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The text is a synthesis and interpretation of existing National, Defense, Joint, and Service systems, processes, and procedures, and will be updated in accordance with changes in policy and doctrine.
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Foreword

1. This publication provides a guide for U.S. Army War College students to understand design, planning, and execution of cyberspace operations at combatant commands (CCMDs), joint task forces (JTFs), and joint functional component commands. It combines existing U.S. Government Unclassified and "Releasable to the Public" documents into a single guide.

2. This strategic guide follows the operational design methodology and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) detailed in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning and applies these principles to the cyberspace domain found in Joint Publication 3-12(R), Cyberspace Operations. However, this publication is not to be cited, copied, or used in lieu of doctrine or other official publications.

The U.S. Army War College Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide contains six chapters:

   **Chapter 1** provides an overview of cyberspace operations, operational design methodology, and joint planning, and execution.

   **Chapter 2** includes a review of operational design doctrine and applies these principles to the cyberspace domain.

   **Chapter 3** reviews the joint operation planning process and identifies cyberspace operations planning concerns.

   **Chapter 4** describes cyberspace operations during the execution of joint operations.

   **Chapter 5** provides an overview of cyberspace operations in the homeland.

   **Chapter 6** includes a case study on the Russian – Georgian conflict in 2008 with a focus on cyberspace operations.

   **Appendix A** provides an overview of cyberspace policies, strategies, and guidance.

   **Appendix B** includes a description of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, Joint, and Service cyberspace organizations.

3. This publication was compiled and edited by Mr. Benjamin Leitzel and Mr. Gregory Hillebrand.

4. Changes from the first volume (1 June 2016) include 2017 testimony from the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and the Director of National Intelligence, new Presidential Executive Order on Cybersecurity, changes to Army Doctrine, and updated cyberspace organization information.

5. This document is based on U.S. policy and doctrine and will be updated on a routine basis to reflect changes in guidance. We encourage comments to improve this guide – send recommended changes to:

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   Carlisle, PA 17013
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Chapter 1: Introduction

"We . . . need to develop a framework within which to deter cyber threats, and obviously attributing threats and managing escalation and hardening ourselves against cyberattacks are all areas that require more work"  

General Joseph Dunford,  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. This guide follows the operational design methodology and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) and applies these principles to the cyberspace domain. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace operations (CO) are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.2 Commanders must develop the capability to direct operations in the cyber domain since strategic mission success increasingly depends on freedom of maneuver in cyberspace (see Figure 1-1).3

2. The President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) provide strategic guidance to the joint force. This guidance is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes planning activities and operations. It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force.4

3. The commander and staff develop plans and orders through the application of the operational design methodology and by using JOPP. Operational design results in the commander's operational approach, which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the desired end state. The commander and staff translate the broad operational approach into detailed plans and orders using JOPP.5 Planning continues during execution, with an initial emphasis on refining the existing plan and producing the operations order and refining the force flow utilizing employed assigned and allocated forces.6

4. Commanders integrate cyberspace capabilities at all levels and in all military operations. Plans should address how to effectively integrate cyberspace capabilities, counter an adversary's use of cyberspace, secure mission critical networks, operate in a degraded environment, efficiently use limited cyberspace assets, and consolidate operational requirements for cyberspace capabilities. While it is possible that some military objectives can be achieved by CO alone, CO capabilities should be integrated into the joint force commander's plan and synchronized with other operations during execution.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Cyberspace Operations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of maneuver in cyberspace is vital to U.S. National Security. The U.S. Army has a significant and active role in defending and fighting through this domain in order to advance U.S. National Security Interests.</td>
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Figure 1-1: Strategic Cyber Warfare
I. Operational Design

1. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, describes operational design methodology and the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Operational design requires the commander to encourage discourse and leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems. The operational approach is a commander’s description of the broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the operational environment and the problem facing the commander. Once the commander approves the approach, it provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or completing detailed planning (see Figure 2-1).8

   a. This methodology incorporates three distinct aspects to produce an operational approach. Together, they constitute an organizational learning methodology that corresponds to three basic questions that commanders answer to produce an actionable operational approach to guide detailed planning:

   (1) Understand the strategic direction. (What are the strategic goals to be achieved and the military objectives that support their attainment?)

   (2) Understand the operational environment. (What is the larger context that will help me determine our problem?)

   (3) Define the problem. (What problem is the design intended to solve?)

   (4) The answers to these three questions support the development of an operational approach. (How will the problem be solved?)9

2. Understand the Strategic Direction. The President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) all promulgate strategic guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes “victory” or success (ends)
and allocate adequate forces and resources **(means)** to achieve strategic objectives. The operational approach **(ways)** of employing military capabilities to achieve the ends is for the supported commander to develop and propose. Connecting resources and tactical actions to strategic ends is the responsibility of the operational commander.11

3. **Understand the Operational Environment.** The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains, and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Understanding the operational environment helps the commander to better identify the problem; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how these actions affect achieving the military end state.12

4. **Define the Problem.** Once armed with an initial understanding of the operational environment's current and desired systems, the design effort shifts to the challenge of understanding and describing the problem (those factors that must be addressed to change the current system to the desired system).13

   a. Defining the problem is essential to solving the problem. It involves understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue at hand - defining the essence of a complex, ill-defined problem. Defining the problem begins with a review of the tendencies and potentials of all the concerned actors and identifying tensions among the existing conditions and the desired end state. The problem statement articulates how the operational variables can be expected to resist or facilitate transformation and how inertia in the operational environment can be leveraged to ensure the desired conditions are achieved.14

   b. As the commander and staff gain an understanding of the problem within the context of the operational environment, potential solutions should become evident. The configuration of tensions, competition, opportunities, and challenges may reveal ways to interact with various aspects of the environment in order to transform it to the desired system. Analyzing these options often requires coupling potential actions to a problem by quickly wargaming their possible outcomes. This deepens understanding, informs the commander's ability to visualize friendly actions, and enables the commander to expedite detailed planning by developing intent and planning guidance.15

5. **Develop an Operational Approach.** The operational approach reflects understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander's visualization of a broad approach for achieving the desired end state. It is the commander's visualization of how the operation should transform current conditions into the desired conditions at end state — the way the commander wants the operational environment to look when operations conclude (see Figure 2-2).

   a. The operational approach is how the commander believes U.S. instruments of national power and other interorganizational actions should address the various factors that comprise the gap between the current and desired systems. The resulting product provides the foundation for the commander's planning guidance to the staff and collaboration with interorganizational partners. The commander and staff should continually review, update, and modify the approach throughout planning and execution as the operational environment, end state objectives, or the problem change.
b. In developing an appropriate operational approach, the commander should address the following questions:

(1) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various actors?
(2) What are the opportunities and threats?
(3) How do we go from the existing conditions to the desired conditions?
(4) What will be the likely consequences as we seek to shape the operational environment toward a desired set of conditions?

c. The operational approach should describe the operational objectives that will enable achievement of the key conditions of the desired end state. The operational approach may be described using lines of operation (LOOs)/lines of effort (LOEs) to link decisive points to achievement of objectives. It should also include a description of how key adversarial desired conditions will be precluded, and how other non-adversarial desired conditions will be mitigated.

II. Strategic Direction and Cyberspace.

1. In 2012 President Obama directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to organize and plan to defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence, in concert with other U.S. government agencies. In response, the DOD developed the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy that focuses on three cyber missions (see Appendix A for cyberspace policies, strategies, and guidance):

a. defend DOD networks, systems, and information;

b. defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence; and

c. provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingency plans.\textsuperscript{17}
III. Understanding the Cyberspace Environment.

1. Introduction. The ability to operate in cyberspace has emerged as a vital national security requirement. The growing impact of information warfare on military operations further increases the importance of cyberspace. As technological capabilities and instantaneous access to information continue to grow, the opportunities for real-time communication and information sharing expand. These capabilities are vital to economic and national development. However, reliance on these capabilities demands protection of the networks and information. Adversary activity in cyberspace could threaten the United States' dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains as they become increasingly interconnected and dependent on cyberspace technology.

   a. Cyberspace comprises the Internet, networks, systems, associated peripherals, data, and users in the information environment. This interconnected environment is important to global governance, commercial, military, and national security. A major challenge for the United States and its allies is protecting and defending the environment from adversaries. The host of cyberspace adversaries and threats include state actors, non-state actors, criminal organizations, general users, rogue individual hackers, and, in many cases, internal personnel. Conversely, many of these adversaries and threats may also be vulnerable through cyberspace.18

   b. The Department of Defense information networks (DODIN) are a globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The DODIN includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and national security systems.19

2. Unique Cyberspace Capabilities and Characteristics. Cyberspace is a global enabler for expedient, dynamic information exchange impacting all aspects of life. It allows instantaneous information flow across the globe for financial transactions as well as the movement and tracking of products and goods. However, it also allows adversaries to access this information and disrupt vital operations from any location. Cyberspace is difficult to regulate due to ease of accessibility. From a military perspective, cyberspace activities rarely require movement of forces, allowing engagement from extended stand-off ranges. It also enables the influence of populations that are inaccessible through the other domains.

   a. Can be reverse engineered: Unlike munitions, which are normally destroyed upon use, cyberspace activities include code that can be saved, analyzed, and recoded for use against allies or friendly nations. Planners must account for the possibility of a "cyber ricochet"20 in which cyber activities are turned against the originator or other unintended targets through reverse engineering.

   b. No Single National/International Ownership: While someone owns each physical component of cyberspace, the whole of cyberspace is not under any single nations' or entities' complete control. The infrastructure is a disparate combination of public and private networks without standardized security or access controls. This arrangement enables free information flow, but the lack of controls hinders global accountability, standardization, and security. The traditional concept of territorial integrity can be unclear due to the nature of cyberspace.

   c. Lack of Cooperation/Collaboration: The lack of international laws and regulations governing the environment complicates responses to actions in this domain. The difficulty in tracing the source of a cyberattack makes them easily deniable, especially if
conducted by individual "hackers." Further hindering collaboration is the tendency to deny that a cyberspace attack has occurred to prevent loss of trust in an organization's cyber security measures.

d. **Low Cost:** Cyberspace is the most affordable domain through which to attack the United States. Viruses, malicious code, and training are readily available over the Internet at no cost. Adversaries can develop, edit, and reuse current tools for network attacks. Inexpensive tools and training allow an adversary to compete without costly ships, aircraft, or missiles. Furthermore, an adversary can impose significant financial burdens on nations that rely heavily on cyberspace by forcing them to invest in cyberspace defense. Currently, "military-grade" cyberspace capabilities remain too expensive for most malign actors, but they can buy relatively inexpensive services of professional hackers.

e. **Volatile:** Successful cyberspace attacks depend on vulnerabilities within the adversary's network. Identifying these vulnerabilities and creating cyberspace capabilities sometimes require great expense. If an adversary discovers their network's vulnerability and closes it, the cyberspace attack technique is rendered immediately and unexpectedly useless despite the development expense. For this reason, great care must be taken to prevent alerting adversaries to vulnerabilities in their networks.

f. **Speed:** Cyberspace operations occur quickly. However, preparation for those operations is often extensive. An intense study of the adversary's network may be required to learn system specifications and understand patterns of life. Therefore, a cyberspace unit operating on one adversary's networks may not be able to shift focus to another target without substantial preparation.

g. **Unintentional cascading effects:** Another unique characteristic of cyberspace is the potential for unintended cascading effects. Capabilities and munitions in the natural domains lose momentum the greater distance from impact. However, physical distance means very little in cyberspace. While cyberspace capabilities are developed and evaluated in computer labs and cyberspace ranges, there can never be complete assurances as to how a capability will behave or where it might spread when introduced to the great expanse of cyberspace.21

h. **Layers:** Cyberspace can be visualized as three layers: Physical Network, Logical Network, and Cyber-persona (see Figure 2-3). Adversaries might attack any of these layers to disrupt, degrade, or destroy cyberspace capability. Conversely, each of these layers presents a means to attack adversaries’ use of cyberspace.

(1) The **physical network layer** of cyberspace is comprised of the geographic component and is part of the physical dimension. The geographic component is the location in land, air, maritime, or space where elements of the network reside. The physical network layer is comprised of the hardware, system software, and infrastructure (wired, wireless, cable links, EMS links, satellite, and optical) that supports the network and the physical connectors (wires, cables, radio frequency, routers, switches, servers, and computers). The physical network layer uses logical constructs as the primary method of security and integrity.

(2) The **logical network layer** consists of the components of the network related to one another in a way abstracted from the physical network. For instance, nodes in the physical layer may logically relate to one another to form entities in cyberspace not tied to a specific node, path, or individual. Web sites hosted on servers in multiple physical locations where content can be accessed through a
single uniform resource locator or web address provide an example. This may also include the logical programming to look for the best communications route, which is not the shortest physical route, to provide the information requested.

(3) The **cyber-persona layer** is a digital representation of an individual or entity in cyberspace. This layer consists of the people who actually use the network and therefore have one or more identities that can be identified, attributed, and acted upon. These identities may include e-mail addresses, social networking identities, other web forum identities, computer Internet protocol addresses, and mobile device numbers. One individual may have multiple cyber-personas through Internet services at work and personal e-mail addresses, web forum, chat room, and social networking site identities; which may vary in the degree to which they are factually accurate. The authenticity of a cyber-persona is a concern especially with the ability of a threat force to hide their identity. Conversely, a single cyber-persona can have multiple users — for example, a username and password for an administrative account multiple people access.22

![Figure 2-3. The Three Layers of Cyberspace](image)

3. **Cyberspace Location and Ownership.** Maneuver in cyberspace is complex and generally not observable to anyone not directly involved. Therefore, staffs that plan, execute, and assess CO benefit from language that describes cyberspace based on location in a way that aids rapid understanding of planned operations.

   a. **Blue Cyberspace.** Denotes U.S. cyberspace in general, and any other friendly cyberspace that DOD may be ordered to protect. Although DOD has standing orders to protect only the Department of Defense information network (DODIN), cyberspace forces prepare, on order and when requested by Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to defend other United States Government (USG) cyberspace, as well as cyberspace related to critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) of the U.S. and Partner Nations (PNs).
b. **Red Cyberspace.** Those portions of cyberspace owned or controlled by an adversary or enemy. In this case, "controlled" means more than simply "having a presence on," since adversaries may have clandestine access to elements of global cyberspace where their presence is undetected and without apparent impact to the operation of the system. Here, controlled means the ability to direct the operations of a link or node of cyberspace, to the exclusion of others.

c. **Gray Cyberspace.** All cyberspace that does not meet the description of either "blue" or "red" is referred to as "gray" cyberspace.

4. **Intelligence Support.** The intelligence team provides critical insights to help the commander and staff understand the cyberspace environment. They draw on intelligence products focused on vulnerabilities and threats in the cyberspace domain. The assessment of enemy cyberspace capabilities, to include an examination of doctrinal principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and observed patterns of enemy operations in the cyberspace domain lead to a determination of possible enemy courses of action (COAs).24

**IV. Defining the Problem: Threats and Challenges in Cyberspace.**

1. The commander faces a unique set of cyberspace threats and challenges while conducting operations in a complex global security environment.

2. **Cyber Threats.** Cyberspace presents the commander with many threats ranging from nation states to individual actors.

   a. **Key Cyber Threats.** From 2013-2015, the Director of National Intelligence named the cyber threat as the number one strategic threat to the United States, placing it ahead of terrorism for the first time since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Potential state and non-state adversaries conduct malicious cyber activities against U.S. interests globally and in a manner intended to test the limits of what the United States and the international community will tolerate. Actors may penetrate U.S. networks and systems for a variety of reasons, such as to steal intellectual property, disrupt an organization's operations for activist purposes, or to conduct disruptive and destructive attacks to achieve military objectives. These threats can be internal or external to cyberspace (see Figure 2-4).

   b. Potential adversaries have invested significantly in cyber as it provides them with a viable, plausibly deniable capability to target the U.S. homeland and damage U.S. interests. Russia and China have developed advanced cyber capabilities and strategies. Russian actors are stealthy in their cyber tradecraft and their intentions are sometimes difficult to discern. China steals intellectual property from global businesses to benefit Chinese companies and undercut U.S. competitiveness. While Iran and North Korea have less developed cyber capabilities, they have displayed an overt level of hostile intent towards the United States and U.S. interests in cyberspace.

   c. In addition to state-based threats, non-state actors like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) use cyberspace to recruit fighters and disseminate propaganda and have declared their intent to acquire disruptive and destructive cyber capabilities. Criminal actors pose a considerable threat in cyberspace, particularly to financial institutions, and ideological groups often use hackers to further their political objectives. State and non-state threats often blend together; patriotic entities often act as cyber surrogates for states, and non-state entities can provide cover for state-based operators. These behaviors can make attribution more difficult and increases the chance of miscalculation.25
(1) **Nation State Threat.** This threat is potentially the most dangerous because of access to resources, personnel, and time that may not be available to other actors. Other nations may employ cyberspace to either attack or conduct espionage against the U.S. Nation state threats involve traditional adversaries and sometimes, in the case of espionage, even traditional allies. Nation states may conduct operations directly or may outsource them to third parties to achieve their goals.

(2) **Transnational Actor Threat.** Transnational actors are formal and informal organizations that are not bound by national borders. These actors use cyberspace to raise funds, communicate with target audiences and each other, recruit, plan operations, destabilize confidence in governments, and conduct direct terrorist actions within cyberspace.

(3) **Criminal Organization Threat.** Criminal organizations may be national or transnational in nature. Criminal organizations steal information for their own use or, in turn, sell to raise capital. They also may be used as surrogates by nation states or transnational actors to conduct attacks or espionage through CO.

(4) **Individual Actors or Small Group Threat.** Individual actors or small groups of people can illegally disrupt or gain access to networks or computer systems. Their intentions are as varied as the number of groups and individuals. These actors gain access into systems to discover vulnerabilities, sometimes sharing the information with the owners; however, they also may have malicious intent. Political motivations often drive their operations, and they use cyberspace to spread their message. They may also create and then install malware on commercial or government systems. These actors can be exploited by others, such as criminal organizations or nation states, in order to execute concealed operations against targets in order to preserve their identity or create plausible deniability.26

(5) **Insider Threat.** The "insider" is an individual currently or at one time authorized to access an organization's information system, data, or network. Such authorization implies a degree of trust in the individual. The insider threat refers to harmful acts that trusted insiders might carry out; for example, something that causes harm to the organization, or an unauthorized act that benefits the individual.

(6) **Natural Threat.** Natural threats that can damage and disrupt cyberspace include events such as floods, hurricanes, solar flares, lightning, and tornados. These types of events often produce highly destructive effects requiring the DOD to maintain or restore key cyberspace systems. These events also provide adversaries the opportunity to capitalize on infrastructure degradation and diversion of attention and resources.

(7) **Physical Threat.** Threats are unpredictable and can take many forms. A backhoe cutting a fiber optic cable of a key cyberspace node can disrupt the operation of cyberspace. Physical threats to cyberspace and cyberspace operations should be anticipated.27

d. **Risk to DOD Networks and Infrastructure.** The Defense Department's own networks and systems are vulnerable to intrusions and attacks. In addition to DOD's own networks, a cyberattack on the critical infrastructure and key resources on which DOD relies for its operations could impact the U.S. military's ability to operate in a
contingency. DOD has made gains in identifying cyber vulnerabilities of its own critical assets through its Mission Assurance Program – for many key assets, DOD has identified its physical network infrastructure on which key physical assets depend – but more must be done to secure DOD's cyber infrastructure.

e. In addition to destructive and disruptive attacks, cyber actors steal operational information and intellectual property from a range of U.S. government and commercial entities that impact the DOD. Victims include weapons developers as well as commercial firms that support force movements through U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). State actors have stolen DOD's intellectual property to undercut the United States' strategic and technological advantage and to benefit their own military and economic development.  

3. Cyber Operations against the United States (2010 – 2017). In May 2017, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated that, "Our adversaries are becoming more adept at using cyberspace to threaten our interests and advance their own, and despite improving cyber defenses, nearly all information, communication networks, and systems will be at risk for years. Cyber threats are already challenging public trust and confidence in global institutions, governance, and norms, while imposing costs on the U.S. and global economies. Cyber threats also pose an increasing risk to public health, safety, and prosperity as cyber technologies are integrated with critical infrastructure in key sectors. These threats are amplified by our ongoing delegation of decision making, sensing, and authentication roles to potentially vulnerable automated systems. This delegation increases the likely physical, economic, and psychological consequences of cyber attack and exploitation events when they do occur." In 2016, over 30,899 cyber incidents led to the compromise of U.S. government agencies' information or system functionality. Sixteen of these incidents met the threshold for a major incident, a designation that triggers a series of mandatory steps. The following list includes cyberspace operations against the U.S. that have been acknowledged by the U.S. Government:

a. Russia. The DNI stated, "Russia is a full-scope cyber actor that will remain a major threat to U.S. Government, military, diplomatic, commercial, and critical infrastructure. Moscow has a highly advanced offensive cyber program, and in recent years, the Kremlin has assumed a more aggressive cyber posture. . . . Outside the United States, Russian actors have conducted damaging and disruptive cyber attacks, including on critical infrastructure networks. In some cases, Russian intelligence actors have masqueraded as third parties, hiding behind false online personas designed to cause the victim to misattribute the source of the attack. Russia has also leveraged cyberspace to seek to influence public opinion across Europe and Eurasia. We assess that Russian cyber operations will continue to target the United States and its allies to gather intelligence, support Russian decision making, conduct influence operations to support Russian military and political objectives, and prepare the cyber environment for future contingencies."

2015 – The DNI noted that Russian cyber actors were developing the means to remotely access industrial control systems (ICS) used to manage critical infrastructures. Unknown Russian actors successfully compromised the product supply chains of at least three ICS vendors so that customers downloaded malicious software ("malware") designed to facilitate exploitation directly from the vendors' websites along with legitimate software updates.

2016 – Russian aggressiveness was evident in its efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. election. And the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assessed that only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized the 2016 U.S. election-
focused data thefts and disclosures, based on the scope and sensitivity of the
targets.33

b. China. The DNI assessed that China will continue to actively target the U.S.
Government, its allies, and U.S. companies for cyber espionage. Private-sector security
experts continue to identify ongoing cyber activity from China, although at volumes
significantly lower than before the bilateral Chinese-U.S. cyber commitments of
September 2015. Beijing has also selectively used offensive cyber operations against
foreign targets that it probably believes threaten Chinese domestic stability or regime
legitimacy.34

2012 – A Chinese national pleaded guilty to participating in a years-long
conspiracy to hack into the computer networks of major U.S. defense contractors
to steal military technical data (C-17 strategic transport aircraft and certain fighter
jets) and send the stolen data to China.35

2013 – Members of PRC’s Third Department of the General Staff Department of
the People’s Liberation Army (3PLA), Second Bureau, Third Office, Military Unit
Cover Designator (MUCD) 61398 were charged with conspiracy to penetrate the
computer networks of six American companies while those companies were
engaged in negotiations or joint ventures or were pursuing legal action with, or
against, state-owned enterprises in China. They then used their illegal access to
allegedly steal proprietary information including, for instance, e-mail exchanges
among company employees and trade secrets related to technical specifications
for nuclear plant designs.36

2014 – A U.S. company, Community Health Systems, informed the Securities
and Exchange Commission that it believed hackers "originating from China" had
stolen personally identifiable information on 4.5 million individuals.37

c. Iran. The DNI stated that, Iran continues to leverage cyber espionage, propaganda,
and attacks to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions,
and counter threats—including against U.S. allies in the region. Iran has also used its
cyber capabilities directly against the United States.38

2011 – 2013 – A group sponsored by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
conducted a coordinated campaign of distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks against 46 major companies, primarily in the U.S. financial sector. These
attacks, which occurred on more than 176 days, disabled victim bank websites,
prevented customers from accessing their accounts online, and collectively cost
the banks tens of millions of dollars in remediation costs as they worked to
neutralize and mitigate the attacks on their servers.39

2013 – An Iranian hacker obtained unauthorized access into the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems of the Bowman Dam, located in
Rye, NY. This allowed him to repeatedly obtain information regarding the status
and operation of the dam, including information about the water levels and
temperature, and the status of the sluice gate, which is responsible for controlling
water levels and flow rates.40

2014 – Computer security experts reported that members of an Iranian
organization were responsible for computer operations targeting U.S. military,
transportation, public utility, and other critical infrastructure networks.41 Iranian
actors also conducted a data deletion attack against the network of a U.S.-based
casino.42
d. **North Korea.** The DNI assessed that North Korea has previously conducted cyber-attacks against U.S. commercial entities and remains capable of launching disruptive or destructive cyber attacks to support its political objectives. It also poses a cyber threat to U.S. allies.

2014 – Conducted a cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, which stole corporate information and introduced hard drive erasing malware into the company's network infrastructure, according to the FBI.\(^43\)

e. **Syria.**

2011 and 2013 – Two Syrian hackers were charged with targeting Internet sites – in the U.S. and abroad – on behalf of the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), a group of hackers that supports the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The affected sites – which included computer systems in the Executive Office of the President in 2011 and a U.S. Marine Corps recruitment website in 2013. They collected usernames and passwords that gave them the ability to deface websites, redirect domains to sites controlled by the conspirators, steal e-mail, and hijack social media accounts. To obtain the login information they used a technique called "spear-phishing."\(^44\)

2014 – A member of the SEA is suspected of being responsible for a series of cyber extortion schemes targeting a variety of American and international companies.\(^45\)

f. **Terrorists.** The DNI testified that terrorists – to include the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) – will also continue to use the Internet to organize, recruit, spread propaganda, raise funds, collect intelligence, inspire action by followers, and coordinate operations. Hizballah and HAMAS will continue to build on their cyber accomplishments inside and outside the Middle East.\(^46\)

2015 – ISIS released sensitive information about U.S. military personnel, in an effort to inspire attacks.\(^47\)

g. **Criminals.** The DNI stated that criminals are developing and using sophisticated cyber tools for a variety of purposes including theft, extortion, and facilitation of other criminal activities. "Ransomware," malware that employs deception and encryption to block users from accessing their own data, has become a particularly popular tool of extortion.\(^48\)

2014 – 2016 – Four individuals, including two Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers, have been charged in connection with compromising at least 500 million Yahoo accounts.\(^49\)

2016 – Criminals employing ransomware turned their focus to the medical sector, disrupting patient care and undermining public confidence in some medical institutions.\(^50\)

h. **Insider Threats.**

2010 – Army PFC Manning was found not guilty of the most serious charge of knowingly aiding the enemy, but was convicted on 20 other specifications related to the misappropriation of hundreds of thousands of intelligence documents sent to WikiLeaks. Prosecutors alleged that Manning downloaded some 470,000 SIGACTS (from Iraq and Afghanistan) from the SIPRNET.\(^51\)
2013 – Edward J. Snowden, was charged with violations of: Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information; Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Communication; and Theft of Government Property.52

2015 – A former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission employee pleaded guilty to an attempted spear-phishing cyber-attack on Department of Energy computers to compromise, exploit and damage U.S. government computer systems that contained sensitive nuclear weapon-related information with the intent of allowing foreign nations to gain access to that information or to damage essential systems.53

i. Unattributed:

2013 – Hackers penetrated the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (USACE) database about the nation's 85,000 dams. That data included their location, condition and potential for fatalities if the dams were to be breached.54

2014 – JP Morgan Chase suffered a hacking intrusion.55

2015 – In June 2015, a Pentagon spokesman acknowledged that an element of the army.mil service provider's content was compromised. After this came to their attention, the Army took appropriate preventive measures to ensure there was no breach of Army data by taking down the website temporarily. Later, the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) claimed responsibility for defacing the army.mil website.56

2015 – The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) discovered that a number of its systems were compromised. These systems included those that contain information related to the background investigations of current, former, and prospective federal government employees, as well as other individuals for whom a federal background investigation was conducted.57 OPM announced the compromise resulted in 21.5 million personal records being stolen. The Chinese government announced that it arrested a handful of hackers it says were connected to the breach of Office of Personnel Management’s database.58

2015 – A "group of hackers" was responsible for an intrusion into an unclassified network maintained by the Joint Staff.59

2016 – A DDoS attack used Internet-connected devices to cripple servers that connect the public to many popular websites.60

2017 – DHS announced reports of ransomware known as WannaCry affecting multiple global entities.

4. Cyberspace Operation Techniques. Adversaries use a myriad of cyberspace techniques to accomplish their objectives. Some of these are:

a. Backdoor. This is used to describe a back way, hidden method, or other type of method of by passing normal security in order to obtain access to a secure area. It is also referred to as a trapdoor. Sometimes backdoors are surreptitiously planted on a network element. However, there are some cases where they are purposely installed to facilitate system management, maintenance, and troubleshooting operations by technicians.

(1) Security for these interfaces is normally via user IDs and passwords. Unfortunately, passwords are often the weakest link in a computer security scheme because password cracking tools continue to improve and the
computers used to crack passwords are more powerful than ever. Network passwords that once took weeks to crack can now be cracked in hours.

(2) Although this intentional interface allows the service provider access to conduct maintenance on the equipment, many vendors build back doors to have access to these interfaces so they can also remotely troubleshoot equipment. Unfortunately, this means a technician from outside the organization is able to gain access to the system and could facilitate cyber terrorist activities.

b. **Denial of Service Attacks (DOS).** A DOS attack is designed to disrupt network service, typically by overwhelming the system with millions of requests every second causing the network to slow down or crash.

c. **Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDOS).** An even more effective DOS is the DDOS. This involves the use of numerous computers flooding the target simultaneously. Not only does this overload the target with more requests, but having the DOS from multiple paths makes backtracking the attack extremely difficult, if not impossible. Many times worms are planted on computers to create zombies that allow the attacker to use these machines as unknowing participants in the attack.

d. **E-mail Spoofing (also called Phishing).** E-mail spoofing is a method of sending e-mail to a user that appears to have originated from one source when it actually was sent from another source. This method is often an attempt to trick the user into making a damaging statement or sent claiming to be from a person in authority requesting users to send them a copy of a password file or other sensitive information.

e. **IP Address Spoofing.** A method that creates Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) packets using somebody else’s IP address. Routers use the “destination IP” address to forward packets through the Internet, but ignore the “source IP” address. This method is often used in DDOS attacks in order to hide the true identity of the attacker.

f. **Keylogger.** A software program or hardware device that is used to monitor and log each of the keys a user types into a computer keyboard. The user who installed the program or hardware device can then view all keys typed in by that user. Because these programs and hardware devices monitor the actual keys being typed, a user can easily obtain passwords and other information the computer operator may not wish others to know.

g. **Logic bomb.** A program routine that destroys data by reformatting the hard disk or randomly inserting garbage into data files. It may be brought into a computer by downloading a public-domain program that has been tampered with. Once it is executed, it does its damage immediately, whereas a virus keeps on destroying.

h. **Physical Attack.** This involves the actual physical destruction of a computer system and/or network to include transport networks as well as the terminal equipment.

i. **Ransomware.** A type of malicious software that infects and restricts access to a computer until a ransom is paid. Although there are other methods of delivery, ransomware is frequently delivered through phishing emails and exploits unpatched vulnerabilities in software.

j. **Sniffer.** A program and/or device that monitors data traveling over a network. Although sniffers are used for legitimate network management functions, they are also used during cyber attacks for stealing information, including passwords, off a network. Once
emplaced, they are very difficult to detect and can be inserted almost anywhere through different means.

k. Trojan Horse. A program or utility that falsely appears to be a useful program or utility such as a screen saver. However, once installed it performs a function in the background such as allowing other users to have access to the target computer or sending information from the target computer to other computers.

l. Virus. A software program, script, or macro that has been designed to infect, destroy, modify, or cause other problems with a computer or software program.

m. Worm. A destructive software program containing code capable of gaining access to computers or networks and once within the computer or network causing that computer or network harm by deleting, modifying, distributing, or otherwise manipulating the data.63

5. Challenges. In addition to the threats mentioned above, the commander must address significant cyberspace challenges when defining the problem and producing an operational approach.

a. Anonymity and Difficulties with Attribution. Perhaps the most challenging aspect of attributing actions in cyberspace is connecting a cyberspace actor (cyber-persona) or action to an actual individual, group, or state actor. This effort requires significant analysis and collaboration with non-cyberspace agencies or organizations. The nature of cyberspace presents challenges to determining the origin of cyberspace threats.

b. Private Industry. Many of DOD’s critical functions and operations rely on commercial assets, including Internet service providers and global supply chains, over which DOD has no direct authority to mitigate risk effectively. Therefore, DOD will work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other interagency partners, and the private sector to improve cybersecurity.64

V. Cyberspace Actions and the Operational Approach.

1. Operations 'In', 'Through', and 'External' to Cyberspace. When developing an operational approach, commanders should synchronize actions 'in' and 'through' cyberspace with other activities to achieve the desired objectives. Actions 'in' cyberspace are typically offensive and defensive operations that deny an adversary’s use of resources or manipulate an adversary’s information, information systems, or networks. On the other hand, the military operates 'through' cyberspace on a routine basis as it conducts joint functions: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information. These joint functions comprise related capabilities and activities grouped together to help commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct operations (see Figure 2-4).

