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This anthology is an outgrowth of a conference titled “The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium,” held at the Collins Center of the Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership from 7 through 9 February 2000. The genesis for the conference was the realization by several members of the staff of the Collins Center and Army War College faculty that the U.S.-led NATO operation in Kosovo resulted in a significant shift of Russian views on the United States and NATO. The conference also complemented our general objective of examining the changing environment in which the United States—including its armed forces—finds itself. The conference brought together over 50 individuals from academia and the policy and intelligence communities to examine the current state of the Russian military. Focusing primarily on the socio-political dimension of the military but not ignoring the military-technical dimension, the presentations delivered during the conference looked at Russia's domestic environment, the state of the military, perceived threats, and Russia's capacity to generate responses to those threats.

Although the chapters in this anthology are organized into four sections, the conference itself was conducted in seven panels. The first two panels examined how the Russian military fits into the changing domestic political environment and the impact of Russia's depressed economic state on the military, with a key question being the ability of the economy to support future military developments. The topic then shifted to the Russian military's response to its current environment, with the third panel focusing on the Russian approach to the revolution in military affairs, the fourth on regional security and threat perceptions issues, and the fifth on nontraditional threats to Russian security, including the dangerous state of the environment. The sixth panel addressed the halting Russian efforts at military reform, while the seventh looked at changing Russian military doctrine and strategy. The final morning of the conference was dedicated to a lively discussion of the issues raised during the previous two days.

The conference was conducted during the period between the appointment of Vladimir Putin as Acting President at the end of 1999 and his election as president in his own right in the spring of 2000. During the same period, the Russian military was conducting its campaign in Chechnya. These developments made for a dynamic intellectual and polemical environment as the conference speakers and attendees addressed a wide range of current issues affecting the Russian military. There have been a number of dramatic developments affecting the Russian military in the subsequent period, perhaps most obviously the tragic loss of the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk and its entire crew. However, none of these developments contradict the basic conclusions generated by the presentations and discussions of the workshop.

I would like to commend all the authors for their contributions to a better understanding of the issues, as well as the attendees for their valuable additions to the discussions throughout the conference. Their efforts shed considerable light on the challenges faced by the Russian
leadership as it seeks to determine the form and function of the Russian military in the years ahead.

DOUGLAS B. CAMPBELL
Director, Center for Strategic Leadership
U.S. Army War College
IN MEMORIAM

Professor Alexander Kennaway

14 August 1923 - 1 May 2000

Alexander ("Sasha") Kennaway was born in Vienna into a Russian émigré family, gaining the advantage of speaking literary quality Russian as well as the language of his adopted country. His family later moved to Britain, and Sasha graduated in Mechanical Engineering at Cambridge in 1942. He joined the Royal Navy as Engineer Officer and served in the Arctic, Mediterranean (where his ship was torpedoed & sunk), and in the Far East. After leaving the Royal Navy in 1947, he served as a Lieutenant Commander in the Royal Naval Reserve, studying Soviet naval technology.

For over two decades, Sasha worked in industry in a wide variety of chemical and mechanical engineering posts, which included work on the development of artificial limbs. From 1973, he was a visiting professor at the Imperial College of Science, London, and he also lectured at Japanese and Chilean Universities.

From 1993, he was a consultant at the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Camberley, writing and lecturing on the Russian military-industrial complex. He also visited many factories and research institutes in the former Soviet Union as an adviser on conversion or commercialization of defence industries.

The dynamism and insights that Sasha brought to our workshop in February 2000 were but a sample of the depth of his knowledge and the liveliness of his conversation. He was married to Jean for 27 years, and he leaves friends all over the world who value the privilege of having known him.
Part One: Domestic-Political Environment

Introduction

Marybeth P. Ulrich

The chapters in this section address the domestic civil-military, social, environmental, and economic contexts that affect the specific issues raised in subsequent panels. Each author addresses the intersection of these issues and military policy. Marybeth P. Ulrich looks at the fragile state of Russian democracy through the lens of the two Chechen wars, concluding that Russia is clearly not acting as a democratic state in the conduct of its national security policy. As evidence of Russia’s gradual democratic decline, Ulrich examines the undemocratic nature of the Russian national security policymaking process, the connection between strategic ends and undemocratic means in the conduct of the wars, and the general undermining of democratic institutions in the pursuit of the alleged national interest. She argues that the “democratic deficits” within the national security process have begun to spill over into other policy arenas and threaten Russia’s potential for consolidating its democracy. Ulrich analyzes both Chechen wars of the post-Soviet era, concluding that the conduct of the second Chechen campaign was less restrained by democratic forces within Russia than the first. Particularly troubling has been the complicit role of the Russian news media in the second conflict coupled with the government’s crackdown on access to information about the war. Ulrich documents the deviations from the expected behavior of democratic states in the first war that continued unchanged into the second. Lack of accountability for war crimes, atrocities against Russian civilians in the war zone, and a pattern of fabricating official versions of the war characterized both wars. The ineffectiveness of levers within Russian civil society to keep the government in compliance with the democratic principles of its own constitution was also a common feature of Russia’s conduct in Chechnya in the past decade. Ulrich’s focus on the conduct of national security policy in general, and the prosecution of an internal conflict specifically, illustrate that cumulative democratic backsliding, justified in the name of national security, can gradually weaken the fragile democratic structures of transitioning states to the point of collapse.

Mikhail Tsypkin surveys the Russian military’s political influence in the general power structure of the Russian government and more specifically within the realm of defense policymaking. He paints a picture of a national security decisionmaking process that is chaotic and lacking clear procedures for the military’s proper interface with civilian policymakers throughout the post-communist era. Tsypkin outlines how Yeltsin preferred personal control of the military over creation of accountable military and political institutions capable of executing and participating in the formulation of sound national security policy. His portrayal of the rise and fall of two larger-than-life personalities, Alexander Lebed and Lev Rokhlin, highlights the difficulty of harnessing the forces of intrigue and power which hold sway behind the scenes of Russian politics. Indeed Tsypkin’s chapter notably cedes little relevance to the functioning of Russian civil society or a Russian polity in general in the
policymaking process. The absence of these significant influences in the conduct of the
government is a theme that permeates each author’s characterization of the domesticpolitical environment.

As the feeble struggle for military reform plods on and defense ministers, chiefs of generalstaff, and competing defense policy bodies feud for influence in the policymaking process,Russia limps from crisis to crisis. Tsypkin effectively analyzes two recent critical nationalsecurity policy decisions, the daring move to seize control of the Pristina airport in June 1999and the selection of a strategy for the second Chechen War, as indicative of the military’sundue influence in security policy. Tsypkin warns that this influence is unlikely to wane in thefuture since it is fueled by an anti-Western mood that permeates all aspects of Russian society andgovernment. Furthermore, he argues that weak and fragmented Russian political institutions, the lack of competent and visionary civilian political leaders in nationalsecurity affairs, and the tendency of Russian presidents to make decisions based on a calculation of short-term self-interest, contribute to the present dominance of the Russianmilitary in security policy.

Dr. Odelia Funke argues that environmental issues are an ignored dimension of nationalsecurity interests and that Russia has treated both its environment and its population as expendable, renewable resources. This has resulted in a situation in which Russia faces immense environmental and health challenges, with profound implications for both the military and society as a whole. Pointing out that if a country’s “citizenry is not healthy, the state cannot be secure,” she underscores the impact of decades of environmental damage in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. She cites increasing mortality, declining birthrates, increased incidence of occupational and communicable diseases, and a declining population that has since been noted with concern by President Putin himself; she alsounderscores the pervasive and serious risks to the physical health and mental development ofRussian children. Her chapter points out that there were sound environmental laws under theSoviet regime, but that these laws were virtually ignored. She also raises questions about both the commitment and the ability of the Russian government to control ongoing pollution, let alone tackle the expensive process of remedying past abuses. Finally, she notes thepotential for cooperation between the West and Russia in the environmental arena.

Dr. Ted Karasik argues that health and demographic problems pose significantchallenges not only to Russia’s current military capabilities but also to its ability to respond to the demands and opportunities of contemporary and future revolutions in military affairs. He cites a wide variety of factors that contribute to the current health and demographic problems, including communicable diseases, environmental neglect, various types of substance abuse, including alcohol, tobacco, and drug use. Other factors include substandardpublic health systems—within the military and the rest of society—and a relatively lowregard for the welfare of citizens who comprise the “human capital” of society and the armedforces.

Karasik also cites the current trend of declining population that could result, in the worst case, in the Russian population being halved by mid-century. Other problems include a military leadership that has not fully recognized the need for comprehensive military reform,
to include the elimination of disruptive practices such as the hazing of junior soldiers. All these factors, Karasik argues, will limit Russia’s ability to respond to the types of conflicts it is most likely to face in the near future—counterinsurgency and urban operations. He cites the need for the Russian leadership to address health and demographic problems on a broad scale in the society at large and within the military establishment.

Dr. Steven Rosefielde’s chapter reviews the economic challenges facing the new Russian leadership. He argues that the new generation of Russian leaders is unlikely to adopt real economic reform and the surrendering of real power that such a course of action would entail, in large part due to culturally embedded forces that frustrated reform under the Yeltsin regime. Rather, those in power will adopt a different path that is determined by elite priorities and the existing economic system. Looking at the economic capabilities necessary to support a military establishment, Rosefielde argues that Russia’s capital and labor assets have deteriorated less than many assumed.

Consequently, Russia could rearm relatively quickly. However, Rosefielde argues that the E-revolution in microelectronics and communications have barely touched Russia, “leaving the nation far behind in a technological time warp.” He argues that there are two options for Vladimir Putin, who is unlikely to opt for real reform, to choose from: (1) to remain with Yeltsin’s “klepto-command” economy and continue to fall further behind the West and even less capable nations; or (2) to return to Mikhail Gorbachev’s concept of a command economy by disciplining the kleptocracy, exercising central controls, and using the power of state contracting, largely for arms, to rehabilitate the economy. Rosefielde sees Putin as more likely to adopt the latter course, largely because he does not harbor the hostility against the old system that characterized Yeltsin and because such a course is feasible. Rosefielde sees such a choice as protecting inefficient and obsolescent industries, further limiting the ability of the Russian economy to compete on the world markets. Among Rosefielde’s projections is one scenario in which Russia’s per capita gross domestic product in 2025 is roughly eight percent that of the United States and only 11 percent that of the People’s Republic of China. He concludes with the judgment that although Russia has the capability, motive, and perhaps the will to rearm, it probably lacks the ability either to restore a command economy or transition to competitive free enterprise. The result, according to Rosefielde, is that Russia is likely to be a source of significant instability.
Russia’s Failed Democratic National Security State and the Wars in Chechnya

Marybeth P. Ulrich

Introduction

An examination of post-communist Russia’s pursuit of national security through the lens of its behavior in the wars in Chechnya shows a clearly underdeveloped understanding of the link between strategic ends and democratic means in the formulation and execution of national security policy. Russian behavior across the two Chechen wars reveals a pattern of willing deviations from the course of shoring up the nascent democratic institutions that are critical for the eventual consolidation of democracy in Russia.

All democracies must balance the mandate to provide for the national security of their people with their charter to protect and foster the liberty of their citizens. Indeed, these sometime competing imperatives are at the core of a democratic government’s reason for being. To sacrifice liberty in the pursuit of national security is to have failed in the most fundamental mission of democratic government. Citizens of democracies accept the limitations on their freedom that the rule of law imposes in exchange for the protection of their individual rights and liberties.

Any decision or act that degrades the rule of law or that undermines the democratic institutions established to preserve individual rights and liberties should be taken with the utmost caution and reluctance. The primary national interest of a democratic state is to protect the democratic values upon which it was founded. Only when the survival of the state itself is threatened may such deviations be justified, and even then the leaders of a democratic state who adopt such measures must be vigilant for the first opportunity to correct the undemocratic course that is weakening the fabric of their democracy.

The national security institutions of democratic states are charged with achieving their critical function in a manner that does not threaten the democratic character of the state. National security professionals entrusted with achieving the national interests of democratic states must balance the need to achieve specific strategic objectives with the concurrent imperative that the means employed do not undercut the democratic values at the core of the state.1 This democratic military professionalism pervades the national security apparatus of democratic states and is exhibited in the manner of preparing national security plans, observing the limits of participation in policy decisions, and actual conduct in wartime.2

This chapter argues that Russia has not been acting as a democratic state in the conduct of its national security policy. The first Chechen War (1994-1996) and the second Chechen War (1999-today) paint a telling portrait of the state of democracy in Russia at two critical
crossroads in the post-communist era. Each war serves as a sort of microcosm of the overall democratic transition underway at the time of the conflict. The decisionmaking process, leadership tendencies of individual political leaders, and conduct of the conflicts indicate a general state of political-military affairs immune to the expectations of democratic polities and political systems. The result has been an ad hoc stream of policy decisions that are flawed by both the undemocratic nature of their formulation processes and their subsequent general authoritarian quality.

The Russian state and society embarked on the second Chechen campaign in a different place from the first, and will finish in a weakened position in terms of the democratic health of national security structures. Democratic values and the fostering of democratic institutions have come to mean less, while the pursuit of a strong state and the assertion of power in the world or at least within Russia’s own sphere of influence have come to mean more—perhaps at the cost of furthering the consolidation of democracy in Russia.

The Undemocratic Nature of the Russian National Security Policymaking Process

The Russian national security policymaking environment during the first Chechen War was characterized by very limited participation by the emerging democratic institutions and elements of democratic civil society. Indeed, a secret war was carried out in late October and early November 1994 against the rebel forces in Grozny. On 26 November 1994, Russian regular army forces joined Russian mercenaries hired by the FSK (the successor to the KGB and later renamed the FSB) in an attempted coup against General Dzhokhar Dudayev’s government. This effort to secretly ally with internal opposition forces to crush Dudayev’s independence movement failed miserably, forcing a move to the open use of force against the Chechen rebels.

In early August 1994, the Russian Security Council, the Presidential Commission on Security, and the cabinet under Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin assembled to discuss the Chechen policy. In the end, however, the decision to intervene specifically and the power to make broad Chechen policy were taken over by the Security Council as part of a general plan to boost the influence of Boris Yeltsin’s “security clique.” Some analysts hold the view that the decisionmaking circle may have been even more limited. Though the Russian press reported that the decision to disarm the Chechen formations by force was made at a November 24, 1994, Russian Federation Security Council meeting, there are other reports suggesting that such a meeting never took place and that whatever meeting did take place did not include those opposed to the use of force in Chechnya.6

As Anatol Lieven points out, in 1994 nothing had yet replaced the top communist institutions such as the Politburo and Central Committee in terms of alternative central decisionmaking functions.7 The Security Council was a tool of the President in that it was merely an advisory body comprised of members appointed by presidential decree who were not accountable to anyone but the President. Its operations were not transparent and its
decisions were not subject to democratic oversight. In any case, Yeltsin ran the Security Council in a pseudo-democratic style reminiscent of the Soviet Politburo. All members were requested to vote in favor of a resolution to go to war in Chechnya without debating the issue. When Yeltsin signed the final decree to restore "the constitution and law and order on the territory of the Chechen republic," the decision was kept secret from the nation.

Meanwhile, the post-communist decisionmaking structures were frequently ignored or circumvented, and efforts were made to limit participation of bodies potentially capable of checking power in the policymaking process. Both the Duma and the Federation Council (upper house of Parliament) resolved that the government should solve the matter peacefully. But both parliamentary bodies proved to be powerless because Yeltsin did not issue a state of emergency at the start of the war, an action which would have required the approval of the Federation Council before Defense Ministry forces were deployed in the conflict.

A brief look at the state of key national security institutions in the first Chechen War will highlight a few of the "democratic deficits" within the Russian national security process that marked this era. Democratization had not yet made great inroads into the conduct of the Russian national security process. Yeltsin's Chechen policy was promulgated via a presidential decree issued on 9 December 1994. The decree cited Article 13 of the Constitution, which prohibited the creation of armed formations aimed at undermining the integrity of the Russian Federation. Although the military action was justified on constitutional grounds, the Constitutional Court was bypassed in the policymaking process.

In addition, at the time of the first Chechen War, the Defense Ministry was in effect a pyramid of purely military staffs and administrations whose inner workings were hidden from the public and beyond the control of the political leadership. Civilian control of the security apparatus was not dependent on the performance of democratic institutions of government, but on Yeltsin's personal control and manipulation of information networks that were directly subordinate to him. One analyst went so far as to define civilian control in Russia at the time as "a monitoring system involving the timely delivery of critical reports to the President, a system of guaranteeing that military personnel do not become insubordinate and stage a putsch or some other such outrage."

However, this method of civilian control did not result in the uniform obedience of Yeltsin's commanders. Many commanders simply refused to send their units to the front, while others spoke out openly against the war without retribution. One particularly egregious transgression was the failure of President Yeltsin to halt the bombing of Grozny when he ordered the shelling to cease on 27 December 1994. Yeltsin's impotence as commander in chief fueled speculation that a group known as "the party of war" was dictating policy in the Chechen operation according to the preferences of the chiefs of the power ministries. This influential group of Yeltsin's inner circle included the ministers from the security forces, former KGB officers with confidant status, and hard-line politicians. Other members of the party of war included such figures as First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Sokovets, who had close links to the military and stood to benefit financially from war. Each member was guided by his own interests and the shared view that a war in Chechnya might be the death knell for a liberal agenda in Russia.
The Russian Duma's parliamentary role in the national security decisionmaking process in the first Chechen war was weak and generally ineffective. In the 1994-96 era parliamentary control in Russia was at the stage of development where it was possible to lodge complaints and conduct inquiries, but the body being investigated was not compelled to respond in a substantive way. The Duma's primary leverage within the national security process, budgetary control, was largely unrealized. A key reason for the Duma's inability to exert real oversight over the military was that it lacked crucial information, such as budget line items, essential to even knowing what activities the military was conducting. In addition, the defense committees and the Duma as a whole were generally timid toward the military. For instance, the issue of military reform—even after stunning defeat in the first war—was largely avoided. Many observers regarded the Duma as irrelevant to the political process as a whole. In a country that was largely being run by presidential decree, many alleged that the Parliament was little more than a national debating club.

In general, Yeltsin's circle of liberal reformers had faded from prominence by the time of the first Chechen War. Those few who remained were marginalized or ignored, like human rights adviser Sergei Kovalyev. Management of the first Chechen War indicated that those at the top of the political power structure had a view of democracy that was limited to soliciting the input of the polity only at election time. Even democrats held the view that once they came to power they could decide what was best for the country, with little or no further consultation with those who elected them. The decision to launch the first Chechen War revealed a return to Soviet era practices evidenced by the complete indifference to public opinion and democratic structures.18

Similarly, the decision to go to war for a second time in Chechnya was not the result of a comprehensive consultation of the relevant actors in a democratic national security process. Much of the decisionmaking process is still shrouded in secrecy, but early reports indicate that the decision's final shape reflected the preferences of then Prime Minister Putin and the security establishment. In a February 2000 interview, former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin stated that political leaders in the Yeltsin government had started to develop a strategy for dealing with the unstable territory back in March 1999. The strategy settled upon before Putin was appointed Prime Minister was limited to the modest goals of sealing Chechnya's frontiers and establishing a buffer around the republic.19 However, once Putin came to power he was persuaded by the arguments of key leaders in the security establishment who rejected a limited approach. Although his predecessors in office lobbied him to stick to the original plan, the generals seeking revenge for defeat in the first Chechen War carried the day.20

Stepashin also called into question the link between the Moscow apartment blasts and the decision to go to war. In a January 2000 interview with Nezavisimaia Gazeta he asserted that Russian authorities had actually planned an invasion for August-September 1999—months before either the apartment bombings or the invasion of Dagestan. Stepashin said that he personally visited the Caucasus region when he was Prime Minister to oversee the preparations of troops for the operation. Furthermore, he accused Putin of capitalizing on the apartment bombings to whip up public support for the military action that the Kremlin had already planned and to justify its expansion to include the storming of Grozny.21
Like the first Chechen war, the Duma had no role in the authorization of the use of force in Chechnya, nor was there any debate or participation among other formal and informal actors in Russian society. There is little evidence that democratic institutions or specifically designated actors in the national security process participated in a deliberative and inclusive national security policymaking process before the employment of the military instrument of power and a significant amount of Russia's scarce resources.

What is at Stake and How Have the Wars Been Justified?

Democracies that engage in war normally have to make some effort to gain and sustain public support for the action. This involves a process of education and justification to convince the public that the war aims are worth the cost to society in terms of national treasure, lives, and the sacrifice of liberty necessary to obtain the war's objectives. An important difference between the two Chechen wars has been how they were rationalized to the Russian people. In the first Chechen War the focus was on whether or not Chechens should have the right to independence. The picture was certainly muddied by the Chechens' preference for armed rebellion over peaceful negotiations and the undemocratic practices of the Dudayev regime in Grozny. But many Russians differed with the government on the decision to mount a full-scale military invasion to prevent independence, preferring that a political settlement be pursued to resolve the crisis. Indeed, after defeat in the first Chechen War most Russians were willing to allow Chechnya to go. In March 1997 the popular Moscow mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, declared that it was time to grant Chechnya independence.

However, the Russian government successfully framed the second Chechen War in terms of a state—Russia—fulfilling its obligation to protect its citizens from terrorists. As Prime Minister, acting President, and President, Putin consistently conveyed the government message that the war was in line with the widely shared goal of combating international terrorism, while insisting that the fight was purely an internal matter. Prime Minister Putin explained to the American people in a November 1999 op-ed piece published in the New York Times that “no government can stand idly by when terrorism strikes. It is the solemn duty of all governments to protect their citizens from danger.” He went on to link the “Chechen terrorists” to the same religious fanaticism that threatened US interests and to the archenemy of America, Osama bin Laden himself.

The framing of the second Chechen War in these terms has been a crucial component of maintaining the support of the Russian people. The government's orchestrated information campaign is focused on convincing the public that the key components of its story are true. However, the ongoing speculation that the Kremlin itself may have been responsible for the August 1999 apartment bombings speaks to the lack of legitimacy that both the Yeltsin government and its successor have with the Russian people. Russian scholar Stephen Cohen remarked in a NewsHour roundtable airing in the midst of the second Chechen War that “many very sensible people, people who are absolutely normal, have been led to ask the question whether it was the Kremlin itself that set off those bombs inside Moscow. I mean
what kind of government would be suspected of such a thing?” He added, “And that’s the political context in which this terrible war is unfolding.”

The Information War

Lack of information and misinformation characterized the Russian government’s release of news in the first post-communist Russo-Chechen War. For instance, it was often impossible for families to find out information about servicemen who had been killed or injured. However, for the most part the role of the press as a lever of democratic accountability was largely hailed as a success story in the first war. The unflappable grit of the press in its coverage of the war ensured that the earlier Chechen campaign would go down in history as the first publicly reported and press-covered military operation in Russian history. Television coverage enabled people to see the negative impact of government policy for the first time and to draw their own conclusions about the wisdom of leaders who promulgated such an ill-founded policy.

Indeed, the Russian press directed the greatest criticism ever at the government over the conduct of military operations. Media coverage splashed uncensored scenes of gore and suffering, which helped to shape public opinion against the war. This occurred despite the fact, according to the Russian human rights commissioner Sergei Kovalyev, that the Russian government made its best effort to generate lies through its propaganda machine in order to control the news from Chechnya. But the accurate accounts reported in many newspapers and in news broadcasts “shredded the official fabrications,” and by the midpoint of the war reporters agreed that the military was becoming more receptive to the press’s role and had lifted the policy of harassment that characterized the relationship of the press and the military at the onset of the conflict.

In the second Chechen war, however, the combination of a media disillusioned with the Chechen cause for independence and the Russian government’s stepped-up effort to win the “information war” led to striking differences in press coverage from that of the first Chechen war. First, the once dovish Russian news media that had prided itself on turning public opinion against the first Chechen war with its objective and gutsy reporting—often contradicting official reports—began the second Chechen War in the government camp. As one Russian journalist noted, “Never since the appearance of free speech in Russia have the authorities enjoyed such friendly support from the media as during the course of the current Chechen war.”

After the first war, Chechnya dissolved into a chaotic land of kidnappings and banditry, lacking any semblance of control by a functioning central government. This led to self-censorship within the press and the tendency of many journalists and news agencies to serve as willing accomplices to the government’s “patriotic war.” Much of the media’s support, of course, also reflected the views of the “oligarchs” who own them. The media’s pro-government bias was also a measure of the popularity of the war among the Russian people.
Meanwhile, in the course of its strategic planning for the second Chechen War Russian military planners and government leaders made a conscious decision to correct one of its greatest perceived deficiencies of the first war—the inability to win the war for public opinion. Evidently, Russian information troops were acute students of NATO's air war in Kosovo and attempted to replicate the methods employed in Operation Allied Force to manage the flow of information to the press.

The creation of a new government press center overseen by the Ministry of the Press was the greatest manifestation of this new thinking. To keep military information officers “on message,” a common glossary of terms was disseminated to include such instructions as referring to Chechen fighters as “terrorists” and refugees as “resettlers.” At the daily briefings the progress of the Army was favorably spun and the latest casualty accounts detailed the always-low Russian Army losses and always-high Chechen terrorist losses, and recounted the negligible effect of the war on civilians.

The prosecutors of the war were concerned that some journalists might be eager to report objective news from both sides of the conflict. These strategists decided that the best way to prevent independent news coverage from turning the public against the war was to prevent domestic and foreign media access to the conflict zone and to bully and otherwise intercept and censor objective reporting to the greatest extent possible. Many journalists were detained or subjected to tight Federal Security Service (FSB) surveillance to ensure that they did not wander away from the close supervision of Russian military handlers.

The much publicized arrest and detention of Andrei Babitsky, a correspondent for the US-funded Radio Liberty who had broadcast hard-hitting investigative reports from behind rebel lines, drew the attention of the international press to Russia’s war on objective journalism. Russian forces arrested Babitsky in mid-January 2000 and detained him for several weeks in the notorious Chernokozovo detention center in Chechnya for allegedly aiding the separatist rebels. Babitsky was still under investigation in June 2000 for allegedly forging documents and is not permitted to leave Moscow.

As Fred Weir reported in the Christian Science Monitor, “Journalists are apparently the enemy.” At Russian military checkpoints soldiers confiscated videotapes and film while scrutinizing reporters’ written notes. Since the war began, journalists have been interrogated, arrested, and even ordered to undergo psychiatric tests—a dusted off tactic from the Soviet era. In contrast to the first Chechen War, because of both the requirement imposed by the government to limit reporting to the area controlled by Russian military units and the fear of being subjected to kidnappings in Chechen territory, there was virtually no reporting from Chechen-held territory. Human Rights Watch criticized Russian authorities for harassing journalists and for imposing “arbitrary and obstructive regulations” rooted in a desire to achieve a virtual ban on coverage of the war.

Consequently, reports contrary to official government reports went uncorroborated by TV images or newspaper photos and the government carried on with its strategy of denying any reporting hostile to its preferred account of the war. For instance, when Amnesty International (AI) demanded an official government accounting for the perceived
indiscriminate use of force against civilians in several incidents where AI had gathered the specific testimony of eyewitnesses, one of Russia’s ambassadors simply issued a denial: “I would like to draw your attention to the fact that your letter to a large extent consists of episodes and events which are concocted [by] Chechen war propagandists, have not taken place, or at least remain not independently confirmed.”45 The letter simply did not address the specific incidents raised by Amnesty International.

However, by early January 2000 some cracks began to appear in the united front of the docile domestic press corps. Some outlets began to react negatively to the government’s overplaying of its “information war” hand and inability to admit even the slightest of setbacks in the field. The official account of the war had been so grossly misleading that the government’s reports finally began to lose credibility with the Russian media and the public. For instance, as foreign news agencies in Grozny reported that 115 Russian soldiers were lying dead amid the wreckage of their armored vehicles as the result of a Chechen ambush, Russian defense officials denied that any battle had occurred at all.46

The Military News Agency, founded and staffed by former military information officers at the time of the first Chechen war in an effort to bring down the wall between the news media and the Defense Ministry, has been at the forefront of the domestic effort for accurate reporting in the war.47

The most closely guarded information is that related to casualties. As of June 2000, the official death toll in the North Caucasus region stood at 2,400 killed and 7,000 wounded since the fighting began in Dagestan in August 1999.48 Other credible estimates place the real total much higher. The estimate of the respected watchdog group on human rights in the Russian army, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, is usually two to three times the official number, based on troop visits and information obtained from relatives.49 A certain amount of underreporting in the official accounting system based on counting techniques also leads to lower counts. Only soldiers who die on the battlefield are considered killed in action. Soldiers who are wounded but later die in a hospital, or those whose bodies are never recovered, are not counted as killed in action.50 Bodies too badly damaged to be identified are not included, nor are records kept on the number of troops missing in action.51

Another casualty counting technique employed from the era of the Soviet war in Afghanistan is to spread the reporting of casualties from a single casualty-intensive event over several weeks or months. The public discrediting of some such official figures has raised the ire of government media manipulators. On 23 January 2000 Russia’s main commercial television station, NTV, reported that it had been ejected from the military journalists’ pool covering the war because it aired an interview of a Russian officer who described an attack on a Russian column with large losses.52 Accounts of Russian troops themselves, Chechen accounts substantiated by video footage in some cases, and the investigations of independent reporters consistently painted a picture at odds with the official accounting. They confirmed that Russian troops suffered heavy losses in the war.53

Many fear that the “information war” waged in the second Chechen War to control the flow of information from the war zone was the beginning of a more comprehensive campaign to
control the media in all aspects of national policy. Prime Minister Putin created the new Russian Press Ministry on the eve of the second Chechen conflict and appointed Mikhail Lesin, a political ally openly determined to increase the central government’s control over the media, as ministry head.\textsuperscript{54}

The war in Chechnya proved to be a vehicle conducive to exerting broad control over the press. Sergei Grigoryants, president of the Glasnost human rights fund, argued that “the war in Chechnya came in very handy for this purpose. Citing strategic considerations and Russia’s national interests, the Putin administration set new rules for the media to cover the military campaign in Chechnya, and it will start applying these rules in everyday life too.”\textsuperscript{55}

Many analysts fear that Putin’s heavy-handedness in Chechnya, the appointment of former KGB allies as “presidential representatives” to oversee elected governors in the regions,\textsuperscript{56} and efforts to exert greater control over the independent media are all part of a plan to restore an authoritarian power center in the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{57} The arrest of independent media baron and leading oligarch critic Vladimir Gusinsky clarified the comprehensiveness of the anti-independent media crackdown and led many to note that Putin is distinguishing himself from Yeltsin with his employment of pre-glasnost strong-arm tactics.\textsuperscript{58}

A particular Soviet-era practice evident in the second Chechen War and beyond has been the “repetition of obvious lies that the public is told to accept and pretend to believe. Public acquiescence is then cited abroad as substantiation of the original lie.”\textsuperscript{59} Even the tactic of attempting to commit critics to a mental hospital has been revisited with the government’s harassment of Moskovsky Komsomolets reporter Aleksandr Khinstein in the midst of the second Chechen War.\textsuperscript{60}

**Conduct of the War**

In each conflict, both the Russians and Chechens have violated international norms and treaties governing the conduct of war. Regardless of Chechnya’s disputed legal status in this period, human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch/Helsinki consider the Chechens to be obligated to uphold those human rights instruments to which Russia is a party. These include, among others, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Helsinki Final Act.\textsuperscript{61}

Moreover, both sides were obligated to uphold Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Protocols. This agreement, governing internal armed conflict, states: “Persons taking no part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any similar criteria.”\textsuperscript{62} Additionally the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Code of Conduct, which obligates combatants to ensure that the use of force by their armed forces “must be commensurate with the needs
for enforcement” and to “take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property,” applies to both parties.

Widespread and egregious human rights violations occurred in both conflicts on both sides, but this chapter’s scope will focus primarily on the conduct of the Russian combatants and government leaders that has been incompatible with democratic norms. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki cited Russia in the first Chechen War for violating the accords listed above through the indiscriminate shelling and targeting of civilians, torture, and the use of civilians as human shields. Other misconduct documented by human rights organizations included the systematic detention and mistreatment of males fleeing villages and using civilians as barter in exchange for servicemen. Estimates of the number of civilians killed, many of them ethnic Russians, ranged from 50,000 to 100,000, or five to ten percent of the 1994 pre-war Chechen population. The inability or unwillingness of both sides to account for the missing or to exhume mass graves contributed to the lack of precision of the various death tolls.

Of particular concern to many human rights organizations and democratic activists within Russia and abroad was the parallel systematic failure to hold accountable those responsible for the unlawful acts. Neither the Russian military nor Russian politicians acknowledged the need to investigate or punish individuals who took part in indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians during the hostilities.

Indeed, the belief that there was no threat of being held criminally responsible for their actions created a permissive environment that only encouraged the continuation of the misconduct. This lack of accountability permeated every dimension of the conflict from the political decision to use force to its actual implementation—all of which were policy decisions that should have involved the input of civilians accountable to the public. While a small circle of civilians within the government was responsible for the decision to use force in the first Chechen War, the choice to implement “scorched earth” tactics was undertaken by the Military High Command alone without the consultation or prior approval of the country’s parliament, the executive political leadership, or the other institutions of the civilian government. Such a pattern of behavior unchecked by democratic institutions and civil society led to the spiraling cycle of human rights abuses in the first Chechen War, and it seems to have continued unabated into the second.

Grave breaches of international humanitarian law have also characterized the second Chechen War. Amnesty International issued a report in December 1999 alleging that Russian forces carried out indiscriminate attacks or direct attacks on civilians. The report also expressed the human rights’ organization’s concern over the manner in which Chechens have been targeted by authorities in Moscow for harassment, detention, and deportation: “The government has been involved in a campaign to punish an entire ethnic group... ‘Fighting crime and terrorism’ is no justification for violating human rights.”

In early December 1999, the Russian military issued a now notorious ultimatum to the citizens of Grozny, warning that all who were still there five days later would “be destroyed.” Due to a swift and outraged international response, several safe corridors were opened, but
few dared to use them. The air bombardments against Grozny did not let up prior to the Russian takeover, and there were some reports that unguided incendiary weapons were used against civilians huddled in basements hoping to ride out the attacks.

Another short-lived order was issued in mid-January 2000 to round up all Chechen males between the ages of 10 and 60 to send to holding camps reputed to be venues for widespread torture and other abuses. This policy was another indication of the Russian government’s view that the entire Chechen population was the target of its military campaign. Again, international condemnation convinced the Russians to back off from the policy, but the fact that it was promulgated certainly gives rise to significant concern about the ease with which individual rights are sacrificed for expediency in wartime.

A British report from the war zone in early March 2000 detailed a 4 February Russian attack on the refugee-swollen village of Katyr-Yurt. Russian forces subsequently attacked convoys of fleeing refugees flying white flags killing 363 people who were purportedly told that their escape route was a “safe corridor.” In addition, Russian television networks broadcast film supplied by a German television station of mass graves filled with Chechen fighters who had been tortured, mutilated, and killed execution style after their capture.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that children made up 30 to 40 percent of the estimated 240,000 refugees who had fled Chechnya into other parts of Russia or the North Caucasus at the height of the conflict. It was widely reported that the refugees were poorly provided for and were often subjected to extortion en route by Russian soldiers in addition to frequently coming under fire. As a doctor in the Chechen town of Shali remarked, “Last time one [Chechen] fighter was killed for every 170 civilians. This time the fighters are better trained, he added, so more civilians will die for each dead guerrilla.”

The US State Department’s annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Russia highlighted the violation of human rights in its December 1999 report. Among the numerous human rights violations attributed to the Russian government were the use of indiscriminate force in Chechnya against civilians, the existence of military detention centers in the war zone that held civilians in life-threatening conditions, and the raping of civilians by government forces.

The Council of Europe alleged that serious human rights violations and war crimes had taken place in Chechnya, embarrassing Putin with the revocation of Russia’s voting rights in the body on 7 April 2000. The motion stating that “Russia has violated some of its most important obligations under both the European Convention on Human Rights and international law” passed by a clear two-thirds majority and called for complete suspension of Russia’s membership if evidence of “substantial, accelerating and demonstrable progress” was not made immediately. On 26 June 2000, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) reported that only 12 people have been prosecuted for alleged human rights abuses by Russian forces in Chechnya. PACE President Lord Russell Johnston called the number small compared to data on abuses documented by international human rights groups and even official Russian numbers.
The Effectiveness of Levers Within Civil Society to Uphold Democracy

The ability of organized groups in civil society to exert countervailing pressure against the government in the conduct of the second Chechen War has clearly declined from the limited leverage that existed in the first. The government set aside the democratic process in the pursuit of a self-proclaimed national priority, “to clear the terrorists from Chechnya.” All who supported the effort and stuck with the program were considered patriots. All who wavered were perceived to be guilty of treasonous acts. Grigory Yavlinsky, who supported the war’s aims 100 percent but suggested that consideration of political negotiations be inserted into the plan, was attacked by fellow “liberal” Anatoly Chubais as a traitor.81

One constant actor across the two cases that seems to have held its own into the second Chechen War is the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers. This activist group formed in 1988 as an advocate for soldiers’ rights came into its own in the first Chechen War and is credited as one of the key actors responsible for shaping public opinion against the Russian government’s conduct in that war.82 The organization has remained active in the second Chechen War, serving one of the few voices seeking to hold the government accountable for its practices and tactics that negatively impact Russian soldiers—especially conscripts—and their families.

Memorial is another homegrown and respected human rights organization, which has collected detailed evidence of war crimes by Russian forces in order to balance the official story being told by the Russian media. Its field workers have been painstakingly interviewing Chechen refugees arriving in neighboring Ingushetia as well as Russian soldiers, who were shocked by the carnage they were ordered to inflict in Chechnya.83 Memorial attributes many of the worst offenses to paid mercenaries known as “kontraktniki” and special police units acting with impunity in the war zone.

One particular voice in the government who refused to be muted during the first the war was that of the Russian Chief Commissioner on Human Rights. Sergei Kovalyev tirelessly and bravely pointed out the human rights abuses of his own government in the first Chechen War with some real effect domestically. Although the Russian government largely ignored Kovalyev’s vigorous protesting of Russian military conduct, he effectively used his position to shape public opinion.

Oleg Mironov currently fills the human rights post, and he has broadly approved the government’s large-scale military campaign in the rebel region of Chechnya.84 He has rarely spoken out on human rights issues and even pronounced the highly repressive Belarussian regime as being free from human rights violations following a recent trip there.85 In response to human rights accusations from the international community, Putin appointed Vladimir Kalamanov as special representative to safeguard human rights in Chechnya in February 2000. Human rights advocates widely regard the appointment as cosmetic, criticizing Kalamanov for doing little more than accusing Western politicians of bias, rather than investigating humans rights abuses.86
Russian leaders believe that restricting the press directly and indirectly is justified for the contributions such actions can make to restore confidence in the state. Indeed, this is the logic behind Putin’s effort to build up the state media. Putin declared, “The state should have its own media outlets to be able to bring the official position of the government through to the public.” He added that the government was counting on the “talented support to be given by the media to all the positive steps taken by Moscow.” Such an “accentuation on the positive” may be morale-boosting to Putin’s administration, but obviously ignores the vast democratic backsliding currently taking place in Russia.

Conclusion

From the perspective of Russian military and political leaders, the achievement of their respective missions depends on maintaining public support for the war even at the cost of sacrificing democratic principles. The ends are all-important—military victory and the political success of Putin. The undemocratic means are tolerated as the requisite cost. Military leaders argue the importance of restoring honor to the armed forces and boosting the image (and budget) of the Russian military as essential institutional aims that are dependent on success in the war. Indeed, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev remarked at the inaugural ceremonies for the Russian Information Center that “the actions of Russian soldiers and officers should be covered to reflect the present-day momentum so as to make them feel needed by society and to boost their morale.”

For the political leadership, maintenance of public support for the war is itself a critical political objective, which, as noted earlier, is considered by many to be the very reason for initiating the conflict. The cumulative sacrifices of democratic principles, compromising of various rights of free press and free speech, along with seriously limiting access to critical information about the war are perhaps the most troubling developments surrounding the politics and conduct of the second Chechen war.

The power structure, with the willing though manipulated support of the people, is short sightedly pursuing the goal of reconfiguring post-communist Russia. The aim of Putin’s Russia is to be a strong centralized state that stands up for its national interests in the face of Western opposition, cracks down against terrorism, crime, and corruption, and regains its “sense of pride and self-worth after a decade of economic dislocation and political drift.”

This resurgent nationalism is a path inconsistent with the goal of creating a tolerant society capable of peacefully resolving the differences of its diverse peoples through vibrant democratic institutions instead of violent means. As Fred Weir observed, since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia has failed to offer its ethnic minority citizens an integrating principle to motivate them to stay in the Russian Federation fold. He quotes a Russian major as saying, “If we don’t take strong measures now, all this instability will spread.” Yet the methods employed to save the integrity of the union are simultaneously tearing the fragile fabric of Russia’s tenuous democracy by breeding intolerance and promoting cynicism concerning the value of “democratic” institutions.
If the crucible of war is a valid measure of the strength of democracy in a state, then Russia has miserably failed this test twice in the post-communist era. The thoughts of a Moscow editorialist captured this notion quite eloquently with the thought that October 1999 may be remembered, like so many other infamous Octobers in Russian history, as the tragic month when so many democratic institutions finally slipped away:

We have become inured to the idea that Russia commits horrors in Chechnya; that the media in Russia serve not the public but the agendas of this or that intrigue or cabal; that the Russian presidency is vested with enormous powers for a single man; that the Kremlin will, from time to time, “backslide” on democratic principles or values; that the nation is ruled by a corrupt nomenklatura. None of this bothers us as much as it might, or should. We are simply used to these ideas. But there are degrees of war horrors, of intrigue, of corruption and of backsliding—and in all of these areas, Russia is rapidly sinking. Not since the Soviet era have the media been so crippling politically—not even in 1996, when the media were unified against the Communists. The sheer ugly corruption, Kremlin intrigue, and Chechnya have all long been threats to national security, but never have all three looked so out of control. And when the elections commission chief recently announced he feared for his life, it was barely even news. Stunned and sullen, we again watch civilians being killed with a casual air in Chechnya; we watch the government lie and the media follow; evenings we watch the worst sort of media smear campaigns, pitting clans against clans while ordinary people watch in confusion; and we wonder: Is there anyone out there who believes that we will soon have free and fair elections?

The editors of the Moscow Times captured an important truth—democratic institutions that are not nurtured and protected from blows inflicted by those serving their self-interest will crumble and be replaced by alternative governmental forms to democracy. Democratic theory teaches us that democracy cannot be restored until all the various conditions that led to its demise are repaired. This requires strong leadership focused exclusively on this end. The post-communist Russian political environment has thus far proven incapable of fostering or advancing such a leader or set of leaders. The undemocratic practices that have characterized the promulgation of both Chechen wars justify their actions in the name of national security. But the tactics and processes followed are gradually resulting in the perpetuation of a state where democratic principles and rights are increasingly less secure.

**Endnotes**

2. See Ulrich, chapter 3.
6. Knežys and Sedlickas, pp. 53-54.
7. Lieven, p. 95.


17. Smith, p. 139.

18. Ulrich, p. 100.


20. Ibid.


29. Ulrich, p. 87.

33. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
44. Dixon, “Journalists Under Pressure.”
47. Ibid.
51. Charlton.
60. Dixon, “Journalists Under Pressure.”
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid, p.2.
65. Ibid, p.4.
68. Ibid, p. 20.
69. Stasys and Kneyzys, p. 186.
77. Quinn-Judge, p. 56.


86. Ibid.


88. Ibid.


The Russian Military, Politics and Security Policy in the 1990s.

Mikhail Tsypkin

The ten years of post-authoritarian political development in Russia (counting from the first free elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in the spring of 1989) have seen an acrimonious debate about the role of the military in politics. The decade started with a growing chorus of warnings about an imminent military intervention in politics, and is ending without a reliable mechanism for constitutional control of the military. It began with the attempts to make civilian influence a major factor in defense policy, and ends with the military sometimes seeming to drive Russian security policy.

Just about everything that can aggravate civil-military relations has happened in Russia:

Civil-military crisis is most likely under two sets of conditions. First, military and civilian organizations may fall out if either side concludes that the other, be it due to mismanagement, denial of resources, or some other reason, is doing an unacceptably poor job of safeguarding national security. A bungled war, a gross discrepancy between defense budgets and security needs, heavy-handed civilian interference in internal military decisionmaking, or creation of an anti-army militia may spark this recognition. In a second pattern, military radicalization follows governmental failure within the normal core of civilian jurisdiction. Military leaders here come to perceive, usually after years of grief, that the politicians and civil service are so corrupt, inept, or disorderly that the very survival of the state they are sworn to defend is in jeopardy.

Indeed, the Russian military is impoverished, suffered a humiliating defeat in the Chechen war of 1994-96 and is not yet victorious in the second war in Chechnya, and has to compete for resources with the better paid troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (to name just the largest of the several militarized organizations in today's Russia). The failure of the Russian government in its civilian duties, along with its corruption and ineptitude, are unfortunately not in doubt. Civil-military relations in Russia are obviously dysfunctional, and Western political science tends to see military intervention in politics as a likely result of this dysfunction.

The military's political influence can be exerted in three domains: the issue of sovereign power, defense policy proper, and societal choice (economic, technological, and socio-cultural issues "loosely related to military security"). I will investigate the first two domains, that of sovereign power and defense policy. The military influence in the domain of societal choice has been minimal in the last decade. Under Vladimir Putin some tentative steps have been made to reassert this influence, but since the picture is not yet clear, I will leave the issue of societal choice out of this analysis.
Another and very important subject largely left out of this paper is the role of the Russian parliament, especially its lower house, the State Duma, in establishing constitutional civilian control over the military. The issue of the Duma and civil-military relations is worthy of a special study, because Russia’s legislators have passed a number of laws pertaining to the military. At the same time, the Duma’s real influence on military affairs has been minimal. This is true to the spirit of Yeltsin’s Constitution of December 1993, which minimized the role of the Duma in general and in military affairs in particular. Even in budgetary matters, where the Duma has been given considerable authority on paper, its real power is minimal. This is because the government has routinely ignored the budgets (including the military ones) passed by the Duma, and the Duma lacks an investigative arm capable of unearthing the truth about how the government spends the money allocated by the Duma.

I will argue that the military has not been interested in seizing political power in Russia. Despite its important role in the domestic balance of power, the military has suffered from declining political influence during most of Yeltsin’s term in office. The military has been much more successful in preserving, and even strengthening, its immunity from civilian ideas on defense policy and has recently come to exert a growing influence on Russian security policy as a whole.

The Background

Since the days of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, the main issue in civil-military relations in the USSR, and then in post-communist Russia, has been how to build modern “civilized” armed forces appropriate for a democratic state and society, and commensurate with its real security requirements and available resources. A keen observer of civil-military relations in Russia has noted that, unlike Americans, Russians have traditionally not feared their military as a potential threat to democracy; rather, the military is seen as the bulwark against external threats. This does not exclude fears of a military coup, which were rife during the period 1989-1991. Most of the speculation on the possibility of a military coup in the waning days of the USSR focused on a move by reactionary nationalist-communist political forces with participation of some of the top generals. This was exactly what happened on August 19, 1991, when the military as a whole refused to play the role that the anti-Gorbachev political cabal hoped it would play. In fact, the military refused to play any political role, which doomed the coup’s chances to succeed even in the shortest term.

The post-communist and post-imperial transitions have been slow to move the military closer to the ideals of the proponents of military reform. Boris Yeltsin’s early approach to military issues suggested that he was primarily interested in securing the armed forces’ support (or, at least, neutrality) in his struggle for power, first, against Mikhail Gorbachev, and then, against the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Reforming the military was going to be clearly secondary for Russia’s first president. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had courted the top ranks of the military, even abandoning for sometime his call for the creation of a “Russian military,” something which had caused concern among many officers.
A Committee of Defense and Security functioned in the government of the Russian Federation as an embryonic Ministry of Defense, beginning in July 1990 and lasting until March 1992, when the Russian Ministry of Defense was created. It was staffed primarily by recently retired or discharged middle-rank military officers dedicated to the idea of drastic military reform. Yeltsin would not fill the job of the committee chairman with any of these reformers, and left it open until he found a high-ranking active duty officer, Colonel General Konstantin Kobets, to fill the position. As the then Deputy Chairman of the Committee, Colonel (ret.) Vitaliy Shlykov, commented in 1998, “We realized that Yeltsin needed at least one general on his side, and that’s why Kobets was appointed, and [we realized] that there would be no reform in the Armed Forces.”

The reformers on the Committee of Defense and Security were planning to build a new military for Russia. This military was supposed to respond to a democratic system of civilian control, and be much smaller and less expensive than its Soviet predecessor. Yeltsin, however, ended up inheriting the largest chunk of the armed forces of the USSR. In the first months after the defeat of the August 1991 coup, Yeltsin had an opportunity to appoint a civilian as the first minister of defense of Russia, but obviously preferred ensuring the loyalty of the military high command by appointing a military officer. Thus, Yeltsin’s political ally Colonel General Pavel Grachev became the Minister of Defense, and, as a gesture towards those clamoring for more civilian control, Dr. Andrei Kokoshin was appointed as one of Grachev’s first deputies, in charge of the defense industrial issues.

In the Soviet era, civilian control of the military was ensured by a mixture of a robust system of subjective civilian control (that is, control implemented by denial of professional autonomy of the military through “civilianizing” them) and a considerable measure of objective civilian control (control by maximizing military professionalism and autonomy) thanks to the inevitable professionalism of a superpower officer corps. In post-communist Russia, both facets of civilian control have deteriorated. Throughout his term as president, Boris Yeltsin has continued to court the military high command, although with sharply diminishing returns. Yeltsin, through Grachev, would simply buy the loyalty of top officers through generous promotions and by tolerating corruption. At the same time, the rapidly progressing impoverishment of the middle rank and junior officers has widened and deepened the chasm between Yeltsin’s generals and the rest of the officer corps. Thus, loyalty of the Russian high command does not guarantee the loyalty of the officer corps as a whole. Elimination of the institution of political officers and weakening of the political police (FSB) have made civilian control over the officer corps even more tenuous.

The professionalism of the Russian officer corps has also been jeopardized. Lack of funding has dramatically reduced the opportunities for training and exercises. There is little future in being an officer. The impoverishment has forced many officers into second jobs and into starting their own small businesses. As a result, they frequently neglect their military duties with the connivance of their commanding officers, who know that their subordinates’ families simply cannot survive on what the government pays them (see Table 1), not to mention that even these meager payments have been frequently delayed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Monthly Salary (in Rubles)</th>
<th>Poverty Line for Family of Three Per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>2,600 to 4,600 with regional variations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Salaries of Russian Officers

In discussing civil-military relations in Russia it is important to note that the term “military” is, to a certain degree, misleading insofar as it projects an image of a monolithic organization. Although command of the Russian military continues to be centralized, it is a highly complex organization with its own diversified subcultures, interest groups, and internal bureaucratic politics of high intensity, especially in view of the very limited financial resources available. It is a simplification to view the military always as a single agent in dealing with the world of politics at large, but for the sake of convenience and brevity I will refer to “the military” unless the circumstances require me to be more specific about personalities and interest groups within the military.

The Military and Political Power

Attempts to involve the military in politics have been going on practically since the establishment of the independent Russian Federation. The most important episode was the October 1993 constitutional crisis. Both sides in the conflict, the Supreme Soviet and the president, appealed to the military. Initially, on September 21, 1993, the Ministry of Defense spokesman proclaimed that the military was neutral in the political standoff. This posture quickly changed to that of outward support for Yeltsin once the Supreme Soviet appointed its own minister of defense and the Supreme Soviet’s supporters from a pro-communist organization of ex-officers attacked a military installation in Moscow. Still, when the Supreme Soviet’s supporters took up arms in Moscow and threatened the existence of Yeltsin’s government, the military (that is, the top brass) acted quite reluctantly and only after a considerable hesitation and pressure from Yeltsin. It was apparent to some in the Kremlin that the military would be more willing to intervene on Yeltsin’s side if the public were to demonstrate its support for such an action, and thousands of Muscovites duly took to the streets to defend Yeltsin in response to the call of the Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar.

All the noise and smoke from the tank guns shelling the building of the Supreme Soviet on October 4, 1993, concealed the equally if not more crucial role played by the troops of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) the previous day. While the military high command was temporizing (General Grachev demanded a written order from Yeltsin to use the military against the rebels), it was the MVD troops who prevented a potential disaster by saving the
national television center from falling into the hands of the Supreme Soviet. Still, once the military was committed to battle, the outcome of the political struggle was no longer in any doubt.

The military's decisive role in the crisis did not translate into greater political influence and fatter budgets—quite the contrary. And to add insult to the fiscal injury, Yeltsin authorized a sharp increase in the number of MVD troops, financed and paid better than the military and rivaling the ground forces in numbers. Why? It's possible that once the military had cast its lot with Yeltsin and helped him dramatically weaken the opposition, Yeltsin felt less need for them and less to fear from them—thus, he reduced its funding. It is also possible that the military's reluctance to defend Yeltsin made him view the MVD troops as more essential for his political survival. Perhaps Yeltsin wanted to preclude the military from becoming a political force and therefore cut its budget and used the growth of MVD troops as a useful counterweight to the military. In any event, it appears that, as a result of the change of the Russian political and economic systems, the state has lost much of its control over the nation's resources, and the military has lost much of the political clout required to obtain the lion's share of whatever budgetary resources are available.

The lesson of the 1993 crisis, that the military is not a reliable or willing participant in domestic politics and that the civilians are not grateful partners, apparently was learned by both Yeltsin and the military. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs General Anatoly Kulikov, in March 1996 Yeltsin told his security chiefs that he was planning to dissolve the Duma, but Minister of Defense General Grachev was not among them. Yeltsin told the gathering that Grachev's cooperation had been already obtained. However, once Kulikov contacted him, General Grachev stated that he was completely unaware of Yeltsin's plan. The plan was then dropped by the president.

Boris Yeltsin did his utmost to ensure his personal control over the military, or at least to deny the military's loyalty to others, by creating a network of competing bodies with vaguely defined responsibilities. One such body has been the Security Council of the Russian Federation, which served as a collective smoke screen for Yeltsin's decisions. The Defense Council headed by Dr. Yuriy Baturin was created in 1996 to counterbalance the influence of then Secretary of the Security Council General (Retired) Aleksandr Lebed and his protégé, Minister of Defense General Igor Rodionov. With both Lebed and Rodionov out of the way, Yeltsin removed Baturin and promoted the First Deputy Minister of Defense, Dr. Andrei Kokoshin, to the positions of Secretary of the Defense Council and the State Military Inspector. Within several months, Dr. Kokoshin became the Secretary of the Security Council, and soon the Defense Council and the Military Inspectorate were abolished, with their staffs joining the Security Council. With this shuffle, the Security Council was becoming more than a simple appendage to the President's staff. Eventually, Dr. Kokoshin was fired, and the Security Council entered an era of irrelevance.

The military has made no attempt as an institution to impose its will on the Russian polity by unconstitutional means. The civil-military conflict was at its peak during the tenure of General Igor Rodionov as the Defense Minister. As I will discuss later, Rodionov behaved as an advocate of the officer corps, not as a cabinet member, and he did threaten the
government—but with the disintegration of the armed forces, not with a military coup! (Without a civilian ministry of defense, civil-military relations tend to become aggravated because every bureaucratic conflict between the Ministry and other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance, the military's most frequent scapegoat, becomes a civil-military confrontation.)

Nevertheless, the military card has been played indirectly in Russian politics since 1993. The military has tried to enter civilian politics through constitutional means for the most part, without an endorsement or backing by the armed forces. Prominent military commanders have run for office, and political movements for retired and active duty military have been created. In a couple of interesting cases, the military backed an organized effort at political representation. In 1995, Minister of Defense General Grachev organized an attempt to elect 123 officers (23 of them generals) to the Duma, and the command of the military garrison in Volgograd ran a campaign to elect an officer as mayor and 24 other officers as city council members. Neither attempt was a resounding success.

For the most part, upon entering the political scene, prominent military personalities rapidly lose their charismatic qualities and, at best, become run of the mill politicians. In addition, “mass” movements do not actually go far beyond their organizing conferences. Such were the cases of the last Soviet commander in Afghanistan, Colonel General Boris Gromov, and the ex-Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Director of the Federal Border Service General Andrei Nikolaev. Such was also the fate of the Russian Military Brotherhood, the All Army Officers’ Assembly, and many other groups.

**General Aleksandr Lebed**

I will briefly discuss the cases of two officers that seemed for some time to defy this pattern—first, because they achieved meaningful political successes, and second because their actions and popularity suggested the possibility of an unconstitutional power grab by at least some elements in the military. These cases are the political career of Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed and the story of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, founder and first leader of the Movement in Support of the Army, Military Science, and Defense Industry (DPA).

General Lebed, in the imagination of quite a few journalists and scholars, was the best candidate to become a “Russian Pinochet.” His chances of becoming Russia’s leader were deemed so high in the West that the Rand Corporation published a book-length study of the man. Lebed became a political figure while commanding the Fourteenth Army based in Moldova, where he decisively ended the war between the government of Moldova and the separatists of the Transdniestrian Republic. In his numerous interviews with the mass media, Lebed successfully cultivated an image of an independent-minded, plain-spoken soldier of the former empire. His relentless criticism of the powers that be in Moscow, including General Grachev, culminated in statements (while still on active duty) against the
war in Chechnya (1994-1996). This behavior eventually got him “retired” from military service, but not until he had become a popular and closely watched political figure.

Upon his retirement, Lebed settled in Moscow, successfully ran for the Duma from the city of Tula, where he had been a division commander several years earlier, and established a “mass” organization of veterans as an embryo of a future political party. Then Lebed deviated from the pattern of mediocre political achievement of other military figures by mounting a credible presidential bid in 1996. He appealed to a large segment of the nationalist electorate, and he brought it to the Yeltsin camp in the second round of voting. It has been suspected (although never proven) that Lebed’s campaign during the first round of presidential elections received funding from the same political sources that supported Boris Yeltsin (i.e., the “oligarchs”), and that the deal between the first and second rounds, making Lebed (in June 1996) the Secretary of the Security Council in exchange for his endorsement of Yeltsin, had been cut well in advance.

The events of the next several months clearly demonstrated Lebed’s weaknesses as a politician. Some of these were rooted in his personality, such as his boorishness and alleged disloyalty to his aides, but others were obviously the result of his being a recently retired military officer. He did not read at all well the map of the corridors of power in the Kremlin, for example his attempt to sideline Yeltsin before acquiring any significant political allies. After doing his second (the first being delivering his voters) signal service to Yeltsin by hammering out the peace agreement with Chechnya, Lebed was dismissed by the ailing and seemingly powerless President Yeltsin in October 1996. At the time rumors abounded that Lebed was preparing a military coup. Lebed may have given grounds for such rumors when, in September 1996, he talked about a possible military “mutiny” because of pay arrears.

In fact, it appears that he did not make any serious attempt to mobilize the military’s support. And this is despite the fact that in September 1996 Lebed was reliably rated in an opinion survey to be by far the most trusted political figure in Russia – with 34 percent of the public expressing confidence in him and with the communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and President Yeltsin distant second and third with 15 and 12 percent respectively. It was also despite the fact that General Rodionov was appointed as Minister of Defense in July 1996 on Lebed’s recommendation. What prevented Lebed, who had made no secret of his ambition to lead Russia, from translating his popularity and powerful connections at the very top of the Ministry of Defense into political power?

First, the Russian military, as suggested earlier, is a complex organization with its own sharp internal rivalries and strong parochial loyalties. This factor quickly drove a wedge between Lebed and Rodionov, when the latter proposed reducing the size of the Airborne Troops (VDV), which had been treated preferentially by General Grachev, the former Commander in Chief of the VDV. Lebed, a life-long VDV officer, ferociously and publicly criticized Rodionov’s proposal as a “criminal document.” Also, Lebed was not necessarily popular with all the top brass—he had just ordered a purge of a number of some, but by no means all, generals connected with Grachev. Those remaining on active duty probably had no desire to see Lebed’s further political elevation.
Second, Yeltsin and his entourage successfully limited Lebed’s influence over the military. Soon after he had become the Secretary of the Security Council, a draft bill was prepared in the Duma by the Chairman of its Defense Committee General Lev Rokhlin regarding the establishment of a Military Council within the Security Council. This bill would have given Lebed vast authority not only over the military, but also over various security forces. Yeltsin rejected the draft bill and established a very different Defense Council, a body separate from the Security Council. Lebed became just one of the Defense Council’s members. Its work was to be supervised by the Defense Council Secretary Dr. Yuriy Baturin, a civilian and Yeltsin loyalist. On top of this, Baturin was to chair the commission in charge of all promotions of senior officers, much to Lebed’s chagrin, who in turn boycotted the meetings of the Defense Council.

Third, the military was well counter-balanced by the MVD with its growing Internal Troops. In the undisciplined Russian government, Lebed quickly developed a bitter conflict with the powerful Minister of Internal Affairs Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov. Initially, the quarrel was over Lebed’s policy of negotiating peace in Chechnya. Subsequently, the conflict escalated to the point of Kulikov’s accusing Lebed of high treason and Lebed’s private security detail seizing an MVD undercover team trailing him.

Fourth, the Russian officer corps was not inclined towards the idea of the military taking power. In their responses to a Russian survey of the officer corps conducted in 1994-95, when asked to view the likelihood of three scenarios, 23 percent of the officers surveyed expected the military to stay completely out of politics, 41 percent believed that the military might become involved in solving “domestic conflicts” from time to time, and only 16 percent believed that the military would take power. While the methodology of Russian surveys has been frequently criticized, a survey of 600 field grade Russian officers, prepared by American scholars and carried out in 1995, suggested that the Russian officers “are for the most part democratic, not authoritarian.”

Aleksandr Lebed continues to be a noteworthy political figure, but he owes his current prominence much more to the political games of the oligarchs, who generously underwrote his campaign for governor of the Krasnoyarsk Region, than to his influence among the officer corps. His political movement, Chest’i Rodina (Honor and Motherland), remains just a clique of Lebed’s supporters, not a mass organization.

