Common Security and the Global War on Terror

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By Professor B. F. Griffard

Fighting terrorism is our common goal. . . . Our ultimate success will be in a short-term strategy of fighting terrorism locally and long-term in addressing the root causes and symptoms.

—General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, April 12, 2007

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 demonstrated the global reach of transnational terrorism. Protected by the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and its international network posed a major threat to the stability and security of many nations of the world. The risk was especially acute within the regions encompassed in the United States Central Command area of responsibility. To counter this threat Coalition Forces initiated Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. In both cases a decisive military victory has been followed by extensive counter terrorist/counter insurgency operations. It is the tactics and techniques employed in these on-going operations that framed the discussions at the second annual Land Forces Symposium in Islamabad, Pakistan April 10-12, 2007.

As part of an on-going effort to outline a comprehensive and collaborative strategy toward terrorism the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Pakistan, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander, U.S. Army Central co-hosted this year’s symposium. Organized around the theme “Common Security and the Global War on Terror,” it provided a forum for Chiefs of Staff of the Armies from the 22 attending nations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and surrounding region to meet and confer on topics of common concern. These topics included the discussion of common threats, political, socioeconomic or ideological motivations of terrorists and an examination of how nations can deal effectively with such issues. Throughout the symposium, distinguished speakers and participating military commanders shared their own experiences and ideas in improving security and transforming their nation’s capabilities to meet the evolving threat.

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) assisted the U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) staff in identifying subject matter experts and speakers. Professor Bernard F. Griffard, USAWC/CSL, reprised his role from the initial Land Forces Symposium (LFS) 2006, and served as the symposium’s co-moderator. He shared duties with Dr. Pervaiz Cheema, the Director of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). Lieutenant General (Retired) David Barno, Director NESA, served as a principal panelist.

COLLECTIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE

Discussions throughout the symposium were lively and frank. Neither speakers nor delegates exhibited reticence when expressing their opinions and ideas. Following welcoming remarks by General Ahsan Saleem Hyat, Vice Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan, and Lieutenant General R. Steven Whitcomb, Commander, United States Army Central/Third Army, that emphasized the need for a collective and comprehensive response to the threat of terrorism, the

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Keynote Address was delivered by the Honorable Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister of Pakistan. Highlighting Pakistan’s role in the war on terror, especially experience gained in operations within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan, the Prime Minister stressed employment of a realistic and comprehensive strategy focused on rooting out the causes of terrorism and engaging all stakeholders. A strategy that views the military option as one of many choices, not the only choice; an option employed in an integrated fashion with all other instruments of national power. Such coordinated action supports building partnerships with strength of commitment to defeating terrorism both nationally and in the international arena.

Taken as a whole, this initial session stressed three main themes. First, in combating transnational terrorism the use of military force alone has not and will not yield desired results. Second, win the “hearts and minds” of the people. Such a strategy addresses the root causes of terrorism by removing the sense of deprivation that leads a population to support terrorist operations and recruitment. Following from these two themes, the third was a recommendation to replace the word “war” from the phrase “war on terror” with a suitable word that properly reflects the multi-dimensional nature of the counter terrorism struggle.

SECURITY CONCERNS

The adaptation of terrorism or the threat of terrorism by certain states as a tool of international relations is a problem that cannot be addressed by military action alone. “Force”, as pointed out by Dr. Mahmoud Khalaf, a member of the Global and National Security Concerns panel, “is a first generation response to fourth generation ideas.” It must be addressed by a multi-dimensional strategy that employs comprehensive approaches to strengthen the socio-economic environment, encourages political dialogue, and, where necessary, applies measured force. Mr. Mushahid Syed, a panelist and former Pakistani Information Minister, supported Dr. Khalaf and pointed out that the Coalition had failed to grasp this reality in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Colonel (R) Orozbek Moldaliev, Kyrgyz Diplomatic Academy, joined his fellow panelists in promoting a “hearts and minds” offensive. The first step in such an effort must be the reclamation of the information high ground in order to counter the radical’s message that this is really a war against Islam, not terror. The existence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism would aid in focusing the counter terror effort.

