The Sixth Annual USAWC Reserve Component Symposium

Achieving Unity of Effort in Responding to Crises

Workshop #1:

“Examine the evolving relationship between USNORTHCOM and the National Guard, the Army Reserve and other Reserve Components”

By Professor B.F. Griffard

Among the many challenges revealed during the military's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the summer of 2005 were significant issues surrounding Command and Control (C2). Given the frequently strained interaction between the active component and the National Guard, it became clear that our traditional notions of C2 required a cultural migration away from “command and control” toward a broader concept of “command, control, and collaboration.” For all their devastation, however, many experts are labeling Katrina and Rita as representative of the “lower end” of potentially catastrophic events which could occur. In addition to regional disasters such as Category V hurricanes and earthquakes, events with greater national impact such as pandemic influenza or terrorist attacks employing nuclear or biological devices could result in death and destruction that would exceed even the devastation wreaked along the Gulf Coast and on September 11, 2001 combined. These kinds of events make up the 98% of incidents effectively addressed in the National Response Plan (NRP). The focus for symposium discussions was the latter, the 2%, that compel us to seek means for achieving a ‘unity of effort’ between those envisioned to respond to catastrophe, first within the military's active and reserve components, and then between the military and the civil authorities we are sworn to serve.

On July 11-12, 2007, the United States Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a symposium, Achieving Unity of Effort in Responding to Crises, designed to address these ends. The forum was directed at determining better means of incorporating all elements of military response—the active component (AC), the Services' reserves, and the National Guard—in support of Federal, state, and local authorities following catastrophic events. Participants in the symposium arrived armed with a compelling interest and a wealth of experience in the area of defense support to civil authorities. They represented the leading stakeholders in homeland defense and security affairs, including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the National Guard Bureau, and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve. Adding their experience to the exchange of concern and understanding on this topic were the Adjutants General from the states of Georgia, Rhode Island and Texas, the Pennsylvania Director of Homeland Security, and representatives of both the public and private sectors.

Symposium Methodology

With improving Unity of Effort as the focal point, participants were divided into four “workshops,” each examining a critical aspect of the response and recovery requirements for the military in support of Federal, state and local government:

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Workshop #1: The Evolving Relationship Between the USNORTHCOM and the Military’s Reserve Component in Preparing for and Responding to Catastrophe

Workshop #2: The Potential Need to Establish an Appropriate Mechanism for the Military to Accompany and Support Civilian Components Focused on Regional Response to Catastrophe

Workshop #3: The Military’s Role in Supporting an Evolving National Response Plan

Workshop #4: The Development and Dissemination of a “Common Operational Picture” in Preparation, Response and Recovery Operations Between the Components of the Military and Civilian Authorities at All Levels of Government.

Each workshop began with a “subject matter expert presentation” from an individual or organization intimately involved in the particular focus areas being addressed. Following the presentation, each workshop group embarked upon a series of questions designed to frame the discussions, observations, and recommendations that were to follow. At the end of the symposium, those observations and recommendations were presented to a “Blue Ribbon Panel,” which consisted of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Deputy Commander of USNORTHCOM; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Integration from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs; the Director for Operations Coordination, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; the Chief of the Army Reserve; the Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard Affairs; and the Chief of Logistics of the National Guard Bureau.

**The Evolving Relationship**

This paper focuses on the observations and recommendations of Workshop #1 as they examined “The Evolving Relationship between USNORTHCOM and the Military’s Reserve Component in Preparing for and Responding to Catastrophe.” These deliverables were developed by exploring the overall topic through three questions:

- **Question #1:** How can the Department of Defense (DoD)/Combatant Commands (COCOMs) more effectively leverage Title 10 Reserve Component (RC) units and bring them to bear in support of Catastrophic Incidents?
- **Question #2:** How can planning be integrated horizontally, vertically and geographically to better determine required National capabilities for responding to Catastrophic Events?
- **Question #3:** How do we logistically sustain the AC and the RC forces at appropriate readiness levels for domestic missions faced with the current and foreseeable OPTEMPO?

Even though the 2005 Hurricane season’s efforts have come under great scrutiny and criticism, all in all they were regional events. For this reason Workshop participants were asked to frame their discussions on the “two percent” of events that could qualify as Catastrophic Incidents with national impact.

**Leveraging Capabilities**

In discussing the initial question consensus was reached that a major challenge facing both DHS and DoD is the identification of the required capabilities that the military would be asked to provide. To accomplish this the basis for requirements determination must be refined and institutionalized to include an understanding of local and state capabilities and needs. Once requirements are identified, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) must source capabilities to ensure timely employment in support of Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) missions. Two programs could address this issue: first, the development of an EXORD-based, steady-state posture sourced by the Services’ Title 10 Reserve Components (RC); and, second, an effort should be made to improve the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to reflect DSCA mission capabilities.