**Lev Rokhlin And the Movement in Support of the Army**

Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin gained prominence as one of the few commanders who performed well in the early stages of the First Chechen War. In 1995, he became a Duma deputy as “number three” on the list of the “centrist” NDR (Russia Is Our Home) party associated with then Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin. He was thereupon selected as chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. He justified his decision to enter politics as something that would benefit the military. Indeed, he ran for the Duma as one of the officers...
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<tr>
<td>December 1995</td>
<td>Elected to Duma as NDR deputy</td>
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<td>July 1996</td>
<td>Proposes Igor Rodionov as Minister of Defense; advocates creation of Military Council under Lebed; accuses Pavel Grachev and five top generals of corruption. Izvestiya accuses Rokhlin of corruption.</td>
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<td>August 1996</td>
<td>Says the situation in the military is “explosive” because of pay arrears.</td>
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<td>December 1996</td>
<td>Supports reappointment of Rodionov as a civilian, after his retirement.</td>
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<td>April 1997</td>
<td>Reveals Russia’s clandestine shipments of weapons to Armenia.</td>
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<td>May 1997</td>
<td>Criticizes Rodionov’s removal, but praises Sergeyev.</td>
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<td>June 1997</td>
<td>Sends personal appeal to Yeltsin, accusing him of failing the military and starting the war in Chechnya. MOD says the appeal is meant to push the military toward havoc. Sergeyev says “Rokhlin violated Russian laws aimed at preventing “political agitation” in the armed forces and compared the appeal to Bolshevik agitation in the Russian army in 1917.” Rokhlin calls for a mass movement to help the military and defense industry—the Movement In Support of the Army (DPA)</td>
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<td>July 1997</td>
<td>The CPRF faction will not help NDR to remove Rokhlin as Chairman of the Defense Committee. Rodionov supports the idea of DPA. Rokhlin and Rodionov attack Sergeyev’s plan for military reform. CPRF supports Rokhlin, who tours Russia, addresses leaders of defense industry, but complains that he was prevented from addressing generals of the Leningrad Military District. Also slams the growth of MVD forces, while the military is being reduced. Lebed says Rokhlin kept Honor and Motherland out of future DPA.</td>
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<td>August 1997</td>
<td>Says DPA would call for Yeltsin’s resignation. CPRF: its activists are helping DPA establish regional branches.</td>
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<td>September 1997</td>
<td>Promises to bring together all opposition forces under DPA umbrella to unseat Yeltsin; is expelled from NDR. DPA founding congress brings 2,000 supporters from 68 regions. Rokhlin threatens street protests, fears assassination. Government concerned that he is advocating violent unconstitutional action.</td>
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Table 2. Timeline of Lev Rokhlin’s Political Activities

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designated to do so by Minister of Defense Grachev in his attempt to create a large military faction in the Duma.\textsuperscript{32}

Very quickly Rokhlin made a name for himself as a political figure by voicing loud accusations of corruption against senior military officers (see Table 2). Then his accusations escalated to include President Yeltsin, whom Rokhlin blamed for the miserable condition of the military, especially payment arrears, and whose resignation he demanded. Rokhlin’s confrontation with the government became particularly sharp after Igor Rodionov (whose candidacy Rokhlin originally promoted)\textsuperscript{33} had been replaced as minister of defense by General Igor Sergeyev, who finally began the military reform by implementing personnel cuts. The cuts, combined with non-payment of salaries, created an atmosphere of acute misery among the officer corps.

This timeline demonstrates that Rokhlin’s sharp radicalization coincided with the removal of “his” defense minister and the beginning of real reductions of the armed forces. DPA developed a considerable regional presence, something no other purported mass movement for the military achieved, but it would have been impossible without the help from the communists. There has never been any evidence that DPA organized protests among servicemen, but the government was definitely worried. The Volgograd garrison, where Rokhlhin had served as the commander of the Eighth Guards Corps, had been under particularly close observation, and DPA activities there provoked considerable fear of the authorities.\textsuperscript{34}

In retrospect, the authorities’ nervousness over the possibility of some kind of a military uprising under the leadership of the Movement in Support of the Army seems to be unjustified. Whatever the private sympathies of military officers, most of them were fearful of an open affiliation with DPA, especially at the time of cuts in the officer corps, when political disloyalty to the regime could easily be punished by forced retirement. The threat was particularly potent for middle rank officers, colonels and lieutenant colonels, who hold the day-to-day command of the armed forces in their hands: these officers could already anticipate retirement and full pensions within a few more years of service, and were not likely to risk it.

Rokhlin may have hoped that mass discharges of officers would produce protests, but they did not. For the most part, an officer discharged from active duty would travel to his chosen place of residence and only there discover whether the government’s promise of his discharge/retirement package (primarily housing) would really be forthcoming. By that time, the officer would be far away from his garrison, and thus his fate would not serve as a catalyst to discontent.\textsuperscript{35}

Rokhlin designed the Movement in Support of the Army as a potentially broad political movement, embracing not only the officer corps but all the sectors of the former Soviet military-industrial complex. Thus, if successful, DPA would have involved a number of officers in a radical anti-government movement. This would have damaged the chain of command and reliability of the military as a political instrument, but would not have resulted
in a military coup because Rokhlin lacked allies at the very top of the chain of command, especially after Rodionov’s replacement with Sergeyev.

By the time of Rokhlin’s death, the DPA was past its zenith. Rokhlin turned out to be a talented organizer, but a somewhat naive politician. He failed to take into consideration the internal balance of power in the CPRF between its relatively moderate leader Gennady Zyuganov and true extremists such as Viktor Ilyukhin. He formed a close relationship with Ilyukhin, thus strengthening the extremist’s hand in dealing with Zyuganov in the party and in the Duma. The consequences followed soon: Rokhlin was removed as chairman of the Defense Committee of the Duma, thus losing his bully pulpit as the spokesman for the disgruntled officers. His removal could be taken only with the support of the communist faction. The CPRF also began to distance its regional organizers from the DPA, which undercut the latter’s all-Russian presence.

The selection of Rokhlin’s successor as the DPA leader underscored the degree to which it became a radical political movement in which many retired officers participate rather than a movement of active duty officers with a radical political agenda. There were three candidates to replace Rokhlin. One was the retired Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, a prominent Airborne Troops officer with the impeccable radical left credentials of plotting against Gorbachev in 1991 and then being the defense minister of the rebellious Supreme Soviet in 1993. Another candidate was the retired Colonel General Albert Makashov, who had similar credentials. The third was Viktor Ilyukhin himself, a former prosecutor and communist firebrand. Unlike Achalov and Makashov, whose role in the Duma has not been important (Makashov acquired notoriety for his anti-semitic pronouncements), Ilyukhin is an effective politician. He chairs the Committee on Security of the Duma, and he conceived, together with Rokhlin, the idea of impeaching President Yeltsin, and spearheaded this plan’s eventual implementation that nearly succeeded in May 1999. Ilyukhin has no military credentials, but he was elected chairman of the DPA and has kept this position until now.

The military has not been immune to the struggle for political power. The prevalent pattern has not been an attempt by the military establishment to seize power for itself, or for a civilian “front” for the military’s interests. Rather, politically ambitious officers have used their military careers as a launching pad for their political futures. To be a success, such an enterprise requires an alliance with an established political force. General Lebed’s weakness was that he simply did not have such a force behind him—and his charisma, popularity, and military connections did not help him. General Rokhlin attempted to establish such a political force, but his first successes in this enterprise turned out to be his last.

Opposition politicians and ambitious military officers continue to measure each other up in search for an alliance that may bring them to power. For instance, Chief of General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin once entered into all but open conflict with Minister of Defense Marshal Sergeyev over the course of military reform; he also distinguished himself by obtaining Yeltsin’s permission to send Russian paratroopers to seize the Pristina airfield in Kosovo without asking Sergeyev’s permission, after which the hyper-nationalist-communist opposition began to flatter him as a hero and possible “savior” of Russia. While an alliance between the military and Russian hyper-nationalists has definitely been a threatening
prospect since the late 1980s, the probability of such an alliance becoming a potent political force is not very high. The main reason for this is a failure of a large-scale organized hyper-nationalist movement to materialize.  

**Military and Security Policy**

While the ability and inclination of the military to gain control of political power in Russia has not grown in the post-Communist era, the military has somewhat strengthened its role in the formulation of security policy during the Yeltsin era compared to the period of Gorbachev’s perestroika. Gorbachev attempted, with limited success, to make the Soviet military doctrine fit his “new thinking” security policy. This meant the introduction of such changes as reasonable sufficiency, defensive strategy, and inadmissibility of any use of nuclear weapons, all to be authored by experts from outside the military. This was quite a break with the established (especially since the fall of Khrushchev) Soviet pattern of the military’s unchallenged primacy in formulating the “military-technical” aspect of military doctrine. The high command initially resisted these changes and greeted with fury publications by civilian academic experts critical of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, as well as the media revelations about the conditions of the conscripts (for example, the practice of dedovshchina, or brutal hazing) in the Soviet armed forces.

Eventually, the military (or, to be precise, the upper crust of the officer corps) complied with the General Secretary of the Communist Party’s demands to reduce conventional forces, compromise on nuclear and conventional arms control (INF and CFE treaties), and change military doctrine and strategy. At the same time, deep fissures emerged within the officer corps. A minority of senior officers agreed with the thrust of civilian-initiated reforms of the military, and a number of junior officers also supported such efforts and vocally proposed reform ideas of their own. The majority, especially among the senior-ranking officers, followed the ideas of civilians on military reform only reluctantly.

Yeltsin’s failure to appoint a civilian minister of defense was indicative of his reluctance to encroach on the high command’s prerogative in formulating defense policy. It was also symbolic of the failure of objective expertise to replace vested interests among the new Russian elite in military and defense industrial issues. The civilian national security experts who rose to prominence as critics of the Soviet military establishment during the Gorbachev era had little knowledge of the extremely complex Soviet military-industrial heritage that Russia had inherited. Academics in the Soviet era studied the military and defense industrial issues of Western nations, and even then their conclusions were viewed by the military with suspicion and they were kept out of the defense policy kitchen.

Yeltsin’s government at times found it quite difficult to assert civilian control even over such basic issues as the defense budget. This became quite obvious during General Rodionov’s term as Minister of Defense (1996-1997). In the course of his one-year term Rodionov became the first civilian Minister of Defense, since after several months in office he reached the mandatory retirement age of 60. Rather than use his power to extend Rodionov
on active duty, Yeltsin allowed him to continue as a civilian. Even in mufti, however, Rodionov resisted the attempts of the civilian authorities to control the direction of defense policy. Rodionov, and those in the military who supported him, simply insisted that the government provide the Ministry of Defense with all the resources that it requested in order to carry out military reform; otherwise, no military reform would be carried out at all. Rodionov's resistance took the form of a very obvious civil-military conflict, because the opposite view was held by a powerful civilian official, Secretary of the Defense Council Yuriy Baturin. (The Defense Council membership consisted of President Yeltsin, and Dr. Baturin, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of General Staff, and several top civilian officials.)

The “civilian” view was that the military had to learn to live with the resources available and stop dreaming about the Soviet days of glory. As one prominent civilian analyst wrote in the Russian Navy's professional journal in the spring of 1997, “the gap between the MOD requests for minimal funding of the existing structure of the armed forces and the existing resources for defense financing have reached in the 1992-1996 period the size of five annual defense budgets!” He added provocatively, “What kind of armed forces can be supported by a nation with a GDP equaling that of Brazil or Mexico?”

Rodionov incessantly and loudly complained about poor financing, refused to proceed with military reform, embarrassed the Russian government by saying that the command and control of strategic nuclear forces was dangerously degraded, and behaved as an ambassador of the officer corps to the civilian government rather than as a member of that government. After a year of this, President Yeltsin fired Rodionov.

While the term “national security policy” has become popular, Russia finds it difficult to establish a national security policy capable of coordinating its diplomatic and military instruments. For instance, while Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev focused in the early 1990s on Russia's relations with the West, the military's top priority was extracting its assets from, and preserving its bases, in the post-Soviet nations.

Yet, the question remains, what impact does the military have on the overall security policy? How much influence do civilians have on the military policy? Let's look at two recent cases.

The Military and Russian Policy in the Kosovo Crisis

The most revealing recent case of the military in security policy formulation is the Russian decision to seize control of the Pristina airport in Kosovo from NATO forces at the end of the Kosovo campaign in June 1999. The plan was hatched in secrecy in the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was not informed, so the military claimed, in the name of operational security. Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin was also left in the dark. Even the highest ranking Russian officer, Minister of Defense Marshal Igor Sergeyev was informed only after the Chief of General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin, using his right of direct access to the President, had already convinced Yeltsin to sign off on
The Minister of Foreign Affairs denied to his Western counterparts the rumors of the Russian advance on Pristina. The denial was probably sincere, because had the Ministry of Foreign Affairs been consulted, they would have explained to the Russian generals, who were ignorant of the nuances of international politics and law, that their much-cherished plan was fatally flawed. Only 200 Russian paratroopers dispatched by road from Bosnia seized the Pristina airport—too few to establish a serious presence in Kosovo. Moreover, they could not be supplied by the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo. The General Staff, of course, was aware of these problems; the seizure of the airport was supposed to be only the first step of the operation, to be followed by an airlift of 2,500 Russian paratroopers and supplies.40

The General Staff planners failed to appreciate several factors:

- Russia needed permission from three former Warsaw Pact nations (Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary) for the overflight of their territories.
- Such permission in the post-Warsaw Pact world needed to be secured in advance through diplomatic channels.
- There was no chance that the three East European nations in question, one of them already a NATO member, and two aspiring to admission to NATO, would grant such an overflight permit.

The result was the very thinly veiled anger of NATO, and an embarrassing demonstration of the Russian policymaking chaos and military weakness. It appears from some reports that those who planned the Pristina operation in the General Staff had a goal that, had it been achieved, would have seriously affected Russian security policy: the goal was to establish a Russian sector in the industrial northern and north-western parts of Kosovo with significant Serbian population and in the immediate proximity of the Serbian border, which would have enabled the Russian forces to cooperate with the Yugoslav military.41 Needless to say, an acquisition of a pariah state as a strategic partner in an area of confrontation with NATO would have cast Russia in a confrontational role with the West for a long time to come.

The roots of the Pristina plan lie in a quasi-monarchic Russian policymaking pattern, bureaucratic and personality conflicts within the top echelons of the military, and the mindset of the elites and the public. Despite the proliferation of different bodies which are supposed to advise the president of Russia—such as the Security Council and the now disbanded Defense Council—on matters of national security, Yeltsin made these decisions by himself on the basis of reports by this or that courtier currently in the president's favor. General Kvashnin happened to be in the right place at the right time to offer his plan to Yeltsin.

The Pristina operation gave Kvashnin a chance to score in a bureaucratic turf war against Minister of Defense Sergeyev. The latter had been promoting a plan to establish the Joint Command of Strategic Nuclear Forces, which would remove the control of these forces from the General Staff and make their commander a powerful competitor to the Chief of General

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Staff. The apparent goals of this reorganization were to centralize both operational and administrative control of strategic nuclear forces and to further strengthen the preeminent role of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which Igor Sergeyev had previously commanded. Sergeyev apparently obtained approval of this plan from President Yeltsin, bypassing the Chief of General Staff, who has ever since battled the plan and conducted a rumor campaign against Sergeyev.  

While a strategic failure, the Pristina operation was a domestic public relations success, and Kvashnin could count on some political benefits from it. Kvashnin’s name has become associated with Russia “showing it” to NATO, while it fell to Marshal Sergeyev to negotiate with the United States the real conditions of Russian participation in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, which were far less grandiose than the expectations of many in the high command. This could not enhance the popularity of Sergeyev, whose program of military reform resulted in the involuntary discharge of many officers. This lessened popularity pleased Kvashnin and his supporters. Indeed, the rumors of Sergeyev’s imminent dismissal and his replacement by Kvashnin as a more decisive figure intensified to such a degree that by the beginning of the Chechen campaign in September-October 1999, the official military daily had to speak up in defense of the minister.

If we go beyond personalities, the Sergeyev-Kvashnin conflict represents a clash between those in favor of radical military reform and those opposed to it. The latter continue to adhere to a somewhat attenuated form of Soviet military doctrine; these opponents of reform think that the West is a real threat to Russia and that it must be deterred by a combination of strategic nuclear forces and sizable conventional forces. The former believe that the threat from the West or from China is unlikely to arise in the immediate and mid-term future as long as Russia maintains its nuclear arsenal. They believe that this allows for a breathing space, during which money could be saved by reducing the conventional forces to the minimum necessary for prevailing in local conflicts.

Finally, one may argue that the Pristina operation would never even have been conceived if not for the anti-NATO hysteria in the Duma, the mass media, and the public. After all, the real motivation behind the operation was to strengthen politically a certain faction of the high command. Indeed, subsequent events have suggested that Kvashnin at least partially achieved his goal, since planning for a Joint Strategic Command appear to be shelved for now. Thus, Russian security policy at the end of the Kosovo crisis was strongly influenced by the military, or, to be more precise, by a conflict within the Russian military. It appears that the Kosovo experience is having a serious impact on the conduct of the present war in Chechnya.

The Second War in Chechnya

The Russian military campaign against Chechnya followed an incursion by the Chechen warlords into the neighboring Dagestan and a series of still unresolved terrorist bomb explosions in Moscow and other cities which the Russian government quickly attributed to terrorists operating from Chechnya. In the beginning of the campaign, Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin explained its strategy: “To prevent involvement in the conflict of large masses of people, which is the goal of the tactics of the bandits.” Further, Putin proclaimed the Khasavyurt peace agreement with Chechnya of 1996 dead, and proposed a “temporary quarantine” along the whole administrative boundary with Chechnya and elimination of all Chechen guerrilla groups in Dagestan. If the government of Chechnya refuses to turn over to Russia the “bandits,” they will be destroyed as soon as they “cross the administrative boundary with Chechnya.” Then, economic sanctions should be introduced against Chechnya.\(^{45}\)

This plan of action appears reasonably well thought-out and could safeguard Russia’s interests insofar as it appeared to avoid massive bloodshed among both the Russian troops and the Chechen civilians. There is not a hint of a possibility of occupying the whole of Chechnya. One may argue, of course, that the speech was an elaborate deception, meant to reassure a Russian public mindful of the losses of the first war in Chechnya, and to lull Chechen leaders into a false sense of security with regard to an imminent invasion. Still, the plan described by Putin to the Duma rather closely corresponded to the so-called “phase one” of the campaign, that is, occupation of the easily defensible part of Chechnya north of the Terek River.\(^{46}\) According to a usually very well informed Russian analyst, after completing “phase one” the government did not have a plan for a further advance, and Prime Minister Putin and Minister of Defense Sergeyev initially preferred to stop there and start building the “quarantine.”\(^{47}\) Indeed, the military even started building fortifications along the proposed line of the “sanitary cordon.”\(^{48}\) Then on October 20, 1999 a meeting was held between Yeltsin and the chiefs of the “power agencies”—the Ministry of Defense, FSB (Federal Security Service), etc. At this meeting the decision was made to proceed with the “second phase” of the campaign.\(^{49}\)

The “second phase” violated each point of Putin’s original plan. Chechnya was to be occupied, and all armed formations (not just the “terrorists”) were to be destroyed. This would lead to the victimization and alienation of its population as a whole, which is likely to lead to more terrorism and a long guerrilla war. In addition, Russia’s reputation in the West has suffered, with possible negative consequences for the Russian economy and state. This security policy resembles the Russian response to Kosovo, which was very much shaped by the military; again, political considerations were ignored, direct appeals were made to Yeltsin, and the desire to demonstrate the power of Russian arms to a receptive public has reigned supreme. What could motivate the military in this case?

It has been reported that the “second phase” strategy has been pushed by the generals in charge of the troops in the North Caucasus.\(^{50}\) There is obviously a desire on the part of the military to settle scores with the Chechens for the defeats of 1994-96. In addition, a speedy military victory would be highly beneficial for the careers of the generals involved; Major General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the Zapad group of forces in Chechnya, publicly threatened a “civil war” if the politicians stopped the military from achieving complete victory in Chechnya.\(^{51}\)

A victory is especially important for General Kvashnin. He commanded the North Caucasus Military District during the disastrous first war against Chechnya, something his
critics never fail to mention. Kvashnin not only covets Sergeyev’s job, he has to worry about his own. Russian observers mention ambitions of another general, Viktor Chechevatov, who has been recently moved from the command of the Far Eastern Military District to Moscow, to assume the position of the Commander of the General Staff Academy. General Chechevatov is an enterprising figure who ran for president of Russia in 1996, only to concede early in the game in favor of Yeltsin. During the Kosovo war, he publicly offered to lead a group of Russian volunteers to fight on Serbia’s side. Another possible candidate is Army General (ret.) Andrei Nikolaev, who has become chairman of the Defense Committee in the new Duma. A protracted “quarantine” was certainly less likely to impress the future new president of Russia when it comes to awarding promotions to military brass. Many officers also complain that in 1994-96 the politicians did not let the military “finish” the job, hoping that “this time” the politicians will not interfere.

Just as in the case of Kosovo, public support of the war against Chechnya must have encouraged the military command, which initially was very cautious about casualties among the conscripts, to proceed with an all-out war against Chechnya. The same estimation of the public mood probably was responsible for Putin’s embrace of the new and bolder military strategy, because a quick victory made him a serious contender for the Russian presidency. Yeltsin may have hoped that a victory by the spring (as envisaged by the initial plan) would have strengthened him against his political enemies and allowed him and his family an exit from the political scene on favorable conditions. Thus the broad public and the elites encouraged the military to shape the security policy in the North Caucasus.

The counterproductive shape the Chechnya campaign took, that of total war, is by itself the result of the failure of the civilians to guide and implement a military reform. The Russian generals feel satisfied that they are conducting a war according to all the precepts of military science as they have been taught in the Soviet and now Russian military academies—as if it were a war against NATO. The Russian military establishment has, by and large, cocooned itself in its steadfast refusal to recognize the reality that Russia is no longer a superpower and that its concerns should be with relatively small-scale insurgencies (the whole population of Chechnya is well under one million people, smaller than the number of men under arms in Russia).

While the threat of war was already hanging over Russia’s southern rim in the spring of 1999, the Russian military conducted its first major exercise in years. Named “West 99,” the exercise’s mission was to repel a NATO attack on Belarus, and its scenario included sorties of strategic bombers close to America’s shores! In the meanwhile, little if anything had been done to prepare the Russian military for a limited counterinsurgency campaign that could have bottled up the Chechen warlords, such as construction of garrisons. Once the war began, the fear that the Russian forces in Chechnya simply would not survive winter in the field reportedly influenced General Kvashnin to speed up the offensive.

During the Kosovo campaign, the eagerness with which the Russian top brass embraced the fanciful idea that NATO might very well attack Russia over her actions in the North Caucasus is quite suggestive of their collective flight from reality. Having NATO as an enemy is obviously more flattering to their self-image and professional standing, not to mention
potentially more fattening for the defense budget, than deflating their force posture and mindset to deal with the real opponent. This strategic daydreaming has been codified in the national security concept, which was approved in January 2000, and in the draft military doctrine approved in October 1999. Both point in less than thinly veiled terms to the United States and NATO as the main threats to “world peace.”\textsuperscript{57} The threats from Russia's southern rim are recognized as well, but with NATO supposedly at the gate, the profound reforms that the Russian military needs will be delayed.

Conclusions

The Russian military has no tradition of aspiring to power. The officer corps would rather pursue political influence needed for advancing its corporate interests and individual careers by extending crucial support to a receptive political faction likely to win in a power struggle. Throughout most of the Soviet period, save for a few crucial episodes, the military was prevented from playing this role, but it also received highly preferential treatment from the regime.\textsuperscript{58} The Yeltsin years did not add to the military's appetite for political power or its ability to seize it. Tradition may be one reason. Another possible reason is the enormous and unappealing complexity of running Russia, especially its economy. The Russian military is a large and complex organization, usually split by personal and service conflicts in its top echelons. With the demise of communism, the security services have lost much of their intimidating power, but they can still spy on the military. The buildup of MVD Internal Troops has created a significant counterbalance to the military's coercive power.

Those individual military officers who aspired to political power discovered that their military careers had not prepared them for the Byzantine world of politics in Moscow. They made obvious mistakes, failed to gain allies, and were easily used and discarded by civilian politicians. The military as an institution did not give them support. Still, every armed conflict in the late 1980s and 1990s has produced its candidate for Napoleon. Afghanistan produced Colonel General Boris Gromov; the conflict in Moldova, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed; and the first war against Chechnya, Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin. As is clear, defeat can produce charismatic military personalities as surely as victory. So far, the generals fighting in Chechnya have provided an approving chorus to Vladimir Putin's political career, but a downturn in his fortunes may still present us with another spectacle of a general eyeing the Kremlin.

The military started the decade very much disoriented by the impact of Gorbachev's “new thinking,” which was highly skeptical about the utility of military power in the modern world. The “new thinking” died an untimely death probably as early as 1993,\textsuperscript{59} and the military began to reassert its monopoly on defense policy and its influence on security policy as a whole. By 1997, the military was disintegrating because of budget shortfalls. At that moment, the inspiration for drastic and necessary force reductions came both from the military (but from its most “unmilitary” service—the Strategic Rocket Forces, which is run not by “real soldiers” but by highly skilled technical specialists like Marshal Sergeyev himself) and from the civilian Andrei Kokoshin, first in his job as the Secretary of the Defense
Council and Chief Military Inspector, and then as the Secretary of the Security Council. Military reform is by no means over, but the armed forces are at least no longer disintegrating. It remains to be seen, now that the catastrophe seems to have been avoided, whether the military will try to isolate themselves again from “civilian” ideas.

The military’s renewed influence on Russian security policy has been amply demonstrated by Russian conduct at the endgame in Kosovo and during the current war in Chechnya. Why, after years of criticism of the excessive military influence upon Soviet security policy, is the military in the driver’s seat again? One reason is the anti-Western sentiment now pervasive in Russian society. If the West is so threatening and treacherous, the military is a logical choice to handle security policy. Moreover, military action, be it in Kosovo or in Chechnya, is for the time being one of the very few emergency valves available to Russians battered again by the twists and turns of their turbulent history. But the most important reason is the weakness and fragmentation of the political institutions, primarily that of the presidency, which has come to operate as a court system where decisions are based not on rational policy analysis but on the whims and perceived short-term self-interests of the quasi-monarch.

Endnotes

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3. Ibid., p. 7.


8. Interview with Vitaliy Shlykov, June 2, 1998, Moscow, Russia.

9. Ibid.


17. This forms an interesting parallel to the events of 1957, when Khrushchev first used Marshal Gheorgiy Zhukov to help him get rid of the “anti-party group.” and then sacked the marshal.


27. OMRI Daily Digest, 18 October 1996.


33. OMRI Daily Digest, 8 July 1996.

34. OMRI Daily Digest, 27 June 1996.

35. Derived from OMRI Daily Digests and RFE/RL Daily Reports.


37. Author’s interview with Alexander Golts, Moscow, October 1997.


47. Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Stenogramma zasedanii, no. 279 (421), September 14, 1999, pp. 5-6.


52. Golts, “Na shturm!”


57. Golts, “Na shturm!”


60. For a more detailed treatment, see Tsypkin, “Will the Military Rule Russia?” pp. 42-44.

Environmental Issues and Russian Security

Odelia Funke

Introduction

How should we frame national security policies for the 21st century? Traditional approaches to national security have assumed that other states are the principal source of danger to national welfare and security, and that therefore national defense and security are best served by being prepared for some form of aggression involving other states. As we grasped the importance of economics for international politics, we incorporated economic considerations as a key component into our security analysis. But there are several reasons why our previous approaches were insufficient to capture political reality. The threat of terrorism by non-state groups is one illustration that a focus on state institutions and power relations is not adequate. Environmental issues, at the global, regional, and even state level, constitute another dimension that is important to security interests.

Nearly three decades ago, Lynton Caldwell called for a realignment of our understanding of security. He pressed for a reevaluation of the priority we give to environmental matters, based on a recognition that humans are part of a biosphere, and that its integrity is critical to human life and well-being.1 Giving priority to military expenditures and technological developments without evaluating environmental consequences is not only an incomplete strategy, it has led states to pursue avenues that are not sustainable over time and that are in fact self-destructive. A more holistic approach to security—urged by the United Nation’s Brundtland Commission,2 continued at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, and supported by an expanding group of policy analysts, historians, political scientists, natural scientists, and practitioners over the past 25 years—requires that we incorporate environmental matters into our analyses. NATO too has embraced the concept.3 We should consider the impact of elements such as the wealth and integrity of the resource base, the health of the environment, population growth and migration, as well as trade patterns and trends. Societies must learn to live within their ecological resources, or suffer terrible consequences that will spill past their borders to the global commons. Environmental consequences have to be part of the equation for calculating political and economic health and stability.

Environmental, as well as political and economic realities, have a profound influence on the military and its relationship to civilian authorities. These realities provide a context that will support or undermine the military and its policies. The interconnected nature of environmental and socio-political issues, and their intimate relation to technical and strategic military concerns, are nowhere more evident than in the former Soviet Union. This chapter will address security challenges Russia faces in light of environmental security concepts. First the chapter reviews the environmental security perspective and the close relation between the environment and a nation’s health and wealth. Then the discussion
turns to the environmental conditions in Russia, with a brief consideration of international environmental security issues, including a discussion of Caspian Sea oil production.

**An Environmental Security Perspective**

First, it is appropriate to note that while the environmental security perspective has gained broad support, it is not universally accepted. Some of the principal concerns have to do with the implications for delineating security issues, and who will control the definitions of and policy responsibility for environmental problems. Some are concerned that the military will be diverted from its most important function—national defense—if it is embroiled in environmental matters. This diversion could take the form of limitations on military choices and actions relating to research, development, and acquisition because of environmental consequences, or the draining of military resources to address environmental problems at home or abroad. The diversion of resources can be direct, such as using military personnel and equipment to address environmental problems, or indirect, such as funneling budget allocations the military needs to nonmilitary concerns couched in strategic terms. Other critics fear that the primary analytical issues pertinent to security will be confused or diluted by a focus on environmental issues. They argue that those few environmental problems that truly rise to the level of national security threats can be handled within the traditional national security analysis framework. A parallel set of fears is raised by those who are concerned that the military will co-opt environmental issues and distort priorities. They note that defense activities are the source of much environmental degradation; they fear a militarization of the environmental agenda and are suspicious of any genuine “greening” of the defense sector. Some suspect that environmental matters will be put on the defense agenda only as a way to guarantee continued access to funding that might—and should—be reallocated for expressly environmental security objectives. Rather than relying primarily on the defense establishment for important environmental analyses and programs, there should be a shift in the national budget to provide funds to other entities to address important environmental issues. From this perspective, strategic considerations should take environmental resources and consequences into account, but we should not rely on the defense establishment to handle this analysis or promote this kind of agenda. Adopting the language and perspective of national security, these skeptics believe, encourages co-optation of an important agenda.

While the debate is undoubtedly not over, environmental security analysis has gained legitimacy. One can find authoritative evidence over the past decade, from the White House to the State Department to the Pentagon, that the U.S. government has begun to adopt this broader perspective. If it is clear that our security policies must take environmental costs and consequences into account that still leaves open the question of what role the military should play in the analysis or solutions. It seems obvious that a successful integration of environmental issues into the security establishment requires the participation and support of the military. The military uses the environment directly to carry out its mission of testing weapons and conducting training exercises. In the United States, we have made increasingly greater demands on the military to be good stewards of the vast national lands entrusted to
their care. In fact, we sometimes rely on the military to safeguard endangered species as animals flee to large installations to escape the encroachment of civilian developments. But there is a larger set of activities the military can legitimately address because of their expertise and their worldwide operations. Hence, advocates inside and outside of the defense establishment believe the military should have an important role in environmental security matters. On the other hand, environmental security in the U.S. has not been the domain of any one establishment. It is a topic widely discussed in academe, in the public interest sector, and across government agencies. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has signed agreements with other agencies (Defense, Energy, and State Departments) to address issues affecting environmental security. The EPA has articulated its acceptance of the environmental security perspective, with a corresponding intention to contribute to security by managing the hazardous conditions that are a legacy of the Cold War; give attention to global environmental issues; anticipate emerging issues at the national, regional and global level; and enforce environmental treaties.

If the national security problem necessarily entails an interconnected complex of elements, with environmental impacts and carrying capacity being a major factor, what does that mean for security analysis? A realistic assessment of national security requires a holistic look, including environmental integrity, because a healthy environment is critical for the economy, for the health and welfare of the people, and for overall stability of the society. Indeed, the military strength of a nation relies on environmental qualities in several ways. The wealth of a nation, which supports its ability to exert influence and to sustain a powerful military, is built on its natural resource base. Nations have fought to control natural resources, both to enhance overall wealth and to secure specific strategic materials under domestic control. In the 20th century alone control of natural resources was the cause of a dozen or more wars in addition to a broad range of conflicts that threatened regional peace.

An environmental security approach broadens and deepens our analysis of state interests, highlighting the complex interrelationship among the social, economic, ecological, and political elements operating at the domestic and international levels. Political stability and societal well-being are closely connected to environmental protection. Because pollution itself can spread beyond borders, and because some consequences of environmental degradation can cause major disruptions nationally and regionally, it is a matter of national interest to minimize ecological damage not only domestically, but also internationally.

The environmental security concept is particularly useful for thinking about Russian security goals and US policy toward Russia. From the Russian perspective, giving adequate weight to environmental considerations would mean allocating more attention and resources to environmental crises. It might also leaven suspicion and secrecy, and convince the Russians to seek the Western assistance they desperately need for addressing chemical and radiological contamination associated with military as well as industrial activities—even if this entails providing information from previously classified sources. Foreign assistance in the form of expertise, loans, or outright grants is likely to be quite limited in the absence of information from Russia intended to assure donor governments about the nature of the need and to provide ongoing assurance that the money is being used for the targeted purposes.
Scandals involving large amounts of diverted US funding to Russia in the early 1990s will make donor governments especially cautious.

Based on an environmental security perspective, other nations will be more likely to actively support Russian recovery and environmental restabilization. There are strategic reasons for the West to help Russia control its chemical and nuclear materials, including wastes. But even where economic or traditional strategic objectives are not obviously at stake, other governments see a clear interest in the cleanup and security of dangerous materials and the proper management of toxic materials. Western European neighbors quickly realized, for example, that spending money on pollution controls in Russia makes better economic sense than spending the same amount at home. The benefits of reducing the horrendous pollution problems in Russia in some cases provides relatively greater environmental benefits in Western Europe, while at the same time bringing significant benefits to the Russian people and helping to insure social and political stability in that country and, by extension, across Europe. Perhaps less obvious is that from an environmental security perspective, the health of the Russian citizenry is a security concern of the United States and Western Europe. If a health crisis develops in Russia (some believe it has already begun), it will dramatically affect economic and political as well as social stability. With domestic instability, economic markets would likely collapse totally, and pollution problems would spread even wider. Of immediate concern would be who controls nuclear materials and weapons. But chaos would undoubtedly bring other troubles as well; turmoil often spills across borders. Further, providing assistance for severe environmental problems fits articulated Western values of promoting human health and natural resource protection. Finally, adopting a more comprehensive approach encourages us to confront the implications of trans-border problems and issues that cannot be solved individually. In a frequently-cited article over a decade ago, Jessica Tuchman Mathews wrote about the shift in our most fundamental concepts, noting that traditional lines separating nations, and separating foreign from domestic affairs, are increasingly irrelevant to solving our problems. She pressed for policymakers to recognize that our borders are porous and that security rests "more and more on international—rather than strictly national—conditions." Security in the military sense, she continued, "remains important, but it is now only a part of the essential equation." 

A Clean Environment: Implications for Wealth and Health

The importance of environmental integrity for the security of a nation can hardly be exaggerated. Reference has already been made to the importance of the natural resource base to shape wealth. An abundance of resources can provide the basic materials needed for existence—fertile lands to grow foods, metals and minerals to build what is needed for civilian and military use, abundant water for consumption and energy, etc. It is axiomatic that nations will seek to control fundamental resources and avoid dependence on other nations if possible, not only for resources to feed the people, but also for resources that feed sophisticated technologies, and most particularly those strategic resources required for military research, development, and acquisition. The ability to provide for the people is an
ingredient of domestic stability, and resources undergird that capability. Natural resources reduce the need for imports and are a source of both wealth and influence through trade with other nations. Resources attract investment from foreign and domestic sources, and can attract tourism, another source of domestic wealth.

But wealth from natural resources can only be realized if these resources are well managed. This involves the efficiency with which the resources are tapped or extracted, as well as how they are consumed, processed, and turned into products. We have become more cognizant of the need to conserve precious resources. World oil and gas reserves, though very large, are being consumed at a fast rate. Even “renewable” resources, such as clean water or fish, are not inexhaustible. Russia has had an abundance of water resources for drinking water, irrigation, transportation, and power generation. Yet Russia has allowed a shocking deterioration of this vast wealth, leading to the disappearance of huge areas of once magnificent water bodies, contamination of much of the surface water, and threats to underground water sources. The United States is fast consuming deep aquifers of fresh water to irrigate crops on desert plains; use rates now dramatically exceed the slow recharge rate. Contaminated air and water have serious deleterious effects in both the long and short term.

Environmental degradation tends to create a downward spiral. The fate of the Aral Sea in Central Asia provides an infamous example. The sea has been reduced in size by about two-thirds, due to unsustainable cotton farming in the surrounding area, farming that depleted the water sources feeding the sea and overused chemicals and pesticides. Not only surrounding lands, but lands hundreds of miles away, are contaminated with salts, metals, and chemicals, which were carried by winds from the exposed seabed. As the land became drier and more depleted, the erosion and dispersion increased—7.9 million hectares of arable land were degraded. These contaminants cause human illness as well as destruction of water resources and wider land deterioration. Occurrences of typhoid fever there, for example, are up to 29 times the regional average. Alarming rates of anemia in women and children have been found in one area, as well as several-fold increases in viral hepatitis. Destruction of fishing on the sea has caused additional collateral damage. Experts believe that the Aral Sea is dead, its condition being so deteriorated that the process is no longer reversible.

If the citizenry is not healthy, the state cannot be secure. The health of the citizens should be a fundamental goal of any state, so as to maintain the contentment as well as the capability of the people. People are the source that keeps the institutions functioning, the most vital asset. The future of the workforce, including the pool of people available for military service, depends upon a continuing source of competent and physically capable individuals. A widespread problem with neurotoxic chemicals, for example, could cause mental disabilities and loss of intelligence and cognitive reasoning abilities that would in turn jeopardize the intellectual reservoir upon which the nation depends to operate sophisticated industrial and military systems.

Children are a particularly important asset, as they represent the future strength of the nation. At the fetal and early developmental stages, their body systems are especially vulnerable to toxins. Contamination can pass from the mother to child in utero (contaminants can even leach out of mothers’ bones during pregnancy) or through breast
milk. Neurotoxins are very dangerous for the fetus and small child, as their systems cannot successfully eliminate toxins. Proportionally, a toxin such as lead will do far more damage to a fetus or child, not only because of body mass, but because their neural structures are growing rapidly and are vulnerable.\textsuperscript{12}

Some key indicators of national health are life expectancy rates, the prevalence of various diseases, and the general health of children, including live birth rates. If these indicators or other general health statistics show high rates of illness or death, surely this constitutes a challenge to the nation's security. Often health factors derive from environmental factors, particularly the availability of clean drinking water, though contaminated air, soil, or food can also cause severe problems. Environmental contamination can involve a complicated set of cascading problems—for instance, contaminated water can lead to illness and death; it also contaminates fish living in it, or other animals that drink from it, which creates problems up the food chain. Water and sediments from contaminated water can affect crops and cattle, and can be carried long distances to contaminate other places and life forms. Aside from the drain on workforce power, widespread health problems pose a formidable cost to the nation in the form of medicine, care facilities, rehabilitation, and so forth. The costs of identifying and cleaning up these sources can be overwhelming—even when cleanup methods are available.

\textbf{State of the Environment in Russia}

Russia covers a vast area, with a rich store of natural resources. These resources have been severely compromised through the practices of the past half-century or more. The regime practiced no restraint or any stewardship, seemingly confident that the rich resource base was inexhaustible—a tragically delusional attitude. Further, it appears that Russia has similarly treated its people as an expendable, renewable resource. The government showed virtually no concern for human life or welfare. Now they are reaping the results of this dissociation from ecological and natural systems. In particular, Russia might be scraping the bottom of its human resource cache. Some of the serious ecological and health problems may not be reversible, or at least not for many decades or even centuries. The possibility of depleting the stock of healthy, intelligent youth has direct relevance for the future of their armed forces, particularly when seen in the context of the multiple crises facing the military.

Information about Russian environmental conditions can be somewhat confusing, for several reasons. Many facilities fail to provide required emissions data, and data that are provided are not deemed reliable. Reported monitoring data might vary over time, or in different studies, or might not be representative. Some official health statistics underestimate or ignore significant indicators of poor health. And while the press and other sources contain important environmental descriptions and issues, the data relate to specific areas or sources, so it is best not to rely too heavily on any single set of data. It is difficult to generalize across all of Russia.

According to stories and studies coming out of the former Soviet Union since its breakup, it is clear that environmental conditions have severely deteriorated. Russia is suffering the
consequences of a half-century of neglect and incredible mismanagement, followed by a
decade of inability to deal with many of the serious cleanup problems and ongoing insults to
ecological systems, even though they were recognized. There are serious threats to water, air
and soil across the country, with industrial areas and cities hardest hit. As one Moscow
newspaper said, “Russian cities are very polluted and it is hazardous to live in them; everyone
knows that.”13 And cities contain most of the population: 70 percent of the approximately 147
million (1998) Russian population lives in cities. The three largest cities, Moscow, St.
Petersburg, and Nizhniy Novgorod, account for almost 15 million of them.14 In many areas,
the environment is polluted, with dangerous levels of chemicals, including pesticides,
disease-carrying water, and polluted air. People are being exposed to a variety of pollutants
with dire health consequences. Most commercial enterprises are not in compliance with
Russian environmental standards; many facilities fail to provide required emissions data,
and the emissions data that are provided are not deemed reliable.15

There is a direct relationship between the large-scale release of toxins into the
environment and negative impacts on human health, both premature deaths and the onset of
a variety of illnesses. In the polluted industrial regions, morbidity rates for children under six
years old exceed that of children in less polluted areas by a factor of seven-to-five.16
Environmental problems across Russia pose a major risk to workers, who suffer occupational
illnesses, and also threaten the general public due to widespread contamination of air, water,
and soil. The deteriorating health of citizens is a direct and obvious cost of environmental
mismanagement. Disease threats that have increased in recent years (many associated with
contaminated water supplies) include tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid, hepatitis A and E,
dysentery, and asthma. The rate of environmentally related birth defects has risen, as has
infectious disease.17 Diseases resulting from compromised immune systems are increasing
because of chemical exposures and a deteriorating public health system. Contaminated food
and water cause diarrhea and other illnesses. Contamination is passed from mother to child
through mothers’ breast milk.

The disastrous state of environmental/medical affairs in Russia (and the former Soviet
republics) was documented in the early 1990s by Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, who
tied environmental problems directly to health consequences.18 Other studies, cited in a
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, have confirmed this linkage, finding that
health-related problems will continue to grow. For example, studies have found
environmental factors that contributed to an increase in developmental problems as well as
acute and chronic respiratory and gastrointestinal illnesses in children in several cities; high
rates of asthma, endocrine system problems, and chronic digestive diseases; 25 percent of
kindergarten children in one city with lead levels above that which causes impaired
intelligence; and an increase of waterborne diseases (e.g., cholera, dysentery) and
environmentally related birth defects. According to a Russian government report, air
pollution contributes to 17 percent of childhood and 10 percent of adult illnesses. The Russian
Security Council reported premature mortality and loss of labor potential of about 82,000
people in 1991 due to environmental causes. Losses from non-lethal environmentally related
illnesses are far higher.19
A relationship between increased air and water pollution and increases in human mortality and morbidity has been demonstrated. Soviet researchers concluded that acute air and water pollution are related to occurrences of cancer and blood and liver diseases, among other serious illnesses. Russia has the dubious distinction of being a modernized, “advanced” nation, but with decreasing life expectancy rates. In Moscow, between 1970 and 1990, residents had lost 10 years of life expectancy.20

Some of the problems have been widely broadcast in the West. As the USSR disintegrated, horrendous stories emerged from far and wide. The fate of the once magnificent Aral Sea in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, cited above, is the most infamous of the catastrophes that beset the former Soviet states.21 But Lake Baikal, in Siberia, is another symbol of massive environmental deterioration, though there is still hope of reversing the process there. Baikal is the deepest lake in the world, and the eighth largest lake. It contained 20 percent of the world’s supply of fresh water, and 80 percent of the USSR’s.22 Decisions to build a plant for aircraft tires, over the protest of many, have resulted in large-scale pollution of this once pristine water body. A pulp and paper plant continues to create serious pollution problems in that basin. By the late 1980s, much of the surface water in the former Soviet Union was classified as polluted. About one-third of the polluted wastewater in the USSR went totally untreated. In Russia itself, about a third was treated to some extent, though not completely; in other parts of the former USSR, treatment was at an even lower rate. The great majority of major rivers have dangerous levels of pollution, including sewage. Water samples from 200 of them showed 79 percent with bacterial and viral agents at dangerous levels. In 1988, the Ob River in Siberia contained pollutant levels at 4,000 times the established health limit.23

Water pollution is the most pressing issue. All major Russian waterways are poisoned to some extent; some are dying. Clean water, a precious resource that sustains ecosystems, supports agriculture, and provides drinking water and fresh fish, is endangered in Russia. In some areas, surface water is the primary source of drinking water, and these waters are polluted; current rates of usage are unsustainable.24 Drinking water supplies all over Russia have been severely compromised. Intestinal illnesses associated with contaminated drinking water are frequently reported in urban areas.25 Experts estimate that less than one-half of Russia’s population has access to safe drinking water; 69 percent of their wastewater treatment systems have insufficient capacity. The Russian government stated that nearly all water courses in the Volga watershed, which covers two-thirds of European Russia, do not meet their standards. Municipalities are the primary source of pollution, with industry and agriculture following.26 Water bodies surrounding Russia are likewise very polluted.27 The fishing industry has been badly injured because of polluted waters, including a decline in the lucrative caviar trade.28 In Siberia, according to one source, there are huge pollution levels annually, and 40 million tons of pollution discharged to water bodies, including organics and metal at levels 30 percent higher than the permissible level. The average life span in Siberia is 16-18 years less than across Russia; tuberculosis and child mortality rates are significantly higher than in the rest of the country.29

Poor air quality is another very serious problem. It is estimated that 30 to 80 percent of the residents living in cities with annual concentrations four times higher than the maximum allowable concentrations (MACs) have respiratory diseases. Average annual sulfur dioxide
Concentrations at two to four times the MAC are associated with a 12 to 23 percent great incidence of respiratory diseases. Over 200 Russian cities often exceeded prescribed health maximums for annual concentrations for at least one pollutant in 1996. Eight cities exceeded standards for three or more pollutants, and excesses were by a factor of 10 or more. Pollution from motor vehicles is becoming more of a problem in cities. Air quality also is degraded.

Increased pesticide and fertilizer use has resulted in degraded soils as well as impaired human health in Russian. Food quality is said to be generally poor. Man-made chemicals have been widely misused and over-used, depleting the fertility of the soil and loading it with dangerous levels of chemicals that persist over time. Farmlands have been badly damaged, and crop yields have declined, making Russia more dependent on imports and further draining scarce Russian capital while increasing national dependencies. By the mid-1980s crop yields per acre were far below those in the United States. Nearly half of the arable land was seriously threatened by erosion. And what the fields were producing was not healthy. A late 1990 study claimed that only four of 432 farms studied produced healthy crops—or farmers. Cattle also suffer from contaminated lands and water. Further, the Soviet regime pushed farmers into marginal and fragile lands; excessive levels of nitrates are in up to 10 percent of the food. Mortality and morbidity rates also correlate to high pesticide use areas. Children are especially susceptible. Russia has found that infant mortality rates are up to twice as high as the norm where pesticide use is high. As the Soviet era was drawing to a close, Feshbach and Friendly noted that 25 million acres of cropland were overloaded with DDT, which was still being used in the USSR long after other nations banned it; that 40 percent of baby food was significantly contaminated; and that by the end of the 1980s, pesticide poisoning deaths of Soviet farmers jumped 18 to 20-fold compared to the period 1976-85. The Soviet Health Ministry had data linking pesticide use to a wide variety of pathologies, including anemia, tuberculosis, viral hepatitis, and acute upper respiratory tract infections. Overuse of nitrates for fertilizer also has deleterious effects, particularly on infants. It interferes with the oxygen supply to the brain and can even cause death.

In some regions, children have dangerously high blood lead (Pb) levels, which affect cognitive capabilities. Despite unequivocal human health data showing neurotoxic effects from lead exposures, and the serious danger particularly to fetuses and small children, Russia has still not banned leaded gasoline. In 1995, 5.7 thousand tons of lead were released to the atmosphere in Russia. Of this, road transport accounted for almost 71 percent, the metallurgical industry for about 12 percent, aviation and space for about 7 percent, and the energy and fuel sector for about 7 percent. While total emissions from stationary sources decreased 55 percent between 1992 and 1997, the estimates above show that little of the 1995 releases were from stationary sources. At the same time, Russia is increasing the number of vehicles on the roads (by 250 percent between 1991 and 1997). In heavily congested areas, ambient lead levels frequently reach four times the U.S. air quality standard. Mercury contamination, present in some industrial areas, is another source of neurotoxic disorders particularly dangerous for children. A study in St. Petersburg found children with mercury levels 1.5-2 times higher than is typical for children in large Western cities.
Resources have been wasted, adding copious amounts of potentially valuable resources to the environment as pollution. Energy is wasted through poor management and inefficient, aged delivery systems. For example, oil leaks and spills have been fairly common. In Siberia, oil pollution has done irreversible damage. One area has about 120 spills per year. One newspaper cited a layer of oil eight centimeters thick that flowed for a week in one river. Every year there are some 11,000 accidents along Russia’s main oil pipelines, which in total are about 100,000 kilometers long. In 1977, there were 22,000 breaks in long-distance oil pipelines and 33,000 breaks in on-site pipelines. Initial processing entails up to two percent loss; in western Siberia by 1997, this had amounted to 100 million tons lost. Western Siberia is estimated to have 2,000 km$^2$ of contaminated land near oil and gas extraction sites. It is not surprising that water bodies are also highly contaminated. The Ob River exceeds limits for oil contamination by a factor of 500. Lake Samotlor (280 kilometers by 100 kilometers) in Siberia was killed by the late 1980s from oil contamination. Foundries release valuable metals as pollutants; metals dangerous to human health and the environment are found at very high levels in surrounding soils.

We have heard continuing descriptions of the contamination from nuclear development and wastes. The catastrophic failure of the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl, Ukraine, was a dramatic illustration of the potential for environmental destruction with dire human consequences, not only domestically but also internationally. Russia still has 47 of the older commercial reactors in use that are thought to be dangerous.

Russia’s three military sites for plutonium production—Mayak (Chelyabinsk-65), Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26—are said to be highly contaminated, with wastes seeping into and threatening water supplies; they have contaminated waterways, which have carried pollutants to the Arctic Ocean, and in some places pollute agricultural products around the rivers and ocean. The Mayak facility began in the 1940s as the center for collecting and processing all nuclear waste generated in Russia, for military or civilian purposes. Two rivers (Techa and Islet) from this area are said to be the most radiologically contaminated sites in the world. And some sediments in this area are said to yield an hourly dose that is twice the lethal level. From the late 1940s, in this region where 3.6 million people currently live, over 146 million curies of radiation were released over time; by comparison, 50-80 million curies were released at Chernobyl. Human health effects in the area are serious, covering a range of problems. Farm animals continue to graze on the river banks and drink the contaminated water. Though nuclear waste storage is reported as full or at 95-99 percent capacity, and the Mayak facility cannot adequately and safely process existing wastes, Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry pressured the Duma last summer to change the law and allow the import of spent nuclear fuel from within the Federation for processing—as a money-making venture. While the government is planning to import wastes, the Russian press has reported about the overfilled storage facilities, the totally inadequate funding allocated (despite a decree going back to 1992, it has been financed at 4.3 percent of the required amount), and the short time frame for adopting emergency measures in order to avoid disaster.

At Tomsk, processed nuclear waste has been pumped underground for long-term storage. Weapons-grade plutonium is produced at Krasnoyarsk reactors and contaminated cooling
waters are released directly into the river. Reprocessed wastes have been pumped underground. Krasnoyarsk is one of the 10 most polluted Russian cities.\(^{44}\)

Until a few years ago, Russia disposed of radioactive wastes in the Arctic Sea, the Sea of Japan,\(^{45}\) and the Northern Pacific Ocean.\(^{46}\) Nuclear cores disposed of in surrounding waters have contaminated seas to the north and east of Russia. Under the 1992 Start II Treaty, Russia agreed to dismantle part of its nuclear submarine fleet. Decommissioning of nuclear submarines at naval facilities on the Kola Peninsula in the north and at Vladivostok in the Far East has evoked international concern. Norway and Japan have been particularly worried about long-term destruction of fishing waters. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Russian navy is storing thousands of spent nuclear fuel assemblies in inadequate facilities on the Kola Peninsula. Over 30 leaking containers have been stored in the open there for over 30 years.\(^{47}\) The EPA noted that fuels are being stored in vessels not designed for this purpose off Murmansk, the largest population center north of the Arctic Circle. Fears of mishap are growing in that area. In Vladivostok, there is currently a 10-year backlog in the shipping and processing of spent nuclear fuel rod assemblies—of which there are 700—and other nuclear wastes. There is a considerable backlog of liquid wastes and leaky storage facilities, making a serious release quite possible. Far East naval bases are storing submarine reactor cores in vaults.\(^{48}\) While these environmental threats from production and storage are sobering, they do not take into account the very heavy price for nuclear testing, much of which occurred in Kazakhstan.\(^{49}\)

The Soviet Union produced chemical weapons from 1924 to 1987. These weapons were stored at many sites throughout the USSR. Not all of these storage sites and bases are known, and abandoned sites continue to be found in former Soviet territories. Toxic chemicals produced during World War II were part of over 4.5 million chemical munitions. There are no official data available about the fate of these chemicals. Of the postwar chemicals manufactured, Moscow supplied 40,000 metric tons of toxic chemicals for destruction between 1990 and 1992. But they had earlier dismantled and destroyed chemical production facilities and chemicals, showing careless disregard for human and environmental consequences. Methods of disposal included incineration, open explosion, burial, and dumping of untreated materials in domestic and international waters. For example, they used open burning to destroy approximately 2,000 metric tons of mustard gas at a site that is now polluted with dioxins. At other facilities where chemicals were produced and/or destroyed, concentrations of arsenic in the soil in the mid-1990s still exceeded maximum permissible standards by a factor of 8,500 at one site and 10,000 at another. Once again, the Volga River basin was a large-scale production area, and wastes were discharged directly to the River.\(^{50}\) Russia dumped chemical munitions in the surrounding waters as well, though some conclude that these pollutants will do only localized harm.\(^{51}\) But the production itself claimed many lives and caused chronic illnesses, involving both workers and local residents. And the toll among workers is continuing; according to one source, worker illnesses continue to grow even many years after production has stopped. Children in one area studied in 1994-1995 had a complex of pathologies, including aging and intellectual degeneration. Gastro-intestinal and nervous system disorders have also been found. Current plans to dispose of the chemical weapons stockpiles, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, do not address public health and environmental aspects of weapons production. One commentator
asserts that elimination cannot occur in ten years; it will take at least 15-20 years, particularly since not all of the sites have yet been discovered.52

Many military facilities are contaminated with spilled and leaked petroleum products as well. Of other hazardous wastes, Russia is said to have collected and stored 1,407 million tons of toxic industrial and consumption wastes in various places (including dumps, target ranges, warehouses, etc.) by 1996. In 1996, an additional 84 million tons were generated and 10 million tons were recycled.53 While we all recognize the potential danger of radioactive wastes, it is worth noting that many toxic chemicals do not biodegrade, or have a half-life. Safe recycling or disposal of these chemicals should be a very high priority.

The threat of catastrophic failure in a variety of environmental arenas poses a genuine security threat to Russia, for example: depletion of once-abundant water supplies; contamination of major waterways and bodies, including fish poisoning; contamination of arable land; increasing mortality and morbidity, higher infant mortality rates, and lower life expectancy rates; and contamination of international water bodies. These will constitute challenges to economic viability and political stability in the coming years. Economic impacts are near-term in the increased need for imports to substitute for reduced productivity of the land and reduced fish stocks, and parallel reduction in income from exports that rely on fresh water and arable land. Some Russian experts estimate overall economic losses from environmental degradation at 10 to 12 percent of GDP.54 Deteriorated health of the people, already serious, could soon become a crippling element.

**Status of Environmental Programs/Action in Russia**

Russian environmental standards are in theory sound. The problem does not appear to be lack of recognition of the issues, nor has there been an unwillingness to set standards in this complicated and controversial arena. Russia has long had strict rules on the books, some that were developed many decades ago. The USSR Constitution guaranteed protection of the environment and efficient use of natural resources, declaring environmental protection to be one of the basic functions of the state. The Soviet Republics developed a set of rules in the 1950s and 1960s. The Law on Air Protection, for example, was enacted in 1960, and the Water Code in 1972. The standards set were very stringent compared to those in many other nations.55

The new Russian Federation was established in 1991. The 1991 Law on Environment and Protection specifies government responsibilities and also citizens' rights to have information and to seek redress for environmental damages. The 1993 Constitution recognizes the importance of the environment and natural resources. Another important aspect of the new regime is decentralization. Regions now carry out much of the policy. They have the authority and responsibility, and therefore they are the key to bringing about environmental improvements. The framework of laws, codes, etc. sets minimal standards; regional governments may set stricter standards.56 But regions mirror many of the same difficulties as the central government, which critically impairs environmental protection.
The scheme of national laws and institutions is extensive, but it does not equate to a comprehensive or effective framework. Unfortunately, it appears that the Soviet, and Russian, governments have never taken the rules seriously. According to the OECD report on environmental performance, at least some inspection, licensing, and monitoring requirements are being enforced. But data for compliance are incomplete; even if these data are correct, big compliance gaps are evident. The rhetoric has always far exceeded the willingness, or ability, to implement the standards. Those in power do not seem to take the long-term sustainability of resources, or the health of citizens, fully into account. Surely precious resources were not treated as security reserves in this nation that sacrificed so much to security and defense interests. Cheap energy and the development of heavy industries were given priority in the Soviet era. Environment crises were a rallying point at the breakup of the empire, which demonstrated that the people were aware of and alarmed by the crumbling environmental conditions. But the level of concern has not been sufficient to sustain national commitment for the formidable tasks—and costs—of cleanup and realignment of industries toward environmental protection. Pressing issues include the protection of natural resources, including surface and drinking water, but also timber and fisheries. Still looming is the cleanup of polluting facilities, and of the widespread industrial pollution and pesticides that have contaminated the environment. Chemical and nuclear stockpiles, from military and energy sources, beg for the implementation of safe handling processes and facilities. And these awaiting problems from past practices are not all; there are emerging new issues such as pollution from an increasingly consumer-oriented society, increased auto emissions, and products from biotechnology.

One clear indication of the priority of environmental protection is the status and funding of the national institutions that set and enforce policies. The question is whether environmental issues have a strong voice at the highest levels of state policy-making, and whether they have the resources to carry out the policies. What was a Ministry for Environmental Protection and Natural Resources under the new Constitution was downgraded in 1996 to the State Committee on Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Natural Resources, a clear sign of the reduced importance of this issue at the national level. Neither the central nor the regional governments have successfully implemented the legal environmental framework. A couple of the regions, those less economically crippled, have made some progress.

Activists and analysts offer various reasons for the relative impotence of the environmental protection infrastructure in Russia.

Economic Crisis. Among not only government officials but also the general public, protection of the environment ranks surprisingly low on their list of concerns, particularly given the evidence of concern with health consequences already emerging. (One 1994 public opinion survey cited in a Russian study found that “80 percent of respondents associated a decline in their health with pollution, and 68 percent believed pollution affected their children’s health.”) Environmental issues rank consistently below pressing economic needs. Managers and government alike are looking for short-term measures rather than longer-term environmental investments to bring about fundamental changes. With the current economic crisis, the government does not have the will, capability, or funding to
articulate good policy and enforce it. The existing framework is largely ignored, without legal or administrative consequences. Polls show that people are concerned about their health and know some of the relationships between health and the environment, but they do not seem to be willing to make the required tradeoffs. Government funding for environmental programs is very low, less than 0.5 percent of their federal budget.

There is no money for cleanup. The military is a prime example. They have left environmental hazards, including munitions, willy-nilly across the landscape. Even though there has been a decline in production the past decade, there has not been a proportional decline in emissions. Reasons given for this are that industries are cutting corners (including turning off pollution controls) to save money and safeguard business. Companies hard hit in the economic crisis cannot or do not comply; there is also widespread misreporting or simple ignoring of requirements. Whether through need or greed, most facilities can effectively ignore standards, as the government does not police them. The environmental agencies do not have the funding to do effective national implementation and enforcement. Local committees are said to be underfunded and overworked. Further, the system has a significant disincentive in having the environmental agencies depend financially on the fees which are paid for development activities. This reduces the willingness of these agencies to disapprove or stop activities which fund their work, particularly given the woeful inadequacy of national funding, in a time of economic crisis, investors are more wary of committing their funds. Upgraded industries (cleaner technologies) are among the casualties, and there has been a huge drop in the rate of new equipment acquisition since 1991.

Institutional Failure: Capacity. There are other aspects that go beyond economic capability and incentive. The Russian bureaucracy is not implementing the environmental protection system established by legislation. Politically, environmental institutions do not have enough clout to bring about significant changes. There is little effective pressure for strong environmental protection. While environmental issues have become more public, and the press now airs some of the issues, there is a continuing lack of institutional capacity to carry out the requirements of the legislative directives. Some note poor management skills for environmental protection, and poor processes for oversight. Others note that while the laws are protective, they might be unrealistically strict and unenforceable in the current situation; still others argue that environmental agencies do not have adequate guidance for implementing the laws. It is difficult to implement a system if the infrastructure is not in place; for example, there are insufficient landfills to accept the wastes being generated. Infrastructure refers not just to environmental institution, but also to elements such as a legal framework to define and defend property rights and clear contracting practices. Investors need these societal mechanisms to safeguard their assets, guarantee continuity, and provide for settlement of disputes if necessary.

Institutional Failure: Corruption. Widespread corruption and bribes which hamper implementation are another kind of basic organizational problem. A related complaint is that environmental officials have ties to industries they regulate, and so do not enforce compliance. Another systemic failure is that black markets for goods (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons for refrigerants, or CFCs) are rife, which means an evasion of the entire government system. The black marketing carries compound damages. It often results in
polluting activities that the government does not have a chance to regulate, which can result in resource depletion and also dispersion of contaminated goods. Black markets also comparatively disadvantage anyone willing to abide by environmental requirements; they feed a general context of lawlessness regarding environmental requirements. And black markets exacerbate the financial poverty of the government by avoiding taxation.

The most serious criminal assessment, however, points to institutional crisis. Many sources have described widespread, powerful criminal networks, with international operatives. These mobsters, often with ties to the military, exercise broad controls in both the economic and political realms; the consequences are widespread and crippling. Economist Steven Rosefielde characterizes the pervasive nature of mobster control in Russia as a "kleptocracy."

Western-style Consumerism. Western influences toward increased consumption patterns have further burdened the system by adding significantly to some kinds of pollution. There are more cars, and the auto is a significant source of pollution, especially since Russia has still not banned leaded gasoline.

Ineffective Independent Organizations. The government is generally not responsive to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Despite the strength of the green movement as a catalyst for change in the Soviet regime, its influence is now quite small. There is no tradition of public philanthropy in Russia to support these organizations, and once the regime was toppled and economic pressures rose, attentions turned elsewhere.