2. U.S. Military Dependence on Cyberspace. Commanders must be aware that U.S. military forces are critically dependent on networks and information systems to conduct operations. Nearly every conceivable component within DOD is networked. These networked systems and components are inextricably linked to the Department's ability to project military force and the associated mission assurance. Over the past decades, DOD developed its Full Spectrum Dominance doctrine that envisioned information superiority to great advantage as a force multiplier. The power of this doctrine and its near total reliance on information superiority led to networking almost every conceivable component within DOD, with frequent networking across the rest of Government, commercial and private entities, and coalition partners in complex, intertwined paths. While proving incredibly beneficial, these ubiquitous IT capabilities have also made the U.S. increasingly dependent upon safe, secure access and the integrity of the data.
contained in the networks. A weakness of the implementation of this doctrine is its focus on functionality, connectivity and cost of information superiority over security—similar to the development of the Internet.

Figure 2-4: Operations In, Through, and External to Cyberspace

3. Cyberspace Vulnerabilities. The performance of U.S. military forces has demonstrated the superiority of networked systems coupled with kinetic capabilities and well-trained forces. Adversaries have discovered that the same connectivity and automation that provides great advantage to the U.S., is also a weakness that presents an opportunity to undermine U.S. capabilities in a very asymmetric way. The network attack tools that are available on the commercial market are available to our adversaries. In addition, adversaries with financial means will invest to improve those tools and build more capable weapons to attack U.S. military systems and national infrastructure.

4. Cyberspace Missions. All actions in cyberspace that are not simply cyberspace-enabled activities are taken as part of one of three cyberspace missions: Department of Defense information networks (DODIN), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) (see Figure 2-5). Cyberspace Operations (CO) can contribute directly to the commander's visualization of the operational approach and achievement of desired effects, conditions, and end state objectives. The successful execution of (CO) requires integrated and synchronized cyberspace missions.

a. DOD Information Network (DODIN) Operations. The DODIN operations mission includes operational actions taken to secure, configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain DOD cyberspace in order to create and preserve the security of the DODIN. These include proactive cyberspace security actions which address vulnerabilities of the DODIN. DODIN operations are network-focused and threat-agnostic: the cyberspace forces and workforce undertaking this mission endeavor to keep all threats out of a particular network or system they are assigned to protect. Although many DODIN operations activities are regularly scheduled events, they should not be considered
routine or unimportant, since their aggregate effect establishes the security framework on which all DOD missions ultimately depend.

b. Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO). DCO missions are intended to defend DOD or other cyberspace that DOD cyberspace forces have been ordered to defend, from active threats in cyberspace. Specifically, they are passive and active cyberspace defense operations to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, cyberspace-enabled devices, and other designated systems, by defeating on-going or imminent malicious cyberspace activity. This distinguishes DCO missions, which defeat specific threats that have bypassed, breached, or are threatening to breach security measures, from DODIN operations, which endeavor to secure DOD cyberspace from all threats in advance of any specific threat penetration. DCO are mission assurance focused and threat specific. DCO missions are conducted in response to threats of attack, exploitation, or other effects of malicious cyberspace activity, and leverage information from maneuver, intelligence collection, counterintelligence (CI), law enforcement (LE), and other sources as required. DCO include outmaneuvering or interdicting adversaries taking or about to take actions against defended cyberspace elements, or otherwise responding to imminent internal and external cyberspace threats. The goal of DCO is to defeat the threat of a specific adversary and/or to return a compromised network to a secure and fully functional state. While DCO generally focus on the DODIN, which includes all of DOD cyberspace, military cyberspace forces prepare to defend any U.S. or other blue cyberspace when ordered. DOD operations rely on many non-DODIN elements of cyberspace, including private sector networks and mission partner networks. The passive and active defensive components of DCO are:

(1) DCO Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM). Internal defensive measures are those DCO that are conducted within the defended network. Most DCO missions are DCO-IDM, which include pro-active and aggressive internal threat hunting for advanced and/or persistent threats, as well as the active internal countermeasures and responses used to eliminate these threats and mitigate their effects. Since DCO-IDM does not take initiative to engage the threats outside of the defended network, it represents the passive defense aspect of DCO.

(2) DCO Response Actions (DCO-RA). DCO-RA are those deliberate, authorized defensive actions which are taken external to the defended network. DCO-RA represents the active defense aspect of DCO, with actions normally in foreign cyberspace. DCO-RA missions require a military order that has been coordinated with DOD and interagency mission partners and that has carefully considered scope, rules of engagement (ROE), and measurable objectives.

c. Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO). OCO are missions intended to project power in and through foreign cyberspace through actions taken in support of CCDR or national objectives. OCO may exclusively target adversary cyberspace functions or create first-order effects in cyberspace to initiate carefully controlled cascading effects into the physical domains to affect weapon systems, C2 processes, logistics nodes, high-value targets, etc. All CO missions conducted outside of blue cyberspace with a commander's intent other than to defend friendly cyberspace from a cyberspace threat are OCO missions. OCO missions require a properly coordinated military order and careful consideration of scope, ROE, restraint of effects to areas with both logical and geographic boundaries, and measurable objectives.66
5. **Cyberspace Actions.** While cyberspace missions (DODIN operations, DCO, and OCO) are categorized by intent, as described above, these missions will require the employment of various capabilities to create specific effects in cyberspace. To plan for, authorize, and assess these actions, it is important the commander and staff understand how they are distinguished from one another.

   a. **Cyberspace Security.** Cyberspace security actions are those taken within a protected network to prevent unauthorized access to, an exploitation of, or damage to computers, electronic communications systems, and other information technology, including platform information technology, as well as the information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Cyberspace security is not specific to an enemy or adversary. Cyberspace security actions protect the networks and systems through all phases of network planning and implementation. Cyberspace security activities include vulnerability assessment and analysis, vulnerability management, incident handling, continuous monitoring, and detection and restoration capabilities to shield and preserve information and information systems.

   b. **Cyberspace Defense.** Cyberspace defense are actions normally taken within the DOD cyberspace for securing, operating, and defending the DODIN against specific threats. The purpose of cyberspace defense includes actions to protect, detect, characterize, counter, and mitigate threats. Such defensive actions are usually created by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or Service that owns or operates the network, except in cases where these defensive actions would affect the operations of networks outside the responsibility of the respective JFC or Service.67

   c. **Cyberspace Exploitation.** Cyberspace exploitation actions include maneuver, information collection, and other enabling actions required to prepare for future military operations. Cyberspace exploitation actions are taken as part of an OCO or DCO-RA mission and include all actions in gray or red cyberspace that do not create cyberspace attack effects. Cyberspace exploitation includes activities to gain intelligence and supports current and future operations through actions such as gaining and maintaining
access to networks, systems, and nodes of military value, maneuvering to positions of advantage, and positioning cyberspace capabilities to facilitate follow-on actions. Cyberspace exploitation also supports current and future operations through collection of militarily-relevant information including mapping red and gray cyberspace to support situational awareness; discovering vulnerabilities; enabling target development; and supporting the planning, execution, and assessment of military operations. Cyberspace exploitation actions are deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies IAW national policy.

d. Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace actions that create noticeable denial effects (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) in cyberspace, or manipulation that leads to denial. Unlike cyberspace exploitation actions, which are often intended to remain clandestine to be effective, cyberspace attack actions will be apparent to system operators or users, either immediately or eventually, since they remove some system functionality. Cyberspace attack actions are a form of fires, are taken as part of an OCO or DCO-RA mission, are coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, and are carefully synchronized with planned fires in the physical domains. They include actions to:

(1) Deny. To prevent access to, operation of, or availability of a target function by a specified level for a specified time, by:

- **Degraded.** To deny access to, or operation of, a target to a level represented as a percentage of capacity. Level of degradation is specified. If a specific time is required, it can be indicated.
- **Disrupt.** To completely but temporarily deny (a function of time) access to, or operation of, a target for a period of time. A desired start and stop time are normally specified. Disruption can be considered a special case of degradation where the degradation level selected is 100 percent.
- **Destroy.** To completely and irreparably deny access to, or operation of, a target. Destruction maximizes the time and amount of denial. However, destruction is scoped according to the span of a conflict, since many targets, given enough time and resources, can be reconstituted.

(2) Manipulate. To control or change the adversary's information, information systems, and/or networks in gray or red cyberspace to create physical denial effects, using deception, deceiving, conditioning, spoofing, falsification, and other similar techniques. It uses an adversary's information resources for friendly purposes, to create denial effects not immediately apparent in cyberspace. The targeted network may appear to operate normally until secondary or tertiary effects, including physical effects, reveal evidence of the logical first-order effect.68

5. Multi-Domain Synergy. Multi-domain integration requires familiarity with all the domains: air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace. Cyberspace Operations enhance operational effectiveness and leverage various capabilities from physical domains to create effects, which may span multiple areas of responsibility. They can also be integrated with other information-related capabilities.

a. Information. It is important to address the relationship between the Information Joint Function and Cyberspace Operations. CO are concerned with using cyberspace
capabilities to create effects which support operations across the physical domains and cyberspace. The information function addresses the integrated employment of information-related capabilities during military operations, in concert with other LOOs/LOEs, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Thus, cyberspace is a medium through which some information-related capabilities, such as military information support operations (MISO) or military deception (MILDEC), may be employed. However, the information function also relies on operations in the physical domains to achieve effects in order to accomplish the commander's objectives.

b. **Electromagnetic Spectrum.** Other capabilities the commander may employ in conjunction with, or to enable CO, include significant portions of electronic warfare (EW); electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) management, command and control; ISR; navigation warfare (NAVWAR); and some space mission areas. 69
Chapter 3: Planning

Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into campaign plans and operation orders (OPORDs). Joint operation planning may be based on defined tasks identified in strategic guidance. Alternatively, joint operation planning may be based on the need for a military response to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. Although the four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, they often run simultaneously in the effort to accelerate the overall planning process.70

I. Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP)

1. JOPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs); select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. JOPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem to be solved. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission (see Figure 3-1).

**Figure 3-1: Joint Operational Planning Process**71

a. **Initiation.** Planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. Analyses of developing or immediate crises may result in the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) initiating military planning through a warning order or other planning directive. The commander typically will provide initial planning guidance based upon current understanding of the operational environment, the problem, and the initial operational approach for the campaign or operation.

b. **Mission Analysis.** Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus
effectively on the problem at hand. The primary products of mission analysis are staff estimates, the mission statement, a refined operational approach, the commander's intent statement, updated planning guidance, and commander's critical information requirements.

c. Course of Action (COA) Development. The staff develops COAs to provide unique choices to the commander, all oriented on accomplishing the military end state. Since the operational approach contains the commander's broad approach to solve the problem at hand, each COA will expand this concept with the additional details that describe who will take the action, what type of military action will occur, when the action will begin, where the action will occur, why the action is required (purpose), and how the action will occur (method of employment of forces).

d. COA Analysis, Comparison, and Approval. COA analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will allow the commander and staff to tentatively identify COAs that are valid, and then compare these COAs. COA analysis identifies advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. The commander and staff analyze each tentative COA separately according to the commander's guidance. Once COA analysis is complete, the staff compares each COA using a subjective process whereby COAs are considered independently and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. The goal is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest probability of success against the enemy COA that is of the most concern to the commander.

e. Plan or Order Development. During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed joint contingency plan or Operations Order (OPORD) by first developing an executable Concept of Operations (CONOPS)—the eventual centerpiece of the contingency plan or OPORD. The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels.72

II. Cyberspace Operations Planning

1. Planning Integration. Commanders integrate Cyberspace Operations (CO) into their operations at all levels. Their plans should address how to effectively integrate cyberspace capabilities; counter adversaries' use of cyberspace; identify and secure mission critical cyberspace, and access key terrain in cyberspace; operate in a degraded environment; efficiently use limited cyberspace assets; and consolidate operational requirements for cyberspace capabilities. The commander provides initial planning guidance which may specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of capabilities within the commander's authority, and direct other actions as necessary. Supporting CO plans and concepts describe the role and scope of CO in the commander's effort and address how CO support the execution of the supported plan.

2. Planning Considerations. Although CO planners are presented the same operational design considerations and challenges as planners for operations in the physical domains, there are some unique considerations for planning CO. For instance, because of unforeseen linkages in cyberspace, higher-order effects of some CO may be more difficult to predict. This may require more branch and sequel planning. Further, while many elements of cyberspace can be mapped geographically, a full understanding of an adversary's disposition and capabilities in

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cyberspace involves understanding the target not only at the underlying physical network infrastructure, but also at the logical network layer and cyber-persona layer, including profiles of system users and administrators and their relationship to adversary critical factors. For planning internal operations within DOD cyberspace, DODIN operations and DCO-IDM planners require a clear understanding of which friendly forces or capabilities might be targeted by an adversary; what DODIN vulnerabilities are most likely to be targeted and the potential effects of their exploitation; the mission assurance risks involved; and an understanding of applicable domestic, foreign, and international laws and policy governing self-defense actions. Adversaries in cyberspace may be nation-states, non-state groups, or individuals, and the parts of cyberspace they control are not necessarily within the geographic borders associated with the actor's nationality, or proportional to the actor's geopolitical influence. A criminal element, a politically motivated group, or even a well-resourced individual may have a greater presence and capability in cyberspace than do many nations. Moreover, many adversaries operate cyberspace capabilities from portions of cyberspace geographically associated with the U.S. or owned by a U.S. entity. Each of these factors complicates the planning of CO.73

3. Cyberspace Planning and JOPP. Cyberspace operations capability considerations and options are integrated into JOPP, just like all other joint capabilities and functions.

a. Initiation. During the receipt of mission, cyber planners participate in the commander's initial assessment actions and gather the resources required for mission analysis. Unique to cyberspace, planners conducting the initial assessment determine whether resources can be brought to bear on the mission at hand within a reasonable timeframe or through reachback and support processes.

b. Mission Analysis. Cyberspace planners contribute to mission analysis in order to help commanders understand the operational environment and frame the problem. An effective mission analysis considers the potential impact of cyberspace on an operational environment. Cyberspace planners do this by participating in planning actions that help form the problem statement, mission statement, commander's intent, planning guidance, initial commander's critical information requirements, essential elements of friendly information, and updated running estimates.

(1) Cyberspace planners further contribute to overall mission analysis by participating in the intelligence preparation of the environment and closely coordinating with the intelligence directorate (J-2) by providing information, advice, and assistance. This ensures the intelligence staff understands what cyberspace products are needed in order to tailor intelligence preparation of the battlefield products. Threats and vulnerabilities are identified in accordance with adversary offensive cyberspace capabilities. A friendly center of gravity analysis is conducted to ensure thorough planning. A key portion of this analysis is to assess the potential impact of cyberspace operations on friendly assets.

(2) Cyberspace planners then analyze the commander's intent and mission from a cyberspace perspective and determine if cyberspace capabilities are available to accomplish the identified tasks. If organic assets are insufficient, planners draft cyberspace effects requests using the cyberspace effects request format (CERF). A cyberspace support element may be required to support the organic cyberspace planning team.

C. Course of Action (COA) Development. The cyberspace planning team contributes to COA development by determining possible friendly and enemy operations and which friendly cyberspace capabilities are available to support the operations. Cyberspace planners focus their efforts on achieving an operational advantage at the decision point.
of each COA. By the conclusion of the COA development, the Cyberspace planners generate a list of cyberspace actions that will accomplish the commander's objectives and desired effects. The team also generates a list of capabilities, information, and intelligence required to perform the tasks for each COA.

d. **COA Analysis, Comparison, and Approval.** During COA analysis the cyberspace planning team coordinates with each of the warfighting function staff members to integrate and synchronize CO into each COA, thereby identifying which COA best accomplishes the mission. The cyberspace planners address how CO capabilities support each COA and apply them to timelines, critical events, and decision points. During COA comparison all staff members evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their perspectives. The cyberspace planners present their findings for the others' consideration. At the conclusion of the COA comparison, the cyberspace planning team generates a list of pros and cons for each COA relative to cyberspace. They also develop a prioritized list of the COAs from a cyberspace perspective. The commander's final guidance provides the cyberspace planners with the commander's intent, any new critical information requirements, risk acceptance, and guidance on the priorities for the elements of combat power, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation.

e. **Plan or Order Development.** Cyberspace planners provide the appropriate input for several sections of the operation order or plan and associated annexes or appendixes as required. This may include input to other functional area annexes such as intelligence, fire support, signal, and civil affairs operations as required.

4. **Intelligence Support to Cyberspace Operations Planning.** During mission analysis, the joint force staff identifies significant information gaps about the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment (OE). After gap analysis, the staff formulates Intelligence Requirements (IRs), which are general or specific subjects upon which there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence. Based upon identified IRs, the staff develops more specific questions known as information requirements (those items of information that must be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by the commander). Information requirements related to cyberspace include: network infrastructures and status, readiness of adversary’s equipment and personnel, unique cyberspace signature identifiers such as hardware/software/firmware versions, and configuration files. Collection against these IRs are through intelligence federation where joint forces garner support from the Intelligence Community (IC).

5. **Intelligence Gain/Loss (IGL).** Another planning concern is that maneuver and fires in foreign cyberspace could potentially compromise intelligence collection activities. To the maximum extent practicable, an IGL assessment is required prior to executing such actions. The IGL assessment can be complicated by the array of non-DOD USG and multinational partners operating in cyberspace. The IGL analysis is used by the commander to weigh risks of conducting the CO versus achieving the desired objective via other methods.

6. **Planning Insights.** Gaining insight and understanding of available cyberspace capabilities, from the experts listed above, enables planners to merge these capabilities with the other domains.

   a. **Avoid symmetric thinking.** Merely because the adversary attacks through cyberspace, does not restrict us to solely cyberspace response options. Commanders and staffs should consider attacking the Cyberspace physical layer as well as conducting operations ‘in’ cyberspace.
b. Identify potential cyberspace needs early. Cyberspace capabilities require long approval chains and, sometimes, long development timelines. Identify needs early in the planning process and set cyberspace planners working to secure the necessary permissions.

c. Tailor requests for cyberspace operations. Given cyberspace operations' global nature and potential for cascading effects, authorities rarely grant broad permissions. Planners should craft requirements which are specific (used only in certain situations, limited in duration, and limited networks affected). By requesting a discrete operation, planners increase the likelihood of approval and, potentially, shorten approval time. Planners should coordinate and socialize desired cyber activities with the interagency (IA) as early as possible in planning.

d. Conducting cyberspace damage assessment is often difficult. A friendly cyberspace operator may report mission accomplishment. However, unlike physical munitions, there will not be a blast crater to verify results. Planners must use other ways to measure success of a cyberspace operation. One approach is to layer assessments. For example, if a cyberspace operator reports disarming an adversary through cyberspace, probe the adversary's system with a remotely piloted vehicle before launching a risky major assault.

e. All cyberspace operations require branch plans to accomplish similar effects. Because offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) are often disapproved and susceptible to failure, planners must understand the intent of those cyberspace operations and develop a branch plan to accomplish that intent through other domains. Similarly, joint staff officers must understand that most of today's operating systems are vulnerable to attack. The Joint Force should prepare to operate with degraded cyberspace capabilities.

f. Many cyberspace capabilities are classified to avoid exposing vulnerabilities. Lack of sufficient security clearances will hinder a planner's ability to integrate cyberspace capabilities. To mitigate this challenge, lead planners should include cyberspace experts in planning team meetings to inform them of the plan's objectives and intent. This enables planners to discreetly integrate classified capabilities while informing only those with the appropriate clearance and need-to-know.75

III. Cyberspace Operations Staffs

1. Cyberspace Planning Support. Planners integrating cyberspace operations into a joint planning process should first seek the expertise of the cyberspace planners on their staff and those organizations provided by USCYBERCOM and its Joint Force Headquarters and Service Components (Appendix B provides an overview of U.S. cyberspace organizations).

   a. Combatant Command (CCMD) Cyberspace Operations Support Staffs. CCDRs should size and structure their CO Support Staff to best support mission and CCMD requirements. CCMDs coordinate CO requirements and capabilities throughout their planning, operations, intelligence, targeting, and readiness processes in order to integrate and synchronize CO with all other military operations. Additionally, in partnership with USCYBERCOM, CCMDs engage and coordinate regionally with interagency and multinational partners (as necessary). CCMDs will:

      (1) Secure, operate, and defend tactical and constructed DODIN segments within their commands and AORs.
(2) Integrate CO into plans (e.g., theater and functional campaign plans, CONPLANs, and OPLANs); integrate cyberspace capabilities into military operations as required; and work closely with the joint force, USCYBERCOM, SCCs, and DOD agencies to create fully integrated capabilities.

(3) In coordination with USCYBERCOM, CCDRs orchestrate planning efforts for CO, designate the desired effects of CO, and determine the timing and tempo for CO conducted in support of their missions. Functional CCDRs direct DODIN operations and defense over DODIN segments under their control, consistent with their functional responsibilities.

(4) GCCs lead, prioritize, and direct theater-specific DCO-IDM in response to compromises of DODIN security through the unified command theater network control center or equivalent organization.

(5) Serve as a focal point for in-theater DODIN operations that integrate multinational partners.

b. USCYBERCOM Forward Support Elements. A Forward Support Element integrates within a CCDR’s CO support staff to provide CO expertise and a reachback capability to USCYBERCOM. Forward support elements are organized from USCYBERCOM, Joint Force Headquarters – Department of Defense Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN), and Joint Force Headquarters – Cyber (JFHQ-C) personnel and are forward deployed to each CCMD for full integration into their staffs. Forward support elements provide a CCDR with CO planners and other subject matter experts (SMEs) required to support development of CCMD requirements for CO and to assist CCMD planners with coordination, integration, and deconfliction of CO.76

2. Cyberspace Operations Planning Team Activities. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. Cyberspace operations are integrated and synchronized into the commander’s concept of operations. Fires provided by CO are employed in accordance with the targeting plan. These integrations are based on commander’s guidance, desired effects, friendly capabilities, and likely enemy or adversary course of action (COA). During execution, the cyberspace planning team is responsible for monitoring the proper employment of these capabilities in accordance with the commander’s guidance and ensuring the proper integration with other warfighting function capabilities based on the concept of operations.

a. Each cyberspace operations capability has diverse operational functions and requirements. These capabilities often require wide variances in time to achieve effects. The cyberspace planning team accounts for these time variances and ensures synchronization between the capabilities during execution. The effects from each capability being utilized are then realized at the appropriate phase in the commander’s scheme of maneuver.

b. During execution the cyberspace planning team performs several actions to include:

   (1) Serving as cyberspace experts for the commander.
   (2) Maintaining a running estimate for cyberspace operations.
   (3) Monitoring cyberspace actions in operations and recommend adjustments during execution.
   (4) Recommending adjustments to the commander’s critical information requirements based on the situation.
(5) Recommending adjustments to control measures and procedures related to
cyberspace operations.

(6) Maintaining direct liaison with the fires, signal, and intelligence cells to ensure
integration and deconfliction of cyberspace operations.

(7) Coordinating and managing cyberspace operations taskings to subordinate
units or assets.

(8) Coordinating requests for nonorganic cyberspace assets.

(9) Continuing to assist the targeting working group in target and access
development and to recommend targets to attack through cyberspace
operations.

(10) Receiving, processing, and coordinating subordinate requests for
cyberspace assets during operations.

(11) Providing input to the overall assessment regarding the effectiveness of
cyberspace operations missions.77

IV. Cyberspace Appendix to Operation Plans and Orders

1. Input to Operation Plans and Orders. Commanders and staffs will develop an appendix to
Annex C (Operations) to operation plans (OPLANs) and orders (OPORDs) to describe how
cyberspace operations support operations described in a base plan or order. This appendix
should describe cyberspace operations support and objectives. It should include a discussion of
the overall cyberspace operations concept of operations, required support, and specific details
in element subparagraphs and attachments. This appendix should also contain the information
needed to synchronize timing relationships of cyberspace and should include constraints, if
appropriate. The following is an example of an appendix. It is a guide, and it should not limit the
information contained in an actual appendix (see Figure 3-2):78
APPENDIX (CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPLAN/ORDER

(U) **References:** Add any specific references to cyberspace activities, if needed.

1. **(U) Situation.** Include information affecting cyberspace operations (CO) that paragraph 1 of Annex C (Operations) does not cover or that needs expansion.
   a. **(U) Area of Interest.** Include information affecting cyberspace; cyberspace may expand the area of local interest to a worldwide interest.
   b. **(U) Area of Operations.** Include information affecting cyberspace; cyberspace may expand the area of operations outside the physical maneuver space.
   c. **(U) Enemy Forces.** List known and templated locations and cyberspace unit activities. Identify the vulnerabilities of enemy information systems and cyberspace. List enemy CO that will impact friendly operations. State probable enemy courses of action and employment of enemy cyberspace assets. See Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
   d. **(U) Friendly Forces.** Outline the higher headquarters' cyberspace activities plan. List plan designation, location and outline of higher, adjacent, and other CO assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support. Identify friendly CO assets and resources that affect the subordinate commander. Identify friendly forces cyberspace vulnerabilities. Identify friendly foreign forces with which subordinate commanders may operate. Identify potential conflicts within the EMS, especially for joint or multinational operations. Deconflict and prioritize spectrum distribution.
   e. **(U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations.** Identify and describe other organizations in the area of operations that may impact CO or implementation of CO specific equipment and tactics. See Annex V (Interagency) as required.
   f. **(U) Third Party.** Identify and describe other organizations, both local and external to the area of operations that have the ability to influence CO or the implementation of CO specific equipment and tactics. This category includes criminal and nonstate sponsored rogue elements.
   g. **(U) Civil Considerations.** Describe the aspects of the civil situation that impact CO. See Tab C (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.
   h. **(U) Attachments and Detachments.** List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. List any CO assets that are attached or detached, and resources available from higher headquarters. See Annex A (Task Organization) as required.
   i. **(U) Assumptions.** List any CO specific assumptions.

2. **(U) Mission.** State the commander's mission and describe CO in support of the base plan or order.

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**Figure 3-2: Notional Cyberspace Operations Appendix**

Adapted from FM 3-12, Appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) to Operations Plans and Orders.\(^7^9\)
3. (U) **Execution.**

   a. (U) **Scheme of Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities.** Describe how cyberspace and Electronic Warfare (EW) operations support the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Establish the priorities of support to units for each phase of the operation. State how cyberspace and EW effects will degrade, disrupt, deny, and deceive the enemy. State the defensive and offensive cyberspace and EW measures. Identify target sets and effects, by priority. Describe the general concept for the integration of cyberspace and EW operations. List the staff sections, elements, and working groups responsible for aspects of cyberspace and electromagnetic activities. Include the cyberspace and EW collection methods for information developed in staff section, elements, and working groups outside the cyberspace operations support staff. Describe the plan for the integration of unified action and nongovernmental partners and organizations. See Annex C (Operations) as required. This section is designed to provide insight and understanding of the components of cyberspace and EW and how these activities are integrated across the operational plan. It is recommended that this appendix include an understanding of technical requirements.

   This appendix concentrates on the integration requirements for cyberspace operations and references appropriate annexes and appendixes as needed to reduce duplication.

   (1) (U) **Organization for Combat.** Provide direction for the proper organization for combat, including the unit designation, nomenclature, and tactical task.

   (2) (U) **Miscellaneous.** Provide any other information necessary for planning not already mentioned.

   b. (U) **Scheme of Cyberspace Operations.** Describe how cyberspace operations support the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Describe the general concept for the implementation of planned cyberspace operations measures. Describe the process to integrate unified action partners and nongovernmental organizations into operations, including cyberspace requirements and constraints. Identify risks associated with cyberspace operations. Include collateral damage, discovery, attribution, fratricide (to U.S. or allied or multinational networks or information), and possible conflicts. Describe actions that will prevent enemy and adversary action(s) to critically degrade the unified command’s ability to effectively conduct military operations in its area of operations. Identify countermeasures and the responsible agency. List the warnings, and how they will be monitored. State how the cyberspace operations tasks will destroy, degrade, disrupt, and deny enemy computer networks. Identify and prioritize target sets and effect(s) in cyberspace. If appropriate, state how cyberspace operations support the accomplishment of the operation. Identify plans to detect or assign attribution of enemy and adversary actions in the physical domains and cyberspace. Ensure subordinate units are conducting defensive cyberspace operations (DCO). Synchronize the Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) section with the IO officer. Pass requests for offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) to higher headquarters for approval and implementation. Describe how DOD information network operations support the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Synchronize DODIN operations with the J-6. Prioritize the allocation of applications utilizing cyberspace. Ensure the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Considerations should be made for degraded network operations. (Reference appropriate annexes and appendixes as needed to reduce duplication).

   (1) (U) **DODIN Operations.** Describe how information operations are coordinated, synchronized, and support operations integrated with the J-6 to design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain networks. See Annex H (Signal) as required.

   (2) (U) **Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO).** Describe how DCO are conducted, coordinated, integrated, synchronized, and support operations to defend the DODIN and preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities.
(3) (U) Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO). Describe how OCO are coordinated, integrated, synchronized, and support operations to achieve real time awareness and direct dynamic actions and response actions. Include target identification and operational pattern information, exploit and attack functions, and maintain intelligence information. Describe the authorities required to conduct OCO.

c. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. List CO tasks assigned to each subordinate unit not contained in the base order.

d. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List CO instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight any CO specific rules of engagement, risk reduction control measures, environmental considerations, coordination requirements between units, and commander’s critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information that pertain to CO.

4. (U) Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for CO key tasks and specify additional instructions as required. See Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

   a. (U) Logistics. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instruction for logistics pertaining to CO. See Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation Support) as required.

   b. (U) Personnel. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instruction for human resources support pertaining to CO. See Appendix 2 (Personnel Services Support) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

   c. (U) Health System Support. See Appendix 3 (Health System Support) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

   a. (U) Command.

      (1) (U) Location of Commander. State the location of key CO leaders.

      (2) (U) Liaison Requirements. State the CO liaison requirements not covered in the unit’s SOPs.

   b. (U) Control.

      (1) (U) Command Posts. Describe the employment of CO specific command posts (CPs), including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing.

      (2) (U) Reports. List CO specific reports not covered in SOPs. See Annex R (Reports) as required.

   c. (U) Signal. Address any CO specific communications requirements. See Annex H (Signal) as required.

Figure 3-2 (Continued): Notional Cyberspace Operations Appendix
V. Cyber Effects Request Format (CERF)

1. Cyber-Enabled Effects. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. The commander develops plans, which can include objectives supported by measurable operational-level desired effects and assessment indicators. This may increase operational- and tactical-level understanding of the purpose reflected in the higher-level commander's mission and intent.

   a. The use of effects in planning can help commanders and staff determine the tasks required to achieve objectives. The commander and planners continue to develop and refine desired effects throughout the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Monitoring progress toward creating desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout execution.80

   b. Cyberspace operations capabilities, though they may be used in a stand-alone context, are generally most effective when integrated with other capabilities to create the commander's desired effects. Cyberspace capabilities can be used to manipulate adversary cyberspace targets through military deception (MILDEC), redirection, systems conditioning, etc., to assist with friendly mission objectives, or deny adversary functional use of cyberspace assets.

   c. These effects can be created at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Cyberspace planners should focus their efforts on conducting cyberspace actions that achieve the commander's objectives. The operational level planner is concerned with the accumulation of tactical effects into an overall operational effect. At the operational level, objectives and desired effects are developed by the commander's staff and are used to develop tasks to subordinates. Subordinate staffs use the assigned tasks to develop tactical-level objectives, tasks, subordinate targeting objectives and effects, and plan tactical actions and measures of performance (MOPs)/measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for those actions. Tactical actions typically must combine with other tactical actions to create operational level effects; however, they can have operational or strategic implications. Usually the summation of tactical actions in an operational theater will be used to conduct an operational level assessment which in turn supports the strategic level assessment (as required).81

2. Cyber Effects Request. During the operations process, the commander and staff identify the effects desired in and through cyberspace to support operations against specific targets. All cyberspace effects support approved operations. The Cyber Effects Request Format (CERF) is the format forces use to request effects in and through cyberspace (see Figure 3-3). Tactical units and organizations forward their cyberspace effects requests through a joint force headquarters. Requests typically flow from a joint functional component command (i.e., Joint Force Land Component Command) through a Joint Task Force to a Combatant Command (CCMD). Cyberspace operations support staffs and forward support elements provide guidance and support at each level. The CCMD inputs the CERF into the USCYBERCOM portal for processing. USCYBERCOM sends the approved cyberspace effect mission to the appropriate Joint Forces Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C) for execution. The JFHQ-C synchronizes execution with cyberspace operations support staffs and forward support elements, as appropriate, to support the JTF mission.
CYBER EFFECTS REQUEST FORMAT (CERF)

SECTION 1: REQUESTING UNIT INFORMATION

Supported Major Command: ____________________________
Date / Time Sent: __________________________________
Requesting Unit: ____________________________
Supported OPLAN/CONPLAN/ORDER: ____________________________
Supported Mission Statement: ____________________________
Supported Commander's Intent: ____________________________
Supported Commander's Endstate: ____________________________
Supported Concept of Operation: ____________________________
Supported Objective (Strategic/Operational/Tactical): ____________________________
Supported Tactical Objective/Task: ____________________________

SECTION 2: CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS SPECIFIC INFORMATION

Type of Target (Scheduled / On Call): ____________________________
Target Priority (Emergency / Priority / Routine): ____________________________
Target Name: ____________________________
Target Locator: ____________________________
Target Description: ____________________________
Desired Effect: ____________________________
Target Function: ____________________________
Target Significance: ____________________________

TARGET DETAILS: Include any relevant device information such as type, operating systems version and patch level, software, number of users, activity, friendly actors in the area of operations, surrounding / adjacent / parallel devices, etc.

