Belize 2021: The Vision

A safe, secure Belize at peace with itself and its neighbors, where the security environment allows the development of a peaceful and democratic society that utilizes its human and natural resources to ensure prosperity, social justice, ethnic harmony and sustainable livelihood.

— The Right Honorable Said Musa, Prime Minister, Belize, 14 June 2006

The Challenge

The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning is a strategic disadvantage. To reduce risk and achieve Vision 2021, Belize requires an integrated national security architecture that develops policy, coordinates action plans, monitors execution, reviews progress and maintains a long-term perspective. Currently, the government does not possess an adequate national security planning structure with the requisit capability. Redesigning the current national security architecture so that it provides long-range planning, coordination between cabinet ministers and their agencies, and monitoring of security programs can be the difference between success and failure of a national security strategy.

Objectives

On November 7, 2006 strategic planners representing Belize’s security organizations and other government agencies reconvened to address the final piece of their National Security Strategy (NSS) formulation process. Meeting in Belize City, these planners spent the next three and one-half days discussing the assignment of policy objectives and supporting agencies and recommendations for a redesigned national security framework capable of executing and monitoring security policy. In order to formulate recommended changes that would strengthen the executive branch’s strategic planning capabilities, planners reviewed current Belizean government processes and organizations and studied examples of foreign national security systems. As in the two previous workshops, conducted in June and August 2006, they were assisted by teams from the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) and the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT). Professor B.F. Griffard and Colonel Dale Eikmeier from the USAWC Center for Strategic Leadership, and Mr. Thomas R. Hamilton-Baillie representing the SSDAT provided instructional and facilitation support.
During the opening session Brigadier General Lloyd Gillett, Commander, Belize Defence Force (BDF), and Mr. Leonard Hill, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Belize, stressed that in Belize’s increasingly complex geo-political environment, a short-term focus brings substantial risks. To counter these risks, they charged the assembled group to put aside parochial agendas and focus on developing an optimal NSS architecture.

**Methodology**

Operating within a dynamic security environment requires periodic adjustments in the allocation of resources, and regular periodic reviews of the strategy and resource prioritization. Recognizing this, the planners studied the in-place institutions and processes to determine what changes, if any, were required for effective program development, execution and monitoring. Areas of focus included:

- National Security Council (NSC) Responsibilities
- Ministry/Agency Responsibilities
- Judicial Responsibilities
- Legislative Responsibilities
- Special Committee Responsibilities
- Private Sector/Non-governmental Organization Stakeholder Contributions

To assist in formulating their concepts, the planning team received presentations on existing examples of national security and national intelligence architectures from the CSL and SSDAT teams. This was followed by a detailed discussion of the existing processes within Belize led by Ms. Rhea Rogers, Deputy Coordinator, National Security Council Secretariat. With this information as a start point, planners addressed the pros and cons of the structures presented, developing initial recommendations as to what might work best within the Belizean government structure.

**Belizean Government Structure**

Occupying a strategic position geographically and culturally, Belize forms an important linkage between the Caribbean archipelago and other Central America countries. It differs from its neighbors in that it is the only English-speaking country in Central America and governs within a parliamentary democracy based on the British system with executive, legislative and judicial branches. The executive branch consists of the British Monarch, the Head of State represented by a Governor General; the Prime Minister, the Head of Government; and the Cabinet appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. A bicameral National Assembly with a 29-member elected House of Representatives and an 8-member appointed Senate makes up the legislative branch. The judicial branch is structured around the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the district magistrates. Its national security apparatus consists of a National Security Council designated by the
Prime Minister and supported by a Secretariat. The Secretariat consists of a dual-hatted Coordinator, a Deputy Coordinator and a shared administrative staff.

**WHAT’S GOOD? WHAT’S BAD? WHAT’S REALLY NEEDED?**

As the planners developed their concepts for the optimal NSS execution and monitoring solution within the Belize governmental model, they had to take into consideration the current operating environment. What is the impact of the executive leadership style of the government? What solutions will the existing structure best support? Where is the talent pool and resources? And, what are the legal issues to be addressed brought about by a recommended structure?

To accomplish their tasks, the planners analyzed the previously identified strategic requirements and their need capabilities and matched them to the government ministries and agencies best suited to achieve them. Lead and supporting agencies were recommended for each strategic concept. Although this path provided oversight for individual concepts, it did not resolve the fundamental issue of prioritization and resource allocation among competing concepts at the national level. Therefore, the current National Security structure required change to enhance probability that the NSS would be achieved.

**ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR AND THE NSC SECRETARIAT**

Without a major change, it was obvious that the current NSC structure lacked the resources to ensure that newly developed NSS programs would be executed, monitored and sustained over the long-term. Planners feared that the “crisis of the day” mentality and normal bureaucratic entropy would weaken the NSS. For these reasons, the planners recommended that the NSC create a position for a National Security Advisor (NSA) with an adequate staff comprised of interagency representatives with the capability of developing strategic policy objectives, and translating those objectives into executable initiatives properly resourced and synchronized according to their strategic priority. They viewed this as essential to achieving Vision of Belize 2021.

The NSA is the principal advisor to the NSC with a focus on interagency integration, strategic policy development, implementation, and oversight of security policy and programs. He would draft and staff planning guidance for the development of the NSS supporting action plans by the lead agencies. Working with the members of the NSC, the NSA prepares “over the horizon” reviews and oversees a national security exercise program. He would be assisted in this effort by a small but capable Secretariat.

Reporting to the NSA, the Secretariat staff would be manned by seconded personnel from the various ministries and agencies. The staff would support NSC strategic planning efforts. It would work within an interagency process and coordinate with the designated lead agencies to monitor and synchronize policy implementation with sufficient rigor to ensure a chance at success. The Secretariat would have a special charter to monitor the measured acceptance of risk and expenditure of limited resources on the enablers that provide the highest return on investment.
PROJECT ASSESSMENT

Two major theater strategic objectives for the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) are the establishment of regional partnerships and the enhancement of hemispheric stability and security. Regional partnerships are defined as nations working together as coalition partners to face shared challenges in order to decrease tensions and rivalries through the fostering of transparency between neighbors. Hemispheric stability and security provides the environment for sustained economic improvement and prosperity, conditions essential to reducing the endemic poverty in the region. An important step in achieving these goals in Central America was the successful completion of the Belize National Security Strategy Formulation Process.

With the completion of this three phase effort the Belizean government has developed a workable national security strategy that if implemented, along with the recommended structural changes in the national security architecture provides an excellent roadmap towards Belize 2021. Achieving the objectives laid out by the Belizean government in their Vision 2021 will not be an easy task. Enroute the government must combat the criminal activity and violence brought on by the poverty mentioned above. Since many of the issues have transnational origins, it is to Central America’s benefit to follow the Belizean example and develop a regional strategy that charts a stable and secure path toward the future.

As USSOUTHCOM continues to work towards achieving its theater strategic objectives, the U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership is available to assist. Using the Project Team approach, CSL is capable of drawing on the total depth of expertise extant in the USAWC to develop and execute support for Combatant Commander Security Cooperation initiatives.

These may be found on the USAWC/CSL web site at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/IPapers.asp.

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