Stifling Environmental Activism. The government has not been content just to ignore dissenting voices that call for more strident action environmentally. It has further retreated from environmental protection by adopting intimidation techniques. It has jailed several prominent environmental advocates on charges of treason, for disclosing information about radioactive contamination resulting from government actions, especially in water bodies off the north and east coasts. As noted in the Russian press, the government is not going after those causing pollution, or the Mafia, or those importing hazardous and radioactive wastes illegally, but it is targeting environmentalists. Strong industrial and military groups have succeeded in having laws, even retroactive laws, passed by the Duma to promote secrecy. This harks back to the Soviet approach of declaring opponents and troublemakers to be "enemies of the people," a tactic used against at least one prominent opponent of Lake Baikal's environmental degradation in the 1960s, for example (enemies could be silenced or executed). More recent arrests have not resulted in execution or internal exile, and the Russian courts have shown an encouraging willingness to control the more repressive government elements, but there is an obvious element of intimidation in efforts to eliminate activism on at least some key issues.

Power of the Military Elite. In addition to the economic crisis which places economic recovery at the forefront, there is a separate politico-cultural element that exerts influence: the military. The first war in Chechnya might have damaged that status severely, but the recent more successful campaign seems to indicate that the military is still in favor. There is a strong push toward secrecy and quieting any discussion that might discredit the policies or
the campaign. The military will undoubtedly see themselves as being at odds with environmental activists in at least two ways: they will be competing for budgetary funds to promote their agendas, and some of the most expensive and difficult environmental problems were in fact caused by the defense establishment, which was primarily led by Russians during the Soviet era. Those who fear Western involvement, and therefore fear sharing information on the location and technical characteristics of Russian strategic facilities, advocate increased secrecy.

The prognosis for substantial improvement in the near term is not good. Russians are coping with an economic crisis which consumes their concerns. They do not appear to be convinced that environmental issues are key to resolving the problems creating a national crisis. They have had some success in eliciting assistance from other nations to safeguard and process weapons materials, and to identify and address some other serious problems. But these activities are far from adequate, given the scope of the environmental challenges. They are not doing the difficult and grinding job of policing standards, installing pollution prevention equipment, and adopting improved techniques. And they cannot stop production of critical materials by outmoded, polluting facilities without the capital to replace those operations. In keeping with a long (pre-Soviet) legacy of squandering their human capital, they do not appear to fully appreciate the tremendous scope of the human toll that is likely to be expended.

Further deterioration of the natural resource base and of the health of the people, together with an ongoing crisis facing low-efficiency industries, poses a threat to Russian national security. It could lead to a more severe bunker mentality, with a dangerous escalation of force structure to protect a crumbling infrastructure, secure elite power, or divert citizens’ attention from bankrupt national policies. On the other hand, it could also lead to a willingness to risk further assistance from other nations, most likely the richer West, to shore up infrastructure and provide breathing room for addressing endemic, crippling problems. After many years of undervaluing human resource capital, Russia has reached a critical point. Failure to reverse the tide could lead to a catastrophic collapse of its human resource reserves. The extent to which the military recognizes the seriousness of the issue is not clear. But there are purportedly indications that the Russian military does take environmental issues seriously, particularly given the economic constraints. And while many note the diminishment of environmental activism, others note small but measurable progress in the gathering of information and in influencing public authorities.

Transborder Issues and Pollution

Many of the environmental problems that plague Russia are of international interest, because of transboundary pollution. A nuclear disaster would quickly affect neighboring countries. Heavily polluted rivers and dumping into the seas provide a less catastrophic, but very real scenario for international concern. Russia borders on 14 other countries (close to 20,000 kilometers of shared border) and 13 seas. Sixty-two large and medium-sized transboundary rivers flow from Russia, and 40 flow into Russia. Over 7,100 kilometers of
rivers border with other nations. The Volga River basin is responsible for 37 percent of Russia’s polluted wastewater. It empties into the Caspian Sea, which each year receives 28 cubic kilometers of liquid waste, including 11 cubic kilometers of untreated wastewater. Aside from direct pollution consequences, other nations would be vitally affected by further drastic deterioration and failures in Russian agriculture, clean water resources, or public health. Member states of the former Soviet Union, except the Baltic states and Ukraine, cooperate within the Interstate Ecological Council created by a 1992 agreement on environmental protection. Eleven members generally meet annually to discuss and coordinate issues, and create working groups to address common problems. There has been support for the idea of an interstate center for environmental monitoring, but commitment has floundered due to lack of funding. The Baltic states have a strong strategic interest in having Russia’s major pollution problems resolved, especially those in northwest Russia. Domestically these states are dealing with the legacy of environmental destruction associated with Soviet occupation. They also fear the consequences of catastrophic environmental failure in Russia.

The former Norwegian minister of foreign affairs identified a clear connection between his government’s overriding goal of human health and the need to clean up radioactive and chemical contamination in Russia. Norway wants these new security challenges to be an important element in the further development of relations between NATO and Russia. Pollution from a nickel smelter on the Kola Peninsula has led to a bilateral agreement with Norway. Some believe that Norway is dramatizing the threat of nuclear contamination from Russian sources “to attract US and EU resources and expertise to assist with the massive cleanup and containment tasks in the Kola Peninsula region.” But Norway has to temper its alarms so as not to undercut their fishing industry; and the threat is therefore described as a potential disaster which demands attention. Some Russians argue that the contamination has been exaggerated, that the government is not guilty of hiding anything or of violating agreements, and that problems are relatively minor. Norway does have genuine concerns, particularly after Chernobyl, which are substantiated in the significant funding they have provided to help clean up nuclear problems. In 1995, Norway launched a Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Issues, based largely on Russia’s priorities, to garner international support for cleanup. Japan has similar concerns, and has funded construction of a facility to process low level radioactive wastes in the Russian Far East.

Central Asian states formerly part of the Soviet Union—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan—still rely on Russia for their stability. Russian troops still help guard their borders, and alliance with Russia helps stabilize their domestic structures. These countries are to a greater or lesser degree seeking some level of autonomy within a continued alliance. Further destabilization of the Russian economy or political infrastructure, brought on by a major environmental disaster, would destabilize those regimes as well. Signs of such a possibility might push them to seek stronger alliances elsewhere. Moves towards greater independence, especially involving closer ties with the West or China, are likely to heighten security fears in Moscow, and increase regional tensions dangerously. Emerging Russian regionalism brought on by political decentralization is a factor here, according to the OECD study. Russian regional governments have developed
cooperative relations with border states, and play a significant role in environmental cooperation in their areas.\textsuperscript{76}

Of course these environmental security issues cannot be disentangled from other factors in international relations. The availability of government or private sector-backed financial investment from the international community typically hinges on political and economic considerations more than environmental consequences. But even if the toxic effect of a facility's pollution is not directly of concern to investors, the inefficiencies of wasted materials, the dysfunctions introduced because of increased occupational illness, the possibilities of dealing with local or transborder opposition, and the uncertainties of operating in violation of national standards are all pertinent concerns for investors, whether they be private investors or other governments.

Both Russia and NATO should be interested in increasing technical assistance, particularly when it can be accomplished by sharing already-developed research and tools. Under the CCMS (Committee on Challenges of Modern Society), NATO has conducted significant research pertaining to environmental protection that could benefit Russia. Assisting Russia is in keeping with CCMS's stated belief that cooperation on the environment is a tool for both environmental improvement and peace. A 1999 CCMS study counsels a comprehensive effort “to integrate environmental concerns into all other policy areas and relevant institutions and contexts in order to at least manage, if not prevent, the security impacts of environmental stress.”\textsuperscript{77} But how far can NATO go in helping Russia address its environmental problems? NATO is at root a military alliance. Some (similar to domestic critics of the “greening” of the military) judge that the structures of NATO are not well suited for, or capable of, addressing nontraditional (‘soft’) security tasks, including environmental challenges. Military institutions must be restructured and reoriented to address these newer concerns. U.S. defense leaders do seem to intend such a shift in NATO, from defense of territory to defense of common interests, defined to include elements beyond NATO territory. Even at that, collective security organizations, built on the nation-state, may be ill fitted to resolve environmental challenges, many of which are transnational in character.\textsuperscript{78} CCMS reasons that because there is a close relationship between environmental problems and security risks, a reality insufficiently appreciated in the past, cooperative ventures to address environmental problems should be used as a tool to prevent conflicts and to reduce security risks.\textsuperscript{79} How flexible NATO can become, without totally diluting the organizational framework and perhaps undermining its strength, has yet to be seen.

The Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation (AMEC) agreement, signed in 1996 by Russia, Norway, and the United States, is meant to foster sustainable military use of the Arctic region. The EPA led an initial project, the construction of a prototype storage facility for spent and damaged fuel assemblies from nuclear powered vessels. A Department of State effort, the Northern European Initiative, in cooperation with Norway, Finland, and Sweden, is seeking to better integrate Russia into the western international community. Under this umbrella, the United States proposed helping Russia develop a safe-cask technology for storing spent nuclear fuel now under civilian control. The European Union together with Norway, Sweden, and Finland started the effort in 1998. Fuels now sitting in the two ships off Murmansk will be safely stored when the project is completed.\textsuperscript{80} Russia participates with
seven other countries in the Arctic Council; the Council has an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, and members have exchanged information for surveys, assessments, and scientific analysis.\(^8^1\)

Russian openness about environmental threats might be an important factor in the coming years, as discussed earlier in the paper. Openness will, for the West, have legitimate substantive as well as symbolic significance. However, some powerful factions in Russian will undoubtedly oppose openness, both out of parochial interests relating to the internal power balance, but also out of fear that the West will try to use information gained in the name of environmental assistance for strategic purposes, to the longer-term detriment of Russian global power and influence. To complicate the equation further, Western nations are more likely to recognize their own interests in, and marshal domestic support for, addressing problems related to nuclear waste or chemical weapons destruction than in those related to nonmilitary problems. In knowing this, as surely they must, Russian leaders are faced with the same need to maintain a delicate balance as Norway: how to stimulate enough fear to receive assistance without creating unacceptable fear about purchasing Russian exports or investing in Russian enterprises. But they face another difficult dilemma—whether to seek funding for these domestically sensitive matters, since nuclear and weapons issues are more likely to garner Western support, rather than seeking assistance for other pressing pollution problems that do not raise security hackles internally. Openness is likely to be an essential element to encourage investors to risk money in underwriting new, cleaner technologies and expensive cleanup operations. But some kinds of cooperative ventures will draw heavy criticism in Russia, and could fuel a debate that would be used by neo-nationalists, communists, and conspiracy theorists to feed irrational fear for political purposes. The alternative, a retreat into secrecy and suppression of dissent, will repel Western help, making environmental crisis more likely and fuel chances for a more extremist government, or perhaps political collapse.

A policy of openness and international cooperation has more promise, and should be encouraged. It is not unprecedented in recent Russian/Soviet policy. The former Soviet Union, and now Russia, has supported international environmental goals and agreements. In fact, the Soviet government was quicker than the U.S. government in several cases to promote international cooperative actions and endorse environmental treaties.\(^8^2\) Because it was in their self-interest to do so is not suspicious; nations typically act within a range of perceived self-interest. The United States and Russia have cooperated in addressing the climate change issue. Russia is more enthusiastic about the carbon reductions in the Kyoto Protocol than is the United States. Significant opposition exists in the United States because of the huge estimated domestic costs for meeting the reduction goals. The Russians would be able to sell excess reduction credits because their severe economic downturn has resulted in reduced emissions there. Russia signed over 30 bilateral agreements and ratified over 25 regional multilateral, agreements on environmental protection in the 1990s. In addition to those already mentioned, the United States and Russia have joined in numerous environmental projects, such as air and water quality control at Lake Baikal, sustainable forestry, biodiversity conservation, management of nature reserves, and environmental education. Nordic countries and the European Union have worked with Russia not only on nuclear cleanup, but on a wide range of environmental issues, including hazardous waste
management, energy conservation, and waste water treatment. Russia has cooperated with OECD countries, and signed an agreement with OECD in 1994, on implementing environmental policies compatible with market-based economies. As noted earlier, Russia signed the Start II Treaty in 1992. It is expected that Russia will sign the London Dumping Convention of 1972 once the low level radioactive waste facilities are fully operational. It would support long-term international stability and natural resource maintenance, and therefore serve both U.S. and Russian national security interests, to encourage continued cooperation toward the accomplishment of global environmental goals.

**Example Situation: Caspian Sea Oil**

Issues and options for development of Caspian Sea oil illustrate some of the complex ways in which environmental security is intertwined with economic and traditional military concerns and objectives for Russia and its potential allies. What is at stake? From a geopolitical perspective, Russia has a strong interest in maintaining its hegemonic influence in its own back yard and minimizing Western influence.

Developing the production of Caspian Sea oil could further strengthen alliances with former Soviet states. Of course, mishandling the negotiations could further alienate Russia’s neighbors. From an economic and strategic standpoint, Russia will want to maximize its ability to control these valuable oil resources and advance the interests of its own oil companies. For these same reasons, Russia has to favor using and expanding its existing infrastructure for transporting oil. Russia should support development that will preserve and protect other resources—for example, their fisheries, particularly sturgeon. Safe extraction and transport processes should therefore be a priority, though neither an underwater pipeline nor shipping across the Black Sea is without environmental risk.

Turkey has raised strong objections to further clogging traffic at the Bosporus, which has suffered a number of major environmental disasters with the expansion of ship traffic. Turkey has responded by issuing more stringent rules for transport through the Straits. Russia has an interest in minimizing Turkish involvement and avoiding confrontation at the Bosporus. The fact that Turkey is a strong Western ally would surely confirm concerns about enhancing their role.

The former Soviet states involved in the oil negotiations have similarly complicated and perhaps not entirely compatible issues to juggle. They want to keep on friendly relations with Russia, but have an interest in a developing balance of power in the region to give them more autonomy—but without antagonizing Russia. Ethnic and religious minority disputes must be a factor in policymaking in any of these states, because of the tensions that exist within their artificially created borders. Tensions have already broken out into violence in several places as one group or another won ascendancy domestically and then struggled to establish stable regimes. Corruption has been another barrier to establishing international independence and trust. These states cannot underwrite the large capital investments...
themselves, so they seek reliable financial backing externally without jeopardizing their independence. They then want to maximize extraction and transport efficiency in the future.

The West is also a player because Western nations and companies will be the source of finance capital. Multinational companies competing among themselves and with regional companies, will not necessarily promote the national goals of any Western nation. But they have many interests in common with Western governments. A pipeline through Iran is attractive to companies, for example, but not to the U.S. government. The U.S. government has encouraged exploration and investment because this venture would provide access to critical resources and act as a wedge to balance Russian power in the region while furthering our ties with the former Soviet states. This goal must be tempered by a recognition of Russia's undeniable regional and financial interests in the Caspian. By promoting the financial interests of Western companies, the United States would gain a vested interest in these important strategic resources. The Caspian oil reserves are very large, but not nearly as extensive as those in the Persian Gulf. It is not likely they can ever provide more than a marginal alternative—but in any case, this source has its own political and strategic complications. The United States will also be watching out for Turkish interests, especially as they might compete with Iranian interests and help promote Azerbaijan independence.

Finally, the United States will seek to influence choices so as to avoid routes through areas with strong rebel or terrorist components. This would simultaneously present strategic and environmental threats, leaving the oil and the pipeline route hostage to various unruly forces and the vagaries of unsettled domestic struggles.

Long oil routes are essential to market the oil from the geographically isolated area. Competing oil routes of course represent a control issue. The routes that entail graver danger of oil spills, fires, pilfering, or terrorist attacks pose environmental as well as political and economic risks. Terrorist attack anywhere along the routes would create spillover effects far beyond the site. Concerns about ruptured pipelines across the vast expanses under the Black Sea or between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean are both environmental and financial considerations. Weighing the various interests involves geopolitical and strategic calculations but also ecological factors. The point is not that environmental factors should be foremost in strategic assessments or decisions. The fact is that ecological factors are a part of each nation's strategic concerns, with long-term, even permanent, implications for future generations. These issues, including environmental consequences, are part of any rational analysis of issues and options.

Conclusions

The perspective promoted by the terminology of environmental security is not a call to abandon national needs, nor to assess issues and choices separately from traditional strategic and economic approaches. Rather, it offers a warning to take a more holistic and longer-term perspective, and to consider an added set of elements. It has the benefit of focusing attention on issues of mutual concern that require collaboration, rather than concentrating on what
separates states. It provides, minimally, a different window on the same complex reality for national security analysis.  

Significant issues and problems continue to limit progress on critical environmental threats. How will these non-traditional threats shape Russian threat perceptions and their response in shaping a future force structure? Considering the dire environmental conditions, the widespread reports of toxins that can damage immune and nervous systems, the falling birth rates, the falling life expectancy rates, the rising mortality and birth defects rates, and increased rates of disease among the population—it is reasonable to fear not only catastrophic strains on key natural resources but also on Russia's human resource base. Given the myriad problems facing the military (serious economic, ethnic, and morale challenges, for example), if they also face a diminishing pool of healthy young men, it could threaten the viability of their military force structure. If Russia perceives its largest internal threat to be the collapse of important ecological resources and continued deterioration of public health from imprudent and nonsustainable practices, it might be interested in expanding cooperative arrangements for cleanup and the adoption of less polluting technologies.

Internationally, both the United States and Russia have embraced some cooperative action to preserve global environmental resources. Russia broke with its practice of secrecy and suspicion to seek help from the West to manage some of its highly toxic materials. These cooperative arrangements with former enemies must be particularly difficult as they also constitute a blow to Russia's national pride. Western nations, including the United States, have recognized their self-interest, and made offers to assist in addressing chemical demilitarization and containment of nuclear materials, and to provide financial and technical aid for many pressing environmental problems. Consequently, Russia has reaped large benefits from Western assistance across a broad set of environmental issues.

Substantial progress for Russia is far from assured, however. Even if there was massive and effectively targeted assistance, the sheer size and scope of the problems are daunting. In the current climate, investors are not confident about whom to trust and how to secure agreements. The domestic economic and political situation is in turmoil, and investments cannot be reasonably assured, so government and private sector investors are cautious about risking the very large investments that significant environmental progress will require. At multiple levels serious inadequacies discourage investors, including concerns about the stability of the political system, the lack of a reliable banking system and clear property entitlements, and pervasive control by mobsters, who appear to be connected throughout the political, military, and economic power structures. It is difficult to have sufficient trust in individuals or current institutions to embark upon multi-year funding for important undertakings. And those controlling the funding for complex projects are said to lack the competence to provide adequate oversight. Another aspect of this situation is that Western governments often require projects in Russia to have extensive assessments or planning conducted by Western companies, which depletes most of the money. Because Russia's post-Soviet government is decentralized, it might not be feasible to deal with the central government to assess and manage projects. As noted earlier, at least some of the regional governments have been addressing environmental problems. But governments, whether
central or regional, have a difficult tension between attention to underlying problems and concentrating on more immediate relief and interim solutions.

Finding knowledgeable, trustworthy officials who will maintain enduring authority and policy continuity is perhaps not a reasonable goal. The assurances investors will expect might seem too invasive in the still emerging nation—and internal risks for making assurances to former enemies might be too high domestically. The military has already suffered a significant social and political loss of power and prestige. They will be sensitive to perceived national humiliation in the name of environmental/public health improvements, particularly regarding those issues that touch upon their own mismanagement or excess. There are those who want the public to believe that contamination of the north and east seas is largely anti-Russian propaganda; they are undoubtedly poised to oppose the perceived threat of further losses to pride and status. Western governments are torn between using investments to sway factions toward moderation, or waiting until they have some assurance that neo-nationalists, communists, or militarists will not dominate nationally. It is a delicate balance; but waiting for moderate forces to prevail before offering assistance might give further ideological ammunition to those who seek military solutions to perceived problems of power loss.

The Russian military is likely to be cautious about cooperative arrangements. Given the serious environmental problems, however, it is possible that some will see cooperative ventures as a reasonable way to solve some otherwise unmanageable problems, and a way to safeguard scarce financial resources for defense rather than public projects. The military might welcome, or at least remain neutral about, involvement with the West in arenas where current defense issues and past defense sins are not relevant. Recent moves to attack and silence those revealing nuclear contamination information would seem to indicate that key military leaders are likely to exert heavy influence to prevent disclosures that would implicate the defense establishment in serious damage to the nation, or by inference to prevent being held accountable for ultimately injurious actions it deemed in the national interest.

U.S. and NATO policies over the past decade to share information and build relations (military-to-military programs) with nations of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact could provide a bridge for a broader range of cooperative efforts. The more open NATO appears to be, the less threatening it should appear to the Russians. Programs for environmental protection—for example, detection and cleanup techniques for hazardous waste sites used in Hungary and other former Eastern bloc nations at abandoned Soviet military installations—might provide an excellent mechanism for improving relations between east and west. Global environment issues such as greenhouse gases, ozone depletion, and CFC phaseout, although difficult to resolve, can provide arenas for cooperative problem-solving that go beyond individual state needs and strategies. If Russia can earn carbon “credits” that it can sell to acquire much needed funds, it will make dealing with the West on these kinds of issues all the more attractive. If the Russian defense establishment can achieve a reasonable level of confidence that the West is not a significant strategic threat to its sphere of influence, it can save its already crippled economy the massive defense expenditures which rivalry requires. These funds can be diverted to other critical needs. The
military is more likely to support peaceful collaboration if it receives assurances; these same assurances would help moderate voices prevail over the neo-nationalists.

Western assistance from private or government sources should be tied to a framework of accountability. The West should be explicit about minimum requirements and expectations. Western nations, for instance, should warn against having their assistance result in a further diversion of Russia’s GNP toward enhancing military force structure rather than addressing socio-economic or environmental needs. This same logic would advise against using available resources under NATO to support military capabilities in East Europe, both because of the need to reassure Russia and as a way to focus Western resources on the more important ecological problems in the former Eastern bloc nations. Similarly, the West should practice restraint in pursuing influence in the former Soviet states, including how it pursues oil interests in the Caspian Sea area. Mechanisms such as the Partnership for Peace and the CCMS might be effective tools for collaborative efforts, despite NATO affiliation, as they have a non-military focus and are therefore not as provocative. Support should concentrate on specific agreements with clear objectives, which means that progress will at best be slow and incremental. Projects addressing regional and local problems might prove more attractive in several ways in that they are less likely to involve high political stakes, could minimize national security fears and rhetoric, and increase the chances for continuity of leadership. Where feasible, regional and local definitions of problems and accountability for solving them are probably more reliable than dealing with transient national politicians. Projects that do not rely on high technology solutions will be more affordable and transferable. Some issues, such as safe disposal of spent nuclear materials, are necessarily negotiated at the national level. In any case, public health needs will undoubtedly continue to put grave pressure on the system. It will be very difficult to channel scarce resources to systemic improvements while funds are lacking to help people suffering from deteriorating health conditions. However, long-term environmental stability requires that attention be given to underlying conditions and practices.

If U.S. and West European support is based on assurances that Russia will not divert its own resources more lopsidedly to military expenditures, Russia’s willingness and ability to do this will depend not only on plausible Western assurances that the West poses no threat, but also on Russia’s security vis-à-vis regional issues and concerns. Regional threats will, of course, shape Russian threat perceptions, and consequently their future force structure planning. Russia’s legitimate concern for stability in former Soviet states will continue to require military outlays, including helping these states patrol their borders and deploying a credible force to prevent or combat insurgent forces. Is China a potential threat? Surely Russia should not assume that its long border with China can go untended—particularly since China is overcrowded and the neighboring part of Russia has vast expanses that are very sparsely populated. This potentially tense situation will only worsen if Russia continues to sell military technology to China. The West cannot afford to leave Russia in a position such that its most attractive option is to help increase the military strength of its massive and emerging neighbor to the south. Attention to environmental factors will not compete well against border defense and ethnic conflicts. Further, if Russia is now openly considering the adoption of tactical nuclear weapons as a viable option for conventional war in regional theaters, one has to wonder whether it will also re-embrace chemical weapons as a
reasonable, more affordable alternative for defense. While the West cannot determine this
dynamic, it can pursue policies that attempt to reduce tensions rather than encouraging
Russia’s political or economic isolation.

The history of the Soviet state and its legacy in Russia highlights the importance of
environmental integrity as a substratum of fiscal and human resources. Security concerns
drove Stalinist Russia to undertake Herculean efforts to modernize and secure its national
defenses, at incalculable cost to the people and ecology. The long-term ecological bankruptcy
of these policies is evident. But environmental policies in general and cleanup in particular
will have to be integrated into Russian priorities without totally abandoning these
modernization and defense goals. While environmental problems are not, and will not
become, the driving force in Russian domestic or international policy, they are an unavoidable
reality and will set limits on the future of the Russian state. We need to encourage those
forces which recognize the need to concentrate national resources on restabilizing the
ecological foundations of the state. The West must see this as a political and diplomatic as
well as a technical challenge. The effort needed to address the corrosive sources of
environmental deterioration could parallel the incredible determination marshaled by the
Russian people during Soviet industrialization.

Endnotes

1. See Lynton K. Caldwell, In Defense of Earth: International Protection of the Biosphere (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1972). Caldwell wrote a number of other important works in subsequent years, urging
that we refocus our definition of security, and realign our policies, to take environmental realities into account.

2. World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), Our Common Future
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). The Commission concluded that an environmental crisis exists, one
that threatens national security and even human survival. It cautioned that this crisis has no military
solutions. See especially pp. 29-30.

3. In 1969, NATO created the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) as a forum for
cooperation on transboundary environmental issues. NATO is “increasingly concerned with non-traditional
threats to security, including the consequences of environmental change.” In late 1995, members decided to
conduct a study to summarize current knowledge on the links between environment and security. They noted
that “man-made environmental degradation, resource depletion, and natural disasters may have direct
implications for the security of the international community, and that a comprehensive threat assessment, a
risk analysis, as well as a prioritization of risks to international security were needed to address these
1999, pp. 1, 4; hereafter cited as “CCMS Report.”

4. See, e.g., Thomas Homer-Dixon et al., “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: A Debate,”
Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew, eds., Contested Grounds (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999) discuss the
adequacy of the environmental security concept in several chapters. For a clear and interesting categorization
of various positions about environmental security, see Stacy D. Van Deveer and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, “Redefining
225-229.
5. See, e.g., The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, which recognizes the importance of a healthy environment for a healthy economy, and further, that the stress of environmental challenges “is already contributing to political conflict.” It names addressing environmental degradation among our strategic principles for the 21st century. Ambassador Mark G. Hambley, in a speech at the National Defense University (NDU), August 8, 1996, noted that “the importance of the environment to the health and well-being of each and every one of us has come to be recognized as a key priority for governments, both domestically and internationally.” He cited a speech by then Secretary of State Warren Christopher, April 9, 1996, in which Christopher stressed that “our ability to advance our global interests is inextricably linked to how we manage the Earth’s natural resources.” Christopher embraced the importance of integrating environmental goals into US diplomacy. In addition to several speeches articulating this position, he sent a memorandum to all Under and Assistant Secretaries on this matter, specifying areas in which they should enhance efforts to achieve this goal. See “Official Statements and Documents,” Environmental Change and Security Project Report, cited in n.4, Issue 2, pp. 77-80. The Defense Department now has a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security. At the August 8, 1996, NDU workshop, the principal assistant to this Under Secretary emphasized the view of environmental security as “defending our future”; he presented his vision to “transform the militaries of the world into environmentally sensitive organizations,” and outlined a principle of peace and stability through enhancing the quality of life and of the environment. Gary D. Vest, “Environmental Security: International Activities,” presentation at NDU workshop, August 8, 1996. For a more recent statement see Kurt M Lietzmann and Gary D. Vest, “Environmental Security in an International Context: Executive Summary Report,” Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Issue 5 (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999). See, “Official Statements and Documents,” cited above in this note, for statements about environmental policies by other officials.

6. Though the United States never corrupted its resource base in a way comparable to the Soviet Union, our own legacy of contamination and even illegal activities in the name of defense have resulted in human injury and left very sizable and expensive environmental cleanup problems. The US government budget recognizes cleanup responsibility. In 1970 there was no environmental budget within the military. By fiscal year 1994, DOD had a $5.9 billion environmental budget with about 10,000 environmental professionals. By 1999, even with closing installations and reduced budgets, DOD’s environmental budget was about $4.2 billion, with about 8,000 environmental professionals. See Gary Vest, “U.S.—Russian Military Cooperation on the Environment,” in Geoffrey D. Dabelko and D.J. Peterson, eds., The Toxic Legacy of the Cold War in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press, forthcoming).

7. Kent H. Butts, “Why the military is good for the environment,” Green Security or Militarized Environment (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1994). Butts and other commentors have suggested various kinds of contributions the military can make beyond a better maintenance of lands and stewardship of materials. The military directs a large and sophisticated research component. This expertise might be directed toward pollution prevention and mitigation, finding new ways to reduce the footprint of the military, whether it is technologies for armaments, training activities, or the purchase, storage, and handling of materials on an installation. Defense Department expertise might be employed for assessment and cleanup of hazardous sites. Military liaison and training could be particularly effective with counterparts in other countries. The military has already launched a sizable effort in military-to-military training and assistance on a bilateral and multilateral basis to reduce toxic impacts on the environment. Perhaps the most controversial role for the military is the use of peacekeeping forces to prevent or defuse environmental crises. While this deployment might prevent or contain some of the catastrophic consequences of environmental degradation, such as the mass movement of peoples or local conflicts, it is a seemingly endless set of tasks with high deployment costs and (often) uncertain objectives.


12. Effects of environmental pollutants are much more grave for children than studies on average adults indicate. Children should not be thought of as little adults; their bodies and susceptibilities are qualitatively different. Pesticides and other chemicals that the adult body tolerates can kill or do permanent damage to a child.


15. Ibid., p. 50.


17. There has been a series of dysentery and cholera epidemics in cities such as St. Petersburg. See CIA, “The Environmental Outlook in Russia,” [U] Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA 98-08), January 1999, p. 16; (hereafter cited as “CIA Report”). Typhoid outbreaks have occurred in Chechnya and other places, and there has been an increase in hepatitis A; both of these diseases are generally associated with contaminated water. See DIA, “Infectious Disease Risk Assessment: Russia, European (West of and Including the Ural Mountains),” [U] DI-1812-34-99, pp. 4 and 9; and DIA, “Environmental Health Risk Assessment: Russia, European (West of and Including the Ural Mountains),” [U] DI-1816-18-99, June 1999, p. 8.


19. CIA Report, pp. 2, 16-18. Deterioration of health nationwide might result in outbreaks of unfamiliar illnesses. For instance, the Oblivsiy District reported that children were being attacked by an unknown disease that affects soft brain tissues. They believed that the source was a substance used in treating wood, which triggered a virus. A food and swimming ban was put into effect. Sergey Trofimov, ITAR-TASS, July 16, 1999, trans. FBIS, Doc. ID: FTS19990716000401.

20. Feshbach and Friendly, pp. 8-9. Current reports from the Russian press are alarming; but they provide only a spotty picture and therefore are not generalizable. A study conducted in Gatchina Rayon by the state public health center reported an increase in deaths of more than 25 percent between 1991 and 1996, with a dropping birth rate during the same period. L. Grigoryeva, “Ecology, Safety, Life,” Gatchinaskaya Pravda, March 30, 1991, trans. FBIS, Doc. ID: FTS19990507001337.

21. Uzbekistan seems unable or unwilling to change its self-destructive cotton farming, upon which the area now depends, but which has sucked life from the sea and a vast area. Kazakhstan has decided to attempt recovery of part of the northern shore area by building a large earthen dike to separate it from the rest of the sea. They hope to rebuild a portion of the precious resource.

22. Feshbach and Friendly, p. 113.

23. Feshbach and Friendly, pp. 113-114.


25. A DIA study states that in a 1996 countrywide test, 22 percent of the drinking water failed to meet government standards because of chemical contamination, and 9 percent failed with microbial contamination. DIA, “Environmental Health Risk Assessment: Russia, European” (see n. 17), p. 7. Another DIA study gives


27. For a summary of problems in various seas, see OECD, pp. 179-189.

28. E.g., DIA, “Infectious Disease Risk Assessment: Russia, European” (n. 17), p. 11, notes an increase of 36 percent in one infection from raw fish consumption in the Dneiper River watershed in the late 1980s. The infection has been found in other major rivers.


31. CIA Report, pp. 8-9. Feshbach and Friendly’s numbers are even more alarming. They reported that 68 cities regularly measure air pollution at 10 times or more the maximum level. And the residents, almost one-seventh of the population, have illness at 1.5-2 times or more than the national average. They noted that 125 cities have a 10-fold excess of maximum level of some pollutant, meaning that 40-50 million people are exposed to threat. Feshbach and Friendly, pp. 8, 201.

32. Feshbach and Friendly, p. 50.


34. Feshbach and Friendly, op. cit.: 2.

35. According to a Soviet Health Ministry study, there was a 68 percent increase in still births from 1980 to 1984 where pesticides were intensively used in Armenia. Feshbach and Friendly, pp. 2, 68-70. The 1999 CIA Report also notes that poor soil conditions are widespread, and soil is degraded due to the agricultural practices of overusing fertilizers and pesticides. See CIA Report, p. 13.

36. OECD, p. 57.

37. CIA Report, pp. 9-10.

38. CIA Report, p. 16.


41. Paula Garb, “Nuclear Environmental Attitudes and Activism in Chelyabinsk (Russia) and Hanford (the United States): More Similarities than Differences,” in Dabelko and Peterson. Thomas Nilsen asserts that every year Mayak releases into the local environment the equivalent of one-half of the radioactive contamination released by the Chernobyl accident. See Nilsen, “Naval Nuclear Waste Management in Northwest Russia,” in Dabelko and Peterson, eds.

42. FBIS trans. “Segodnia” newscast, Moscow NTV, August 26, 1999, FBIS Doc. ID: FTS19990826000306. This report attacked the Atomic Energy minister for being involved in financial intrigues with the nuclear industry; he was also said to be the one responsible for the design of the Chernobyl plant. The justification of income for waste handling was deemed short-sighted, for this scheme would bring “a huge burden of financial and economic problems that will haunt us for dozens, hundreds, and even thousands of years.”

44. DIA, “Environmental Health Risk Assessment: Russia, Central,” p. 8.

45. A physicist (Soyfer) previously arrested for his disclosures, reported that there has been a 60-fold increase of nuclear contamination at the bottom of the Chazhma Bay in the Sea of Japan, but that in general levels in the Sea of Japan are significantly lower than in the Barents and Northern Seas. The scientist also noted that a submarine which sank in the Sea of Japan in August 1985, 9 months before Chernobyl, could have provided a warning if it had not been kept secret. Chernobyl had levels 10 million times higher than the Sea of Japan. “Scientist Warns of Bay’s Nuclear Contamination,” trans. FBIS, Doc. ID: FTS19990813001074, from Moscow RIA News Agency, August 13, 1999.

46. Russia began radioactive waste dumping at sea in 1959 and continued until the 1990s. Reactor parts and spent nuclear fuel probably pose the greatest danger. Multiple reactors have been dumped in various coastal waters, with and without fuel; more than 17 ships containing radioactive waste and other contaminated items were sunk off shore. Russia has been open about this dumping; the claim is that there has been no dumping since 1993. See OECD, p. 183. Over 130 nuclear-powered submarines are no longer in active service; some are partially dismantled. None of these has been decommissioned responsibly, in full compliance with requirements. Their conditions are not exactly known, but they are deteriorating. See Thomas Nilsen.

47. Nilsen.

48. DIA, “Environmental Health Risk Assessment: Russia, European,” p. 8; and “Environmental Health Risk Assessment: Russia, Far Eastern,” DI-1816-19-99, June 1999, p. 8. There are also waste sites on land, such as the abandoned factory for cobalt manufacturing. The site has radioactive cesium-137; water contamination is posing health threats, including the loss of teeth. “Disused Cobalt Factory Still Causing Pollution,” trans. FBIS, Doc. ID: FTS19990808000342, from Kirill Pozdnyakov, Moscow NTV, August 8, 1999. EPA, p. 4.

49. The human effects are chilling; the death rate in Kazakhstan is still growing. For a consideration of some of these data, see Kaisha Atakhanova and Gabdolla Kulkebayev, “Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Testing: Public Health and Citizen Activism in Kazakhstan,” in Dabelko and Peterson.

50. Lev A. Fedorov, “Implications of Chemical Weapons Production, Storage, and Destruction in the Former Soviet Union,” in Dabelko and Peterson. Fedorov presents a useful and clear account of these important issues.

51. CIA Report, pp. 18-19. The localized harm includes hurting and killing some commercial fishermen, who came in contact with leaking munitions. Russian TV announced that 40,000 tons of toxic agents are stored in Russia. By treaty, destruction was scheduled to start by the end of 1999, but only 1.7 percent funding was allocated. Regional leaders were upset by the situation and expected the federal government to do more. “Chemical Weapon Stockpile Headache for Russian Regions,” trans. FBIS, Doc. ID: FATS, from the “Military Secret” program on Moscow RenTV, October 14, 1999. Abandoned munitions are also a problem at a number of facilities in Russia; e.g., a minefield was found in the Murmansk regions, and has not been fully cleaned up or secured: “Many Explosives Found at Former Murmansk Military Base,” trans. FBIS, Doc. ID: FTS19991005001098, from Moscow NTV, October 4, 1999.

52. Fedorov; and Jennifer Adibi, “Citizen Activism on Chemical Weapons Issues in Russia and Implications for the United States,” in Dabelko and Peterson.


54. CIA Report, p. 2.

55. OECD, pp. 50-51. By comparison, the United States founded the Environmental Protection Agency and started developing a comprehensive set of laws in the 1970s.
56. OECD, pp. 44-45.

57. See, e.g., OECD, p. 80. In discussing licenses for water use (extraction and waste water discharges), which each enterprise is required to have, OECD found that “Out of a total of some 54,000 water users, 37,000 have received licenses or confirmation of their licensee’s rights.... In 1996, about 15,000 compliance inspections were carried out and 13,980 violations were identified.... In many cases, waste water discharge permits are based on pollutant concentration, thus leading to greater water use in order to dilute the pollutants.”

58. A recurring issue in the United States over the past decade or more is whether the EPA should have cabinet status. It is instructive to note that, after several years of intense debate and maneuvering, the issue was abandoned, largely because of a Congress hostile to the leadership and policies of the Agency. Nonetheless, hostile political forces have not been able to significantly undermine funding for the U.S. EPA. Despite its second-class status within the ranks of federal agencies, the EPA has continued to have powerful leverage through its work force, its underlying statutes, and funding levels to carry out the responsibilities. This has not been the case in Russia, where national legal requirements lack the fiscal or political backing to implement and enforce them.


60. CIA Report, pp. 16, 18.

61. See, e.g., T. Izotova, “Pay for Fresh Air,” Ozerskiy Vestinik, Feb. 3, 1999, trans. FBIS, Doc. ID: FTS19990506001574. This article reports that the legal principle that polluter pays for exploitation of natural resources is routinely ignored over 50-60% of the time. The writer also notes several problems of vanishing, abused resources in his city area, including forest depletion, contamination of water resources, lack of sewage treatment, and an inadequate city dump.


63. A renowned physicist, specializing in oceanography, was arrested and charged with treason, his passport revoked, and apartment searched, because he was active with a foreign environmental organization. The Defense Ministry had stopped financial support for the Pacific Ocean Institute, where he conducted research, but it continued, at least in part because of cooperation with Americans. A Russian official admitted in an article that there is “a tendency to expose so-called ‘environmental campaigners’ who pass on information about Russian territories polluted by nuclear and chemical waste.” His article is clearly critical of the government’s action and seems suspicious that any laws really were violated. Oleg Zhunusov and Yekaterina Glebova, “The Case of the 'Environmentalists,'” Izvestia, July 14, 1999, (also covered in ITAR-TASS), from FBIS, Doc. ID: FTS19990713001255. See also “Case of Environmentalist Soyfer Detailed,” in FBIS, Doc. ID: FTS19990715000376, trans. from Moscow Segodnya, July 14, 1999.

64. See Vest, in Dabelko and Peterson.

65. E.g., Jennifer Adibi.

66. OECD, p. 174. For example, municipal and industrial waste waters travel to the Baltic Sea; four paper mills near Kaliningrad alone release 4 million cubic meters of untreated waste water per year. Industrial and municipal waste and agricultural runoff have heavily polluted the Black Sea; see p. 179.


68. OECD, p. 175.
69. Cited in VanDeveer and Dabelko, “Redefining Security Around the Baltic,” p. 231. This article discusses a broader array of regional environmental security issues relating to Russia and the Baltic states.


73. The Plan of Action focuses on nuclear safety improvements, economic incentives for increasing business contacts with Russia, increasing military-to-military contacts and cooperation, and closer political cooperation. See Sverre Stub, “International Assistance: Opportunities and Stumbling Blocks,” in Geoffrey D. Dabelko and D.J. Peterson.

74. EPA, p. 3. Japan paid about $20 million to finance a processing plant for low-level liquid radioactive waste in Russia’s Far East; see OECD, p. 184.


76. OECD, p. 174.

77. CCMS Report, p. 151. “There is a need to intensify efforts in order to address environmental stress, its consequences, and their impact on the potential incidence or escalation of conflict.”

78. Dabelko and VanDeveer, “European Insecurities,” pp. 177-190.


80. EPA, p. 4-5.

81. OECD, p. 176.

82. Michael Renner discussed some of the actions showing promise for future cooperation in security-related matters. Going back to the 1950s, the Soviets initiated cooperative agreements for restraint among nuclear powers, which helped lead to a limited test ban treaty in the 1960s. In the 1980s, Gorbachev instituted unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing and some weapons, reduced force size, and announced the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles—which the United States did not quickly reciprocate. See Renner, “National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions,” Worldwatch Paper 89 (May 1989), pp. 53-55.

83. OECD, pp. 200-201. In 1998, there were 174 international projects addressing Russia’s radioactive waste. A Task Force under the Barents Council counted more than 250 projects underway in the Murmansk, Arkangelsk, and Karelia areas alone. Also in 1998, Japan was considering 20 joint projects and studies costing billions of dollars to improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gases; pp. 184-196.
86. “The environmental security issue of scarce energy resources is nowhere more complicated than in the Caspian Basin, where other environmental variables influence the exploration, production, and transport of oil throughout this ethnically, regionally, and politically diverse region.” Kent Butts and Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., eds., Caspian Sea International Environmental Security Game, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, 1991): p. 2.

87. For example, in the early 1990s, Kazakhstan attracted significant Western investments, up to about 40% of all coming into the former Soviet republics. But the complex dependencies on Russia, government corruption, and failure to develop privatization programs, all discouraged investors by the mid-1990s. This in turn hampers Kazakhstan’s ability to develop domestic industries. They are using oil to entice Western investment. See Crowe, pp. 413-14.

88. Iran, which also borders on the Sea, is a very active player in the negotiations. Like Turkey, Iran is a major regional player which was not part of the former Soviet sphere. Iran seeks to gain a strong role in the Caspian oil market to secure both its financial and strategic interests in this region.

89. The United States will probably seek to diminish Iranian involvement for ideological reasons, even if that provides a less attractive solution from an economic or environmental perspective. But seeking to deal with Iran is still possible, and might open a path to better relations.

90. The Caspian is the largest inland body of water in the world; it contains over 40 percent of the world’s fresh lake water. Development itself will exact big environmental costs separate from the routes selected. Harvesting the resource will involve substantial pollution; but there will also be stresses brought by the parallel increase in human activities that accompany oil production and distribution operations. Parts of the Caspian Basin are already experiencing degradation. The Volga, e.g., is discharging contaminated waters into the Sea, and the water quality has been declining. The current rising of the Sea level and consequent coastal inundation is another factor damaging surrounding ecologies. See Butts and Bradshaw, pp. 34-72.

91. As Sverre Stub of Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has written, “We want to demonstrate that giving higher priority to long-term environmental needs and to sustainable development also contributes to social and economic development, to democracy, and to regional stability and reduced tension....Cooperation in the environmental field as well as in political arenas contributes to confidence-building and is a stabilizing factor within and among nations.” See Stub, “International Assistance: Opportunities and Stumbling Blocks,” in Geoffrey D. Dabelko and D.J. Peterson.

92. By 1999, there had been over 70 environmental projects or activities between the U.S. military and former Soviet and Warsaw pact states. See Vest, in Dabelko and Peterson.
Do Russian Federation Health and Demography Matter in the Revolution in Military Affairs?

Theodore Karasik

Introduction

The Russian Federation (RF) is in the middle of a health and demography crisis, and the consequences for the Russian military have been and will continue to be enormous. Environmental problems inherited from Soviet times lurk behind much of the current public health problem. Radioactive contamination is rife at several defense and military industrial sites throughout the Russian Federation. Chemical contamination by dioxin is largely to blame for the decline in life expectancy for both sexes. There also is an interrelated and unprecedented surge in infectious and parasitic diseases that, when combined with existing high levels of alcohol poisoning, drug abuse, and violent death, is contributing to a lowered life expectancy. The Russian population will decline by 800,000 to a million people a year until 2010, when the total may be no more than 138 million. Alcoholism, drug abuse, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), malnutrition, and various chronic and infectious diseases may result in a third of the adult population becoming infertile. The incidence of tuberculosis (TB) in Russia is skyrocketing, as is the number of HIV and AIDS cases. The growing number of Russian AIDS cases reflects a sharp rise in sexual promiscuity and hard-drug abuse that reaches into the armed forces. Several questions must be asked: How sick will the population be in subsequent years? Will the Russian population be able to have children? Will their offspring also be sick? These are key questions in understanding the future social and economic health of the Russian Federation as an economic and geopolitical power.

But these questions also relate to whether falling health and demographic statistics will affect the Russian armed forces in the near future. So much of the shrinking Russian population may soon be so ill that long-term solutions to military problems will be inconceivable. This raises a number of questions: What kind of troops will Moscow have if they are not only smaller in number and physical size but suffering from serious illnesses? How can Russian health and demography affect Moscow’s ability to think about the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)? These questions are a fundamental component in understanding Russia’s ability to organize, train, and equip a reliable military force for the foreseeable future.

The Decline In Russian Health And Demographic Trends, 1990-2015

In the mid-1990s, the population of Russia was 148.3 million. By 2015 it is expected to be as low as 138.4 million, and possibly even down to around 131 million. With more recent statistics and projections on fertility rates, the lower projection seems likely, especially
combined with higher mortality rates as tuberculosis and AIDS grow through 2005. On this trajectory, a projection of 80 million by 2050 is not out of the question. Population declines for the Russian armed forces would be enormous, affecting Russian policy in a number of ways by limiting capabilities to respond to internal and external security threats.

With the population declining at such rates, the health of each individual at the margin becomes even more important. With fewer children being born, the reproductive health of their mothers becomes the key for healthy offspring. The rates of major illnesses in the Russian Federation lead to more negative projections. Cancer and heart death rates for 15- to 19-year-olds are double the U.S. rates. For teens, suicides in Russia are also about double those of the United States. In addition, high rates of alcoholism and tobacco use among the entire population are likely to be a burden on a decaying public health system.

Russia’s shrinking population took its largest post-Soviet drop in 1999, with decreasing immigration on top of a surplus of deaths over births. The official population in 1999 was 145.6 million, down by 0.49 percent or 716,900 individuals during the first 11 months of 1999 compared to the same period in 1998. Besides extraordinarily high death rates and a low birth rate, decreasing immigration and an aging population are behind the latest phase in Russia’s health and demographic crisis. A total of 1,117,000 Russians were born from January through November of 1999, as against 1,953,000 deaths, while during the same period in 1998, 1,179,900 people were born as opposed to 1,815,100 deaths. Immigration to Russia, mainly from the Commonwealth of Independent States countries, slowed over 1998-1999. The flow of immigrants slid from 478,600 people during the first 11 months of 1998 to 341,500 people during the same period of 1999. The drop in the first 11 months of 1999 of 716,900 people, or 0.49 percent, was almost double the decrease of the same period in 1998 of 365,600 people. Clearly, this trend is not new, as Russia’s population was 148 million in 1990 and subsequently fell 0.02 percent in 1992, 0.2 percent in 1993, 0.04 percent in 1994, 0.2 percent in 1995, and 0.3 percent each in 1996, 1997 and 1998.

The Russian population is negatively affected by the trend of excess of deaths over births along with declining immigration from the near abroad. The official report states that births in the first five months of 1999 are much less than in the same period of 1998 (507,300 versus 531,100, respectively), that deaths in the first five months of 1999 are much more numerous than in the first half of 1998 (903,000 versus 844,400), and that net immigration is much less as well for these periods (53,300 versus 129,300). Thus, the net population growth in 1999 for the first five months was minus 342,400.

Overall, the demographic crisis in the Russian Federation serves not only as a brake on the radical transformation of the Russian armed forces, but it is also deeply rooted in the social fabric that reform by itself is unlikely to change. And this pattern—one very different from other countries—almost certainly will limit the ability of Russian society to reform the post-Soviet Russian army. The epidemiological situation will be difficult to reverse, but attempts to do so are being made by the MOD in traditional Russian ways. And health problems, reflected in both falling life expectancies and declining populations, might make it difficult for the Russian Federation to bounce back strategically.
Historical Health and Demographic Trends and the Russian Military

Of the approximately 10 RMAs and 18 major technological advances recorded in the history of warfare,\textsuperscript{12} health has played a role in determining the pace and scope of military manpower and technological innovation.\textsuperscript{13} Through these RMAs, armies with technological and organizational innovations who avoid large casualty rates succeeded only with strong, reliable, cunning recruits and soldiers.\textsuperscript{14} One way to measure Russia’s ability to cope with the demands of unhealthy soldiers is by exploring changes in military medical services in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries.

Only in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century did St. Petersburg try to establish medical care for unhealthy soldiers in the Imperial Russian Army because of major battlefield losses suffered from major changes in military knowledge. Nicholas I (1825-1855) introduced reforms in the military medical system that attempted to bring care to Russian soldiers, but these attempts failed. Only by the time of Alexander II (1855-1881) and General Miliutin’s reforms did military health care finally show an improvement. With the influx of trained medical personnel, the advantages of improved evacuation by rail, the designation of unit stretcher-bearers, and the creation of division-level field hospitals, wounded and sick soldiers stood a far better chance of survival than 20 years before. Yet, tainted drinking water and recurring difficulties with bad food and field hygiene created for troops a greater likelihood of falling ill than becoming a casualty in war.

Medical aid did counter large battlefield losses. In comparison with the Crimean War, the changes in medical aid to a sick and poorly trained military had improved dramatically. For instance, medical aid to the sick and wounded during the Russo-Turkish War from 1877 to 1878 was significantly better than in the Crimean War thanks to improved staff training, evacuation procedures, and field hospitals, thus allowing wounded soldiers a substantially higher chance of survivability. By the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, medical services during the Russo-Japanese war were the only organization that did not collapse during the campaign. The high death rates in the Imperial Russian armed forces were the result of the organization, economy, and training system of the army itself.\textsuperscript{15}

Under the Soviets, health care capabilities spread with the increasing state industrialization, which provided a steady stream of fresh recruits.\textsuperscript{16} The Soviet soldier, it was argued, was “a force to be reckoned with in world affairs” due to its formidable potential on the field of battle. Edward Luttwak offered a variant of this argument almost 15 years ago, when he warned readers against “delusions of soviet weakness.”

[D]runkenness is no doubt pervasive in the[ir] . . . armed forces. But the Russians have always been great drinkers. Drunk they defeated Napoleon, and drunk again they defeated Hitler’s armies and advanced all the way to Berlin.\textsuperscript{17}

Yet this objection, too, now appears overtaken by the scope of military revolution and change in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. It is clear that both the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet Russian Federation failed to develop innovative operational concepts despite increases in the capability to provide medical care in the field, particularly in World War II and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{18}
Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf and Operation Allied Force over Kosovo may have offered us glimpses of the next face of war: the hi-tech, information-intensive combat that drive today's debate on RMA. While a debilitated Russian populace is unlikely to support a revolution in military affairs, Russia as a nuclear power must muster the intellectual and physical strength to participate in technological advancements. In an ill country, raising the necessary soldiery and specialists to conduct nuclear and high-technology warfare may be a challenge in itself.\textsuperscript{19} Drunken soldiers may have succeeded in their European campaigns in the past, but they would fare rather less creditably today in electronic warfare and information operations. More important, though, a debilitated Russian populace will be hard-pressed to finance the expenditures and investments that a meaningful revolution in military affairs would demand, particularly in the defense industry.

If Russia cannot support a full-fledged revolution in military affairs in the next decades, it may still be able to field a large conventional force, a force that would perhaps enjoy overwhelming capabilities by comparison with a number of neighboring states or armed factions in the Russian Federation. But this type of an armed force would have little capacity for projecting military power far beyond its borders no matter how courageous or casualty-tolerant the Russians happened to be.\textsuperscript{20} According to Stephen Blank, successful adaptation to revolutionary military conditions requires not just advanced weapons, concepts, and tactics, but also advanced tools, people, and organizations to sustain them.\textsuperscript{21} Countering Professor Blank's arguments is James Kraska, who states, "For the most part, the presence of soldiers in areas of combat is becoming superfluous. The advent of high technology war has introduced weapons where destructive capacities utterly dwarf the strength of human soldiers, reducing heroism largely to statistical survival, and making the weapons themselves the decisive factor in military conflicts."\textsuperscript{22} Kraska's argument may be wrong since technologies, especially information operations, demand greater competence and stamina from human operators. Military success depends on soldiers that are healthy and developing physically in a normal manner. As the Russian Federation delays in fixing the health of their forces, the more its forces will fail to function in modern warfare.

\textbf{Growth in Adolescent Health Problems: 1990 - 2005}

At the start of 1998, there were 19.2 million adolescents in the Russian Federation accounting for 13.1 percent of the population. They represent the generation of Russians born in the period of the highest birth rate (1980-1987) of the last 35 years. In the immediate future these adolescents will be responsible for an increase in the number of people of working age and for the population's rejuvenation. By the start of 2006 the number of 16-29 year olds will increase by 3.4 million compared to 1998, or by 11.6 percent, and their share of the entire able population will increase by 1.6 percent to 36.1 percent. At the same time, a gradual decrease in the number of adolescents will begin, and continue up to 2013. During this time adolescents will decrease from 10.7 million persons to 8.5 million persons (21 percent).\textsuperscript{23}

Morbidity involving temporary and permanent incapacitation is growing in the Russian Federation. The frequency of initial certification of disability reached 91 per 10,000 adults in
1995, compared to 50.5 in 1985 and 77.8 in 1993. In 1998 this trend not only persisted but intensified. Growth of morbidity and disability in children is especially troubling. Morbidity has grown by a factor of 4.5 among newborn infants and 203 among children. Retarded mental and physical development is noted increasingly more often in children. According to the Ministry of Health, around 80 percent of children in Russia’s schools are now suffering from chronic diseases.  

Parental absence, according to Russian analysts, hurts Russian family health by contributing to physical and psychological decline in the Russian armed forces. One parent was absent for one out of every five families with children. In the overwhelming majority of cases (94 percent) these were families raised by a mother in the absence of a father. The probability of one or both parents dying increased from 10.7 to 16.2 percent. In 1997, around 31 million people, or 20.8 percent of the population, had monetary income below the poverty line.

For some recruits, an imbalanced diet is seen as the main reason for a weakening of health in the young generation of Russians. People are consuming less meat, milk and eggs, and the diet is vitamin-deficient. Hypotrophy or substandard weight is around 12.5 percent of draftees. In the 1990s the health trends among adolescents 15-17 years old were the worst among all population age groups. In this case growth of overall morbidity occurs for practically all age groups of diseases due to accelerated transition of acute forms into recidivist and chronic, and growth of primary chronic pathology of internal organs. The occurrence of diseases of the circulatory system among adolescents increased over the last five years by a factor of 2.4, while diseases of the endocrine system eating disorders, and disturbed metabolism and immunity increased by a factor of 2.2. Diseases of the skeleto-muscular system and connective tissue as well as tumors increased by a factor of 2.1, diseases of the urogenital system increased by a factor of 1.9, and infectious and parasitic diseases increased by a factor of 1.8. Due to the worsening health of adolescents, the fitness of draftees for military service has been noted as steadily declining. According to data of the Russian MOD, a whopping 20-30 percent of examined draftees were unfit to serve for health reasons.

Lyudmila Sukharayeva, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, believes that up to 80 percent of school graduates have chronic illnesses, based on up to eight diagnoses. Cardiovascular and gastrointestinal diseases have been encountered twice as often and spinal diseases three times more often in teenagers in recent years. The number of stunted children has tripled in the 1990s. Around 20 percent of school graduates were underweight for their age in 1997. If one adds to this fact that health care is in decline and health education in families is poor, then it becomes understandable why only a few draftees remain fully fit for service in the Russian armed forces. One analyst notes that “the Army is no health resort,” and serious childhood illnesses that are concealed from military medical personnel can seriously affect combat conditions. Clearly, the health of Russian military personnel is one of the main factors preventing readiness in the Russian armed forces. Disease prevention is the most important component of troop health care, and epidemiological oversight will become critical.
Another factor is the morbidity rate resulting from the harmful health effects of environmental and social conditions in Russian military service. When a future conscript has to check in to the local draft board, his age, education, family condition, and specialty are the first things he is asked. These question have significance—the airborne assault troops do not take draftees from broken homes since the rigors of training demand top performance from recruits. 29 Next, the report from the military medical commission is delivered to the draft board and the recruit. According to statistics, a shocking one in three is unfit for service in the ranks because of chronic and psychological illnesses. 30 Almost 40 percent of young men have been raised in disadvantaged families. 31 Each year, according to the Russian military, 70,000 cannot be enlisted because of psychological problems, and some 1,500 are returned from the army within the first three months of service. 32 Major General V.N. Pulitin, chief of the Organizational-Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff, asserted:

The most serious problem is faultless selecting those suited by health for army service. That is far from easy to do, given the catastrophic deterioration of the health of our young people. Suffice it to say that the draft commissions deemed more than 31 percent of the conscripts unfit for military service last fall for the first time. It is expected that the citizens fit for military service with slight limitations among the young replacements being sent into the ranks today will be more than half. The situation will hardly change for the better in this regard since RF government Decree No. 1232 of 22 October of last year has changed the Statute on Military Physical Examination, and raised the requirements for the health of citizens being drafted. There is another aspect as well. Because the so-called adolescent medicine that existed under the USSR has been disrupted, while the new system replacing it is developing very slowly for a number of objective reasons, there has been frequent instances, the further from Moscow, that a young person has his first medical exam when he registers for that draft. 33

Thus, the draft has become a critical test for the health of teenage Russian males. The Russian Federation's largest cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg have not been the main suppliers of conscripts. Moscow provides about 5,000 young men with 70 percent serving in and around Moscow while another 30 percent go to the Northern Fleet or the Far East military district. 34 According to the Chief of Staff of the Siberian Military District, Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Morozov, "There will be nobody to call up for the armed forces." According to Morozov, in 1995 and 1997, the call-up revealed 34 percent and 43 percent to be medically deficient, respectively, based on the health crisis in youth morbidity. 35

Now, there are 20 cities in Siberia that are not fit to live in, including Bratsk, Angarsk, Nizhnevartovsk, Kemerovo, and Barnaul. 36

Funding has been insufficient to rectify the health plight in the Russian armed forces resulting from weakened recruits. In 1998, the plan was to allocate R690 million for health care, but only 22.5 percent of that amount (R155 million) was provided. The planned amount to be allocated for medical property and equipment was R600 million, as compared with the R62.7 million. 37 Each year, more than 40,000 injured military personnel are admitted to hospitals. Injury is the cause of loss of almost one million days of combat training. Injuries thus inflict considerable economic loss not only from treatment expenses but also lost training. 38

Water, a critical component in operating any armed force, is frequently polluted in the Russian Federation. In 1997, more than 250 military units experienced a water shortage.
More than 150 military units have microbiological indicators for their water which do not meet government standards. Communal living conditions have also affected health. Investigations of the sanitary-epidemiological service show that in 170 military units established standards of billeting were violated. With a power shortage and consequent unsatisfactory operation of boilers and emergencies in the heating networks last winter, the standards temperature level was not observed in barracks in more than 130 military units. This led to a substantial increase in the number of those suffering pneumonia. About 60 percent of the baths and laundries do not meet sanitary and technical standards, and 95 percent of bath and laundry combinations are not provided with disinfecting chambers to prevent skin diseases and lice infestation.

Intellectual capabilities, including the pursuit of higher learning, are a critical asset that the Russian armed forces needs desperately to participate in innovative thinking. Putilin is opposed to using education as a deferment for service since the army needs soldiers who are healthy and smart. He states:

Judge for yourself: 85.9 percent of the people registered for the draft are not subject to conscription for various reasons in 1999. Of those, 12.8 percent have health limitations, and 9 percent have outstanding or incomplete criminal sentences; of the remaining 64 percent, the overwhelming majority are studying at educational institutions at various levels. The figures speak for themselves. Of course, the large number of students not called for military service lowers the educational potential of the army and navy. The share of citizens with higher and secondary education has declined by more than 20 percent over the last ten years, and was a little over 70 percent in 1998. There are problems in this regard with manpower acquisition for the military units training junior commanders and specialists.

Clearly, these health exemptions lower the number of eligible able-bodied soldiers.

Critical Factor: The Spread of Infectious Diseases in the Russian Armed Forces

In January 1999, N.N. Lyubimskii and N.I. Lyshenko clarified how the level and structure of morbidity due to infectious disease has changed among men serving in the Russian armed forces between 1992 and 1997. They also aimed to determine responses for anti-epidemic work considered important for maintaining manpower. They showed that there were interesting diseases differences within the Russian Federation military based on types of diseases spread and why. Amazingly, members of the Russian military are at a lower risk of contracting an infectious disease than are members of the Russian population. However, compared with the Russian population as a whole, regular soldiers and sergeants are at a greater risk of contracting shigellosis and intestinal infections caused by other pathogens and parasitic diseases. This fact comes not as a surprise to military physicians, and it may be explained by the fact that transmissions of these diseases are greatest in the armed forces. Simultaneously, despite such factors associated with the epidemic process as densely packed accommodations, close contact, and intermingling of groups being more prominent in the
armed services than in the rest of Russia, members of the military are at lower risk of development of acute respiratory infections. The most likely reason for this phenomenon is that respiratory infection has more to do with the infection process than with the frequency of contacts.  

Under the conditions of military units, while mixing and switching soldiers in their deployments, the absolute number of infectious sources with which susceptible individuals come into contact is generally less than among the civilian population, while the landscape of pathogens responsible for acute respiratory infections is much more sparse. The likelihood that a specific soldier will, over the course of a year, develop multiple infections with an aerial transmission mechanism is therefore significantly lower in military units than it is among the civilian population.

The traditional leaders among infections in the Russian Federation army and navy are acute respiratory infection, angina, hepatitis A, shigellosis, and acute intestinal infections. These have been accompanied by an increase in the morbidity due to venereal diseases, hepatitis A, parasitic diseases, and other infections. In 1992-1997, the relative prevalence of recorded morbidity due to venereal diseases increased by a factor exceeding 5.5 (from 0.48 percent in 1987 to 2.63 percent in 1997), while the relative prevalence of morbidity due to parasitic diseases increased by a factor exceeding 1.2 (6.49 percent versus 8.06 percent, respectively).