CAPACITY BUILDING

How do we prepare Second and Third Generation militaries to fight a Fourth Generation conflict? This was one of the capacity building questions addressed by the Counter-Terrorism and Capacity Building panel. Composed of representatives from Jordan, Pakistan, and the United States, the panel concluded that economic, political and military capacity building has to be undertaken concurrently in a Fourth Generation environment. LTG Barno pointed out that marshalling long-term support and identifying high-payoff long-term investments will aid in “depriving terrorists of oxygen.” The capacity to defeat the terrorists is directly related to the military’s relations with the populace. LTG Safdar Hussein, former Commander, Pakistani 11th Corps, stated that when operating in the Tribal areas the military forces must educate the public as to the terrorist threat and the rationale and necessity
behind the on-going military operation. Military Commanders and government agents must cultivate influential personalities and leaders to mould public opinion in support of government policies. To achieve this capability major transformation is needed in armed forces with regards to equipment and training. An example of such an effort was presented by Her Royal Highness Brigadier General Aisha Bint Al-Hussain, as she described the initiatives of the Jordanian Military Women’s Affairs Directorate to train and integrate military women into the security forces.

WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE

“Terrorists have to be defeated; Extremists have to be convinced and converted.” This statement by Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, succinctly defines the military’s traditional and non-traditional roles in the counter terror campaign. Strategies for winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the population were the focus of the presentations and discussions on the second day of the symposium.

General Dan McNeill, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan set the stage with a review of the efforts of ISAF to build governance and capacity where none previously existed. GEN McNeill stated that he found the expression “winning the hearts and minds” to be misleading, and suggested a better expression would be trying to avail yourself to the will of the people. To succeed in this effort he identified three conditions:

1. The elite of the country must be enthusiastic in supporting change
2. The public must be willing to accept the change
3. The international community must accept the redefined state

These points were reinforced by the Winning the Hearts and Minds Panel. As stated above, the application of combat power can defeat terrorists, but not extremism. This must be accomplished through an effective media and strategic communications strategy that addresses the “trust deficit.” The strategic communications campaign must deliver a credible message backed by policies that reflect reality. As emphasized by Minister Ali A. Jalali, former Afghan Interior Minister, the counter-information campaign must delegitimize the insurgents and aggressively portray the consequences of failure in counterinsurgency operations. Mr. Riad Kahwaji, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) supported General McNeill’s three points by making it clear that winning the hearts and minds requires the population to believe in change to an extent that they would help bring it about or at least not resist it. Part of this battle is won by providing human security through strengthening the national government to the point where they can demonstrate the visible capacity to prevail.

BUILDING REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS: THE WAY AHEAD

The Land Forces Symposium provided the forum for senior ground force commanders from 22 nations, who are actively involved in combating terror and the instability it breeds, to gather and share information, and to look to the future. Meeting in an Executive Session chaired by General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, delegates supported the concept that military force must be fully integrated with programs focused on the root causes of extremism and based on good governance. Since the threat is transnational, to succeed international partnerships must be established to implement a collective and effective response. As part of this partnership nations must share their strengths especially in the military element of power to assist in the reorganizations, reequipping, training, and integration necessary to prepare the required forces. President Musharraf also addressed the issue of using the term “war” to describe the counter-terror campaign. It was admitted that “war” serves the purpose of emphasizing urgency.
and mobilizing the public and funds, however, it tends to skew perspective and de-emphasizes the diversity of response.

At the closing plenary session, President Musharraf again stressed that military actions are never the only solution to the problems of terrorism and extremism. Ultimate success in the fight against terrorism requires a strategy that in the short-term fights terrorism locally and in the long-term addresses the root causes and symptoms – a sense of alienation, deprivation, injustice, and hopelessness. Effective execution of this strategy relies on cooperation and unity amongst coalition members, and the support a free but responsible media.

CONCLUSION

Criticism of the Coalition strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq were freely given throughout the symposium. Their heavy dependence on the military element of power was portrayed as a failure to understand the environment within which these battles are being fought. To emphasize this point, British operations during the Malayan Emergency were presented as a model for successful counter-insurgency efforts. However, placed in perspective, the Coalition has been involved in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq since 2003; the Malayan Emergency lasted 12 years.

Without a doubt planning for the post-major combat operations phases lacked prescience; yet, as is being demonstrated in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, there remains a requirement to kill terrorists while attempting to win the hearts and minds of the extremists. More importantly, Coalition military hearts-and-minds initiatives are short term; long term success requires international political will, and national governments that can govern and provide for the security of their citizens. The populace has become inured to the presence of the military and the media. They will begin to believe when other agencies of government become more relevant in the fight.

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