The rapid response time of the National Guard to all types of disasters is one of its strongest attributes. However, for a catastrophic incident additional capabilities extant in the Title 10 RC will be required as soon as possible. To
achieve such response times will require the involuntary mobilization of Title 10 RC units. This will require law and policy changes to allow for involuntary call-up applicable to all hazards. Once sourced, the Title 10 RC units would be task organized OPCON to a designated COCOM. Workgroup participants identified two enablers to ease implementation of this recommendation: 1) the establishment of a Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), and, 2) the harmonization of the Services’ mobilization policies.

**Integrated Planning**

Effective disaster response requires fully integrated planning to ensure a mutual understanding of priorities and collaborative relationships. From Workgroup discussions it was apparent that this integrated horizontal, vertical, and geographic planning process still requires fine tuning. For example, although the first principle of the Incident Command System (ICS) is that most incidents are managed locally, the current DoD planning process is not designed to develop and consider bottom up requirements.

To improve the quality of integrated planning, the participants recommended a process mirroring the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) regional approach augmented with a standing Joint Field Office (JFO) focused largely on planning and execution matters.

There was strong support for institutionalizing DSCA as a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirement producing an additional skill identifier (ASI). Implementation of this recommendation would ensure a steady stream of Joint officers trained in DSCA planning techniques and would raise DSCA’s profile throughout the Services and DoD.

Available time remains one of the greatest limitations on effective DSCA collaborative planning. Efficient use of this resource is complicated by certain departmental, process, and cultural impediments that constrain planning to a level of detail sufficient to define required capabilities. Further, if operations at all levels are to achieve the same level of success, plans and information must be shared. Current policy restrictions on plan sharing with local, regional, and DHS partners seriously limit the ability to produce a fully coordinated planning response to scenario requirements. This restricted information sharing is compounded by the lack of communications compatibility and procedures between federal departments, as well as state and local planners. DoD planners employ the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), while most of their collaborative agencies operate on the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) or the worldwide web. Finally, DoD needs to synchronize the 15 National Planning Scenarios (NPS) with the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Such an action would result in more efficient time management and would provide a sharper focus for planners at all levels.

**Sustaining the Force**

The Armed Forces of the United States basic mission is to be prepared to fight and win the Nation’s wars. In reality it is harder than that, with daily requirements that span the complete conflict spectrum plus various domestic support missions. Available time, resources, and current OPTEMPO prohibit training and equipping for each specified mission. As the Services prioritize their available resources DSCA rapidly becomes a lesser included event. As a result DSCA requirements definition becomes more critical especially for the Title 10 RC units. Service’s will continue to train and equip to the larger mission on the assumption that the capability to fight the nation’s wars also provides the force the capacity to effectively operate at the low end of the conflict spectrum. Only through accurate DSCA requirements definition can the Service’s be sure that this strategy will meet that two percent catastrophic incident response requirement, without potentially seriously jeopardizing their ability to project and sustain power overseas.

A first step in clarifying domestic support requirements is the synchronization of the 21 Defense Planning Scenarios with the 15 National Planning Scenarios. Such an action would allow the Services to determine if there is a requirement to rebalance the Force (AC and RC) to ensure timely DSCA response. Although the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was tasked to look at this issue it has gaps. DSCA is further complicated by the issue of equipment and communications interoperability, a condition that exists not only between the Armed Forces and
the civilian responders, but between the Services themselves. As requirements are defined and interoperability issues identified COCOMs need to work together in taking them back to DoD in order to raise DSCA’s priority.

**Achieving Unity of Effort**

One of the first orders of business for this Workshop was to widen its field of interest. Originally focused on USNORTHCOM’s relationships with the RC, it was quickly pointed out that both the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) also have responsibility for domestic support missions. By broadening the discussion to include all impacted COCOMs the Workshop observations and recommendations make a greater contribution to achieving unity of effort during DSCA missions. Because of their differing areas of responsibility (AOR) there will be diversity in the identified requirements. It is the role of the Joint Staff to prioritize COCOM requirements based on acceptable risk. This puts DSCA planning on somewhat the same footing as other operational planning efforts. As such it seems essential to continuing maturation of the DSCA planning process that the initiation of the effort to synchronize the 15 National Planning Scenarios with the CPG and the JSCP take place as soon as is feasible.

This symposium allowed the participants to contribute to the search for solutions that will provide for a more effective response by the military in support of federal, state, and local efforts following a catastrophic incident. Certainly a key piece of this endeavor was the effort of this workshop to identify the challenges and impediments of the evolving COCOM relationships with the National Guard and the Services’ Title 10 Reserve Components.

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