Influenza and other acute respiratory infections accounted for 84.4 percent of morbidity due to infectious disease in 1987-1991 versus 78.6 percent in 1992-1997. An increase in morbidity due to acute respiratory infections is observed in nearly all the Russian Federation armed forces with the exception of the strategic rocket forces. It was highest in the air defense forces. In 1995-1997, the increase in morbidity due to these infections practically stopped. However, a rise in morbidity due to angina was noted in 1989-1995.

Intestinal infections between 1992 and 1997 represented 3.64 percent in 1987-1991. The risk of contracting intestinal infections while in the armed forces increased by a factor of 1.19 from 1987-1991 to 1992-1997. The increase in morbidity was observed only in the navy, where the relative risk was about 1.24. In the other branches of the Russian Federation armed forces, the risk of morbidity due to intestinal infections decreased. The decrease was most evident in the air defense forces (by a factor of 2.03-2.04) and in the air forces (by a factor of 1.66-1.71). The relative prevalence of morbidity due to shigellosis and acute intestinal infections caused by other pathogens remained steady in 1974-1992 but increased after those years.

On average, the morbidity rate due to active tuberculosis among military personnel accounted for 0.182 percent of all morbidity due to infectious disease in 1992-1997 versus 0.220 percent in 1987-1991. The risk of contracting tuberculosis in the armed forces in 1992-1997 was practically the same as in 1987-1991. Up to 65 percent of conscripts contract tuberculosis during their first six months.
Finally, venereal disease has increased since 1987. For the armed forces, figures for the past five years show an 11-fold increase in the number of draftees showing up with syphilis, unfit for service. The risk of contracting venereal diseases in 1992-1997 was 3.16 to 3.17 times higher than in 1987-1991. Before 1993, the rise in multiyear morbidity was characterized as exponential. In 1995-1997, morbidity stabilized due to a decline in gonorrhea throughout the armed forces.

In the Russian armed forces, the risk of contracting hepatitis A between 1992-1997 decreased by a factor of 1.20-1.21 compared to 1986-1991. During the same period, the risk of contracting hepatitis A while in the Russian ground forces decreased by 1.21-1.21, the risk in the air force decreased by a factor of 2.067-2.07, and the risk in the air defense forces decreased by a factor of 1.49 -1.51. In the strategic rocket forces, the average level of morbidity due to hepatitis A remained unchanged, whereas in the navy it increased by 2.67-2.68 during outbreaks in 1994-1995. Overall, the outbreak of morbidity due to hepatitis A “was a clear response” to troop involvement in Afghanistan.

Morbidity due to a parasitic disease in the navy during 1987-1991 was significantly higher than in the armed forces as a whole. The greatest increases in morbidity were observed in the strategic rocket forces, with an increase by a factor of 2.43, and in the navy an increase by a factor of 1.79. Morbidity due to parasitic diseases may be reduced further by intensifying public health programs and oversight of military personnel’s bathing and laundry conditions.

Venereal and parasitic diseases and TB are characterized by a relatively close relationship between the level of morbidity and the social changes in the Russian Federation. But there is no evidence to suggest that acute intestinal infections or hepatitis A are linked to social changes in the Russian Federation. Examinations reveal that 20.7 percent of young recruits, 14-16 percent of military personnel who had served three months or more, and 8-11 percent of military personnel serving under contract were immunodeficient.

Psychological Trauma: Draft Dodging and Hazing

In January 2000, the Russian MOD announced that hazing had dropped ten percent and draft dodging was down 30 percent. Draft dodging dropped due to two programs, “Give Yourself Up” and “Runaway,” that began in early 1999. But some preliminary findings from the General Staff’s analysis of the 1999 conscription campaign reveal that many potential draftees could not be enlisted for a variety of reasons: almost one in three had poor health; one-tenth had either alcohol or drug abuse problems; and another 40 percent were brought up in “problematic families.” Another 40,000 young men were estimated to have dodged the draft altogether. Most of this effort to resist service, totally apart from health issues, may be seen later in the psychological stress of training when immune systems become weakened and infectious diseases can attack the body.

According to the Russian General Staff, the autumn 1998 draft period went rather well. The armed forces reportedly inducted 158,000 young men, 110,000 of whom went on to the
army and navy. The 110,000 was enough to meet the military’s needs. The other draftees were sent to military units fielded by the country’s various security ministries, including the Federal Border Service and the troops of the Interior Ministry. The General Staff claimed that the quality of the 1998 biannual draft had even improved somewhat over past years.\(^{62}\)

Even if the General Staff claims are true, however, the Russian military continues to face monumental morale and personnel problems in both its conscript and professional forces. Defense Ministry statistics released at the close of 1998 revealed, for example, that crime and suicide rates in the armed forces continue to rise, while the number of noncombat deaths—a major problem for more than a decade now—has declined only slightly. Between Chechnya 1 and 2, approximately 500 servicemen were killed on active service in 1998, the Defense Ministry said, compared with 600 in 1997. More than 800 soldiers, meanwhile, were said to have died in off-duty incidents in 1998, compared with approximately 1,000 in 1997. The number of suicides had reportedly risen to approximately 350 in 1997. Some 60 percent of those committing suicide were officers.\(^{63}\)

Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s 1996 pledge to ban hazing had been directed not merely at improving the army’s professionalism, but also at addressing widely held concerns among the Russian population over the dismal conditions confronting the Russian Federation’s conscript soldiers. Brutality in the barracks—“hazing”—has been a much-publicized phenomenon in Russia since before the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and there is little reason to believe that the current military leadership has made any significant progress in this area.\(^{64}\) Indeed, a secret General Staff study reportedly concludes that the incidence of hazing is rising in the armed forces as part of a more general increase in the army’s criminalization.\(^{65}\) Other sources have reached similar conclusions. The Soldiers’ Mothers Committee, a Moscow-based group which seeks to improve life for Russia’s conscript soldiers and an active participant in the anti-war movement in both Chechnya 1 and 2, asserts that conditions for the conscript army have sunk to their lowest level since the 1991 dissolution of the USSR. Meanwhile, the Russian Military General Prosecutor’s Office, reports that outside of the Chechen wars and their aftermath, 57 soldiers died and nearly 3,000 were injured during the first 11 months of 1998 as a result of hazing. But an advocate for soldiers’ rights puts the figures much higher, claiming that some 2,000 Russian soldiers die each year either directly or indirectly as a result of hazing. Many of these deaths were suicides reflecting poor social and health conditions.\(^{66}\)

Statistics, however, cannot fully reflect the impact on the recruit mentality. Declining military budgets and a more general demoralization of the armed forces have greatly worsened as substandard living conditions for many of Russia’s soldiers continues. Brutality in the barracks—a feature throughout Russian history—also continues to take its toll on Russian conscripts, while Russian MOD efforts to address such problems have generally been inadequate. The result has been a series of publicized incidents—some of them involving the death or murder of conscripts through war, physical exercise, or lack of basic necessities—that have further discredited the military leadership and reinforced fears among those being asked to serve in Russia’s armed forces.\(^{67}\)
Reports such as the above suggest why a large number of Russian youths are avoiding the military draft. Rather than ensuring that life in the armed forces improves for the Russian Federation’s conscripts, however, the Defense Ministry appears to be more intent on tracking down draft dodgers and deserters. In January 1999 the military prosecutor’s office announced that military authorities had arrested nearly 1,000 such soldiers in a major four-day operation aimed at locating and apprehending up to 700 deserters. Significantly, there is an effort to recruit more teens by conscription when not all or even half may be healthy enough to form the present or future Russian armed forces.

**Analyzing Russian Military Responses in Chechnya 1 And 2 Based on Health Trends and Medical Aid**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation’s ability to field forces has declined. While the Soviet Army entertained global ambitions, the 21st century Russian Army’s conventional forces now find themselves containing an insurrection in a small region within the nation’s borders that is an almost overwhelming challenge due to health, recruitment quality, and technological constraints. Moreover, health and medical aid in urban and rural combat is a particularly acute problem that the Russians have had to contend with for the past 200 years.

Lessons from Chechnya 1 and 2 reveal that the Russian military has tried a network of specialized facilities, both front and rear, to render aid to the wounded and ill, beginning with the front. The experience of military operations in Chechnya 1 showed that specialized medical aid—such as participation of highly-skilled specialists, use of unique equipment and supplies, and treatment at a progressive military hospital—would be mandatory if soldiers were to survive Chechen combat conditions. There is convincing proof of the need and ability to deliver aid with the goal of treating the wounded and ill in the urban setting particularly in battles for Grozny. The need is dictated by modern combat surgical trauma, marked by severe combined and multiple wounds. In both Chechnya 1 and 2, surgical groups were formed according to the layout of the battlefield.

The lethality of severe wounds was lower by a factor of two, although the frequency of these wounds decreased by only 2.1 percent. The average length of treatment of these wounds was 90 days and discharge from the armed forces was 63 percent, leading to a sharp loss in personnel. In November 1996, at a meeting of the Scientific Medical Council of the Chief-Military-Medical Administration of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, participants agreed that the Chechen war can be seen as a model of a large-scale emergency situation creating a dilemma as to whether to evacuate casualties or treat them in place. Subsequently, adjustments were made to treat in place rather than evacuate.

In Chechnya 1, the Russian rear services built a tent city with some 3,000 heated tents, 114 mess halls, shower and bath units, and vehicle wash points. The rear services also brought a shower and laundry train forward to Mozdok. Frontline troops seldom were able to use the laundry and bath facilities. As result, skin diseases and lice were a problem among
Many operational lines of communication also had rest stops containing mess tents and heating tents.

Food service is another indicator of attempts to reform the health deficit. Russian planners decided to provide 150 percent of the normal ration to each soldier. This would exceed 5,000 calories and included a daily 300 grams (10.5 ounces) of meat, 50 grams (1.75 ounces) of heavy cream, and 30 grams (1.05 ounces) of cheese. Field bakeries were established on each of the main axes of Mozdok, Vladikavkaz, and Kizlyar. Later, when the north Grozny airfield was captured, the Russians positioned three field bakeries there with a daily capacity of 18 tons of bread. However, Russian forces had trouble delivering rations to the forward fighting positions. KP-125 and KP-130 mess trailers would get stuck in mud in and around Grozny. In addition, fuel and water trucks had to accompany the mess trailers to help pull the mess trailers through mud and were frequent targets for Chechen snipers. Often troops at forward positions had to eat dry rations. Troops that needed the extra calories the most often were not given even the minimum daily requirement. Clearly, the initial plan to provide 5,000 calories per day went widely astray, primarily due to inadequate transport. Finally, clean drinking water was a high-demand item, but delivery of clean water forward often proved too difficult. Individual water treatment took too long to work, and dirty water created conditions where viral hepatitis and cholera spread quickly.

Urban warfare in Chechnya produced a different distribution of casualty types. Red Cross statistics for limited conflicts usually reflect 23 percent wounded from mines, 26 percent from bullets, 46 percent from shrapnel, 2 percent from burns and 3 percent miscellaneous. In Grozny, there was a higher percentage of burns and the majority of wounds were caused by mortar fire. Most fatalities and lethal head and body wounds were from sniper fire. Whereas the normal ratio of wounded to killed is 3:1 or 4:1, urban warfare in Grozny featured a statistical reverse in that three were killed for every wounded. Snipers presented a problem for medical evacuation, and frequently the wounded could not be evacuated until nighttime, thus leading to increased deaths. Moreover, in Chechnya 1, and presumably in Chechnya 2, bullets made for the M-16 and Russian 5.45-caliber bullets inflicted great injury due to their high initial speed, making treatment and healing more difficult.

Finally, medical support is another critical factor in combat receiving increased attention. Russian military care of the wounded was usually well planned and executed once the patient reached the battalion aid station. Three weeks prior to the Russian incursion in Chechnya 1, the Russian Army established and trained special emergency medical treatment detachments in each military district. Four of these detachments deployed to Chechnya to support the maneuver units and supplement their TO&E medical units. The Russian military used their normal conventional war evacuation system and usually employed ground medical evacuation as the quickest and safest form of evacuation. Each maneuver company was reinforced with a physician's assistant, while each maneuver battalion had a medical doctor plus the ambulance section. Surgeons, anesthetists, and additional nurses manned the regimental medical post. Wounded were normally evacuated to the regimental medical post by makeshift armored ambulances (BTR-80s), since the Chechens fired on the soft-sided ambulances. Forward medical stations and hospitals needed to be dug in or deployed in basements, as the Chechens also shelled these. Patients requiring more
extensive medical care were evacuated by MEDEVAC helicopter and aircraft.\textsuperscript{83} Forward air evacuation was not used much, particularly after the Chechens shot down several MEDEVAC helicopters. The fighting in Grozny proved the need for a specially designed armored ambulance.\textsuperscript{84}

The Russian military's record in disease prevention in Chechnya 1 was nowhere near as impressive as their handling of the wounded. Russian soldiers frequently lacked clean drinking water, clean clothing, hot rations, and washing facilities. Personnel suffered from viral hepatitis, cholera, shigellosis, enterocolitis, diphtheria, malignant anthrax, and plague. One combat brigade had 240 simultaneous cases of viral hepatitis. Since Russian field units were down to 60 percent strength or less at this time, a brigade might be able to muster 1,500 personnel. According to some sources, four percent of the sick worked in food handling or water distribution.\textsuperscript{85} An outbreak of diphtheria may have also been a result of Chechnya 1.\textsuperscript{86}

Psychiatric casualties are higher in urban combat. Most of the fighting in Chechnya 1 and 2 was in cities ranging from Grozny itself to smaller cities to towns. A Russian military psychiatrist surveyed 1,312 soldiers during combat.\textsuperscript{87} The survey found that 28 percent were healthy and the other 71 had some type of psychological disorder, with 46 percent suffering from depression. The percentage of troops with post-traumatic stress was higher than in Afghanistan, thereby reflecting the impact of urban operations.\textsuperscript{88} Consequently, the Russian military noted that they should have rotated units frequently to allow the soldiers to bath, sleep, train, and readjust. This would have required much larger reserves than were available.\textsuperscript{89} Pharmacological substances have an important place in helping to insure an acceptable level of military professional work under extreme conditions. The use of pharmacological substances is aimed at specific "syndrome" targets, i.e., combat stress, physical and psychological fatigue, and the negative consequences of the effect of climate and habitation factors.\textsuperscript{90}

Interesting is the difference between the Russian Federation armed forces' health situation and Chechen citizens' morbidity. Since Chechnya 1, Chechen health facilities have been destroyed, while citizens' health has been undermined by stress and undernourishment. Intestinal infections, lice, scabies, tuberculosis, hepatitis, and respiratory infections have spread. Most of the hospitals and medical assistance and obstetric facilities do not operate because there are no personnel, medicine, or equipment. In Grozny, where 80 percent of the republic's entire health care base was concentrated before 1993, many facilities remained closed in 1999.\textsuperscript{91}

However, in comparison with the Russian armed forces and the need to help and feed soldiers, the effectiveness of Chechens to treat combatants plus feed, clothe, and rest their fighters helps them stay healthier. Chechens commute on their own accord to rest and eat after several days of fighting in both urban and rural environments. The ability to move between the front and the rear gave the Chechens the upper hand in combat health care, including the digging of latrines and washing of hands.\textsuperscript{92} Both for Chechen civilians and the fighters, war-related injuries have been the most common cause of death. However, there has been an increase in communicable diseases, neonatal health problems, and nutritional deficiencies. The impact on health services has adversely affected the management of people
with chronic, non-communicable diseases. For instance, 90 percent of the children in Gudermes district suffer from various forms of tuberculosis. Hepatitis, scabies, and pediculosis are also present. TB is the most common problem, and up to 60,000 IV doses of tuberculin were prepared for injection to fight the disease. Polio outbreaks have been growing. Only partial analysis of the Chechnya area reveals 137 cases in the nine months between March and November 1995 in addition to the approximately 150 cases in 1994. These numbers far exceed those of the Russian Federation as a whole. Not only do these numbers reflect the prevalence of disease in a war zone but a collapse in modern health care.

When thinking about how technological and organizational innovation influences warfare, one has to admire Chechen resolve. Despite the fact that 30 percent of Chechnya is considered to be ecologically dangerous territory, Chechnya is able to field a large enough force to create havoc with the hierarchical Russian military. However, since the early 1990s, there have been about 15,000 small crude oil production facilities that produce some two million tons. In the first years of oil production after de facto Chechen independence, when the processing technology was imperfect, light distillate was dumped underground through special wells. As a result, a huge oil field of one million tons has emerged under Starozavodskii raion. When Chechens search for water, petroleum springs up through the residue and soil. This oil waste seeps into the Sunzha, Argun, and Terek rivers, polluting the entire region and its ecosystem. Oil wells are also igniting by accident and on purpose with estimates of up to 300 tons of oil perishing daily with flames reaching 1.5 kilometers into the atmosphere. Moreover, one of the key problems in Chechnya, and Grozny in particular, is the lack of potable water and a sewage system. All wastes have been dumped into the Sunzha River since the sewage system ceased to function in 1993. A large amount of poisonous chemical substances, including tetrachloride, are entering the Chechen watershed. The fear is that the waste will flow into the Caspian Sea.

Chechnya has a wide depository of nuclear and chemical waste. The Grozny chemical combine remains a danger area where 27 containers of radioactive cobalt are located in an underground vault. Three people have already died from trying to open one of the containers. Radioactive waste is buried to the northeast of Tolstoy-Yurt and to the south of Vinogradnoye village. The burial site, covering more than 12 acres and containing solid radioactive waste—including cesium and cobalt isotopes, was once considered safe from sabotage. Chlorine clouds pollute Chechnya. Tank cars with a capacity of 60 tons of chlorine solution with oil were detonated, sending clouds of toxic gas over the countryside. Chechnya is a wasteland equal to or beyond most parts of the Russian Federation.

Conclusion

The Russian Federation’s efforts to craft a modern military establishment on par with that of the United States or other advanced nations faces a number of challenges. While the deteriorating health and demographic situation in the Russian Federation seldom attract much attention, their consequences are very likely to prove critical to an understanding of the future of the Russian armed forces, more so even than many of the events which now garner
headlines. Although some health and demographic problems appear to occur less often in the armed forces than in the population at large, the military will have to expand its health care system at a time when there is increasing demand for health care services for the civilian population. This competition for medical resources will be another impediment to Russia's efforts to develop a truly modern military establishment.

In no small part, this is because the type of wars Russia will likely fight in the future will require healthy soldiers who are fully capable of operating high-tech equipment and exercising clear thinking. Environmental conditions that impair the physical or mental development of Russia's children today cannot but have a serious impact on their physical and intellectual capabilities as future soldiers, as pointed out by Dr. Odelia Funke in this volume. Moreover, because Russia's environmental and health problems are not amenable to easy or quick solutions, and the wars of the future are likely to be counterinsurgency actions or to take place in an urban setting, soldiers will likely require expanded health care. The increase in disease among Russian forces fighting in Afghanistan is but one example of these problems. This demand for increased health care will come at a time when the authorities are trying to devote available resources to modernization and, at times, to increased military operations such as those in the Northern Caucasus.

Russia's thinking about its military will have to change as well. For example, the Russian armed forces are too ponderous to fight effectively in Chechen-style urban combat unless, of course, they resort consistently to massed fire techniques that result in significant civilian casualties and the destruction of the cities being fought over, Stalingrad-style. The combination of soldiers who are both physically and mentally less capable and inappropriate organizational and technological models creates potential weaknesses that can be exploited by a skillful enemy.

Moreover, even if the Russian Ministry of Defense wholeheartedly embraced military reform, it would be difficult economically for Russia to maintain a large contract or professional force. New technologies are likely to be highly expensive to develop and place into production in numbers sufficient to equip a large force. With such multiple demands, it may be beyond Moscow's ability to feed, clothe, equip, and train a modern and effective force of 500,000 to one million men in contemporary conditions. Thus, ensuring that Russia can respond to its huge health demands while incorporating the developments stemming from a contemporary revolution in military affairs is a multi-faceted challenge. Beyond the technological and organizational advances that must be made and incorporated, Russia must address health and demographic issues on a broad scale. It must address the fundamental and underlying causes of the deteriorating health of the Russian population as a whole to ensure the future human capital that is required for a military establishment, but it must also develop a new attitude and a new approach to maintaining the health of those already serving the country in the military.
Endnotes

1. I wish to thank Professor Murray Feshbach of Georgetown University for his guidance in the early stages of this project. I would also like to thank the RAND Arroyo Center, particularly Tom Szayna and Dave Kassing, for their support.


4. Ibid.


7. Even drug use and the spread of AIDS are beginning to appear in elite Russian forces. In the former Dzerzhinskii Division now the (OMON of the MVD), heroin use and several cases of AIDS have emerged. See “Soldiers in the Elite Dzerzhinskii Division Have Infected Each Other With AIDS,” Moskovskii komsomol’s, 3 February 1999, p. 1.


10. According to Feshbach: “Keeping these data in mind, then, if one uses the total fertility rate (TFR) to project the population, usually the medium scenario assumes that mortality will not worsen nor improve—although in the case of Russia that it will improve is to me somewhat a heroic assumption. Thus, using as a model the TFR projection for West Germany prepared by the Population Reference Bureau (PRB) in Washington, in 1985, its impact, and the analogy for Russia of various levels of the TFR in 3 assumptions of first, a dramatic increase in the period 2007-2027, second, an improvement to simple reproduction of 2.1 in the same projected period, and third, constant at 1.3 children per women over her reproductive years. Nothing sufficient to raise the Russian TFR to 2.5 in the future can be anticipated, and even with a 2.5 TFR, PRB’s chart yields a figure of 62 million (equal to the population of West Germany in 1982) only by 2102 or so, 50 years after the point of concern. Russia likely will not even return to 2.1, the level for simple reproduction of the population. With reproductive health of women so poor (75% of women have a serious pathology during their pregnancy), it may not even hold at 1.3. There are numerous other reasons for a reduced TFR: stress, the choice to have no or very few children, forced migration, poverty of a large portion of the population wherein malnutrition of young women can affect their ability to have children or the fetus is weak, and dramatic increases in sexually transmitted diseases and their impacts on reproductive potential, tuberculosis spreading throughout the
population, dramatic increases in anemia among pregnant women, fetal losses due to spontaneous abortions, etc. Thus, using the PRB illustration for West Germany made in 1985, assuming mortality stays at a constant level (already a problem for Russia, as it is again increasing after a dip of several years), and increases in 2 scenarios to 2.1 or to 2.5 during entire period, 25 years, 2002-2027, the chart shows the population future. It should be noted that the TFR in the Russian Federation has never exceeded 2.194 (in 1987) since 1960. But if it declines to 1.3 and holds steady at that point, then the implication is that in 2052, the population of West Germany would be about 55 percent of its then current level of 1982, or a drop of 45 percent in that period. Thus, using this proportion, the analogy for Russia where the TFR has been dropping steadily to 1.23 in 1997, already below 1.3, and is not likely to be any higher (not only for demographic reasons, but also for health reasons assuming for the moment that economic stresses are not exacerbated), then the population of Russia will drop to 80 million persons (146.0) x (.55)=(80.3) by mid-century.” See Murray Feshbach, “A Comment on Recent Demographic Issues and a Forbidding Forecast,” JRL, August 4, 1999.


19. Heroin use in the Strategic Rocket Forces has become a problem in the 12th Main Directorate which supervises tactical nuclear weapons. See Deborah Ball, “How Safe is Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal?” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 11, no. 12, December 1999, p. 11.


25. Brui, pp. 41-47.


27. Brui, pp. 41-47.


29. In Chechnya 2, the objective of obtaining a divorce to avoid a male offspring's induction has become a way to avoid the draft. With each draft, about 25 percent of the armed forces' personnel is replaced. In the spring draft last year, a presidential decree called for 168,776 men to be drafted, of whom 120,900 were destined for the armed forces. The rest were sent to other units like the border guards. See Celestine Bohlen, “Mothers Help Sons Outwit Draft Board In Wartime Russia,” New York Times, January 30, 2000, p. 1.


32. ITAR-TASS, February 16, 1998 as cited in FTS19980216000859.


38. Ibid., p. 1.


40. Ibid., p. 1.


43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.


53. Lyubimskii and Lyshenko, pp. 46-53

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.


62. Nezavisimaia gazeta, January 20, 1999 via RFERL.
63. AP and ITAR-TASS, December 1, 1998 via RFERL.
65. Moskovskii komsomolets, February 19, 1999 via RFERL.
68. Medical deferments provide an increasingly popular way out; according to recent statistics, more than 30 percent of draft-age men are excused for medical reasons. The high rate is usually explained by the deteriorating health of the male population generally, but it may also be due to efforts by concerned mothers. According to a recent account, one mother stated: “Get your own checkup before your son is called up to the medical commission. Please, please, remember, if he has any medical complaints, get them documented—send him to as many clinics as you can. I know what they will say at the draft board; they will say that he is healthy, that you bought the medical records. Believe me, I know plenty of doctors who want to send your sick son into the armed forces. There is not a disease, ailment or injury that some parents cannot fight. Hepatitis A, B, C, it doesn’t matter: six months. Spinal disorders. I am glad somebody mentioned that. If it is a third degree, then it can be a deferrable disease. Migraines? Accompanied by fainting? Get it checked. It can be deferrable. Ulcers? Beware of radical imported medicines. They are so effective they can clear away the scar tissue, and you don’t want that.” See Celestine Bohlen, “Mothers Help Sons Outwit Draft Board In Wartime Russia,” New York Times, January 30, 2000, p. 1.
71. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
76. According to Grau and Thomas, dry rations are similar to the old U.S. Army C-rations. There are three types of dry rations. The first contained a can of meat, some crackers or toast, some jam, and a tea bag. The second contained two cans of meat mixed with oatmeal. The third contained a can of meat and a can of vegetables or fruit. See Lester Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 5.
77. Grau and Thomas.


82. Ibid., p. 132.

83. Ibid., p. 134.


88. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

89. Ibid., p. 39.


95. ITAR-TASS, December 20, 1999 as cited in “Work Ongoing to Fight Diseases in Chechnya,” FTS19991220001230, December 21, 1999. But there is no guarantee that this strain will be eradicated.


97. Valerii Menshchikov, “A Bucket of Water Costs 1,000 Rubles in Grozny,” Moskovskaya pravda, September 16, 1995, pp. 1, 8; ITAR-TASS, November 2, 1999 as cited in “Chechen Site Holds N. Caucasus’

98. Menshchikov, pp. 1, 8.


103. It is important to note that U.S. forces also undergo readiness and morale problems that could have health consequences affecting the capabilities of American forces, especially in urban combat. See Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph Collins, and Owen Jacobs, American Military Culture in the 21st Century, Washington, DC: CSIS, 2000; and Carl Builder and Theodore Karasik, Organizing, Training and Equipping the Air Force for Crises and Lesser Conflicts, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-626-AF, 1995.
Economic Foundations of Russian Military Modernization: Putin’s Dilemma

Steven Rosefielde

Introduction

It was broadly agreed among discussants at the conference titled “The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium” that the Kremlin has fallen on hard times. No one disputed that Russia’s gross domestic product has roughly halved since 1989, that unemployment is in the high double digits; that income inequality has widened, that population figures have plummeted, or that the military is in disarray. Nor is there any doubt that the debacle was caused by some mix of bad western advice, domestic political ineptitude, and audacious corruption.¹

It is equally evident that Russia’s failed transition has impaired its national security. The Kremlin retains ample nuclear forces, and continues some high tech weapons programs, but its conventional armies, command control, training, and readiness are crumbling. Moreover, Moscow is clearly behind the power curve in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Information Warfare (IW).

This reversal of fortune has greatly diminished Russia’s power to influence and subdue. The military cannot project its forces abroad, and was barely able to quell the insurrection in Chechnya; its historical spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, the Baltic, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus region are in jeopardy.²

What will Russia’s new helmsman do? This essay explores the economic factors governing Vladimir Putin’s choices in an effort to assess the probable course of the military modernization initiative he claims to support. The emphasis throughout will be on the deterministic power of economics, rather than on the traditional question of Chto delat’? (What ought to be done?). The Kremlin does not need a tutorial on what to do. It knows perfectly well that it should radically restructure property rights, install the rule of law, protect free enterprise, and adopt a defense strategy that simultaneously stabilizes peace, and efficiently deters external intrusions on its sovereignty. But it won’t. The same culturally embedded forces that led Yeltsin to sacrifice the development of generally competitive market capitalism to the higher purposes of annihilating his enemies and empowering kleptocracy are likely to dominate Putin’s actions. It is these factors which will govern the magnitude and character of Russia’s military modernization in the years ahead, not vice versa. Putin will not adopt an optimally functioning market as the best strategy for safeguarding national security, restoring its superpower, and advancing the cause of global tranquility. He will take a different path co-determined by elite priorities and the economic system they entail. As promised, he may restore Russian conventional capabilities to near
the Soviet level, but this will not suffice. It will leave the nation vulnerable to superior technological forces and to a waning position in the global economic hierarchy. These somber prospects could make Russia a vortex of instability in an increasingly volatile Eurasian/Asian security environment, prompting Western policymakers to consider whether Moscow’s intractable economic weakness warrants shifting from the Cold War idealist doctrine of mutual deterrence to strategic independence in order to better cope with intensifying global disorders.

**Russia’s Military-Industrial Potential: Capital And Labor**

Economics imposes three distinct kinds of restrictions on Russia’s military power. It determines the nation’s productive potential, demand for defense services, and efficiency. The steep decline in post-communist defense activities was prompted by the second of these factors, a drastic reduction in demand. Yeltsin virtually eliminated new weapons orders for most systems during his first administration, and kept procurement low thereafter. The disintegration of production linkages associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union, and subsequent economic restructuring also had an impact, as did neglect of the capital stock. These developments led many to surmise that Russia has sustained an irreversible decline in its military-industrial capabilities. The first order of business therefore in assessing the Kremlin’s military modernization prospects is to ascertain whether the foregoing conjecture is correct.

The data show that Russia’s capital and labor assets have deteriorated to a lesser degree than supposed. Moscow can’t re-achieve Soviet levels of arms procurement soon, but it could come surprisingly close, especially if parts suppliers in the Commonwealth of Independent States cooperate. Figure 1 clarifies one aspect of this important matter, illustrating postwar trends in new capital formation and the fixed capital stock. New capital formation refers to current investment expenditures on installed assets and incomplete construction projects intended for use in the production of future goods and services. It is a “flow,” an addition to past investments, not a total measure of productive capital assets, and is valued here in constant ruble prices. The figure reveals that new capital formation excluding housing (“productive investment”) fell continuously during the 1990s from a benchmark of 100 to 19 in 1996, a decline exceeding 80 percent. Half of this decrease is explained by Russia’s economic hyperdepression, the rest by the reduced share of new gross fixed capital formation in gross domestic product (GDP) from levels nearly treble America’s to a figure only 50 percent higher. Since industrial production, including military machine-building also fell drastically over the same interval, many analysts infer that the capital stock diminished at an equal rate, thereby reducing Russia’s military industrial capacity catastrophically. If, as Abram Bergson’s estimates suggest, Russia’s capital stock (not the USSR’s) was 92 percent of America’s in 1990, assuming proportionality the ratio should have fallen to 17.5 percent in 1996, precluding any significant challenge to U.S. military dominance for decades.

Official statistics report, however, that Russia not only somehow managed to avert a calamitous collapse of its capital stock, but it achieved a modest advance. The top line in
Figure 1. New Russian Capital Formation and Capital Stock Growth 1990-1996: Index 1190=100

Figure 1 shows that fixed reproducible productive assets (including unsold inventories, semi-finished goods, and materials) grew at one percent annually during the 1990s. Using an index with a basis of 100 in 1990, the capital stock increased to 106 in 1996, and 109 in 1999. This miracle is mostly real, but also partly illusory. The preservation of the stock in the face of plummeting current production is a reflection of the nature of the beast. Most of the fixed capital stock was previously produced, and is affected only by current repair, maintenance, and decommissionings. If existing assets are kept in service and in good repair, then there is no reason for them to contract. And, of course, any new capital formation, no matter how

small compared with prior annual investments, will cause the stock to grow. From this perspective a one percent rate of annual fixed capital stock growth isn't astounding, and the low level of current arms procurement should properly be interpreted as an indication of Russia rearmament potential, with several important caveats.

The official capital stock data presented in Figure 1 have not been adjusted for decommissionings, that is, establishments and durables removed from active service. Nor has any allowance been made for physical deterioration (depreciation) and the underfunding of repair and maintenance. Fixed capital stocks ages and gradually lose their value, even if they are properly maintained. Part of this depreciation is physical, and part is attributable to obsolescence, the reduced ability of equipment to produce goods people currently demand. Capital stocks are commonly adjusted for both types of losses by amortization accounting, where statisticians estimate the historical rates at which fixed assets lose their value, and apply this information to compute the “net” capital stock. The series reported by the Russian government, and reproduced in Figure 1, does not do this, and should be discounted to more accurately appraise the Kremlin’s military-industrial rearmament capacity. Information on Soviet era amortization rates is available to perform a crude mechanical adjustment, but is less helpful than it might be because these rates don’t reflect current conditions. On one hand, present amortization rates should be higher than before because equipment has been under-maintained, while the emergence of markets has accelerated obsolescence. On the other hand, as incomes fall fewer people are able to afford high cost substitutes like foreign imports, thus extending the services lives of old equipment. It is impossible therefore to precisely compute the size of Russian’s net capital stock. The McKinsey Global Institute plausibly suggests that it is 75 percent of the 1990 level today, given the product mix favored by the “new Russians.” A figure closer to 90 percent is probably appropriate for the old Soviet product mix, including military procurements. Although, the capital stock has been under-maintained, enterprise managers are reported to have carefully wrapped and lubricated idle equipment, thereby largely preserving the options of the Soviet era.

This appraisal takes account of structural changes and technological improvements contributed by new capital formation during the 1990s. Table 1 presents data on compositional changes in the Russian industrial capital stock. It reveals that the old Soviet capital structure remains in place. The largest component is still machine-building and metalworking, which is more than treble the light industrial sector. The only shift has been an increase in the capital shares of the electricity and fuels sectors, representing a rational response to foreign demand, but no quantum change in Russia’s core productive strategy. Likewise, the McKinsey Global Institute, after undertaking detailed sectoral studies, found that embodied Russian industrial technologies haven’t been significantly modernized. The E-revolution in microelectronics and telecommunications have barely touched the Kremlin’s domains, leaving the nation far behind in a technological time warp. From a relative standpoint, Russia today is probably more poorly positioned to integrate itself into the global market system than it was a decade ago. During the Cold War, experts estimated that Soviet technology was 10 to 20 years behind the West. Now the figure is more like 30 years. Other things being equal, this implies that while Russia should be able to produce between 55 and 90 percent of the weapons procured by the Soviet Union in 1990, depending on the CIS’s
participation, manufacturing, and weapons technologies will almost certainly have fallen seriously behind the Western standard, diminishing their military effectiveness.\textsuperscript{9}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Electricity & 14.8 & 14.2 & 13.6 & 15.1 & 17.4 \\
Fuels & 12.4 & 14.6 & 17.5 & 22.7 & 20.9 \\
Ferrous Metals & 7.6 & 7.2 & 6.9 & 6.2 & 6.3 \\
Non-Ferrous Metals & 4.9 & 5.0 & 4.9 & 5.4 & 5.6 \\
Machine Building & Metal Working (MBMW) & 26.3 & 26.9 & 27.2 & 22.3 & 22.8 \\
Chemical & 9.0 & 8.8 & 8.3 & 8.9 & 8.4 \\
Forest Products Woodworking & 6.0 & 5.6 & 5.1 & 4.3 & 4.4 \\
Construction Materials & 5.8 & 5.3 & 4.6 & 4.5 & 4.4 \\
Textiles & 3.5 & 3.2 & 3.8 & 2.1 & 2.1 \\
Foods & 6.5 & 6.0 & 6.0 & 5.7 & 4.8 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The Composition of Capital by Industrial Sector (Year-end; at Balance Prices; Billions of Rubles)}
\end{table}


The same story holds broadly for Russia's labor force, including military industrial employment. Both have suffered substantial attrition and qualitative decline. In 1990 there were 75.7 million Russian job-seekers, which the American demographer Stephen Rapawy projected would rise to 81.4 million in 1998.\textsuperscript{10} Adjusting this figure upward to account for his underestimate of actual migration brings the figure to 82.6 million laborers, who should have been available for work in 1998.\textsuperscript{11} The actual figure, however, has turned out to be 73.1 million according to the Russian Statistical Bureau's (Goskomstat's) survey compilation. Somewhere along the line 9.5 million workers who should have been in the labor force in 1998
mysteriously disappeared! And even this number is an underestimate because it doesn’t include the transfer of Russian soldiers from military service to the civilian sector. All told there are 11.3 million fewer laborers supporting production than there should be. Some 3.9 million died prematurely; 3.1 million men and 0.8 million women. The remaining 7.4 million are mostly discouraged workers, that is, individuals who find the prospects of employment so hopeless that they inform employment surveyors that they aren’t looking for work.

Russia’s labor assets accordingly have diminished in roughly the same proportion as the “net” fixed productive capital stock. Its labor force is 13.4 percent less than it should be, and 5.1 percent less than 1990. The situation with respect to military-industrial employment is more obscure. This has always been a tangled subject. Rapawy reports that there were 16 million workers in the machine-building and metalworking sectors in 1985, which should have been enough to encompass the 10 million military machine-building employees estimated by Western intelligence. According to Vitaly Vitebsky, Deputy Director of Russia’s military-industrial complex, in an interview with the author in June 1999, this figure has fallen to 400,000! Judging from the 54 percent decline in industrial production during the 1990s, Vitebsky’s disinformative statistic is probably less than one-tenth the real number, but there is no reason to doubt that attrition rates have been very high, with many key workers resettling abroad. This must be considered a serious constraint on Russia’s rearmament prospects, at least in the short run.

The health of Russia’s workforce should also be considered a significant negative factor. This is most strikingly reflected in the premature death statistics. Nearly 4 million workers perished before their time during the 1990s, and soaring death rates prefigure a continuation of the trend. The mortality rate (per 1000 people) was 11.2 in 1990 and surged to 15.7 by 1994 before leveling off at an abnormally high level. Alcoholism, narcotics addiction, and contagious diseases are at near epidemic levels, and Harley Balzer reports that almost 50 percent of Russian school children are mentally or physically handicapped. The quality of labor has been similarly impaired by drastic budget cuts and failure to modernize Soviet-era curricula. And ominously, birthrates are plummeting. There were 1.3 million newborns in 1998, nearly 700,000 fewer than in 1990. Deaths in the same year exceeded births by nearly three-quarters of a million people, and even Russian demographers are predicting the situation to worsen. The official Demographic Yearbook of Russia is forecasting that the population could decline 11.8 million from 146.5 million at the end of 1997 to 134.7 million in 2010, and Murray Feshbach even more dramatically is predicting a further drop to 80 million by 2050. If his prognostication is right, Russia’s labor productivity will have to rise almost 50 percent above the 1990 level for it to have any chance of rearming to the Soviet standard.

All these woes do not preclude Russia’s military-industrial resurgence. There are approximately 17 million idle, roughly 21 percent of the labor force, who could be mobilized for civilian and military industrial activities, if Putin successfully primes the economic pump. Labor is largely fungible and retrainable over the medium term, and re-achieving Soviet-era levels of arms procurement with the Kremlin’s diminished capital stock is not unthinkable. But it would be a considerable exaggeration to say that the breeze is blowing Moscow’s way.
The productivity of capital and labor partly depends on their embodied technologies, skills, maintenance, the purposes to which they are put, and the economic system used to harness these potentials. The technologies and skills bequeathed to Putin by his Soviet predecessors were designed to achieve specific objectives with a “command” model that severely restricted individual scope and initiative in education, employment, entrepreneurship, management, finance, production, distribution, and transfers, so that resources could be dependably allocated to preferred ends. The approach was dictatorial. The sovereign chose the program, charged his deputies with devising tasks, and appointed supervisors to issue assignments and oversee their implementation. The chief attraction of this system was the subordination of the population to the goals of the leader. The main drawback from the state’s viewpoint was the distortion of microeconomic decisionmaking. Stalin and his successors forbade private ownership of the means of production, entrepreneurship, negotiated prices, and competitive markets, substituting plan directives, price-fixing, and hodgepodge bonus incentives that thwarted efficient factor allocation, production, finance, and distribution. “Red Directors” fully understood that the command model sacrificed consumer welfare for state power, contenting themselves with incremental improvements like profit-seeking and leasing aimed at minimizing microeconomic losses. Mikhail Gorbachev, however, upset the applecart, aping Deng Xiaoping, and derivatively Hitler’s infamous financial advisor Hjalmar Schacht.

Gorbachev’s program of radical economic reform as he embodied in Perestroika was to reverse the “braking” effect of mounting microeconomic inefficiencies embedded in the command model, and reinvigorate communism by optimally mixing markets and planning. The West misconstrued this intention, assuming that he really wanted to abandon communism for competitive market capitalism. But he never aspired to destroy Party rule or the command model. He merely wished to radically redesign the system so that he could achieve the dynamism of capitalism with the authoritarian macro-control of communism. Deng was having some success along these lines, and Hitler had previously shown the way. He believed it could be done, but he was a reckless navigator who destroyed the Soviet ship before reaching the other shore.

Unchastened, Boris Yeltsin spent his eight years in power trying to salvage Gorbachev’s authoritarian agenda (dressed up as usual in democratic rhetoric) by displacing the Communist Party as the de facto sovereign, and replacing it with a kleptocracy that retained the command mentality of subordinating the public’s interests to the leaders’ agenda, while creating corrupt markets to enrich his cronies. He smashed Communist Party power by abolishing the remnants of central planning, freeing enterprises from ministerial micro supervision, dismantling wage and price-fixing, disestablishing the state foreign trade monopoly, partially transferring ownership in most enterprises to workers, managers, and outside shareholders, and promoting entrepreneurship; actions perceived in Washington as empowering consumers. But this didn’t happen because Yeltsin never had any intention of subordinating the state to market control. Politics, not economics, was to be in command, just as it had been under Communism, but with a twist. Instead of harnessing markets to bolster the efficiency of state programs, Russia’s new institutions were designed as an engine for
transferring state assets and conferring “rents” (unearned government largesse) to the post-communist elect. Many Western analysts were elated. They likened Yeltsin’s “new Russians” to American “robber barons” like Rockefeller, Harriman, and Hill, failing to notice that 19th century Western industrialists, for all their faults, were dedicated to advancing the productive efficiency of their enterprises, whereas Russia’s kleptocrats aspire only to live parasitically off their wealth and non-competitive contracting, while ruthlessly repressing upstart competition. These dysfunctional practices are described in the literature as “asset-grabbing,” “asset-stripping,” and “rent-seeking.” They are the hallmarks of a special type of command economy—kleptocracy—driven by the logic of plunder rather than entrepreneurial wealth creation, and reflected in the halving of Russia’s GDP, and a decade of hyperdepression.23

Yeltsin led Russia into a blind alley. As long as his klepto-command system prevails, it does not matter what the size, characteristics, and condition of the Federation’s capital assets and labor force are. Russia will not be able to recover, modernize, and rearm; and as it falls ever further behind its rivals it will become increasingly vulnerable to foreign domination and dismemberment. Putin can choose to follow in Yeltsin’s footsteps, contenting himself with lavish personal corruption. But he has two other alternatives, one illusory, the other real. He could immediately use his authority to re-nationalize the means of production, confiscate other unearned assets, redistribute these funds to productive entrepreneurs, build competitive markets, and end audacious corruption by instituting the effective rule of law. This is what Western “liberalizers,” ever since Lenin seized power in 1917, have been recommending and asserting would spontaneously occur. But every serious Russian economist knows that it is utterly fantastic. Russia’s elites might rhetorically agree to such a social contract, but they would never abide by it. At best they will embark on a treadmill of reform to improve the performance of the klepto-command system. There will be much fanfare, but little tangible progress.

Putin’s other alternative is to jettison Yeltsinism, returning to Gorbachev’s conception of command by gradually disciplining the kleptocracy, and harnessing the state’s contracting, market regulatory, financial, and directive controls to maximize output through the full employment of labor and capital. This can easily be accomplished by adopting Franklin Roosevelt’s strategy of pump priming. Putin merely has to reinstate government contracts canceled by Yeltsin for goods from enterprises with idle capacities, financed with credits from the state bank, or through deficit budgetary spending. Wages and other incomes earned by rehires will reinvigorate aggregate effective demand, as John Maynard Keynes explained long ago, and their employment taxes can be applied later to the repayment of the national debt. Western institutional advisors from the IMF and World Bank have generally opposed this solution because it entails reconsolidating the command model, substituting the contracting tactics of Schacht for Soviet-style administrative command planning. They rightly reason that it makes little difference whether rearmament or the production of other Soviet-era goods is achieved through contracted procurement programs or plan directives.24

But there is no reason for Putin to find this reprehensible. He doesn’t hold a grudge against the Communists as Yeltsin did, and he shouldn’t feel obliged to over-indulge kleptocracy. Of course, he probably doesn’t grasp how easy it would be to initiate a rapid
Schachtian recovery, but if he carries out his rearmament pledge he will learn by doing. Idle production capacities in the military-industrial complex can be brought back on line quickly, and millions rehired. Re-attaining the Soviet standard as has already been discussed will be more arduous. Lost capital will have to be slowly replaced, and workers and parts suppliers who exited the military-industrial complex will have to be re-attracted or supplanted with new recruits. The closer economic activities in Soviet vintage firms approach old capacities (their production possibilities), the tougher the sledding will become. And the restricted competitiveness of Schachtian contracting will perpetuate most of the inefficiencies of administrative command planning. Clearly, the option of perfect competition would be better. But given the realities of the Russian system and culture, Putin is likely to find the Schachtian devil's bargain attractive. Significantly diminished unemployment, humming business activity, and improved military prowess should quiet his critics and make him a hero in most Russians' eyes.25

**Structural Militarism**

The case for rearmament can be enhanced moreover by recognizing that the preferred Western strategy of rapid competitive market transition will necessarily intensify the obsolescence of Russia's capital stock and labor skills. Moscow can produce large numbers of horses and buggies with its inherited assets, but it can't produce new millennium cars. Its capacity for manufacturing high tech weapons, consumer goods, and investment goods is comparatively small; from the standpoint of optimality, this capacity should not be pursued to the exclusion of Soviet era alternatives, as the “shock therapists” advise. This disregard for salvaging aspects of the Soviet legacy has been a prominent feature of Yeltsin's radicalism, and Putin can make points by seizing neglected opportunities.

None of these advantages, however, mean that rebuilding Russia's Soviet-era mass armies will have decisive security and economic benefits. Although rearmament pump priming is better than Yeltsinism, it is also a dead end for two reasons. First, it keeps Moscow shackled to the command paradigm. The microeconomic efficiency costs of a Schachtian market-based procurement strategy, while probably less than Gorbachev's mixed version of administrative command planning, will be substantial, putting the Kremlin at a serious disadvantage in any protracted contest with the West, and perhaps with China as well.26

Second, Vitaly Shlykov, former cochairman of the Russian Defense Council and GRU overseer of the military-industrial complex, contends that these losses will be compounded by "structural militarization," that is, an institutional propensity for over-building military-industrial capabilities in preparation for winning a "total" war.27 His seminal insight here is that rearmament won't just mean revving up idle capacities; it will lead to the restoration of exorbitant strategic reserves, redundant capabilities, and heavy locational dispersion costs that will starve military and economic modernization. Instead of scaling defense forces to the level of the current probable threat, as the West does, the Russian military industrial complex prepares for every contingency, a mind-set which causes extravagant waste. For example, during the Soviet period steel and aluminum production...
vastly exceeded internal requirements, with surplus output being reprocessed, or added to the overstocked war mobilization strategic reserve. These peacetime excesses served the Soviet Union well in the Second World War, but if resumed tomorrow will constitute a tremendous economic burden that goes far beyond the hoary guns versus butter debate because much of the redundant procurement capacities are likely to have no military value in future conflicts.28

Putin cannot afford this extravagance. The command model is inefficient enough in itself without having to shoulder the additional burden of structural militarization, yet this is precisely what Shlykov predicts will happen, severely constraining Russia's development and growth prospects at a time when America and China are surging ahead. Figure 2 illustrates Moscow's dilemma. It shows that if Russia's per capita GDP grows between 1995 and 2025 at the rate of the late 1990s, its living standard and military economic potential will be dwarfed by all the other great powers.29 Not only America's, but also China's per capita income will be more than ten times Russia's. Forecasts of these kinds, of course, are not chiseled in stone. Perhaps the Kremlin will do better, and China's heated growth will decelerate. Putin's rearmament pump priming itself should give Moscow a temporary respite. However, the broad picture is basically correct. The command model, whether Schachtian or Soviet, is inferior, and won't allow Russia either to keep up with the RMA and the IW revolution or prevent the other great powers from leaving it economically in the dust. Since culture and politics almost certainly prevent Putin from switching to Western free enterprise, try as he might Russia is likely to remain trapped between a rock and a hard place—unless of course the West and China unilaterally withdraw from the security competition.

Strategic Independence

Economic and cultural forces thus appear to be fundamentally reshaping the foundations of post-Cold War security policymaking. Throughout the Cold War, American leaders appeared to believe that it was too costly and dangerous to strive for security independence, settling instead for doctrines of mutual deterrence and superpower parity. Whenever expensive defense programs like “Star Wars” were proposed, many persuasively argued that they would exacerbate the “arms race” and be overwhelmed by Soviet countermeasures. Whatever merits these old arguments might have had, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dismal decade of Yeltsinism have proven that the Russian military-industrial complex cannot cope with sustained competition at any level of intensity. This creates the possibility for the United States of a radically new implicit or explicit security doctrine based on strategic independence. Instead of assuming that some form of parity, achieved through bilateral force reductions (despite the ever present risks of deception) always minimizes the danger of great power conflict, America finds itself in a position to exercise flexible superiority by building forces like national ballistic missile defense which countervail the Russians regardless of the procurement strategy they choose to adopt. By incorporating strategic independence in our doctrine, and demonstrating the capability from time to time, we should be able to tutor Putin into restricting rearmament pump priming to levels legitimate for the Federation's security. And this principle by extension may hold us in good stead in managing the destabilizing
threats emanating from South Asia, China, North Korea, and perhaps later Japan, if events trigger a nuclear arms spiral involving these nations and Russia. The economic feasibility of strategic independence of course does not make it wise, but the novel concept does appear to deserve thoughtful consideration.

**Figure 2: Great Power Per Capita GDP Growth, 1995-2025**


**Chaos Theory**

The possibility that America may have a strategic independence card, because Russia can neither make Schachtian command work efficiently nor transition to a market economy, conflicts with Western economic idealism. Although few today are prepared to argue that
command economies are as good or better than free enterprise, there is a deep-seated reluctance to concede that this means Russian-type economies will always underperform. Without any basis in competitive theory, many appear to believe that all systems can be modified, allowing lagging economies to converge to a common high frontier. It is therefore important to draw attention to the fact that the gap between rich and poor nations has been persistently widening throughout the postwar era and that there is no evidence to support the notion that all types of market economies succeed equally.

Economic performance corresponds much better with the revolutionary diversity of mathematical chaos theory, where multiple systems coexist in various states of order and unpredictability rather than converging to a unitary ideal as rational expectations theorists contend. Historical economic systems replicate themselves like Mandlebrot fractals, even though they are internally buffeted by chaotic turbulence and unpredictable sequences of disequilibrating events. Their specifications can evolve gradually, as the Soviet Union did for three decades after Stalin's death, or in quantum leaps (Yeltsinism), and occasionally they can transform or perish in response to external shocks, chaotic or otherwise. The hypothesis that the Russian command paradigm will persist for the next quarter century, from the perspective of chaos theory, thus means that neither internal nor external perturbations will be sufficient to constructively transform the dominant culture-driven pattern. Russians are not unreasonable. The behavioral patterns they prefer, like asset grabbing, asset stripping, and rent seeking, or authoritarian command, just do not happen to be compatible with the efficiency axioms of Adam Smith's invisible hand. Their conduct is no stranger than the idealist notion that people everywhere eschew privilege and scrupulously adhere to the principles of fair play.

Chaos theory also provides some insight into the conditions under which strategic independence should be preferred. The crucial factor is chaotic turbulence. If the environment is mostly well ordered and stable, then strategic independence is superfluous and potentially destabilizing. If, however, it is volatile, as the threat of Russian rearmament and Asian/Eurasian nuclear rivalries suggest, then strategic independence may be the lesser evil.

**Conclusion**

Russia has the capability, motive, and perhaps the resolve to rearm, but it probably lacks the ability to either devise a command model which can militarily subdue other great powers or permit Putin to transition to competitive free enterprise. As such, given the mounting peril of an Asian/Eurasian arms spiral and the risks of conflict elsewhere on the Federation's periphery, Russia should be viewed as a potential vortex of international security destabilization that probably can be better managed through an implicit or explicit policy of strategic independence than the obsolete Cold War concept of superpower parity.
Endnotes


2. Perhaps in frustration, Russian armed forces resorted to terror attacks on civilian populations with vacuum bombs. For a graphic documentary, see “Chechnya,” broadcast by the BBC, March 9, 2000.


4. Steven Rosefielde, “Comparative Production Potential in the USSR and the West: Pre-Transition Assessments,” in Steven Rosefielde, ed., Efficiency and Russia’s Economic Recovery Potential to the Year 2000 and Beyond, Ashgate, Aldergate, 1998, Table 7.A6, p.131. Bergson’s data form the core, and were updated with supplementary information.

5. Russia’s share of the Soviet capital stock was 62 percent. Narodnoe khoziaistvo, 1990, p.290.

6. Allowing for the growth of America’s capital stock during the Nineties increases the disparity.


9. Despite the drastic decline in new capital formation, the share of investment in aggregate Russian GDP is still officially greater than in America. However, discrepancies between savings and investment statistics cast doubt on the Federation’s national income share data.


13. Rapawy's estimates for the Soviet Union, adjusted for Russia using the Soviet labor force participation rate of 50.6 percent, indicates that the Federation labor force in 1990 was 77.0 million, 3.9 million more than the figure for 1998. The 5.1 percent estimated decline is computed from these numbers, but readers should note that it may be distorted in either direction by differences in the definition of employment used by the American Census Bureau and Goskomstat.


18. Ibid, Table 8.1, p.549.


22. The Deputy Director of the Ministry of Science and Technology Education told me gleefully in 1992 that the destruction of communism was a bonanza, a once-in-a-century opportunity to plunder neighbors and become fabulously rich.

24. If properly advised, Putin can mollify Western institutional advisors by pump priming without rearmament, although given the size of the military-industrial complex the approach will generate smaller returns. “Conversion” rarely works, and cannot be expected to provide substantial compensation.

25. If Putin carried out a successful pump priming campaign, he would be in a better position to proceed further by embracing Western-style transition. But it would be a mistake to conclude that because he could, he will. At the end of the day, Putin will find himself back at square one, with a more marketized variant of Gorbachev’s command regime, handicapped by entrenched kleptocracy. Like his illustrious predecessor, he will have to choose once again between gradualism and “shock therapy;” between the risk of elite sabotage, and the perils of anarchy. Cf. Harvey Sicherman, “Yeltsin’s Legacy and Putin’s Plans,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (E-Notes) January 18, 2000 [fpri@fpri.org].


28. Lennart Samuelson, a Swedish economic historian and archival scholar who has closely studied what he calls Russia’s “mobilization” model concurs with Shlykov’s judgment, and argues that Stalin’s war preparedness saved Russia during the Second World War. Samuelson traces the concept to the Czarist advisor Ivan(Jan) Bloch in the 1890s, documenting the broad adoption of total war mobilization doctrine in Western Europe during the ensuing 60 years. See Rot koloss pa larvfotter-Rysslands Ekonomi i Skuggan av 1900-Talskrigen, SNS Forlag, 1999, and Samuelson, Plan’s for Stalin’s War-Machine Tukhachevskii and Military Economic Planning, 1925-1941, New York: MacMillan, 1999.

29. Dollar measures of comparative economic size, whether computed through the exchange rate or with the purchasing power parity methodology, do not accurately reflect production potential of priority sectors in command economies. Although Russian consumer goods continue to be inferior, and mostly unmarketable in the West, the quality of its weapons is much closer to world standards, and its mass procurement capabilities are prodigious.


Part Two: The State of the Military

Introduction

Stephen J. Blank

Russia is now entering the second year of its second Chechen war. Like its predecessor, this war was supposed to be terminated quickly and victoriously by the Russian army; and, as happened in the first Chechen war, this forecast proved to be completely inaccurate. This ongoing military failure points to the continuing inability of the Russian military establishment, including the defense industry, to come to terms with post-Soviet reality. Each of the chapters contained in this section reflects the varying degrees to which military reform has or has not come to terms with current realities, either succeeding or failing to make the transition to a new era. In retrospect, we can observe that one of the signal failures of the Yeltsin era was the overwhelming neglect of military affairs by the government. Yeltsin and his officials did not so much demilitarize the armed forces as they let it decompose. As a result, the social pathologies of the armed forces—hazing, corruption, brutality, politicization—that began under Gorbachev and Yeltsin have flourished since 1991. As Dale Herspring and Deborah Ball indicate, the basic organism of the armed forces is now a very sick one, and, given Russia’s poverty and structural defects that make military reform a difficult and often unrewarding challenge to political leaders, few good solutions are in sight.

As John Reppert shows, the armed forces and the political leadership have both decisively failed to deal with the requirements of reform and adapt their thinking and force-sizing requirements to present military challenges. Nor have they figured out how to transition to a professional army or to build forces capable of fighting in a high-tech environment. Although there has been some substantial progress in creating force packages to wage the second Chechen war, as demonstrated by Michael Orr, such measures have not dealt effectively and perhaps could not deal effectively with the macro-strategic problems plaguing the armed forces. A readiness to rethink traditional strategic verities, verities that survived due to the enormous isolation of the Soviet Union from Western thinking and were then embedded in social and cognitive structures that are difficult to uproot, has proven to be missing in the armed forces.

Moreover, as Alexander Kennaway forcefully reveals, the defense industry (and perhaps industry as a whole) has shown itself utterly unable of coming to terms with contemporary requirements for engineering, marketing, product design, and a host of other requirements that could make Russian products competitive either commercially or militarily. As a result, Russian industry is unable to cope with contemporary challenges, the armed forces cannot obtain the weapons it needs and wants, and both still believe that Russia will be bailed out by government orders or that it must be prepared to fight traditional superpower coalitions and wars. Thus neither the armed forces nor the defense industry are ready for the challenges
presented by the current Chechen war and the bitter infighting in military and industrial circles for resources. The scapegoating for these failures that has already begun can only further weaken an already dangerously enfeebled and sick patient.
"All the signs of a social crisis in the military are evident."

—Armeiskii sbornik, journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, January 1997

When Michael Howard published his now classic book Soldiers and Governments over 30 years ago, the overriding issue in the field of civil-military relations was how to create a military force that was strong enough to defend the nation from external aggression while simultaneously preventing it “from crushing internal liberties?” More succinctly, “How could the armed forces and their leaders be prevented from acting as an independent and usually decisive factor in politics?”

Current civil-military relations in Russia have turned Howard’s concern on its proverbial head. The question is no longer how can the civilian leadership keep the military out of politics, but how can the military keep the civilian leadership from politicizing the armed forces? Numerous articles have been published in Russia that openly discuss the politicization of the military and the disastrous effects it has had on both society and the combat readiness of the armed forces. A remarkably candid essay in the General Staff Journal Armeiskii sbornik, for instance, notes that in the beginning of the 1990s, the official government position was that “the army stood outside of politics.” Leaders “called upon the army to guarantee stability and order in society ... but this did not diminish the level of combat readiness of the armed forces.” The article contends that this lofty talk gave way to a reality in which the army was called upon to become involved in social and political activities to the detriment of both it and society: “The army’s participation did not promote a settlement of the contradictions and conflicts, but exacerbated them.” Moreover, these activities, culminated in the “inglorious war in Chechnya [which] only exacerbated destructive processes in the military [and created] disastrous conditions in the formerly powerful and combat effective army.” These quotations refer, of course, to the first Chechen war, but the use of the military to resolve political disputes characterizes the second Chechen war as well.

Another example in which the misuse of force was contemplated occurred in June 1996 when Yeltsin considered calling off the Presidential elections out of fear that he would lose. Yeltsin’s plot required the support of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), but he ultimately scuttled the plan after the MVD’s Minister, Anatoly Kulikov, declared that he could not guarantee the loyalty of his troops in this particular action.

This politicization of the military—using the military for political purposes—in combination with the abysmal state of the Russian military, has led a number of analysts to suggest that the military has asserted undue influence in the political arena and may possibly
stage a coup. I do not agree. Although the military's deplorable economic situation and loss of prestige certainly provide a motive, it is highly unlikely that the Russian military will employ force to rectify perceived unjust treatment. The Russian military today manifests no sign of wanting to stage a coup or becoming involved in high politics. The reason is that the Russian military was well socialized in the Soviet era and still retains its sense of responsibility to society.

Yet, although the military is responsible in the sense that Samuel Huntington, in his classic volume, The Soldier and the State, defined professional responsibility, the Yeltsin leadership, both intentionally and through neglect (or what might bettered malign neglect), undermined the military's sense of corporateness and expertise—Huntington's two additional key components of a professional army. When officers are forced to seek second jobs to survive, for example, they no longer feel part of a unique community because their organization is not adequately providing for their well-being. Their level of expertise also declines because outside work prevents them from honing their special skills. The many social problems pervading the military also prevent them from focusing on their profession; the effort required simply to find food and winter clothing for their troops can be almost a full-time occupation.

Yet, the military is unlikely to stage a coup because the first component of professionalism—a sense of responsibility to authority and belief in civilian rule—is a more important factor than corporateness and expertise. Resorting to violence can yield uncertain results and is a difficult task to undertake. To be sure, there are individuals in the civilian workplace and the military who resort to force after feeling betrayed by their organization, but staging a military coup depends on many people, not just a few disgruntled individuals. Moreover, Russian military officers do have options. They can leave the military, remain in the military (and misuse or abuse the system), or simply accept their current status. Most proponents of the coup theory tend to ignore that the officers have choices.

But even if the military does not stage a coup, the current situation in Russia is dire, producing enormous repercussions for state-building in Russia. In order for the state to create effective institutions that can extract resources, whether it be taxes, manpower, or support, and serve the needs of its citizens so that they in turn are willing to comply with the rules of the state, the citizens must view the newly created institutions as legitimate. Unfortunately, as Gordon B. Smith points out, "Russia is confronting, at its most fundamental level, a problem of state-building." The Russian government is not meeting the basic needs of its citizens, and this is certainly evident in the microcosmic world of the military.

This chapter will describe the government's inability to create modern, effective political institutions followed by an assessment of the military's sense of responsibility, corporateness, and expertise. The military still feels responsible to society, but the other components of its professional demeanor are eroding. The result is a military that can no longer adequately provide for the security of Russia.
Russia as a Failing State

At the core of the failure of the post-communist Russian government is its failure to create modern governing and policymaking institutions. Policymaking is a multi-step process involving policy formulation and decisionmaking, implementation, and outcome. The most important policies in Russia under Yeltsin were issued in the forms of presidential decrees rather than by a consensus of lawmakers. Legislators were frequently kept in the dark about government policies and the very institutions they were expected to supervise. In the area of defense policy, for instance, the Duma committees charged with making decisions about the military and providing oversight frequently did not possess vital information about the organizations they were assigned to oversee. Mikhail Zadornov, Chairman of the State Duma's Budget Committee in 1997, complained that the draft budget contained “no article on the strength of the armed forces because the government would not tell the legislators how many personnel were under arms.”