CONCEPT OF CYBER OPERATION: Include Task, Purpose, Method, and Endstate. Also specify intelligence collection plan for battle damage assessment, to include allocated resources, measures of performance (MOPs), measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and MOE indicators.

TARGET EXPECTATION STATEMENT: ____________________________

REMARKS: If any of the following information is available, provide
(1) Time on Target / Duration of Effect
(2) No Earlier Than / No Later Than Need time
(3) Trigger Event or Conditions of Execution
(4) Persistence Requirement (i.e., effect must persist through a restart of the target, trigger event)
(5) Command and Control Requirement (i.e., effect must be able to be turned on/off remotely))
(6) Self-Destruct / Auto Delete Requirement (i.e., effect must stop itself if C2 is lost after X amount of time)
(7) Level of Attribution Requirement (i.e., attributable to CONUS/USG, misattributed to USG, etc.)
(8) Level of Detectability Allowed (i.e., should not be detected by (a) administrator, (b) user, (c) forensic analyst, etc.)
(9) Level Co-optability Allowed (i.e., low, medium, high)
(10) Remote Monitoring Requirement (i.e., effect should be able to be monitored by (a) operator, (b) JOC, etc.)
(11) Infrastructure Requirement (i.e., effect should be launched from specific infrastructure / system / platform)
(12) Reversibility Requirement (i.e., effect should be reversible / not reversible)

Figure 3-3: Cyber Effects Request Format (CERF)
Chapter 4: Execution

I. Execution

1. Execute Order (EXORD). Execution begins when the President decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis. Only the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) can authorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to issue an execute order (EXORD). Depending upon time constraints, an EXORD may be the only order a commander receives. The EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and conveys guidance not provided earlier. Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished.83

2. Planning During Execution. Planning continues during execution, with an initial emphasis on refining the existing plan and producing the Operation Order (OPORD) and refining the force flow utilizing assigned and allocated forces.

   a. As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current operations (see Figure 4-1).

![Figure 4-1: Planning During Execution](image)

(1) The plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) focuses on future plans. The timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of command, type of operation, commander desires, and other factors. Typically, the emphasis of the future plans effort is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation or the next phase of the campaign.

(2) Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (future operations planning). The timeframe of focus for future operations planning varies according to the factors listed for future plans, but the period typically is more near-term than the future plans timeframe. Future planning normally occurs in the J-5 or
joint planning group (JPG), while future operations planning normally occurs in the operations directorate (J-3).

(3) Finally, current operations planning addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This occurs in the joint operations center or J-3.

b. During execution, progress in meeting the commander's intent and successful accomplishment of tasks will be monitored and measured, along with the input of new data and information as it is obtained to facilitate decision making and allow for selection of branches or sequels, if applicable, or the plan to be modified as necessary.

c. Future planners must also look for opportunities or unforeseen challenges that suggest that the current mission may require revision and that a different operational approach may be required to achieve the desired end state. They should also look for indicators that the desired end state is not achievable or no longer desirable. Subsequently, these circumstances may result in a reframing of the problem and the development or execution of a branch plan or new course of action (COA).

d. Execution of a plan does not end the planning process. The planning cycle may be reentered at any point to receive new guidance, provide an in-progress review (IPR), modify the plan, decide if and when to execute branches or sequels, or terminate the operation. Planning also continues for future operations.

3. Command and Control. How commanders organize their assigned or attached forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of operations. The first principle in joint force organization is that commanders organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their intent and concept of operations (CONOPS). Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint forces can be established on a geographic or functional basis. Commanders may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. Commanders should allow Service and special operations forces (SOF) tactical and operational forces, organizations, and capabilities to function generally as they were designed. All Service components contribute their distinct capabilities to joint operations; however, their interdependence is essential to overall joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service's capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both; the degree of interdependence varies with specific circumstances. Simplicity and clarity of expression are essential.

a. Mission Command is key to effective command and control. Mission Command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. The mission command philosophy effectively accounts for the nature of military operations. Throughout operations, unexpected opportunities and threats rapidly present themselves. Operations require responsibility and decision-making at the point of action. Through mission command, commanders initiate and integrate all military functions and actions toward a common goal – mission accomplishment.

b. The exercise of mission command is based on mutual trust, shared understanding, and purpose. Commanders understand that some decisions must be made quickly at the point of action. Therefore, they concentrate on the objectives of an operation, not how to achieve them. Commanders provide subordinates with their intent, the purpose of the operation, the key tasks, the desired end state, and resources. Subordinates then
exercise disciplined initiative to respond to unanticipated problems. Every Soldier must be prepared to assume responsibility, maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the commander's intent.87

4. Fires. To employ fires is to use available weapons and other systems to create a specific kinetic or non-kinetic effect on a target. Joint fires are those delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired results in support of a common objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects, but various non-kinetic ways and means can be employed with little or no associated physical destruction. This function encompasses the fires associated with a number of tasks, missions, and processes, including:

a. Targeting. This is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of command objectives, operational requirements, and capabilities.88

b. Time-Sensitive Targeting. A time-sensitive target (TST) is a target of such high priority to friendly forces that the commander designates it as requiring immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces, or it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target. TSTs are normally executed dynamically; however, to be successful, they require considerable deliberate planning and preparation within the joint targeting cycle.89

5. Assessment. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a joint operation toward mission accomplishment. It involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. In general, assessments should answer two questions: Is the commander doing things right? Is the commander doing the right things? More specifically, assessment helps commanders determine progress toward achieving objectives and whether the current tasks and objectives are relevant to reaching the end state. It helps identify opportunities, counter threats, and any needs for course correction, thus resulting in modifications to plans and orders. This process of continuous assessment occurs throughout the joint planning process. It is an essential tool that allows planners to monitor performance of tactical actions (measures of performance [MOPs]) and to determine whether the desired effects are created (measures of effectiveness [MOEs]) to support achievement of the objectives.90

a. During execution, the commander's staff identifies those key assessment indicators that suggest progress or setbacks in accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and military end state.

b. Normally, the operations directorate (J-3), assisted by the intelligence directorate (J-2), is responsible for coordinating assessment activities. The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and the determination of commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) by incorporating them into the staff's battle rhythm. Various elements of the commander's staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.91

II. Cyberspace Operations during Execution.

1. Execution. As the commander integrates cyberspace operations (CO) capabilities into joint operations, careful consideration must be given to some of the unique aspects of cyberspace, as well as its commonalities and synergies with operations in the physical domains: the
relationship with IO; legal, political, and technical drivers and constraints; and the role of non-DOD actors.92

2. Legal Considerations. The legal framework applicable to CO depends on the nature of the activities to be conducted, such as offensive or defensive military operations; defense support of civil authorities; service provider actions; law enforcement and counterintelligence activities; intelligence operations; and defense of the homeland. Before conducting CO, commanders, planners, and operators must understand the relevant legal framework in order to comply with laws and policies, the application of which may be challenging given the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace and the often geographic orientation of domestic and international law (see Appendix A: DOD Law of War Manual excerpt).

3. Command and Control of Cyberspace Operations. The cyberspace operations command and control (C2) architecture defines global, regional, and functional cyberspace operational lanes; enables unity of effort; and allows combatant commands (CCMDs) to use current authorities to conduct timely operations. It stresses the need for partnership among all Department of Defense (DOD) organizations conducting operations across the three cyberspace lines of operation (LOOs) and lines of effort (LOEs) of: Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations, defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) (see Figure 4-2).

a. CCMD Support Relationships. Cyberspace Operations require coordination between theater and global operations, creating a dynamic command and control (C2) environment. CO are integrated and synchronized by the supported commander into their CONOPS, detailed plans and orders, and specific joint offensive and defensive operations. The Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) is generally the supported commander for CO with first order effects within their area of responsibility (AOR). Similarly, the Commander USCYBERCOM is generally the supported commander at the global or transregional (across AOR boundaries) level. C2 of Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations and Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) may require pre-determined and preauthorized actions based on meeting particular conditions and triggers, executed either manually or automatically if the nature of the threat requires instantaneous response. The commander and planners should understand these command relationships, how they are derived and employed, and when necessary, how to deconflict them without compromising other operations. Forces conducting CO may simultaneously support multiple users. This requires extensive coordination, planning, and early integration of requirements and capabilities. Supported and supporting commanders coordinate, as appropriate, the deployment and employment of forces conducting CO required to accomplish the assigned mission. Some CO forces may be geographically separated from a particular supported theater of operations. Such cases require all involved commanders to take extra measures to ensure the supported commander is continuously aware of the remote supporting forces’ operational status.

(1) Forces providing global CO capabilities may need to support multiple CCMDs nearly simultaneously. Reachback to these capabilities allows faster adaptation to rapidly changing needs. At the same time, GCCs must be able to effectively conduct theater CO in order to operate and defend tactical and constructed networks. They must also be able to synchronize cyberspace activities related to accomplishing their operational objectives. In order to do that, some CO capabilities supporting synchronization may need to be forward deployed. However, CCMDs should retain knowledge and expertise required to support
effective reachback within the CCMD, typically through the CCMD's Cyberspace Operations Support Staff.\textsuperscript{93}

(2) Mission Command. CO planning teams assist the commander in the details of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing by conducting the operations process. They use the operations process to integrate and synchronize within the headquarters and across the force. Although staffs perform many tasks, they use knowledge and information management practices to provide commanders the information they need to create and maintain their understanding and make effective decisions. Staffs also assist the commander in informing and influencing audiences. Additionally, staffs integrate and synchronize cyber electromagnetic activities across all command echelons and warfighting functions.

b. Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The focus of USCYBERCOM's Cyber Mission Force teams aligns with the DOD Cyber Strategy's three primary missions: Defend DOD networks and ensure their data is held secure; support joint military commander objectives; and, when directed, defend U.S. critical infrastructure. Specifically, Cyber Mission Force teams support these mission sets through their respective assignments:

(1) Cyber Protection Force (CPF) teams defend the DODIN and assigned cyberspace, protect priority missions, and prepare cyber forces for combat. The CPF comprises:
- Cyberspace Protection Teams (CPTs).

(2) Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) teams defend the nation by seeing adversary activity, blocking attacks, and maneuvering to defeat them. The CNMF comprises:
- National Mission Teams (NMTs)
- National Support Teams (NSTs)

(3) Cyber Combat Mission Force (CCMF) teams conduct military cyber operations in support of combatant commands. The CCMF comprises:
- Combat Mission Teams (CMTs)
- Cyber Support Teams (CSTs).

c. Joint Force Headquarters – Cyberspace (JFHQ-C). As a part of the Cyberspace Mission Force, USCYBERCOM designated each service's cyberspace component (AFCYBER, ARCYBER, MARFORCYBER, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command) a Joint Force Headquarters–Cyberspace and directed each one to support specific combatant commands. These headquarters provide cyberspace domain expertise, enabling the supported CCMD staff to integrate the necessary operational- and tactical-level cyberspace planning activities into operational plans. Additionally, JFHQ-C executes OPCON to the tactical firing units known as Combat Mission Teams, which are aligned to specific target sets within their respective combatant commands. The CCMD cyberspace operations support staff and JFHQ-C establish unity of command and unity of effort for the combatant commander's (or joint force commander's, if established) cyberspace operations through direction of the attached combat mission teams.

(1) JFHQ-C Marine Forces Cyber Command supports U.S. Special Operations Command.

(3) **JFHQ-C Fleet Cyber Command** supports U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command.


d. **Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN).** JFHQ-DODIN has operational control over each DODIN command for global DODIN/Defensive Cyberspace Operations – Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM) activities supporting USCYBERCOM’s global DODIN mission. The DODIN commands are tactical level headquarters supporting both global and regional CCMD mission needs. CCMD JCCs have tactical control of assigned DODIN commands for those DODIN and DCO-IDM activities supporting their regional CCMD missions.

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4. **Cyberspace Synchronization.** The pace of CO requires significant pre-operational collaboration, as well as constant vigilance upon initiation, to ensure that activities in cyberspace and throughout the operational environment (OE) are coordinated and deconflicted in advance. One key to this is maintaining cyberspace SA and assessing the potential impacts to the joint force of any planned CO, including security posture, changes in configuration, or observed I&W of adversary activity. Planners and operators must also understand how operations within the OE may impact the commander’s CO efforts, and vice versa. Fire support coordination measures are a method that the joint force plans and uses in the air, land, and maritime domains which facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Deconfliction and coordination efforts in or through cyberspace should include similar measures:

   a. Deconfliction of the commander’s intended offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), their activities, and the techniques planned to create these effects with other commands and agencies that may have equities in the same area of cyberspace is required. From a
technical and operational perspective, deconfliction requires detailed analysis of each of the capabilities whose interoperability is being considered, as well as that of the target environment, to ensure the desired effects are achieved without unintended consequences. Additionally, the timelines required for analysis and coordination should be considered and included in the plan.

b. Planners should maintain awareness of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and its impact on mobile devices and wireless networks, including cellular, wireless local area network, Global Positioning System, and other commercial and military uses of the EMS. CO and electronic attack (EA), to include offensive space control, must be deconflicted. Uncoordinated EA may significantly impact OCO utilizing the EMS. Depending upon power levels, the terrain in which they are used, and the nature of the system being targeted, unintended effects of EA can also occur outside of a local commander's AOR just as second order effects of CO may occur outside the AOR.

c. Minimizing vulnerabilities to the joint force caused by cyberspace applications. Coordinated joint force operations benefit from the use of various applications, including Web sites used for public affairs and strategic communication. Forward deployed forces also use the Internet, mobile phones, and instant messaging for logistics, morale purposes, and to communicate with friends and families. These DOD classified and unclassified networks are targeted by myriad actors, from foreign nations to malicious insiders. The commander must work with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the Services, and USCYBERCOM as well as assigned forces to limit the threat to U.S. and partner nations' networks.96

5. Targeting in Cyberspace. The purpose of targeting is to integrate and synchronize fires (the use of available weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target) into joint operations. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. However, three aspects of CO should be included in the commander's targeting processes: recognizing that cyberspace capabilities are a viable option for engaging designated joint targets; understanding that a CO option may be preferable in some cases; and first, second, and third order effects on joint targets may involve or affect elements of the DODIN. Additionally, there are some characteristics unique to cyberspace targets and cyberspace capabilities that are described below.

a. Targets in Cyberspace. Every target has distinct intrinsic or acquired characteristics. These characteristics form the basis for target detection, location, identification, target value within the adversary target system, and classification for future surveillance, analysis, strike, and assessment. As discussed earlier, cyberspace can be viewed as consisting of three layers: physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona. The challenge in targeting is to identify, coordinate, and deconflict multiple activities occurring across multiple layers.

(1) The physical network layer is the medium where the data travels. It includes wired (land and submarine cable) and wireless (radio, radio-relay, cellular, satellite) transmission means. It is the first point of reference for determining jurisdiction and application of authorities. It is also the primary layer for geospatial intelligence, which can also contribute useful targeting data in cyberspace.

(2) The logical network layer constitutes an abstraction of the physical network layer, depicting how nodes in the physical dimension of the information environment logically relate to one another to form entities in cyberspace. The
logical network layer is the first point where the connection to the physical dimension of the information environment is lost. 

(3) The cyber-persona layer, an individual's or groups' online identity(ies), holds important implications for joint forces in terms of positive target identification and affiliation, and activity attribution. Because cyber-personas can be complex, with elements in many virtual locations, but normally not linked to a single physical location or form, significant intelligence collection and analysis capabilities are required for the joint forces to gain sufficient insight and SA of a cyber-persona to enable effective targeting and creation of the commander's desired effects.\(^97\)

b. Target Development in Cyberspace. Target development should be requested much earlier than that for traditional targets and should have a longer-term focus. More often, full target development takes weeks, months, or years instead of days.\(^98\) This is due to the additional lead time necessary to generate intelligence for the offensive cyberspace effects. During deliberate planning, the capabilities analysis phase seeks to match apportioned assets and ordnance with the target and effect desired. Once a target is selected to be serviced by traditional means, it is periodically reviewed during the plan review cycle. No further resources are expended on maintaining access to the target until the plan is executed. By contrast, designating a target to be engaged with OCO starts the immediate allocation and expenditure of additional resources. Maintaining and developing a target requires a significant amount of time (see Figure 4-3).\(^99\)

(1) Mission. Due to the technical and sensitive nature of cyberspace operations, the commander will normally approve planning based on an initial concept of operations. Planners should consider cyber-enabled effects to accomplish the commander's objectives. Cyberspace capabilities must operate and create effects within the complex and ever-changing systems in cyberspace; however, they are each developed with certain environmental assumptions and expectations about the operating conditions that will be found in the target environment.\(^100\)

(2) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. After receiving the commander's approval, the cyberspace operations team attempts to gain access and understand the targeted system.

- **Access.** The first step to engage a target with OCO is to gain access to it. Without physical or electronic access to the target, it is impossible to proceed with OCO. A system linked to the Internet is, in general, more accessible, though getting into its targeted portions may be challenging due to its own network security environment. A closed system would require insider access to gain firsthand knowledge of the computing environment in the target facility. Once forces gain access to a target system, they need to maintain it as long as they might wish to strike the target. Network upgrades or system changes made in the regular maintenance of the target could make it difficult to maintain or regain access. The risk from gaining access to a system is that an adversary might detect the hacking well before the attack. The adversary would discover which systems were being targeted. Moreover, discovery would assuredly result in access being lost – and the possibility of the adversary studying the attack to
understand U.S. cyberspace operations and develop better defenses or even counterattacks.

- **Understanding.** Once access is gained, the next step is to learn the unique internal attributes of the targeted system. Cyberspace operations teams may need to acquire the software being targeted so they can determine its nature and vulnerabilities. Depending on the system to be attacked, the code might be commented in a language other than English. If cyberspace teams are unable to gain technical insight into the targeted software, then OCO cannot proceed; coordinating the proper effect is impossible. The commander must consider these attributes of OCO when setting target priorities during deliberate planning.

(3) **Capability Development.** Once the cyberspace operations team has developed a means for continuous access and learned the targeted system, they must then coordinate acquisition or development of the weapon with which to attack it. Some weapons designed to attack common operating systems such as Windows are commercially available. However, systems produced and used only in certain countries typically require forces to develop weapons from scratch. Developing a cyber weapon is a complex challenge. Once a weapon has been developed, the cyberspace operations teams must constantly maintain access to and monitor the target. They must ensure routine system maintenance does not nullify their labors. All of these actions require a significant amount of time, perhaps months, before anything besides a rudimentary attack can be launched with a presumption of success. Furthermore, depending on the target and its accessibility, a weapon may need to navigate through several networks to its intended target.

(4) **Execution.** After the cyberspace operations teams gain access and develop a capability, the proposed operation is reviewed for collateral damage issues and legal concerns. USCYBERCOM, in coordination with the applicable Service Component/Joint Force Headquarters – Cyber (JFHQ-C), determines if resources are available to service the commander's target request. If all these criteria are met, the commander directs an Execution Order (EXORD) for the specific cyberspace operation.

- **Cascading and Collateral Effects.** Overlaps between military, civil, government, private, and corporate activities on shared networks in cyberspace make the evaluation of probable cascading and collateral effects particularly important when planning for CO. Due to policy concerns, an EXORD or applicable rules of engagement (ROE) may limit CO to only those operations that result in no or low levels of collateral effects. A collateral effects analysis to meet policy limits is separate and apart from the proportionality analysis required by the law of war. Even if a proposed CO is permissible after a collateral effects analysis, the proposed operation must also be permissible under a law of war proportionality analysis.

- **Target Nomination and Synchronization.** Component commanders, national agencies, supporting commands and/or the staff submit target development nominations to the targeting staff for development and inclusion on the joint target list (JTL). Once identified on the JTL,
targets can be selected for engagement by organic assets (if within a component commander's assigned area of operations) or nominated for action by other joint force components and other organizations, usually via a coordinating body (joint fires element [JFE] of the operations directorate of joint staff) or working group (joint targeting working group [JTWG]). The JFE normally holds a JTWG for prioritization of the nominated targets through a draft joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) and establishment of the "cut line." The "cut line" simply reflects an estimate of resources available to take action against targets in priority order and does not guarantee that a specific target will be attacked. The joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) provides a senior level forum in which all components can articulate strategies and priorities for future operations to ensure that they are synchronized and integrated. Although most targeting issues are worked out at the JTWG, the JTCB normally conducts final coordination of the JIPTL and submits it for commander approval. The JFE also maintains the restricted target list and no-strike list. The no-strike list contains objects or entities that are not legal targets, while, the restricted target list is constrained by the commander for other reasons characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or the rules of engagement.102

![Figure 4-3: Cyberspace Target Development and Approval](image)

c. **Time-Sensitive Targeting.** Time-sensitive targets (TSTs) that are engaged through CO require detailed joint, cross-CCMD, interagency, and likely multinational planning and coordination of OPE, engagement, assessment, and intelligence efforts. The actual prosecution of a TST through cyberspace requires that cyberspace planners and operators coordinate with the supported commander early in the planning phase to ensure access to the target is available when the fleeting opportunity arises. In addition, commanders should establish procedures to quickly promulgate execution orders for
CO-engaged TSTs, which due to their unique cyberspace interagency deconfliction/coordination requirements may involve coordinating pre-approval for specific actions conducted under specific circumstances. Likewise, successful prosecution of TSTs requires a well-organized and well-rehearsed process for sharing sensor data and targeting information, identifying suitable strike assets, obtaining mission approval, and rapidly deconflicting weapon employment. The key for success is performing as much coordination and decision making as possible in advance.

d. **Multinational Considerations.** Allies and coalition partners often require approval of the CO portion of plans and orders from higher authority, which may significantly impede CO implementation. Additionally, this national-level approval requirement increases potential constraints and restraints upon the participating national forces, and further lengthens the time required to gain national approval for their participation. Commanders and planners should be particularly sensitive to national agendas and anticipate the additional time required for approval through this parallel national command structure.

6. **Authorities.** Authority for actions undertaken by the Armed Forces of the United States is derived from the U.S. Constitution and Federal law. These authorities establish roles and responsibilities that provide focus for organizations to develop capabilities and expertise, including those for cyberspace. Key statutory authorities that apply to DOD include Title 10, United States Code (USC), *Armed Forces*; Title 50, USC, *War and National Defense*; and Title 32, USC, *National Guard*. See Figure 4-4 for a summary of applicable titles of USC as they apply to cyberspace operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States Code (USC)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Key Focus</th>
<th>Principle Organization</th>
<th>Role in Cyberspace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title 6</td>
<td>Domestic Security</td>
<td>Homeland security</td>
<td>Department of Homeland</td>
<td>Security of US cyberspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 10</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>National defense</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Msn, train, and equip US forces for military operations in cyberspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 18</td>
<td>Crimes and Criminal Procedure</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
<td>Crime prevention, apprehension, and prosecution of criminals operating in cyberspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 32</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>National defense and civil support training and operations, in the US</td>
<td>State Army National Guard, State Air National Guard</td>
<td>Domestic consequence management (if activated for federal service, the National Guard is integrated into the Title 10, USC, Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 40</td>
<td>Public Buildings, Property, and Works</td>
<td>Chief information officer roles and responsibilities</td>
<td>All Federal departments and agencies</td>
<td>Establish and enforce standards for acquisition and security of information technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 50</td>
<td>War and National Defense</td>
<td>A broad spectrum of military, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence activities</td>
<td>Commands, Services, and agencies under the Department of Defense and intelligence community agencies aligned under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence</td>
<td>Secure US interests by conducting military and foreign intelligence operations in cyberspace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4-4: United States Code-Based Authorities**

7. **Cyberspace Assessment.** Cyberspace Operations should be considered in the development of operational level MOPs/MOEs. In some cases, activities in cyberspace alone will have operational level effects; for example, the use of a cyberspace attack to bring down or corrupt the adversary headquarters network could very well reverberate through the entire Joint Operations Area (JOA). A CO option may be preferable in some cases.
a. Assessments in cyberspace may be unique in that the normal assessment cell will not typically have the capabilities or expertise to assess CO; CO will typically involve multiple commands, such as the supported joint force commander (JFC), CDRUSCYBERCOM, and possibly other functional supporting JFCs.

b. Additionally, with CO typically being conducted as part of a larger operation, assessment of CO will need to be conducted in the context of supporting the overarching commander's objectives. Therefore, CO assessments will require close coordination within each staff and across multiple commands. Coordination and federation of the assessment efforts will often require arrangements that need to be in place prior to execution.\textsuperscript{107}

8. **Operational Challenges.** CO may not require physical proximity; many CO can be executed remotely. Moreover, the effects of CO may extend beyond a target, a joint operations area (JOA), or even an AOR. Because of transregional considerations or the requirement for high-demand, low-density resources, CO may be coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with centralized execution from a location outside the AOR of the supported commander. Another challenge facing the commander is that the use of a capability may reveal its functionality and compromise future effectiveness. This has implications for O\textsuperscript{CO}, but it also affects DCO as the same capabilities may have a role in both O\textsuperscript{CO} and DCO.\textsuperscript{108}
Chapter 5: Operations in the Homeland

"Much of our critical infrastructure – our financial systems, our power grid, health systems – run on networks connected to the Internet, which is hugely empowering but also dangerous, and creates new points of vulnerability that we didn't have before. Foreign governments and criminals are probing these systems every single day."

President Barrack Obama

I. Department of Defense Missions in the Homeland

1. The mission of the Department of Defense (DOD) is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the U.S. The U.S. employs all instruments of national power to continuously defeat threats to the homeland. DOD executes the homeland defense (HD) mission by detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating threats from actors of concern as far forward from the homeland as possible.

2. The U.S. homeland is the physical region that includes the continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. The homeland is a functioning theater of operations, and the DOD regularly performs a wide range of defense operations within the theater. Homeland Defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. An external threat or aggression is an action, incident, or circumstance that originates from outside the boundaries of the homeland. Threats planned, prompted, promoted, caused, or executed by external actors may develop or take place inside the boundaries of the homeland. The reference to external threats does not limit where or how attacks may be planned and executed. DOD is responsible for the HD mission, and leads the response with support from international partners and United States Government (USG) departments and agencies. HD is executed across the active, layered defense construct composed of the forward regions, the approaches, and the homeland.

3. By law, DOD is responsible for two missions in the homeland: HD and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). Two geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are the supported commanders for HD in their AORs, with virtually all other combatant commanders (CCDRs) supporting them. Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) and Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) are charged with specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA. HD, DSCA, and homeland security (HS) operations or events may occur simultaneously.

4. Operations in the homeland environment (both HD and HS) require pre-event and ongoing coordination with interagency, intergovernmental (i.e. federal, state, local, and tribal), and multinational partners to integrate capabilities and facilitate unified action. In this complex environment there are numerous threats across multiple jurisdictions that are addressed by a diverse group of actively involved stakeholders to include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), multinational partnerships, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector. DOD plans and prepares to operate in concert with other USG entities (see Figure 5-1).
a. **Homeland Security (HS)**. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for HS. HS is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce domestic vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. HS is typically conducted by federal, state, tribal, and/or local government organizations in conjunction with the private sector; and includes law enforcement (LE) activities related to countering terrorism and other criminal activities. For HS, DOD may conduct DSCA in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities, supporting a lead interagency partner such as DHS or Department of Justice (DOJ), or in some cases, a state governor. DOD support must be formally requested by the applicable civil authority and then approved by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

b. **Homeland Defense (HD)**. HD is a DOD mission. DOD is the USG lead agency responsible for defending against traditional external threats or aggression (e.g., nation-state conventional force or weapons of mass destruction [WMD] attack) and against external asymmetric threats. During HD operations, DOD coordinates with other interagency partners that may be undertaking simultaneous operations to counter the same or other threats.

c. **Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)**. DSCA is support provided by U.S. federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard (NG) forces (as applicable under Title 10, USC, Section 12304 or Title 32, USC, Section 502) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, LE support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. HD and DSCA missions may occur simultaneously and require extensive coordination, integration, and synchronization.

d. **Emergency Preparedness (EP)**. DOD may also be required to engage in emergency preparedness. EP are measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of
life and property and to protect a nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a 
comprehensive emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, 
response, and recovery. EP is considered a part of DOD's overall preparedness 
activities. It is not a stand-alone activity, but is an integral part of DOD training, 
mitigation, and response for both HD and DSCA.110

II. Critical Infrastructure

1. The nation's critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin American 
society and serve as the backbone of our nation's economy, security, and health. We know it as 
the power we use in our homes, the water we drink, the transportation that moves us, the stores 
we shop in, and the communication systems we rely on to stay in touch with friends and family.

