additional critical analysis of organization(s) as DOD leadership identifies options for use(s) of the RC in the 21st century. To what degree is current RC organization and structure appropriate to meet the total evolving needs and requirements of the global security environment with respect to employment either inside or outside the continental United States? Does redundancy exist between the AR and ARNG? If so, how much, and where? What is the impact of the current RC organization and mobilization structure on the ability to satisfy an individual Combatant Commander’s requirements and personnel limitations? What are the appropriate quantities of various high demand and low-density units to meet both overseas and HLS requirements? As we further transform The Army, particularly the ARNG and AR, what are the functional capabilities that should be in the RC, and in what part of the RC structure should they be located? Should a Combatant Commander be required to request complete units (UIC) or have the capability to request some smaller piece or derivative of a UIC? If the latter, then what is the appropriate force structure to permit the most flexible sourcing? Also, would the creation of multi-component and multi-service RC units or staffs for each Combatant Commander help ensure seamless RC integration? If so, what should be the mission and composition of those elements?

Mobilization: Mobilization and deployment of RC resources is critical to the success of Combatant Commands and Joint Task Forces on both a global and domestic basis. Are the current mobilization processes – largely designed for response to major war — agile enough to address the evolving national security strategy for the near and long term? What mobilization process improvements with respect to alert and order processes, availability of RC elements, funding, unit sourcing, and mobilization requirements should be addressed? Is there still a valid need for a Continental US Army in the ARNG/AR mobilization or training processes? What are the feasible corrective action plans and associated risk levels for fixing those transportation and funding/personnel shortfalls which are the major identified root causes for ineffective Power Projection Platforms and Power Support Platforms? Timely mobilization may be adversely affected by organizational changes, because changes to unit personnel, training, and equipment requirements potentially affect readiness (C) ratings. What processes will ensure key decision makers understand readiness factors and the potential capabilities of RC unit types at different C-rating levels? Should units not rated C-1 be eligible to deploy? If so, then under what circumstances do they deploy? Should units consistently

---

3 Unit versus derivative UIC sourcing creates issues for local commanders and readiness. Key agencies must understand that if constraints do not permit sourcing by a complete UIC, the request for forces must clearly identify specific personnel, equipment, and training resources.

4 Mobilization regulations in CONUSA and other MACOM areas are standardized under AMOPES and FORMDEPS. However, many members of the workshop felt that if the recent global war on terrorism and the 9/11 responses worldwide are any indicator, a reassessment is needed and consensus found on how best to resolve mobilization related challenges that were experienced.

5 Power Projection Platforms are military installations responsible for deploying either AC or RC forces; Power Support Platforms are military installations responsible for activities associated with mobilizing RC forces; a single installation may serve in both roles.
rated C-4 or below be deactivated if they don’t or can’t meet deployment requirements? Is the current C-rating scheme an appropriate criterion for mobilization for missions within the continental U.S.? If not, what is appropriate?

**CONCLUSION**

The U.S. National Security Strategy states “… military capabilities must also include the ability to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space.” Current military capabilities are being stretched as requirements increase, and the Reserve Components are an increasingly essential element of total US military power. Some challenges in the integration of the Reserve Components into both homeland and overseas operations surfaced immediately after September 11, and both military leadership and civil authorities had to devise immediate workarounds. The questions raised in this paper are designed to stimulate idea and concept exchanges within The Army and thereby assist in transforming America’s Army to better meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. Creating ad hoc solutions to unplanned events to some degree always remains inherent in the military’s operational-strategic business, but exploring methods to address the multiple challenges confronting an integrated AC and RC response is essential. To do otherwise puts our soldiers and the nation at unacceptable risk.

This and other CSL publications can be found online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp

The views expressed in this report are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect official policy or position of the United States Army War College, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other Department or Agency within the U.S. Government. Further, these views do not reflect uniform agreement among exercise participants. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.