The Duma's Committee on Defense had access to a mere 11 lines out of 128 that dealt with defense issues in the 1996 budget. Needless to say, there can be no serious formulation of policy and no informed decisions on the policy recommendations of others when incomplete information is made available.

Something akin to an interagency process that considers options, analyzes outcomes, and reaches a consensus so that the policies chosen are for the good of the country and not for the good of a particular organization or a few individuals is essentially non-existent in Russia. To be sure, who prevails in an interagency forum, such as in the United States, is often a function of individual personalities and personal ties. This is the nature of politics. But the individuals involved must build a consensus through the strength of their arguments as well as their connections.

In Russia, the only connection that appears to matter is to the one on top. As Stephen Blank notes with regard to the Yeltsin presidency, “Each interested agent either acts on his own, runs to his boss, or with his boss appeals to Yeltsin, who, like a Tsar, maintains final authority.” This not only creates a situation in which policy is formulated as a result of personal jockeying and personal relationships, but, when President Yeltsin was absent or medically incapacitated, there was no formulation of policy at all. As a result, the country was virtually paralyzed. Nowhere was this problem more apparent than in the functioning of the Defense Council which Yeltsin created in July 1996 to deal with the issue of military reform. Despite Yeltsin’s insistence that military reform be addressed, the Defense Council managed only to engage in acrimonious discussions, most notably between its secretary Yuri Baturin and then Defense Minister Igor Rodionov. A meeting had been called for January 8, 1997, that was to be chaired by Yeltsin with the hope of resolving the internal disputes. However, Yeltsin’s poor health led to the meeting’s cancellation. The meeting was postponed numerous times while the military sat idle with no direction.

The days of the Baturin-Rodionov clashes are over, and military reform has proceeded further under Minister of Defense Sergeyev, but the reforms have been primarily administrative rather than the deep restructuring so badly needed. The Air Force and Air Defense Forces have been consolidated, the number of military districts is being reduced from eight to six, and the military districts themselves are being reorganized in an attempt to
make sure that the districts of the power ministries—the MOD, MVD, and Border Guards—coincide.14

Developing common districts for all the power structures is an important step, as it will eliminate needless duplication of resources; it is expensive to maintain excessive logistical, administrative, and technical support. Also, a single coordinated command structure within a region will lead to better use of the forces, depending on the nature of the military response required: war, a domestic hostage situation, domestic conflict, terrorism, and so on.

Despite recent exercises to test this concept—i.e., the August 1998 command post exercise in the Caucasus region and the April 1999 Far East military district exercise (the latter being the first time the MOD commanded all other power forces in a district)—the evidence indicates that the actual implementation of this plan has a long way to go.15 The reason for the delay is partially financial. In the short term it costs money to lay off people and become more efficient.

The continued bickering between Defense Minister Sergeyev and Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin has also contributed to the hold-up. Sergeyev’s two-year old proposal for a unified Strategic Nuclear Command is still in the “discussion” phase. Kvashnin opposed the plan and Yeltsin refused to make a decision about which side to support. It remains to be seen whether President Putin will be more decisive in this arena. In any event, that serious reform is needed to improve combat efficiency is recognized by the Russian people as well. In a 1999 poll conducted by the Public Opinion Fund, over half the respondents (51%) stated that the Russian army was unable to ensure the country’s security and two-thirds (64%) of the respondents felt that army reform was badly needed.16

To compound problems still further, even when a decision is made by the leadership, the implementation stage of policymaking is undermined by the absence in Russia of the rule of law and the inability of agencies to effectively implement policies.17 As far as policy outcomes are concerned, the press has provided a relatively accurate assessment of the government’s effectiveness or lack thereof. However, the press’s limited access to the Chechen war as well as the government’s blatant misuse of the press in the 1999 Duma elections point to a press that is far less independent than previously thought. In fact, as acting President, Putin authorized subsidies to 2,500 local newspapers totaling 6 million dollars. This raised concerns that Moscow is trying to influence or even assert control over the press nationwide.18 Even on those issues where it is able to report candidly, there is no real accountability because laws to ensure compliance either do not exist, are contradictory, or are not enforced. Ministers and heads of agencies are susceptible to corruption because even if the press reports corruption, there are no reliable or impartial bodies equipped to investigate serious allegations, let alone initiate prosecution. It is thus tempting to conclude that the Russian government exists in name only.19
The Russian Military's Sense of Responsibility to Society

Some believe that Russia's feeble institutional structure gives the military a certain leeway that may eventually culminate in its posing a direct threat to civilian rule in Russia. I argue that despite the poor treatment of the military by the political leadership, the military is a professional organization that has internalized the civilian leadership's instructions of the past 80 years that civilians should run the country, allowing the military to serve the country in its area of expertise, namely, the defense of the nation.

When the military was called upon to storm the White House in Yeltsin's 1993 showdown with Parliament, the military initially refused to obey the orders of their commander-in-chief because they did not think it appropriate to resolve domestic political disputes with force. In a private meeting between Yeltsin and 30 officers from the elite Vympel and Alfa units on the morning of October 4th, "nobody uttered a word" when Yeltsin inquired whether they were "prepared to fulfill the President's order?" Even after posing the question in a different way, "Are you refusing to obey the President's order?" he was met with dead silence. Of course, the troops eventually did storm the Parliamentary building, but only after Yeltsin met the military's demand to put his order in writing. The military had borne the brunt of the public's wrath for quelling domestic disputes in Tbilisi (1989), Baku (1990), and Vilnius (1991) and refused to be the object of blame yet again for decisions made by the political leadership.

Others have pointed to the military's attempt to beat NATO peacekeeping troops in the race to Pristina in the summer of 1999 as further evidence of the military acting independently in the political arena. Although many key government officials were kept in the dark, such as Prime Minister Stepashin, Foreign Minister Ivanov, and the President's special envoy to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Viktor Chernomyrdin, it was Yeltsin, himself, who approved of the dash to Pristina by approximately 200 Russian soldiers. Yeltsin gave his permission directly to the Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, who in turn gave General Viktor Zavarzin the nod to proceed. Thus, the dash to Pristina was not a rogue military operation, either at the field level or at the headquarters level.

Further evidence of the military's acceptance of civilian rule and its responsibility to serve the state is found in the ease with which defense ministers leave their posts once relieved of their duties. All Russian defense ministers have left their posts without any hint of extra-constitutional resistance to the state. This stands in stark contrast to the recent events in the Ivory Coast where the Minister of Defense staged a successful coup after being dismissed. Civilians control military appointments in Russia, and this is accepted by the military. If either Sergeyev or Kvashnin were fired tomorrow, they would both abide by the decision and leave their posts.

The recent draft of the new Russian military doctrine was produced as a result of close coordination with the civilian leadership. Unlike most decisions made in Moscow, the document appears to have been produced by an interagency group comprised of 14 ministries, agencies, and military research institutes. Moreover, the military doctrine was drafted
with the new national security concept in mind, thereby ensuring that the civilian view of the world and future threats would be represented in military doctrine.

Some have pointed to the large number of military officers who ran in the December 1995 Parliamentary elections as evidence of the military's inappropriate involvement in politics. Although the military fielded 123 candidates, they were working within the democratic process and not against it. Unlike the previous Parliamentary election wherein Defense Minister Pavel Grachev discouraged military candidates, this time around the minister encouraged officers to run. The large number of officers running for office signified a marked increase in political activism by the nation's arms bearers, raising fears among observers that democracy would give way to Bonapartism. But, as I argued then, those fears were unfounded.

The dire economic situation drove many officers to seek elected office. Having long been the darlings of the Soviet economy, the officer corps was especially hard hit with the demise of the Soviet Union. Politicians were not delivering on their promises to improve the military's lot once elected. As Krasnaya zvezda observed, “You can count on your fingers the number of [parliamentary] deputies who actually care about the military.” The military decided to field a large number of candidates not to subvert the democratic process, but to advance its own interests within that process.

In the recent 1999 Parliamentary election, only 38 candidates from the military ran for office, considerably fewer than in 1995. The reasons for the reduction are as yet unclear, but may be a result of the military's relatively unsuccessful attempts to gain office in 1995, leading them to believe that it is not an avenue worth pursuing. Alternatively, given the military's low prestige in society and dearth of strong, respected military leaders at the top, the political parties may have seen no benefit to having a “military man” at the head of their ticket, something they all had desired in the previous election.

**Undermining the Military’s Sense of Corporateness**

A sense of unity and belonging to a group that adheres to the high standards set by the profession is the second criterion of professionalism. As Huntington states, “This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility.” The economic and social problems prevalent in the Russian military are eroding the sense of corporateness among the Russian officer corps. Every individual has numerous responsibilities and plays a number of roles in society. The officer is not only a professional military man, but a father and husband as well. When the economic situation creates tension among these various roles, then the officer may feel less responsibility to the professional organization that is not living up to its social contract and thereby not allowing him to take adequate care of his family. The poor economic situation in the military is causing the officer corps to behave less than responsibly toward his military organization.
The Social Ills of the Russian Military

Health Issues. The health problems prevalent in Russia obviously affect the military as well. Most statistics focus on the conscripts, but the officer corps is also deeply affected. The military recognizes that healthy personnel are a key component of combat readiness, but it is operating in a larger environment that lacks the basic requirements for good health: quality water is not available in all the regions of the RF, food is frequently contaminated, heat and electricity are often turned off because of insufficient funds. The military has seen a dramatic increase in the number of its personnel requiring treatment for serious ailments such as cardiovascular disease and malignant tumors.

The number of oncological illnesses has risen at military medical institutes to 23,000 patients per year. But the military is a mirror of the larger society in which it resides: “One out of five Russian inhabitants suffers from cancer in one form or another!” The number of cases of tuberculosis has doubled in the armed forces from only a few years back. In response, the Main Military Medical Directorate (GVMU) has developed a six-year program to combat TB in the army. The goal of this program is to reduce the rate of illness by 10 percent annually. The goal of reducing TB by 10 percent suggests that the military is using the same type of vaccine that is used only in underdeveloped countries. Given limited resources, in particular the unavailability of needles, it is questionable whether the military will be able to achieve its objective of reducing the rate of illness in servicemen by even 10 percent.

Psychiatric disorders have also increased among servicemen. The last two years alone have witnessed a 19 percent increase among officers. Among the central causes given for such problems are the stressful state of conditions for families trying to make ends meet in Russia as well as alcohol and drug addiction. Most astounding is the report that suicides accounted for 27 percent of all military fatalities in 1998. Conscripts commit more suicides (60%) than officers and warrant officers (40%), but the number is quite large for both groups. These are astonishing statistics that would never be tolerated in a developed nation.

Hazing. Dedovshchina or hazing is a well-known problem in the Russian military. What appears to be a new phenomenon in the post-Soviet era is that the practice of dedovshchina is being conducted not merely by the senior conscripts but by commissioned officers as well. In one instance, lieutenants with “brains, inflamed by alcohol, suggested the only option for solving all their problems—it was necessary to beat up their subordinates…. As a result, six men were severely beaten up.” In another instance, an officer serving in the Caucasus “slammed” [a private’s] neck so hard that he fractured the soldier’s laryngeal cartilage. But the military leadership at times seems baffled over the large number of youth who avoid military service as well as the large number of deserters. They claim that “Russian citizens have lost their sense of responsibility for the country’s safety” and that rather than encouraging the youth to join the military, “it has become fashionable to save the boys from the horrors of the barracks.” The practices that take place in the barracks are indeed horrific. The practice of dedovshchina has long been routine in the Russian military. Dedovshchina encompasses much more brutality than the usual fraternal practice of humiliating the incoming class by having them clean toilet stalls, run outside without clothes,
consume great quantities of alcohol, and possibly even endure some paddling. Conscripts are beaten up with fists and shovels and often require hospitalization. Rape is not an uncommon occurrence. The treatment is so ignominious that many cannot cope and commit suicide. Having heard intimate details of the practice of dedovshchina, other youth undertake extreme measures to avoid military service including self-mutilation. Although dedovshchina is not a new phenomenon in the Russian military, it appears to have worsened since Soviet times.

Housing and Salary. A social contract that guaranteed officers housing, wages, and medical care for their family, as well as a pension, existed between the Soviet military and the state. These benefits were expected to continue for Russian officers. Russian officers have inherited the legal right to these same benefits, but unfortunately this right exists primarily on paper. Officers go for months without receiving their wages, and often the money they do receive is inadequate to support their families. One reason the money is insufficient is that there is not enough housing for officers’ families, and they have to pay rent if they are even sufficiently lucky to find an apartment. General Yakovlev, head of the Strategic Missile Troops, recently acknowledged that over 16,000 officers do not have permanent housing, which means that they cannot retire for fear of not ever receiving housing.\(^{35}\)

A survey I conducted in the summer of 1995 of 600 Russian field grade officers in twelve regions of Russia revealed that the majority of officers (67%) were dissatisfied with military service. When asked how they viewed the overall economic situation in Russia at the time, 93% viewed it as very bad or fairly bad. Perhaps more significantly, when the officers were asked whether their material well-being—a phrase that encompasses salary, health care, housing, and other benefits discussed above—would have been better if the Soviet Union still existed, three-fourths of the officers said they would indeed have been better off under the old system. One-fifth of the officers believed their material well-being would have been the same. Unfortunately, four years later, the figures probably remain dismal because many officers today are destitute with little hope for improvement, whereas in 1995 there was still some hope of economic progress in the not-too-distant future.\(^{36}\)

Officers Leaving the Military. Rather than seek to subvert the political system, the best officers choose to leave the military, resulting in an enormous shortage of young officers in the military: “They are tired of roaming from one place of service to another and of bad housing conditions and are lured by good prospects and better payment in commercial and other civilian structures.”\(^{37}\) The Strategic Missile Troops appear to be especially susceptible to losing good officers because they have coveted electrical engineering skills that can command high wages in the private sector. A recent article by the military journalist Aleksandr Golts tells of three highly qualified electronics officers who transferred to Moscow from their unit in Chita and were immediately offered jobs in private industry, which they accepted.\(^{38}\)

Officers who leave before finishing their tour of duty do not appear to face any criminal proceedings. During the first Chechen war, the military reported 557 cases in which officers refused to go to Chechnya. There were reports of proceedings against a handful of officers—11 to be precise—but the cases do not appear to have been brought to any conclusion.\(^{39}\) For a variety of reasons, the officers disobeyed orders to serve in Chechnya. And
they probably understood that there was little legal recourse on the part of the military. Loyalty to the military has certainly waned since the Soviet days.  

Officers Seek Second Jobs. Those officers who remain in the military tend to engage in practices that undermine their sense of corporateness and loyalty to the organization, the very traits so necessary to ensure proficient command of the units. The impact on the military is dire. As a result of their economic plight, officers are either compelled to seek additional work outside the military or engage in illegal activities (more on this below). The ramifications of this cannot be underestimated. There can be no order in a military where situations prevail in which an officer, moonlighting as a taxi driver, picks up one of his sergeants who can afford the ride as a result of illegal activities. Combat effectiveness and morale are undermined when the officer spends his time thinking about how to raise money to feed his family rather than focusing on military matters. Chaos reigns in the barracks because there is no one around to hold the troops accountable. Accordingly, combat cohesiveness and effectiveness is thoroughly undermined.

Crime. Crime is an enormous problem in the military, and it is not bounded by rank. From the top generals to the conscripts crime is rampant. Embezzlement is common, including the sale of weapons, munitions, and any other military property. Military personnel sell Stinger-type weapons, air-to-ground missiles, tanks, and planes—basically anything that can be moved. Even honest officers condone the behavior because they often have no other means to pay their troops. Organized crime has penetrated the armed forces, and former army officers are apparently prominent in various Mafia organizations as well. The Minister of Defense, Igor Sergeyev, admitted that in 1997 roughly 18,000 officers were charged with criminal activity. The activities and behavior of senior officers have been particularly corrupt. They not only inappropriately use conscripts to build dachas for themselves, but have developed businesses where they profit by using conscripts to build dachas for others. In the early 1990s, 300 generals built dachas in the suburbs of Moscow using military conscripts and stolen material. Prior to becoming the Defense Minister, General Rodionov publicized corruption among his fellow flag officers. Among the many cases he discussed was the disappearance of $23 million received by the Defense Ministry's budget chief, Vasili Vorobev, from the sale of ammunition to Bulgaria. To date, no charges have been brought against Vorobev.

It should be noted that some officers commit crimes for personal aggrandizement, while others will go to great lengths to obtain food, clothes and other essentials for their troops. Thus it is difficult to assign the same classification to all crimes. I would argue, however, that the overall effect is the same.

The Impact on Conscripts. Taking care of the soldiers is the hallmark of a professional army. In the Russian military, the officers are more like babysitters and watchdogs because the quality of the conscripts is abysmally low. This leaves insufficient time to develop and enhance their military expertise.

Drug Abuse. Drug abuse has become an enormous problem in Russia. The number of drug users has increased roughly 250% between 1993 and 1998. In the past ten years, there has
been a twelve-fold increase in the number of deaths attributed to drug abuse, while the number of drug-related deaths among children “increased by a factor of 42!” 44 Young people between the ages of 18 to 25 years comprise 80 percent of the drug addicts, and it is precisely this age group from which people are called to serve in the military. Drugs appear to have replaced alcohol as the choice substance of abuse. According to a recent report, “The number of children who are addicted to narcotics is six times more than the number of the persons in the same age group who drink alcoholic beverages.” 45

The rate and scale of the spread of narcotics in Russia point to an epidemic and the military has not been able to shield itself from this injurious activity. Statistics on criminal activities indicate that more than half of the soldiers apprehended with drugs in their possession began to use them for the first time during their military service. 46 The Russian Defense Ministry’s main newspaper notes that drug use in the military reflects the drug problem throughout Russian society. “Despite the tightening of measures to keep ‘pot lovers’ out of the draft, their penetration into the army ranks continues.” 47 The military’s claim that it has tried to keep drug addicts out of the army is disingenuous. First, it admits to not having a system to identify the addicts and root them out. 48 At the same time, the military acknowledges that it conscripts teenagers even if there are many needle markings on their arm: “If a person has pricked veins, that still is not a reason to reject him or her for military service.” Unless it can prove that the youth in question is an addict rather than a casual drug user, the military conscripts the youth. 49

Why No Military Coup?

Given the poor state of the Russian military, many analysts have inquired why it has not staged a coup. The reasons are numerous. David Mendeloff argues that although the officer corps has a strong motive to stage a military coup, they do not have the capability to carry one out as a result of the many difficulties facing the military itself. 50 Stephen Meyer’s response to this query was, “What military?” Meyer believes that the military has been too fractured along too many dimensions to act as a cohesive unit capable of carrying out a coup. 51 I would also mention four additional factors. First, the military does not possess the expertise to develop better solutions to improve the economic and social well-being of the citizens in Russia. Second, although the military feels its status in society has declined and that it is worse off than during Soviet days, other groups in society have experienced the same decline—notably Russian scientists. The military, possibly recognizing that other professional groups have experienced a similar loss of status in society, most likely views its lot as a result of the demise of the previous system, to which most members do not desire to return. Third, polls indicate that while the military does not fully support capitalism, but in fact prefers a mix of socialism and the free market, the vast majority supports democracy and its concomitant rule by civilian leaders. 52 Fourth, some in the military have benefited from the enormous and pervasive corruption and may not desire change.
Independent Military Action

To be sure, there are instances where the military has acted on behalf of its own interests without having its actions sanctioned by Moscow. For example, when suppliers cut off electricity to units because the military had failed to pay the bill, the units have taken over the power stations to restore the electricity. This happened twice in Chita in 1994, in the cities of Borzinsk and Chernyshevsky, and happened as recently as October 1999 in the region of Altay where an armed detail from a nearby Strategic Missile Troops division seized the local power station. They occupied the building, confiscated the keys, and kept the operating staff out for several days. In Latvia in 1994, a local official had the Latvian militia surround a Russian army compound because he wanted evidence that retiring servicemen had obtained residency permits. Three Russian generals arrived to negotiate the situation, but the local official, acting brazenly and foolishly, had them arrested. (He had the audacity to think he could do as he pleased in his own country.) Russian troops were immediately placed on alert and notified the Latvian government that the troops would be ready to enter the country in 15 minutes. The incident was resolved swiftly, as the local official who was heady with independence was fired. Finally, General Lebed’s actions in Moldova appear not always to have been sanctioned by the top civilian leadership, though the complete details on that war remains to be uncovered.

Conclusion

The dissolving sense of corporateness and expertise has had enormous consequences for the military as a whole. The poor conditions and lack of pay in the military have led to serious officer and enlisted manpower problems. Most companies, battalions, and regiments in the land forces are below the required manpower levels. This results in a loss of fighting effectiveness. Aleksei Arbatov, a member of the Duma and staff member of the Duma Defense Committee, wrote a penetrating analysis of the spiraling adverse effects of the abysmal social conditions in the military in 1995, which is as true today as it was then: poor social conditions “undermine army morale. Officers have to work without enlisted men and take their places, and the soldiers who are conscripted have to do double duty. The result is more harassment of subordinates and increased draft evasion.”

The number of desertions has increased as well. Officers and conscripts deserted the military in the first Chechen war. Within the first year of the war, many left because they were not receiving their salaries. Moreover, as reports filtered out about how the units were quickly cobbled together, had little training time as a unit, and were thus ill-prepared to fight, mothers came to Chechnya to retrieve their sons. In the second Chechen war—the popular one—the number of draftees evading service has increased sharply. Although mothers need to have “intimate knowledge of arcane regulations” and to be willing to move their families, they are doing this and taking any other necessary actions to keep their sons out of the war.
Moreover, the quality of the troops and officers serving in Chechnya is of less than professional quality. Top military officers are accepting bribes to spare local civilians’ homes from shelling and looting, while the Chechens are buying arms from Russian soldiers, which they then use to fight them. The Kafkaesque nature of both Chechen wars is truly frightening.

Thus, while the Russian military has no desire to stage a coup, the political leadership’s irresponsible treatment of the military and the military’s failure to reform itself has created an army that has lost its unique identity and its fighting expertise. It should have come as no surprise to the West that the new Russian military doctrine stresses the importance of nuclear weapons to ensure the survival of the Russian state, for it cannot expect to fight a major power successfully using conventional means.

Endnotes

1. This article was written under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-74-05-Eng-48. The views expressed here are those of the author and not the Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, or the U.S. government.


7. Huntington’s defined a professional officer as one having a sense of responsibility to society, a sense of belonging to a unique community (corporateness), and expertise in a specialized skill. For a more detailed explanation of these concepts, see The Soldier and the State, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 7-18.


10. Smith offers a more sanguine view of Russia’s state-building record under Yeltsin than I myself hold. It remains to be seen whether President Putin tries to build effective institutions rather than destroy them.


13. The Siberian and the Trans-Baikal Military Districts have been merged, now comprising the new Siberian MD. The Volga and the Ural Military Districts are expected to be merged into a single Volga-Ural MD.


17. David Satter asserts that “it is virtually impossible in today's Russia to distinguish legal from criminal business. At the same time, criminals, in many respects, have replaced the judicial system, collecting debts, settling disputes, and enforcing contracts....” See “Russia's Lost Sense of Morality,” Prism, April 18, 1997.


19. Maria Latynina states that “during the 1990s the central government has disappeared, leaving behind only a web of personal relationships that sets the boundaries within which government and business operate. At the lower levels, these relationships evolve into organized crime; at the top, they develop into organized corruption. Quoted in Blank, “Towards the Failing State,” p. 3.


21. I am grateful to John Reppert for a valuable discussion on this point.


27. Huntington, p. 10.


30. Ibid., 1.

31. Ibid., 1.


40. Aside from the fact that an officer probably could not get away with disobeying an order to serve in the Soviet days, it is unlikely that they would have desired to do so as their sense of corporateness was stronger.


47. Altunin and Ivaniuk, p. 1.


52. Ball and Gerber.


The Continuing Disintegration of the Russian Military

Dale R. Herspring

“There were virtually no units which were combat ready in 1997.”
— Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev

Introduction

All indications are that in spite of the very public role being played by the Russian military in Moscow’s efforts to subdue Chechen rebels, the situation inside the Russian armed forces—both in terms of material and personnel—is continuing to deteriorate. Indeed, the situation is so bad that unless the Kremlin is prepared to allocate greater resources to both reforming and modernizing the Russian military, it could soon find itself incapable of conducting combat operations on a significant scale.

In arguing the above proposition, I plan to address two broad topics. First is the question of the material situation within the armed forces. Second, I will address some of the personnel issues that seem to plague the Russian military. To some this discussion may seem at bit tedious and repetitive. I would argue, however, that it is impossible to discuss the role of the military without understanding in some depth just how serious the situation is within Moscow’s armed forces. As those who have spent time either working in or analyzing military issues know, turning around a military force that is in the kind of shape that the Russian armed forces finds itself in will not be easy. It will take considerable time and effort. The lead-time on many weapons systems exceeds five years from planning to production, and convincing a new generation of young Russians to serve in the armed forces will likewise be very difficult. Finally, I will take a look at the long-term implications of this situation for the future of national security policy in Russia.

The Material Situation Facing the Russian Military

Despite Defense Minister Marshal Igor Segeyev’s comment on July 19, 1999, to the effect that Russia’s armed forces are “combat ready, controllable, and capable of ensuring the military security of the country,” the fact is that the material situation facing the Russian military is nothing short of disastrous. Its equipment is outdated, and its budgetary situation gives no reason to believe the situation will improve any time soon. Indeed, the situation appears to be so bad that with the exception of some of its airborne troops, its conventional troops are in disarray.
Everywhere one looks, the Russian military is beset with problems. The key issue facing the army for the past ten years has been money. Every year since 1993 it has seen its budget cut and cut again. This would not be so bad if the military actually received the money it was promised. More often than not, however, it has had to try and run itself on empty promises. For example, in 1993 the shortfall was one billion rubles, in 1994 it was 12.2 billion, in 1995 it was 6 billion, and in 1997 it was 34.4 billion. The military has been arguing for a budget share of at least 3.5 percent, but even were the armed forces to get a budget that large, there is no certainty that they will not be treated as in the past—by receiving only a portion of what they had been promised. To make matters worse, the Kremlin's decision to send 3,600 soldiers to Kosovo — not to mention the 100,000 that were sent to Chechnya—is straining the military budget even further. It was necessary to come up with an additional $50 million just to cover costs for the Kosovo operation in 1999.

These constant budget shortfalls have had a cataclysmic impact on the military as a whole. Consider weapons. Because of cutbacks in weapons purchases (only two combat aircraft were purchased in 1995 compared to 585 in 1991), by 1998 only 30 percent of all weapons in the Russian inventory were modern—while in NATO countries the number stood at 60-80 percent. If current conditions continue, by 2005 only five to seven percent of weapons will be new, thereby relegating Russia's military to the status of a Third World country's. Moscow's worry about weapons does not end with the need for new weapon systems. Existing equipment is also in bad need of repair. Sergeyev noted as recently as April 1998 that 53 percent of all aircraft, as well as 40 percent of their anti-aircraft systems, helicopters, armored equipment and artillery, were in need of repair. The navy is in even worse condition, with more than 70 percent of its ships in need of major repairs. The tragic loss of the submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea in August 2000 was only one indicator of the serious problems facing the military.

Equipment problems have had a disastrous impact on Russian combat operations. For example, in its losing war in Chechnya, the army discovered in 1994-95 that it did not have enough money to carry out these costly operations. It was necessary to take money out of the regular budget, thereby further worsening the army's ability to meet is budgetary commitments. The situation was so bad that the boots and winter hats worn by Russian troops in the first Chechen war were paid for by a bank in Moscow—the army simply did not have the money to buy such “luxuries.” Furthermore, because of a lack of modern weapons, the military is continuing to rely on weapons and shells from an earlier time—some going back as far as World War II—in its war against the Chechens.

The financial situation deteriorated to the point that by 1997 almost all government meteorological stations had stopped passing critical weather information to the military, and former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had to sign an order forcing power stations to keep supplying military installations with power even if they had not paid their electricity bills. In spite of this action, on July 20, 1999, it was reported that a local electricity supplier in the Far East cut off power—because the Russian military had not paid its bills. As a consequence, radar units were unable to monitor the country's air borders and troops not only lacked electricity but were also temporarily out of water since it had to be pumped. This
was at least the third time that sensitive military installations have found themselves without power because of unpaid bills.

As far as equipment is concerned, the situation is not likely to get better any time soon. On February 8, 1999, Marshal Sergeyev told an audience at the Air Defense University in Tver that the Russian armed forces would not start receiving new weapons until the year 2005. Until then, existing weapons would have to be repaired and updated. This does not mean that weapons production has stopped. There are estimates that by the end of 1999, Russian arms exports could reach the handsome sum of 5.7 billion dollars. As far as Rosvooruzheniye, the country’s official arms export company, is concerned, it expects to double or triple its exports in the next four or five years. Even South Korea has indicated an interest in buying Russian submarines and Mi-17 helicopters as a way of helping the Russians pay off their debts to Seoul. The problem for the Russian military, however, is that it doesn’t have the money to buy weapons. It must sit and watch as Russian companies turn out weapons and equipment that instead of going into its inventory head for China or the Middle East or some other part of the world.

This lack of money has also hurt training, a critical activity in any military. If soldiers don’t train, their ability to carry out missions goes down very quickly. The army has not conducted a single division-level ground forces operation since 1992. Compared with 1991, training funds are down 90 percent. Similarly, Russian pilots are lucky if they get in 25 hours flying a year, compared with the 150-200 that is standard among NATO countries. And that number was cut by 10-15 percent again during 1999. According to Russian sources, pilots often spend more timesweeping runways than they do in the air. The situation among pilots has deteriorated to such a degree that 2,000 young pilots were assigned to the infantry, armor, artillery, and communications troops. There were no aircraft for them to fly and, in any case, no fuel for the aircraft even if they did exist. In addition, many of the pilots are working part-time as cab drivers. It is now a common sight to see soldiers begging for money on the streets of Moscow.

Moscow made much out of the West-99 joint military exercise, and it evoked considerable interest on the part of some in the West, especially when Russian bombers flew close to the Norwegian coastline. In fact, it was primarily a command and staff exercise. While better than nothing—it involved a number of ships, planes and troops—it fell far short of the kind of exercises the Soviet Army carried out in the past. Besides, reports from senior Russian officers to the effect that “the ground forces have the utmost of seven combat-ready divisions” do not inspire much confidence in the Russian Army. By the end of 1999, one expert claimed that out of a 1.2 million-man army, only 100,000 were combat ready. Recognizing just how bad the situation is, the Duma passed a resolution in 1998 noting that “the Army and the Navy have virtually ceased to do combat training, and the amount of damaged equipment is increasing,” a statement with which almost no one close to the Russian military would disagree.

In spite of that resolution, however, the reality is that with the exception of some elite units—i.e., airborne troops and those engaged in peacekeeping operations—the vast majority
of Russian soldiers receive little or no training. As a result, they are in no position to carry out combat operations. If the Russian army were called upon to go to war (especially if the operations were large-scale and offensive), given its lack of training the cost in terms of human life would be tremendous.

As far as the most recent operations in Chechnya are concerned, pictures from Russian TV suggest that all of the equipment being utilized by Russian forces is at least five to ten years old—and some even older. Recently, for example, it was revealed that the Russians were firing Scud missiles at Grozny. In addition to the questionable military utility of such weapons, one has to wonder why the Russian military decided to make use of such cumbersome and outdated weapons—unless there was nothing else available.

The country’s senior military officers understand fully the extent of the problem. Nevertheless, the training situation will not be getting better any time soon. As Marshal Sergeyev put it,

Eighty percent or more is spent on maintaining the armed forces, while combat training is funded from what is left—whatever can be scraped together, is allocated for combat training, and that is obviously insufficient for maintaining combat readiness.\(^{16}\)

The situation is so bad that the Russian military has faced problems in feeding its troops. Sailors have starved to death because of the military’s inability to feed them. Forces stationed in the far north have also been gradually withdrawn, and those stationed in Russia proper have often been told to pick mushrooms or berries to supplement their diets. The reality is that “Russian soldiers are surviving mostly on bread and stocks of vegetables.”\(^{17}\) The problem was brought home even more clearly in March 1999 when a young soldier armed with an automatic weapon broke into a food store. When he was captured, the soldier confessed that he “was really hungry.”\(^{18}\)

For someone familiar with the Soviet Army during the Cold War, it is hard to grasp just how chaotic the situation is within the Russian military. This is especially evident when it comes to personnel issues.

**The Personnel Situation Facing the Russian Military**

One of the key personnel problems aggravated by the “creeping disintegration” of the military is discipline. Take, for example, the issue of crime. At one point, observers could talk of “Prussian-style” discipline in the Russian/Soviet military. This writer can remember having seen many cases where Soviet soldiers and sailors were subject to the most brutal discipline and behaved almost like mechanical puppets. While some crimes probably occurred, they were largely limited to senior-level corruption, such as officers using soldiers to build dachas for themselves. Soldiers might not have been the most efficient, and they might have taken whatever they could from the state, but by and large the amount of crime within the military was limited.
Over the past ten years, however, discipline has deteriorated to the point where the prosecutor’s office has a full-time job pursuing those guilty of the most serious forms of crime; for example, murder. In this regard, the chief military prosecutor noted in 1997 that some 50 soldiers were shot by their fellow servicemen. And this was just the number of individuals on guard duty who shot each other! He further reported that by March 1998 another ten had died in the same way. And the problem is continuing to grow. In the Far Eastern Military District in May 1998, four soldiers reportedly shot and killed their commanding officer. Even more alarming has been the spate of shootings at nuclear weapons facilities. The situation became so serious that on October 20, 1998, President Boris Yeltsin ordered an inspection of troops at a nuclear weapons production facility. In fact, from 1997 to 1999 the Russian military dismissed 20 soldiers who had access to nuclear weapons because of “psychological problems.” By October 1999, the Duma was expressing concern over the level of crime in the military, noting that the situation was “alarming and in need of emergency measures.”

Part of the reason for the increase in crime is related to both alcohol and drugs, the latter a relatively new phenomenon in the Russian military. In 1996 there were only 256 drug offenses in the Russian armed forces. In 1998 there were 605, and the vast majority of those who took drugs began their habit while serving in the armed forces. Even more upsetting was the fact that there was a 2.4 percent increase in drug-related incidents in the Strategic Rocket Forces—among those troops who have charge of the country’s nuclear weapons!

The AIDS virus also appears to becoming a serious problem in the Russian military. In early 1997, for example, the prosecutor of the Moscow Military District claimed that there were 128 cases of HIV, which was up from 32 for the entire period from 1993 to 1996. And there are no signs that the situation will get better any time soon. As late as January of this year, top military leaders were complaining about the quality of soldiers being sent to Kosovo because of their alcohol and drug problems as well as their criminal pasts.

As far as the overall number of deaths in the army is concerned, during 1997 some 521 died as a consequence of criminal activity. The same source reported that an investigation was under way concerning a major theft of fuel. “This is the most notorious case of 1998. But it’s too early to give any details. The investigation is still going on.”

During 1997, 487 soldiers committed suicide, an increase of 57 over the previous year. Another source reported that between January and April 1998 another 132 committed suicide. While the cause of these suicides is unclear, most observers believe that factors such as poor food and working conditions and the widespread hazing of recruits are the primary causes. Insofar as the latter situation is concerned, this is a long-standing problem. Rather than exerting close personal supervision over enlisted personnel, Russian officers have traditionally relied upon more senior conscripts to keep the junior ones in line—a practice referred to as dedovshchina. The problem, however, is that the more senior conscripts, called Deds, have brutalized many of the junior ones—to the point that a number of them have committed suicide. Others have been killed. For example, as recently as May 1998 a young soldier was buried in the southern Russian city of Budennovsk. He had been beaten to death because he refused to mend an older conscript’s soccer shoe. The army understands the problem, but it would require a major change in the way Russian officers and
NCOs are trained and acculturated for the problem to go away. There is little indication that the high command is prepared to make these kinds of fundamental changes. Overall, during the first 11 months of 1998 “57 soldiers died and 2,735 were injured from hazing.”

Suicide is also a problem among officers. Sixty percent of all suicides were committed by officers. In October 1998, for example, a major and a lieutenant colonel committed suicide in Moscow. An investigation revealed that their families were starving, and both officers knew that if they committed suicide their monthly pension would be paid to their families when it was due—in contrast to the paycheck delays of weeks and months faced by those on active duty.

Conventional crime also remains a serious problem in the Russian military. The Russian Defense Ministry reported on December 1, 1998, that about 10,500 crimes and criminal incidents had been reported in comparison with about 10,000 the previous year—and this in a military that was being downsized to 1.2 million. As far as incidents of bribery were concerned, they had risen 80 percent, and there was a 44 percent increase in cases of physical violence. Stealing from military installations has also reached crisis proportions. According to Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, the commander of the Northern Fleet, it has become so bad that “combat capability is being undermined and lives of servicemen are being jeopardized.”

Lack of discipline also led to a number of accidents—in fact their number appears to be increasing. According to the Mothers’ group, which seeks to protect conscripts, during 1997 some 1,046 soldiers either took their own lives or were killed in accidents. And there is no sign of a let-up in such incidents. In February 2000, some 6,000 23-millimeter aircraft cannon shells exploded during a fire on an air force base, while in Volgograd at the same time, some 2,000 tank shells exploded. Then in June at least two dozen soldiers were killed at an ammunition depot near Sverdlovsk. In all these cases, negligence was listed as the cause.

While not necessarily a result of a lack of discipline, accidents also seem to be waiting to happen when it comes to the country’s nuclear submarines. Around 100 of them are tied up waiting to be dismantled, just in the Northern Fleet. There are an additional 57 tied up in the Far East. Some of these ships were decommissioned 25 years ago. Most experts believe it will take approximately ten to 12 years to unload the nuclear cores from all of the submarines. The problem is that meanwhile, these submarines are sitting in salt water and rusting, with their nuclear cores on board. Investigatory bodies sent out from Moscow reportedly discovered that it was easy to walk aboard some of these decommissioned submarines unchallenged—because there were not enough sailors for guard duty. Indeed, there are many reports of officers being forced to perform guard duty because of personnel shortages.

Meanwhile, it was reported that 50,000 young men evaded the draft in 1997, while more than 12,000 conscripts went AWOL rather than endure the brutality of barracks life. Moscow military authorities themselves estimate that there are almost 500 deserters living in Moscow alone. Around the country, there are estimates that some 40,000 men are hiding from the army.
Problems have not been limited to enlisted personnel. According to Sergeyev, commanders in the Russian army have been guilty of some 18,000 serious breaches of military discipline. In a number of cases, this involved the issuance of illegal orders. On July 1, 1999, it was reported by Russian prosecutors that 17 army generals and navy admirals were found guilty of corruption during the preceding year. Most upsetting, they noted that the incidence of such crimes is rising. Furthermore, there were 818 reports in 1998 that officers had assaulted and battered their subordinates—a doubling of the cases reported the previous year. A year later the Military Prosecutor reported that the number of known cases of bribery rose 82 percent from 1993 to 1999.

All of the information available suggests that the personnel situation will not get better any time soon. Take, for example, the kind of individual who is now entering the Russian military. The quality of recruits is deteriorating steadily. Some 40 percent of new conscripts have not attended school nor held a job in the two years prior to their military service. Furthermore, one in 20 had a police record and others were “drug addicts, toxic substance abusers, mentally disabled, and syphilitics.” Some 71,000 individuals who had committed crimes were not drafted, but some 20,000 who had been given suspended sentences were drafted—much like the old American practice of giving a young man the option of jail or the military. As one source put it, “An ever greater proportion of conscripts are coming from lower social strata and from the impoverished countryside.”

The situation among junior officers is also getting worse. Not only are such individuals resigning their commissions at an alarming rate, but competition among candidates for officers’ schools (which once was very intense) has dropped sharply. In 1989, for example, it was 1.9 applicants per space to only 1.35 in 1993. By 1999 it was even lower. In fact, some educational institutions will accept every applicant just in order to fill their vacancies—and this when the number of such establishments is being reduced from 101 to no more than 50! Furthermore, by 1996 more than 50 percent of all junior officers had left the service as soon as their obligation was finished in order to enter business. Why should they remain in the military when they are paid about $100 per month doing a job that requires heavy physical work and has all of the physical discomforts that go with it? Poor salaries, an insecure future, inadequate family quarters and supporting institutions, with prestige at an all-time low, all take their toll. As of June 1, 1998, there were 110,000 men on duty and 160,000 discharged servicemen without housing. Indeed, providing an idea of just how bad this situation is, the Defense Ministry reported in 1997 that the shortfall in junior officers was equivalent to the number of those graduating from all military educational establishments annually. Some 19,000 officers under the age of 30 left the military during 1998 alone. By 1999 it was being reported that 10 percent of all officer posts in the army were vacant.

Given the problems facing the military, it is not surprising that morale is also at an all-time low. Not only do few of the professionals see any future in the military, Pavel Felgenhauer, the highly respected Russian commentator on military affairs, has reported that senior military officers have begun to openly tell journalists that Marshal Sergeyev is not fit to command the Russian army—another development that would have been inconceivable during the Soviet period. Even more troubling from the Kremlin’s standpoint are the questions being raised concerning what officers would do if called upon to support Moscow
internally. In 1995, for example, a survey was conducted of some 600 field grade Russian officers. The survey showed that questions concerning the army’s reliability were pervasive throughout the officer corps.48 “Officers were particularly adamant in their opposition to using the military to quell a separatist rebellion in one of the regions of the Russian Federation.” Only seven percent supported such an action. In addition, when asked if they would follow Moscow’s orders if one of the republics declared independence, 39 percent “admitted that they probably or definitely would not follow orders.”

Reliability continues to be a problem, as indicated by the tendency of Russian officers to “threaten” political authorities openly. The clearest case was that of General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the Western Group of Forces in Chechnya, who warned that if Moscow ordered the army to stop its activities in Chechnya, “there would be a massive defection of officers of all ranks from the armed forces, including generals.”49

To make matters more difficult, the government has now decided to increase the amount of taxes soldiers pay, a decision that cannot but further lower morale. For example, in the past, military officers did not pay an income tax. Now they must not only pay income tax, they are being deprived of benefits such as free travel and a 50 percent discount on housing. In addition to not being paid on time, officer pay has not been indexed for inflation for over two and a half years. Such a situation has obvious implications for Moscow’s ability to ensure that its troops obey its orders in a crisis situation, especially if it led to a serious internal confrontation.

**Cohesion (?) in the Russian Military**

The problems that beset the Russian military will have—in fact, already are having—a major impact on Russian civil-military relations. There has long been a misperception in the West that the Soviet military was highly politicized. Much depends on how one defined the term “ politicization.” One commonly accepted definition in the West refers to the effort by a party-state such as the former USSR to inculcate a particular political point of view in the minds and hearts of its troops. In this sense, the Soviet military was very politicized. Political officers and indoctrination lectures were all part of the life of the Soviet soldier.

There is, however, another type of politicization. It has to do with the involvement of military officers in politics. In this sense, Western military officers have been much more politicized than Soviet military officers—one need only spend time as a Congressional staffer in Washington to note how politicized many senior American officers are!50 Russian and Soviet officers were far more isolated from civilian society and, with the exception of a few at the very top, seldom became involved in the political process.

Since the end of the Soviet Union, this apolitical stance on the part of Russian military officers has broken down. Names of former Soviet (and Russian) generals such as Alexandr Rutskoi, Boris Gromov, Alexandr Lebed, Albert Makashov, and Andrei Nikolayev have become household terms among those who follow politics in Moscow. All have taken the
plunge into politics with varying degrees of success. As far as civil-military relations are concerned, this has had the effect of increasing the possibility that at some point Russian generals may move directly into the political realm.

As far as the military itself is concerned, the increased involvement by senior military officers has had the effect of further undermining cohesion as generals begin to view themselves as political actors and sometimes find themselves on different sides of issues. After all, just because they wear (or wore) uniforms, it does not follow that all generals think alike, as some Western analysts seem to believe.

I am not suggesting that the Russian military is about to intervene directly in the political process. The Russian military is too split internally to engage successfully in a coup—unless, of course, such an action was not resisted by the country’s political authorities. In such a case, a coup would succeed, but if the past few years are any indication, the chances of a “peaceful coup” succeeding would appear small indeed. On the other hand, if—as this writer would anticipate—an attempt by a general to seize power were resisted, military units would probably find themselves on different sides, thereby raising the danger of a civil war. At a minimum, a battle between military units would undermine further Moscow’s ability to retain central control over many of the regions that currently make up Russia.

The greater danger facing the Russian Army in this writer’s opinion comes from the increasing need by senior officers to make deals with local and regional authorities. When a U.S. ship visited Vladivostok in 1989, this writer asked a senior Russian admiral to describe his most serious problem. He responded by noting that it was trying to feed his sailors. He regularly made deals with local agricultural enterprises whereby he traded the labor of his sailors for a part of the produce. The need to interact with local authorities has increased over time because units in places like Vladivostok cannot count on Moscow to provide them with the materials they need. As one observer noted, “Many commanders no longer believe that the state is able to feed its troops and have begun to try to do it themselves.” For example, the commander of a Northern Fleet nuclear submarine went to the city fathers of Bryansk to request 10 tons of potatoes to feed his crew since he could not count on the military to supply them.51 These increasingly close ties between the country’s military officers and local political and economic authorities have serious implications for the nature of civil-military relations in the country.

Another possible scenario is the continued disintegration of the military into the world of chaos and crime. What else can one expect from hungry and mistreated soldiers? Instead of deciding to support local warlords, they may decide to take matters into their own hands and seize local foodstuffs or take over running the area where they are stationed themselves. Ex-soldiers—especially paratroopers—are already playing an abnormally significant role in organized crime. After all, since crime among officers and men within the Russian military has already reached epidemic proportions, it is not too difficult for these individuals to make the transition to organized crime. Needless to say, such a scenario would have the most serious implications for the safety of Moscow’s nuclear weapons.
Reading official Russian military reports, one could easily get the impression that the reform process within the Russian military is well advanced and that its problems will soon be solved. If fact, if the reader were to count the number of times the phrase “military reform” has been mentioned in Soviet military circles during the past five or six years, I suspect he or she would discover that it was mentioned literally thousands of times.

For our purposes, the most important, ambitious, and controversial plan is the one the Russian high command claims is currently being implemented. Designed under Marshal Sergeyev’s leadership, but with heavy political influence in the background, this plan divides military reform into two stages. The first lasts until the year 2000.

In the first stage, the military will be reduced to 1.2 million troops. In order to reach this number, thousands of troops are being discharged. The maximum number of generals (in both the military and all other paramilitary units) is being cut to 2,300. A way will have to be found to pay those who are discharged, since Russian law requires that soldiers who are forcibly discharged receive a hefty separation allowance.

This proposal also calls for the position of Commander in Chief of Ground Forces—one of the most powerful in the Russian Army—to be abolished. It has been replaced by a Ground Force Main Department, as the military districts have been raised to the status of an operational strategic or territorial command. This latter change currently is being implemented and will lead to the discharge of thousands of officers and soldiers. For example, some 961 Army aviation pilots and 1,134 flight and ground technicians were discharged in 1998. The first stage also calls for the introduction of more mobile forces, and the Russians appear to be working in that direction, although progress in this area lags behind the others for lack of the necessary funds.

The plan also calls for combining the Air Defense and Air Force into one service. This process is already well underway. Some 125,000 air force personnel were discharged in 1998. In the meantime, a number of redundant offices and organizations were disbanded in an effort to save money. As far as junior officers are concerned, this new plan is making the situation worse. General Kornukov, the commander of the now combined air force and air defense forces made his priorities clear when he observed with regard to new graduates of officer schools,

We had 415 pilots, and 365 of them were dismissed. This is painful, we feel bad about it. But our aim was not to lose first-class pilots who are 25-30 years old. We should keep them, and we are letting younger and less experienced people go.

While one can certainly understand Kornukov’s reasoning, his decision to let so many junior officers go will only exacerbate an already serious problem.

While all of these changes are taking place, Russia is placing primary reliance on nuclear weapons. Such weapons are cheaper than conventional systems, and easier to maintain. The danger, however, is that by going to a “launch on warning” system, even greater reliance is placed on Moscow’s command and control systems as well as its missiles. Unfortunately, both
are deteriorating. There is a serious danger that these antiquated warning systems could misread the situation and lead the Kremlin to believe it is under attack when such is not the case. The Russians have begun to upgrade their missiles with the introduction of the Topol-M ICBM, although there have been problems in tests. Even with the Topol-Ms in the Russian inventory, the nuclear balance will not be seriously affected. Missiles are only as good as their command and control systems.

Stage two of the reform plan calls for even more ambitious changes. Space forces may be combined with the air force, military academies will undergo major changes both in terms of curriculum and numbers, and there are suggestions that the military will be divided into conventional and strategic nuclear forces. This latter option will inevitably lead to a blurring of service lines (each has both kinds of forces), and opposition on the part of old-line military and navy officers is already evident.

The fact is, however, that while officials in Moscow have made much of the military’s reform plan, one can find even more articles written by both military and civilian observers which describe in considerable depth the nature of the problems facing the armed forces—as this article has demonstrated. My point is simple: even if the reform process were to succeed, it will be decades before the problems noted above can be successfully addressed. It is for this reason that I do not take the new draft military doctrine too seriously. It is a statement of Russian military frustration vis-à-vis the West and especially the United States. I doubt that its adoption will significantly change the situation in which the Russian military currently finds itself.

It is hard to be optimistic when looking at the situation facing the Russian military today. President Yeltsin gave the impression that he neither understood nor cared about the state of the armed forces. Rather, he tolerated the military and if anything seemed more interested in the country’s internal security organs. After all, the latter are especially trained to deal with domestic violence, and if the collapse of the East German military demonstrates anything it is that one cannot take the willingness of the country’s armed forces to put down internal disturbances as a given.

As far as the reform process itself is concerned, it is true that for the first time the country has the outlines of a plan and appears to be trying to implement it. The problem, however, is that the military is continuing to fall apart in the process. As the West knows only too well, downsizing is a very expensive process.

President Vladimir Putin has suggested on several occasions that he wants to rebuild the armed forces. Furthermore, there have been press reports suggesting that the more outspoken position taken by Russian generals in pushing for a decisive solution to the Chechen war shows that “the Russian military appears to be exercising, at least temporarily, serious political clout.” While the budget for the year 2000 indicates that spending on national defense will rise by 50 percent to $5.3 billion, past practice suggests that the military will be lucky to receive a fraction of what is promised. Assuming the Putin government does carry through with its promise, for the first time the military will be in a position to begin some work on modernization—a big if. In any case, it is clear that he and the
country's military leaders have their work cut out for them. Rebuilding the military's infrastructure will take billions of rubles—and considerable time. As far as the personnel issues are concerned, the only answer would seem to be a professional military. As Murray Feshbach's analysis of the health and demographic situation in Russia demonstrates, the Kremlin simply won't have the numbers of recruits to ever again field the kind of mass armies that were standard in the past.\textsuperscript{56} But such reductions will require tremendous amounts of money. There is no lack of will on the part of the military leadership in this area—they would love to move toward a professional military, but it is simply too expensive. Furthermore, as Steve Blank has pointed out, "Defense reform, to be meaningful and lasting, entails a comprehensive reform of the state."\textsuperscript{57} Until the state has put its house in order, little will change within the military.

The bottom line is that while the Russian military has not yet collapsed, all indications are that unless the Putin government decides to make some major investments in it, its collapse may not be too far off.

**Endnotes**


3. In normal Russian fashion, reference to the army means all services unless otherwise indicated.


30. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


50. This became clear to the author during the two years he spent as a staffer on the House Armed Services Committee.


The Politics of Russian Military Reform

John C. Reppert

Debates and infighting over Russia's military reform are at the very center of domestic politics.

—General-Lieutenant Lev Rokhlin

Although “military reform” has been a central aspect of Russian security policy since the founding of the modern Russian State in 1991 and has been a matter of active political debate throughout the past eight years, it is still the source of considerable confusion regarding both goals and accomplishments.

Duma Deputy Alexei Arbatov has provided the best comprehensive definition of what “military reform” was meant to be in regard to its political intentions:

The commonly accepted meaning of the term “military reform” in Russia (in particular as provided by the draft law “On The Military Reform” elaborated by the Russian parliament in the spring of 1997) is a combination of political, economic, legal, military, technical, and social measures designed to qualitatively transform the armed forces of the Russian Federation, other troops and military formations, military executive agencies, and defense production organizations so they can provide a sufficient level of national defense within the limits of available resources.

It should be emphasized that “military reform” implies a more comprehensive framework than “reform of the armed forces.” The latter term is mostly confined to the doctrine and strategic missions, structure, composition, force levels, combat equipment, and training of the armed services and armed forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD). “Military reform” includes comprehensive reorganization of troops and formations, defense industries and war mobilization assets, the recruitment system and social security for the military, the division of power and authority among the branches of the government on military matters, the financial system for funding defense and security, the organization of the executive branch and the MOD itself for implementing defense policy, military build-up (or build-down) and force employment.

Whatever failings we may wish to attribute to military reform in Russia, we cannot blame them on the lack of a comprehensive approach and an ambitious agenda.

While the focus of this paper will be on the armed forces, it is important to understand that this element of reform was intended to be but one portion of a far more comprehensive shift in security structure and policy. Unfortunately from the perspective of the reformers, the efforts to better integrate the various military formations of the Russian Federation (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Bureau, and the forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, to name but a few) with those of the Ministry of Defense have produced few results. Likewise, the ambitious plans put forth by First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrei Kokoshin on how the military-industrial complex (VPK) of Russia would be slimmed down, modernized, and focused on the needs of the future have likewise been unachieved. Arbatov's
final point on the reorganization of the Russian government as a critical part of the overall concept of military reform has not only failed to be realized, it has not yet been realistically addressed.

**Politics of Reform of the Russian Armed Forces**

What then can be said about those efforts at reform focused specifically on the Ministry of Defense? As is the case for the larger issue of military reform, much confusion exists in the West (and in Russia) on the more specific issue of reform of the Russian armed forces.

While no one would argue that the Russian armed forces of 2000 are not dramatically different than the Soviet Armed Forces of the late 1980s, there is widespread divergence of views as to whether the changes are the result of reform within the armed forces, or simply the result of failure to adapt to new conditions. While describing the extent of change in the last decade exceeds the scope of this chapter, two authoritative capsule comments illustrate the point.

A prudent American defense policy cannot rest on theories of Soviet motivation, but must respond to the facts of Soviet military capabilities. These are that the Soviets have more than 200 ground divisions, roughly 1,400 ICBMs, over 50,000 tanks, and more than 8,400 tactical aircraft.\

The Russian Armed Forces has 24 divisions plus 13 training units, 771 ICBMs, about 15,500 tanks, and fewer than 2,000 tactical aircraft.

Therefore, acknowledging the obvious that significant changes have taken place, there are two basic issues to be examined. The first is whether the Russian armed forces recognized the need to reform and developed appropriate plans to achieve the needed changes. The second is whether the changes of recent years are the result of or even related to any plan for reform that had been developed.

The initial driving force behind the transformation of the Soviet/Russian army needs to be seen in light of the momentum created in the late 1980s and not exclusively in the post-Soviet period. The period of rapid change began from the four Rs. As a result of dramatic changes in the political landscape internationally and within Russia, the Army had to be Relocated, Reduced, Restructured, and Reequipped. While reform was not a totally alien concept to the armed forces, in this case it was made more difficult because of the speed with which it had to be accomplished and the fact that it was not in response to any alleged or acknowledged deficiency in the existing armed forces or any failure to perform on the battlefield. It was an imperative created by colossal changes in the environment within which the military was to operate. Let's discuss each of the four Rs in turn.
Relocation

The first of the imperatives, Relocation, emerged as a shaping force on December 7, 1988, when then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced the beginning of a unilateral withdrawal of some portion of Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe at a U.N. speech. The validity of this pledge was looked at with some skepticism by Western national security leaders, as reflected in this reaction by U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney:

While the United States encourages the evolution of the Soviet Union toward a more open society, a Soviet Union demonstrably dedicated to democratic principles, we cannot react unilaterally to Soviet initiatives that are not yet implemented or to proposals which, if implemented, can easily be reversed. ... It is, therefore, clear that despite the dramatic changes occurring in the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership's declaration of benign intentions toward the Western democracies, Soviet military capabilities continue to constitute a major threat to our security.

The machinery of the Soviet General Staff, however, began the immediate task of looking for new homes for the forces being withdrawn. While this withdrawal proved over time to be real, it was both difficult and expensive. But in this case, as opposed to later efforts by the Russian armed forces to relocate forces within the former Soviet Union, the Soviets found adequate financial support to both facilitate and accelerate the announced policy. Germany was the most generous in providing necessary funding to allow the forces to return swiftly to the Soviet Union. This assistance was especially attractive in light of Gorbachev's next challenge to the West, “We will deprive you of an enemy.”

The decision to withdraw a significant number of Soviet forces unilaterally from the Eastern European states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact) was clearly a leadership-driven policy and not one based on military correlation of force considerations or explicit pressure from the host countries for Soviet force redeployments. In April 1985, the first month of Gorbachev's six-year presidency, the life of the Warsaw Pact had been voluntarily extended by its members for another 20 years. Thus, internal politics in Moscow was the determining factor in this major relocation and rebalancing of forces in Europe.

By 1989 Russian and Chinese negotiators had agreed on a new level of cooperation along their long common border, permitting both sides to significantly reduce the large troop concentrations that had built up there. Specifically, Gorbachev pledged during a visit to China in May 1989 to reduce Soviet forces along the Chinese border by 120,000 men. The Chinese quickly began to reciprocate with comparable reductions of their own.

By 1990 another major consideration emerged that would affect and complicate the relocation challenge. The newly approved Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty included specific limitations on quantities of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) which could be deployed in certain geographical areas. While this in itself did not legally limit the number of troops deployed in those areas, the reductions in tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat helicopters, and fighter aircraft logically limited deployed armed forces. For the Soviets and later the Russian armed forces, this was particularly important in that it affected their ability to redeploy the forces from Eastern Europe or the Chinese border into the flank.
regions, primarily the Transcaucasus Military District to the south where, they argued, the greatest threat to their national security existed. This problem was further exacerbated by the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1990, requiring the total withdrawal of the 1,000,000 plus Soviet forces that Gorbachev had begun to reduce only two years earlier.

Were that not enough, the final redeployment challenge came about as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union itself in December 1991 and the decision in the spring of the following year to break up the Soviet armed forces, withdrawing virtually all stationed forces and those which had been redeployed from Eastern Europe to the Baltics, as well as specific elements from the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Moldova, and even Ukraine and Belarus. These movements also had to accommodate the constrictions imposed by the 1990 CFE Treaty zones.

Unlike moves from Eastern Europe, these relocations had to be accomplished without foreign funding, an exception being the withdrawal of forces from the Baltics, which was largely underwritten by the West. One example of this difficulty was the removal of an airborne regiment from Moldova in 1992. While the Russians were resisting relocating their “14th Army” commanded by General-Lieutenant Alexander Lebed from the Transdniestr portion of Moldova, they were willing to move an independent airborne regiment from the Moldovan capital of Chisinau, which was, ironically, commanded by Lebed’s younger brother. In December 1992, the move was accomplished over protest by those involved when the regiment was flown to a remote location in Siberia, where it was presented with construction materials for its new barracks and storage facilities. The regiment urged to swiftly get about constructing them in the midst of the Siberian winter.

While the frequently heard Russian claim that thousands of officers are still without housing as a result of the sequential relocations is misleading, it is clear that the two major barriers to a more effective relocation strategy have been finances and the CFE Treaty of 1990. The Russians have repeatedly sought to modify the CFE Treaty to allow greater deployments in flank areas, arguing that there was no longer any confrontation between the two armed blocs (NATO and Warsaw Pact) that the Treaty had been conceived to constrain. Though this was in part acknowledged by concessions in Vienna this past year, the deployments of Russian forces to fight the conflict in Chechnya have again raised concerns that Russia is acting outside the bounds the revised treaty imposes.

Reduce

As in the case of the relocation of forces, the clear starting point for dramatic reductions in the Soviet armed forces can be traced to President Gorbachev’s speech to the U.N. in December 1988. There he pledged to reduce the Soviet military by 500,000 men. Of these, 200,000 were to come from the Far East, 240,000 from west of the Urals (including the 50,000 he announced were to be withdrawn from Warsaw Pact countries), and 60,000 from the Southern borders. The base from which these reductions would be achieved was reflected in a Gorbachev speech in London April 8, 1989. Here he reported Soviet strength at 4,258,000
Parallel to this significant manpower reduction was the surge of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements from 1987 to 1992 that eliminated one class of weapons for the two superpowers and placed significantly lower levels on many others. These included the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of December 1987, which resulted in the elimination of all Soviet and American intermediate range nuclear missiles. This was followed by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which capped numbers of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat helicopters, and fighter aircraft in the area from the Atlantic to the Ural's. A next step was the START II Treaty of 1992 (still not ratified by the Russian Federation), which would cut strategic systems by half. Also, while having less impact on combat capabilities or plans, the 1997 agreement on eliminating all chemical weapons had major potential budget implications for Russia.

Ultimately, the drive to reduce the armed forces was defined by the decisions regarding relocation and restructuring, but even more by demographic and economic realities. With the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia lost access to the manpower-rich regions of Central Asia, where large numbers of recruits had been inducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Even more important, the collapse of the new Russian economy led to inconceivable reductions in the defense budget, which not only foreclosed the option of the 5 million man army of the past, but also precluded options then proposed to move quickly to a highly professional all-volunteer force.

While the economic pressures on the military are commonly associated with the post-Soviet period, it is well to understand that this too was a work already in motion. This process can also trace its modern roots back to a unilateral initiative by President Gorbachev. In early 1989, Gorbachev announced that Soviet defense spending was to be reduced by 14.2% in the 1991 budget. The graphic representation of this financial factor can be seen best in Western estimates of Soviet/Russian defense spending. The budget for defense spending announced by the Soviets in May 1989 indicated that they would spend $120 billion at current exchange rates on defense. (Most Western estimates were higher.) Ten years later, the budget with additions during 1999 was estimated to be closer to $5.5 billion at current exchange rates a figure not challenged in the West except in terms of purchasing price parity advantages enjoyed by the Russians.

In personnel terms, the Ministry of Defense says the period of reductions has ended. The Russian military now stands at 1.2 million, and Minister of Defense Sergeyev has repeatedly said there are no plans to go below this number. However, it is important to realize that the Russian armed forces did not drop by 75% as a result of a well thought-out plan. They fell in part because the draft system is badly broken, and large numbers of eligible young men evade military service. They also took large reductions when the talented young officers decided the grass was far greener outside of military service. None of these fundamental problems has yet been effectively addressed.
Restructuring

While initial efforts at the next imperative, Restructuring, were made in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, this process became a decisive determinant as a result of two dramatic events of the early 1990s. The first case was the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decision to allocate those portions of the Soviet Army stationed on the territories of a number of former Soviet republics (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) to those states and their new national armies. The second was the new doctrinal tenet that the emergent Russia state had no enemies.