2. There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether 
physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination thereof. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain 
secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. PPD-21 identifies 16 critical infrastructure 
sectors:

a. Chemical Sector – Department of Homeland Security
b. Commercial Facilities Sector – Department of Homeland Security
c. Communications Sector – Department of Homeland Security
d. Critical Manufacturing Sector – Department of Homeland Security
e. Dams Sector – Department of Homeland Security
f. Defense Industrial Base Sector – Department of Defense
g. Emergency Services Sector – Department of Homeland Security
h. Energy Sector – Department of Energy
i. Financial Services Sector – Department of the Treasury
j. Food and Agriculture Sector – Department of Agriculture and Department of Health 
and Human Services
Services Administration
l. Healthcare and Public Health Sector – Department of Health and Human Services
m. Information Technology Sector – Department of Homeland Security
o. Transportation Systems Sector – Department of Homeland Security and Department 
of Transportation
p. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector – Environmental Protection Agency111

III. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program

1. DOD Responsibilities. The DOD has two roles for critical infrastructure protection, first as a 
Federal department and second as a Sector-Specific Agency for one of 16 national 
infrastructure sectors – the Defense Industrial Base. Within DOD, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, ASD (HD&ASA), is assigned as the lead official for providing policy, guidance, oversight, and resource advocacy for these roles. The Director of Critical Infrastructure Protection under the ASD (HD&ASA) oversees the day-to-day execution of these responsibilities. The responsibilities for each of these roles are summarized below.

a. Federal Department. As a Federal department, DOD has both departmental and national responsibilities. Departmental responsibilities include the identification, prioritization, assessment, remediation, and protection of defense critical infrastructure. Additionally, all Federal departments and agencies work together at a national level to "prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit" critical infrastructure and key resources. DOD and the broader Federal government will work with State and local governments and the private sector to accomplish this objective.

b. Sector-Specific Agency. As the Sector-Specific Agency for the Defense Industrial Base, DOD has the responsibilities to:

(1) Collaborate with all relevant federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector, including key persons and entities in their infrastructure sector;

(2) Conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector;

(3) Encourage risk-management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources; and

(4) Support sector-coordinating mechanisms:

- to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources; and

- to facilitate sharing of information about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.112

IV. Cyberspace Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense

1. DOD Cyber Strategy. The U.S. conducts operations, including HD, in a complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment to include the cyberspace domain. The DOD Cyber Strategy sets five strategic goals for its cyberspace missions. One of these goals it to be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital interests from disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence. The Department of Defense must work with its interagency partners, the private sector, and allied and partner nations to deter and if necessary defeat a cyberattack of significant consequence on the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests. The Defense Department must develop its intelligence, warning, and operational capabilities to mitigate sophisticated, malicious cyberattacks before they can impact U.S. interests. Consistent with all applicable laws and policies, DOD requires granular, detailed, predictive, and actionable intelligence about global networks and systems, adversary capabilities, and malware brokers and markets. To defend the nation, DOD must build partnerships with other agencies of the government to prepare to conduct combined cyber operations to deter and if necessary defeat aggression in cyberspace. The DOD is focused on building the capabilities, processes, and plans necessary to succeed in this mission (see Figure 5-2).113
2. **Unified Action.** For cyberspace, the open vulnerability and complex interrelationship of national and international networks demands closely coordinated action among the military and other government entities at all levels. The CCMDs, Services, and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), are the military front line of defense. The Secretary of Homeland Security has statutory primary agency responsibilities as the focal point for the security of cyberspace, and established the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) within DHS for protecting USG, state and local governments, and public networks against cyberspace intrusions and attacks. USPACOM and USNORTHCOM, because of their HD and HS responsibilities, have coordination requirements for cyberspace operations through their cyberspace operations support staff with USCYBERCOM and potentially with NCSD, if that is not done through USCYBERCOM.\textsuperscript{114}

   a. USCYBERCOM synchronizes planning for cyberspace operations, to include direction of DOD information network (DODIN) operations and defense to secure, operate, and defend DOD networks, and to defend U.S. critical cyberspace assets, systems, and functions. Directs DODIN operations and defense in coordination with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and CCMDs. Coordinate with other CCMDs and appropriate USG departments and agencies prior to the generation of cyberspace effects that cross AORs in response to cyberspace threats.

   b. USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities for offensive and defensive cyberspace operations and defense of DODIN; and when directed, conducts cyberspace operations to enable actions in the physical domains, facilitates freedom of action in cyberspace, and denies the same to adversaries. USCYBERCOM can support HD cyberspace operations in collaboration with USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and DHS, by coordinating activities within the required AOR and assisting with expertise and capabilities directed and made available.\textsuperscript{115}
3. Command and Control (C2) of Cyberspace Operations.

a. **CDRUSNORTHCOM** is responsible to defend against, mitigate, and defeat cyberspace threats against specific USNORTHCOM and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) systems, in coordination with USCYBERCOM and USPACOM. Geographic and functional CCDRs, as well as the Services, are responsible for protecting their networks located within the USNORTHCOM AOR which are not specifically assigned or attached to USNORTHCOM.\(^\text{116}\)

b. **CDRUSPACOM** is responsible for protection of USPACOM networks in the USPACOM AOR. USPACOM will coordinate cyberspace operations with its component commands, subordinate unified commands, JTFs, direct reporting units, and other CCMDs through the USPACOM Joint Cyber Center (JCC). CDRUSCYBERCOM, is the supporting commander for cyberspace operations within the USPACOM AOR. USCYBERCOM normally provides a cyberspace operations teams to USPACOM for major exercises and operations. For HD, USPACOM and USCYBERCOM have coordination requirements with DHS through its NCSD as primary agency for protecting USG and public networks against cyberspace intrusions and attacks. Functional CCDRs and the Services are responsible for protection of their networks located within the USPACOM AOR, but not assigned or attached to USPACOM.\(^\text{117}\)

4. Cyberspace Operations Teams and Missions. Defending the nation in cyberspace requires a military capability, operating according to traditional military principles of organization for sustained expertise and accountability at a scale that lets us perform multiple missions simultaneously.

a. The application of military capability at scale is what the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) gives USCYBERCOM and DOD as a whole. Combat Mission Teams (CMTs) operate with the combatant commands to support their missions, while National Mission Teams (NMTs) help defend the nation's critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity of significant consequence. Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) defend DOD Information Networks alongside local Computer Network Defense Service Providers (CNDSPs). Each of them complements the efforts of the others. Cyber Mission Force teams can and do contribute to the nation's cyberspace efforts as they assist the combatant commands and partner departments and agencies.

b. Cyber Mission Force teams give USCYBERCOM the capacity to operate on a full-time, global basis on behalf of the combatant commands. The Combat Mission Teams help combatant commanders accomplish their respective missions to guard U.S. interests and project the nation's power when authorized to deter those who would threaten our security—the teams help ensure that we have the ability to enable our combatant commanders to defeat emerging threats. Additional Combat Mission Teams under the functional commands (U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command) bring still more resources to supplement those of the regional commands.

c. USCYBERCOM controls additional teams under the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) that help defend the nation's critical infrastructure against malicious cyber activity of significant consequence. The CNMF comprise National Mission Teams, National Support Teams, and National Cyber Protection Teams to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations to deter, disrupt, and defeat adversary cyber actors.

d. USCYBERCOM established the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ-DODIN) and dual-hatted the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to command it.
As a functional component command of USCYBERCOM located at DISA, JFHQ-DODIN leads the day-to-day defense of DOD's data and networks. DOD is working to harden and defend its networks and systems, with USCYBERCOM providing the operational vision and directing the defense, and the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO), working with NSA, DISA and the military services, providing the technical standards and implementation policy. DOD CIO measures the cyber security status of the whole department. The goal is to minimize the adversary's ability to attack our systems and networks, and to detect, diagnose, contain, and eject an adversary should an attack occur.

e. Operations to defend DOD networks and the nation's critical infrastructure are conducted in conjunction with a host of federal, industry, and international partners. Defending the U.S. in cyberspace is a whole-of-government, indeed a whole-of-nation, endeavor. No single agency or department has the authority, information, or wisdom to accomplish this mission alone, which is why USCYBERCOM and NSA recently updated their memorandums of understanding with DHS in a cyber action plan to chart collaboration. The entire federal government, however, cannot do the job without the active participation and cooperation of the private sector.  

5. Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) Protection. The increased use of cyberattacks as a political instrument reflects a dangerous trend in international relations. Vulnerable data systems present state and non-state actors with an enticing opportunity to strike the United States and its interests. During a conflict, the Defense Department assumes that a potential adversary will seek to target U.S. or allied critical infrastructure and military networks to gain a strategic advantage. A sophisticated actor could target an industrial control system (ICS) on a public utility to affect public safety, or enter a network to manipulate health records to affect an individual's well-being. A disruptive, manipulative, or destructive cyberattack could present a significant risk to U.S. economic and national security if lives are lost, property destroyed, policy objectives harmed, or economic interests affected. CI/KR consist of the infrastructure and assets vital to the nation's security, governance, public health and safety, economy, and public confidence. Concurrent with its national defense and incident response missions, DOD will also support DHS and other USG departments and agencies to ensure all sectors of cyberspace CI/KR are available to support national objectives. CI/KR protection relies on analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability identification and reduction, mitigation, and aiding of national recovery efforts.

a. Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI). DCI refers to DOD and non-DOD assets essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide that are a subset of CI&KR. GCCs have the responsibility to prevent the loss or degradation of the DCI within their AORs and must coordinate with the DOD asset owner, heads of DOD components, and defense infrastructure sector lead agents to fulfill this responsibility. The Director of DISA is responsible for matters pertaining to the identification, prioritization, and remediation of critical DODIN infrastructure issues, as the lead agent for the DODIN sector of the DCI. Likewise, DOD is responsible to support the DHS coordination of efforts to protect the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and the DODIN portion of the DIB.

b. DOD Reliance on Critical Infrastructure. The Defense Department must further develop adequate warning intelligence of adversary intentions and capabilities for conducting destructive and disruptive cyberattacks against DOD and the United States. Beyond its own networks, DOD relies on civil critical infrastructure across the United States and overseas for its operations, yet the cybersecurity of such critical infrastructure is uncertain. A cyberattack on the critical infrastructure and key resources on which DOD
relied for its operations could impact the U.S. military's ability to operate in a contingency.

c. **Critical Infrastructure Owners' Responsibilities.** The Defense Department cannot, however, foster resilience in organizations that fall outside of its authority. In order for resilience to succeed as a factor in effective deterrence, other agencies of the government must work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and the private sector more broadly to develop resilient and redundant systems that can withstand a potential attack. Effective resilience measures can help convince potential adversaries of the futility of commencing cyberattacks on U.S. networks and systems.121

d. **DOD Exercise Program.** DOD's annual exercise program, to include Cyber Guard, includes exercising with DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for contingencies that may require emergency allocation of forces to help protect critical infrastructure, under partner agencies' lead. This framework describes how combatant commands and combat support agencies can partner with DHS and FBI and other agencies to improve integration, training and support.

e. **National Guard.** DOD works with the National Guard to define the coordinate, train, advise, and assist (C/TA) roles of the National Guard force and refine implementation through Cyber Guard exercises. Under its existing and planned force structure, National Guard forces will exercise to coordinate, train, advise, and assist state and local agencies and domestic critical infrastructure and to provide support to law enforcement, HD, and DSCA activities in support of national objectives.122

6. **Defense Industrial Base (DIB).** In accordance with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DOD is designated as the sector-specific agency for the DIB. DOD provides cyberspace analysis and forensics support via the DIB Cybersecurity and Information Assurance Program and the DOD Cyber Crime Center.123 The Defense Department will improve accountability and responsibility for the protection of data across DOD and the DIB. DOD will ensure that policies and any associated federal rules or contract language requirements have been implemented to require DIB companies to report data theft and loss to the DOD Cyber Crime Center.

   a. DOD will continue to assess Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) rules and associated guidance to ensure they mature over time in a manner consistent with known standards for protecting data from cyber adversaries, to include standards promulgated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

   b. DOD will continue to expand companies' participation in threat information sharing programs, such as the Cyber Security/Information Assurance program.

   c. As the certification authority for DIB cleared defense contractor sites, the Defense Security Service will expand education and training programs to include material for DOD personnel and DIB contractors to enhance their cyber threat awareness.

   d. In addition, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will review the sufficiency of current classification guidance for critical acquisition and technology programs to protect information on contractor networks.124

7. **Private Industry.** Many of DOD's critical functions and operations rely on commercial assets, including Internet service providers and global supply chains, over which DOD has no direct authority to mitigate risk effectively. Therefore, DOD will work with the DHS, other interagency partners, and the private sector to improve cybersecurity. One example of such cooperation is the 2010 memorandum of agreement signed by DOD and DHS to align and enhance cybersecurity collaboration. The memorandum formalizes joint participation in program planning.
and improves a shared understanding of cybersecurity. Under this memorandum USCYBERCOM and DHS exchange liaison personnel. DOD supports DHS in leading interagency efforts to identify and mitigate cyberspace vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical infrastructure. DOD will continue to support the development of whole-of-government approaches for managing risks associated with the globalization of the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. The global technology supply chain affects mission critical aspects of the DOD enterprise and IT risks must be mitigated through strategic public-private sector cooperation.125

V. Department of Homeland Security Cyberspace Responsibilities

1. DHS has the responsibility to secure cyberspace, at the national level, by protecting non-DOD USG networks against cyberspace intrusions and attacks. The DOD ensures secure operation of the DOD portion of cyberspace and depends on other USG departments and agencies to secure the portions of cyberspace under their authority.

2. Within DHS, the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) is tasked to protect the USG network systems from cyberspace threats. NCSD partners with government, industry, and academia, as well as the international community, to make cybersecurity a national priority and to reinforce that cybersecurity is a shared responsibility.

3. The National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23, issued on 2 Jan 2008, established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). The CNCI formalizes a series of continuous efforts to further safeguard Federal systems from cyberspace threats. Under the CNCI, DHS has the lead in a number of areas, to include:

   a. Establish a frontline defense to reduce current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions.

   b. Defend against the full spectrum of threats by using intelligence and strengthening supply chain security.126
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Chapter 6: Cyberspace Operations – Case Study

I. Russian Operations against Georgia in 2008

1. Scenario. Russia used cyberspace missions and actions in concert with other instruments of national power to achieve success in their operation against Georgia in 2008. This case study provides an opportunity to apply the principles outlined in this guide to a real-world event (see Figure 6-1).

   ![Figure 6-1: Russian – Georgian Conflict, August 2008](image)

   a. Multi-Domain Synergy. The war between Georgia, Russia, and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia saw some 35,000-40,000 Russian and allied forces, augmented by significant air and naval forces, confront some 12,000-15,000 Georgian forces with little air and minimal naval capability. Although a short and limited conflict, it was historic and precedent setting. This appears to be the first coordinated cyberspace attack synchronized with major combat actions in the other warfighting domains, primarily land and air.

   b. Cyberspace Intelligence Collection. Russian cyberspace operations began several weeks before the outbreak of kinetic operations. Russian cyber intelligence units conducted reconnaissance on important sites and infiltrated Georgian military and government networks in search of data useful for the upcoming campaign. During this period, the Russian government began organizing the work of Russian cyberspace militias - irregular hackers outside the government - that would support the campaign and provide cover for some of the government's operations. Russian government and cyberspace militias conducted rehearsals of attacks against Georgian targets.

   c. DCO Response Actions (DCO-RA). Russian forces also attacked Georgian hacker forums in order to pre-empt a retaliatory response against Russian cyberspace targets.

   d. Deny – Degrade. Russian cyberspace forces attacked civilian sites near the action of kinetic operations with the goal of creating panic in the civilian population. For example, in the town of Gori, Russians disabled government and news websites with distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks just prior to an air attack. Cyberspace interdiction (attacks concentrated on tactical data links and data fusion centers) degraded and disrupted the Georgians' decision cycle limiting their military response.
e. Deny – Disrupt. The Russian cyberspace operations forces disrupted Georgian government, military, and diplomatic communications.

(1) **Government and military communications.** When the kinetic battle started on 7 August, Russian government and irregular forces conducted DDoS attacks on Georgian government and military websites. These attacks disrupted the transmission of information between military units and between offices in the Georgian government.

(2) **International communications.** Faced by overwhelming Russian air power, armored attacks on several fronts, an amphibious assault on its Black Sea coastline, and devastating cyber-attacks, Georgia had little capability of kinetic resistance. Its best hope lay with strategic communications: transmitting to the world a sympathetic message of rough treatment at the hands of Russian military aggression. But Russia effectively used cyberspace operations to disrupt the Georgian government's ability to assemble and transmit such a plea thus removing Georgia's last hope for international support.

f. Deny – Destroy (potential). The Russians were very sophisticated in their target selection. For example, Russians refrained from attacking Georgia's most important asset, the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and associated infrastructure. By holding this target in reserve, the Russians gave Georgian policymakers an incentive to quickly end the war.

g. **Manipulate.** Although there were no known attempts to manipulate data, the Russian cyberspace operations forces dislocated Georgian data flows, shunting data that normally would have traveled over the Internet into more traditional conduits such as telephone and radio communications. Georgians were trying to transmit more data at a higher rate than the useful capacity of their information network could accommodate because a large proportion of that capacity was being consumed by cyber attacks injecting extraneous data into the network. The cyber attacks effectively jammed Georgia's overall information network during the early stages of the war when rapid and organized action by Georgian defenses, cyber and kinetic, could have had the greatest impact.128

h. In summary, Russian planners tightly integrated cyberspace operations with their diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of power (i.e. DIME). The Russo-Georgian war provides a case study for joint planners preparing for a future conflict, involving the new domain of cyberspace.**129**

II. Russian Cyberspace Operations – Design, Planning, and Execution

1. **Cyberspace Operations Team.** This section demonstrates notional cyberspace operations team design, planning, and execution activities in support of the Russian operation in Georgia.

2. **Cyberspace Design Activities.** The design principles outlined in this handbook provide a guide for a cyberspace operations team to assist the commander in developing an operational approach for this scenario.

   a. **Understanding the Cyberspace Environment.** After receiving direction to plan the operation, the cyberspace operations (CO) team attempts to gain an understanding of the operational environment. The CO team studies the Georgian, Russian, and international environment with a focus on physical and logical networks as well as key individuals and groups (see Figure 6-2).
b. **Understanding the Problem(s) in Cyberspace.** After identifying key individuals, groups, and physical and logical networks, the CO team focuses on identifying and understanding the problem(s) associated with the operation. The team identifies cyberspace challenges, threats, and risks to operations. They attempt to understand the adversary's resiliency and recovery capabilities. A recurrent cyberspace operations risk is losing anonymity.

c. **Developing the Operational Approach.** The operational approach is the commander's visualization of how the operation should transform current conditions into the desired conditions at end state. When developing an operational approach, a commander should synchronize actions 'in' and 'through' cyberspace with other activities to achieve the desired objectives. The commander can use lines of operation (LOOs) and lines of effort (LOEs) to show how the objectives will be achieved (see Figure 6-3).
3. **Cyberspace Planning Activities.** Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into campaign plans and operation orders. Based on the commander's operational approach and guidance, the CO team will assist the staff in developing and analyzing courses of action and developing the plan or order. The team should further develop and phase CO LOOs/LOEs for inclusion in the Cyberspace Operations Concept (see Figure 6-4).

![Figure 6-4: Russian Cyberspace Operations Concept in Georgia](Original graphic derived from content of Cross Domain Synergy in Joint Operations)

4. **Cyberspace Operations during Execution.** Planning continues during execution, with an initial emphasis on refining the existing plan and producing the Operation Order (OPORD). During execution, the CO team supports future plans, future operations, and current operations.

a. **Cyberspace Enabled Effects.** Cyberspace planners should focus their efforts on conducting cyberspace actions that achieve the commander's objectives. Cyberspace Operations planners should be concerned with the accumulation of tactical effects into an overall operational effect. At the operational level, objectives and desired effects are developed by the commander's staff and are used to develop tasks to subordinates. In this scenario, the Russian CO teams defended their networks and ensured anonymity while employing DDOS and other techniques to deny the Georgian government and military the ability to effectively respond. These cyberspace effects directly contributed to the accomplishment of the commander's objectives and end state (see Figure 6-5).

b. **Target Development – Lead Time.** It's critically important to start cyberspace operations planning early. The lead time necessary to generate intelligence for the offensive cyberspace operations often takes longer than that required for kinetic operations. Target development should be requested much earlier than that for a traditional targets and should have a longer-term focus. In this scenario, Russian cyber intelligence units conducted reconnaissance on important sites and infiltrated Georgian military and government networks in search of data useful for the upcoming campaign. The cyberspace teams also conducted rehearsals prior to execution.
c. **Targeting Coordination and Authorization.** Cyberspace targets require detailed joint, cross-Combatant Command, interagency, and likely multinational planning and coordination, engagement, assessment, and intelligence efforts. The actual prosecution of a target through cyberspace requires that cyberspace planners and operators coordinate with the supported commander early in the planning phase to ensure access to the target is available when the fleeting opportunity arises. In addition, commanders should establish procedures to quickly promulgate execution orders (EXORDs) for CO-engaged targets, which due to their unique cyberspace interagency deconfliction/coordination requirements may involve coordinating pre-approval for specific actions conducted under specific circumstances.

### III. Georgian Defensive Cyberspace Operations

1. Russian cyberspace operations teams maintained cyber superiority throughout the conflict, and as a result Georgia never mounted a successful cyber defense or cyber counterattack. This was due in a large part to a critical cyber vulnerability—more than half of Georgia's 13 connections to the outside world via the Internet passed through Russia, and most of the Internet traffic to Web sites within Georgia was routed through Turkish or Azerbaijani Internet service providers, many of which were in turn routed through Russia. Overall, the cyber defense efforts were too little too late. This section will demonstrate defensive cyberspace operations planning and actions that Georgian cyberspace operations teams attempted to use to mitigate the severity of Russian offensive cyberspace operations (see Figure 6-6).

   a. **Defense Network Operations.** Despite their lack of success, the Georgian CO teams attempted to conduct information network operations (similar to Department of Defense Information Network Operations) to enhance the security of their military networks. They monitored the flow of information over their information networks. The Georgian CO team also attempted proactive actions which addressed their entire defense network, including configuration control and patching, cybersecurity measures and user training, physical security and secure architecture design, intrusion detection, bandwidth management/spectrum management, operation of host-based security systems and firewalls, and encryption of data.
b. Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO). The Georgian CO teams conducted passive and active defensive cyberspace operations to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems.

1. **DCO Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM).** The CO teams used internal defensive measures within their networks. These measures included actively hunting for advanced internal threats as well as the internal responses to these threats. For example, Georgia attempted to maneuver around the cyber attacks by filtering them out based on their origin. However, the Russian cyber attackers' intelligence preparation allowed them to easily defeat this tactic. The Russian attackers routed their assault through foreign servers to mask their real IP addresses and created false IP addresses to spoof Georgia's cyber defense filters. Still, the Georgian CO teams preserved the use of some government web sites by moving them to U.S.-based servers.

2. **DCO Response Actions (DCO-RA).** The Georgian CO teams also conducted limited DCO-RA to counter the Russian government cyberspace operations teams and 'cyber militias'. These actions were taken external to the defense network to defeat ongoing or imminent threats in order to defend their defense cyberspace capabilities. The CO teams attempted at least one major counterattack, but it failed. They posted cyber attack tools and instructions in Russian-language Internet forums to deceive pro-Russian cyber forces into unwittingly attacking Russian Web sites. This Georgian counterattack appears to have had a negligible effect on the Russian Web sites targeted.

Figure 6-6: Georgian Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO)
(Original graphic derived from content of Cross Domain Synergy in Joint Operations)
Appendix A includes:

I. U.S. Strategy and Policy
   - U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace
   - Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy
   - Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity

II. Department of Homeland Security Strategy and Guidance
    - The Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise
    - Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

III. Department of Defense Strategy
    - DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace

IV. U.S. Cyber Law Guidance
    - DOS Position on International Law in Cyberspace
    - DOD Law of War Manual
I. U.S. Strategy and Guidance  

A. U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace  

This factsheet provides an overview of the International Strategy for Cyberspace released by The White House on 16 May 2011. The full strategy can be found at:  

INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE  

Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World  

The U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace outlines our vision for the future of cyberspace, and sets an agenda for partnering with other nations and peoples to realize it.  

We live in a rare historical moment with an opportunity to build on cyberspace's successes and help secure its future—for the United States, and the global community.  

Digital infrastructure is increasingly the backbone of prosperous economies, vigorous research communities, strong militaries, transparent governments, and free societies. The reach of networked technology is pervasive and global. To realize fully the benefits that networked technology promises the world, these systems must function reliably and securely. Assuring the free flow of information, the security and privacy of data, and the integrity of the interconnected networks themselves are all essential to American and global economic prosperity, security, and the promotion of universal rights.  

Strategic Approach  

The United States' approach to international cyberspace issues is founded on the belief that networked technologies hold immense potential for our Nation, and for the world. The United States will pursue an international cyberspace policy that stokes the innovation that drives our economy and improves lives here and abroad.  

Our strategic approach builds on successes, recognizes the challenges to our national and economic security, and is always grounded by our unshakable commitments to fundamental freedoms of expression and association, privacy, and the free flow of information.  

The Future We Seek  

The cyberspace environment that we seek rewards innovation and empowers entrepreneurs; it connects individuals and strengthens communities; it builds better governments and expands accountability; it safeguards fundamental freedoms and enhances personal privacy; it builds understanding, clarifies norms of behavior, and enhances national and international security. This cyberspace is defined by four key characteristics:  

- Open to innovation  
- Interoperable the world over  
- Secure enough to earn people's trust  
- Reliable enough to support their work
To realize this vision, we will build and sustain an environment in which norms of responsible behavior guide states’ actions, sustain partnerships, and support the rule of law. These norms include:

- Upholding Fundamental Freedoms
- Respect for Property
- Valuing Privacy
- Protection from Crime
- Right of Self-Defense
- Global Interoperability
- Network Stability
- Reliable Access
- Multi-stakeholder Governance
- Cybersecurity Due Diligence

To realize this future, the United States will combine diplomacy, defense, and development to enhance prosperity, security, and openness so all can benefit from networked technology.

Diplomacy: Strengthening Partnerships

The United States will work to create incentives for, and build consensus around, an international environment in which states – recognizing the intrinsic value of an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable cyberspace – work together and act as responsible stakeholders. Through our international relationships and affiliations, we will seek to ensure that as many stakeholders as possible are included in this vision of cyberspace precisely because of its economic, social, political, and security benefits.

Distributed systems require unified action because no single institution, document, arrangement, or instrument could suffice in addressing the needs of our networked world. From end-users, private-sector hardware and software vendors, and Internet service providers, to regional, multilateral, and multi-stakeholder organizations – all are important in helping cyberspace meet its full potential.

Defense: Dissuading and Deterring

The United States will, along with other nations, encourage responsible behavior and oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems, thereby dissuading and deterring malicious actors, while reserving the right to defend these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate. The United States will continue to strengthen our network defenses and our ability to withstand and recover from disruptions and other attacks. For those more sophisticated attacks that do create damage, we will act on well-developed response plans to isolate and mitigate disruption to our machines, limiting effects on our networks, and potential cascade effects beyond them.

When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. We reserve the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests. In so doing, we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad international support whenever possible.

Development: Building Prosperity and Security

We believe the benefits of a connected world are universal. The virtues of an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable cyberspace should be more available than they are today, and as the world’s leading information economy, the United States is committed to ensuring others benefit from our technical resources and expertise.
Our Nation can and will play an active role in providing the knowledge and capacity to build and secure new and existing digital systems. The United States’ capacity-building assistance is envisioned as an investment, a commitment, and an important opportunity for dialogue and partnership. As countries develop a stake in cyberspace issues, we intend our dialogues to mature from capacity-building to active economic, technical, law enforcement, defense and diplomatic collaboration on issues of mutual concern.

Policy Priorities

This strategy is an invitation to other states and peoples to join us in realizing this vision of prosperity, security, and openness in our networked world. It is a call to the private sector, civil society, and end-users to reinforce these efforts through partnership, awareness, and action. It is also a roadmap allowing the United States Government’s departments and agencies to better define and coordinate their role in our international cyberspace policy, to execute a specific way forward, and to plan for future implementation.

The United States Government organizes its activities across seven interdependent areas of activity, each demanding collaboration within our government, with international partners, and with the private sector. Taken as a whole, they form the action lines of our strategic framework.

Economy: Promoting International Standards and Innovative, Open Markets. To ensure that cyberspace continues to serve the needs of our economies and innovators, we will:

- Sustain a free-trade environment that encourages technological innovation on accessible, globally linked networks.
- Protect intellectual property, including commercial trade secrets, from theft.
- Ensure the primacy of interoperable and secure technical standards, determined by technical experts.

Protecting Our Networks: Enhancing Security, Reliability, and Resiliency. Because strong cybersecurity is critical to national and economic security in the broadest sense, we will:

- Promote cyberspace cooperation, particularly on norms of behavior for states and cybersecurity, bilaterally and in a range of multilateral organizations and multinational partnerships.
- Reduce intrusions into and disruptions of U.S. networks.
- Ensure robust incident management, resiliency, and recovery capabilities for information infrastructure.
- Improve the security of the high-tech supply chain, in consultation with industry.

Law Enforcement: Extending Collaboration and the Rule of Law. To enhance confidence in cyberspace and pursue those who would exploit online systems, we will:

- Participate fully in international cybercrime policy development.
- Harmonize cybercrime laws internationally by expanding accession to the Budapest Convention.
- Focus cybercrime laws on combating illegal activities, not restricting access to the Internet.
- Deny terrorists and other criminals the ability to exploit the Internet for operational planning, financing, or attacks.

Military: Preparing for 21st Century Security Challenges. Since our commitment to defend our citizens, allies, and interests extends to wherever they might be threatened, we will:

- Recognize and adapt to the military's increasing need for reliable and secure networks.
- Build and enhance existing military alliances to confront potential threats in cyberspace.
• Expand cyberspace cooperation with allies and partners to increase collective security.

**Internet Governance: Promoting Effective and Inclusive Structures.** To promote Internet governance structures that effectively serve the needs of all Internet users, we will:
• Prioritize openness and innovation on the Internet.
• Preserve global network security and stability, including the domain name system (DNS).
• Promote and enhance multi-stakeholder venues for the discussion of Internet Governance issues.

**International Development: Building Capacity, Security, and Prosperity.** To promote the benefits of networked technology globally, enhance the reliability of our shared networks, and build the community of responsible stakeholders in cyberspace, we will:
• Provide the necessary knowledge, training, and other resources to countries seeking to build technical and cybersecurity capacity.
• Continually develop and regularly share international cybersecurity best practices.
• Enhance states’ ability to fight cybercrime – including training for law enforcement, forensic specialists, jurists, and legislators.
• Develop relationships with policymakers to enhance technical capacity building, providing regular and ongoing contact with experts and their United States Government counterparts.

**Internet Freedom: Supporting Fundamental Freedoms and Privacy.** To help secure fundamental freedoms as well as privacy in cyberspace, we will:
• Support civil society actors in achieving reliable, secure, and safe platforms for freedoms of expression and association.
• Collaborate with civil society and nongovernment organizations to establish safeguards protecting their Internet activity from unlawful digital intrusions.
• Encourage international cooperation for effective commercial data privacy protections.
• Ensure the end-to-end interoperability of an Internet accessible to all.

These ideals are central to preserving the cyberspace we know, and to creating, together, the future we seek.

B. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy

The following is an excerpt of testimony by Christopher Painter, Department of State (DOS) Coordinator for Cyber Issues, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, on 25 May 2016: https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/cyberissues/releasesandremarks/257719.htm.

In May 2016, as required by the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2016, the Department submitted to Congress the Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy (the Strategy) that included a report on the Department's work to implement the President's 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, as well as a discussion of our efforts to promote norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, alternative concepts for norms promoted by certain other countries, threats facing the United States, tools available to the President to deter malicious actors, and resources required to build international norms.

In spite of the successes outlined in the Strategy, the U.S. vision for an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet faces a range of policy and technical challenges. Many of these challenges were described in my testimony last year, and they largely remain. I would like to focus my time today delving specifically into our efforts to promote a broad international framework for cyber stability, as well some of the alternative views regarding the Internet that some governments are promoting. I will also spend some time discussing the technical challenges and threats posed by continuing malicious cyber activity directed at the United States, as well as our allies, and the tools we have at our disposal to deter these actions.

Diplomatic Efforts to Shape the Policy Environment

Building a Framework for International Stability in Cyberspace

The Department of State, working with our interagency partners, is guided by the vision of the President's International Strategy for Cyberspace, which is to promote a strategic framework of international cyber stability designed to achieve and maintain a peaceful cyberspace environment where all states are able to fully realize its benefits, where there are advantages to cooperating against common threats and avoiding conflict, and where there is little incentive for states to engage in disruptive behavior or to attack one another.

This framework has three key elements: (1) global affirmation that international law applies to state behavior in cyberspace; (2) development of an international consensus on and promotion of additional voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that apply during peacetime; and (3) development and implementation of practical confidence building measures (CBMs), which promote stability in cyberspace by reducing the risks of misperception and escalation.

Since 2009, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE) has served as a productive and groundbreaking expert-level venue for the United States to build support for this framework. The consensus recommendations of the three UN GGE reports in 2010, 2013, and 2015 have set the standard for the international community on international cyberspace norms and CBMs. The UN GGE process will continue to play a central role in our efforts to fully promulgate this framework when it reconvenes in August 2016.

Applicability of international law. The first and most fundamental pillar of our framework for international cyber stability is the applicability of existing international law to state behavior in cyberspace. The 2013 UN GGE report was a landmark achievement that affirmed the applicability of existing international law, including the UN Charter, to state conduct in cyberspace. The 2013 report underscored that states must act in cyberspace under the
established international obligations and commitments that have guided their actions for decades – in peacetime and during conflict – and states must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them. The 2014-2015 UN GGE also made progress on issues related to international law by affirming the applicability of the inherent right to self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and noting the law of armed conflict’s fundamental principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction.

Norms of responsible state behavior. The United States is also building consensus on a set of additional, voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that define key areas of risk that would be of national and/or economic security concern to all states and which should be off-limits during times of peace. If observed, these stability measures – which are measures of self-restraint – can contribute substantially to conflict prevention and stability. The United States was the first state to propose a set of specific peacetime cyber norms, including the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, the protection of computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), and cooperation between states in responding to appropriate requests in mitigating malicious cyber activity emanating from their territory. In May 2015, Secretary of State Kerry highlighted these norms in his speech in Seoul, South Korea, on an open and secure Internet. The 2015 UN GGE report’s most significant achievement was its recommendation for voluntary norms of state behavior designed for peacetime, which included concepts championed by the United States.

Confidence Building Measures. Together with our work on law and voluntary norms, cyber CBMs have the potential to contribute substantially to international cyber stability. CBMs have been used for decades to build confidence, reduce risk, and increase transparency in other areas of international concern. Examples of cyber CBMs include: transparency measures, such as sharing national strategies or doctrine; cooperative measures, such as an initiative to combat a particular cyber incident or threat actor; and stability measures, such as committing to refrain from a certain activity of concern. Cyber CBMs are being developed, and are in the first stages of implementation, in two regional venues – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the ASEAN Regional Forum where agreement was reached in 2015 on a detailed work plan with a proposed set of CBMs for future implementation.