The first of these developments resulted in organizational chaos since the original Soviet military districts and other structures had not been organized exclusively along republic political boundaries. For instance, the Transcarpathian front was divided between Ukraine and Moldova, with air support for the front assigned to one nation and artillery to another. The dispute over allocation of ships and assets of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine dragged on for seven years.

This division was further compounded by the considerable ambiguity surrounding the role and creation of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) armed forces. Many former Soviet officers at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union envisioned this as a NATO-like military structure with an integrated command and control, with the independent states being largely responsible for administration and logistics. The serving Minister of Defense of Russia, Marshal Shaposhnikov, made his own bet on the future in 1992 in giving up his Russian assignment as Minister to become CIS Joint Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief. Within less than a year even the most casual observer had concluded that the CIS did not and would not have joint armed forces, and even the optimistic Shaposhnikov was exploring new career options.

The second of these factors—the doctrinal declaration that Russia had no foreign enemies—meant that the Russian army no longer had a rationale or budgetary justification for the large tank armies and armored formations, which had been designed against NATO capabilities. This aspect of the military reform package caused irritation within the armed forces and friction with certain elements of society. On one level, military schools were required to revise instruction and exercises against conflict with NATO forces. In fact, for several years in the mid-1990s they conducted exercises at higher-level schools in which the opposing forces were identical to their own in structure and doctrine with questionable training value. At the larger public level, a series of critics of military spending (even at the dramatically reduced levels) argued in the press that a nation with no foreign enemies requires no armed forces.

The subsequent events of NATO expansion, NATO operations in Kosovo, and the “fight against international terrorism” in Chechnya have allowed the Russians in 2000 to issue a revised National Security Concept and a revised draft military doctrine that once again acknowledge the existence of foreign enemies, thus freeing the military to again adjust instruction and exercises at its schools. As Putin noted shortly after being appointed Prime
Minister, “Several years ago we fell prey to an illusion that we have no enemies. We have paid dearly for this. Russia has its own national interests and we have to defend them.”

By the 1996 presidential election campaign in Russia, Yeltsin introduced another dramatic element in restructuring by firmly stating that the state was committed to creation of an all-volunteer armed force within the next five years. Russian officers, who by this time had gained considerable insight into the realities of volunteer forces through contacts with Western armies, were supportive in concept, but universally skeptical that the Russian state would provide the necessary resources. By 1998 they and the members of the Duma had convinced the President to stop including this ambitious conversion policy in public statements, and by 1999 it was officially acknowledged as a distant goal. However, having observed the army’s performance in Chechnya, Acting President Putin was once more raising the question of a professional force in early 2000.

The few steps in the direction of a volunteer force are worth noting. In one manifestation, it significantly increased the number of women in the armed forces as officers “recruited” their own wives to serve at the promised higher pay and benefits. A single episode observed by the author suggests that these volunteers may have been capable, but were probably not deployable. An impressive firing demonstration of individual and crew-served weapons at the 2nd Division outside of Moscow was concluded ceremonially by having the BDU-clad volunteers in the firing positions remove their helmets to reveal long hair flowing over their shoulders. They then emerged to shake hands with observers, stepping from the trenches in high heels, since “the Russian Army doesn’t have boots for women.”

Three others concepts of restructuring emerged in the mid-1990s. The first was to combine elements and services of the armed forces to create a more efficient management system. The second was to restructure the Military Districts to better match the various federal structures, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The third was advocacy for a major internal restructuring of the armed forces based on the introduction of western-style noncommissioned officers.

After heated debate within the Ministry of Defense, the first of these concepts was realized in part on March 1, 1998, when the air force and air defense forces were legally merged into a single organization. A continuing effort on behalf of Minister of Defense Sergeyev to consolidate all of Russia’s nuclear forces into a single agency is still being stifly resisted by the General Staff. The effort to restructure the Military Districts has met with partial success under Sergeyev. The Siberian and Transbaykal MDs were merged in 1998, while a final move to bring together the Volga and Ural MDs is underway. This step would go far in aligning the Ministry of Defense and the other power ministries geographically for more integrated control, although further restructuring of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Border Guards would still be required.

Despite intense interest expressed by each of the successive Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of the General Staff, as well as a host of service chiefs, virtually no progress has been made on the issue of creating a Western-style NCO corps. While the reasons are complex, a few basic factors can illustrate the problem. The simplest is that if you wish to attract and
retain qualified NCOs, you have to be willing to pay them. No Russian defense budget has yet included that option. A second factor is that the Russian army is structured to have officers perform many of the functions assigned in other armed forces in the West to NCOs. Any introduction of large numbers of NCOs would require parallel reductions in the officer corps. The officer corps has rejected this strongly for obvious reasons. Finally, the creation of an NCO corps requires a well-constructed long-term plan and program. This would involve a structure allowing increased responsibility with rank, a school system paralleling the officer schooling system, and a relationship between officers and NCOs that would allow both to succeed through cooperation.

Reequipping

The drive to Reequip the forces was the result of two independent variables. The first was the proposed restructuring to change the army from an armor-heavy force to a light, mobile, agile structure designed to fight small conflicts along the border of Russia (or the former USSR). The second was the ongoing “Revolution in Military Affairs,” which premised its development on movement toward information warfare, vastly improved intelligence, and precision weapons.

The move to “lighten” the forces became public with the withdrawals from Eastern Europe in 1989. The Soviets announced that they would lighten their tank divisions by changing from a structure consisting of three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment to two and two.11 This transformation was greatly accelerated by the limits the CFE Treaty placed on the five categories of combat equipment. The Soviets quickly implemented change. For instance, largely in response to the Treaty, the Soviets announced that between January 1989 and November 1990 they had reduced tanks in the Atlantic-to-Urals regions from 41,580 to 20,725.12

Reequipping has always been listed as the final stage of military reform, in part because of the clear cost implications for a dramatically reduced Russian defense budget. This has led in recent years to a running struggle between Minister of Defense Sergeyev, former Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, who has stated his preference for devoting virtually all major end equipment procurement dollars to the new TOPOL-M missile to update the strategic forces—and Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, who has argued for investment in conventional technology. For the past two years Sergeyev has prevailed, and the Russian armed forces have deployed 10 new TOPOL-M’s to their force each year, as conventional procurement has languished.

Russia’s President has said that the government will increase the arms procurement budget by 50% in 2000, thus offering an opportunity to partially satisfy both parties and to respond to real conventional equipment losses in Chechnya.13
Conclusion

In all fairness to the Russian armed forces, they have dramatically adjusted their size and activities to the changes in their operational environment and the cuts in their budget. Unfortunately, the vast majority of steps they have taken along the path prescribed by the four R’s have been unrelated to their own developmental concept.

A recent development may have interesting implications for the future of military reform in Russia. General Nikolayev was selected in February to become the new Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. This was the same General Nikolayev, then assigned to the Ministry of Defense in 1992-93, who was the father of the initial comprehensive program for reform of the Russian military and particularly the reform of the Ministry of Defense. In a conversation in Moscow weeks after Nikolayev had received his new appointment, the author reviewed with him the status of the military reform to which he had given birth. Nikolayev expressed near total dismay with the havoc wrought upon the Russian armed forces in the name of reform. He stated that getting the program back to the original intentions was to be one of his highest priorities.

As the Chairman of the Defense Committee, he will have an opportunity to influence the budget, which has been the greatest constraining factor on change. He will receive further support for his efforts through the new National Security Concept, which renews the justification for a more capable and diverse military capability.

However, the challenges faced by Nikolayev and the new President of Russia are more than formidable. Russia’s army has been relocated, but not necessarily in the optimal way to use their limited military resources. The army has been drastically reduced, but often through the process of allowing their best and brightest young officers to leave to pursue more financially rewarding positions. Further, the conscription system, which supplied the enlisted manpower for the armed forces, is seriously flawed and may not be salvageable. The achievements of restructuring have been most modest, and the absence of material acquisition and funds for training have further constrained the few benefits that the steps taken to date might have been expected to bring. Finally, the big budget item in the reform program is re-equipping, where the Russian armed forces have made no progress at all. They are, if anything, even less mobile and agile than they were in 1991. They have lost a generation in R&D, not to mention acquisition, of modern military weaponry. They have been reduced politically and practically to an armed force strained to the limit in battling some 10,000 irregulars in Chechnya, while brandishing their vast nuclear arsenal in order to hold any external enemies at bay.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense cannot be congratulated on achieving reform, but deserves praise and even gratitude for maintaining the armed forces under governmental control at a time when neither officers nor enlisted personnel were adequately fed or paid. They have worked hard to preclude proliferation of their weapons of mass destruction, even though foreign buyers were available with desperately needed cash. They have maintained a centrally controlled and coherent military force that offers the new Russian leadership the
opportunity to accomplish what they failed to do in the first decade of national existence, but the challenges remain immense and time to move forward is increasingly limited.

**Endnotes**


2. Ibid., p. 4.


8. Ibid., p. 30.

9. Ibid. p. 17.


12. Ibid. p. 33.

New Structures, Old Thinking

Michael Orr

This paper examines force restructuring in the Russian armed forces, especially in the ground forces over the last decade. Progress or stagnation in force structuring provides a useful indication of the reality and status of military reform generally. Russians frequently make a distinction between “military reform” and “reform of the armed forces.” Military reform is a fundamental reassessment of a state’s defense policy and requirements, affecting government, society, and the economy as a whole; reform of the armed forces is the reorganization of the armed forces to meet these changed requirements. Military leaders sometimes use the politicians’ lack of interest in military reform to justify their slowness in reform of the armed forces, but a study of restructuring demonstrates that there is a great deal which could have been accomplished by the generals without waiting for the politicians to move and which would have increased the efficiency of the armed forces significantly.

Restructuring of the Russian armed forces is driven by two major forces: internal or technical and external or geopolitical. The internal or technical consideration is the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which pre-dates the establishment of the Russian Federation. Soviet military scientists concluded that the RMA would require slimmer, more mobile forces, in which greater firepower and improved C3I capabilities would compensate for reductions in size. In the ground forces these structural changes were expressed in

![Figure 1. Ground Force Structures: Two Models](image)

Figure 1. Ground Force Structures: Two Models
experiments with a chain of command, which ran corps-brigade-battalion rather than army-division-regiment-battalion (Figure 1).

It is significant that these changes would have required deeper reforms to be effective because of the higher standards of leadership and training which would have been required in these new formations. The external or geopolitical force was the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, with Russia's consequent reduced world status and resource base. These demanded rapid, in fact, over-hasty troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and saw the loss of many formations to newly independent republics. Obviously, all the NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces were subject to some of these pressures, but I would argue that Russia faced the greatest pressure and was the worst equipped of all to face that pressure.

In particular, during the period in which General Grachev was Minister of Defense (1992-1996), the Russian approach to restructuring was driven by a refusal to confront reality—it was an attempt to retain as much of the Soviet system as possible, with its roots in a mass-industrial warfare mobilization capability, and insofar as there was discussion of change, it was over-ambitious and remained merely words. For example, it was proposed to create a new structure to be called “the Mobile Forces.” Their creation would have benefited Grachev’s own branch of the service, the airborne forces (VDV), but would have stretched Russian defense resources even more thinly.

As a result, Soviet-style structures were left in place without the demographic and economic resources to sustain them. By the middle of the 1990s Russian military formations were becoming a hollow shell, illustrated by the fate of the divisions brought back from Eastern Europe. Having been “Category A,” First Strategic Echelon forces, they returned to Russia at reasonably high manning levels, approximately 12,000 men in motor rifle divisions and 8,000 in tank divisions. At the time of the first Chechen War their strengths had shrunk to 7,000 - 8,000 men in motor rifle divisions and 3,000 - 4,000 in tank divisions. By 1997 strengths had fallen even lower; some tank divisions could hardly raise 2,000 men and apart from some formations in the north Caucasus and parts of the so-called “peace-keeping divisions” manning levels were so low that hardly a formation in the Russian ground forces could be considered combat effective.

The consequence of this failure to adapt structures to realities was seen in the first Chechen War. “Composite units” were created in every military district for deployment to Chechnya (see Figure 2). Divisions struggled to raise a “composite regiment” and were able to do so only by bringing in individual reinforcements from all over the district. To raise a composite battalion of naval infantry in the Baltic Fleet, men reportedly were drawn from over 100 ships and establishments. Men were posted without any regard for their military specialties; radar operators might be expected to become snipers overnight. With no time to train together these hodgepodge units were thrown into battle, meeting a series of tactical disasters.

It was obvious that reform and restructuring could not be delayed any longer, and a new defense minister, General Igor Rodionov, was appointed. Rodionov, from his position as head
of the General Staff Academy, had developed the only effective critique of the existing system and the best-founded proposals for change. His period in office will probably be seen as a failure, but an honorable one. He proposed controversial changes but was quickly shown that he would not get political or financial support to introduce them and retreated into his bunker. Restructuring was an obvious indicator of his problems. Rodionov tried to reduce the bloated ground and airborne forces but was met with an uproar, Yeltsin vacillated, and restructuring did not happen.

After less than a year Rodionov was made a scapegoat for Yeltsin’s inability to face the consequences, especially the financial consequences, of military reform. His successor, General Igor Sergeyev, has introduced the first major steps to restructure the Russian armed forces. Most of Sergeyev’s program is based on Rodionov’s ideas. The difference between the two men can be summed up by a quotation from each of them. Rodionov said that military reform was the “process of bringing the entire defense activity of the state into conformity with the new political, economic, and social changes in policy”. Sergeyev said, “I see military reform as the implementation of proposals approved by the president.” Whereas Rodionov thought that the pace of reform should be influenced by the need to protect the welfare of personnel who might be made redundant or relocated, Sergeyev has been more willing to make cuts and changes, whatever the cost to individual servicemen. He has also sought to change the balance of power within the armed forces by promoting the interests of his own service, the Strategic Rocket Forces.

This last tendency is most clearly demonstrated in the restructuring of the armed services since 1997. All space-based forces have been absorbed into the Strategic Rocket Forces. After

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**Figure 2. Mobilization for Chechnya, 1994-95**
the national air defense forces (PVO) had lost their anti-missile component, the remainder was amalgamated with the Air Force, reducing the number of armed services to four. These changes were not too difficult to justify in military terms; other countries had never found it necessary to make national air defense a separate arm of service, and in procurement terms alone having two separate air forces was very wasteful.

It is less easy to justify the abolition of the main command of the ground forces. The ground forces are the largest of the Russian armed services and had always carried most weight in Ministry of Defense politics. Both the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff have almost always been drawn from the ground forces. It is therefore difficult to see why this large and important branch of the services should be expected to do without a professional head. The ground forces are now controlled by a directorate, not a main command, and by a director, not a commander-in-chief.

In addition, the military districts were reorganized (see Maps 1 & 2). The Siberian and Transbaikal MDs were amalgamated into a new Siberian MD in 1998. The Volga and Urals MDs were to have amalgamated in 1999 but the process seems to have been delayed until 2000 and had not begun at the time of writing. (Some cynics have suggested that in parts of the Ministry of Defense military reform means restructuring the Volga Military District).

More importantly the military districts are supposed to take on such new responsibilities as “operational-strategic” or “operational-territorial commands.” This gives their headquarters operation status rather than administrative status. Each is responsible for a strategic sector of Russia’s borders; in theory, all forces within that sector, whether Ministry of Defense or others, should come under control of the command, which is itself subordinate to the general staff. In practice, the details are still unclear, and it is uncertain how much authority the general staff and military districts will possess over non-Ministry of Defense forces in peacetime. The second Chechen war is the first test of the system, with the North Caucasus Military District controlling operations through a Joint Forces Grouping headquarters.
Russian Military Districts Before 1998

MAP 1

Russian Military Districts From 1998

MAP 2

KEY TO MILITARY DISTRICTS: FE = Far Eastern; LE = Leningrad; MO = Moscow; NC = North Caucasus; SI = Siberian; TB = Transbaikal; UR = Urals; VO = Volga; VO-UR = Volga-Urals
At the moment, the situation appears to be that there are four Russian armed services but only three main commands and that the intention is to go on to a system of three armed services, probably based on land, sea, and air forces. However, the picture is not totally clear, with the relationship between the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Force in such a system not having been explained.

It could be argued that raising the SRF’s status fits the new Russian military doctrine, which stresses the value of nuclear forces in deterring even conventional conflicts. However, an examination of the personnel appointments made by Sergeyev shows that he has been concerned to end the ground forces’ traditional domination of senior appointments in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff and replace it with SRF primacy.

Within the ground forces Sergeyev has made the deep cuts which Rodionov proposed. The order of battle has been drastically reduced, but the formations which remain are better manned, and a number of “permanent readiness formations” have been created. The first of these was a new 3rd Motor Rifle Division created in the Moscow Military District from elements of two under-strength tank divisions with large drafts of personnel from elsewhere. These permanently ready forces are supposed to have 100 percent of their wartime equipment list and 80 percent of the wartime manpower strength even in peacetime, and to be capable of deployment within a few days. By 1999 it was claimed that three ground force divisions, four ground forces brigades and three airborne divisions had achieved this standard. In addition, a number of regiments in other divisions have been allocated permanent readiness status. These reduced-strength divisions are said to require 30 days’ notice to mobilize as a whole, though the permanently ready regiments should be deployable earlier. Finally, there is a mobilization reserve of formations requiring 90 days’ preparation to be ready for war.

This is certainly a more rational structure, apparently modelled on the old Soviet pattern of three levels of readiness. We shall have to see how it will stand up in times of emergency. Two case studies from 1999 suggest that problems remain.

**Deployment of the Russian Contingent in Kosovo (See Figure 3)**

The first point of interest is what did not happen. A permanent readiness formation was not deployed. Instead a totally new formation was recruited and sent to Kosovo to serve in KFOR. The reason for this is that conscripts, under the regulations then applying, could not be sent to serve in a “hot spot” outside Russia unless they volunteered for service. This illustrates the problem of trying to form permanent readiness formations in a conscript army. Instead, it was necessary to recruit the contingent from serving and reserve soldiers and pay them a substantial dollar allowance.

We should also note that the final deployment did not match Russia’s original proposal to raise a force of about 10,000 men. Russia could not recruit or pay a force on the larger scale, which meant that it was unable to claim its own sector within KFOR.
Deployment for the War in Dagestan and Chechnya (See Figure 4)

This was an even stiffer test of the armed forces reforms, and I will touch on only some of the most relevant points here. The mobilization and deployment represented a great improvement on the chaos of the first Chechen war. The permanent readiness units which provided the basis of a force of 57,000 Ministry of Defense troops and up to 40,000 men from the Interior and other ministries have proved to be a much more coherent force than in 1994-95. The permanent readiness units received sub-unit reinforcements to improve their
combat capability, but individual replacements were required on a much smaller scale than in 1994. The deployment timetable allowed more time for shakedown training, while command post exercises and some field exercises over the last two years had improved staff work and coordination. However, there were some serious snags in the deployment, largely because of the weakness of a conscription-based manning system for supposedly permanently ready forces. Again the problem was the presidential decree limiting service in a “hot spot” to those who had served in the armed forces for at least 12 months and who had volunteered. If that system had been retained it would have been impossible to deploy the force. Both limitations were abolished, but then in response to public concern a new limitation of six months service was introduced. The requirement to volunteer was not restored. It was necessary to return conscripts with less than 6 months service from the area of deployment. In some units this caused serious problems. The new 3rd Motor Rifle Division suffered particularly because it was raised two years before from almost nothing and thus had replaced a large proportion of its conscripts in the spring of 1999.

Maintaining a significant force in Chechnya is likely to prove as great a problem as deploying it. A force of 57,000 men represents about a fifth of the total ground forces’ strength and will absorb almost all the permanently ready units. The VDV now has about one man in three deployed in Chechnya or in a “peacekeeping role” in the Balkans or elsewhere in the Caucasus. This represents a significant “over-stretch” of Russian manpower resources. Training assets and budgets will be eaten up in preparing the Chechen force and in training individual and sub-unit replacements. The VDV has been able to conduct some rotation of battalion groups since the beginning of 2000, while the ground forces started to pull back units in March. It has been suggested that a permanent garrison of a motor rifle division and an MVD brigade will be required in Chechnya, and some military districts have been training units to form part of this new formation. However, it would be overly optimistic to believe that the Russian force in Chechnya can be reduced to this level in the immediate future without allowing the rebels to re-build their strength and counter-attack. On the other hand, maintaining a larger force will not only be financially expensive but is likely to cause morale problems.

Russian deployments in both Kosovo and Chechnya demonstrate the inadequacies of the traditional Soviet-style force structure in the type of operations which actually face the Russian armed forces. A decade of debate and argument has left the ground forces with a force structure which mixes the traditional army-division-regiment-battalion and the new corps-brigade-battalion chains of command. If anything, recent years have seen a shift away from the latter system, with some corps disappearing or being converted back to armies and brigades being disbanded or converted into regiments within divisions. The justification for this seems to be a concern to preserve the capacity to mobilize conventional forces for a protracted war.

In essence the problem is how best to achieve force sustainability and how to balance the tooth-to-tail ratio. The traditional Soviet approach favored limiting tactical and logistic independence at the tactical level in order to maximise flexibility at the operational level of command. Small tactical units, which could be reinforced with operational assets when necessary and replaced when exhausted, were best suited to this requirement. However, in
lower intensity operations such as peacekeeping or counter-insurgency more self-sufficient tactical units and sub-units are required. In particular the battalion level of command becomes more significant, requiring greater logistic autonomy. This was recognized during the Afghan War, but the institutional conservatism of the Russian armed forces and their fixation with major war, particularly the threat of a war with NATO, delayed real change.

The unhappy experience of composite units in the first Chechen war was the result of trying to make do with the old structures. By 1999 the ground forces had developed a concept of “temporary operational groupings” (Russian: Vremennye Operativnye Gruppirovki, or VOG), which represent a more considered attempt to adapt peacetime organizations to the realities of active service. Figures 5a-c illustrate three different levels of VOG, depending on the scale of operations. The Russian contingent in Kosovo is an example of the third type of VOG, formed by sub-units from more than one formation. VDV divisions provided battalions to operate under a newly-formed brigade headquarters (compare Figures 3 and 5c). In this case battalions were not deployed intact but were raised with a cadre from an existing battalion, fleshed out by volunteers from other units. It is significant that these battalions, once deployed, are often referred to as “tactical groups” because they have been reinforced with additional combat and service support elements to give them considerable self-sufficiency.
The operational groupings in Chechnya have been on a larger scale and have involved several branches of the armed forces. Besides Ministry of Defense units from the ground forces, airborne forces, naval infantry, and air force, all the other “force ministries” (internal troops, border guards, railway troops, etc.) have contributed elements. Reflecting this, the title “Joint Force Grouping” (Russian: Ob'edinennaya Gruppirovka Voysk or OGV) has been used. As shown in Figure 6 the OGV has controlled a varying number of subordinate groupings, each with its own sector of responsibility. Originally there were three of these, Northern, Western, and Eastern, but as operations developed a Southern grouping was created to command a force inserted near the Georgian border of Chechnya, while the Northern grouping became the Groznyy grouping to control operations within the city. (It was subsequently renamed the Central grouping after the fall of Groznyy, when it became responsible for operations in the Argun valley).
The ground forces’ contributions to the OGV have been based on regimental and battalion “tactical groups.” These are all-arms groupings, with strong artillery components (often a mixed rocket & tube artillery unit) and sometimes an army aviation element. The base units have been drawn from permanent readiness formations and units from most of the military districts. Once deployed in Chechnya, these tactical groups have been allocated sectors of responsibility and have been able to plan fire support for their operations with considerable autonomy. Previously commanders at this level would have been able to organize fire support only within the context of a plan drawn up at the operational level of command. Tactical groups have been shifted between joint force groupings with much greater flexibility than the old army-division-regiment structure would have allowed.

This structure of joint force groupings and regimental or battalion tactical groups more closely resembles the corps-brigade-battalion structure, though the joint element is new. It may well form the basis for a major restructuring of the Russian armed forces after the war. The General Staff will push for powers to coordinate and even control all Russia’s armed forces, which would be exercised at regional level through military district headquarters (operational-strategic or operational-territorial commands). Within the ground forces some restructuring at the operational-tactical and tactical levels is likely, but its outlines are not clear. One possibility is that there will be only minor changes in peacetime unit TO&Es. In this case, as in the present Chechen campaign, an improvised or temporary command structure would be created as required in times of emergency. Alternatively, a looser and more flexible structure could be created in peacetime, which would be closer to that required on operations. A key element in such a scheme would be to free operational units and formations of the burden of administrative and training tasks under which they presently suffer. From military district to divisional level and lower, Russian headquarters have to combine administration and operations to a far greater degree than in most western armies. In particular, they have heavy responsibilities for conscription and basic training, which detract from their operational readiness. Separating recruitment and basic training from preparing for operations would greatly improve the Russian army’s capability for force projection.

Conclusions

A study of Russian force structuring over the last decade is a valuable monitor of the meaning and progress of military reform in the country. Restructuring, like reform generally, has been too slow and often nonexistent. The guiding principle seems to have been that expressed by General Tretyak in 1988: “Any changes in our army should be considered a thousand times over before they are decided on.”

Reform and restructuring have been affected and distorted by rivalries between services within the Ministry of Defense and between the MOD and the other force ministries. Interservice rivalry is not a purely Russian phenomenon, but it is rarely so bitter as in Russia. In other states a more open debate on defense matters and the greater number of actors in the decisionmaking process act as a check and balance to interservice politics.
The most hopeful course for restructuring within the ground forces is to try to match peacetime force structures with those required on operations and to separate operational and administrative functions. However, achieving such changes will require a mental flexibility that has not been obvious in the Russian military to date. In particular, the leadership will have to review their ideas of the nature of future wars and the roles of armed forces.

Finally, change in top-level structures and the drive and resources to make change happen lower down will depend on the new political leadership. Key decisions, such as the role of the General Staff in the central control of all Russia’s armed forces, whether the General Staff is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense or not, and how the armed services are to be structured within the Ministry of Defense will be made by the new president. We can be reasonably sure that Vladimir Putin has a greater capacity to concentrate on an issue than his predecessor and probably a greater interest in security policymaking. However, in the field of defense policy as in all others, Putin’s ultimate objectives remain an unknown factor.
What Can the Military-Industrial Complex of Greater Russia Deliver in the Next Decade?¹

Alexander Kennaway

Motives for the Current Program of Rearmament

Well before Russian President Yeltsin resigned, many statements by the leaders of Russia, including then acting Prime Minister Putin, pointed Russia back to the concepts of the Soviet state. This was especially true in the military and defense industries in order to reassert her position as a Great Power, and, as the nationalists and Communists see it, to save Russian civilization itself.² If that view is maintained by Putin as president, the time for genuine cooperation with the West is probably over and will be increasingly being replaced by another era of cold war wariness, suspicion, and hostility. These are the old, traditional, introspective, defensive Russian attitudes which, it has to be said, the West has done not a little to fuel and reinforce. From a Russian perspective, NATO ignored the sensitivities and interests of a once powerful nation when its economic and military basis collapsed. Gorbachev insists that he received a promise that NATO troops would not replace Soviet forces in central and eastern Europe when he sanctioned their withdrawal, an act for which Russian extremists still regard him as a traitor to the Motherland. Those extremists, supported by many ordinary people as well as those in positions of leadership, believe that NATO is deliberately exploiting Russian weakness to impose its will on the world, citing as evidence NATO expansion, recent military and political events, such as those in Iraq and attacks by Turkish forces on Kurds in Iran. The NATO attack in Kosovo persuaded them of the falsity of the Solana doctrine of NATO, holding that it is a defensive alliance working to rid Europe of terrorism, arms and drug smugglers, and local wars leading to mass exodus of refugees and epidemics. The stated intention of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to redefine as “not illegal within the UN Charter” its self-declared humanitarian armed crusades has, not unexpectedly, rekindled Russian resistance to, and suspicions of, the West.

Currently, the Russians view the world as unipolar, that is, one run by and in the interests of the United States. This is a phrase that we will hear many times. The West’s blatant—from the Russian point of view—exercise of its power in the key industries of gas and oil rekindles Russian perceptions that the capitalist West, through the multinational corporations, is set to steal, or buy far too cheaply, her natural resources. This extends to accusations that the West is determined to reduce Russia to the status of a colony whose commercial role is to supply raw materials and to be forced to import Western technology. However, this argument conveniently overlooks a century-old Russian inability to design and make engineered products for civilian purposes that are adequate for its own use, let alone that are competitive on world markets. Illogical as the exploitation perspective may be, it has led to more than one rejection of Western offers to invest in Russian industrial operations, both military and civilian, with the aim of making them competitive. The European Union
and the World Trade Organization also are accused of policies aimed at excluding Russia from world trade in civilian markets. The only unregulated international trade is in arms, and Russia is pursuing it with increasing vigor and competence, regardless of the potential dangers to herself or others.

It is also true that the voluminous and highly publicized Western economic and financial advice aimed at creating a free market economy in Russia was inappropriate to Russian conditions. It was very largely responsible for the theft of important state assets by a small number of people who seized the opportunity to become immensely wealthy and politically powerful. It will take many a year for the Russian economy to recover from this Western-led folly, admittedly implemented without apparent reluctance by leading Russian politicians and “bankers.” In spite of the exaggerations, it is small wonder that Russian trust in Western commercial, financial, and political institutions has evaporated.

Newton’s Third Law—“To each action there is an equal and opposite reaction”—also holds true in international affairs; we fuel each other’s paranoia. The Russians claim to believe that the West, led by the United States, is conspiring to destroy Russia by all possible means. Given such a belief, it is not hard to understand the current Russian return to strident nationalism backed by increased military expenditures and a hardening of their international negotiating stance. To many of us, it seems unlikely that any Western administration is intellectually or politically capable of devising or implementing a successful conspiracy, especially among such a disparate set of nations that comprise NATO, each with its own anxieties and internal preoccupations. Nevertheless, we have squandered our opportunities of the past decade; it will be much harder now to build mutual trust and cooperation with Russia in a range of measures essential for assisting in developing a strong, stable and developing Russia which will be less of a danger to its own people, its neighbors and the West.

President Putin’s message to the nation “on the edge of a new millennium,” however, presented a completely different and far more encouraging picture of his own current thinking. Nowhere did he repeat ideas such as the unipolar world allegedly desired by the United States in order to dominate the world and crush Russia. There was not a single threat to the West, no blame attached to the West for Russia’s current plight. On the contrary, he presented a stark, truthful analysis of Russia’s present situation, blaming its own deficiencies. In a clever, irresistible remark he stated that while one must not dismiss the real achievements of the Soviet regime, its fundamental failure was its inability to create a dynamic society in which people could look forward to planning a better life for themselves and for their children, enjoying freedom as individuals and as entrepreneurs in economic affairs. He did point out, correctly, that one cannot apply Western theories or practice, lock, stock, and barrel; Russia will have to find her own way and has barely begun. Russia’s greatness is based not primarily on its armed forces but on its people, intellect, resources, culture, and history. In order to approach the standard of living of an individual Portuguese, he said, will take a decade of genuine reform and the integrated, sustained, and well-managed application of those human and physical resources. It will take far longer to reach the current standards of living of a Frenchman or an Englishman. He recognized that, without foreign investment in the real economy, progress will be very slow indeed. For
progress to come about, a sea change is essential in creating the right conditions. The Russian
people are accustomed to a strong government, but he is against an imposed official ideology
or government interference in spheres where that is unnecessary. The government has
created a Strategic Center to attack the social, economic, and security issues; he emphasized
the need to reduce the gray economy, corruption, and crime. He castigated the legal
authorities for the “limp” way they have approached these issues.

As a statement of intent it cannot be faulted. It reminds me of Juan Carlos of Spain,
intended by Franco as his successor in running a fascist state, but who emerged from the
shadows as his own man determined to lead Spain to achieving a functioning democracy and
market economy.

Putin’s problem lies in finding enough competent, willing, and enlightened people to carry
through his program in the real world. This will entail a slow but thorough restructuring of
the apparatus of government and of every social, educational and economic activity. One’s
experience is that there are very few such people in the apparatus, science, and industry,
especially in the military-industrial complex. Too many of them fall back on the only
experience they know and trust, that of the past. The “New Russians” are as little to be
trusted as any “Get-rich Quick Johnny” in the West. They know how to make money for
themselves, not how to serve their country.

Putin’s statements as Prime Minister and President are inconsistent; and it remains to be
seen which wins. I have to say that his latest statement reads as the heartfelt words of a very
sincere man who has observed the scene and thought about it deeply.

Reading the Trend Lines

It would be foolish, however, to speculate overmuch on Putin’s words. One must work on
the basis of all other evidence to date, including consideration of Russia’s past behavior. The
declared intention by Russian leaders to provide a counter-weight to the imbalance of forces
provides another basis for their decision to strengthen their armed forces and the defense
industries, financing the latter by a more vigorous drive for arms exports and to form
alliances against the United States. Military and defense industrial linkages will grow
between Russia, China, India, and other countries on the Pacific Rim and in the Islamic belt.
It is becoming clear from their actions that the “people of power” have turned significantly
against involvement by foreign powers, whether in direct financial investment or in
managerial control, despite the fact that the latter could provide the essential expertise to
lead the civilian economy upward.

There also is much recent evidence that people in government and those who may aspire to
the presidency or senior office are not going to put into liquidation the loss-incurring sectors of
the economy nor will they reduce the share of R&D, design institutes, and production
facilities devoted to military and space activities. In the foreseeable future, the old structures
and managerial systems and attitudes of the Soviet past will continue, coupled with the
post-Soviet opportunities to amass wealth and power that were made possible by the unregulated rush to “privatize” firms that could be milked by crude or ingenious means. These conditions continue to benefit a small number of people who operate at every level, federal, regional, and city; they may be in positions of political authority or they may own or direct commercial organizations. In the present circumstances there is little point in trying to decide who controls whom. The outcome of these struggles is yet to be decided. It varies from place to place, industrial sector to sector, among the so-called “power ministries,” and between them and the presidential administration.

One cannot rationally talk of “market reform” or of a “transition economy” in Russia, and one can do so only with caution in most of the other countries of the CIS. Other formerCOMECON countries have fared better; some, such as Poland, Hungary, and Estonia, are well on the way towards genuine improvement. The absence of the desire, will, and ability by industrial leaders to embark on the necessarily long and hard road toward a thriving and profitable economy is closely linked with, and indeed is produced by, political attitudes.

The nature of the Russian government itself is also significant. In Soviet Russia (post-Stalin), the General Secretary was first among equals; in the Russian Federation, however, his successor, the President, is supreme. The constitution provides for a super-presidency whose occupant can and does rule on caprice, ignoring the Duma and Federal Council, frequently dismissing and replacing the Prime Minister and ministers of government. The presidential administration employs 2,500 people; any strategic thinking and decisionmaking that is done at the federal level of government is done there. It is an expensive copy of the old central committee of the Communist party, which advised the General Secretary and Politburo, who made the final decisions. The present “government” is similar to the Soviet Council of Ministers, composed of functionaries who are supposed to carry out the instructions of the presidential administration. The Prime Minister is simply the chief administrative officer. Under Putin, the government was even more subservient to the President than before. No wonder Russia survives its frequent, abrupt changes. It is doubtful if any presidential candidate will attempt to amend the constitution to reduce the powers of the President. For this reason it is likely that Russia will continue to be governed in ways that have changed little down the centuries. Yeltsin, it will be remembered, anointed Putin on the occasion of his appointment as Prime Minister in the summer of 1999, as Yeltsin’s chosen successor to the Presidency. He was almost unknown at the time, but the second Chechen war of the 1990s has pushed his rating in the opinion polls to heights previously unknown in the post-Soviet period.

Putin’s statements in the last months of 1999 demonstrated the hard line set out above. He will try to accelerate economic union within the CIS, thus seeking to replace competition in arms exports by, for example, Ukraine and Kazakhstan with cooperation on the old Soviet model. He announced increased allocations to the military, as well as the defense R&D institutes and industries, and further efforts to finance them through exports of arms and transfer of weapons technology. His intentions are to use the military-industrial complex (MIC) as the engine to revive all other sectors of the economy. Based on his record in 1999, Western expectations of reforms toward a genuine free-market economy, internal democracy, or detente with the West are likely to be disappointed.
Current State of the Defense R&D and Design Institutes

The size, number, and division of labor between research, development, design, and production organizations remain as they were in late Soviet times. We consider them to be inefficient, unwieldy, and in need of drastic slimming and rebuilding if they are ever to be profitable or capable of creating competitive civilian products. But that is not the prime objective, if indeed it ever was; conversion is dead. No one talks about it, and the sums allocated to that end in the federal budget are mere tokens. The real issue is whether any serious effort was made over the decade to convert the institutes, design bureaus, and factories away from military toward profitable and competitive civilian production. I conclude that it was all a bluff, mere talk. The West wasted its time and money sending industrial experts to help with the job. But we did gain something; our people saw what those factories are really like and experienced first hand the abilities and deficiencies of the directors, managers, and work force. I, for one, found it illuminating. Having looked for some decades at Soviet weaponry which performed well, I had assumed that they must be made in factories that more or less resembled ours. It was a surprise to find that the Russians produced good stuff in such awful factories. But the reconciliation of these opposites is to be found in their indifference to cost, rework, and all else except the quantitative (apparent or real) fulfillment of the Plan. Conversion means what it always meant in Soviet times, the ability of the MIC to turn out products either for military or for civilian use and/or for the products to have dual functions like tractors to pull ploughs or pull tanks out of a ditch. Many Russian political, industrial, and military leaders have gone on record to confirm that it means this and no more. The MIC remains the core of their economy.

R&D and Design Institutes. Most of them are separate from MIC factories. The factories are exactly what their title suggests, purely manufacturing facilities with none of the other functions deemed in the West to be essential to a commercial organization based on manufacture. The number of R&D and design institutes probably lies between 400 and 600; this figure may exclude civilian higher educational establishments that accept military research contracts and prepare scientific and technical graduates who may enter the defense field. These institutes have always attracted the brightest graduates in natural sciences, mathematics, and engineering. In 1991 they employed around 1.8 million of the total number of 2.7 million qualified scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union, with over 80 percent remaining in the Russian Federation. According to official statements, current employment in defense R&D is now well below 750,000, following the continued reduction of orders and funding. People are, with the approval of their directors, seeking part-time work elsewhere so that they may remain available for military work when it comes. Actual funds received for R&D in 1998 were 2.61 billion rubles. Simple calculation of numbers, probable wages, and costs shows, however, that the official figures for financial allocation are much too low. They remain unbelievable, like most Soviet and post-Soviet numerical data.

Conversations with directors of formerly closed nuclear science and engineering laboratories disclose that the best of them are unworried by financial constraints. They receive extra allocations as well as state bonuses. One, from a nuclear teaching and research establishment, observed: “We are so important we can ignore the state budget and taxes.” On the other hand, visits show that many of them are indeed very run down. Some of the huge
office and laboratory establishments once fully occupied are now almost empty, with floors remaining unlit in winter and therefore presumably unoccupied. Some rent ground floors to small private firms, some of which are run by former graduate employees of the military; others are just ordinary shops or offer financial and software services. It does not occur to the authorities to concentrate these institutes. They apparently prefer to leave them empty awaiting another expansion.

The ones I visited earlier in 1999 invited their pensioners to talk to me. They ranged in age from 60 to 85; all were bright, involved in innovations and supervision of PhD students. An enjoyable, well-informed discussion on the future lines of science and technology ensued. The heads of departments and the general directors varied in ability. Some were talkative, rather colorless, repeating outworn dissertations on their pet ideas. Most of these were of no interest to us. Some were merely fantasies, such as the ground effect plane that I was first shown in 1989 when it was most secret. It was developed to carry heavy equipment across a marsh or river and has so far as I could see no other use, even if a large machine could fly in combat conditions. Others, like the radar antenna with no moving parts, existed only as a laboratory model; on a working scale it would be prohibitively expensive, with the claimed reduction in maintenance cost not justifying the expense. But it was indeed a very clever idea. Other ideas discussed were, contrary to their inventors' assertions, neither original nor ahead of Western devices and equipment of which the institutes had never heard. One economy measure has been the isolation from Western technical and scientific papers and personnel. As a result of this and the reduction in funding, the research projects chosen are rarely going to achieve their stated objective of putting Russia ahead. A very few had some attraction to me as a former research worker, but evoked no commercial or military interest at home. As a practical man, I shared that view. It is not enough to be clever; one has to be clever to some useful purpose.

All these visits confirmed my previous experiences and knowledge of the Soviet system. With unlimited resources they set up several research units in the same field, to which the military provided a military scenario and then asked the research units, in competition with each other, to dream up ideas that would put them ahead of their opponent in that scenario. This procedure of course resulted in much free thinking, from which the military chose that course which suited them best. Presumably the rest remained unfunded, but they lived on in the minds of their creators. Over the years, these people used to try them on visitors, including Westerners, to enlist support, which was rarely forthcoming. The Russian military was wise in rejecting them! I for one was surprised that people with a good track record could produce such impractical ideas; but then I had also met similar people in the best universities in the United Kingdom. Every good scientist must be allowed one bee in his bonnet, it seems. I formed the impression that the old brainstorming habit had not died. Nor should it. We could do with more of it ourselves.

I conclude that the Russians are perfectly capable of producing some useful, imaginative science along with a mass of mediocrity and impracticable fantasy. Russian mathematicians and physicists are very good, and in a military environment they and the military design engineers are capable of excellent original solutions to difficult problems. Putin stated on his visit to the cruiser Varyag in October 1999 that nearly 180 new types of weapons had been
issued during 1999 to the armed forces. This shower of new weapons came in spite of all their claimed shortages of funds. They have been ingenious at finding software solutions to overcome their lack of decent and advanced electronics. Many of their ideas work along different lines than ours and may be better and also cheaper to produce, provided they are made in our advanced factories—not in theirs. They can also make excellent products in small numbers, but there is rarely a military or civilian factory that does not degrade an excellent concept when attempting to mass produce a commercial product such as is needed for a modern army or civilian market.

Current State of the Defense Factories. Of all the large arms designers and producers, Russia is surely the last to be able to deliver systems in the required quantities and time scale along the lines of the U.S. “Star 2000”. For that reason alone I find it hard to conceive that the Russian armed forces will match the United States in its ability to fight an almost casualty-free battle. However, their more conventional equipment will continue to sell well to third world countries.

The best performers (for example, in aircraft and personal weaponry) have their own design departments; their market research has relied on their own armed forces and research units, who have so far served them well. Such items, including both tactical and strategic (Topol M) missiles, are as good as the best in the world.

The number of factories directly working in military production is estimated by different official Russian sources to lie between 2,500 and 1,760, officially stated to employ 2.7 million workers in 1997. The industry was reported by Krasnaya Zvezda on August 3, 1996, to be producing at 22.9 percent of their total 1991 output (14.3 percent of the former level of military equipment and 27.1 percent of civilian products). The figures also showed that the total output of the MIC factories was split, with one-third to the military and two-thirds to civilian output during those years. More recent reports, in 1998, placed the military output at 15 percent and the civilian at 16 percent of the 1991 figure. Thus the utilization of the factories had dropped by a further 30 percent, attributed to a 41 percent drop in civilian output. This drop was almost certainly due to greater reliance on imported goods. Putin, in a recent speech, claimed the combined figure rose by 6 percent, but six percent of what is unclear. If it refers to the actual output, then it is now merely 1.06 times 15.5 percent of the 1991 output, i.e., 16.4 percent, not a very impressive amount. If he meant a rise of six percentage points, as so many unmathematically trained people often do when speaking thus, then that restores the output reduction experienced from 1996 to 1998, a much more impressive rise. Whatever the figure, the improvement was caused by the devaluation of the ruble in August 1998 and the consequent reduction of expensive imports.

These factories, of course, are supported by a wide range of firms not included in the MIC count, such as sub-contractors whose defense orders may be only a small proportion of their business activity. The metal extraction industries and energy generation stations also supply the defense industries, but they are excluded from the figures just presented. Published data suggest that these firms continue the old Soviet practice in one form or another of supplying the defense and other state organizations with materials and energy at reduced prices. A
considerable proportion of their output is still conveyed as barter in lieu of paying taxes; we do not know how the amounts conveyed are carried on the books for valuation purposes.

Let us try to test the data to see if the factories can be sustained on current performance. The MOD allocation to procurement is 5.97 billion rubles,\(^8\) to which one might add a maximum of $2 billion for arms exports (which equals 6-10 billion rubles in 1997-98 values and 50 billion rubles in post-August 1998 values). The procurement figure, of course, relates to the value of purchases for the Russian Federation MOD. Starting from September 1998, the military income of the MIC factories from exports might reach an annualized value of 50 billion rubles, deducting a generous share for Rosvooruzheniye, the State export sales organization. Of course, we have to add in the civilian production of these factories, which is roughly equal to, and perhaps slightly above, their military output. But we do not know for certain whether the official figures quoted above, which show rough parity between the civilian and military output of the MIC, are in physical or monetary terms. Assuming the latter, because it is the only data we have, a rough estimate is therefore 106 billion rubles in today's values for the total income of the MIC factories. Even if no account is taken of amortization, maintenance, other overheads, and the bartered taxes paid to the state from the MIC, these sums are inadequate to sustain the factories, their workers, and dependents. There must be further subsidies from non-budgetary sources. We may therefore conclude that:

- Even if the MIC factories, the best in the Russian Federation, can continue their modest post-August 1998 increase in production and sales of civilian goods and sustain their exports (provided they are for cash), they cannot be sustained and preserved for a future expansion of military orders by the Russian military unless they continue to receive significant subsidies or are reformed.

- Procurement for the armed forces is but a small proportion of their total income, a significant comment on the state and prospects of the armed forces. Averages, however, do not represent the realities factory by factory. Obviously those with good export prospects fare the best. Russia also exports a significant amount of nuclear products, material, and technology, most of which presumably is not included in the figure for machinery exports.

The MIC factories can turn out vast quantities of extremely effective weapons, given the political will to task them and to provide the means, and provided that one disregards the real costs of supply. The factories by our standards are managed purely to drive forward the planned output and are mostly poorly laid out. Some of their equipment is good to adequate but the ancillary tooling, control systems, and drives are often primitive. Moreover, the workforce and its managers are untrained and indifferent to a regime of high-quality, low-rejection, low-cost, and profitable manufacture. For these reasons the MIC factories are inefficient, with high waste and a high rejection rate in production.

The McKinsey Global Institute studied ten representative sectors and then published a report analyzing some aspects of Russian industry.\(^9\) Their conclusions are that Russia is in a dire economic situation, with labor productivity averaging 19 percent of the U.S. levels,
ranging, for example, from 7 percent for cement to 38 percent for software. Productivity has halved from 30 percent in 1992 to 15 percent in 1999 in the old Soviet factories. New assets, it turns out, are surprisingly unproductive. It does not surprise me. The report, strangely for such a management consulting firm, overlooks many key factors, especially that of poor management, which also bears hard on competitiveness, sales, reject rates, and productivity (none of which are properly defined in the report). Many Soviet military factories were awash with high-quality imported production and laboratory equipment. Some of it formerly lay in the corridors in packing cases, other machines were lying idle, their parts covered with dust and sometimes broken.

I was told that the work force resented fully automated equipment because it meant that their traditional craft skills would be unused. Though it is a widespread view in Russia, shared elsewhere, that modern equipment is essential and sufficient to rendering such factories fully competitive, this view overlooks the cultural impediments in the absence of which, they could turn out competitive products at a profit according to the Western or Japanese model. Reequipment could follow in due course and be paid for out of profits. McKinsey’s assessment of average productivity is confirmed by this author’s experience in Russian military factories in the electronic, instrumentation, and mechanical engineering fields. Their managers and work force do not have the right attitudes toward work, commerce, design, and manufacture. These weaknesses, together with the poor physical features of the military factories, ensure that they are even more unsuitable than their Western competitors for “conversion,” i.e., shifting to making and selling civilian products that would be competitive on a world market. The understandable pride of the designers and researchers in their military output has, unfortunately, led them to denigrate the skills needed to create world-class civilian products. This is another handicap for the improvement of a manufacturing sector that remains the only one organized to produce what they regard as “high-tech” civilian products.10 These products satisfied the populace in Soviet times; with better-quality imports now too highly priced for most people, they will again command a place in the domestic market. But the regime has so far set its face against closure or drastic reorganization of the bankrupt works that have no profitable future judged by the norms of a free-market economy.

The military share of the federal budget for 1999 projected an expenditure of 145.6 billion rubles. There are advantages in making preliminary assessments of military expenditures as a share of the federal budget rather than of GDP. The first is that the budget is more or less transparent and defined, which is by no means true of the Russian GDP. As a measure of the health of the economy, Soviet and post-Soviet data relating to GDP and other calculations of output and performance are far from providing a reliable measure.11 GDP is therefore not a reliable device for determining if the intended expenditure on the military (or anything else) can be afforded and sustained without damage elsewhere to the economy. Second, the allocations from the state budget provide a guide to the intentions and priorities of the President, to the mood of the State Duma, since it has to pass the budget, and lastly to the bargains struck, at least on paper, between the politicians and the General Staff.

The 2000 federal budget of around 800 billion rubles provides 145.6 billion rubles ($5.7 billion at current exchange rates) for the total military budget, amounting to 18 percent of the
federal budget. In 1999, 25 percent of the military allocation was to be spent on R&D, replacement, maintenance, and decommissioning of military hardware. In 1998, according to Colonel-General Lyuboshits, 14.1 percent of the military budget was to be divided as follows: 3.2 percent on R&D, 7.3 percent on purchase of military equipment, and 3.6 percent on capital construction (presumably civil engineering and buildings). The Russian armed forces have not purchased much new major equipment in recent years. General Lyuboshits observed that R&D actually received only 12.5 percent of the planned expenditure; i.e., 0.4 percent of the slated military budget. According to other data the numeric sum came to 2.61 billion rubles. This sum by itself could not pay for the 800,000 people claimed to be working in defense R&D. But the defense institutes did receive large non-budgetary funds.

One also has to make some adjustments to arrive at the true expenditure on defense. A downward adjustment is necessary, since the military received less than was budgeted; according to Colonel-General Lyuboshits it was 87%. An upward adjustment is needed to bring it into line with NATO standard budgeting practice by including many items that NATO includes but Russia does not, for example, internal troops, border guards, and military education outside military academies. Then there are the “non-budgetary funds” which enable the government to top up expenditures where it desires from undisclosed sources.

So far as the defense economy is concerned, Russia’s leaders have, after 10 years of floundering, abandoned all pretense of “conversion” or reconstruction of the MIC to make it efficient, profitable, or contributory to the national economy. This will also be treated in the old Soviet way; direct foreign collaboration, essential to its improvement, either will not be offered or will be refused. The potentially electable candidates for the presidency, their chief administrators, the regional governors, and nearly all of the city mayors as well as the directors of important enterprises, especially those of the MIC, are all of one mind. The only way they know and trust to survive, to re-create the vision of Russia as a great power, is to employ more rigorously the old Soviet ways within a system that retains the old Soviet structure and modus operandi, along with a few new elements. That which was lost with the breakup of the USSR they will work hard to re-create through an economic union of the CIS. If successful, this would put together the old connections between suppliers and users in the commercial chain, especially in the MIC, where they will seek collaboration and work to prevent the present moves toward competition among the defense industries of republics such as Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. They will, at the same time, expand the opportunities for personal gain, for benefiting the MIC and the state monopolies that have been opened by the crude forms of capitalism, and for the genuine improvements in export promotion they have learned in the last decade. This applies with full force to the export of arms. Trade Minister Fradkov said that arms exports rose over 80 percent in January-August 1999 compared with 1998 and now account for about 40 percent of all exports of machinery. This claim is unlikely to be sustainable on a year-to-year basis.
Making Russian Arms Industries Competitive: The Western Model?

We have our own experience in the West of the consequences of reducing demand for military equipment on the defense industries. It was not in the interests of Western shareholders to switch workers from military work to attempt to compete in civilian markets where they were unlikely to succeed in capturing a profitable share from competent, well-established firms. The reasons were clear: they lacked the commercial abilities, that is experience in perceiving market needs and designing products giving equal or better value for the money. They had after all been notoriously high-cost suppliers to the defense departments. This culture was ingrained in the staff and work force and would be difficult to change, especially within the same corporation. This is true even when people work in a successful, innovative, entrepreneurial market economy.

Consequently, different solutions to the problems of redundant employees, equipment, and plant were chosen by the directors. These included:

- Massive lay-offs, accompanied, especially in the United States, with its laudable legislation, by paid retraining and help in finding alternative employment and relocation.

- Mergers with other defense firms, nationally and internationally.

- Closures of plant accompanied by sale at auction of plant, which other businesses could put to better use or sell the land and buildings for other purposes.

All these steps are typical and sustainable in an advanced, enlightened market economy. In Britain, for example, the defense industries over roughly five years contracted from 750,000 employees to half that figure. This presented only a regional—not national—problem of unemployment, which was addressed by energetic steps in cooperation with the national and regional authorities, such as substituting other kinds of employment. The net job loss was small by comparison with the losses of over 2 million that had accompanied the closure of Britain’s sunset industries, admittedly over a longer period. At present, total British unemployment is running just above one million out of a potential work force of 27 million. The social costs were and still are high, but the national economy is healthy enough to sustain them.

The Russian defense industry shares all the faults and deficiencies of Western arms builders, and to an even higher degree. But for many reasons it cannot adopt most of the West’s solutions, especially over the short term. Not least is the plight of the several hundred one-company towns. Without military orders they stagnate, becoming breeding grounds for disease, crime, and social unrest. The USSR had no means of supporting movement of labor; this is still true. In the interests of stability, this issue should be high on the Russians’ list for treatment.
What Might Have Been Done?

In my view, a sensible program should have been carefully planned and carried out without haste, moving from one step to the next only after having reviewed progress. By today, good progress could have been made. Given that the design offices and factories of the MIC are the best of their manufacturing industries, an objective and realistic audit of their potential capabilities would provide a useful new start, and it should be matched by a identification of the most essential industrial and consumer goods required within the country. This would provide a reasoned basis for a program of import substitution, saving foreign currency as well as providing work. If no design offices exist in or near the chosen factories, a small design contingent might be relocated.

Russian experience shows the folly of pushing military engineers to design something they have never done before, especially in the civilian field. Competent design must be based on evolutionary experience and not, as the Russians have always done, by copying a foreign product that is already on the market or starting from a clean sheet with no experience. Kokoshin, once in charge of the MIC, wrote that an aircraft factory was asked to design a machine to package macaroni. After a few years they gave up the attempt. I have myself seen in the Lenistent electrical works in Leningrad their designs for simple things like a coffee grinder and a coffee maker. The former failed the most elementary safety checks at the Consumers’ Association English Laboratory, while the latter resembled a tabletop 110mm mortar which would not have found room in the cramped Soviet-legacy kitchens. It would also have been much more expensive than the foreign ones entering the country. Russian military designers think that the civilian field is beneath them, little appreciating the wider range of conditions and attributes required to compete against experienced and successful firms.

The best way to make progress would have been to invite a competent foreign firm to collaborate, contributing its designs under license, importing skills and components where necessary, and exporting finished goods or assemblies to their other operations. This would profit both partners. We tried this in Russia in Belarus during the middle 1990s. But the local firms failed dismally to produce even simple components within the required tolerances, and consequently the foreign firms immediately lost interest in any form of collaboration. It was essential for the chief engineer to stand over the inspection bench and check it all for himself since it was such an important test order. In no case did he bother. This has been the experience of foreign firms in Russia since the 1880s. That of Ford USA in the 1930s is a well-documented catalogue of totally unacceptable Russian performance. As a result, Ford was accused by Stalin of deliberately sabotaging the program. Without foreign supervisors at every stage, the work will not succeed.

The most effective way of getting decent designs is to hire a senior design engineer from a foreign firm specializing in the chosen product range. Another way is to ask USAid or the British equivalent, the British Executive Service Overseas, for a retired specialist to come on a voluntary basis. If such a person, familiar with available materials, production systems, and conditions of transport and use, were placed in charge of an existing design team, something competitive would result in less than a year and could be put into production. The
team would of course have had to do its own market investigations. It would ascertain the limitations of available engineering materials, and its analysis should initiate the essential program of widening the range and ensuring consistency of properties that are today absent. The team with its marketing, sales, design, prototype shop manufacturing, and purchasing facilities should be notionally insulated from the rest of the operation, ensuring lack of professional contamination and a cost structure restricted to that which is essential to the task, thereby excluding general overheads from the rest of the plant, which of course would ensure failure from the outset. Success would bring income and genuine profits. Some people at the deputy general director level would indeed work for failure. Therefore the general director must be on the side of such work and receive support from the highest authorities. Our work in Belarus failed for precisely the lack of will to stop the sabotage instituted by the Red Directors. The MIC and the Republic suffered, but the aim of preserving its sacred mission as a “Soviet republic” intent on joining Russia was maintained.

The team concept commended above could be implemented in several organizations simultaneously. They would need rigorous monitoring from the ministry responsible for the MIC as well as from abroad. Success might provide a surplus which could slowly pay for more general improvements, for example, buying decent cutting tools and power factor correctors. Improvements in layout and physical structure could be made by many of the idle workforce. They may or may not be paid, but they would remain on the books to retain their access to the social services of the factory. The staff and workers would learn by doing and by example; classroom training need be minimal and should be conducted by the foreign executives, who may be able to improve the training in local technical colleges and “universities” in Russia. What I have seen of current Russian handbooks and training in management is lamentable.

As profitability, productivity, and other essential indicators improved, it would become possible to organize a long-term program for closing the worst design offices and factories which have no prospects for a profitable future. The state budget would benefit, subsidies would disappear relatively quickly, and natural resources and energy would be used more efficiently and profitably. Old but basically adequate machine tools would be available cheaply to new, perhaps innovative, small businesses, and they might even be modernized with an enhanced sales value. Small and medium sized firms might occupy space vacated within the old factories and offices, thereby sharing in the funding of overhead expenses. This is what has occurred in Britain to some of the factories vacated by defense firms.

Such a program, if successful, could serve as a model to be followed by others. Any competent Western industrial engineer, given the authority comparable to that of a Western CEO and supported by the minister, could probably make a typical defense factory profitable within two years. With improved performance, the resulting products would be refined slowly to enable them to compete in export markets, first in the third world, second in the old “socialist camp,” and last in the “far abroad” of the advanced capitalist world.

I see no other way for the Russians, or for that matter the Ukrainians or others in the CIS, to achieve their ambitions of providing significantly more engineered goods for domestic consumption or for export. Such improved performance would, of course, spill over into the military aspect of the MIC. For that reason Russians do not believe that we would carry it out.
But we probably would run that risk because it is likely to raise the standard of living of the ordinary Russian and therefore raise his stake in peaceful development, as well as increase his exposure to and trust in Western experts. Furthermore the Russians will rearm anyway, even at the cost of frustrating a rise in popular standards of life. Perceived foreign intentions, the need for Russian “self-respect,” and available funds—rather than the efficiency and profitability of arms manufacture—determine issues of peace or war; whether foreign intentions are perceived to be hostile also determines the volume of arms produced. It is arguable whether Russia has been motivated for most of this century by an exaggerated defensiveness or by expansionist aggression. Such collaboration as outlined here would slowly but surely reduce Russian suspicions of foreign intentions toward them. It might be possible for Russia to finally achieve industrial and economic success through a revitalized MIC.

What Is Russia’s Likely Future?

Such a program has no chance of implementation unless Putin understands it and can get people to put it into practice. Otherwise, to be realistic, the time for it has regrettably passed. We—and the Russians—have misused the decade of opportunity. The Russian authorities are unwilling to adopt such an approach for reasons set out above, as well as some others. These include the feeling that “big is not only beautiful” notably contributing to Russian pride, but that “big is also effective.” That is the only way they know how to manage. Consequently, defense firms are encouraged to merge. In Soviet times aircraft firms offered their own concept airplanes to the MOD in competition with each other, relying on the blat ("who you know in high places") method to win.

They believe that such assets as buildings, land, and equipment are valuable and to be cherished, even hoarded, even if they make no profit now or in the foreseeable future and require continuing subsidies. This belief applies to obsolete, stagnating factories as well to equipment which suffers years of neglect. An example of this illness was related to the author by a deputy Minister for Science in 1993: “We have built the world’s largest heated, indoor ship-testing tank; it is a world treasure, the West must provide funds to support it.” It did not occur to him to ask whether we needed or could afford it.

Land is sacred according to a tradition spanning a millennium and more: it belongs communally to “the people,” it may be allocated to individuals or families, but they do not own it. Therefore it can neither be sold nor rented to foreigners. Only one or two provincial governors and city mayors have taken the opposite view and rented land to foreign firms, for 49 years in one case, hoping that before the end of the lease a federal law will legitimize this step. Changes of use of land and buildings in Russia are also rare. Unlike ours, Russian state organizations in education, R&D, design, and manufacturing mostly remain frozen from inception. The well-known Antonov plant in Kiev is a case in point. In contrast, the main offices of Tupolev in Moscow are pleasantly modernized. These domestic habits, almost totally lacking a conception of property rights, inhibit change and genuine entrepreneurial
spirit or even adequate managerial methods; Russian attitudes to foreigners make things harder still.

Russians and foreigners alike have a concept that Russia is rich in land. This led them to think it could be squandered and misused without thought. The sprawl of Russian cities provides some evidence. A recently retired Minister of Agriculture, however, pointed out that this was not the case. Actually, he observed, Russia is short of productive arable land. He calculated that it amounts merely to 0.25 hectare per capita (just over 0.6 acre).

The specific deficiencies of the MIC also apply with even greater force to manufacturing industry in general. Several observations are in order. The separation of functions between research, development, design, and manufacture prevents the interplay that we find essential within an integrated, multi-disciplinary project team. Whereas some of their theoretical work is outstanding, this separation, together with the hierarchical system, allows the perpetuation without challenge of inadequate or even erroneous theoretical bases underlying design. This weakness, as can be seen in the redundant spoilers on some aircraft, resulted in costly remedial work.

The experience of their qualified scientists and engineers (QSE) is quite narrow. Their basic education on a theoretical level is no worse than the best of ours, but their so-called "advanced training for the improvement of qualifications" is more of a formality than a bona fide opportunity for bringing them in touch with new methods and knowledge. This criticism, of course, is often applicable to continuous professional training in the West. Secondly QSEs in factories rarely do what we would call professional technical work; they are more concerned with "fire-fighting," trying to cope with day-to-day problems and shortages. This is now readily admitted by some objective Russian commentators.

The organization and system fails to provide the integrated data on a project team basis that we regard as essential for the creation and production of high-quality products and for flexible, rapid-reaction production aimed at continuous cost reduction and all-round improvement. It is interesting to note the recent intentions to apply the ISO 9000 series of quality assurance to the MIC. In all probability, however, they will be applied blindly, and, as before, slavish adherence to paperwork routines will take the place of proper technical thought and activity. This characteristic has been noted before; Baedeker's guide to Russia, published in English for the first time in 1914, had this to say:

Alongside of admirable achievements in all spheres of intellectual activity, we find also a great deal of merely outward imitation of western forms, with a tendency to rest content with a veneer of western culture and a stock of western catchwords. Side by side with the unquenchable desire for scientific knowledge, which shuns no sacrifice and is constantly drawing new elements from the lower classes, there is only too often a total inability to put into practice and to make effectual use of what has been learned. Fancy and emotion are much more widely developed in the soul of the Russian than true energy and joy in creation.

This is a very contemporary description.
Ambitions

The Russians will probably be very slow to apply a real quality assurance approach. I suspect that the workers will continue to make and inspectors reject, as at present. Nor will the buyer concern himself with the improvement of the performance of their suppliers. Current arrangements to re-create the old MIC among republics and the agreements within groups of regions to buy from each other’s existing products will also restrict competition and hence quality.

The MIC is to be reorganized into five agencies, according to R. Popkovich, until early December 1999 the chairman of the State Duma’s defense committee. These five are: aircraft/aerospace; naval; explosive devices; conventional weapons; and strategic missiles. In terms of export, the first is probably the most lucrative, especially if it includes the air-borne missiles. Izvestiia, in an article under the headline “Everything for the front,” reports that the Governmental Commission for Military-Industrial Policy has increased the year 2000 defense budget by 1.5 times. Prime Minister Putin gave Ilya Klebanov, his deputy, just one week to determine the priorities for weapon development. The MOD announced that money would not be cut for the Strategic Missile Forces (Defense Minister Sergeyev was their chief); manufacture of light weapons, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and aircraft would be increased. Zinoviy Pak, the Director of the Ordnance Agency, stressed the importance of high-precision weapon systems, space reconnaissance, and communication systems. The Izvestiya article comments that right now such major reallocation toward the military is impossible and that the intentions put Russia on the threshold of a mobilization economy. Its sub-head states, “The Government has bitten off more than it can chew.”

Other reports show that MIC elements are, as in the West, combining to survive. For example, 120 factories and institutes are planned to move under the umbrella of the new international financial industrial organization FIG Granit, involving the known firm CIS United Anti-Aircraft Defense Systems. But most of the 120 barely survive. One closed enterprise assembled up to 1,000 S-300 complexes a year, now only 10-20. A single complex costs over $100 million. The Moscow radio-technical factory, which makes locators, is practically at a standstill and has debts of 440 billion rubles. In spite of this, it will not be put into liquidation. It rents space to a defense systems company, a private company employing 100 people. In early 1999, the author visited this place and some similar institutes—they look like ghost towns. Another possible member of the planned association Granit is the well-known Almaz design bureau, which created the S-300P system. Other mergers are planned; one, between two aircraft firms, MIG-MAPO and Sukhoi, is still unresolved, with both Sukhoi and MIG-MAPO resisting the loss of their independence.

Consequences Of Russian Policies

Russia will continue to feel justified in its assessment that the West is hostile and bent on destroying it and its “civilization.” It rejects our good advice along with the bad. It will consequently strive to revive the MIC along the existing lines and provide the means for it to
sell more arms abroad and to increase its share of domestic market for civilian goods. It will redouble its emphasis on science and technology aimed at military applications. It will continue to modernize its armed forces and rely on its strategic rocket forces in, as it sees it, the ongoing geo-political struggle, and to foreign involvement in Russian affairs, such as in Chechnya. It will find the resources necessary for this program by increased exports of arms, oil, gas, and other minerals and semi-finished goods such as metal scrap, rolled steel and aluminum billets.

It will strengthen its military links with, and arms sales to, other third world countries, which it sees as unsympathetic to an American-dominated world. These are China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, South Korea, Libya and subsequently the smaller former colonies of the West including Cyprus. It will continue offers to former Warsaw Pact allies such as Bulgaria and Slovakia as well as NATO members such as Turkey, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Russian arms exporters have learned a lot recently. They have created operational, maintenance, and training manuals in English and other languages, established training centers to support Kilo submarines, sold and supported fighter aircraft and missiles in India, and are currently establishing a maintenance base in Hungary to service upgraded MIG fighters. They are commercially flexible, selling arms to satisfy old Soviet debts; accepting bartered goods for arms; offering to recently joined NATO countries ammunition to NATO standards cheaper than they could get from domestic or West European sources; modernizing old Soviet deliveries of MIG planes and other products in collaboration with Israel. They have mastered the processes of bribery, kickbacks, and other financial games that profit the rulers of the buying countries as well as the Russian sales organization itself. They are selling weapons (for example, to China) while extending the right to make deviations from Russian designs, to improve and further develop them. (Eventually, China will sell in competition with them.) Russia also engages in selling what it calls weapons technology; presumably this means the designs, manufacturing and other know-how. In 1999 this new trade is claimed to have earned $500 million.

The world's arms market is, however, shrinking, if slowly. Russian arms exports are unlikely to raise enough funds to sustain their defense industry while providing for increased demands of their own. They are still outsold by experienced and competent American, British, and French companies. Moreover, they will face increased competition also from Israel. However, they claim that in 2000, they have secured arms exports to the value of $3 billion. This, if true and paid in cash, would be a considerable rise over the present estimated figure of $2 billion. Any product or service paid for in goods is admitted to be worth only 30 percent of its original value once the proceeds are converted to cash.

But if the goal of such sales is simply provision of a good show on Independence Day, support for the ruling military governments, and the ability to put down rebellion and to prosecute local wars, then Russian arms sales will do well enough. Furthermore, as better quality dual-use technology proliferates within the MIC, that technology, too, will become an attractive package to offer to other countries, particularly to states formerly comprising the Soviet Union. In this way not only will the CIS become a credible replacement for the USSR, but so will its arms exports become more credible, effective, and profitable than those of the
USSR. In this way Russian leaders intend to promote their own influence in the world and to confound what they perceive as unipolar American intentions.

**Political Consequences**

If my reading of current Russian intentions (i.e., prior to Putin’s January 2000 Presidential address) is even approximately right, what will be the internal political consequences? The move toward reunification of the economy and the defense forces via the CIS is the opposite of what some observers have feared: the breakup the Federation. A return to hard-line nationalism and a real revitalization of the armed forces would unify all the strident voices from the extreme right through the nationalists to the Communists, and it would maintain a continuous internal appeal to “patriotism” while using some catch phrases borrowed from the Western financial world to mollify Russia’s creditors. Simultaneously, the quasi monopolies of oil, gas, mineral, and energy firms will receive every support from the state to extend their economic power and therefore the political influence of Russia in the newly independent states and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and further afield.

This policy also suits the top benefactors from crony capitalism at every level. They will probably come to an agreement with the state to repatriate some of their overseas earnings in order to finance the subsidies to the MIC, military, agriculture, and the rest of the loss-incurring organizations. Some regions may be allowed to collaborate with foreign States; these may include the Far East with the Pacific Rim countries, the south with Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The fortunes of the present small middle class may improve through professional services and improved pay to the bureaucracy and the military.

As in Soviet times, however, the interests of the common people will come last. The regime will try to pacify the masses with occasional and judicious handouts for increased pensions and minimum wages, even at the expense of printing money in a controlled fashion. Yet, there will be no revolution. Its potential leaders will have joined the fat cats, and the administration has pinched their programs. Recent history does not provide examples of revolutions organized from the bottom. Emelyan Pugachev in the 18th century led the last significant revolt from the bottom in Russia.

The evolved regime will be basically Soviet, but, having learned much concerning commerce from abroad, it could, as before, survive for decades. With regard to Putin’s Millennium Address, it is surely the duty of the West to take it at face value and to do everything to help his program. This does not mean giving credits, but practical assistance, especially in changing attitudes and improving competence in every sphere of Russian life. This can only be done by building trust, through practical cooperation from world-class firms with their Russian operations staffed by people the Russians can respect. If we fail to act in this way, if we continue to offend Russian susceptibilities and to ignore her legitimate interests, we will be encouraging a slow return to some evolved adaptation of the Cold War, with all the deprivations for the Russian population and the military risks to the rest of the world that such a course entails.
Endnotes

1. Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defense.

2. They take seriously Samuel Huntington’s thesis regarding “The clash of civilizations,” which is not the case in the West.


6. See note 3.

7. Some Western sources, such as the CIA, estimated that the USSR MIC employed between 12 and 16 million people, which, with hindsight, was probably an overestimate. D. Steinberg, quoted in Duchene, Paper 2.3 of the book The Soviet Defense Enigma (1986), reduced his estimates from 6.5 million down to 4 million for 1982. A figure frequently used in Russia today is that the Soviet MIC consisted of 2,700 factories. Since others say that roughly half of them were within the present Russian Federation this figure is probably about right. This estimate is not only of historical importance but is especially significant since the Russian Federation intends once more to reunite the old MIC within the CIS.

8. NVO, January 22-28, 1999 and March 26 - April 1, 1999.


10. Washing machines, kitchen equipment, TV, radios, floor cleaners, and the like.

11. Fudge factors include: (1) a huge unofficial economy which, by definition, is incalculable. Estimates vary between 40 and 70% of total activity; (2) over-estimates of trade based on barter, IOUs, and other non-monetary means of account; (3) under-estimates of monetary transactions made in order to reduce taxation; (4) slanted data either way given by regional and city authorities to bolster demands for support from the federal budget, and international bodies offering loans, credits, and grants; (5) over-estimates of activity designed to attract foreign direct investment; (6) poor definition of elements that are conventionally included in more settled and transparent foreign economies; and (7) deliberate concealment by the state.


14. Izvestia, October 7, 1999, p1. Presumably, the 2000 defense budget increase means from a base of 100 to 150.

15. This strikes the author as unreal.
Part Three: Russia’s International Situation

Introduction

R. Craig Nation

During the years of Soviet power, Moscow was fond of boasting that no problem in world politics could be resolved without taking its own position into account. A highly codified foreign policy doctrine wrapped in the arcane categories of Soviet Marxism-Leninism only partially disguised the imperial ideology of a dominant world power. The Soviet Union aspired to play a leading role in all major world regions, and its engagement in a variety of regional conflicts through the 1970s and 1980s was an important source of discord with the West. Though ideological affinity with international communism (often interpreted as a variety of anti-colonialism) won the Soviets some adherents in developing regions, the key source of whatever influence they were able to garner was usually military power.

In the first years of its post-communist transition, under the direction of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, the new Russian Federation downplayed competitive regional engagement (at least in areas outside the post-Soviet space) in the hope of reinforcing cooperation with the West. The precipitous loss of stature that accompanied the process of change, however, quickly gave rise to a backlash against policies of accommodation that seemed to neglect Russia’s own national interests. Under the direction of new Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov beginning in 1996, Russia adopted a much more competitive approach to regional affairs. Primakov’s prescription for international redress included a strong emphasis upon the cultivation of regional leverage and strategic allies as sources of influence.

Today’s Russia cannot aspire to the role of a global power. Domestically troubled and without economic clout, it has no choice but to reduce radically the extent of its international engagements. Its regional priorities are presently focused in the former Soviet areas immediately contiguous with its own borders (the “Near Abroad”), and in adjacent power complexes that represent either long-term threats or prospects for mutually beneficial interaction (in particular Europe and East Asia). Once again, in large measure due to a lack of positive alternatives, military means have become an essential source of leverage—whether asserted via outright interventions or “peacekeeping” deployments, an intimidating diplomacy of force, or aggressive arms transfer and military assistance packages. Competition for influence in critical regions is a source of friction between the new Russia and the West, and a potential source of confrontation.

The chapters in this section outline the shifting contours of the Russian approach to security into the tenure of new President Vladimir Putin and examine regional engagement in Europe, in the Far East, and in the post-Soviet Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasus.
Stephen Blank begins by summarizing official perspectives on security as presented in the new Russian national security concept and military doctrine. He notes that both documents express a much more acute sense of threat perception than comparable documents that have preceded them. The most significant response to heightened threat perception that has emerged from current Russian security discourse is a new reliance upon an assertive deterrence posture and warfighting scenarios including the use of tactical nuclear weapons. These are dangerous and destabilizing commitments, intended to support a policy of engagement inspired by an outmoded doctrine of derzhavnost', or great power chauvinism, that greatly exceeds Russia’s means and that works to frustrate the difficult but essential task of basic reform.

R. Craig Nation looks at the evolution of Russia’s European policy. He argues that despite the concerns expressed in Moscow over NATO enlargement and the implications of the Alliance's engagement in the Kosovo crisis, the security environment along Russia’s western borderlands is essentially benign. Though the Russian Federation cannot aspire to join key Western institutions any time soon, NATO and the European Union are anxious to engage Russia in a common process of adaptation to post-Cold War realities. In order to make that engagement a reality, Russia will have to grow beyond an inherited strategic culture that has consistently achieved consensus by focusing on real and imagined external threats.

The assessments of Russian engagement in the Caucasus and the Far East presented by Pavel Baev and Frank Umbach are considerably more somber. Baev suggests that in the Caucasus, and along its entire southern tier, Russia's reach has come far to exceed its grasp. The Second Chechen War may be regarded as the very symbol of Russia's clumsy attempts at redress. Though it has created some short-term domestic advantages for the Putin team, it has also left the country isolated internationally and is effectively unwinnable. As a protracted low-intensity conflict, the contest in Chechnya will represent a source of considerable instability in the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasus for some time to come. Umbach emphasizes the decisive shift in the balance of power that is transforming Russia's relations with China in the Far East. The rhetoric of Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” disguises the reality of China's steady rise to the status of a dominant regional power, a reality with unsettling long-term implications for Russia itself. In both cases objective trends point toward an inexorable process of decline and retreat.

All of the contributors make note of the gap between Russia’s ambitious regional aspirations and the weak material base upon which those aspirations rest. This imbalance imposes a certain caution upon Russian policymakers, but it is also a potential source of danger. Over-reliance upon military instruments of power can have unintended consequences. One example is the case of Russian arms transfers to China, which secure short-term material advantage and political leverage at the expense of strengthening a long-term strategic rival. Another is Russia’s “dash to Pristina” during the culminating phase of the war in Kosovo, where competitive angling for influence in the context of a volatile regional contingency brought both sides to the brink of an undesired confrontation. Positive engagement is a much better option for Russia and its key international partners, but, as all of the authors agree, it is not an option that will be easy to pursue.
Military Threats and Threat Assessment in Russia’s New Defense Doctrine and Security Concept

Stephen J. Blank

Generals have told me that we must build a monument to Clinton because the campaign over Kosovo drastically changed political attitudes here. Now there is no more opposition to the idea that Russia should restore its military potential.

—Russian Military Correspondent Alexander Zhylin

Introduction

In October 1999 Moscow published a draft defense doctrine and in the following month a draft of the national security concept. That concept was then revised and given the official imprimatur in January 2000. A revised and official version of the military threat will be published during the spring of 2000. Because those publications have an official and normative (if not juridical) character, their content and unusual sequence of publication possess crucial significance. They aroused considerable interest due to their provisions on nuclear use and their frank postulation of the United States and NATO as the source of rising military and political threats. This essay focuses on those threat assessments which underlie whatever justification may exist for the use of nuclear weapons or for any other defense policy.

Background: The Security Concept, the Draft Defense Doctrine, and Their Context

Because of these documents’ importance, their content, threat assessments, and the context of those assessments merit careful scrutiny. The draft doctrine states its purposes in its very opening.

Russian Federation military doctrine (henceforth military doctrine) represents a systemized aggregate of fundamental official views (guidelines), concentrated in a single document, on preventing wars and armed conflicts, on their nature and methods of waging them, and on organizing the activities of the state, society, and citizens to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.... Military doctrine elaborates on the 1993 “Basic Provisions of RF Military Doctrine” and, as applied to the military sphere, concretizes guidelines of the RF National Security Concept. It is based on a comprehensive assessment of the status of the military-political situation; on a strategic forecast of its development; on a scientifically substantiated determination of current and future missions, objective requirements, and real capabilities for ensuring RF military security; and on conclusions from a systems analysis of the content and nature of modern wars and armed conflicts and of the domestic and foreign experience of military organizational development and military art.
The character, importance, and centrality of the threat assessment of the draft doctrine and security concept ensure that both documents (and particularly their threat assessment) emerge from continuing intense political struggles over the definition of the threats. These struggles are so highly charged because the winner in these struggles then gains decisive leverage over doctrine, strategy, policy, and resource allocation.

These assessments are developed through an ongoing “ordered ferment” that constantly assesses the nature of war, its characteristics, potential threats to Russian security, and desirable replies to those threats. Since this debate remains largely, though not exclusively, confined to officers within the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, and the key national security officials in the leadership stratum, the issues under debate are matters of high politics and political struggle within the military leadership and highest levels of the government. Indeed, the ongoing debate over a revised national security and defense doctrine to replace that of 1993 had begun by 1996. Once the government announces an official doctrine based on the threat assessment and outlines ensuing policy requirements, that doctrine should then determine the policies and strategy to meet those threats and defend Russia. But discussion and controversy clearly continue, since the draft doctrine was sent back for revisions in February 2000.

All these documents appeared under very inauspicious conditions. Russian military apprehensions have grown with the collapse of Russian power, the augmentation of American and NATO power, Kosovo, the Anglo-American bombing campaign against Iraq, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the onset of information warfare and information operations (IW and IO, respectively). The NATO operation in Kosovo was the last straw since it united many of the most feared military and political elements of threat. Authoritative spokesmen like Defense Minister General Igor Sergeyev, and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Valery L. Manilov who chaired the doctrine’s editorial “collective,” admitted that Kosovo led to revisions of the draft doctrine. Manilov also admitted that there were enormous differences of opinion among those charged with preparing the draft doctrine, with the published draft doctrine representing the fifth attempt since 1997 to draft a doctrine. Not surprisingly, he claimed the draft doctrine’s “supertask” was to ensure unanimity among everyone concerning the threats, nature of contemporary war, and policy recommendations presented therein.

It is important, therefore, to understand exactly what threats Kosovo posed or ratified in the minds of the Russian military-political elite and what the final unanimity concerning threats signified. According to Harvard University Professor Celeste Wallander, Kosovo presented or confirmed the following negative assessments of NATO enlargement.

For Russia all the hypothetical security concerns of the past decade are the threats of today. NATO is now closer to Russian borders, and is bombing a non-NATO state. Even before NATO’s new strategic concept, the alliance’s development of Combined Joint Task Forces offered ways for the alliance to employ forces outside the constraints of Article 5 (self-defense). NATO’s changes, combined with its determination to use force against non-members, threatens Russia because political turmoil in the former Soviet Union increases the likelihood of NATO involvement near and perhaps even in Russia. Moscow has long feared that expansion of the alliance...
could radicalize or destabilize neighboring countries, sparking internal splits or civil wars that could drag in Russia—a role it neither wants nor can afford.

Unfortunately, NATO-Russia cooperation failed to address these concerns even before Kosovo. After Kosovo, it is difficult to see what kind of cooperative relationship NATO and Russia can have. For one thing, the air strikes (as viewed from Russia-SB) violated several principles of the NATO-Russia Founding Act—primarily NATO’s commitments limiting its right to use force and promising the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Russians interpret the ongoing military campaign absent UN Security Council approval as NATO’s drive for unilateral security in Europe. NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the 50th anniversary expanded the alliance’s mission to include non-NATO Europe as a potential area for further NATO use of force. While the Concept recognizes the role of the UN Security Council, it does not require that NATO obtain [a] UN mandate for actions beyond the alliance’s border.4

Clearly these are largely political threats that if carried out would reduce and even potentially marginalize Russia’s role in European and even Eurasian security processes. But they are not, for the most part, military threats against Russia or its vital strategic interests. However, this assessment, while correct as far as it goes concerning Russian perceptions of Kosovo’s importance, does not go far enough. Conversations with Russian military leaders and military-political analysts indicated to the author that they see Kosovo as presenting serious military threats to Russia’s military-political interests.

For example, by 1999 Russia had come to see itself “as being under threatened or actual information attack, even if not to the same extent as its friend Serbia. Western reactions to the ‘anti-terrorist’ operation in Chechnya is a case in point,”5 even though this perception actually preceded that operation. Military leaders and analysts also argued that NATO’s Kosovo operation represented the template of future NATO operations against Russia or its vital interests in the “near abroad” as outlined in NATO’s April, 1999, strategy concept.6 Again, that perception preceded Kosovo, but the latter cemented and seemed to validate it.

A central element of that Russian perception is that NATO harbors designs of enlargement and unilateral out-of-area operations in both the Balkans and the Caucasus, areas that are regarded as more or less equally vital areas of Russian national interests. When NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana told a NATO conference in September 1998 that both those regions were troubled areas from which NATO “cannot remain aloof,” he was not merely reiterating ideas he had already voiced publicly, he was confirming the expansive threat assessment held with increasing conviction in Moscow.7 His subsequent statement that “we are not condemned to be the victim of events that lie beyond our control—we can shape the future,” seemed to prove NATO’s—and especially Washington’s—hegemonic aspirations.8

While official policy as embodied in the documents under examination here had not yet fully crystallized, the trend by 1998 was moving (at least in leading military circles) toward public acceptance of the expansive threat assessment found later in the documents of 1999-2000. The following statement of November 1998 by Colonel General Yuri N. Baluyevskii, Chief of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate, indicates a desire to portray the military-political threat as growing and that it must be met by military means,
but it also reflects the concomitant pressure not to go beyond the more optimistic line enforced by the 1997 security concept. Baluyevskii observed that,

A deepening of international integration, formation of a global economic and information space, and increased acuteness of the competitive struggle by world centers of strength for consolidating and expanding spheres of influence are among the main trends of the military-political situation. Views on [the] use of military force have also changed. Despite this, however, its role as an important factor in the process of achieving economic and political objectives has been preserved.

Yes, large-scale threats to Russia are basically hypothetical in nature. They can and must be neutralized by political means with reliance on the state’s military might, and first and foremost on combat-ready strategic nuclear forces and general-purpose forces with precisely functioning command and control, communications, intelligence, and early-warning systems. At the same time, with a diminished probability of a major war being initiated and with the main emphasis of interstate contradictions being transferred from the area of ideology into the sphere of politics and economics, there has been a significant growth in the danger of outbreak of armed conflicts where escalation can lead to their expanded geographic scale, an increased number of participants and development into a local and then a regional war. Therefore the Russian Armed Forces must be ready both to localize and neutralize them as well as to carry on wide-scale military operations.

These remarks clearly outline the armed forces’ and General Staff’s desire to have it both ways, to conform to policy while registering the sense of expanding threats, the need for a large army, and the importance of the military factor as an instrument for resolving non-military problems as well as actual conflicts and wars. They just barely stay within the confines of the 1997 security concept that the military resented because it stated that the main threats for now and the foreseeable future were not military but “are concentrated in the domestic, political, economic, social, environmental, information, and spiritual spheres.” The 1997 concept also cited the particularly critical state of the economy. There is no doubt this approach “unsettled” military commanders. General Leontii Kuznetsov, CINC of the Moscow Military District, publicly stated that the main provisions of the 1997 Security Concept wrongly cited the low probability of large-scale war within the next few years. Kuznetsov complained that civilians had reinserted the statement there that Russia’s army should be prepared only for conducting regional and local wars which he had removed from the original draft. Instead, Russian troops should prepare for large-scale aggression. The Kremlin, he lamented, accepted the draft “without his amendments.”

“Worse” than this was the fact that the 1997 concept expressly invoked the availability of numerous political mechanisms and avenues for resolving disputed issues. Thus,

There has been an expansion in the community of Russia’s interests with many states on problems of international security, such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, settling and preventing regional conflicts, countering international terrorism and the drugs business, and solving acute ecological problems including nuclear and radiation security. This significantly increases the opportunity to ensure Russia’s security by non-military means—through legal treaties, political, economic, and other measures.

This posture presented Russian armed forces as more of a burden than an asset, and one whose priority had shifted from preparing for the previous total war template to the more
extreme areas of the spectrum of conflict, namely nuclear deterrence, IW, and space war at one end, and preparedness for small-scale, local and even internal conflicts, at the other end of the spectrum. While that posture met the desiderata of President Yeltsin, his national security teams of 1997-98, and the Defense Minister, General Igor Sergeyev, former CINC of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, it assuredly did not conform to the General Staff’s views on the threats facing Russia and the military forces needed to counter them. Their view emerges from another example of pre-Kosovo threat assessments, an article that also appeared in November 1998 under the authorship of lower-ranking but knowledgeable members of the General Staff.

This article, written as the crisis in Kosovo was nearing its zenith, lambasted NATO for desiring to act unilaterally out of area and impose a new world order by bypassing the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It accused NATO and specifically the United States of trying to go beyond the Washington Treaty and convert the alliance into an offensive military bloc that was expanding its “zone of responsibility” by punitive, military means. The authors charged that,

At the same time, it is not unlikely that NATO could use or even organize crises similar to that in Kosovo in other areas of the world to create an excuse for military intervention since the “policy of double standards” where the bloc’s interests dictate the thrust of policy (the possibility of the use of military force in Kosovo against the Yugoslav Army and simultaneous disregard for the problem of the genocide faced by the Kurds in Turkey, the manifestation of “concern” at the use of military force in the Dniester Region, Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh) is typical of the alliance’s actions (emphasis added).

The authors went beyond this hint that the war in Chechnya was already on the agenda to forewarn NATO openly of Russia’s likely reaction to an operation against Serbia. Rather than accept a NATO-dictated isolation from European security agendas and the negating of organizations like the UN and OSCE, Russia would act because this crisis provided NATO with an opportunity to project military force not just against Serbia but also against Russia itself. This was because the main objective of NATO enlargement was perceived to be to weaken Russia’s influence in Europe and around the world. Therefore the following scenario was seen as possible: “Once our country has coped with its difficulties, there will be a firm NATO ring around it, which will enable the West to apply effective economic, political, and possibly even military pressure on Moscow.” Specifically,

When analyzing the development of events in the Balkans, parallels with the development of events in the Caucasus involuntarily suggest themselves: Bosnia-Herzegovina is Nagorno-Karabakh; Kosovo is Chechnya. As soon as the West and, in particular, NATO, has rehearsed the “divide and rule” principle in the Balkans under cover of peacekeeping, they should be expected to interfere in the internal affairs of the CIS countries and Russia. It is possible to extrapolate the implementation of “peacekeeping operations” in the region involving military force without a UN Security Council mandate, which could result in the Caucasus being wrested from Russia and the lasting consolidation of NATO’s military presence in this region, which is far removed from the alliance’s zone of responsibility. Is Russia prepared for the development of this scenario? It is obvious that, in order to ensure that the Caucasus does not become an arena for NATO Allied Armed Forces’ military intervention, the Russian Government must implement a well-defined tough policy in the Balkans, guided by the UN charter and at the same time de-
fending its national interests in the region by identifying and providing the appropriate support for this policy's allies. (emphasis added)\textsuperscript{17}

Clearly we were warned here that Moscow would intervene in Kosovo along with Serbia in the event of an attack, and, second, that it was ready to use force in Chechnya not just against secession and terrorists, or whatever threat Chechnya presented, but to forcefully oust NATO from the Caucasus, an area that remains insofar as these authors and those for whom they spoke are concerned, exclusively part of Russia. The fact that NATO went ahead and intervened in Kosovo, probably not even understanding such warnings which probably were lost in the background noise of the Kosovo crisis, only confirmed for the General Staff its view of the threats to Russia and the unilateral measures it had to take, e.g., landing in Pristina, and attacking Chechnya to reorient defense policy and force structure. It was essential for the General Staff that it do so to reorient threat assessments and thus subsequent defense policy in the direction that these documents then took. If one then adds the threat posed by the pending U.S. decision about theater and national missile defense (TMD and NMD), which Russia regards as a threat to the very basis of strategic stability worldwide, then the reason and context for subsequent Russian statements and policies become much clearer.

The Content of the Draft Doctrine and Security Concept

The security concept's nuclear provisions state that a vital task of the armed forces is to exercise deterrence to prevent nuclear or other aggression on any scale against Russia and its allies. Thus, Russia extended deterrence to its allies, presumably the CIS members. Likewise, "Nuclear weapons should be capable of inflicting the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances."\textsuperscript{18} The concept also stated that nuclear weapons use would become possible "in the event or need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and proven ineffective."\textsuperscript{19} The security concept tailors nuclear use to the particular threat at hand as implied by its phrases "aggression on any scale, nuclear or otherwise" and "to the desired extent of damage."\textsuperscript{20} Key officials, e.g., Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Mikhailov, confirm this interpretation of the conditions for nuclear use, thereby proclaiming limited nuclear war as Russia's officially acknowledged strategy in response to many different kinds of contingencies.\textsuperscript{21}

In this context, Russian nuclear weapons serve two crucial, but not necessarily complementary, functions. First, they deter a wide range of phenomena across the spectrum of conflict that could conceivably threaten Russia. Second, they are also warfighting instruments that are to be used in a wide range of actual conflict situations, including even small-scale operations.\textsuperscript{22}

These documents' nuclear provisions also clearly relate to NATO's Kosovo operation. Officers and analysts told the author in June 1999 that Kosovo led doctrine writers to include contingencies for deploying tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in conventional threat scenarios.\textsuperscript{23} In December 1999, General Vladimir Yakovlev, CINC of the Strategic Nuclear
Forces, admitted this, attributing the new strategy to Russia’s economic crisis—where nuclear forces receive about half the funds they need—and new regional proliferation threats.

Russia, for objective reasons, is forced to lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, extend the nuclear deterrent to smaller-scale conflicts, and openly warn potential opponents about this.\(^{24}\)

Russia would also continue to replace old arms with new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles. The foregoing statements illustrate as well the belief that Russia can use nuclear weapons for the purpose of de-escalating conflict situations and wars.\(^{25}\) These remarks also illustrate some of the “threat context” animating the formulations in these documents, amplify the security concept’s intentions, and suggest that TNW will be the weapon and/or deterrent of choice for many of the smaller-scale contingencies that Russia fears. Russian doctrinal statements also represent the latest iteration (or plateau) of a debate going back at least to 1993 over nuclear first-strike use against certain kinds of conventional attacks on Russian interests and targets.\(^{26}\)

Conforming to the security concept, Yakovlev tied the new posture to the multiple threats facing Russia. He stated that nuclear weapons serve the political function of deterring “possible aggression of any intensity” to convince everyone to desist from using aggressive power methods against Russia.\(^{27}\) Like virtually every other senior commander and military-political analyst, he invoked Kosovo as a justification. NATO’s campaign convinced Russia, he said, that Washington and other NATO allies were rehearsing methods of warfare that will be the basis for future wars to which Russia must adjust. The General Staff shares this belief that Kosovo is a template of future NATO strategy.\(^{28}\) Yakovlev asserted that,

The massive use of aviation and long-range precision weapons; electronic countermeasures; and integrated use of space information assets—all these approaches have become a firm part of U.S. military threats beginning with Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991. Moreover, the primary targets in the course of the conflict were clearly specified; key installations of the economic infrastructure, elements of the state and military command and control system, and lines of transportation. NATO’s eastward enlargement not only radically altered the force ratio in theaters of military operations, but also permitted a number of kinds of tactical and operational-tactical weapons to perform strategic missions previously set aside for Pershing II missile complexes and cruise missiles.\(^{29}\)

Therefore, the draft doctrinal/security statements on nuclear issues are a fundamental aspect of Russia’s adaptation to future war. Yakovlev and the Russian leadership are equally adamant about blocking U.S. efforts to build ballistic missile defense (BMD), which they regard as a threat to the foundations of strategic stability between Moscow and Washington and a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.\(^{30}\)

The defense doctrine and the security concept, as well as published statements by authoritative officials and spokesmen, also invoke a broad range of political-military threats, many of which directly emerge out of NATO enlargement, Kosovo, and the Anglo-American Iraqi operation of 1998-99. NATO enlargement and its strategic repercussions constitute the most significant of the military-political threats. Apart from political or military-political threats, we also can identify three specific military threats displayed in Kosovo and Iraq that
particularly trouble Russian leaders: IW and IO, the use of high-tech precision weapons in a primarily aerospace and long-range offensive (what the Russians call contactless war), and BMD.

These documents’ threat assessments also portray the United States and NATO as threats in and of themselves, formulations that serve two purposes. They justify and shape the increasingly anti-NATO and anti-American political orientation of the military and government. And at home they are the essential pillars of the General Staff’s unprecedented resolve to define and control Moscow’s entire national security policy, gain higher status, and garner more resources for defense. Indeed, Sergeyev stated that the forthcoming officially revised defense doctrine examines 12 new external threats and 6 new internal ones that have appeared recently. Inasmuch as only two years have elapsed since the old security concept and its official threat assessment, this remark tells us how much of the threat assessment we are now reading has been fabricated out of a sense of paranoia to justify obtaining more resources from the government. Or, in other words, threat assessment is a major aspect of the military’s resource-seeking prodivities as well as a justification of its status in Russian politics and the quest to retain Russia’s global standing.

Consequently, the new security concept repudiated its 1997 predecessor’s optimistic and supposedly scientifically substantiated, high-level, official prognosis of no direct threat by stipulating the rising possibility of direct aggression against Russia. The security concept and draft doctrine invoke NATO and the United States as the authors of growing threats, seek to define international affairs mainly in terms of the threat U.S. unipolarity poses to Russia’s espousal of a multipolar world, expand parameters for nuclear first-strikes, urge vastly increased defense spending, and argue that defense spending should be returned to the Soviet basis, i.e., calculations based upon the military’s self-proclaimed needs, not Russia’s actual capabilities. These documents thus provide a kind of official imprimatur to the view that increasingly saturates the Russian media portraying American and Western-inspired actions as threats to Russia’s very existence.

Western alleged misdeeds include: attempting to force inappropriate reform medicine down Russia’s throat while failing to give real help to the ailing economy; stealing Russia’s markets, including blocking the sale of arms and nuclear technology; endeavoring to turn Russia into an economic colony, a provider of cheap raw materials and a market for dumping; inciting Ukraine and other CIS states against Russia; trying to limit Russian influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia with a view to controlling energy sources and transit routes; encouraging Balts and others to repress Russian minorities; establishing military and political hegemony through the expansion of NATO and the crushing of such Russian friends as Iraq and Serbia; perhaps even encouraging the disintegration of the Russian state (hence the increasingly vociferous condemnation of anti-terrorist actions in Chechnya).

Signifying the greater militarization of assessments and thinking about national security, the official security concept also replaces the word “defense” (oborona and its derivative adjectives) in the 1997 concept with the word “military” (voennyi and its derivations). Thus the new documents not only conflate political and military threats, strongly suggesting the need to respond to the former by military means, they also reflect the increasing remilitarization of the “discursive practice” of thinking about Russian security.
This mode of thinking about military-political and specifically military threats appears prominently in these documents and in public statements by leading military and political spokesmen and analysts. Sergeyev, Manilov, and the Chief of Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, argue that until and unless NATO recants over Kosovo and gives Russia a veto over its operations, the threat of more Kosovo-like crises and operations will remain, freezing Europe (and Russia) into permanent insecurity.\(^{37}\) This essentially political threat will endure and govern defense policy.

Russian military leaders charge that Kosovo, as aggression against sovereign Serbia, breached the UN charter and bypassed the UN, that NATO's claim to use force unilaterally could trigger an international and global catastrophe, and that NATO also overturned European politics and security by negating concepts of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. In their view, this allowed Washington to intervene abroad under the pretext of human rights and place a "bomb" under the structures of world politics.\(^{38}\) Kosovo also damaged nonproliferation efforts because it convinced other governments that they could deter Washington only by obtaining nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).\(^{39}\)

Kvashnin openly stated that any enlargement of NATO is at Russia's expense and that European security is a zero-sum game: "We will view NATO's further practical actions for eastward enlargement and for annexing Central and East European states to it as a challenge to national security."\(^{40}\) Sergeyev went even further, saying that,

> The approaching of NATO's infrastructure to Russian borders is a direct increase of NATO's combat possibilities, which is unfavorable for our country in a strategic sense. We will regard the approaching of NATO's tactical aviation to Russian borders as an attempted nuclear threat.\(^{41}\)

Sergeyev here reiterated and even expanded Yakovlev's threat assessment. He also showed how far he would go to expand deterrence against NATO in discussing the parameters of what the armed forces now call expanded deterrence.\(^{42}\)

His remarks evoke expanded deterrence with a vengeance. But they are not far removed from Kvashnin's harsh rhetoric that reads more like a late 19th century treatise on realpolitik—wherein alliances "annex" states to themselves—than a discourse on our times. Like Manilov and Yeltsin, Kvashnin demands an all-European security system based only on the OSCE's framework. That supposedly would assure Moscow of an exclusive zone of influence in the CIS and equal status with Washington and NATO.\(^{43}\) Kvashnin's justification is simple: NATO's enlargement extended its zone of responsibility 650-750 kilometers eastward, substantially reducing the warning time Russia would have before an attack. Russia's nuclear weapons, not to mention its conventional ones, are therefore insufficient as a deterrent.\(^{44}\)

Despite this implicit belief in the ineffectiveness of Russia's nuclear deterrent, Kvashnin also takes for granted the need to extend nuclear deterrence to unspecified allies. Of course, few states might want such an alliance since Moscow apparently is ready to risk nuclear war even in small contingencies on their behalf. Neither does anyone anywhere in Russia spell
out the criteria for becoming a Russian ally and enjoying this extended deterrence, an omission that in itself is a sign of how dangerous and slipshod the new approach to security issues is. The contradiction between simultaneously affirming the ineffectiveness and potency of Russia’s nuclear systems’ apparently eluded Kvashnin and other elites as well. But this ambivalence reflects key strategic dilemmas. Indeed, if any of Russia’s neighbors or enemies went nuclear that would intensify the burden on an already overstressed nuclear force and pose a serious threat to vital Russian interests.45

In December 1999 Sergeyev also characterized NATO enlargement, in and of itself, as a threat to global and European collective security and world politics. He particularly stressed the deployment and use of NATO forces out of area without UN or OSCE sanction as a threat that devalues confidence-building measures, arms control treaties, and security (probably having in mind the CFE Treaty and the strategic weapons agreements).46 Kosovo duly became a moment of truth for Russia that rendered efforts to work with NATO towards equal security “totally worthless.” It also follows that the nightmare scenario of NATO supporting secessionist or anti-Russian movements in the CIS is now a staple of threat assessments, including the doctrine and security concept.47 After all, such threats, manifested in NATO’s support for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and supposedly backed up by NATO’s tactical aviation and tactical/operational-tactical missiles, could appear as attacks against either Russia’s nuclear missiles or their command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I).

Consequently military leaders express the fear that NATO’s continued existence in its present form will intensify Europe’s dependence upon Washington, precluding any hope of a solid pan-European security system. As Manilov, like Kvashnin, insists,

There has to be a search for a “European identity,” and the “European factor” should be strengthened in dealing with the USA. This means establishing a pan-European security system serving the interests not only of two, five, or seven states but absolutely all European countries.48

These remarks in favor of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) neatly illustrate this conflation of political and military threats and the armed forces’ efforts to direct foreign policy on European security issues.

Sergeyev’s strictures against NATO also stress Kosovo’s impact regarding IW and IO. These two phenomena carry a many-sided threat, and are cited for doing so in the new security concept as well as in official briefings given to foreigners.49 Implicit in these publications, briefings, and many Russian writings is the understanding of an ongoing RMA wherein the nature of war has changed or is undergoing a revolutionary transformation. Contemporary war typically displays new components that must be taken into account in constructing armed forces. And those components include all aspects of the art of war on display in Kosovo, prominently including IW and IO.
Threat Assessments in the Draft Doctrine and the Security Concept

The draft doctrine, security concept, and associated military-political commentary paint a very alarming picture. Because military elites clearly view Kosovo as a template of NATO’s future operations, they charge that NATO’s Strategic Concept destabilizes the strategic military situation and the entire structure upon which the defense of Russian interests and, supposedly, world peace rest. The draft doctrine, security concept, and their authors’ threat assessments also demonstrate the General Staff’s determination to realize the countermeasures it and political leaders suggested to NATO enlargement.

The mélange of political and military threats and recommendations for policy in the draft defense doctrine tell us that it is, first of all, a blueprint for a total national security policy, not just defense policy. As such it represents the General Staff’s effort to seize the rudder of the ship of state with regard to national security. The discernible resemblance of both documents’ portrayal of military-political threats illustrates the primacy of the General Staff’s vision of the threat. The draft doctrine postulates the following external military-political threats: territorial claims upon Russia; intervention in its internal affairs; attempts to infringe upon or ignore Russian interests in resolving international security issues and oppose Russia’s strengthening as a center of a multipolar world; armed conflicts, especially near Russia’s and/or its allies’ borders; creation and buildup of forces and troop groupings that disturb the balance of forces near Russia’s or its allies’ waters; expansion of military blocs and alliances against the interest of Russia and/or its allies’ military security; introduction of troops without UN Security Council sanction to states contiguous with and friendly to Russia; creating, equipping, supporting, and training armed groups abroad to redeploy them for attacks upon Russia’s and/or its allies or against installations and structures on Russia or its allies’ borders; operations aiming to undermine global and regional security or stability, including hindering the operation of Russian state and military C2 systems, systems supporting the functioning and combat stability of nuclear forces and missile attack warning, ABM defense, and space surveillance systems; hindering the operation of nuclear munitions storage facilities, power plants, chemical installations, and other potentially dangerous installations; information operations of a technical, psychological, and other nature against Russia and/or its allies; discrimination against Russians abroad; and international terrorism.

This all-encompassing list of military and political threats portrays NATO, not only in its enlarged form, as a threat in and of itself and shows deep concern for the use of IO and IW in all their guises against Russia. Russia believes IO and IW can be used to unhinge the basis of military control over weapons, political control and governance over the state, and overall social stability. Given the centrality of nuclear weapons to Russian strategic policy and the criticality of proper C3I for their deployment and use, any weapons that strike at that C3I network obviously are seen in the worst possible light.

Hence the draft doctrinal/security concept’s threat assessments in many ways evoke Soviet precedents. By publishing the draft doctrine before the security concept that it is supposed to concretize, the General Staff sought to preempt and dominate debate on national security policy. No other approach to potential threat assessments and policy...
recommendations would command a public platform. For the first time Russian doctrine clearly articulates Soviet-like perceptions of growing Western threats. The causal links between the military's dominance of threat assessment, its recommendations for defense and foreign policy, and its unilateral efforts to define the volume and direction of defense spending recall Soviet practice.

The concurrent military operations in Pristina and Chechnya, as predicted above, further sharpen the doctrine's anti-Western animus and serve three related goals. The first goal is to forestall NATO's further enlargement in scope or mission. Russia still rejects NATO enlargement on principle and regards further NATO expansion in territory or mission as intolerable. Pristina and Chechnya forcefully illustrate how Russia plans to resist either kind of enlargement, especially in the Caucasus.

Second, Pristina, Chechnya, and the threat assessment forcefully and directly reply to U.S. policies in Kosovo, NATO's attempts to exclude Russia from the Balkans, and its implications for future warfare. Moscow's premeditated war with Chechnya serves the second goal of forcefully suppressing threats of secession from Russia that may become aligned with foreign, and probably NATO, support, as in Kosovo, and deter NATO participation in those wars, once again particularly in the Caucasus. High-ranking military commentary explicitly yokes together internal secessionist threats with that of U.S. and/or NATO enlargement and implies that they are already joined together as a single composite threat. Therefore the strongest possible military action is urged to resist those converging threats.

The doctrine's third goal is to reorient the domestic and defense agenda and preserve Yeltsin and now his successor, Vladimir Putin, in power.

Accordingly Manilov charged that,

Actually, today the internal threat, that is associated with terrorism that is covered by Islamic phraseology, has become extremely exacerbated. That threat does not have anything in common either with Islam or with national-ethnic problems. Its roots and primary sources are outside Russia.... The pragmatic conclusion is as follows: we cannot weaken external security while placing the emphasis on internal security. Or vice versa.

He also listed new threats present in the new documents that are not listed in the 1993 doctrine:

Attempts to ignore and all the more so infringe upon Russia's interests in the resolution of international security problems and to oppose its consolidation as one of the influential centers of the modern world. As you know, that's what happened when the United States and NATO made the decision to bomb the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Or another threat is the creation, equipping, support, and training of formations and groups on the territory of other states with the goal of their transfer for operations on the territory of Russia and its allies. Specifically, that is what happened with the manning, equipping, training, and financing of the Chechen terrorist formations that committed aggression against Russia in the North Caucasus.
Kvashnin also listed these items as threats as they are contained in the draft defense doctrine.\textsuperscript{56} These primarily political and psychological threats now justify the military response of a major buildup of conventional weapons. Putin too linked foreign and domestic threats, even invoking the domino theory, and charging that the Chechen threat was part of an overall attempt to detach whole territories from Russia and CIS governments on behalf of an international Islamic project. He stated that,

What happened this summer in Dagestan should not be seen as some particular, local occurrence. Combine in a single whole Dagestan, the incursions of the gang elements from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and the events in Kyrgyzstan. What was happening—we will call a spade a spade—was an attempt at the military and political assimilation of part of the territory of the former Soviet Union.... A rebellious self-proclaimed state supported by extremist circles of a number of Islamic countries had in these four years (NOTE: Since the Khasvayurt agreement of 1996 ending the first war with Chechnya. Author) fortified its position on the territory of Russia. A self-proclaimed state which, in the intentions of these extremist circles, was to have become Greater Ichkeria from the Caspian to the Black Sea, that is to have seized all of the Caucasus, cut Russia off from the Transcaucasus, and closed the route into Central Asia. Dagestan was, after all, to have been merely the first step.... So the danger for our country was extremely high. We really could have lost Dagestan and quit the Caucasus. And subsequently in the very near future, we would have had, in accordance with the domino principle, attempts by the international terrorists to detonate the situation in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Volga region. We must not close our eyes, these attempts could well have been successful. Centrifugal trends in the relations of the federal authorities and particular regions of the country are still strong on the territory of Russia. And it would not then be a question of today's anti-terrorist operation, which some overseas and Russian politicians consider incommensurate. It would be a question of truly broad-based combat operations, a call-up of reservists, and the transfer of the entire country absolute to a war footing.\textsuperscript{57}

Kvashnin also echoed the draft doctrine and 1997 security concept in noting that direct military aggression is presently unlikely. However, potential external and internal threats have been preserved “and in a number of regions are intensifying.”\textsuperscript{58} This parallels the revised and now official security concept’s line that “the level and scope of the military threat are growing,” an unprecedented statement in Russian Federation official documents.\textsuperscript{59} Kvashnin also took a strong line towards these perceived threats. For him, the principal threats facing Russia are:

- Territorial problems connected to the absence of precise juridical borders;
- Intervention in Russian Federation affairs, including encroachment on state unity and territorial integrity;
- Attempts to ignore or infringe upon Russian Federation interests in resolving international security problems;
- The appearance and escalation of armed conflicts, particularly near the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies;
- Creation and buildup of troop groupings that disturb the balance of forces near those same borders;
- Expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of Russian security; and
- Actions aimed at undermining global regional security, etc.  

While this list parallels Manilov's list as well as the draft doctrine and the security concept's assessment, Kvashnin, as stated above, assessed any enlargement of NATO as being at Russia's expense and claimed that European security is a zero-sum game. Kvashnin's response to the enlargement threat—extending deterrence to the CIS—is also not a new departure and reflects a continuing policy trend. Preliminary discussions on doctrine in 1997 took extended deterrence in the CIS for granted. Secretary of the Security Council Yuri Baturin's January 1997 reform plan stated that Russia, when confronting local wars that expand into large-scale conventional wars due to outside intervention, reserves the right to use nuclear weapons as first strike and preemptive weapons. This allegedly limited first strike would putatively regain escalation dominance and force a return to the status quo.  

Obviously this formulation closely anticipated the language of the security concept and its optimistic belief that Moscow could launch and control a supposedly limited nuclear war.  

Kvashnin also strongly argued that Russia's exclusion from NATO means that NATO ignores Russian security interests. NATO's benevolent intentions are irrelevant because its capabilities are what matters, and they are, in the Russian view, awesome and growing. Kvashnin similarly invokes NATO's defiance of the OSCE and UN in Kosovo as an example of the growing trend towards using force unilaterally out of area and of NATO's attempt to dictate European security by force. Hence, he, too, saw Kosovo as a moment of truth for Russia. He also invoked the threat of proliferation in the Middle East, blaming Israel, not Iran or Iraq for it. Yet, his public response to this problem is purely dialogue with potential proliferators, this being the official Russian position. Though Russia shares Washington's unease about proliferation, he dismisses the likelihood of Third World states having the requisite technology to constitute a threat in the near future and rejects ballistic missile defense (BMD) because it would undermine arms control and the reduction of strategic weapons. His statement follows the official line in regard to BMD, but it also suggests indecision concerning the desirability of fighting proliferation or the best method of doing so.  

Kvashnin's reasoning also suggests that Russia refuses to believe in the reality of the new proliferation threats even though the Rumsfeld Commission's findings in 1998 demonstrated that new proliferation threats are already a fact of life and multiplying in ways previously unforeseen and undetected either by Moscow or Washington. Or Kvashnin may be attempting to conceal the fact that Russia is assiduously proliferating dual-use technologies and systems to China, Iran, India, and perhaps other states as well. Given Russia's past record as nuclear proliferator, one might be pardoned for suspecting that Russia, like China, is not totally unhappy to see at least certain states gain nuclear weapons and reduce the reach of U.S. military power.  

Statements by Sergeyev and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, now follow the same line as Kvashnin, Manilov, the security concept, and the draft doctrine concerning the linked foreign and internal threats sponsored by or emanating from the United States. On
November 12, 1999, Sergeyev for the first time linked internal and external threats, claiming that U.S. interests are best served by a continuing smoldering war in the North Caucasus. In his view, that would force Russia to weaken itself through major exertions to localize the conflict. Furthermore, he claimed, Kosovo showed that NATO’s new strategy relies on the use of force. That strategy “is an attempt to defy Russia’s positions, to oust it from the Caspian region, the Transcaucasian area, and Central Asia.” Four days later Ivanov wrote that,

The question often raised in Moscow is whether Kosovo and Chechnya are links in a chain of steps toward the creation of a one-dimensional, NATO-centered world. Is Chechnya being used as a smokescreen for preparing NATO to assume the role of a world policeman, for undermining the fundamental components of strategic stability and reversing the disarmament processes? Has the anti-Russian campaign over Chechnya been launched to force Russia out of the Caucasus, and then out of Central Asia? And these are by no means the only concerns that have arisen in Russian public opinion with respect to the action—or sometimes, the lack of actions—of our Western partners.

Accordingly, the draft defense doctrine and the security concept reek with a sense of pervasive and linked internal and external threats. Sergeyev’s article on the foundations of Russia’s military-technical policy in December 1999 reinforced that outlook. Here he listed as internal threats not just Russia’s horrible socio-economic crisis and the constraints that this crisis put upon modernizing and restructuring of the armed forces, but also the “aggravation of international relations, regional separatism, and regional extremism which create favorable conditions for the outbreak of internal armed conflicts.” Consequently the main foreign threats to Russia that derive from its weak global military position and that represent a threat to its sovereignty and integrity include,

- Negatively developing trends in the entire system of international relations as expressed in the striving by the United States and NATO for military resolution of political problems and bypassing of the UN and OSCE;
- The strengthening of unfriendly military-political blocs and unions (i.e. the U.S. alliance system) “and the broadening of their sphere of influence and zones of responsibility” with the simultaneous intensification of centrifugal forces within the CIS;
- The outbreak and escalation of armed conflicts in proximity to the borders of Russia and the CIS;
- “The sharp escalation of the scale of international terrorism against Russia and its allies, to include the possible use of OMP [weapons of mass destruction];”
- The increasing gap between those leading military powers who are breaking away from other states and the growth of their capabilities for creating a new generation of military and military-technical weapons; this trend triggers a qualitatively new phase in the arms race and significantly changes the character, forms, and composition of military operations; and
Territorial claims on Russia from neighboring states. This is most powerfully expressed in NATO's “expansion to the East and their aggression against Yugoslavia, as well as the events in the Northern Caucasus.” Here Sergeyev, too, linked domestic and foreign threats, recklessly conflating them to formulate his assessment and justify his political-military agenda.

The draft doctrine and security concept echo this inflated threat perception. They both begin by polarizing two opposed tendencies, U.S.-led unipolarity and Russian-led multipolarity, as determining “the status and prospects for development of the present-day military-political situation.” Accordingly the basic features of the military-political situation are as follows. While there is a diminished threat of world war, including nuclear war and the development of mechanisms for safeguarding international peace regionally and globally, doctrine writers nevertheless discern the formation and strengthening of regional power centers, national-ethnic and religious extremism, and separatist tendencies associated with those phenomena.

Although there are economic, political, technological, ecological, and informational trends favoring a multipolar world and Russia's equal position in it, Russian leaders clearly believe that Western policies, and the policies of other countries associated with proliferation, are working to circumvent international law and threaten Russia. Hence military force and the resort to violence remain substantial aspects of international relations, a favorite justification of the military for their policy aims.

According to the draft doctrine, those negative trends foster the escalation of local wars and armed conflicts, strengthened regional arms races, proliferation of WMD and delivery systems, aggravated information contestation (protivoborstovo in Russian), and expanding transnational threats: crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the illegal arms trade. These actual and potential threats create basic destabilizing factors of the military-political situation.

Those destabilizing factors are support for extremist nationalist, ethnic, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements and organizations (Chechens or the KLA in Kosovo); the use of informational and other non-traditional means and technologies to attain destructive military-political goals; diminished effectiveness of international security organizations, particularly the United Nations and the OSCE; operations involving military force in circumvention of “generally recognized principles and rules of international law [and] without UN Security Council sanction”; violation of international arms control treaties, e.g., the United States’ intention to amend or withdraw from the ABM treaty.

Russia’s active foreign policy and the maintenance of a sufficient military potential, including nuclear deterrence, presently avert direct and traditional forms of aggression against Russia and its allies. Nonetheless “a number of potential (including large-scale) external and internal threats to Russia and its allies’ military security remain and are strengthening in a number of directions” (emphasis in the original). The original draft security concept went further, reflecting the General Staff's preeminence, charging that the combination or sum total of specific internal and external threats which encompass all the
threats arising out of Russia’s socio-economic catastrophe “can present a threat to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including the possibility of direct military aggression against Russia.” Likewise, “the spectrum of threats connected with international terrorism, including the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, is widening.” Much of this language obviously paralleled Kvashnin’s and Sergeyev’s views. Although the final version of internal and external threats listed in the official security concept is both broader and more specific in detail, interestingly, this language was left out except to cite the growing level and scope of the military threat. In this context the armed forces’ warnings of a nightmare scenario of NATO support for an ethno-secessionist (and, in Russian eyes, necessarily terrorist), anti-Russian movement are not surprising.

Fusing Internal and External Threats

The scope of internal military threats that these documents outline also deserves attention because the manner of its presentation permits the fusion of internal and external threats described by Sergeyev, Manilov, Kvashnin, Putin, et al. As the other military forces have proven unable to cope with these threats in Chechnya, the draft doctrine and security concept now also strongly imply the use of the regular armed forces for those other forces’ domestic mission. This new set of missions is an extremely dangerous risk for the army and government because of the incompatibility of police functions and missions with those of the regular army. But in so stressed a state as Russia where both the MVD and the armed forces are already thoroughly criminalized, placing the army in the domestic line of fire is apparently the only alternative. Here Russia is flirting with the risk of state failure. The progression from linking internal and external threats to fusing foreign and domestic missions in a single organization automatically entails many great risks and was probably taken without the requisite forethought about its implications. Although it makes a nice logical progression, in practice such policy decisions already represent a confession of failure or of despair at the absence of usable effective police or military power inside Russia, a point all too tragically evident in Chechnya in 1994-96 and again today.

We should note that this fusion of internal and external threats also continues previous Leninist and more recent military-political arguments invoking IW to link external and internal threats of aggression and subversion from within.

The draft doctrine’s internal threats comprise:

- Attempts at a violent overthrow of the constitution;
- Separatist ethno-national, terrorist movements seeking to disrupt state unity and Russia’s integrity or to destabilize the internal situation there;
- Planning, preparation, and accomplishment of actions to disrupt and disorganize the activity of state governmental organization;
• Attacks on governmental, military, economic, and information infrastructures;

• Establishment, equipment, training, and functioning of illegal armed units; unlawful proliferation of weapons usable for terrorist or criminal actions; and

• Organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, and other unlawful acts on a scale threatening Russian military security.88

While Putin altered the draft of the security concept to put more emphasis on internal threats and crime, the document as a whole exudes the Soviet sense of pervasive and all-encompassing threats.89

After laying out a comprehensive description of those internal threats, the revised security concept then addresses the foreign threats. It is noteworthy that their order of presentation represents a full-blown attack on the United States. These threats are:

• States’ desires to bypass organizations of security like the UN and OSCE;

• Weakening Russian influence in the world;

• The strengthening of military blocs and alliances, particularly, NATO’s eastward expansion;

• The possible emergence of military bases and presences “in the immediate proximity of Russia’s borders;”

• Proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, weakening of integrative processes within the CIS;

• The outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the borders of Russia and/or the CIS states; and

• Territorial claims on Russia.90

The revised concept also lists as threats attempts by other states to prevent a strengthening of Russian positions in world affairs and hinder the exercise of its national interests in Europe, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The latter region was added due to Putin’s intervention, signifying renewed Russian interest in playing a key role there.91 A new note crept into this document because of Kosovo and perhaps belatedly as a result of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998. Moscow seems to show more concern, if not fear, of nuclear proliferation. Perhaps Pakistan’s supposed support for the Chechens and Taliban forces in Afghanistan and its nuclear status now give Moscow pause. Thus, the new security concept warns expressly against the aspiration of a number of states to strengthen their influence in world politics, including the use of proliferation.92 Not surprisingly, then, the security concept cites terrorism as a serious threat.
Information threats are also rising. They grow out of states’ (i.e., the United States) desire to monopolize the global information space “and expel Russia from the external and internal information market.” The development of concepts of IW fit in here as well. Finally, the rising military threats are attributable, as in the draft defense doctrine, to NATO’s highhanded unilateralism in expanding its scope and missions in Kosovo without international agencies’ sanction.

All these threats, including increased intelligence subversion of Russia are growing as the Russian military remains at a “critically low level” of training and faces block obsolescence of its technical base. Moscow also even sees cultural threats from abroad, not to mention the standard litany of transnational threats, narcotics, crime, etc. These precepts are shared by the military and were concretized in the official doctrine that was published on April 24, 2000 (too late for discussion here), representing a revised version of the draft doctrine which we have discussed here.

Signs of Continuing Debate

Because they are supposed to be authoritative documents, both the defense doctrine and the national security concept are obviously the subject of enormous political maneuvering, much of it hidden from view. However, the struggles leading up to publication of both of these documents evidently continue. For the first time the navy has been allowed to publish its draft of a naval strategy, and Putin went out of his way to focus on critical challenges confronting this service. Evidently the navy has won its constantly reiterated point that there is such a thing as a separate naval strategy (if not doctrine), thereby upgrading to some degree its status in Russian military policy. Clearly there was a struggle over these issues. In October 1999, Eduard Shevelev, a leading naval theorist and Vice-President of the Academy of Military Sciences, wrote to the MOD, fearing that the navy was being ignored in the new doctrine. This upgrading evidently occurred to some degree at the expense of the army, i.e. ground forces, which have yet to reclaim their special status in the MOD that Sergeyev and Yeltsin abolished in 1997-98. As a result of this struggle, Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, Head of the navy’s main headquarters, announced plans to create a Russian naval presence in all the world’s major waterways including the Mediterranean Sea. Heavy cruisers will regularly be posted there. Design and construction of fifth-generation ships is underway, and work on the naval strategic nuclear forces is “being conducted as a priority.” This means that by 2005 the Russian navy will carry 55 percent of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, present tests of SLBM RSM-50s are intended as possible responses to the United States’ expected withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty and subsequent construction of an American national missile defense system.

Kravchenko’s observations correspond to the revised budget program for military spending in the year 2000. According to that program, there will be a 50 percent increase in defense spending, 80 percent rise in spending on R&D, and a 70 percent increase in the state order. Future defense spending will reflect major increases in aerospace systems; microelectronics; electro-optical systems; new strategic, tactical, and miniature nuclear
weapons; the first Borey class nuclear submarines armed with the new SS-NX-28 SLBM, other naval systems; C3I technologies for IW; and nuclear weapons. Spending on naval force development will double to bring new ships on stream by 2008. Current plans also include increasing strategic naval forces to 55 percent of the total by 2005.\textsuperscript{101} Other large-scale programs are also now being announced.\textsuperscript{102}

Putin also apparently participated in this struggle by decreeing changes in the draft security concept and publishing them in the revised version in January 2000. They are designed to strengthen the security concept’s emphasis on fighting terrorism and crime, provisions that if taken to their logical end, mean following Yeltsin’s line of strengthening the Ministry of Interior Troops (VVMVD) and FSB at the expense of the army, or, alternatively engaging the army even more in domestic “counterinsurgency” operations, which it has never liked.\textsuperscript{103} Yet, as suggested above, there is no alternative. The replacement of the MVD CINC, General Vladimir Ovchinnikov, with an army general, Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, suggests an attempt once again to bring the MVD’s forces up to snuff, but one that probably cannot succeed for all the usual reasons—lack of funding, corruption, inter-service rivalry, etc.

\textbf{Analyzing the Threats}

These threat assessments are notable for their pessimism, pervasiveness, and expanded scope. They are significant weapons in the internal political struggle to direct military reform and appropriations. Yet, fundamentally, many of them are essentially psychological projections of threats to Russia’s vision of itself and/or political and diplomatic threats more normally the province of the government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They expose the exaggerated but prevalent ideas in many quarters concerning Russia’s place and prospects in world affairs. While they clearly flow from the sense of outrage at being disregarded in Kosovo as cited by Wallander, they also reflect the inability to come to terms with Russia’s limited ability to contribute now and for the foreseeable future to international and European security. They also are a convenient refuge from the reality that Russian policy did nothing at all to contribute to a peaceful outcome in Kosovo before March 1999, and were notably obstructive of Western efforts to do so. While the United States and its allies contributed their own share of follies and misdeeds throughout this crisis, it is Moscow, not Washington, that has attempted to have one standard for Europe and another for its projected exclusive zone of influence in the CIS, an outcome that is clearly unacceptable to those states and Europe, not to mention Washington. Thus many of the fears and threats that Moscow projects due to Kosovo owe at least as much if not more to Russian policies and policy failures than they do to so-called Western “aggression.”