Although many of the elements of the framework I have described above may seem self-evident to an American audience, it is important to recognize that cyber issues are new to many states, and as I describe later in my testimony, there are also many states that hold alternative views on how we should promote cyber stability. Notwithstanding these headwinds, as well as the fact that diplomatic negotiations on other issues can take many years, if not decades, the United States and its allies have made substantial progress in recent years towards advancing our strategic framework of international cyber stability. At this point, I would like to highlight examples from last year that reflect our progress.

U.S.-China Cyber Commitments

The United States strongly opposes the use of cyber technology to steal intellectual property for commercial advantage, and has raised this concern with Chinese interlocutors for several years. In 2014, the U.S. indicted five members of the Chinese military for hacking, economic espionage, and other offenses directed at six U.S. entities. This led China to suspend the U.S.-China Cyber Working Group. The U.S. and China, however, reached agreement during President Xi Jinping’s state visit in September 2015 on several key commitments on cyber issues. These commitments are:
(1) both governments agreed to cooperate and provide timely responses to requests for information and assistance regarding malicious cyber activity emanating from their territories;

(2) neither country's government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial advantage;

(3) both governments will work together to further identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace and hold a senior experts group on international security issues in cyberspace; and

(4) both governments will establish a Ministerial-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues.

On 11 May 2016, the United States hosted the first meeting of the senior experts group in Washington on international security issues in cyberspace, which provided a forum to further engage China on its views and seek common ground regarding norms of state behavior in cyberspace and other topics. The Department of State led the U.S. delegation that included participation from the Department of Defense and other U.S. government agencies. The senior experts group helps us advance the growing international consensus on international law and voluntary cyber norms of state behavior. We also have encouraged China to join us in pushing for other states to affirm these principles in international forums like the Group of Twenty (G20), and will continue to do so.

To implement other commitments reached during President Xi's visit, the United States and China held the first ministerial level dialogue on cybercrime and other related issues in Washington on December 1, 2015. Attorney General Loretta Lynch and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, together with Chinese State Councilor Guo Shengkun, co-chaired the first U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues to foster mutual understanding and enhance cooperation on law enforcement and network protection issues. The second dialogue is scheduled to occur next month in Beijing, China.

Moreover, regarding the commitment that neither government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft for commercial gain, Deputy Secretary of State Blinken testified last month before the full Committee on Foreign Relations that the United States is "watching very closely to ensure this commitment is followed by action."

The outcomes of last year's Xi-Obama summit focus on concrete actions and arrangements that will allow us to hold Beijing accountable to the commitments they have made. These commitments do not resolve all our challenges with China on cyber issues. However, they do represent a step forward in our efforts to address one of the sharpest areas of disagreement in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.

**Group of Twenty (G20) Antalya Summit**

In November 2015, the leaders of the G20 met in Antalya, Turkey, to discuss and make progress on a wide range of critical issues facing the global economy. At the conclusion of the Antalya Summit, the strong final communique issued by the G20 leaders affirmed the U.S.-championed vision of international cyber stability and its pillars.

Among other things, the G20 leaders affirmed in their statement that "no country should conduct or support the [Information and Communication Technologies] ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors." They also highlighted the "key role played by the United Nations in developing norms" and the work of the UN GGE and its 2015 report. Addressing our overall framework, the G20 leaders stated that they "affirm
that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable to state conduct in the use
of ICTs and commit ourselves to the view that all states should abide by norms of responsible
state behavior in the use of ICTs… ."

The G20 leaders' communique represents a remarkable endorsement of our approach to
promoting stability in cyberspace. But there is still more to do. The United States will continue to
work within the G20 and in other bilateral and multilateral engagements to promote and expand
these policy pronouncements regarding responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

**Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**

As a result of the leadership by the United States and like-minded countries, the 57 member
states of the OSCE, which includes not only Western allies but also Russia and other former
Soviet states, reached consensus in March 2016 on an expanded set of CBMs. This expanded
set, which includes five new CBMs, builds upon the 11 CBMs announced by the OSCE in 2013
that member states are already working to implement.

The initial 11 CBMs were primarily focused on building transparency and putting in place
mechanisms for de-escalating conflict. For example, there were CBMs calling upon participating
states to identify points of contact that foreign governments could reach out to in the event of a
cyber incident emanating from the state's territory and put in place consultation and mediation
mechanisms. The additional five CBMs focused more on cooperative measures focusing on
issues like cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and developing public-private partnerships.

Secure and resilient critical infrastructure, including in the communications sector, requires the
integration of cyber, physical, and human elements. Since most critical infrastructure is privately
owned, public-private partnerships are essential for strengthening critical infrastructure. Given
the distributed nature of critical infrastructure, these efforts also require international
collaboration. Work will continue this year to strengthen implementation of the previous CBMs
and to begin implementing the new ones as well. This will build on the cooperation we have
underway with many international partners in this and other similar fora. We also hope that this
further success within the OSCE context can serve to strengthen CBMs as a model that other
regional security organizations can adopt.

In addition to our work with governmental organizations, the Department of State engages
extensively with a range of stakeholders outside of government, who play critical roles in helping
to preserve and promote the same vision of cyberspace held by the United States. Non-
government stakeholders are often part of our delegations to key meetings, for which there is
intensive consultation, and we often engage with our stakeholders before and after key events
to hear their views and to inform them of our activities. We also engage extensively with the
stakeholder community ahead of and immediately following major cyber conferences, such as
the Global Conference on Cyberspace, most recently in The Hague, the Netherlands, and
previously in Seoul, South Korea.

**Policy Challenge: Alternative Views of the Internet**

A challenge to the implementation of our cyberspace strategy is a competing and alternative
view of the Internet. The United States and much of the broader international community
support the open flow and movement of data on the Internet that drives economic growth,
protects human rights, and promotes innovation. The United States believes in a
multistakeholder approach whereby governments, private sector, civil society, and the technical
and academic communities cooperate to address both technical and policy threats through
inclusive, transparent, consensus-driven processes.

China's approach to cyberspace in the international context is propelled by its desire to maintain
internal stability, maintain sovereignty over its domestic cyberspace, and combat what it argues
is an emerging cyber arms race and ‘militarization’ of cyberspace. China has been willing to consider cyber confidence building measures, and has affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace, but has not been willing to affirm more specifically the applicability of the law of armed conflict or other laws of war, because it believes it would only serve to legitimize state use of cyber tools as weapons of war.

This has led to a set of external policies that reinforces traditional Chinese foreign policy priorities of non-interference in internal affairs, national sovereignty over cyberspace, and "no first use" of weapons. China views its expansive online censorship regime – including technologies such as the Great Firewall – as a necessary defense against destabilizing domestic and foreign influences, and it has promoted this conception internationally. China also urges creation of new "cyber governance" instruments, which would, inter alia, create new binding rules designed to limit the development, deployment, and use of "information weapons," promote speech and content controls, seek to replace the framework of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), elevate the role of governments vis-à-vis other stakeholders, and likely give the United Nations authority for determining attribution and responding to malicious cyber activity. While the United States and its partners seek to focus our cyber policy efforts on combatting threats to networks, cyber infrastructure, and other physical threats from cyber tools, China also emphasizes the threats posed by online content. In addition, some of these policies stand in sharp contrast to the U.S. view that all stakeholders should be able to contribute to the making of public policy regarding the Internet.

Russia's approach to cyberspace in the international context has focused on the maintenance of internal stability, as well as sovereignty over its "information space." While Russia co-authored the Code of Conduct, with China and other Shanghai Cooperation Organization members, Russia's ultimate goal is also a new international cyber convention, which they pair with criticism of the Budapest Convention.

Russia has nonetheless found common ground with the United States on our approach of promoting the applicability of international law to state conduct in cyberspace as well as voluntary, non-binding norms of state behavior in peacetime. Russia has also committed to the first ever set of bilateral cyber confidence building measures with the United States, as well as the first ever set of cyber CBMs within a multilateral institution, at the OSCE in 2013 and 2016 that I previously discussed.

We counter these alternative concepts of cyberspace policy through a range of diplomatic tools that include not only engagement in multilateral venues, but also direct bilateral engagement and awareness-raising with a variety of state and non-state actors. I now would like to discuss some of the technical challenges and threats the U.S. faces and some of the tools we have to respond to and prevent cyber incidents.

**Responding to and Preventing Cyber Incidents**

**Continuing Cyber Threats**

Cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity. In 2015, high profile cyber incidents included the breach of health insurance company Anthem, Inc.'s IT system that resulted in the theft of account information for millions of customers; an unauthorized breach of the Office of Personnel Management's systems that resulted in the theft of approximately 22 million personnel files; and hackers launching an unprecedented attack on the Ukraine power grid that cut power to hundreds of thousands of customers.

Overall, the unclassified information and communications technology networks that support U.S. government, military, commercial, and social activities remain vulnerable to espionage and
disruption. As the Department noted in the Strategy we submitted last month, however, the likelihood of a catastrophic attack against the United States from any particular actor is remote at this time. The Intelligence Community instead foresees an ongoing series of low-to-moderate level cyber operations from a variety of sources, which will impose cumulative costs on U.S. economic competitiveness and national security, pose risks to Federal and private sector infrastructure in the United States, infringe upon the rights of U.S. intellectual property holders, and violate the privacy of U.S. citizens.

In February, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress on the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and stated: "Many actors remain undeterred from conducting reconnaissance, espionage, and even attacks in cyberspace because of the relatively low costs of entry, the perceived payoff, and the lack of significant consequences." He highlighted the malicious cyber activities of the leading state actors, non-state actors such as Da'esh, and criminals who are developing and using sophisticated cyber tools, including ransomware for extortion and malware to target government networks.

The Intelligence Community continues to witness an increase in the scale and scope of reporting on malicious cyber activity that can be measured by the amount of corporate data stolen or deleted, personally identifiable information compromised, or remediation costs incurred by U.S. victims. The motivation to conduct cyber attacks and cyber espionage will probably remain strong because of the gains for the perpetrators.

**Tools Available to Counter Cyber Threats**

The United States works to counter technical challenges through a whole-of-government approach that brings to bear its full range of instruments of national power and corresponding policy tools – diplomatic, law enforcement, economic, military, and intelligence – as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.

The United States believes that deterrence in cyberspace is best accomplished through a combination of "deterrence by denial" – reducing the incentive of potential adversaries to use cyber capabilities against the United States by persuading them that the United States can deny their objectives – and "deterrence through cost imposition" – threatening or carrying out actions to inflict penalties and costs against adversaries that conduct malicious cyber activity against the United States. It is important to note that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to deterring or responding to cyber threats. Rather, the individual characteristics of a particular threat determine the tools that would most appropriately be used.

The President has at his disposal a number of tools to carry out deterrence by denial. These include a range of policies, regulations, and voluntary standards aimed at increasing the security and resiliency of U.S. government and private sector computer systems. They also include incident response capabilities and certain law enforcement authorities.

With respect to cost imposition, the President is able to draw on a range of response options from across the United States government.

Diplomatic tools provide a way to communicate to adversaries when their actions are unacceptable and to build support and greater cooperation among, or seek assistance from, allies and like-minded countries to address shared threats. Diplomatic démarches to both friendly and potentially hostile states have become a regular component of the United States' response to major international cyber incidents. In the longer term, U.S. efforts to promote principles of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, including peacetime norms, are intended to build increasing consensus among like-minded states that can form a basis for cooperative responses to irresponsible state actions.
Law enforcement tools can be used to investigate crimes and prosecute malicious cyber actors both within the United States and abroad. International cooperation is critical to cybercrime investigations, which is why the United States has promoted international harmonization of substantive and procedural cybercrime laws through the Budapest Convention, created an informal channel for data preservation and information sharing through the G7 24/7 network, and promoted donor partnerships to assist developing nations.

Economic tools, such as financial sanctions, may be used as a part of the broader U.S. strategy to change, constrain, and stigmatize the behavior of malicious actors in cyberspace. Since January 2015, the President has provided guidance to the Secretary of the Treasury to impose sanctions to counter North Korea's malicious cyber-enabled activities. Executive Order 13687 was issued, in part, in response to the provocative and destructive attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, while Executive Order 13722 targets, among others, significant activities by North Korea to undermine cybersecurity, in line with the recently-signed North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. Aside from these North Korea-specific authorities, in April 2015, the President issued Executive Order 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, which authorizes the imposition of sanctions against persons whose malicious cyber-enabled activities could pose a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States.

Military capabilities provide an important set of options for deterring and responding to malicious cyber activity. The Department of Defense continues to build its cyber capabilities and strengthen its cyber defense and deterrence posture. As part of this effort, the Department of Defense is building its Cyber Mission Force, which is already employing its capabilities to defend Department of Defense networks, defend the Nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence, and generate integrated cyberspace effects in support of operational plans and contingency operations. In addition, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced earlier this year that U.S. forces are using cyber tools to disrupt Da'esh's command and control systems and to negatively impact its networks.

Intelligence capabilities are also an important tool at the President's disposal in detecting, responding to, and deterring malicious activities in cyberspace, particularly given the unique challenges associated with attributing and understanding the motivation behind such malicious activities.

Even with this broad range of tools, deterring cyber threats remains a challenge. Given the unique characteristics of cyberspace, the United States continues to work to develop additional and appropriate consequences that it can impose on malicious cyber actors.

**Capacity Building**

In addition to the tools that I have just outlined, the ability of the United States to respond to foreign cyber threats and fight transnational cybercrime is greatly enhanced by the capabilities and strength of our international partners in this area. Therefore, the Department of State is working with departments and agencies, allies and multilateral partners to build the capacity of foreign governments, particularly in developing countries, to secure their own networks as well as investigate and prosecute cybercriminals within their borders. The Department also actively promotes donor cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral participation in joint cyber capacity building initiatives.

In 2015, for example, the United States joined the Netherlands in founding the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, a global platform for countries, international organizations, and the private sector to exchange best practices and expertise on cyber capacity building. The United States
partnered with Japan, Australia, Canada, the African Union Commission, and Symantec on four cybersecurity and cybercrime capacity building initiatives. The Department also provided assistance to the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations Global Program on Cybercrime to enable delivery of capacity building assistance to developing nations. Many traditional bilateral law enforcement training programs increasingly include cyber elements, such as training investigators and prosecutors in the handling of electronic evidence. Much of our foreign law enforcement training on combating intellectual property crime focuses on digital theft.

In another example of capacity building, the Department of State, through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, manages five International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) worldwide, and one additional Regional Training Center. These six facilities provide law enforcement training and instruction to law enforcement officials from approximately 85 countries each year. The ILEA program includes a wide variety of cyber investigation training courses, from basic to advanced levels, taught by subject matter experts from the U.S. Secret Service and other agencies and policy-level discussions with senior criminal justice officials. This serves as a force multiplier to enhance the capabilities of the international law enforcement community to collaborate in the effort to fight cybercrime.

The Department of State is committed to continuing its capacity building initiatives as another effective way to counter international cyber threats and promote international cyber stability.

**Looking ahead**

Cybersecurity will continue to be a challenge for the United States when we take into consideration the rapidly expanding environment of global cyber threats, the increasing reliance on information technology and number of "smart devices," the reality that many developing nations are still in the early stages of their cyber maturity, and the ongoing and increasingly sophisticated use of information technology by terrorists and other criminals. Thus, the Department of State anticipates a continued increase and expansion of our cyber-focused diplomatic and capacity building efforts for the foreseeable future.

The Department will continue to spearhead the effort to promote international consensus that existing international law applies to state actions in cyberspace and build support for certain peacetime norms through assisting states in developing technical capabilities and relevant laws and policies, to ensure they are able to properly meet their commitments on norms of international cyber behavior.

C. Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening Cybersecurity

On 11 May 2017, President Trump signed an executive order aimed at strengthening cybersecurity. The following is an excerpt from a White House News Release providing an overview of the order, the Executive Order can be found at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/11/presidential-executive-order-strengthening-cybersecurity-federal:

WHITE HOUSE NEWS RELEASE – 12 May 2017

Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure

AMERICA’S NETWORK LEFT VULNERABLE: The United States has been left vulnerable to destructive attacks through cyber space.

The Federal Government, as a large and lucrative target for electronic criminals and foreign agents, has been a victim of cyber intrusions for years.

The cybersecurity of critical American network infrastructure – public and private alike – is under constant attack from both foreign and domestic sources.

On a daily basis we receive new reports of major corporations in the United States [that] have been hacked by foreign-based threats.

TAKING ACTION TO SECURE OUR NATION’S CYBER DEFENSES: President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order to take much needed action to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

- In order to secure our Nation's defense, we are emphasizing Federal cybersecurity.
  - It is now the policy of the United States to manage cybersecurity risk as a Federal enterprise.
  - The President has mandated the use of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework across government, ensuring the same high standards recommended for private industry are applied everywhere.
  - The Executive Order directs agency heads to begin planning for the deliberate modernization of Federal Executive Branch information technology (IT)—a critical, long overdue effort to better manage cyber risk. This work modernizing our IT will be championed from the White House by the President's American Technology Council.
  - Cabinet Secretaries and Agency Directors will be held accountable for managing cyber risk in their respective portfolios, ensuring accountability across the board.
  - The Government's information systems will be optimized, prioritizing modernity, safety, usability, and economy, innovating while addressing security. In this effort, the President has directed a preference towards shared services.
  - Specific actions include:
    - Requiring all agencies to use the industry-standard NIST Cybersecurity Framework (Framework) to manage their cybersecurity risks;
    - Requiring all agencies to prefer shared IT services in all future procurements, to the maximum extent allowed under the law;
    - Requiring all agencies to explicitly document their cybersecurity risk mitigation and acceptance choices, including any decisions to not mitigate known vulnerabilities in a timely manner, and describe their action plan in a report to
implement the Framework, in a report to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB);

- Requiring the Secretary of DHS and the Director of OMB to evaluate the totality of these reports to comprehensively assess the adequacy of the Federal Government's overall cybersecurity risk management posture and propose changes in law, policy, and budgeting to protect adequately the executive branch enterprise;
- Requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence to undertake comparable efforts for national security systems; and
- Empowering the White House's American Technology Council to launch a process of planning for the deliberate modernization of Federal IT, including the technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of transitioning agencies to one or more consolidated network architectures and shared services such as email.

- Government and industry will partner in protecting our Nation's critical infrastructure.
  - As the private sector is heavily involved in our Nation's infrastructure, this Executive Order will prioritize deeper, more collaborative public-private partnerships in threat assessment, detection, protection, and mitigation.
    - Following the principle that "practice makes perfect," the President will work together with infrastructure providers to boost our national resilience to cyber-attacks through training exercises and other operations.
    - Voluntary compliance and collaborative efforts, such as efforts to address denial of service attacks, will be encouraged.
  - Specific actions include:
    - Establishing a clear policy that the Federal Government should bring to bear all of its authorities and capabilities to support the cybersecurity risk management efforts of the owners and operators of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
    - Requiring civilian, military, and intelligence agencies to develop an integrated, comprehensive inventory of the specific legal authorities and capabilities that agencies could employ to support the cybersecurity risk management efforts of those critical infrastructure entities at greatest risk of attacks that could result in catastrophic impacts;
    - Requiring these agencies to offer such support to these entities on a voluntary basis, and to work directly with these entities to solicit their feedback and input on any gaps in the Federal Government's cybersecurity toolkit, including gaps in law, policy, or budgeting;
    - Evaluating Federal Government efforts to promote transparency in cybersecurity risk management practices within critical infrastructure to support market-driven risk management decisions;
    - Convening the private sector to address complex Internet of Things (IoT) cybersecurity challenges, starting with denial of service attacks perpetrated by IoT devices;
    - Strengthening the Nation's ability to respond to and recover from a prolonged power outage caused by a cyber-attack; and
• Mitigating cybersecurity risks to Department of Defense weapons platforms and the defense industrial base, including risks associated with foreign manufacture of sensitive components.

• The Executive Order will strengthen our deterrence posture as a Nation and forge international coalitions to fight back against cyberattacks across the globe.

  o The White House, State Department, and all other applicable Federal agencies will continue to work hand-in-hand with the nations of the world to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure global Internet. The Internet is a United States invention, it should reflect American values as it continues to transform the future for all nations and all generations.

  ▪ The State Department shall be tasked with drafting an international engagement strategy for cybersecurity, outlining America's path forward with our allies.

  o The global shortage of cybersecurity professionals must be addressed, the President is committed to working programs that identify, develop, and retain first-class cyber security talent.

  o Other nations will not be allowed to hold us at risk through the use of cyber-attacks, espionage, or other malicious action.

  o Specific actions include:

    ▪ Formulating strategic options for deterring adversaries and better protecting the American people from cyber threats;

    ▪ Crafting an international engagement strategy for cybersecurity that will outline how the United States will take the initiative and work with partners to defend against and deter malicious actors, promote an international framework for cyber stability, and safeguard an open, interoperable and secure Internet that drives economic and social growth and development in the United States and around the world; and

    ▪ Undertaking a comprehensive review of United States efforts in both the public and private sectors to support the development and sustainment of world-class civilian and military cybersecurity workforces, and benchmarking these efforts against parallel efforts by foreign governments to support their workforces.

II. Department of Homeland Security Strategy and Guidance

A. The Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released this strategy in November 2011. It was developed pursuant to the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and reflects the importance of cyberspace to our economy, security, and way of life. The following is an excerpt of the Executive Summary, The full document can be found at: https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nppd/blueprint-for-a-secure-cyber-future.pdf.

Executive Summary

The Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future builds on the Department of Homeland Security Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report's strategic framework by providing a clear path to create a safe, secure, and resilient cyber environment for the homeland security enterprise. With this guide, stakeholders at all levels of government, the private sector, and our international partners can work together to develop the cybersecurity capabilities that are key to our economy, national security, and public health and safety. The Blueprint describes two areas of action: Protecting our Critical Information Infrastructure Today and Building a Stronger Cyber Ecosystem for Tomorrow. The Blueprint is designed to protect our most vital systems and assets and, over time, drive fundamental change in the way people and devices work together to secure cyberspace. The integration of privacy and civil liberties protections into the Department's cybersecurity activities is fundamental to safeguarding and securing cyberspace.

The Blueprint lists four goals for protecting critical information infrastructure:

- Reduce Exposure to Cyber Risk
- Ensure Priority Response and Recovery
- Maintain Shared Situational Awareness
- Increase Resilience

These goals are supported by nine objectives. Each objective is dependent on a variety of capabilities that, when implemented, will work in tandem to effectively anticipate and respond to a wide range of threats. Some of the cybersecurity capabilities described in the Blueprint are robust and at work today, while others must be expanded. Still others require further research and development. All necessitate a collaborative and responsive cybersecurity community.

Achieving a safe, secure, and resilient cyber environment includes measuring progress in building capabilities and determining whether they are effective in an evolving threat environment. Accordingly, each year's performance will be compared with that of the previous year. This approach will highlight where progress is being made and will identify gaps and resource requirements.

Cyberspace underpins almost every facet of American life, and provides critical support for the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national security. Protecting cyberspace requires strong vision, leadership, and a broadly distributed effort in which all members of the homeland security enterprise take responsibility. The Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future was developed to address this reality.

**B. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity**

The National Institute of Standards and Technology released this framework on 12 February 2014. The following is an excerpt of the Executive Summary, The full document can be found at: https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.

**Executive Summary**

The national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems, placing the Nation's security, economy, and public safety and health at risk. Similar to financial and reputational risk, cybersecurity risk affects a company's bottom line. It can drive up costs and impact revenue. It can harm an organization's ability to innovate and to gain and maintain customers.

To better address these risks, the President issued Executive Order 13636, "Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity," on February 12, 2013, which established that "[i]t is the Policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties."

In enacting this policy, the Executive Order calls for the development of a voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework – a set of industry standards and best practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks. The resulting Framework, created through collaboration between government and the private sector, uses a common language to address and manage cybersecurity risk in a cost-effective way based on business needs without placing additional regulatory requirements on businesses.

The Framework focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the organization's risk management processes. The Framework consists of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and the Framework Implementation Tiers. The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and informative references that are common across critical infrastructure sectors, providing the detailed guidance for developing individual organizational Profiles. Through use of the Profiles, the Framework will help the organization align its cybersecurity activities with its business requirements, risk tolerances, and resources. The Tiers provide a mechanism for organizations to view and understand the characteristics of their approach to managing cybersecurity risk.

The Executive Order also requires that the Framework include a methodology to protect individual privacy and civil liberties when critical infrastructure organizations conduct cybersecurity activities. While processes and existing needs will differ, the Framework can assist organizations in incorporating privacy and civil liberties as part of a comprehensive cybersecurity program.

The Framework enables organizations – regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to improving the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. The Framework provides organization and structure to today's multiple approaches to cybersecurity by assembling standards, guidelines, and practices that are working effectively in industry today. Moreover, because it references globally recognized standards for cybersecurity, the Framework can also be used by organizations located outside the United States and can serve as a model for international cooperation on strengthening critical infrastructure cybersecurity.
The Framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing cybersecurity risk for critical infrastructure. Organizations will continue to have unique risks – different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances – and how they implement the practices in the Framework will vary. Organizations can determine activities that are important to critical service delivery and can prioritize investments to maximize the impact of each dollar spent. Ultimately, the Framework is aimed at reducing and better managing cybersecurity risks.

The Framework is a living document and will continue to be updated and improved as industry provides feedback on implementation. As the Framework is put into practice, lessons learned will be integrated into future versions. This will ensure it is meeting the needs of critical infrastructure owners and operators in a dynamic and challenging environment of new threats, risks, and solutions.

Use of this voluntary Framework is the next step to improve the cybersecurity of our Nation's critical infrastructure – providing guidance for individual organizations, while increasing the cybersecurity posture of the Nation's critical infrastructure as a whole.

III. Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance

A. DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace


**FACT SHEET: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) CYBER STRATEGY**

**APRIL 2015**

An engine of innovation and communication, the Internet connects billions of people, helps deliver goods and services globally, and brings ideas and knowledge to those who would otherwise lack access. The United States relies on the Internet and the systems and data of cyberspace for a wide range of critical services. This reliance leaves us vulnerable in the face of a real and dangerous cyber threat, as state and non-state actors plan to conduct disruptive and destructive cyberattacks on the networks of our critical infrastructure and steal U.S. intellectual property to undercut our technological and military advantage.

The purpose of the new *Department of Defense Cyber Strategy*, the Department's second, is to guide the development of DOD's cyber forces and strengthen its cyber defense and cyber deterrence posture. It focuses on building cyber capabilities and organizations for DOD's **three cyber missions**: defend DOD networks, systems, and information; defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence; and provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingency plans. The strategy sets five strategic goals and establishes specific objectives for DOD to achieve over the next five years and beyond.

**What drove DOD to develop a new cyber strategy?** Three major drivers required that DOD develop a new cyber strategy. First is the increasing severity and sophistication of the cyber threat to U.S. interests, to include DOD networks, information, and systems. The Department of Defense has the largest network in the world and DOD must take aggressive steps to defend its networks, secure its data, and mitigate risks to DOD missions. Second, in 2012 President Obama directed DOD to organize and plan to defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence, in concert with other U.S. government agencies. This new mission required new strategic thinking. Finally, in response to the threat, in 2012 DOD began to build a Cyber Mission Force (CMF) to carry out DOD's cyber missions. The CMF will include nearly 6,200 military, civilian, and contractor support personnel from across the military departments and defense components. The strategy provides clear guidance for the CMF's development.

**Building bridges to the private sector and beyond.** To build the force of the future, DOD must attract the best talent, the best ideas, and the best technology to public service. To do so, DOD must build strong bridges to the private sector as well as the research institutions that make the United States such an innovative nation. The private sector and America's research institutions design and build the networks of cyberspace, provide cybersecurity services, and research and develop advanced capabilities. The Department of Defense has had a strong partnership with the private sector and these research institutions historically, and DOD will strengthen those historic ties to discover and validate new ideas for cybersecurity for DOD and for the country as a whole.

**Deterrence is a key part of DOD's new cyber strategy.** This strategy describes the Department of Defense contributions to a broader national set of capabilities to deter adversaries from conducting cyberattacks. The Department of Defense assumes that the deterrence of
cyberattacks on U.S. interests will be achieved through the totality of U.S. actions, including declaratory policy, substantial indications and warning capabilities, defensive posture, effective response procedures, and the overall resiliency of U.S. networks and systems. DOD has a number of specific roles to play in this equation; this strategy describes how DOD will fulfill its deterrence responsibilities effectively.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND KEY IMPLEMENTATION OBJECTIVES:

I. BUILD AND MAINTAIN READY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS. In 2013, DOD initiated a major investment in its cyber personnel and technologies for the Cyber Mission Force. The Department of Defense must train its people, build effective organizations and command and control systems, and fully develop the capabilities that DOD requires to operate in cyberspace. Key objectives of this goal include:

- Build technical capabilities for operations, to include a unified and integrated operational platform.
- Accelerate research and development to provide DOD with a significant advantage in developing leap-ahead technologies to defend U.S. interests in cyberspace.
- Assess CMF capacity to achieve mission objectives when confronted with multiple contingencies.

II. DEFEND THE DOD INFORMATION NETWORK, SECURE DOD DATA, AND MITIGATE RISKS TO DOD MISSIONS. DOD must identify, prioritize, and defend its most important networks and data so that it can carry out its missions effectively. DOD must also plan and exercise to operate within a degraded and disrupted cyber environment in the event that an attack on DOD's networks and data succeeds, or if aspects of the critical infrastructure on which DOD relies for its operational and contingency plans are disrupted. Key objectives of this goal include:

- Build the Joint Information Environment single security architecture to shift the focus from protecting service-specific networks and systems to securing the DOD enterprise.
- Implement a capability to mitigate all known vulnerabilities that present a high risk to DOD.
- Identify, plan, and defend the networks that support key DOD missions.
- Build a layered defense around the Defense Industrial Base through improved accountability, cybersecurity standards, counterintelligence, and whole of government efforts to counter IP theft.

III. BE PREPARED TO DEFEND THE U.S. HOMELAND AND U.S. VITAL INTERESTS FROM DISRUPTIVE OR DESTRUCTIVE CYBERATTACKS OF SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCE. The Department of Defense must work with its interagency partners, the private sector, and allied and partner nations to deter and if necessary defeat cyberattacks of significant consequence on the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests. The Department of Defense must develop its intelligence, warning, and operational capabilities to mitigate sophisticated, malicious cyberattacks. Key objectives of this goal include:

- Develop intelligence and warning capabilities to anticipate threats.
- Partner with key interagency organizations to prepare to defend the nation in cyberspace.
- Work with DHS to develop continuous and automated mechanisms for sharing information.
- Assess DOD's cyber deterrence posture and provide recommendations for improving it.
IV. BUILD AND MAINTAIN VIABLE CYBER OPTIONS AND PLAN TO USE THOSE OPTIONS TO CONTROL CONFLICT ESCALATION AND TO SHAPE THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT AT ALL STAGES. During heightened tensions or outright hostilities, DOD must be able to provide the President with a wide range of options for managing conflict escalation. As a part of the range of tools available to the United States, DOD must develop viable cyber options and integrate those options into Departmental plans. DOD will develop cyber capabilities to achieve key security objectives with precision, and to minimize loss of life and destruction of property.

V. BUILD AND MAINTAIN ROBUST INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS TO DETER SHARED THREATS AND INCREASE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. All three of DOD's cyber missions require close collaboration with foreign allies and partners. In its international cyber engagement, DOD seeks to build partnership capacity in cybersecurity and cyber defense.

- Partner capacity building will focus on priority regions, to include the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and Europe. DOD will remain adaptive and flexible to build new alliances and partnerships as required.

IV. U.S. Cyber Law Guidance

A. DOS Position on International Law in Cyberspace

Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace


This is a fitting place to discuss the topic I am here to speak about today – the importance of international law and stability in cyberspace – just across the Bay from Silicon Valley, home to many of the world's largest and most innovative information technology companies. The remarkable reach of the Internet and the ever-growing number of connections between computers and other networked devices are delivering significant economic, social, and political benefits to individuals and societies around the world. In addition, an increasing number of States and non-State actors are developing the operational capability and capacity to pursue their objectives through cyberspace. Unfortunately, a number of those actors are employing their capabilities to conduct malicious cyber activities that cause effects in other States' territories. Significant cyber incidents – including many that are reportedly State-sponsored – frequently make headline news.

In light of this, it is reasonable to ask: could we someday reach a tipping point where the risks of connectivity outweigh the benefits we reap from cyberspace? And how can we prevent cyberspace from becoming a source of instability that could lead to inter-State conflict?

I don't think we will reach such a tipping point, but how we maintain cyber stability in order to preserve the continued benefits of connectivity remains a critical question. And international law, I would submit, is an essential element of the answer.

Existing principles of international law form a cornerstone of the United States' strategic framework of international cyber stability during peacetime and during armed conflict. The U.S. strategic framework is designed to achieve and maintain a stable cyberspace environment where all States and individuals are able to realize its benefits fully, where there are advantages to cooperating against common threats and avoiding conflict, and where there is little incentive for States to engage in disruptive behavior or to attack one another.

There are three pillars to the U.S. strategic framework, each of which can help to ensure stability in cyberspace by reducing the risks of misperception and escalation. The first is global affirmation of the applicability of existing international law to State activity in cyberspace in both peacetime and during armed conflict. The second is the development of international consensus on certain additional voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace during peacetime, which is of course the predominant context in which States interact. And the third is the development and implementation of practical confidence-building measures to facilitate inter-State cooperation on cyber-related matters. I'll address two of these pillars—international law and voluntary, non-binding norms—in greater detail today.

International Law

In September 2012, my predecessor, Harold Koh, delivered remarks on "International Law in Cyberspace" at U.S. Cyber Command's Legal Conference. It says a lot about where we were four years ago that the first two questions Koh addressed in his speech were as fundamental as: "Do established principles of international law apply to cyberspace?" and "Is cyberspace a law-free zone, where anything goes?" (So as not to leave you hanging, the answers to those questions are an emphatic "yes" and "no" respectively!)
We have made significant progress since then. One prominent forum in which these issues are discussed is the United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that deals with cyber issues in the context of international security. The GGE is a body established by the UN Secretary-General with a mandate from the UN General Assembly to study, among other things, how international law applies to States' cyber activities, with a view to promoting common understandings. In 2013, the 15-State GGE recognized the applicability of existing international law to States' cyber activities. Just last year, the subsequent UN GGE on the same topic, expanded to include 20 States, built on the 2013 report and took an additional step by recognizing the applicability in cyberspace of the inherent right of self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 2015 GGE report also recognized the applicability of the law of armed conflict's fundamental principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction to the conduct of hostilities in and through cyberspace. With other recent bilateral and multilateral statements, including that of the leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) States in 2015, we have seen an emerging consensus that existing international law applies to States' cyber activities.

Recognizing the applicability of existing international law as a general matter, however, is the easy part, at least for most like-minded nations. Identifying how that law applies to specific cyber activities is more challenging, and States rarely articulate their views on this subject publicly. The United States already has made some efforts in this area, including by setting forth views on the application of international law to cyber activities in Koh’s 2012 speech and also in the U.S. submission to the 2014–15 UN GGE, both of which are publicly available in the Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law. The U.S. Department of Defense also has presented its views on aspects of this topic in its publicly available Law of War Manual. But more work remains to be done.

Increased transparency is important for a number of reasons. Customary international law, of course, develops from a general and consistent practice of States followed by them out of a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. Faced with a relative vacuum of public State practice and opinio juris concerning cyber activities, others have sought to fill the void with their views on how international law applies in this area. The most prominent and comprehensive of these efforts is the Tallinn Manual project. Although this is an initiative of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, it is neither State-led nor an official NATO project. Instead, the project is a non-governmental effort by international lawyers who first set out to identify the international legal rules applicable to cyber warfare, which led to the publication of "Tallinn Manual 1.0" in 2013. The group is now examining the international legal framework that applies to cyber activities below the threshold of the use of force and outside of the context of armed conflict, which will result in the publication of a "Tallinn Manual 2.0" by the end of this year.

I commend the Tallinn Manual project team on what has clearly been a tremendous and thoughtful effort. The United States has unequivocally been in accord with the underlying premise of this project, which is that existing international law applies to State behavior in cyberspace. In this respect, the Tallinn Manuals will make a valuable contribution to underscoring and demonstrating this point across a number of bodies of international law, even if we do not necessarily agree with every aspect of the Manuals.

States must also address these challenging issues. Interpretations or applications of international law proposed by non-governmental groups may not reflect the practice or legal views of many or most States. States' relative silence could lead to unpredictability in the cyber realm, where States may be left guessing about each other's views on the applicable legal framework. In the context of a specific cyber incident, this uncertainty could give rise to misperceptions and miscalculations by States, potentially leading to escalation and, in the worst case, conflict.
To mitigate these risks, States should publicly state their views on how existing international law applies to State conduct in cyberspace to the greatest extent possible in international and domestic forums. Specific cyber incidents provide States with opportunities to do this, but it is equally important—and often easier—for States to articulate public views outside of the context of specific cyber operations or incidents. Stating such views publicly will help give rise to more settled expectations of State behavior and thereby contribute to greater predictability and stability in cyberspace. This is true for the question of what legal rules apply to cyber activity that may constitute a use of force, or that may take place in a situation of armed conflict. It is equally true regarding the question of what legal rules apply to cyber activities that fall below the threshold of the use of force and take place outside of the context of armed conflict.

Although many States, including the United States, generally believe that the existing international legal framework is sufficient to regulate State behavior in cyberspace, States likely have divergent views on specific issues. Further discussion, clarification, and cooperation on these issues remains necessary. The present task is for States to begin to make public their views on how existing international law applies.

In this spirit, and building on Harold Koh’s remarks in 2012 and the United States’ 2014 and 2016 submissions to the UN GGE, I would like to offer some additional U.S. views on how certain rules of international law apply to States’ behavior in cyberspace, beginning first with cyber operations during armed conflict, and then turning to the identification of voluntary, non-binding norms applicable to State behavior during peacetime.

**Cyber Operations in the Context of Armed Conflict**

Turning to cyber operations in armed conflict, I would like to start with the U.S. military’s cyber operations in the context of the ongoing armed conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter informed Congress in April 2016, U.S. Cyber Command has been asked “to take on the war against ISIL as essentially [its] first major combat operation […]. The objectives there are to interrupt ISIL command-and-control, interrupt its ability to move money around, interrupt its ability to tyrannize and control population[s], [and] interrupt its ability to recruit externally.”

The U.S. military must comply with the United States' obligations under the law of armed conflict and other applicable international law when conducting cyber operations against ISIL, just as it does when conducting other types of military operations during armed conflict. To the extent that such cyber operations constitute “attacks” under the law of armed conflict, the rules on conducting attacks must be applied to those cyber operations. For example, such operations must only be directed against military objectives, such as computers, other networked devices, or possibly specific data that, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Such operations also must comport with the requirements of the principles of distinction and proportionality. Feasible precautions must be taken to reduce the risk of incidental harm to civilian infrastructure and users. In the cyber context, this requires parties to a conflict to assess the potential effects of cyber activities on both military and civilian infrastructure and users.

Not all cyber operations, however, rise to the level of an "attack" as a legal matter under the law of armed conflict. When determining whether a cyber activity constitutes an "attack" for purposes of the law of armed conflict, States should consider, among other things, whether a cyber activity results in kinetic or non-kinetic effects, and the nature and scope of those effects, as well as the nature of the connection, if any, between the cyber activity and the particular armed conflict in question.
Even if they do not rise to the level of an "attack" under the law of armed conflict, cyber operations during armed conflict must nonetheless be consistent with the principle of military necessity. For example, a cyber operation that would not constitute an "attack," but would nonetheless seize or destroy enemy property, would have to be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Additionally, even if a cyber operation does not rise to the level of an "attack" or does not cause injury or damage that would need to be considered under the principle of proportionality in conducting attacks, that cyber operation still should comport with the general principles of the law of war.

Other international legal principles beyond the rules and principles of the law of armed conflict that I just discussed are also relevant to U.S. cyber operations undertaken during armed conflict. As then-Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan said in his September 2011 remarks at Harvard Law School, "[i]nternational legal principles, including respect for a State's sovereignty [...], impose important constraints on our ability to act unilaterally [...] in foreign territories." It is to this topic—the role played by State sovereignty in the legal analysis of cyber operations—that I'd like to turn now.

Sovereignty and Cyberspace

In his remarks in 2012, Harold Koh stated that "States conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the sovereignty of other States, including outside the context of armed conflict." I would like to build on that statement and offer a few thoughts about the relevance of sovereignty principles to States' cyber activities.

As an initial matter, remote cyber operations involving computers or other networked devices located on another State's territory do not constitute a per se violation of international law. In other words, there is no absolute prohibition on such operations as a matter of international law. This is perhaps most clear where such activities in another State's territory have no effects or de minimis effects.

Most States, including the United States, engage in intelligence collection abroad. As President Obama said, the collection of intelligence overseas is "not unique to America." As the President has also affirmed, the United States, like other nations, has gathered intelligence throughout its history to ensure that national security and foreign policy decisionmakers have access to timely, accurate, and insightful information. Indeed, the President issued a directive in 2014 to clarify the principles that would be followed by the United States in undertaking the collection of signals intelligence abroad.

Such widespread and perhaps nearly universal practice by States of intelligence collection abroad indicates that there is no per se prohibition on such activities under customary international law. I would caution, however, that because "intelligence collection" is not a defined term, the absence of a per se prohibition on these activities does not settle the question of whether a specific intelligence collection activity might nonetheless violate a provision of international law.

Although certain activities—including cyber operations—may violate another State's domestic law, that is a separate question from whether such activities violate international law. The United States is deeply respectful of other States' sovereign authority to prescribe laws governing activities in their territory. Disrespecting another State's domestic laws can have serious legal and foreign policy consequences. As a legal matter, such an action could result in the criminal prosecution and punishment of a State's agents in the United States or abroad, for example, for offenses such as espionage or for violations of foreign analogs to provisions such as the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. From a foreign policy perspective, one can look to the consequences that flow from disclosures related to such programs. But such domestic law and
foreign policy issues do not resolve the independent question of whether the activity violates international law.

In certain circumstances, one State's non-consensual cyber operation in another State's territory could violate international law, even if it falls below the threshold of a use of force. This is a challenging area of the law that raises difficult questions. The very design of the Internet may lead to some encroachment on other sovereign jurisdictions. Precisely when a non-consensual cyber operation violates the sovereignty of another State is a question lawyers within the U.S. government continue to study carefully, and it is one that ultimately will be resolved through the practice and opinio juris of States.

Relatedly, consider the challenges we face in clarifying the international law prohibition on unlawful intervention. As articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its judgment on the merits in the Nicaragua Case, this rule of customary international law forbids States from engaging in coercive action that bears on a matter that each State is entitled, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely, such as the choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system. This is generally viewed as a relatively narrow rule of customary international law, but States' cyber activities could run afoul of this prohibition. For example, a cyber operation by a State that interferes with another country's ability to hold an election or that manipulates another country's election results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention. For increased transparency, States need to do more work to clarify how the international law on non-intervention applies to States' activities in cyberspace.

Some may ask why it matters where the international community draws these legal lines. Put starkly, why does it matter whether an activity violates international law? It matters, of course, because the community of nations has committed to abide by international law, including with respect to activities in cyberspace. International law enables States to work together to meet common goals, including the pursuit of stability in cyberspace. And international law sets binding standards of State behavior that not only induce compliance by States but also provide compliant States with a stronger basis for criticizing – and rallying others to respond to – States that violate those standards. As Harold Koh stated in 2012, "[i]f we succeed in promoting a culture of compliance, we will reap the benefits. And if we earn a reputation for compliance, the actions we do take will earn enhanced legitimacy worldwide for their adherence to the rule of law." Working to clarify how international law applies to States' activities in cyberspace serves those ends, as it does in so many other critical areas of State activity.

Before leaving the topic of sovereignty, I'd like to address one additional related issue involving a State's control over cyber infrastructure and activities within, rather than outside, its territory. In his 2012 speech, Koh observed that "[t]he physical infrastructure that supports the Internet and cyber activities is generally located in sovereign territory and is subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial State." However, he went on to emphasize that "[t]he exercise of jurisdiction by the territorial State, however, is not unlimited; it must be consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights obligations."

I want to underscore this important point. Some States invoke the concept of State sovereignty as a justification for excessive regulation of online content, including censorship and access restrictions, often undertaken in the name of counterterrorism or "countering violent extremism." And sometimes, States also deploy the concept of State sovereignty in an attempt to shield themselves from outside criticism.

So let me repeat what Koh made clear: Any regulation by a State of matters within its territory, including use of and access to the Internet, must comply with that State's applicable obligations under international human rights law.
There is no doubt that terrorist groups have become dangerously adept at using the Internet and other communications technologies to propagate their hateful messages, recruit adherents, and urge followers to commit violent acts. This is why all governments must work together to target online criminal activities – such as illicit money transfers, terrorist attack planning and coordination, criminal solicitation, and the provision of material support to terrorist groups. U.S. efforts to prevent the Internet from being used for terrorist purposes also focus on criminal activities that facilitate terrorism, such as financing and recruitment, not on restricting expressive content, even if that content is repugnant or inimical to our core values.

Such efforts must not be conflated with broader calls to restrict public access to or censor the Internet, or even – as some have suggested – to effectively shut down entire portions of the Web. Such measures would not advance our security, and they would be inconsistent with our values. The Internet must remain open to the free flow of information and ideas. Restricting the flow of ideas also inhibits spreading the values of understanding and mutual respect that offer one of the most powerful antidotes to the hateful and violent narratives propagated by terrorist groups.

That is why the United States holds the view that use of the Internet, including social media, in furtherance of terrorism and other criminal activity must be addressed through lawful means that respect each State's international obligations and commitments regarding human rights, including the freedom of expression, and that serve the objectives of the free flow of information and a free and open Internet. To be sure, the incitement of imminent terrorist violence may be restricted. However, certain censorship and content control, including blocking websites simply because they contain content that criticizes a leader, a government policy, or an ideology, or because the content espouses particular religious beliefs, violates international human rights law and must not be engaged in by States.

**State Responsibility and the "Problem of Attribution" in Cyberspace**

I have been talking thus far about States' activities and operations in cyberspace. But as many of you know, it is often difficult to detect who or what is responsible for a given cyber incident. This leads me to the frequently raised and much debated "problem of attribution" in cyberspace.

States and commentators often express concerns about the challenge of attribution in a technical sense – that is, the challenge of obtaining facts, whether through technical indicators or all-source intelligence, that would inform a State's determinations about a particular cyber incident. Others have raised issues related to political decisions about attribution – that is, considerations that might be relevant to a State's decision to go public and identify another State as the actor responsible for a particular cyber incident and to condemn that act as unacceptable. These technical and policy discussions about attribution, however, should be distinguished from the legal questions about attribution. In my present remarks, I will focus on the issue of attribution in the legal sense.

From a legal perspective, the customary international law of state responsibility supplies the standards for attributing acts, including cyber acts, to States. For example, cyber operations conducted by organs of a State or by persons or entities empowered by domestic law to exercise governmental authority are attributable to that State, if such organs, persons, or entities are acting in that capacity.

Additionally, cyber operations conducted by non-State actors are attributable to a State under the law of state responsibility when such actors engage in operations pursuant to the State's instructions or under the State's direction or control, or when the State later acknowledges and adopts the operations as its own.
Thus, as a legal matter, States cannot escape responsibility for internationally wrongful cyber acts by perpetrating them through proxies. When there is information – whether obtained through technical means or all-source intelligence – that permits a cyber act engaged in by a non-State actor to be attributed legally to a State under one of the standards set forth in the law of state responsibility, the victim State has all of the rights and remedies against the responsible State allowed under international law.

The law of state responsibility does not set forth explicit burdens or standards of proof for making a determination about legal attribution. In this context, a State acts as its own judge of the facts and may make a unilateral determination with respect to attribution of a cyber operation to another State. Absolute certainty is not – and cannot be – required. Instead, international law generally requires that States act reasonably under the circumstances when they gather information and draw conclusions based on that information.

I also want to note that, despite the suggestion by some States to the contrary, there is no international legal obligation to reveal evidence on which attribution is based prior to taking appropriate action. There may, of course, be political pressure to do so, and States may choose to reveal such evidence to convince other States to join them in condemnation, for example. But that is a policy choice – it is not compelled by international law.

**Countermeasures and Other "Defensive" Measures**

I want to turn now to the question of what options a victim State might have to respond to malicious cyber activity that falls below the threshold of an armed attack. As an initial matter, a State can always undertake unfriendly acts that are not inconsistent with any of its international obligations in order to influence the behavior of other States. Such acts – which are known as acts of retorsion – may include, for example, the imposition of sanctions or the declaration that a diplomat is persona non grata.

In certain circumstances, a State may take action that would otherwise violate international law in response to malicious cyber activity. One example is the use of force in self-defense in response to an actual or imminent armed attack. Another example is that, in exceptional circumstances, a State may be able to avail itself of the plea of necessity, which, subject to certain conditions, might preclude the wrongfulness of an act if the act is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.

In the time that remains, however, I would like to talk about a type of State response that has received a lot of attention in discussions about cyberspace: countermeasures. The customary international law doctrine of countermeasures permits a State that is the victim of an internationally wrongful act of another State to take otherwise unlawful measures against the responsible State in order to cause that State to comply with its international obligations, for example, the obligation to cease its internationally wrongful act. Therefore, as a threshold matter, the availability of countermeasures to address malicious cyber activity requires a prior internationally wrongful act that is attributable to another State. As with all countermeasures, this puts the responding State in the position of potentially being held responsible for violating international law if it turns out that there wasn’t actually an internationally wrongful act that triggered the right to take countermeasures, or if the responding State made an inaccurate attribution determination. That is one reason why countermeasures should not be engaged in lightly.

Additionally, under the law of countermeasures, measures undertaken in response to an internationally wrongful act performed in or through cyberspace that is attributable to a State must be directed only at the State responsible for the wrongful act and must meet the principles of necessity and proportionality, including the requirements that a countermeasure must be
designed to cause the State to comply with its international obligations – for example, the obligation to cease its internationally wrongful act – and must cease as soon as the offending State begins complying with the obligations in question.

The doctrine of countermeasures also generally requires the injured State to call upon the responsible State to comply with its international obligations before a countermeasure may be taken – in other words, the doctrine generally requires what I will call a "prior demand." The sufficiency of a prior demand should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular circumstances of the situation at hand and the purpose of the requirement, which is to give the responsible State notice of the injured State's claim and an opportunity to respond.

I also should note that countermeasures taken in response to internationally wrongful cyber activities attributable to a State generally may take the form of cyber-based countermeasures or non-cyber-based countermeasures. That is a decision typically within the discretion of the responding State and will depend on the circumstances.

Voluntary, Non-Binding Norms of Responsible State Behavior in Peacetime

In the remainder of my remarks, I'd like to discuss very briefly another element of the United States' strategic framework for international cyber stability: the development of international consensus on certain additional voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace that apply during peacetime.

Internationally, the United States has identified and promoted four such norms:

- First, a State should not conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, or other confidential business information with the intent of providing competitive advantages to its companies or commercial sectors.
- Second, a State should not conduct or knowingly support online activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use of critical infrastructure to provide service to the public.
- Third, a State should not conduct or knowingly support activity intended to prevent national computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) from responding to cyber incidents. A State also should not use CSIRTs to enable online activity that is intended to do harm.
- Fourth, a State should cooperate, in a manner consistent with its domestic and international obligations, with requests for assistance from other States in investigating cyber crimes, collecting electronic evidence, and mitigating malicious cyber activity emanating from its territory.

These four U.S.-promoted norms seek to address specific areas of risk that are of national and/or economic security concern to all States. Although voluntary and non-binding in nature, these norms can serve to define an international standard of behavior to be observed by responsible, like-minded States with the goal of preventing bad actors from engaging in malicious cyber activity. If observed, these measures – which can include measures of self-restraint – can contribute substantially to conflict prevention and stability. Over time, these norms can potentially provide common standards for responsible States to use to identify and respond to behavior that deviates from these norms. As more States commit to observing these norms, they will be increasingly willing to condemn the malicious activities of bad actors and to join together to ensure that there are consequences for those activities.

It is important, however, to distinguish clearly between international law, on the one hand, and voluntary, non-binding norms on the other. These four norms identified by the United States, or
the other peacetime cyber norms recommended in the 2015 UN GGE report, fall squarely in the voluntary, non-binding category. These voluntary, non-binding norms set out standards of expected State behavior that may, in certain circumstances, overlap with standards of behavior that are required as a matter of international law. Such norms are intended to supplement existing international law. They are designed to address certain cyber activities by States that occur outside of the context of armed conflict that are potentially destabilizing. That said, it is possible that if States begin to accept the standards set out in such non-binding norms as legally required and act in conformity with them, such norms could, over time, crystallize into binding customary international law. As a result, States should approach the process of identifying and committing to such non-binding norms with care.

In closing, I wanted to highlight a few points. First, cyberspace may be a relatively new frontier, but State behavior in cyberspace, as in other areas, remains embedded in an existing framework of law, including international law. Second, States have the primary responsibility for identifying how existing legal frameworks apply in cyberspace. Third, States have a responsibility to publicly articulate applicable standards. This is critical to enable an accurate understanding of international law, in the area of cyberspace and beyond. I hope that these remarks have furthered this goal of transparency, and highlighted the important role of international law, and international lawyers, in this important and dynamic area.

B. DOD Law of War Manual


XVI – Cyber Operations

Chapter Contents

16.1 Introduction
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16.3 Cyber Operations and Jus ad Bellum
16.4 Cyber Operations and the Law of Neutrality
16.5 Cyber Operations and Jus in Bello
16.6 Legal Review of Weapons That Employ Cyber Capabilities

16.1 INTRODUCTION This Chapter addresses the law of war and cyber operations. It addresses how law of war principles and rules apply to relatively novel cyber capabilities and the cyber domain.

As a matter of U.S. policy, the United States has sought to work internationally to clarify how existing international law and norms, including law of war principles, apply to cyber operations.1 Precisely how the law of war applies to cyber operations is not well-settled, and aspects of the law in this area are likely to continue to develop, especially as new cyber capabilities are developed and States determine their views in response to such developments.2

16.1.1 Cyberspace as a Domain. As a doctrinal matter, DOD has recognized cyberspace as an operational domain in which the armed forces must be able to defend and operate, just like the land, sea, air, and space domains.3

Cyberspace may be defined as “[a] global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”4

16.1.2 Description of Cyber Operations. Cyberspace operations may be understood to be those operations that involve “[t]he employment of cyber space capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.”5 Cyber operations: (1) use cyber capabilities, such as computers, software tools, or networks; and (2) have a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.

16.1.2.1 Examples of Cyber Operations. Cyber operations include those operations that use computers to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. Cyber operations can be a form of advance force operations, which precede the main effort in an objective area in order to prepare the objective for the main assault. For example, cyber operations may include reconnaissance (e.g., mapping a network), seizure of supporting positions (e.g., securing access to key network systems or nodes), and pre-emplacement of capabilities or weapons (e.g., implanting cyber access tools or malicious code). In addition, cyber operations may be a method of acquiring foreign intelligence unrelated to specific military objectives, such as understanding technological developments or gaining information about an adversary’s military capabilities and intent.
16.1.2.2 **Examples of Operations That Would Not Be Regarded as Cyber Operations.** Cyber operations generally would not include activities that merely use computers or cyberspace without a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. For example, operations that use computer networks to facilitate command and control, operations that use air traffic control systems, and operations to distribute information broadly using computers would generally not be considered cyber operations. Operations that target an adversary's cyberspace capabilities, but that are not achieved in or through cyberspace, would not be considered cyber operations. For example, the bombardment of a network hub, or the jamming of wireless communications, would not be considered cyber operations, even though they may achieve military objectives in cyberspace.

16.1.3 **Cyber Operations – Notes on Terminology.** DOD doctrine and terminology for cyber operations continue to develop.

16.1.3.1 **“Cyber” Versus “Cyberspace” as an Adjective.** The terms "cyber" and "cyberspace" when used as an adjective (e.g., cyber-attack, cyber defense, cyber operation) are generally used interchangeably.

16.1.3.2 **Cyber Attacks or Computer Network Attacks.** The term "attack" often has been used in a colloquial sense in discussing cyber operations to refer to many different types of hostile or malicious cyber activities, such as the defacement of websites, network intrusions, the theft of private information, or the disruption of the provision of Internet services. Operations described as "cyber attacks" or "computer network attacks," therefore, are not necessarily "attacks" for the purposes of applying rules on conducting attacks during the conduct of hostilities. Similarly, operations described as "cyber attacks" or "computer network attacks" are not necessarily "armed attacks" for the purposes of triggering a State's inherent right of self-defense under *jus ad bellum*.

16.2 **APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WAR TO CYBER OPERATIONS**

Specific law of war rules may apply to cyber operations, even though those rules were developed before cyber operations were possible. When no more specific law of war rule or other applicable rule applies, law of war principles provide a general guide for conduct during cyber operations in armed conflict.

16.2.1 **Application of Specific Law of War Rules to Cyber Operations.** Specific law of war rules may be applicable to cyber operations, even though these rules were developed long before cyber operations were possible.

The law of war affirmatively anticipates technological innovation and contemplates that its existing rules will apply to such innovation, including cyber operations. Law of war rules may apply to new technologies because the rules often are not framed in terms of specific technological means. For example, the rules on conducting attacks do not depend on what type of weapon is used to conduct the attack. Thus, cyber operations may be subject to a variety of law of war rules depending on the rule and the nature of the cyber operation. For example, if the physical consequences of a cyber attack constitute the kind of physical damage that would be caused by dropping a bomb or firing a missile, that cyber attack would equally be subject to the same rules that apply to attacks using bombs or missiles.

Cyber operations may pose challenging legal questions because of the variety of effects they can produce. For example, cyber operations could be a non-forcible means or method of conducting hostilities (such as information gathering), and would be regulated as such under rules applicable to non-forcible means and methods of warfare. Other cyber operations could be used to create effects that amount to an attack and would be regulated under the rules on
conducting attacks. Moreover, another set of challenging issues may arise when considering whether a particular cyber operation might be regarded as a seizure or destruction of enemy property and should be assessed as such.

16.2.2 Application of Law of War Principles as a General Guide to Cyber Operations. When no specific rule applies, the principles of the law of war form the general guide for conduct during war, including conduct during cyber operations. For example, under the principle of humanity; suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose must be avoided in cyber operations.

Certain cyber operations may not have a clear kinetic parallel in terms of their capabilities and the effects they create. Such operations may have implications that are quite different from those presented by attacks using traditional weapons, and those different implications may well yield different conclusions.

16.3 CYBER OPERATIONS AND JUS AD BELLUM

Cyber operations may present issues under the law of war governing the resort to force (i.e., jus ad bellum). Prohibition on Cyber Operations That Constitute Illegal Uses of Force Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Cyber operations may in certain circumstances constitute uses of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law. For example, if cyber operations cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means, would be regarded as a use of force under jus ad bellum, then such cyber operations would likely also be regarded as a use of force. Such operations may include cyber operations that: (1) trigger a nuclear plant meltdown; (2) open a dam above a populated area, causing destruction; or (3) disable air traffic control services, resulting in airplane crashes. Similarly, cyber operations that cripple a military's logistics systems, and thus its ability to conduct and sustain military operations, might also be considered a use of force under jus ad bellum. Other factors, besides the effects of the cyber operation, may also be relevant to whether the cyber operation constitutes a use of force under jus ad bellum.

Cyber operations that constitute uses of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law must have a proper legal basis in order not to violate jus ad bellum prohibitions on the resort to force.

16.3.2 Peacetime Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities. International law and long-standing international norms are applicable to State behavior in cyberspace, and the question of the legality of peacetime intelligence and counterintelligence activities must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Generally, to the extent that cyber operations resemble traditional intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, such as unauthorized intrusions into computer networks solely to acquire information, then such cyber operations would likely be treated similarly under international law. The United States conducts such activities via cyberspace, and such operations are governed by long-standing and well-established considerations, including the possibility that those operations could be interpreted as a hostile act.

16.3.3 Responding to Hostile or Malicious Cyber Operations. A State's inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, may be triggered by cyber operations that amount to an armed attack or imminent threat thereof. As a matter of
national policy, the United States has expressed the view that when warranted, it will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as it would to any other threat to the country.28

Measures taken in the exercise of the right of national self-defense in response to an armed attack must be reported immediately to the U.N. Security Council in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.29

16.3.3.1 Use of Force Versus Armed Attack. The United States has long taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force.30 Thus, any cyber operation that constitutes an illegal use of force against a State potentially gives rise to a right to take necessary and proportionate action in self-defense.31

16.3.3.2 No Legal Requirement for a Cyber Response to a Cyber Attack. There is no legal requirement that the response in self-defense to a cyber armed attack take the form of a cyber action, as long as the response meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality.32

16.3.3.3 Responses to Hostile or Malicious Cyber Acts That Do Not Constitute Uses of Force. Although cyber operations that do not constitute uses of force under jus ad bellum would not permit injured States to use force in self-defense, those injured States may be justified in taking necessary and appropriate actions in response that do not constitute a use of force.33 Such actions might include, for example, a diplomatic protest, an economic embargo, or other acts of retorsion.34

16.3.3.4 Attribution and Self-Defense Against Cyber Operations. Attribution may pose a difficult factual question in responding to hostile or malicious cyber operations because adversaries may be able to hide or disguise their activities or identities in cyberspace more easily than in the case of other types of operations.35 A State’s right to take necessary and proportionate action in self-defense in response to an armed attack originating through cyberspace applies whether the attack is attributed to another State or to a non-State actor.36

16.3.3.5 Authorities Under U.S. Law to Respond to Hostile Cyber Acts. Decisions about whether to invoke a State’s inherent right of self-defense would be made at the national level because they involve the State’s rights and responsibilities under international law. For example, in the United States, such decisions would generally be made by the President.

The Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. forces have addressed the authority of the U.S. armed forces to take action in self-defense in response to hostile acts or hostile intent, including such acts perpetrated in or through cyberspace.37

16.4 CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY

The law of neutrality may be important in certain cyber operations. For example, under the law of neutrality, belligerent States are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral States.38 Because of the interconnected nature of cyberspace, cyber operations targeting networked information infrastructures in one State may create effects in another State that is not a party to the armed conflict.39

16.4.1 Cyber Operations That Use Communications Infrastructure in Neutral States. The law of neutrality has addressed the use of communications infrastructure in neutral States, and in certain circumstances, these rules would apply to cyber operations.

The use of communications infrastructure in neutral States may be implicated under the general rule that neutral territory may not serve as a base of operations for one belligerent against another.40 In particular, belligerent States are prohibited from erecting on the territory of a neutral State any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea, or from using any installation of this kind established by them before the armed conflict.
on the territory of a neutral State for purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages. However, merely relaying information through neutral communications infrastructure (provided that the facilities are made available impartially) generally would not constitute a violation of the law of neutrality that belligerent States would have an obligation to refrain from and that a neutral State would have an obligation to prevent. This rule was developed because it was viewed as impractical for neutral States to censor or screen their publicly available communications infrastructure for belligerent traffic. Thus, for example, it would not be prohibited for a belligerent State to route information through cyber infrastructure in a neutral State that is open for the service of public messages, and that neutral State would have no obligation to forbid such traffic. This rule would appear to be applicable even if the information that is being routed through neutral communications infrastructure may be characterized as a cyber weapon or otherwise could cause destructive effects in a belligerent State (but no destructive effects within the neutral State or States).

16.5 CYBER OPERATIONS AND JUS IN BELLO

This section addresses *jus in bello* rules and cyber operations.

16.5.1 Cyber Operations That Constitute "Attacks" for the Purpose of Applying Rules on Conducting Attacks. If a cyber operation constitutes an attack, then the law of war rules on conducting attacks must be applied to those cyber operations. For example, such operations must comport with the requirements of distinction and proportionality.

For example, a cyber attack that would destroy enemy computer systems could not be directed against ostensibly civilian infrastructure, such as computer systems belonging to stock exchanges, banking systems, and universities, unless those computer systems met the test for being a military objective under the circumstances. A cyber operation that would not constitute an attack, but would nonetheless seize or destroy enemy property, would have to be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.

16.5.1.1 Assessing Incidental Injury or Damage During Cyber Operations. The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks in which the expected loss of life or injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack, would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.

For example, in applying this prohibition to cyber operations, it might be important to assess the potential effects of a cyber attack on computers that are not military objectives, such as private, civilian computers that hold no military significance, but that may be networked to computers that are valid military objectives.

In assessing incidental injury or damage during cyber operations, it may be important to consider that remote harms and lesser forms of harm, such as mere inconveniences or temporary disruptions, need not be considered in assessing whether an attack is prohibited by the principle of proportionality. For example, a minor, brief disruption of Internet services to civilians that results incidentally from a cyber attack against a military objective generally would not need to be considered in a proportionality analysis. In addition, the economic harms in the belligerent State resulting from such disruptions, such as civilian businesses in the belligerent State being unable to conduct e-commerce, generally would not need to be considered in a proportionality analysis.

Even if cyber operations that constitute attacks are not expected to result in excessive incidental loss of life or injury or damage such that the operation would be prohibited by the principle of proportionality, the party to the conflict nonetheless would be required to take feasible precautions to limit such loss of life or injury and damage in conducting those cyber operations.
16.5.2 Cyber Operations That Do Not Amount to an "Attack" Under the Law of War. A cyber operation that does not constitute an attack is not restricted by the rules that apply to attacks. Factors that would suggest that a cyber operation is not an "attack" include whether the operation causes only reversible effects or only temporary effects. Cyber operations that generally would not constitute attacks include:

- defacing a government webpage;
- a minor, brief disruption of Internet services;
- briefly disrupting, disabling, or interfering with communications; and
- disseminating propaganda.

Since such operations generally would not be considered attacks under the law of war, they generally would not need to be directed at military objectives, and may be directed at civilians or civilian objects. Nonetheless, such operations must not be directed against enemy civilians or civilian objects unless the operations are militarily necessary. Moreover, such operations should comport with the general principles of the law of war.

For example, even if a cyber operation is not an "attack" or does not cause any injury or damage that would need to be considered under the principle of proportionality in conducting attacks, that cyber operation still should not be conducted in a way that unnecessarily causes inconvenience to civilians or neutral persons.

16.5.3 Duty to Take Feasible Precautions and Cyber Operations. Parties to a conflict must take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of incidental harm to the civilian population and other protected persons and objects. Parties to the conflict that employ cyber operations should take precautions to minimize the harm of their cyber activities on civilian infrastructure and users.

The obligation to take feasible precautions may be of greater relevance in cyber operations than other law of war rules because this obligation applies to a broader set of activities than those to which other law of war rules apply. For example, the obligation to take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of incidental harm would apply to a party conducting an attack even if the attack would not be prohibited by the principle of proportionality. In addition, the obligation to take feasible precautions applies even if a party is not conducting an attack because the obligation also applies to a party that is subject to attack.

16.5.3.1 Cyber Tools as Potential Measures to Reduce the Risk of Harm to Civilians or Civilian Objects. In some cases, cyber operations that result in non-kinetic or reversible effects can offer options that help minimize unnecessary harm to civilians. In this regard, cyber capabilities may in some circumstances be preferable, as a matter of policy, to kinetic weapons because their effects may be reversible, and they may hold the potential to accomplish military goals without any destructive kinetic effect at all.

As with other precautions, the decision of which weapon to use will be subject to many practical considerations, including effectiveness, cost, and "fragility," i.e., the possibility that once used an adversary may be able to devise defenses that will render a cyber tool ineffective in the future. Thus, as with special kinetic weapons, such as precision-guided munitions that have the potential to produce less incidental damage than other kinetic weapons, cyber capabilities usually will not be the only type of weapon that is legally permitted.

16.5.4 Prohibition on Improper Use of Signs During Cyber Operations. Under the law of war, certain signs may not be used improperly. These prohibitions may also be applicable during cyber operations. For example, it would not be permissible to conduct a cyber attack or to attempt to disable enemy internal communications by making use of communications that initiate non-hostile relations, such as prisoner exchanges or ceasefires.
Similarly, it would be prohibited to fabricate messages from an enemy’s Head of State falsely informing that State’s forces that an armistice or cease-fire had been signed.67

On the other hand, the restriction on the use of enemy flags, insignia, and uniforms only applies to concrete visual objects; it does not restrict the use of enemy codes, passwords, and countersigns.68 Thus, for example, it would not be prohibited to disguise network traffic as though it came from enemy computers or to use enemy codes during cyber operations.

16.5.5 Use of Civilian Personnel to Support Cyber Operations. As with non-cyber operations, the law of war does not prohibit States from using civilian personnel to support their cyber operations, including support actions that may constitute taking a direct part in hostilities.69

Under the GPW, persons who are not members of the armed forces, but who are authorized to accompany them, are entitled to POW status.70 This category was intended to include, inter alia, civilian personnel with special skills in operating military equipment who support and participate in military operations, such as civilian members of military aircrews.71 It would include civilian cyber specialists who have been authorized to accompany the armed forces.

Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities forfeit protection from being made the object of attack.72

16.6 LEGAL REVIEW OF WEAPONS THAT EMPLOY CYBER CAPABILITIES

DOD policy requires the legal review of the acquisition of weapons or weapon systems.73 This policy would include the review of weapons that employ cyber capabilities to ensure that they are not per se prohibited by the law of war.74 Not all cyber capabilities, however, constitute a weapon or weapons system. Military Department regulations address what cyber capabilities require legal review.75

The law of war does not prohibit the development of novel cyber weapons. The customary law of war prohibitions on specific types of weapons result from State practice and opinio juris demonstrating that a type of weapon is illegal; the mere fact that a weapon is novel or employs new technology does not mean that the weapon is illegal.76

Although which issues may warrant legal analysis would depend on the characteristics of the weapon being assessed, a legal review of the acquisition or procurement of a weapon that employs cyber capabilities likely would assess whether the weapon is inherently indiscriminate.77 For example, a destructive computer virus that was programmed to spread and destroy uncontrollably within civilian Internet systems would be prohibited as an inherently indiscriminate weapon.78

End Notes:

1 See, e.g., United States Submission to the U. N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2014 – 15) , 1 (“But the challenge is not whether existing international law applies to State behavior in cyberspace. As the 2012 – 13 GGE affirmed, international law does apply, and such law is essential to regulating State conduct in this domain. The challenge is providing decision-makers with considerations that may be taken into account when determining how existing international law applies to cyber activities. Despite this challenge, history has shown that States, through consultation and cooperation, have repeatedly and successfully applied existing bodies of law to new technologies. It continues to be the U.S. view that all States will benefit from a stable international ICT [information and communication technologies] environment in which existing international law is the foundation for responsible State behavior in cyberspace.”); Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, 9 (May 2011) (“The development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding state behavior — in times of peace and conflict — also apply in cyberspace. Nonetheless, unique attributes of networked technology require additional work to clarify how
these norms apply and what additional understandings might be necessary to supplement them. We will continue to work internationally to forge consensus regarding how norms of behavior apply to cyberspace, with the understanding that an important first step in such efforts is applying the broad expectations of peaceful and just interstate conduct to cyberspace.

2 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 464 - 65 (2002) (“The international community ordinarily does not negotiate treaties to deal with problems until their consequences have begun to be felt. This is not all bad, since the solution can be tailored to the actual problems that have occurred, rather than to a range of hypothetical possibilities. One consequence, however, is that the resulting law, whether domestic or international, may be sharply influenced by the nature of the events that precipitate legal developments, together with all their attendant policy and political considerations. Similarly, we can make some educated guesses as to how the international legal system will respond to information operations, but the direction that response actually ends up taking may depend a great deal on the nature of the events that draw the nations’ attention to the issue. If information operations techniques are seen as just another new technology that does not greatly threaten the nations’ interests, no dramatic legal developments may occur. If they are seen as a revolutionary threat to the security of nations and the welfare of their citizens, it will be much more likely that efforts will be made to restrict or prohibit information operations by legal means. These are considerations that national leaders should understand in making decisions on using information operations techniques in the current formative period, but it should also be understood that the course of future events is often beyond the control of statesmen.”).

3 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 3 (Dec. 2012) (“Cyberspace is not a ‘law-free’ zone where anyone can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraint. Think of it this way. This is not the first time that technology has changed and that international law has been asked to deal with those changes. In particular, because the tools of conflict are constantly evolving, one relevant body of law — international humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict — affirmatively anticipates technological innovation, and contemplates that its existing rules will apply to such innovation.”).

4 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 3 - 4 (Dec. 2012) (“In analyzing whether a cyber operation would constitute a use of force, most commentators focus on whether the direct physical injury and property damage resulting from the cyber event looks like that which would be considered a use of force if produced by kinetic weapons. For example, cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force. ... Only a moment’s reflection makes you realize that this is common sense: if the physical consequences of a cyber attack work the kind of physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber attack should equally be considered a use of force.”).

10 Refer to § 5.26 (Non-forcible Means and Methods of Warfare). 11 Refer to § 5.5 (Rules on Conducting Assaults, Bombardments, and Other Attacks).

12 Refer to § 5.17 (Seizure and Destruction of Enemy Property).

13 Refer to § 2.1.2.2 (Law of War Principles as a General Guide).

14 Refer to § 2.3 (Humanity).

15 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 7 (Dec. 2012) (“I have also noted some clear-cut cases where the physical effects of a hostile cyber action would be comparable to what a kinetic action could achieve: for example, a bomb might break a dam and flood a civilian population, but insertion of a line of malicious code from a distant computer might just as easily achieve that same result. As you all know, however, there are other types of cyber actions that do not have a clear kinetic parallel, which raise profound questions about exactly what we mean by ‘force.’”).
states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could present implications that are quite different from the implications presented by attacks with traditional weapons. These different implications may well yield different conclusions.

17 Refer to § 1.11 (Jus ad Bellum).

18 U.N. C HARTER art. 2(4).

19 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) reprinted in 54 H ARVARD I NTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 3 (Dec. 2012) (“Cyber activities may in certain circumstances constitute uses of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law.”).

20 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 4 (Dec. 2012) (“Commonly cited examples of cyber activity that would constitute a use of force include, for example, (1) operations that trigger a nuclear plant meltdown, (2) operations that open a dam above a populated area causing destruction, or (3) operations that disable air traffic control resulting in airplane crashes.”).

21 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 483 (2002) (“Even if the systems attacked were unclassified military logistics systems, an attack on such systems might seriously threaten a nation’s security. For example, corrupting the data in a nation’s computerized systems for managing its military fuel, spare parts, transportation, troop mobilization, or medical supplies may seriously interfere with its ability to conduct military operations. In short, the consequences are likely to be more important than the means used.”).

22 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 4 (Dec. 2012) (“In assessing whether an event constituted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors including the context of the event, the actor perpetrating the action (recognizing challenging issues of attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects and intent, among other possible issues.”).

23 Refer to § 1.11.3 (Prohibition on Certain Uses of Force).

24 Refer to § 16.1 (Introduction).


27 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 4 (Dec. 2012) (“Question 4: May a state ever respond to a computer network attack by exercising a right of national self-defense? Answer 4: Yes. A state’s national right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, may be triggered by computer network activities that amount to an armed attack or imminent threat thereof.”; Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, 10 (May 2011) (“Right of Self-Defense: Consistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace.”).

28 Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, 14 (May 2011) (“When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our military treaty partners. We reserve the right to use all necessary means — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic — as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests. In so doing, we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad international support whenever possible.”).

29 Refer to § 1.11.5.6 (Reporting to the U.N. Security Council).

30 Refer to § 1.11.5.2 (Use of Force Versus Armed Attack).

31 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 H ARVARD I NTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 7 (Dec. 2012) (“To cite just one example of this, the United States has for a long time taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force. In our view, there is no threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an "armed attack" that may warrant a forcible response. But that is not to say that any illegal use of force triggers the right to use any and all force in response — such responses must still be necessary and of course proportionate.”).

32 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) reprinted in 54 H ARVARD I NTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE.
33 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 482 (2002) ("There is also a general recognition of the right of a nation whose rights under international law have been violated to take countermeasures against the offending state, in circumstances where neither the provocation nor the response involves the use of armed force. For example, an arbitral tribunal in 1978 ruled that the United States was entitled to suspend French commercial air flights into Los Angeles after the French had suspended U.S. commercial air flights into Paris. Discussions of the doctrine of countermeasures generally distinguish between countermeasures that would otherwise be violations of treaty obligations or of general principles of international law (in effect, reprisals not involving the use of armed force) and retorsions — actions that may be unfriendly or even damaging, but which do not violate any international legal obligation. The use of countermeasures is subject to the same requirements of necessity and proportionality as apply to self-defense.").

34 Refer to § 18.17 (Retorsion).

35 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, 4 (Nov. 2011) ("The same technical protocols of the Internet that have facilitated the explosive growth of cyberspace also provide some measure of anonymity. Our potential adversaries, both nations and non-state actors, clearly understand this dynamic and seek to use the challenge of attribution to their strategic advantage. The Department recognizes that deterring malicious actors from conducting cyber attacks is complicated by the difficulty of verifying the location from which an attack was launched and by the need to identify the attacker among a wide variety and high number of potential actors.").

36 United States Submission to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2012-2013, 2 ("As the United States noted in its 2010 submission to the GGE, the following established principles would apply in the context of an armed attack, whether it originated through cyberspace or not: the right of self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack applies whether the attacker is a State actor or a non-State actor"). Refer to § 1.11.5.4 (Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors).

37 See, e.g., CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, 6b(1) (June 13, 2005), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 95 (2007) ("Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.").

38 Refer to § 15.3.1 (Neutral Rights).

39 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the THEUSCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 6 (Dec. 2012) ("States conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the sovereignty of other states, including outside the context of armed conflict. The physical infrastructure that supports the Internet and cyber activities is generally located in sovereign territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial state. Because of the interconnected, interoperable nature of cyberspace, operations targeting networked information infrastructures in one country may create effects in another country. Whenever a state contemplates conducting activities in cyberspace, the sovereignty of other states needs to be considered.").

40 Refer to § 15.5 (Prohibition on the Use of Neutral Territory as a Base of Operations).

41 Refer to § 15.5.3 (Prohibition Against Establishment or Use of Belligerent Communications Facilities in Neutral Territory).

42 Refer to § 15.5.3.1 (Use of Neutral Facilities by Belligerents Not Prohibited).

43 Colonel Borel, Report to the Conference from the Second Commission on Rights and Duties of Neutral States on Land, in JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, 543 (1917) ("We are here dealing with cables or apparatus belonging either to a neutral State or to a company or individuals, the operation of which, for the transmission of news, has the character of a public service. There is no reason to compel the neutral State to restrict or prohibit the use by the belligerents of these means of communication. Were it otherwise, objections of a practical kind would be encountered, arising out of the considerable difficulties in exercising control, not to mention the confidential character of telegraphic correspondence and the rapidity necessary to this service. Through his Excellency Lord Reay, the British delegation requested that it be specified that 'the liberty of a neutral State to transmit messages, by means of its telegraph lines on land, its submarine cables or its wireless apparatus, does not imply that it has any right to use them or permit their use in order to render manifest assistance to one of the belligerents'. The justice of the idea thus stated was so great as to receive the unanimous approval of the Commission.").

44 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, 8 (Nov. 2011) ("The issue of the legality of transporting cyber 'weapons' across the Internet through the infrastructure owned and/or located in neutral third countries without obtaining the equivalent of 'overflight rights.' There is currently no international consensus regarding the definition of a 'cyber weapon.' The often low cost of developing malicious code and the high number and variety of actors in cyberspace make the discovery and tracking of malicious cyber tools difficult. Most of the technology used in this context is inherently dual-use, and even software might be minimally repurposed for malicious action."). Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 489 (2002) ("There need be less concern for the reaction of nations through whose territory or communications systems a destructive message may be routed. If only the nation's public communications systems are involved, the transited nation
will normally not be aware of the routing such a message has taken. Even if it becomes aware of the transit of such a message and attributes it to the United States, there would be no established principle of international law that it could point to as being violated. As discussed above, even during an international armed conflict international law does not require a neutral nation to restrict the use of its public communications networks by belligerents. Nations generally consent to the free use of their communications networks on a commercial or reciprocal basis. Accordingly, use of a nation’s communications networks as a conduit for an electronic attack would not be a violation of its sovereignty in the same way that would be a flight through its airspace by a military aircraft.

45 Refer to § 5.5 (Rules on Conducting Assaults, Bombardments, and Other Attacks).

46 Refer to § 5.6 (Discrimination in Conducting Attacks); § 5.12 (Proportionality – Prohibition on Attacks Expected to Cause Excessive Incidental Harm).

47 Refer to § 5.7 (Military Objectives).

48 Refer to § 5.17.2 (Enemy Property – Military Necessity Standard).

49 Refer to § 5.12 (Proportionality – Prohibition on Attacks Expected to Cause Excessive Incidental Harm).

50 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 8 (Dec. 2012) (“As you all know, information and communications infrastructure is often shared between state militaries and private, civilian communities. The law of war requires that civilian infrastructure not be used to seek to immunize military objectives from attack, including in the cyber realm. But how, exactly, are the *jus in bello* rules to be implemented in cyberspace? Parties to an armed conflict will need to assess the potential effects of a cyber attack on computers that are not military objectives, such as private, civilian computers that hold no military significance, but may be networked to computers that are valid military objectives. Parties will also need to consider the harm to the civilian uses of such infrastructure in performing the necessary proportionality review. Any number of factual scenarios could arise, however, which will require a careful, fact-intensive legal analysis in each situation.”).

51 Refer to § 5.12.2 (Types of Harm – Loss of Life, Injury, and Damage).

52 Cf. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 28 (A.1.e.7) (2010) (“The definition of ‘attacks’ also covers ‘non-kinetic’ attacks (i.e. attacks that do not involve the physical transfer of energy, such as certain CNAs [computer network attacks]; see Rule 1(m)) that result in death, injury, damage or destruction of persons or objects. Admittedly, whether ‘non-kinetic’ operations rise to the level of an ‘attack’ in the context of the law of international armed conflict is a controversial issue. There was agreement among the Group of Experts that the term ‘attack’ does not encompass CNAs that result in an inconvenience (such as temporary denial of internet access).”).

53 Refer to § 5.12.2 (Types of Harm – Loss of Life, Injury, and Damage).

54 Refer to § 16.5.3 (Duty to Take Feasible Precautions and Cyber Operations).

55 Refer to § 5.5 (Rules on Conducting Assaults, Bombardments, and Other Attacks).

56 Refer to § 5.3.2.1 (Non-Violent Measures That Are Militarily Necessary).

57 Refer to § 16.2.2 (Application of Law of War Principles as a General Guide to Cyber Operations).

58 Refer to § 5.3.3 (Affirmative Duties to Take Feasible Precautions for the Protection of Civilians and Other Protected Persons and Objects).

59 United States Submission to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2012-2013, 4 (“The law of war also requires warring States to take all practicable precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian considerations, to avoid and minimize incidental death, injury, and damage to civilians and objects. In the context of hostilities involving information technologies in armed conflict, parties to the conflict should take precautions to minimize the risk of damage to computer systems, networks, and other cyber activities on civilians’ infrastructure and users.”).

60 Refer to § 5.11 (Feasible Precautions in Conducting Attacks to Reduce the Risk of Harm to Protected Persons and Objects).

61 Refer to § 5.14 (Feasible Precautions to Reduce the Risk of Harm to Protected Persons and Objects by the Party Subject to Attack).

62 Refer to § 5.11.3 (Selecting Weapons (Weapononeering)).

63 United States Submission to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2012-2013 , 4 (“Cyber operations that result in non-kinetic or reversible effects can be important tool in creating options that minimize unnecessary harm to civilians. In this regard, cyber capabilities may in some circumstances be preferable, as a matter of policy, to kinetic weapons because their effects may be reversible, and they may hold the potential to accomplish military goals without any destructive kinetic effect at all.”).

64 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 490 (2002) (“Another possible implication of a defender’s technological prowess may arise when a nation has the capacity for graduated self-defense measures. Some may argue that a nation having such capabilities must select a response that will do minimal damage. This is a variant of the argument that a nation possessing precision-guided munitions must always use them whenever there is a potential for collateral damage. That position has garnered little support among nations and has been strongly rejected by the United States.
There is broad recognition that the risk of collateral damage is only one of many military considerations that must be balanced by military authorities planning an attack. One obvious consideration is that a military force that goes into a protracted conflict with a policy of always using precision-guided munitions whenever there is any potential for collateral damage will soon exhaust its supply of such munitions. Similarly, military authorities must be able to weigh all relevant military considerations in choosing a response in self-defense against computer network attacks. These considerations will include the probable effectiveness of the means at their disposal, the ability to assess their effects, and the "fragility" of electronic means of attack (i.e., once they are used, an adversary may be able to devise defenses that will render them ineffective in the future).

65 Refer to § 5.24 (Improper Use of Certain Signs).

66 Refer to § 12.2 (Principle of Good Faith in Non-Hostile Relations).

67 Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 459, 473 (2002) ("Perfidy: It may seem attractive for a combatant vessel or aircraft to avoid being attacked by broadcasting the agreed identification signals for a medical vessel or aircraft, but such actions would be a war crime. Similarly, it might be possible to use computer 'morphing' techniques to create an image of the enemy's chief of state informing his troops that an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been signed. If false, this would also be a war crime.").

68 Refer to § 5.23.1.5 (Use of Enemy Codes, Passwords, and Countersigns Not Restricted).

69 Refer to § 4.15.2.2 (Employment in Hostilities).

70 Refer to § 4.15 (Persons Authorized to Accompany the Armed Forces).

71 Refer to § 4.15 (Persons Authorized to Accompany the Armed Forces).

72 Refer to § 5.9 (Civilians Taking a Direct Part in Hostilities).

73 Refer to § 6.2 (DOD Policy of Reviewing the Legality of Weapons).

74 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE , 6 (Dec. 2012) ("States should undertake a legal review of weapons, including those that employ a cyber capability. Such a review should entail an analysis, for example, of whether a particular capability would be inherently indiscriminate, i.e., that it could not be used consistent with the principles of distinction and proportionality. The U.S. Government undertakes at least two stages of legal review of the use of weapons in the context of armed conflict: first, an evaluation of new weapons to determine whether their use would be per se prohibited by the law of war; and second, specific operations employing weapons are always reviewed to ensure that each particular operation is also compliant with the law of war.").


76 Refer to § 6.2.1 (Review of New Types of Weapons).

77 Refer to § 6.7 (Inherently Indiscriminate Weapons).

78 United States Submission to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2012-2013, 3 ("Weapons that cannot be directed at a specific military objective or whose effects cannot be controlled would be inherently indiscriminate, and per se unlawful under the law of armed conflict. In the traditional kinetic context, such inherently indiscriminate and unlawful weapons include, for example, biological weapons. Certain cyber tools could, in light of the interconnected nature of the network, be inherently indiscriminate in the sense that their effects cannot be predicted or controlled; a destructive virus that could spread uncontrollably within civilian internet systems might fall into this category. Attacks using such tools would be prohibited by the law of war.").

Appendix B includes:

I. Department of State  
   - Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues

II. Department of Homeland Security  
    - Office of Cybersecurity and Communications

III. Department of Defense  
    - National Security Agency (NSA)  
    - Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO)  
    - Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

IV. Joint Organizations  
    - Joint Spectrum Center (JSC)  
    - Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)  
    - U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)

V. Service Organizations  
    - Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER)  
    - Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)  
    - 1st Information Operations Command (Land)  
    - Army 780th MI Brigade  
    - Marine Corps Forces Cyber (MARFORCYBER)  
    - Navy U.S. Fleet Cyber / U.S. TENTH Fleet (FCC-C10F)  
    - Air Forces Cyber / 24th Air Force
I. Department of State – Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues

1. In partnership with other countries, the State Department is leading the U.S. Government's efforts to promote an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and innovation.

2. To more effectively advance the full range of U.S. interests in cyberspace, as outlined in the U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace, the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI) was established in February 2011.

3. The S/CCI brings together the many elements in the State Department working on cyber issues. Its responsibilities include:
   - Coordinating the Department's global diplomatic engagement on cyber issues
   - Serving as the Department's liaison to the White House and federal departments and agencies on these issues
   - Advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretaries on cyber issues and engagements
   - Acting as liaison to public and private sector entities on cyber issues
   - Coordinating the work of regional and functional bureaus within the Department engaged in these areas

4. S/CCI's coordination function spans the full spectrum of cyber-related issues to include security, economic issues, freedom of expression, and free flow of information on the Internet.

II. Department of Homeland Security – Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C)

The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C), within the National Protection and Programs Directorate, is responsible for enhancing the security, resilience, and reliability of the Nation's cyber and communications infrastructure. CS&C works to prevent or minimize disruptions to critical information infrastructure in order to protect the public, the economy, and government services. CS&C leads efforts to protect the federal "gov" domain of civilian government networks and to collaborate with the private sector – the "com" domain – to increase the security of critical networks. In addition, the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) serves as a 24/7 cyber monitoring, incident response, and management center and as a national point of cyber and communications incident integration.

As the Sector-Specific Agency for the Communications and Information Technology (IT) sectors, CS&C coordinates national-level reporting that is consistent with the National Response Framework (NRF).

Structure: Congress created the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications in 2006. CS&C carries out its mission through its five divisions:

The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC): The OEC supports and promotes communications used by emergency responders and government officials to keep America safe, secure, and resilient. The office leads the Nation's operable and interoperable public safety and national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications efforts. OEC provides training, coordination, tools, and guidance to help its federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and industry partners develop their emergency communications capabilities. OEC's programs and services coordinate emergency communications planning, preparation, and evaluation to ensure safer, better-prepared communities nationwide.

The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC): Information sharing is a key part of the DHS mission to create shared situational awareness of malicious cyber activity. Cyberspace has united once distinct information structures, including our business and government operations, our emergency preparedness communications, and our critical digital and process control systems and infrastructures. Protection of these systems is essential to the resilience and reliability of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources; therefore, to our economic and national security. DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) is a 24x7 cyber situational awareness, incident response, and management center that is a national nexus of cyber and communications integration for the Federal Government, intelligence community, and law enforcement.

Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience: The Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience (SECIR) division is the DHS primary point of engagement and coordination for national security/emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications and cybersecurity initiatives for both government and industry partners, and is the Executive Secretariat for the Joint Program Office for the NS/EP Communications Executive Committee. CS&C relies on SECIR to streamline coordination and engagement with external partners, while leveraging capabilities and significant subject matter expertise in order to meet stakeholder requirements.

Federal Network Resilience (FNR): is responsible for developing innovative approaches to drive change in cybersecurity risk management by focusing on
establishing metrics that have measureable impact on improving cybersecurity for Federal Civilian Executive Branch departments and agencies; gathering cybersecurity requirements and developing operational policies for the federal government; collaborating with, and providing outreach to, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council, and individual agency Chief Information Officers (CIOs) and Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs); and leveraging best practices across CS&C and lessons learned in support of Federal Civilian Executive Branch departments’ and agencies’ cyber hygiene.

**Network Security Deployment (NSD):** The NSD division serves as the cybersecurity engineering and acquisition "Center of Excellence" within CS&C. In support of that role, NSD provides development, acquisition, deployment, operational, and customer support to satisfy the Department's mission requirements under the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI).

In addition, CS&C operates the Enterprise Performance Management Office, which ensures that the Assistant Secretary's strategic goals and priorities are reflected across all CS&C programs; measures the effectiveness of initiatives, programs, and projects that support those goals and priorities; and facilitates cross-functional mission coordination and implementation between CS&C components, within DHS, and among the interagency.

III. Department of Defense

A. National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)

Mission. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) leads the U.S. Government in cryptology that encompasses both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) products and services, and enables Computer Network Operations (CNO) in order to gain a decision advantage for the Nation and our allies under all circumstances.

The Central Security Service (CSS) provides timely and accurate cryptologic support, knowledge, and assistance to the military cryptologic community. It promotes full partnership between the NSA and the cryptologic elements of the Armed Forces, and teams with senior military and civilian leaders to address and act on critical military-related issues in support of national and tactical intelligence objectives. CSS coordinates and develops policy and guidance on the Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance missions of NSA/CSS to ensure military integration.

The Information Assurance (IA) mission at the National Security Agency (NSA) serves a role unlike that of any other U.S. Government entity. National Security Directive (NSD) 42 authorizes NSA to secure National Security Systems, which includes systems that handle classified information or are otherwise critical to military or intelligence activities. IA has a pivotal leadership role in performing this responsibility, and partners with government, industry, and academia to execute the IA mission.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The National Security Agency is responsible for providing foreign SIGINT to our nation's policy-makers and military forces. SIGINT plays a vital role in our national security by providing America's leaders with critical information they need to defend our country, save lives, and advance U.S. goals and alliances globally.

- SIGINT is intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets, such as communications systems, radars, and weapons systems. SIGINT provides a vital window for our nation into foreign adversaries' capabilities, actions, and intentions.
- NSA's SIGINT mission is specifically limited to gathering information about international terrorists and foreign powers, organizations, or persons. NSA produces intelligence in response to formal requirements levied by those who have an official need for intelligence, including all departments of the Executive Branch of the United States Government.

Cyber. NSA’s SIGINT and Information Assurance missions come together to detect and prevent threats to official U.S. government networks. SIGINT and IA analysts work together around the clock to assess foreign threats to networks. They also enable the U.S. military and our allies to carry out integrated computer network operations.

Support to the Military. NSA is part of the U.S. Department of Defense, serving as a combat support agency. Supporting our military service members around the world is one of the most important things that we do.

- We provide intelligence support to military operations through our signals intelligence activities, while our information assurance personnel, products and services ensure that
military communications and data remain secure, and out of the hands of our adversaries.

- We provide wireless and wired secure communications to our warfighters and others in uniform no matter where they are, whether traveling through Afghanistan in a Humvee, diving beneath the sea, or flying into outer space. Our information assurance mission also produces and packages the codes that secure our nation's weapons systems.
- Additionally, we set common protocols and standards so that our military can securely share information with our allies, NATO and coalition forces around the world. Interoperability is a key to successful joint operations and exercises.
- To support our military customers, NSA has deployed personnel to all of the major military commands and to locations around the globe where there is a U.S. military presence. NSA analysts, linguists, engineers and other personnel deploy to Afghanistan and other hostile areas to provide actionable SIGINT and information assurance support to warfighters on the front lines. Many of our deployed personnel serve in Cryptologic Services Groups, providing dedicated support at the Combatant Command or headquarters level. Since the mid-2000s, however, NSA personnel have also been serving on Cryptologic Support Teams, which are assigned to support smaller units such as Brigade Combat Teams to ensure they are receiving the intelligence and information assurance products and services they need to accomplish their specific missions. These teams have enabled NSA to push the full capabilities of our global cryptologic enterprise as far forward as possible.

Customers & Partners. The U.S. government, the military, and many allies rely on NSA’s expertise in foreign signals intelligence and information assurance for mission success. NSA’s customers range from the highest levels of government, such as the Office of the President, the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all the way down to small teams of warfighters deployed in harm’s way. NSA works 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year to ensure that customers receive the critical intelligence and information assurance products and services they need to accomplish their missions and to protect the nation. No single agency can do this alone, which is why NSA partners both inside the United States and with foreign governments.

B. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO)

**Mission:** The DOD CIO is the Principal Staff Assistant and senior Information Technology advisor to the Secretary of Defense. This role includes overseeing many national security and defense business systems, managing information resources, and finding efficiencies. It is responsible for all matters relating to the Department’s information enterprise, including:

- Communications
- Spectrum management
- Network policy and standards
- Information systems
- Cybersecurity
- Positioning, navigation, and timing policy
- DOD information enterprise that supports DOD command and control

The organization includes four deputies and assigned staffs:

**Deputy Chief Information Officer for Information Enterprise (DCIO IE).** Responsible for integrating DOD policy and guidance to create information advantages for Department personnel, organizations, and DOD mission partners. DCIO IE focuses on providing the leadership, strategy, and guidance to adopt a Joint Information Environment based on a single, secure, reliable DOD-wide IT architecture, and key enabling enterprise capabilities.

**Deputy Chief Information Officer for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) and Information Infrastructure Capabilities (IIC) (DCIO C4&IIC).** Provides expertise and broad guidance on policy, programmatic, and technical issues relating to C4&IIC to integrate and synchronize DOD-wide communications and infrastructure programs and efforts to achieve and maintain information dominance for the Department.

**Deputy Chief Information Officer for Cyber Security (DCIO CS).** Also acts as the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) for DOD and is responsible for ensuring that the Department has a well-defined and well-executed cyber security program. This organization is also responsible for coordinating cyber security standards, policies, and procedures with other federal agencies, coalition partners, and industry.

**Deputy Chief Information Officer for Resources and Analysis (DCIO R&AQ).** Responsible for enabling DOD CIO to manage the Department’s information technology spending, ensuring that DOD gets the most out of every dollar and that the Warfighter has the tools to do the mission. The Department’s IT & cyberspace budget request for fiscal year 2018 was nearly $42 billion, which includes warfighting, command, control, and communications systems; computing services; enterprise services, like collaboration and e-mail; and business systems.

C. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

Vision: Information superiority in defense of our Nation.

Mission: DISA, a Combat Support Agency, provides, operates, and assures command and control, information sharing capabilities, and a globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure in direct support to joint warfighters, national level leaders, and other mission and coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations.

The Objective State: Provide assured, scalable, managed access to services and data at the point of need and in all environments through cost-effective infrastructure and computing.

Overview: DISA is a combat support agency of the Department of Defense (DOD). The agency is composed of nearly 6,000 civilian employees; more than 1,500 active duty military personnel from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; and approximately 7,500 defense contractors. The agency provides, operates, and assures command and control and information-sharing capabilities and a globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure in direct support to joint warfighters, national level leaders, and other mission and coalition partners across the full spectrum of military operations.

DISA’s Mission Partner Support: As the information technology (IT) combat support agency, DISA is committed to providing enterprise-level IT capabilities and services to the Nation’s warfighters, national-level leaders, and mission and coalition partners.

The DISA Director is also the Commander of the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) DOD Information Network (DODIN), which maintains command and control (C2) of defensive cyber operations.

DISA delivers hundreds of IT support and service capabilities to our mission partners. These capabilities are captured in our online service catalog, https://www.disa.mil (accessed through each service category link on the top navigation bar). Regardless of the IT service or support need, DISA has the capacity to host, support, engineer, test, or acquire IT services.

Additionally, in order to optimize DOD’s world-class enterprise infrastructure, DISA is focused on providing enterprise services, unified capabilities, and mobility options to support DOD operations anywhere, anytime. Through enterprise security architectures, smart computing options and other leading-edge IT opportunities, DISA remains committed to its role of the IT provider to meet our defense needs.

DISA has organized its workforce to optimally support and work with leaders and partners in the White House, Pentagon, military services, combatant commands, and defense and federal agencies, as well as coalition partners across the globe.

Through the White House Communications Agency (WHCA), DISA provides direct telecommunications and IT support to the president, vice president, their staff, and the U.S. Secret Service.

DISA also has a significant presence in the Pentagon with a support cadre in the Joint Staff Support Center (JSSC) providing direct support to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces; the Joint Chiefs of Staff comprised of the senior ranking officers from each military service; and the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff J6 for command, control, communications, computers/cyber (C4) represents the joint warfighter in support of C4 requirements validation and capability development processes while ensuring joint interoperability. The J6 also partners with DISA as the department evolves the Joint Information Environment (JIE) with the development and promulgation of enterprise services and the enhancement of the enterprise information infrastructure.
DISA has a field office co-located with and directly supporting each of the nine unified combatant commands. DISA also has a support element assigned to U.S. Cyber Command, a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command.

DISA provides DOD IT support through its DOD Enterprise Computing Centers (DECCs), Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization (DITCO) field sites, and special mission centers, such as the Joint Interoperability Test Command. In addition, DISA operates the DISA Command Center (DCC), which maintains situational awareness of all network operations and the DISA-provided infrastructure, computing, and enterprise services. This center ensures continued quality customer service to all of DISA's mission partners.

The Mission Partner Engagement Office and Engagement Executives are DISA's principal representatives to the mission partners - receiving their requests, reaching out to them, advocating for their issues, and providing a conduit for their feedback to DISA.

**Chain of Command:** DISA reports to the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO). The Office of the DOD CIO is the department's primary authority for the policy and oversight of information resources management, to include matters related to information technology (IT), network defense, and network operations. The DOD CIO is responsible for achieving and maintaining information superiority through the collection, processing, and dissemination of an uninterrupted flow of information in support of DOD missions. The DOD CIO exercises authority, direction, and control over the director of DISA and organizationally reports to the Secretary of Defense, the principal advisor to the President of the United States on all defense matters and issues.

**Joint Information Environment (JIE):** As the department evolves the Joint Information Environment, the lines between components will blur. The matrixed organization evolving the JIE illustrates the department's technological way ahead. The current organization includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO), DOD CIO, Joint Staff J6, CYBERCOM, military services, intelligence community, and National Guard.

The management of JIE is conducted through the JIE Executive Committee, which is tri-chaired by the DOD CIO, Joint Staff J6, and the CYBERCOM commander who also serves as the initiative's operational sponsor.

In execution, there are three lines of operation: governance, operations, and technical synchronization. DISA has been given responsibility for the technical aspects of JIE and leads the JIE Technical Synchronization Office (JTSO), which includes agency staff, as well as representation from the military services, intelligence community, and National Guard.

IV. Joint Organizations

A. Joint Spectrum Center (JSC)

The Joint Spectrum Center (JSC), a Field Command within the Defense Spectrum Organization (DSO), has leading experts in the areas of spectrum planning, electromagnetic environmental effects (E3), information systems, cyber security, quality assurance, modeling and simulation, and operations to provide complete, spectrum-related services to the Military Departments and Combatant Commands (CCMDs). It applies electromagnetic environmental databases and analysis tools to assist in both the acquisition and operation of communications-electronics assets. JSC is a source of engineering expertise and services dedicated to ensuring effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

JSC provides services such as spectrum-planning guidance, system integration, system vulnerability analysis, environmental analysis, test and measurement support, operational support and spectrum management software development.

JSC provides support for spectrum planning, spectrum certification of new weapon and sensor system development, and training and operational support to the unified commands, military departments, and defense agencies. These services are also available to federal and local government activities. Additionally, foreign nations can obtain assistance through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channels. JSC can provide these services to U.S. industries when the efforts are determined to be in the interest of national security.

JSC Branches/Services:

**Cyber Security and Quality Assurance (J2)** provides information assurance, technical and non-technical cyber operations expertise and oversight for all DSO spectrum capabilities and developmental efforts. J2 also provides acceptance support for application developments and overall quality assurance processes for the DSO.

**Operational Support (J3)** provides communications-electronics and electromagnetic battlespace support, and joint spectrum interference resolution support to the CCMDs.

**Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Engineering (J5)** provides E3 engineering and spectrum supportability (SS) technical support to the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD/CIO), the Joint Staff, the Services, and other DOD Components through: (1) Management of the DOD E3 Program and Policy Development; (2) Joint Capabilities Acquisition Support; (3) Joint E3 Ordnance Program; (4) DOD Electromagnetic Compatibility Standardization; and (5) E3 and SS Training and Awareness.

**Information Systems (J6)** provides IT support to the DSO and JSC as the customer advocate for enterprise systems and services to enable mission execution. J6 operates and maintains advanced IT environments supporting deployment and sustainment of spectrum-related software application.

**Spectrum Enterprise Services (J7)** provides Joint, dynamic, responsive and agile spectrum management enterprise services and capabilities in support of the warfighters needs and requirements. The Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS) Program Office develops and provides enterprise capabilities and services supporting the DOD.

**Applied Engineering Division (J8)** provides tailored engineering support and guidance that enables the DOD and Military Services to proactively plan, design, acquire, and operate spectrum-dependent systems compatibly in their intended electromagnetic environment.

B. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)

The Joint Communications Support Element is a subordinate command assigned to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command and USTRANSCOM. It provides enroute, initial entry, or early entry communications support for up to 40-personnel Joint Task Force (JTF) in support of permissive and non-permissive environments. Additionally, the Element has the requisite skill sets to support larger JTF Headquarters and two Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Headquarters – anywhere from 40 to 1500 users.

**Mission:** On order, JCSE immediately deploys to provide enroute, early entry, scalable C4 support to the Regional Combatant Commands, Special Operations Command, and other agencies as directed; on order, provides additional C4 services within 72 hours to support larger CJTF/CJSOTF Headquarters across the full spectrum of operations.

**Organization:** JCSE is a Joint Command consisting of a Headquarters Support Squadron (HSS) and Communications Support Detachment (CSD), three active squadrons, two Air National Guard squadrons, and one Army Reserve Squadron.

- The three active squadrons (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Joint Communications Squadron [JCS]) as well as the HSS and CSD are all headquartered at MacDill AFB, FL.
- The Army Reserve Squadron (or 4th JCS) is also headquartered at MacDill AFB, FL.
- The Air National Guard Squadrons are part of the Florida and Georgia Air Guard:
  - The 290th Joint Communications Support Squadron (JCSS) is from the Florida Air Guard, and is headquartered at MacDill AFB, FL.
  - The 224th JCSS is from the Georgia Air Guard and is headquartered at Brunswick, GA.

**Core Competencies:** The Element's core competency – what makes us different – is our communications support for contingency operations as directed by the Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). With us, you will see the latest technologies that meet today's operational requirements. We are a tactical unit that has a rare ability to operate at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. As a part of our contingency mission, we provide enroute, initial entry, or early entry communications support for up to 40-personnel Joint Task Force in support of permissive and non-permissive environments.

Additionally, the Element has the requisite skill sets to support larger Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters and two Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Headquarters – anywhere from 40 to 1,500 users.

To meet this expansive mission requirement, JCSE maintains a professional force of trained, rapidly deployable communications experts who possess only the latest forms of network and telecommunications skills. Our diverse and flexible organization comprises both active and reserve component forces. We are the model of the total force and our units routinely exercise and deploy together, making for an effective team capable of accommodating a wide range of mission options and tasks.

C. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)

On June 23, 2009, the Secretary of Defense directed the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command to establish a sub-unified command, United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Full Operational Capability (FOC) was achieved 31 October 2010. The command is located at Fort Meade, MD.

Mission: USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace, and deny the same to our adversaries.

Focus: The Command has three main focus areas: Defending the DODIN, providing support to combatant commanders for execution of their missions around the world, and strengthening our nation’s ability to withstand and respond to cyber attack.

The Command unifies the direction of cyberspace operations, strengthens DOD cyberspace capabilities, and integrates and bolsters DOD’s cyber expertise. USCYBERCOM improves DOD's capabilities to operate resilient, reliable information and communication networks, counter cyberspace threats, and assure access to cyberspace. USCYBERCOM is designing the cyber force structure, training requirements, and certification standards that will enable the Services to build the cyber force required to execute our assigned missions. The command also works closely with interagency and international partners in executing these critical missions.

Organization: USCYBERCOM is a sub-unified combatant command subordinate to USSTRATCOM. Its service elements include Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBER), Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER) and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER). Coast Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER), although subordinate to the Department of Homeland Security, has a direct support relationship to USCYBERCOM. The Command is also standing up dedicated Cyber Mission Teams to accomplish the three elements of our mission.

Seal: The eagle, our national symbol, is revered for the keen eyesight that allows it to pierce the darkness and remain vigilant. The two swords on the shield represent the dual nature of the command to defend the nation and, if necessary, engage our enemies in the cyber domain. The lightning bolt symbolizes the speed of operations in cyber, and the key illustrates the command’s role to secure our nation’s cyber domain.

V. Service Organizations

A. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER)

Army Cyber Command is an operational-level Army force reporting directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). The Commander, ARCYBER, exercises operational control over Army forces, as delegated by the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command or the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. ARCYBER is the primary headquarters responsible for conducting cyberspace operations (offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and Department of Defense Information Network operations), as directed and authorized on behalf of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command or the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. ARCYBER organizes, trains, educates, mans, equips, funds, administers, deploys, and sustains Army cyber forces to conduct cyberspace operations.

U.S. Army Cyber Command's breadth of responsibility spans the entire Army and the entire world, from the tactical edge to the strategic enterprise level or national levels. Traditional boundaries no longer exist and anonymous attacks can occur literally at near-light speed over fiber optic networks. Our enemies will attempt to deny freedom of movement on our networks and use any resources they can, from anywhere on earth, to gain an advantage.

U.S. Army Cyber Command is composed of a professional team of elite warriors defending Army networks and providing full-spectrum cyber capabilities, enabling mission command and providing our forces with a global advantage. Cyber warfighting requires impact, integration, risk, and knowing ourselves, our enemies, and the cyber terrain.

Mission. United States Army Cyber Command directs and conducts integrated electronic warfare, information and cyberspace operations as authorized, or directed, to ensure freedom of action in and through cyberspace and the information environment, and to deny the same to our adversaries.

Vision.

- A force that can aggressively operate and defend our networks, data, and weapons systems
- A force which delivers effects against our adversaries in and through cyberspace to enable commanders' objectives
- A force that designs, builds, and delivers integrated capabilities for the future fight – spanning cyberspace, electronic warfare, and information operations

Army Cyber Units.

- U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)
  - Cyber Protection Brigade
- 1st Information Operations Command (Land)
- 780th MI Brigade

B. Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)

**Organization:** The U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, headquartered at Fort Huachuca, AZ, is the Army's single information technology service provider for all network communications. A major subordinate command to U.S. Army Cyber Command, it maintains and defends the Global Network Enterprise to enable information superiority and freedom of access to the network in all phases of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational operations. With the expertise of nearly 16,000 Soldiers, Civilians, and Contract personnel stationed around the globe, the command provides support to organizations across the entire spectrum of strategic, expeditionary, joint, and combined environments.

NETCOM plans, engineers, installs, integrates, protects, and operates Army Cyberspace, enabling Mission Command through all phases of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational operations.

**Mission:** U.S. Army NETCOM leads global operations for the Army's portion of the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN), ensuring freedom of action in cyberspace while denying the same to our adversaries.

**Vision:** Our Army's varsity communicators, conducting decisive cyberspace operations in support of Unified Action.

**Subordinate Organizations:**

- **5th Signal Command (Theater)** builds, operates, and defends network capabilities to enable mission command and create tactical, operational, and strategic flexibility for the Army, joint and multinational forces in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command areas of responsibility.

- **7th Signal Command (Theater)** ensures cyber superiority for Army and Joint Forces to lead, direct and maneuver during day to day operations, contingencies, crisis, or war.

- **311th Signal Command (Theater)** plans, builds, operates, defends, and extends Army and Joint networks throughout the Pacific Theater to enable mission command for full spectrum, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations across all Joint operational phases. As directed, supports cyberspace operations to ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and to deny the same to our adversaries.

- **335th Signal Command (Theater)** provides signal and cyber units in direct support of Third Army, Army Central Command (in Southwest Asia), and Homeland Defense missions. One of four theater signal commands in the Army, the 335th SC(T) has the distinction of serving in Iraq and Afghanistan longer than any other command in the Army Reserve.

- **Army Cyber Protection Brigade** is headquartered at Fort Gordon, GA. Its mission is to rapidly evaluate and act in response to unexpected and dynamic cyber situations; defend the nation in response to hostile action and imminent cyber threats; conduct global cyberspace operations to deter, disrupt, and defeat our adversary's cyberspace operations; and defend the United States through specialized cyber support missions.

C. 1st Information Operations Command (Land)

The 1st Information Operations Command (Land), is a major subordinate command to U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and is under the operational control of U.S. Army Cyber Command. It is the Army's only active component information Operations (IO) organization.

The command has regionally focused IO and IO-related intelligence planning teams assigned to provide reach-back planning and special studies support. Operations planners are involved prior to, during, and after exercises and support contingencies such as the counter improvised explosive device effort.

1st IO Command conducts specialized training for IO subject-matter experts, deploying IO teams, and deploying units through fixed resident training facilities and by customized and deployable mobile training teams.

Mission: 1st Information Operations Command (Land) provides IO and Cyberspace Operations support to Army and other Military Forces through:

- Deployable Support Teams
- Opposing forces support
- Reachback planning and analysis
- Specialized training

In order to support freedom of action in the information environment and to deny the same to our adversaries.

Organization: As a source of IO planning and integration expertise, the Command strives to think across inherent boundaries and gain an advantage through the coordinated use of multiple capabilities to affect the information environment. This Command does not operate exclusively in any of the IO competencies; it utilizes the synergy of multiple, simultaneous solutions needed throughout the U.S. Army and other Military Forces around the world.

Unique Capabilities to Support the Warfighters: 1st IO Command functional areas include IO Intelligence, Reachback Teams, deployable IO Support Teams, and IO Training.

- Tailored IO Support Teams
- IO Vulnerability Assessments
- Cyber OPFOR
- Intelligence Support to IO
- Reachback Support
- Specialized IO Training (Mobile & Resident)
- OPSEC Support
- Cyberspace Operations Support
- IO Planning Support
- IO Best Practices
- IO Doctrine – Review
- Exercise Support

Key Functions:

- Cyberspace Opposing Force
- IO Planning Support
- Intelligence Support to IO
- OPSEC Support
• Specialized IO Training
• IO Field Support Team (FST) Mission Readiness Exercise (MRX)
• Vulnerability Assessments

Subordinate Organizations: 1st IO Command is comprised of two battalions. The 1st IO Battalion primarily provides IO Field Support Teams (FSTs), IO Vulnerability Assessment Teams (IOVATs), Army OPSEC support and training teams, and other missions. The 2d IO Battalion primarily provides Cyber Opposing Forces. The Command is a multi-component unit with an integrated U.S. Army Reserve Element.

• **1st IO Battalion** deploys trained and ready IO teams to synchronize the employment of information-related capabilities, conduct multi-disciplined IO vulnerability assessments, and provide OPSEC assistance and training.

• **2nd IO Battalion** executes cyberspace opposing force operations and provides cyberspace operational support to Army and other Military Forces; on order, conducts cyberspace operations to defend Army networks, enable freedom of action in the Information Environment and deny the same to adversaries.

• **The Reserve Component Integration Section (RCIS)** provides trained and ready Soldiers in support of 1st IO Command's global mission to operationally integrate information operations, defend cyberspace, and provide reachback planning and analysis for Army and Joint stakeholders.

D. Army 780th Military Intelligence Brigade

The 780th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade (Computer Network Operations [CNO]) is headquartered at Fort Meade, MD. It activated 1 October 2011, as U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command's newest Major Subordinate Command, under the operational control of U.S. Army Cyber Command. The Army's only computer network operations brigade, it provides signals intelligence support and conducts cyber operations.

The 780th MI Brigade (CNO) is uniquely capable of supporting 21st century combat operations. Its capabilities build upon institutional knowledge gained through years of experience analyzing and exploiting adversary networks, and have become essential in enabling the dynamic defense of Army and Defense Department networks.

The 780th MI Brigade consists of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 781st MI Battalion, and the 782nd MI Battalion.

- 781st Battalion. The 781st MI Battalion, supports the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense in providing tactical support to Army Brigade Combat Teams world-wide through strategic support to other services, joint commanders, and interagency partners.
- 782nd Battalion. The 782nd MI Battalion is headquartered at Fort Gordon, GA and works in collaboration with the 706th MI Group.

Mission. The mission of the 780th MI Brigade is to...

- Conduct Signals Intelligence
- Execute Computer Network Operations
- Enable Dynamic Computer Network Defense
- Achieve operational effects in support of Army, Combatant Command, and Department of Defense operations
- Deny our adversaries freedom of action in cyberspace

F. Marine Corps Forces Cyber (MARFORCYBER)

Overview. The Secretary of Defense recognized the significance of the cyberspace domain to national security, and directed the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). USCYBERCOM's primary objective is to plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and conduct activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to the adversary. In response, the Marine Corps established Marine Forces Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER) in October 2009 (this was complemented by the establishment of the Navy's U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBER), Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), and Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER)).

Mission.

(1) Commander, Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (COMMARFORCYBERCOM), as the Marine Corps service component commander for the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM), represents Marine Corps capabilities and interests; advises CDRUSCYBERCOM on the proper employment and support of Marine Corps forces; and coordinates deployment, employment, and redeployment planning and execution of attached forces.

(2) COMMARFORCYBERCOM enables full spectrum cyberspace operations, to include the planning and direction of Marine Corps Enterprise Network Operations (MCEN Ops), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) in support of Marine Corps, Joint and Coalition Forces, and the planning and, when authorized, direction of offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) in support of Joint and Coalition Forces, in order to enable freedom of action across all warfighting domains and deny the same to adversarial forces.

(3) COMMARFORCYBERCOM has direct operational control of Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group (MCCYWG) and Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations Group (MCCOG) to support mission requirements and tasks. Additionally, the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC) will be in direct support of MARFORCYBER for full spectrum cyber operations.

Subordinate Units.

Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations Group (MCCOG) executes Marine Corps Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) Operations and Marine Corps Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) in order to enhance freedom of action across warfighting domains, while denying the efforts of adversaries to degrade or disrupt this advantage through cyberspace.

Key MCCOG tasks include:

- Provide Cyberspace Operations (CO) Support to Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs)
- Plan and Direct Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) Operations
- Plan and Direct Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO)

Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group (MCCYWG) organizes, trains, equips, provides administrative support, manages readiness of assigned forces, and recommends certification and presentation of Cyber Mission Force (CMF) Teams to U.S. Cyber Command. The MCCYWG plans and conducts full spectrum cyberspace
operations as directed by COMMARFORCYBER in support of service, combatant command, joint, and coalition requirements.

Key MCCYWG tasks include:

- Conduct personnel management to organize and assign individuals to work roles and place them in work centers to ensure operational readiness of CMF Teams
- Ensure all personnel are trained in accordance with USCYBERCOM Joint Cyberspace Training and Certification Standards and equipped to perform all duties and tasks outlined in the MARFORCYBER Mission Essential Task List (METL)
- Plan for and, when authorized, conduct OCO including computer network exploitation (CNE), cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and operational preparation of the environment (OPE)
- Plan and conduct designated DCO in response to threats against the MCEN, supported combatant command (CCMD) designated networks, and the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN)
- Advise COMMARFORCYBER on force employment considerations
- Provide subject matter expertise for operational planning requirements

G. Navy U.S. Fleet Cyber / U.S. TENTH Fleet (FCC-C10F)

**Operational** – U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. TENTH Fleet (FCC/C10F) warfighters direct cyberspace operations to deter and defeat aggression while ensuring freedom of action in cyberspace. Operations are not limited to cyberspace alone, however, as FCC/C10F is the Navy's central operational authority for cryptologic/signals intelligence, information operations, electronic warfare, and space capabilities in addition to cyber and networks operations.

- U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC) serves as the Navy component command to U.S. Cyber Command and the Navy's Service Cryptologic Component commander under the National Security Agency/Central Security Service. Fleet Cyber Command also reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations as an Echelon II command.
- U.S. 10th Fleet (C10F) is the operational arm of Fleet Cyber Command and executes its mission through a task force structure similar to other warfare commanders. In this role, C10F provides operational direction through its Maritime Operations Center located at Fort George Meade, MD, executing command and control over assigned forces in support of Navy or joint missions in cyber/networks, information operations, electronic warfare, cryptologic/signals intelligence, and space.

**Fleet Cyber Command**

**Mission:** The mission of Fleet Cyber Command is to serve as central operational authority for networks, cryptologic/signals intelligence, information operations, cyber, electronic warfare, and space capabilities in support of forces afloat and ashore; to direct Navy cyberspace operations globally to deter and defeat aggression and to ensure freedom of action to achieve military objectives in and through cyberspace; to organize and direct Navy cryptologic operations worldwide and support information operations and space planning and operations, as directed; to execute cyber missions as directed; to direct, operate, maintain, secure, and defend the Navy's portion of the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN); to deliver integrated cyber, information operations, cryptologic, and space capabilities; to deliver a global Navy cyber common operational picture; to develop, coordinate, assess, and prioritize Navy cyber, cryptologic/signals intelligence, space, information operations, and electronic warfare requirements; to assess Navy cyber readiness; and to exercise administrative and operational control of assigned forces.

**Vision:** Fleet Cyber Command's vision is to conduct operations in and through cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and space to ensure Navy and Joint/Coalition freedom of action and decision superiority while denying the same to our adversaries. We will win in these domains through our collective commitment to excellence and by strengthening our alliances with entities across the U.S. government, Department of Defense, academia, industry, and our foreign partners.

**Tenth Fleet**

**Mission:** The mission of Tenth fleet is to serve as the Numbered Fleet for Fleet Cyber Command and exercise operational control of assigned Naval forces; to coordinate with other naval, coalition and Joint Task Forces to execute the full spectrum of cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and signal intelligence capabilities and missions across the cyber, electromagnetic, and space domains.

H. Air Forces Cyber / 24th Air Force

The 24th Air Force is the operational warfighting organization that establishes, operates, maintains and defends Air Force networks to ensure warfighters can maintain the information advantage as U.S. forces prosecute military operations around the world.

On 6 October 2008, following its annual Corona conference, the U.S. Air Force announced that a numbered air force, the 24th Air Force, would gain the cyber warfare mission as part of Air Force Space Command. The 24th Air Force was activated on 18 August 2009, achieved Initial Operating Capability on 17 January 2010, and Full Operational Capability on 1 October 2010. On 7 December 2010, HQ 24th Air Force was re-designated Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER) to recognize its role as the service component to United States Cyber Command.

More than 5,600 men and women conduct or support 24-hour operations involving cyberspace operations for 24th Air Force, including approximately 3,250 military, 900 civilian and 1,400 contractor personnel. Approximately 1,100 Air Reserve Component personnel came to AFSPC from existing Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units associated with the combat communications mission of the 688th Cyberspace Wing and the Air Force Network Operations mission of the 67th Cyberspace Wing.

**Mission:** The 24th Air Force Commander also serves as the Service Cyber Component Provider to United States Cyber Command. As AFCYBER, its' mission is "American Airmen delivering full-spectrum, global cyberspace capabilities and effects for our Service, the Joint Force, and our Nation." Through daily cyber tasking orders, AFCYBER directs units around the world to conduct cyberspace operations across six Lines of Effort; Build, Operate, Secure and Defend the Air Force Information Network (AFIN) and directed mission critical cyber terrain, Extend cyber capabilities to the tactical edge of the modern battlefield, and Engage the adversary in support of combatant and air component commanders.

**Organization:** The 24th Air Force is comprised of an integrated operations center (OC) (624OC) and two wings (688th and 67th Cyberspace Wings) located at Joint Base San Antonio - Lackland, TX. The 5th Combat Communications Group is located at Robins AFB, GA.

- **624th Operations Center**'s mission is to establish, plan, direct, coordinate, assess, command, and control full spectrum cyber operations and capabilities in support of Air Force and Joint requirements.

- **67th Cyberspace Wing** is charged as the Air Force execution element for Air Force Network Operations and providing network warfare capabilities to Air Force, Joint Task Force, and combatant commanders that operate, manage, and defend global Air Force networks. Additionally, the 67th CW performs Defensive Cyber Analysis for the Air Force and Joint community.

- **688th Cyberspace Wing** is responsible for creating the information operations advantage for combatant forces through exploring, developing, applying, and transitioning counter information technology, strategy, tactics and data to control the information battlespace and provide the world’s best IO leaders.

- **The 689th Combat Communications Wing** trains, deploys and delivers to the President, Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commanders, and the warfighter expeditionary communications, information systems, air traffic control, and weather services.

Glossary

Most terms are taken from the Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (as of July 2017). Other cyberspace terms are taken from Cyber Operations and Cyber Terrorism, DCSINT Handbook No. 1.02 (15 August 2005) and the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) web site.

**area of responsibility (AOR)** — The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.

**battle damage assessment (BDA)** — The estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force.

**CERF** — Cyber Effects Request Format.

**CJCS** — Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**CMT** — Combat Mission Team.

**CCDR** — Combatant Commander.

**CCMD** — Combatant Command.

**command and control (C2)** — The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

**commander's critical information requirement (CCIR)** — An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making.

**concept of operations (CONOPS)** — A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources.

**counterintelligence (CI)** — Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.

**course of action (COA)** — 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. 3. A product of the course-of-action development step of the joint operation planning process.

**CPT** — Cyberspace Protection Team.

**cybersecurity** — Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.

**cyberspace** — A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

**cyberspace operations** — The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.
**cyberspace superiority** — The degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary.

**data mining** — A method of using computers to sift through personal data, backgrounds to identify certain actions or requested items.

**defensive cyberspace operations (DCO)** — Passive and active cyberspace operations intended to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems.

**defensive cyberspace operations internal defensive measures (DCO-IDM)** — Deliberate, authorized defensive measures or activities conducted within the Department of Defense information networks. They include actively hunting for advanced internal threats as well as the internal responses to these threats.

**defensive cyberspace operations response actions (DCO-RA)** — Deliberate, authorized defensive measures or activities taken outside of the defended network to protect and defend Department of Defense cyberspace capabilities or other designated systems.

**denial of service attack (DOS)** — A cyber attack designed to disrupt network service, typically by overwhelming the system with millions of requests every second causing the network to slow down or crash.

**Department of Defense information networks (DODIN)** — The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, including owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and national security systems.

**DISA** — Defense Information Systems Agency.

**distributed denial of service attack (DDOS)** — A cyber attack involving the use of numerous computers flooding the target simultaneously. Not only does this overload the target with more requests, but having the denial of service attack from multiple paths makes backtracking the attack extremely difficult, if not impossible. Many times worms are planted on computers to create zombies that allow the attacker to use these machines as unknowing participants in the attack.

**DOD** — Department of Defense.

**DOD Information Network (DODIN) Operations** — Operations to design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain Department of Defense networks to create and preserve information assurance on the Department of Defense information networks.

**electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)** — The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands.

**electromagnetic spectrum management** — Planning, coordinating, and managing use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures.

**electronic attack (EA)** — Division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires.
**electronic warfare (EW)** — Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.

**e-mail spoofing** — A method of sending e-mail to a user that appears to have originated from one source when it actually was sent from another source.

**execute order (EXORD)** — 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed.  

**firewall** — A barrier to keep destructive forces away from your property.  

**GCC** — Geographic Combatant Commander.  

**hacker** — Advanced computer users who spend a lot of time on or with computers and work hard to find vulnerabilities in IT systems.  

**hacktivist** — These are combinations of hackers and activists. They usually have a political motive for their activities, and identify that motivation by their actions, such as defacing opponents' websites with counterinformation or disinformation.  

**information environment** — The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.  

**information operations (IO)** — The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.  

**IPR** — in-progress review.  

**intelligence** — 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The organizations engaged in such activities.  

**intelligence requirement (IR)** — 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces.  

**intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)** — An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function.  

**J-1** — manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff; manpower and personnel staff section.  

**J-2** — intelligence directorate of a joint staff; intelligence staff section.  

**J-3** — operations directorate of a joint staff; operations staff section.  

**J-4** — logistics directorate of a joint staff; logistics staff section.  

**J-5** — plans directorate of a joint staff; plans staff section.  

**J-6** — communications system directorate of a joint staff; command, control, communications, and computer systems staff section.  

**JFHQ-C** — Joint Force Headquarters-Cyberspace.
JFHQ-DODIN — Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Networks.

joint fires element (JFE) — An optional staff element that provides recommendations to the operations directorate to accomplish fires planning and synchronization.

joint force commander (JFC) — A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force.

joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) — A prioritized list of targets approved and maintained by the joint force commander.

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) — The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process.

joint operation planning process (JOPP) — An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a joint operation plan or order.

joint operations area (JOA) — An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission.

joint target list (JTL) — A consolidated list of selected targets, upon which there are no restrictions placed, considered to have military significance in the joint force commander's operational area.

joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) — A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance, synchronization, and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list.

joint task force (JTF) — A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

keylogger — A software program or hardware device that is used to monitor and log each of the keys a user types into a computer keyboard.

line of effort (LOE) — In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.

line of operation (LOO) — A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s).

logic bomb — A program routine that destroys data by reformatting the hard disk or randomly inserting garbage into data files.

malware (short for malicious software) — software designed specifically to damage or disrupt a system, such as a virus or a Trojan Horse.

measure of effectiveness (MOE) — A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.
measure of performance (MOP) — A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.

military deception (MILDEC) — Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

military information support operations (MISO) — Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives.

navigation warfare (NAVWAR) — Deliberate defensive and offensive action to assure and prevent positioning, navigation, and timing information through coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare operations.

Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) — A global, multi-segment network used by the Department of Defense.

offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) — Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.

operation order (OPORD) — A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

operation plan (OPLAN) — 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. A complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data.

operational environment (OE) — A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

operational preparation of the environment (OPE) — The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the operational environment.

ransomware — A type of malicious software that infects and restricts access to a computer until a ransom is paid. Although there are other methods of delivery, ransomware is frequently delivered through phishing emails and exploits unpatched vulnerabilities in software.

reachback — The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed.

rules of engagement (ROE) — Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) — The worldwide SECRET-level packet switch network that uses high-speed Internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Network circuitry.

signals intelligence (SIGNT) — 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals.
sniffers — A program designed to assist hackers/and or administrators in obtaining information from other computers or monitoring a network. The program looks for certain information and can either store it for later retrieval or pass it to the user.

spam — The unsolicited advertisements for products and services over the Internet, which experts estimate to comprise roughly 50 percent of the e-mail.

spyware — Any technology that gathers information about a person or organization without their knowledge. Spyware can get into a computer as a software virus or as the result of installing a new program. Software designed for advertising purposes, known as adware, can usually be thought of as spyware as well because it invariably includes components for tracking and reporting user information.

special operations forces (SOF) — Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.

TTP — tactics, techniques, and procedures.

time-sensitive target (TST) — A joint force commander validated target or set of targets requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces.

trojan horse — A program or utility that falsely appears to be a useful program or utility such as a screen saver. However, once installed performs a function in the background such as allowing other users to have access to your computer or sending information from your computer to other computers.

virus — A software program, script, or macro that has been designed to infect, destroy, modify, or cause other problems with a computer or software program.

worm — A destructive software program containing code capable of gaining access to computers or networks and once within the computer or network causing that computer or network harm by deleting, modifying, distributing, or otherwise manipulating the data.

zombie — A computer or server that has been basically hijacked using some form of malicious software to help a hacker perform a distributed denial of service attack (DDOS).

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