For example, another widely feared threat is that NATO’s enlargement will isolate and marginalize Russia as a serious player, let alone a great power, in areas of historic influence and dominance. The idea that Russia will cease to be counted as a great European and global player on a par with Washington terrifies many elites, even if the younger generation is allegedly—though this is unproven—more reconciled with contemporary reality. The determination to play a global role on a par with the United States or the belief that Russia “is
entitled” to such a seat at the “presidium table” of world affairs dies very hard, indeed too hard.\textsuperscript{104}

This great power mystique of Derzhavnost—a kind of objectively fated quality that Russia is somehow by definition a great power and must be seen and treated as such by all, lest it fall apart—pervades even the most routine diplomatic and political statements.\textsuperscript{105} It also has been the most consistent justification of the anti-reform groups ever since the Decembrist Movement in 1825. This mystique has played such a role because of the profound conviction, going back to the Tsars, that in a multi-national empire and state like Russia, any reform could put the whole system and state at risk. Functionally speaking, Derzhavnost is essentially the most recent contemporary manifestation of the deeply rooted Tsarist idea that the state and the empire are identical and inextricable concepts.\textsuperscript{106}

For instance, at a recent meeting of the Academy of Military Science on future war that Sergeyev attended, its director, Retired General Makhmut A. Gareyev, one of Russia’s leading thinkers and a former Deputy Chief of Staff, stated openly that,

One of these unifying factors is the idea of Russia’s rebirth as a great power, not a regional power (it is situated in several large regions of Eurasia) but a truly great power on a global scale. This is determined not by someone’s desire, not just by possession of nuclear weapons or by size of territory, but by the historical traditions and objective needs in the development of the Russian society and state. Either Russia will be a strong, independent, and unified power, uniting all peoples, republics, krais, and oblasts in the Eurasian territory, which is in the interests of all humanity, or it will fall apart, generating numerous conflicts, and then the entire international community will be unable to manage the situation on a continent with such an abundance of weapons of mass destruction. In the opinion of the president of the AVN [i.e. Gareyev himself], there is no other alternative.\textsuperscript{107}

Gareyev’s perspective, widely shared across the entire Russian military-political elite, also logically entails the precept, enshrined in official policy documents, that Russia must expand territorially and politically as a central pole of the multipolar world if it is to survive at home.\textsuperscript{108} Putin has embraced this notion, not just by stressing integration with the CIS as a priority, but by his observations that if Russia were to grow stronger, those states would naturally gravitate to it because they are Russia’s natural allies. Prominent statesmen like Yevgenii Primakov and Andrei Kokoshin also share a revisionist agenda concerning the territorial settlement of 1989. And they are hardly alone in their thinking.\textsuperscript{109} The distinguished Finnish diplomat and historian, Max Jakobson, observes that virtually everyone he meets in Russia expects the reintegration of the CIS into Russia.

The public flaunting of such delusions, revisionism, and anger at the post-1989 European status quo has long saturated the Russian media. However, it not only intensifies Russia’s inability to devise realistic national security policies or threat assessments but fuels neighboring states’ constant fear and negative perceptions of Russia. Derzhavnost’s prevalence also reflects the failure to consummate democratic reforms. It profoundly distorts the perceptual lenses through which Russian elites see themselves and other states, as well as broader trends in world politics, creating a self-centeredness that cannot—or that refuses to—understand why a blighted state and economy do not carry as much weight as much as the United States does.
Nevertheless, it is clear that adherents of these views remain blind to the way in which 
provocative Russian actions have brought about Russia’s worst nightmares. Russia wants 
status, not responsibility, and indeed it cannot comprehend its own substantial responsibility 
for its currently unfavorable international situation.\textsuperscript{110} Naturally, so archaic and 
dysfunctional an outlook will generate an over-ambitious policy and expansive threat 
assessment.

For example, even though economic conditions rule out the possibility for power projection 
forces, the new security concept openly states that,

The interests of ensuring Russia's national security predetermine the need, under appropriate 
circumstances, for Russia to have a military presence in certain strategically important regions 
of the world. The stationing of limited military contingents [the same term used to describe 
forces in Afghanistan] (military bases, naval units) there on a treaty basis must ensure Russia's 
readiness to fulfill its obligations and to assist in forming a stable military-strategic balance of 
forces in regions, and must enable the Russian Federation to react to a crisis situation in its ini-
tial stage and achieve its foreign policy goals. \textsuperscript{111}

This is an open call for stationing forces in CIS countries for Russia's benefit, thereby 
restoring the former military unity of the Soviet Union. Such stationing would resemble a 
permanent military occupation, albeit under an organizational scheme often described as 
being the son of the Warsaw Pact—hardly a coalition of equal allies. Apart from all the other 
unanswered questions in that paragraph, the fact that Moscow could take for granted the 
need to publicly state its need for a higher degree of security than its supposed allies enjoy 
epitomizes the strategic insensitivity that still defines too much of Russian policy.

Thus, NATO’s enlargement in both scope and mission threatens some of Russia’s most 
basic foundational myths. It undercut the cherished belief of the reformers of 1991 and their 
acolytes that the Russian people and Boris Yeltsin, not NATO’s steadfast resistance to Soviet 
power, destroyed the Soviet Union. Second, NATO enlargement equates the Soviet system 
with Russian imperialism and strikes at the very tenacious Russian myth that Russia 
suffered more than anyone else did, or at least as much as other peoples, from the Soviet 
system. This Russian version of Dostoyevsky’s “egotism of suffering,” or what Freud called 
the “narcissism of small differences” is very deeply ingrained now among many members of 
the elite alongside of the older notions of state and empire being equivalent concepts. Thus an 
enormous propaganda campaign making Russia the victim in the Chechen campaign is now 
underway. Competitive victimization, almost by definition, cannot serve as a realistic basis 
for assessing either threats or opportunities in the international arena. By conflating Soviet 
power with Russian imperialism, NATO and partisans of NATO enlargement also reveal 
their skepticism as to the extent and durability of democratic rule in Russia.

NATO enlargement, seen from Moscow, is hostile even to what Russians believe are 
voluntary, foreordained integrationist tendencies in the CIS that would preserve what 
Russians perceive as the positive ties of the old empires. It allegedly denigrates the extent to 
which Russia has refrained from inciting its co-nationals in the CIS and Baltic states and 
from following Serbia’s example under Slobodan Milosevic.\textsuperscript{112} Russia has flouted basic 
democratic agreements with Europe on the use of the military at home and civilian
democratic control of these forces, has tried to restrict the OSCE from the CIS at every opportunity, and wages “economic wars” and makes other threats against its neighbors—all actions which show it still does not behave as European states think a state should act. The foregoing realities continue to elude Russian thinkers, as does the fact that they cannot play a role equal to that of the United States. As the Finnish Institute of International Affairs’ Russia Beyond 2010 report recently stated,

In the realm of foreign and security policy, Russia is not committed to the principles of democratic peace and common values. Its chosen line of multipolarity implies that Russia is entitled to its own sphere of influence and the unilateral use of military force within it. Russia refuses to countenance any unipolar hegemonic aspirations, in particular it will not accept security arrangements in which the United States seems to have a leading role. As a solution, Russia proposes a Europe without dividing boundaries which will, however, require a buffer zone of militarily non-aligned countries between Russia and NATO. Russia’s idea of Europe’s new security architecture is therefore based on an equal partnership of great powers and supportive geopolitical solutions—not on common values accepted by all, nor on the right of every small state to define its own security policy. The above summary of recent Russian developments is, in every aspect, practically in opposition to Finland’s and the EU’s fairly optimistic goals.

Conclusions

The strategy of limited nuclear war and first-strike use of nuclear weapons, as a backup to a deterrence policy and the singling out of the United States and NATO, are the most prominently reported negative aspects of these documents. But the deeper trends that undergird those strategies and policies are equally, if not more, disturbing. The draft doctrine, security concept, and Russian military policy as shown in Pristina and Chechnya highlight forces and factors that are much more troubling and structurally threatening than the temporary absence of usable conventional forces.

First of all these documents and policies reinforce the bitter truth that there has been no military reform and little or no democratization of the entire edifice of defense policy including its cognitive structures. A government that could start internal wars three times in six years and do so, as in the most recent case, mainly to win elections and give the General Staff a larger share of control over defense policy is a permanent threat to its own people, even more than to its neighbors and interlocutors.

The absence of democratization and reform is evident in several aspects of the documents analyzed above. They conflate political and military threats, conflate internal and military threats, support use of the army for purposes of domestic repression, postpone true military reform and professionalization to some unknown date, maintain, if not increase, the already high economic burden of militarization, continue to conceal that burden’s dimensions from society’s elected officials, and insist that the army must be ready for deterrence and defense on all azimuths and against all-encompassing threats across the entire spectrum of conflict.
These documents also demonstrate the ascendancy of the trend that sees threats everywhere and postulates military control and military-like thinking over all aspects of national security policy and military answers to political challenges. These documents also reveal a military-political elite that cannot come to terms with the realities of Russia’s shrunken estate or the status quo, and who therefore are constantly acting in ways that, to put it mildly, unsettle their neighbors and interlocutors. The self-centered mystique of Derzhavnost and the deeply entrenched Leninist axiom that international security is a question of who does what to whom (kto-kogo) rather than a mutual opportunity for gain for all players remain among the greatest impediments to Russia’s internal and external security and to its ultimate democratization and prosperity.

The greater danger here is not necessarily that a nuclear provocation will occur, it is rather that the military institutions and government have yet to devise a strategy and policy based on reality. Instead they continue to chase after fantasies of recovering a lost status and of being a military-political global superpower. The deeply embedded notions of international security as a zero-sum game, of the militarization of politics, and of the pervasiveness of threats from all sides, are axioms deployed first of all for domestic advantage and to obstruct reform. When juxtaposed to the absence of coherent controls and institutions to formulate and direct defense policy, these axioms are an invitation to disaster.

These documents and the security consensus that lies behind them represent only the latest manifestation of Russia’s continuing failure to become a true democracy at peace with itself and the world. As long as this unrealism and pre-modern structure of politics governs the discourse and practice of Russian security policy, continuous internal unrest is the best scenario we can predict for Russia. But experience shows that this unrest does not remain bottled up in Russia. The war in Chechnya is now accompanied by threats against Tbilisi and Baku as well as attempts at military-political union in the CIS.

Thus Russia’s refusal or inability to adapt to reality presages a continuing struggle in the CIS and other unsettled areas like the Balkans. Every time in Russia’s past when state power in Russia fragmented, the whole region within which it acted was engulfed in instability if not conflict, and foreign armies either were tempted to invade or were dragged into the quagmire. Thus these documents are ultimately a confession of bankruptcy and of despair. If Russia perceives everything around it as a threat whose origins lay outside Russia, then the temptation to avert domestic reform will continue to strengthen and breed still more internal unrest and instability. Nor will any outside attempts to help be appreciated or accepted. Absent a reliable defense policy or defense force and following an elite that seems hell-bent on rushing to the brink of a precipice, Russia’s elites remain fixated on military threats that for the most part do not exist outside their own fantasies. Thus they show themselves utterly unable to come to grips with the new but real threats to the security and stability of the state and the society. If this situation continues without a break then the Russian people, if not their neighbors and partners, will evidently also be thrown over the edge as Russia falls into an economic, ecological, demographic, and possibly even nuclear abyss.
Endnotes


6. Conversations.

7. Dick, pp. 4-5.

8. Ibid.


15. Ibid. (Author’s emphasis).

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid. It bears mentioning that the “extrapolation” spoken of applies as well to the independent states of the Transcaucasia, thus revealing an involuntary hint of the continuing neo-imperial mindset of the General Staff-author.

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
23. Conversations.
27. Nesirsky; see also, Moscow, Interfax, in English, November 26, 1999, FBIS SOV, November 26, 1999.
29. Ibid.
33. Ibid., Voennaia Doktrina, pp. 3-4.
34. Dick, p. 5.
36. This term, taken from the French philosopher Michel Foucault, 1927-84, denotes the manner in which discussions about concepts are structured by the initial definition of those concepts. Thus, e.g., the word “security” is always defined in narrow military terms and in terms of military threats.
38. Conversations.
39. Ibid.
40. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1999.
42. Ibid.
43. FBIS SOV, October 18, 1999; FBIS SOV, November 19, 1999.
44. Ibid.


47. Conversations, “Konseptsia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Internet version) November 26, 1999 (henceforth cited as Konseptsiia), Nesirsky. It should be pointed out, too, that Yakovlev's warnings about nuclear use pertain to exactly this kind of scenario.


50. Conversations.

51. Voyennaia Doktrina, pp. 3-4.


55. Ibid.

56. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1999.


58. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1999.


60. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1999.

61. Ibid.


63. FBIS SOV November 19, 1999.

64. Ibid.


66. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of the REPORT of the COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, July 15, 1998, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress,


70. Ibid.


73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.


76. Ibid.

77. Voennaia Doktrina, pp. 3-4.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Kontseptsiia.

81. Ibid.


84. Conversations.


88. Voennaya Doktrina, pp. 3-4.

89. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
this demand is made explicitly; and Lena Jonson, “In Search of a Doctrine: Russian Interventionism in Conflicts in Its ‘Near Abroad,’” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 5, no. 3, Winter 1996, p. 447.

105. Thus Russia’s ambassador to Seoul, Evgeny Afanasiev, speaking apropos of Moscow’s new treaty with North Korea, observed, “Being a global and regional power, Russia will continue to positively involve itself in a peaceful resolution of the turbulent situation on the Korean peninsula....” Seoul, The Korea Herald (Internet Version), in English, January 7, 2000, FBIS SOV, January 6, 2000.


112. Dannreuther, pp. 153-156.


Russia and Europe: All Quiet on the Western Front?

R. Craig Nation

Russia and the West

The most significant threats to the security and survival of the Russian state have nearly always emerged from across its exposed western border. In 1609, 1708, 1812, and 1941 foreign armies pushed along the high road to Moscow (on two occasions briefly reaching their goal). After 1948, the NATO alliance, eventually armed with a considerable nuclear arsenal and conventional power projection capacity, once again came to embody, as viewed from Moscow, an objective, Europe-based threat. The goal of “joining” Europe, first articulated in the early years of the 18th century by Peter the Great, was a recipe for competition between a physically potent but economically weak and socially fragile Russia and a considerably more prosperous and dynamic West. This juxtaposition, and the sense of strategic exposure that it has encouraged, has always been at the core of the Russian security dilemma. It has been brought to the fore again, with considerable force, by the Soviet apocalypse.

The Russian Federation that emerged in 1992 was stripped of nearly all the elaborately constructed defenses that its Soviet predecessor assumed as a natural right. The USSR was a force unto itself in international affairs, and it left behind few, if any, real allies. Soviet military power was the product of an extraordinary mobilization that could not be maintained indefinitely. Under the successor regime of Boris Yeltsin, the new Russian armed forces were drawn into domestic political struggles as an ally of the “party of power.” They were partially discredited as a result, starved for funds, and in effect allowed to languish by a mistrustful leadership for whom international stature was not a high priority. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the central European buffer bought so dearly during the Second World War was swept away. Simultaneously, declarations of independence in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia led to the surrender of nearly all the territorial acquisitions of Russia’s imperial and communist leaders from the 17th century onward. Viewed in conventional terms, the breakup of the USSR was a strategic disaster. Accompanied by economic meltdown and widespread social demoralization, it left Russia ill-prepared to engage with a victorious and assertive Euro-Atlantic community.

Yeltsin’s reform-oriented supporters originally sought to address the growing imbalance of power through bandwagoning association with a triumphant West. According to new foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s transition would make it an integral part of an enlarged community of Western states stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” committed to a strategic partnership with the United States, but without sacrificing the prerogatives that geographic stature, cultural tradition, and economic potential made its just due. These were extravagant hopes, and they were soon proven to be vain. Suspicion of Russian intentions and concern for its long-term potential were too deeply rooted in Western policy establishments to dissipate overnight. Russia was too big and too troubled to integrate
into existing Western institutions without fundamentally changing their nature. At the same time, Russia’s reduced stature made it difficult for her to attract substantial concessions in exchange for strategic alliance. For its own part, Moscow yearned for a symbolic parity with the leading Western powers that her underlying power indices did not justify or in fact permit.

Russia’s unprecedentedly rapid retreat from great power status has reduced her importance in the context of Western grand strategy. But with over 20,000 nuclear warheads, the world’s largest national repository of strategic raw materials, a critical geostrategic location at the core of the Eurasian heartland, and the status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the great northern kingdom remains too important to ignore.

**Russia and NATO**

The core of Russian concern over current Western security policy in Europe has been the strategic evolution of the Atlantic Alliance. Between 1948 and 1989, central Europe was transformed into something like a prepared battlefield for the third world war. In spite of intense militarization, however, the Soviet Union’s western marches were relatively stable. NATO’s intentions, declared and in fact, were strictly defensive. Moscow’s greatest concern was not a conventional military threat, but rather the potential spillover effect of instability within the Warsaw Pact, of the sort so dramatically manifested in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-1981. The Soviet glacis in central Europe, built around the 20-plus divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, was a sure guarantee against external aggression. As an offensively configured force, it also provided significant leverage against the West in an ongoing geostrategic competition. On these terms, and despite chronic wrangling, Moscow could coexist comfortably with a hostile but essentially passive NATO.

The nearly simultaneous demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union seemed to leave NATO as an alliance without a mission. That lack was remedied by the Alliance’s evolution through the 1990s, including a new activism embodied by a commitment to “out of area” conflict management and peacekeeping missions, an ambitious agenda for eastward enlargement, and the expressed intent to take on the role of a comprehensive, pan-European collective security forum. These trends have led the Alliance toward an “open door” policy of expansion, significant engagements in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the promulgation of a New Strategic Concept in April 1999 that embraces a wide range of new responsibilities.

The new NATO remains a work in progress, but several things about its changing character are already clear. NATO is and will remain the central element of a post-Cold War European security architecture. It continues to serve as the critical anchor for American power in Europe. It is committed to an assertive agenda for monitoring and enforcing security norms in Europe and its environs, and it will continue to expand into Central and Southeastern Europe, albeit at a pace and to an extent that have yet to be determined. Nearly
all of these dynamics are perceived in Moscow to run directly contrary to long-term Russian interests, including the desire to recoup lost influence and regain great power stature in areas immediately contiguous with the Russian frontier.

The original aspirations of Soviet reformers in the Gorbachev era were summed up in the popular phrase the “Common European Home.” 4 So certain was Gorbachev of the declining relevance of force in an interdependent world, of the need for cooperative forums for the pursuit of mutual security, and of his country’s essentially European vocation, that he was willing to accept widely disproportionate arms reduction agreements and unilateral concessions (eventually including the peaceful release of the central European satellite states) in order to bridge the East-West divide.

Inability to realize these aspirations over the first decade of post-Soviet reform may be ascribed to two causes. The first, and the most essential, is the travail of transition within Russia itself. The corrupt, demoralized, quasi-authoritarian, and war-torn regime that Boris Yeltsin has bequeathed to his successors has little that is positive to contribute. Until such time as its internal demons are laid to rest it will be condemned to watch from the sideline as the European project unfolds.

The second cause is Western policy itself, which also shares responsibility for the failure to engage Russia effectively. The United States in particular, though it has maintained a rhetorical commitment to “partnership,” has not succeeded in sustaining proactive policies designed to bring Russia into the Western camp. Growing friction has instead given rise to bitter recriminations and resistance to Western leadership. The Russians’ institution of choice as the foundation for a new European security order has been the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where the Russian Federation is fully represented and U.S. influence is to some extent diluted, and whose idealistic charter (the 1990 Charter of Paris) is grounded in the premises of mutual security. 5 NATO’s activist agenda has effectively precluded any possibility for the OSCE to evolve in this direction. In place of an inclusive but weak and unthreatening OSCE, whose main function would be to provide a forum for dialogue and consensus-building, the Western community has elevated an ambitious, U.S.-led, only partially representative, and militarily robust NATO bloc that bears the legacy of adversarial relations inherited from the Cold War.

Viewed in its own terms, the perpetuation of the Atlantic Alliance makes perfect sense. NATO remains Europe’s only militarily credible security forum, and the ideal of Atlanticism that it represents works in the best interest of both America and its European partners. To the extent that the Alliance helps guarantee peace and stability in the continent as a whole, and in particular among the states of the central European corridor working their way through the rigors of post-communist transition, its evolution and enlargement may be said to serve Russia’s best interests as well. Moscow has not shared these conclusions, but its concerns have in fact been less focused upon the existence of the Alliance as such than its changing role in U.S. grand strategy.

The Alliance’s evolution has been multidimensional. It has included a redrafting of the Alliance’s core security concept, reorganization of the integrated command structure, and a
commitment to proactive security management and preventive diplomacy, including out of area peacekeeping and peace enforcement deployments. Serious efforts have been undertaken to strengthen the organization’s European pillar, including closer working relationships with the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union, the Combined Joint Task Force concept allowing for the creation of Europe-led and U.S. supported coalitions of the willing acting under NATO auspices, and encouragement of a stronger European Security and Defense Identity under the NATO umbrella. There has also been a considerable evolution in the national military doctrine and force posture of key member states, and openings to the new democracies of eastern and central Europe through the mechanisms of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (formerly the North Atlantic Cooperation Council) and the extended Partnership for Peace program. Russia has expressed displeasure with nearly every aspect of NATO’s transformation, interpreting the new NATO as an instrument for perpetuating U.S. hegemony in Europe and for intimidating a temporarily weakened Russian rival. Under Kozyrev’s direction, much of this criticism was intended primarily to placate domestic critics. Disgruntlement became much more focused and substantial with Evgenii Primakov’s accession to the Foreign Ministry in 1996. The real precipitating event in the transformation of Russian threat perception, however, has been the emergence, since the mid-1990s, of a positive agenda for NATO enlargement.

So far as the decision to enlarge can be reconstructed, it seems to have derived from a meeting of U.S. President William Clinton with Lech Walesa of Poland and Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic at the Holocaust Museum in Washington during April 1993; to have been embraced by a small group of presidential advisors and pushed through the interagency process behind the scenes; and to have been promulgated as administration policy without any kind of public debate or consensus in place at the January 1994 NATO ministerial in Brussels. Domestic political motives played a large part in moving the decision forward, but the commitment to expand obviously contained important symbolic and strategic implications. Territorial adjustments and shifts in spheres of influence normally follow decision in warfare; the absorption by the NATO alliance of what had formerly been a Soviet buffer zone seemed as clear a vindication as one could desire of the West’s claim to “victory” in the Cold War. No great power can be expected to rejoice when a potentially hostile military coalition moves closer to its historically exposed frontiers, and from the Russian perspective this was precisely what NATO enlargement amounted to. The symbolic implications were especially resented. Russia has consistently argued that it was its own leaders who took the initiative to end the Cold War, and asserted that a tacit agreement not to expand NATO into the area of the former Warsaw Pact was an integral part of the negotiations that allowed for the peaceful unification of Germany. The strategic implications for Russia were regarded with dismay, and opposition to NATO enlargement became a rare point of consensus across the badly fragmented Russian political spectrum.

It is not clear that any amount of Russian agitation could have reversed the momentum of enlargement once the process had been set in motion. In the event, Moscow’s immediate reactions to the enlargement agenda reflected the general confusion and lack of direction that have characterized nearly all aspects of her tortured post-communist transition. In August 1993, during his first visit to Warsaw as Russian president, Yeltsin stated publicly that Polish membership in NATO would not run counter to Russian interests (an assertion that was
subsequently reiterated by Foreign Minister Kozyrev). The rest of the foreign policy establishment, however, was quick to correct the presidential “misstatement.” Thereafter Russian officials were consistent in condemning enlargement as a threat, a betrayal of the trust that made possible a peaceful winding down of Cold War tensions, and an attempt “to consolidate victory in the Cold War” at Russia’s expense.

What Russia could do about the accession process once it had begun was quite another matter. The various countermeasures that were at various times suggested—to break off arms control negotiations, to adopt a more demanding stance in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, to increase support for Cuba and other anti-American regional powers, to cultivate strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China, to use economic instruments and other sorts of pressure to block a second round of accession possibly including Ukraine and the Baltic states—were by and large rejected as unfeasible, or as steps toward self-imposed isolation. As a result of Russia’s critical weakness the battle of enlargement had in effect been lost in advance, and “to wave one’s fists in anger after the fight is over is nothing more than an empty gesture.” The only viable course, summarized by Kozyrev’s successor Primakov as “keeping damage to a minimum,” was to go on record as opposed to enlargement while simultaneously accepting a limited engagement with NATO in the hopes of maintaining some kind of leverage and influence. On this less than promising foundation, Russia moved to discuss the entangling commitment of what would become the Russia-NATO Founding Act.

Serious negotiations on the Founding Act began in January 1997, and concluded with the signing ceremony of May 27, 1997. Despite Russian efforts to make the agreement as formal as possible, the Act was not a legally binding document, but rather “the fruit of compromise resulting from reciprocal concession” containing “numerous ambiguities.” The document itself consists of a preamble and four thematic sections devoted to principles, mechanisms for consultation, areas for cooperation, and political-military issues. The preamble states the long-range goal of building a new NATO reaching out to a democratic Russia, emphasizing that henceforward neither party will view the other as a potential enemy. In the section devoted to principles, explicit mention is made of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and additional OSCE documents, thus placing NATO-Russian cooperation in the larger framework of ideas and institutions associated with a nascent cooperative security regime. The key mechanism for cooperation defined by the agreement is the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which is tasked to convene monthly on the ambassadorial level and bi-monthly on the level of foreign and defense ministers. The weight that the PJC is expected to carry is, however, left unclear, and it is expressly stated that neither side will have the right to exercise any kind of veto power. The document names a wide range of areas where cooperation is deemed to be possible, including conflict prevention, joint peacekeeping operations, exchanges of information, nuclear security issues, arms control, conversion of military industries, disaster assistance, and the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. The precise responsibilities of the Council in regard to these themes are not specified.

The final section addresses the military-security issues occasioned by NATO’s eastward expansion, including its impact on the conventional balance of forces in Europe, prospects for

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the permanent basing of NATO forces on the territory of new members and a related build-up of military infrastructure, and the issue of nuclear weapons. A number of implicit trade-offs and compromises paved the way for agreement in these sensitive domains. The question of conventional force limits was left to be fixed by the ongoing CFE negotiations. An American “Three Nos” pledge (no need, no intention, no plan) was offered to reduce concerns about the stationing of nuclear weapons. This amounted to little more than a pious declaration of good intentions, but both sides were willing to live with it on the basis of a shared conviction that “any such stationing would make very little military sense.”

NATO managed to insert a statement of approval for the modernization of military infrastructure, deemed necessary to permit the deployment of joint forces in a crisis, and in exchange offered a pledge to refrain from permanent deployments of large military contingents. Russia achieved some face-saving concessions, but in the end NATO gave up almost no option in which it was seriously interested, maintained a strict definition of the Act as an informal and non-binding arrangement, and reiterated the assertion that Russia was receiving nothing more than a consultative voice. If damage limitation was Moscow’s first priority, the results must have been disappointing.

The essence of the Founding Act has been described as “the commitment to develop consultation, cooperation and joint decisionmaking, including an enhanced dialogue between senior military authorities.” In the first year of its existence the PJC made some progress toward achieving these goals. It organized regular high-level consultations, and convoked expert groups and working sessions on a wide range of issues such as peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, nuclear issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, retraining of retired military personnel, air traffic safety, and arms control. A NATO Documentation Center on European Security Issues was opened in Moscow in January 1998, and negotiations on reciprocal Military Liaison Missions were concluded successfully. During June 1998 a conference was convened in Moscow to commemorate the first anniversary of the Founding Act and explore areas for further collaboration.

Collaboration under the aegis of the Founding Act did not disguise Russia’s more fundamental opposition to NATO enlargement, and hopes to block further rounds of expansion. Nor did NATO demonstrate any willingness to meet Russian demands for more substantial cooperation, including an expanded role for the PJC in Alliance planning and decisionmaking. Consequently disillusionment should not be underestimated. Gregory Hall describes Russia’s “consistently and resoundingly negative” reactions to the limitations of the PJC as the foundation for a “shift in orientation away from the West.” The PJC nonetheless seemed to be demonstrating its relevance as a forum for dialogue and association. Foreign Minister Primakov evaluated the experiment cautiously but fairly in remarking, “The past year has shown that we are able to cooperate on the basis of constructive engagement and confidence, and we have achieved quite a lot.” If the PJC was both promising and in some sense necessary, it was also inevitably fragile. In the course of 1999, the frail sprouts of Russia-NATO collaboration were nearly swept away by the storm provoked by NATO’s decision to intervene militarily in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo.
Russia, NATO, and the Kosovo Crisis

The emergence of the Kosovar Liberation Army as the armed wing of Kosovar Albanian resistance to Serbian oppression in 1997-1998 should not have come as a surprise. A decade of egregious violations by the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic had left Kosovo's Albanian majority deeply embittered, and the failure of the strategy of passive resistance crafted by shadow president Ibrahim Rugova was clear. Western capitals were nonetheless caught unprepared as violence in the province escalated through the summer and autumn of 1998. Original U.S. condemnations of the KLA as a “terrorist” organization were discreetly set aside in favor of a campaign of coercive diplomacy designed to force Milosevic to pull in his horns. When this campaign failed to produce the desired results, the United States and its NATO allies, acting through the Alliance, sought to impose a settlement with a campaign of graduated bombing strikes. Milosevic's reaction to the air strikes was to up the ante by moving to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo en masse, thereby provoking a major humanitarian disaster and directly challenging NATO's credibility. The Alliance, perhaps unintentionally, found itself locked into a full-scale air war with disruptive strategic implications.

Russian objections to NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict were concerned more with precedent than with the outcome on the ground. Although Moscow has often positioned itself as a supporter of the Serbian position in the protracted Balkan conflict, it has not been willing to make meaningful sacrifices, or to court substantial risks, in support of its erstwhile ally. In Kosovo, however, the example of unilateral intervention by NATO on behalf of one side in a civil conflict within a sovereign state, without UN or OSCE approval, in the name of an extremely broad and easily manipulated doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and in direct defiance of Russia's express preferences, posed special challenges.

In the first phase of the conflict Russia distanced itself from the NATO initiative and denounced it unambiguously, pillorying the United States as a “new Goliath” for whom “force is again the only criterion of truth.” With the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin as Russian special mediator in May, however, hostile rhetoric was moderated, and Chernomyrdin ultimately played an essential role in bringing about a negotiated resolution. But Russia's concerns remained intact. Russian engagement, including the search for a compromise solution acceptable to NATO and tolerable to Belgrade, and willingness to participate in the UN peacekeeping force, were born, like acquiescence in NATO enlargement, less of enthusiasm than of a desire to limit damage.

Continued frustration was revealed by Moscow's decision to draw an airborne company out of Bosnia-Herzegovina to occupy Pristina's Slatina airport on June 11-12, 1999, in advance of the arrival of the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) contingent, a high-risk grasp for leverage after repeated requests for a Russian zone of occupation had been flatly rejected. The incident could easily have led to an armed confrontation between Russian and NATO forces—a measure of the risks involved in the strategic cat-and-mouse game being played out between Russia and the West in the Balkan conflict zone. Though the Pristina incident was resolved diplomatically, Russia emerged from the Kosovo conflict highly
concerned about its strategic implications, frustrated over its own presumed marginalization in the peacekeeping operation, and finding its relations with NATO in shreds.

In retrospect, Russia’s objections to Western policy in Kosovo have been consistent and intense. 23 The decision to intervene militarily in defiance of Russian protests is first of all excoriated as an example of the extremely low regard in which Moscow is held in Western capitals. The issues in Kosovo were not unambiguous—if Serbian repression was extreme, it came in response to real provocation, and in no way could the United States or its major European allies be said to have vital interests at stake. Unilateral intervention, in defiance of Russia, was the result nonetheless.

Simultaneously, the Kosovo problem is portrayed as an integral part of a policy continuum where Russia's own national interests are directly at stake. The issue is “what Europe itself will become in the new century, with whom and in what direction it will evolve.” 24 Moscow’s greatest fear is the emergence of a consolidated western Europe subordinated to the United States and divided from a weak and isolated Russia by a central European “gray zone”—an enlarged Euro-Atlantic community from which Russia would be effectively excluded. To thwart movement in that direction Russia wants to ensure that the states of the central European corridor remain a bridge for interaction between East and West rather than becoming a cordon sanitaire promoting isolation or containment.

Russia is a traditional Balkan power, and it has close cultural ties and political associations in the region. Southeastern Europe is in fact perhaps the only European area where Russia can still hope to play the role of a major power. Moreover, deeply rooted instabilities guarantee that local actors will need to rely upon sources of external sponsorship for the foreseeable future. Engagement in the Balkans is widely viewed as a critical foundation for Russia’s entire European policy. NATO’s unilateral intervention in the Kosovo conflict, inspired by what Viktor Kremeniuk calls the effort “to create a Europe where Russia has no place,” has therefore been interpreted by analysts on all sides of the policy spectrum as a direct challenge to Russia’s vital interests. 25

The precedent of unilateral action outside the U.N. framework is also disturbing. The Security Council veto remains one of the few levers of power that a weakened Russia is able to call on to shape the international environment to its advantage. Well prior to the Kosovo crisis the United States had consistently maintained that NATO could not be constrained by an absolute requirement for a U.N. mandate, that under certain circumstances independent action might be required, and that NATO must reserve the prerogative to act of its own volition if necessary. The U.S. position was not uniformly supported even by its closest allies, however, and it was usually assumed that such action would be forthcoming only in special circumstances. In the case of Kosovo, much of the pressure for precipitous action was self-imposed through ultimatum presented to Serbia at the Rambouillet negotiations. In Moscow, the precedent established by NATO’s unilateralism was immediately interpreted as a direct challenge to national prerogatives.

Moscow has also portrayed the Kosovo conflict as a “trial run” for a strategic worst-case scenario—the use of NATO, operating from forward bases obtained in central Europe as a
result of the enlargement process, as a tool for military intervention in a conflict on the
Russian periphery, or within the Russian Federation itself. NATO is now depicted in much of
Russian strategic discourse as “the primary and by far the most serious threat not only to
Russian national interests but also to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an
independent and sovereign state.”

The efficiency and effectiveness of NATO’s air war against Yugoslavia only served to
reinforce Moscow’s heightened threat perception. Though it seems that Yugoslav
conventional forces were not degraded by the air offensive nearly to the extent originally
estimated and that without effective Russian mediation the war could have become much
more protracted and difficult, NATO had demonstrated its capacity to function effectively as
a warfighting alliance. Its conduct of the air war was technically impressive, and its
overwhelming technological edge left Serbian infrastructure virtually without defense. If
Operation Allied Force was intended to intimidate, it certainly achieved its purpose.

Russian reactions to the Kosovo crisis have been conditioned, like all of Russian foreign
policy in the recent past, by national weakness and limited options. Moscow did not have the
capacity to prevent a decision for the use of force. Once that was recognized, Russia’s goal
became to limit damage and avoid isolation. NATO’s own strategic miscalculations were of
some service in this regard. The original choice for limited bombing strikes had been
premised on the assumption that after two or three days of punishment, Milosevic would see
that discretion was the better part of valor and cave in to Alliance demands. When this
scenario did not play out, Russia’s influence in Belgrade became a more significant asset in
the search for a negotiated solution. Chernomyrdin’s diplomatic initiatives were critically
important in paving the way for a compromise peace, but even here Russia was able to glean
precious little advantage from its contribution. Its core demand of a Russian zone of
occupation in Kosovo was refused, the role to which it was consigned under KFOR was
modest, and it was made clear to all that NATO would call the shots on the ground inside the
occupied province. Once again, short of frustrated withdrawal accompanied by a loss of any
and all influence, the Russians had little choice other than to accept whatever limited
presence was allowed. Their more significant reactions would come in parallel domains, and
in a longer-term perspective.

The Aftermath of Kosovo

In August 1998 Russian financial markets collapsed, shattering hopes for a long awaited
economic recovery and discrediting the liberal reform policies pursued by the Yeltsin
leadership. In March 1999, NATO began its air attacks upon the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and in the summer Russia launched a new military offensive against its own
rebellious southern province of Chechnya. On New Year’s Day 2000, Yeltsin resigned his
position as Russian president, and in March 2000, acting president Putin was formally
elected to a five-year term. Putin’s popularity had soared on the wings of public support for
the military crackdown in the northern Caucasus, widely perceived as a long overdue gesture
of national reassertion after a lengthy phase of subordination and decline. The conjuncture of
these events—the discrediting of liberal reform as a consequence of fiscal collapse, the transformation of threat perception provoked by the events in Kosovo, the accession of a new, more dynamic and assertive Russian leader, and Russia’s resurgence in Chechnya—has given form to a new climate of relations between Russia and the West with sobering military and strategic implications.

In the months following the Kosovo imbroglio the Russian Federation issued the texts of a new national security concept and national military strategy. Although they had been in the making for at least a year prior to their issuance, the texts clearly coincided with the reformulation of priorities that accompanied the Kosovo experience. The first draft of Russia’s new military doctrine was released in October 1999, several months prior to the release of the draft national security concept, which it is technically intended to support. The curious inversion of the logical sequence—releasing a doctrine before its concept—has been interpreted by some as an attempt by the General Staff to exert influence upon the process leading to a finalization of the Security Concept. Whether or not this is the case, in their current versions (the documents are not definitive and are subject to revision) both statements are essentially complementary. They reflect a competitive, “statist” interpretation of Russian national interests and represent a clear rejection of the liberal policies that inspired Russian foreign and security policy at the outset of the Yeltsin era.

The first variant of a national security policy articulated by the Kozyrev foreign ministry in February 1992 had placed the emphasis upon Russia’s aspiration to join the ranks of the “civilized” West. The 1993 version of a Russian military doctrine abandoned the traditional Soviet disavowal of first-use nuclear options, but it did not single out external threats for special mention. Yeltsin’s 1997 national security concept was more outspoken in asserting the need for a “multipolar” world order, but this concept presumed Russia’s role as a major world power acting in concert with its peers. The 1997 concept downplayed external threats, emphasizing the primacy of internal dilemmas born of poor economic performance, social frustration, and the slow pace of reform. In sharp contrast, the revised concept, formally approved by Acting President Putin on January 10, 2000, highlights external threats, and specifically cites NATO unilateralism as a menace to world peace.

The most challenging military initiative to emerge from the texts is a new emphasis on the role of Russia’s nuclear forces, both as a foundation for deterrence and as a means for prevailing in theater contingencies where vital interests are deemed to be at stake. In the 1993 military doctrine, first use of nuclear weapons was accepted in the case of attack by a nuclear-armed adversary, or by a state allied with a nuclear power, and in the event that the “existence” of the Russian Federation was deemed to be at risk. The 2000 version sanctions the first use of nuclear weapons to “repulse armed aggression” by a conventionally armed adversary, even if that adversary is not bound by alliance to a nuclear-armed ally. These assertions are unfortunately not mere rhetorical flourishes. Russia maintains a large tactical nuclear arsenal, and in June 1999 Russian military exercises simulating a response to conventional attack against the Kaliningrad enclave culminated with a Russian counterattack spearheaded by tactical nuclear weapons.
President Putin was propelled into power by the impetus of the “short, victorious war” in Chechnya, and he has publicly committed to a doubling of the military budget, stressing the importance of rebuilding the foundations of Russian military power, both nuclear and conventional. The road back to military credibility will be a long one for the Russian Federation, but in the wake of Kosovo and with the impulse provided by a new, more dynamic national leader, the commitment seems to have been made. If President Putin succeeds in revitalizing the national economy, Russia could aspire to reemerge as a significant military competitor in a 10-15 year timeframe.

In the meantime, Putin’s military initiatives have been accompanied by reassuring rhetoric towards both Europe and the United States. Russia remains engaged with SFOR and KFOR, and it has cautiously revived its dialogue with NATO under the aegis of the PJC. On March 5, 2000, Putin remarked to the BBC’s David Frost that he “would not rule out” the possibility of Russia’s eventually joining NATO, prompting NATO Secretary General George Robertson to respond that “at present Russian membership is not on the agenda.”

Negotiations leading toward a revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) were carried on despite the distractions of Kosovo and Chechnya, and on Putin’s watch they have been brought to a successful conclusion (though Russia remains in violation of the accords due to its engagement in Chechnya). The Russian Duma has also been brought around, after lengthy delays, to ratify the START II strategic arms control treaty, albeit with significant conditions concerning the U.S. commitment to national ballistic missile defense.

Putin has repeatedly asserted his desire to improve relations with Europe, and there is no reason to doubt his sincerity. The European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner, with over 45 percent of total trade, and interaction is on the rise. It is also the single most important source of direct foreign investment in Russia. Russia ranks sixth among EU trading partners, and in key sectors such as energy its role is critical. Over half the grants made under the EU's TACIS program are earmarked for the Russian Federation, and many (in the areas of military training, nuclear safeguards, chemical weapons conversion, and crime prevention) are security-related. The EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation agreement with Russia on the island of Corfu in 1994, and in 1998 a Russia-EU Partnership Council was created. As a member of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and NATO’s PJC, Russia is already integrated into Europe’s overlapping institutional structure and does not risk isolation. For all these reasons and more, Russia cannot afford a decisive break with the West and it is not in her best interests to pursue or provoke one.

The halcyon days of “strategic partnership” are nonetheless a thing of the past. Kosovo has posed a significant challenge that Russia will seek to counter by a long-term commitment to rebuilding the foundations of national power, including military power. The severity of military repression in Chechnya has weakened the Western commitment to assist Russia. Efforts to rebuild a positive NATO-Russia relationship are important, but will inevitably remain fragile. Meanwhile, Western engagement on behalf of the new independent states is a source of aggravation and concern, which in strategically sensitive areas such as the Baltic, the Crimea, and the Transcaucasus will continue to generate friction. Tension between the United States and its key European allies could also play a role, should Russia opt to revive
past Soviet efforts to leverage trans-Atlantic disagreements to its own advantage. Mutual distrust, Russia's commitment to national resurgence, and a series of unresolved issues have created a strong foundation for a renewal of tensions.

All Quiet On the Western Front?

NATO's adventure in Kosovo and Russia's second round of fighting in Chechnya have probably put to rest, for the foreseeable future, any hopes of making the Russian Federation a functioning part of a recast Euro-Atlantic security order. The new line of division that will separate the Russian Federation and the West, including the "gray zone" in central Europe, but also the fault line between Russia and the U.S. European and Central Commands, stretching through the Caucasus and Caspian Sea into distant Central Asia, will remain a volatile and potentially conflict-prone corridor where a traditional politics of force may be said to have a future as well as a past.

Numerous countervailing tendencies make it unlikely, however, that inevitable friction will sweep out of control. Russia is nowhere near to being in a position to contemplate the use of force outside the immediate vicinity of its frontiers to gain decisive strategic advantage. The interests of its dominant oligarchy do not include suicidal confrontation with great power rivals that it cannot hope to defeat. Military impotence may be rhetorically decried as intolerable, but military effectiveness is a function of many attributes—including social cohesion and morale, leadership, economic viability, technological sophistication, and national purpose—that post-Soviet Russia has not been able to sustain. The currently preferred option of increased reliance on the nuclear option is an essentially defensive (one might even say desperate) expedient that is highly unlikely to increase Moscow's international leverage. Such commitments will make Russia more dangerous, but not necessarily more powerful. In cases where Russian and Western interests have clashed, Moscow has not been able to maintain consistent alternative policies. Weakness and a concomitant lack of alternatives have pushed it, almost inexorably, toward policies of accommodation.

Relative weakness need not be considered intolerable from the perspective of Russian national interests. One of the more daring assertions associated with Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" was the claim, made in sharp contrast to the entire history of Soviet approaches to security affairs, that the Soviet Union did not really confront imminent external threats. Though this emphasis has been reversed in the most recent formal evaluations, the logic that underlies it remains valid. Despite Moscow's heightened threat perception, the Western powers harbor no aggressive intent against the Russian Federation. The new democracies and new independent states of central and eastern Europe have no desire to become platforms for aggression. They are preoccupied with the quest for association with the West, and their fondest hope is not to confront Russia, but rather to turn their backs upon it. Among the myriad problems with which today's Russian Federation must attempt to cope, the threat of conventional invasion across its exposed western flank is not particularly salient. The critical, if not criminal, weakness into which its armed forces
have been allowed to descend is tolerable for that very reason. Barring extreme and improbable provocations, all should remain quiet on Russia’s western front.

But will it? An unfortunate consequence of Russia’s protracted crisis of transition has been considerable confusion about where its real national interests lie and how best to pursue them. Under Yeltsin, Russia was consistently deferential to the West on key foreign policy issues. The two widespread perceptions shared by elites and the public at large, that little of value was obtained in exchange for considerable concessions and that in fact the Western powers have pursued a cynical policy aimed at weakening Russia and holding her down, have come to represent a real political force that Yeltsin’s successors will not be able to ignore. Russia’s great power tradition makes it difficult for her to accept a subordinate role in matters touching upon vital interests, and the recent past has seen numerous confrontations where Russia has defined those interests in such a way as to directly conflict with Western purposes. Neither Russia nor the West has the slightest interest in pushing matters to the point of confrontation. But when contingent powers define important interests in mutually contradictory ways, when they are constrained to answer to volatile public opinion, when they find themselves subject to contradictory counsel including important hawkish lobbies advancing a politics of force, and when they struggle to manage complex regional contingencies where neither side is in complete control of events—then unintended worst-case outcomes are always possible.

The most salient short-term threats to Russian national interests lie along the Federation’s southern flank. The most pressing long-term security dilemma may well concern relations with China in the Far East. On the European front, although flash points are not lacking, security challenges are likely to be much less pressing. Russia’s relations with the Baltic states will remain strained, but they are unlikely to generate open hostilities. Since 1997, Russia has sought to shift the emphasis of its policy in that region from intimidation to engagement.³⁹ Ukraine is an unstable polity in its own right, and though its relations with Russia have improved, not all divisive issues have been overcome. For the time being, however, Moscow has signaled the intention to work on improving relations with Kyyiv within the context of respect for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁴⁰ The status of the Transdniestra Republic remains unresolved, but it is not an issue that anyone desires to go to war over.⁴¹

The decisive fact is that, despite its own critical weaknesses, Moscow confronts fewer direct challenges on its western marches at the present moment than ever before in its history. The West should take account of this relatively benign regional security environment in crafting its own policies and in interpreting the harsher edges of Russia’s current strategic discourse. The Putin leadership has made clear its desire to pursue a pragmatic relationship with the United States and its European allies. The case of Chechnya, though tragic, does not threaten the West. Russia’s motives in this conflict combine cynical political calculations with an understandable preoccupation with domestic order and territorial integrity. Russia will continue to angle for influence in the post-Soviet space, but it is not in a position to use force to achieve its goals. The “nuclear card” in Russia’s current military doctrine bespeaks weakness, not strength. For its part, Russia needs to recognize that Kosovo more closely resembles a strategic aberration than a model for future international crisis management.
Even the process of NATO enlargement, if it is pursued gradually and in the context of a stable and positive NATO-Russian relationship presided over by the PJC, need not become unmanageable.

The goal of a Europe whole and at peace, embedded in a stable Euro-Atlantic community and open to cooperation with its neighbors, does not threaten Russia. It is in fact a vision that works very much in Moscow’s best interests. In coming to terms with the consequences of reduced national stature, the new Russia finds rhetorical self-assertion to be one obvious coping mechanism. The Western powers, however, must also come to terms with the implications of their own advantages. These advantages are not primarily military—Russia’s strategic vulnerability in the post-Cold War period is a product of domestic collapse, not purposeful Western striving for superiority. The West’s strengths are grounded in democratic values, stable institutions, economic dynamism, and social consensus—all attributes that the new Russia must aspire to achieve in its own right if the post-communist transition is to be deemed a success.

Given the current balance of power, deference to Russian sensitivities in areas where vital interests are perceived to be at stake need not be interpreted as appeasement. The overarching goal, on both sides, should be a managed relationship in which a resort to force to resolve differences is precluded. Despite current frictions and the new, more assertive leadership style in Moscow, in the European theater at least, it remains a viable goal.

Endnotes

7. Kozyrev asserted that “Russia will have no objection if NATO does not take an aggressive stance in respect of Russia. This [Polish membership in the Alliance] is a matter of Poland and NATO.” Cited from Vasilii Safronchuk, “NATO Summit Seen As Shame for Russia,” Sovetskaia Rossia, July 9, 1997, p. 3.


25. See Kremeniuk’s comments in “Balkanskiy krizis i vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiia Rossiia,” SSha-Kanada: Ekonomika, politika, kultura, no. 10, October 1999, p. 42. This roundtable discussion provides an interesting survey of Russian perspectives on the Kosovo problem.

27. For the controversy over the effectiveness of NATO's air campaign inside Kosovo see “The Kosovo Cover-Up,” Newsweek, May 15, 2000, pp. 22-26.


30. See the text in International Affairs, no. 3, April-May 1992.

31. See the text in Izvestia, November 18, 1993, pp. 1-4, and, for a good contemporary evaluation, James F. Holcomb and Michael M. Boll, Russia’s New Doctrine: Two Views, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.


Russia in the Caucasus: Sovereignty, Intervention, and Retreat

Pavel K. Baev

Introduction

Russia enters the second decade of its post-Soviet history disillusioned by the results of transition, weakened in every dimension of state power, and alienated from the West. Ten years of democratic and market reforms have brought little more than societal disorientation, declining living standards, mass impoverishment, and corruption at every level of the state bureaucracy. As a result, a new effort to transform the state into a dynamic modern entity will have slim chances of success.

Ten years is enough time to establish that Russia represents a case of failed transition. Many crossroads have been encountered, and a series of poor choices has led the state into a blind alley. This trajectory deserves systematic analysis for a number of reasons, but our concern is more specific: the failure of Russian reforms means that the attempt to create an integrated European security system has been utterly unsuccessful.

The grand design originated by Mikhail Gorbachev’s vision of a “Common European Home” sought to link a broadly defined Eastern Europe to the major inter-state institutions of the West. Massive organizational and bureaucratic obstacles were presumed to be manageable, because fundamental compatibility was guaranteed given the advance of democratic and market reforms in the East. The first doubts sprang up in the autumn of 1993, when the conflict between the executive and legislative powers in Russia was resolved by the use of tanks. The first Chechen war engendered more concerns; they were, however, brushed aside in mid-1995 by the leaders of the West, who opted for unconditional support of President Boris Yeltsin, pictured as the champion of democratic transition. The crisis over NATO enlargement in 1996-1997 revealed that disagreements between Russia and the West were more than just tactical or emotional. The war in Kosovo made it clear that Russia was a force working against the rest of Europe, with only limited and conditional options for cooperation. And the second Chechen war has confirmed that the emerging Russian state is fundamentally incompatible with the security structures under construction in the West.

This incompatibility has been determined by the failure of Russian reforms. It is manifested by the ways in which Russia and the West have proceeded along diametrically opposed paths in attempting to resolve the complex problems surrounding such issues as the changing status of sovereignty, the humanitarian agenda, the development of international law, and the use of military force. In the West, the general trend is towards delegating vital aspects of state sovereignty to the interstate level (despite the habitual slips towards unilateralism in U.S. policy), while the humanitarian agenda is acquiring a higher priority,
becoming a major justification for the use of military force. In Russia, the deepening crisis of the state makes the strengthening of sovereignty the top priority. The humanitarian agenda, in contrast, has become progressively less important, with military force perceived as the key instrument of state power.

The area where the West has been most ready to elevate the humanitarian agenda above sovereignty, and to use military force in pursuit of its goals, is the Balkans. Russia has demonstrated its choices most vividly in the Caucasus. This turbulent region, which includes seven republics and two krai in the North Caucasus (all of them parts of the Russian Federation) and three states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) in the Transcaucasus, will be the focus of the analysis in this paper.

Our analysis begins with a discussion of the interwoven problems of sovereignty, territorial integrity, secessionism, intervention, and their impact upon Russia's policies in the region. The results of the effort to reform military structures are examined next. We go on to traditional geopolitics and the contemporary geo-economics of oil in the Caspian Sea area and then to the phenomenon of regionalism on the sub-state level, with emphasis upon the military dimension. Finally, the impact of the second Chechen war will be assessed. The paper concludes with a glance at possible developments over the next 3-5 years.

Russia in the Caucasus: The Macro-Political Level

Russia has pursued a proactive course in the Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, being up to mid-1994 the dominant external power in the region. The West has in most cases had few reliable instruments and resources to influence developments in this remote corner of Europe and has had to accept the fact of Russia's dominance. But Moscow has never been able to develop a consistent strategy for the Caucasus. Its ad hoc policy has suffered from lack of sustained political attention, poor central coordination, competing bureaucratic agendas, shallow expertise, and plain incompetence. What is more, ever since the start of the first Chechen war in late 1994, Russian policy has been weakened by an insufficient and shrinking resource base. This has not only created a gap between political aspirations and capabilities, but also established a trend of declining Russian influence.

The trajectory of Russia's involvement in the Caucasus and the shifting combination of ideas behind it are remarkably shaky. Moscow's first choice in early 1992 was a "hands-off" approach that prescribed minimal engagement with the clear intention to distance itself from troubled areas. That was typical not only for the Caucasus but for the whole post-Soviet space, where three violent conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria, and Tajikistan) erupted at some distance from Russia's borders. The first priority for the Russian leadership at that moment was pushing forward economic (and, particularly, fiscal) reforms. The concept of sovereignty was used as a justification for going as fast as possible, without asking the opinions of the affected neighbors. It is revealing that even at this point, with Russia publicly embracing new democratic values, neither the leadership in Moscow nor public
opinion at large was particularly concerned about the humanitarian dimension of the conflicts, which in Tajikistan reached a catastrophic level.

The period of disengagement did not last long. In the second half of 1992 Russia undertook several interventions in the post-Soviet space, focusing particularly on the Caucasus. Two key factors contributed to the shift: the presence of troops (over which Russia had assumed control) in the conflict areas and the spread of hostilities closer to or even inside Russia’s borders. Russia’s newly formed Defense Ministry recognized the impossibility of troop withdrawals from such hot spots as Transdniestria and Abkhazia, and was eager to pursue a more proactive course. The political leadership resisted this pressure, but also saw the risk of a spillover of violence from critically unstable Georgia and Azerbaijan into the Russian North Caucasus. The result was several interventions framed as “peace” operations and aimed at securing a termination of fighting.

This crucial shift in policy did not amount to a complete turnaround, since Moscow avoided embarking on a neo-imperial course immediately. The main priority was in fact stabilization of the immediate neighborhood (and first of all the Caucasus) and the Russian periphery, rather than an aggressive promotion of national interests. The notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, or, for that matter, secession did not play much of a role in the planning for those interventions, the major concern being to create a military setting that could bring an end to violence and provide for a sustainable peace. Russia was not particularly keen to restore its own sovereignty over Chechnya, and convinced the Georgians to accept the status quo in South Ossetia. Again, the humanitarian agenda was seen as a secondary consideration in conflict termination. The plight of some 50,000 Ingush refugees from the Prigorodny district was neglected, for example, since backing the North Ossetian militia appeared to be the surest way to stop the hostilities.²

Further changes in policy towards a more self-assertive and proactive course started to appear in early 1993. This new course aimed at instrumentalizing operations already underway in order to consolidate Russia’s sphere of influence, and using power projection to subdue unruly neighbors.³ Internal unrest in Georgia was suppressed in the autumn of 1993, but Tbilisi had to accept Russian military bases. The “peace” operation in Abkhazia was established in June 1994 and acknowledged by the UN. Simultaneously, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev put pressure on Azerbaijan to agree to another “peace” operation that should have guaranteed the cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh that he had personally negotiated in May 1994. The indisputable success and relative ease of the interventions launched after mid-1992 were certainly factors in encouraging adoption of a “hegemonic” policy. Perhaps a more important driving force was the sharp conflict in Moscow between President Boris Yeltsin and the Parliament. Yeltsin saw that active interventionism was popular among the people and helped secure him the support of the military. He and able to harvest the results when the crisis in Moscow culminated in early October 1993.⁴

A policy aimed at establishing Russian dominance over the Caucasus involved a more meaningful and politically loaded interpretation of sovereignty—but only Russia’s own. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the three Transcaucasus states (and other recently emerged countries in the “near abroad”) were taken as pro forma notions, in a manner that
recalled the “big-brotherly” attitude to Eastern Europe once defined by the Brezhnev Doctrine. In an attempt to consolidate its control, Russia was able to use diplomacy in combination with military instruments, but failed to develop a positive peace-maintenance or peace-building approach. Conflicts remained frozen and none of the negotiation channels led toward a resolution of the refugee problem that dominated the humanitarian agenda.

Taking its own sovereignty increasingly seriously, Moscow could hardly afford a relaxed attitude toward quasi-independent Chechnya any longer. Since early 1994, various special operations were launched aimed at bringing the mutinous republic back into the Russian Federation. They led to a series of embarrassing failures, necessitating a massive use of military force. Although the decisionmaking process leading to intervention was muddled and the justifications provided were shaky, the first Chechen war was an absolutely logical development given a Russian policy aimed at establishing control over the Caucasus. It also became a watershed in the implementation of that policy, accelerating the erosion of Russia’s influence and determining its inevitable retreat.

Space limitations do not permit a detailed description of the first Chechen war, but four aspects of the conflict are particularly relevant to our analysis. The first is the depletion of power resources, particularly the military muscle needed to maintain a hegemonic role in the Caucasus. Not a single new intervention in the region was launched by Moscow after late 1994. The second is the “discovery” of the humanitarian agenda by Russian policymakers. Unfortunately, when they tried to act on the agenda by pouring money into reconstruction of “liberated” Chechnya, they found a bottomless barrel. The third aspect is the new freedom of maneuver opened up for Azerbaijan and Georgia as Russia sank into the Chechen quagmire, combined with the increased attention that the states of the Transcaucasus began to receive from the West. Finally, there is the sudden revelation of Russia’s internal weakness, including the fragility of state institutions and a lack of societal cohesion. The central elite saw the danger not so much in the possibility of other regions following the Chechen example, but rather in the possibility of the Russian state itself disintegrating under the pressure of events.

This latter perception was strengthened by Russian defeat in the first Chechen war, which came soon after the presidential elections in mid-1996. President Yeltsin’s second term saw steady erosion of federal links driven by rampant corruption and a chronic crisis of state finances. Deep worries among the ruling elite about the sustainability of the hybrid democratic-authoritarian regime were translated into a strong emphasis on the concepts of sovereignty (threatened by growing dependence upon and deepening conflict with the West) and territorial integrity (threatened by Chechnya). Russia even became more sensitive to the similar concerns of its neighbors, but when it tried to put the squeeze on Abkhazia and other secessionists (whom it had backed earlier on), the predictable discovery was that they were not controllable (although very much adept at manipulating the “master”).

These fears, perhaps often irrational but nevertheless absolutely real, were greatly exacerbated by the August 1998 financial meltdown. Russia was barely able to restore any sort of political normalcy under Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov, once the war in Kosovo erupted. Moscow’s initial reaction to this conflict, which by no means touched upon its
national interests, was dictated least of all by its “brotherly” attitude towards Serbia, and only to a degree by hostility towards NATO, an attitude that had been revitalized by the NATO enlargement crisis. Russia assumed a strongly negative stance in Kosovo primarily due to fear of the precedent of the violation of territorial integrity – a precedent that could be called upon to justify interventions closer to or inside Russian territory. While Moscow gradually moved towards a more flexible position on Kosovo, the fundamental perception of a threatening international environment and an urgent need to strengthen its own sovereignty remained, paving the way to the second Chechen war.

Before we examine this most recent disaster, several other pieces of the Caucasian puzzle need to be fitted together. On the most general level, however, the analysis boils down to one conclusion: throughout the 1990s, Russia and the West were moving in opposite directions regarding the issues of sovereignty and intervention. The West, with NATO at the forefront, gradually arrived at the conclusion that under certain circumstances state sovereignty could be overruled and, if needed, challenged by military force in order to uphold a broadly defined humanitarian agenda. In the opinion of some analysts, this amounted to a “revolution in international affairs.” From this perspective, Russia has clearly become a “counter-revolutionary” force. Its point of departure was a remarkably relaxed interpretation of the idea of sovereignty, but by the end of the decade a commitment to reinforcing sovereignty had become a foundation for policy. Russia has failed to achieve a profound understanding of the humanitarian agenda and remains obsessed with traditional security challenges, which indeed do threaten the very existence of this troubled state.

The Caucasus and Russia’s Military Reform

Since Russia’s main and preferred policy instrument in the Caucasus has been military force, the posture of the Russian armed forces has been one of the key policy determinants. Since the August 1991 coup, the Russian leadership has seen the need to reform the Soviet military machine. It has given all sorts of pledges and promises in this regard, but at the turn of the century the results are less than modest. This crude assessment cannot be elaborated upon here, but the impact of various military developments in the Caucasus on Russia’s efforts at reforming the army is worth a closer look.

It would be grossly unfair to claim that nothing has been achieved in reforming the Russian military during the entire decade. Suffice to point out that at the start of the year 2000, the Russian armed forces are four times smaller than ten years ago. They are also deployed nearly entirely inside the state borders, except for groupings in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan, which together add up to less than 20 percent of the mighty Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in the mid-1980s. Admittedly, the rapid withdrawals from Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states were necessitated by massive external political pressure. It is also true that most of the numerical cuts have been achieved by default rather than by design. Nevertheless, some reforms were implemented and they have made a difference.
Several factors working at cross-purposes with an agenda for change have created a vicious circle of military reform. An inconsistent and uncommitted political leadership, combined with the natural reluctance of the military bureaucracy to reform itself, has constituted one of these factors. Budgetary pressure to cut military expenditures and the need to make substantial investments in reforms have constituted another. Mid- and long-term designs for military modernization have dashed with an urgent need to address current shortages. The desire to maintain a potent strategic deterrent (driven by a steadily growing inferiority complex) has come into conflict with the need to maintain combat-capable conventional forces. All these conflicts have impacted in specific ways upon Russian involvement in the Caucasus.

Up to the end of 1993, while seeking to secure the Army's loyalty, the political leadership in the Kremlin was willing to give the top brass carte blanche in proceeding with reform. The only imposed priority was to keep withdrawals from Germany and the Baltic states on schedule. It was only in 1994 that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev produced blueprints for Rapid Reaction Forces and emergency plans for beefing-up the front-line North Caucasus Military District. Since early 1994, however, the Yeltsin entourage concluded that the loyalty of the military was no longer a crucial issue, and the military budget was cut dramatically. Grachev had no chance to implement his vision and began to encounter the problem of overextension. When in the fall 1994 he came under pressure to move troops into Chechnya (and also faced pressure from corruption investigations), Grachev concluded that a “short, victorious war” might be the answer to his problems.

The first Chechen war, particularly after the disastrous assault on Grozny beginning New Years Eve of 1995, became such a drain on resources that the military had to reach deep into its strategic reserves. The policymakers, despite securing new loans from the International Monetary Fund in mid-1995, were not inclined at all shift budget priorities in favor of the financing of the war. The Defense Ministry was not even able to compensate for combat losses and had to postpone indefinitely all reform plans. Grachev was sacked unceremoniously in early 1996, saving him the further humiliation of having to accept responsibility for the defeat.

New Defense Minister Igor Rodionov instantly saw the urgent and massive need to reform the defeated army. Being an honest professional, he also believed that his arguments would convince the political leadership to provide the necessary resources. By the spring of 1997, however, he became desperate, went public with several alarmist statements, and was duly sacked with few achievements on the reform front to his credit. His successor Marshal Igor Sergeyev has learned the lesson, and has never ever asked for extra funds. Sergeyev's plan for military reform, drafted urgently in the summer of 1997, was composed of nothing more than several long-overdue structural changes (like merging the Air Force and Air Defense Force and reducing the number of Military Districts) and numerical paper-cuts. But he also had a grand design for military reform, centered on prioritizing the strategic forces and integrating them into a single command.

Sergeyev moved cautiously but steadily to implement his master plan despite the political and economic turmoil in Russia in 1998 and early 1999. The financial crisis of August 1998
strengthened his argument that the strategic triad is more cost-effective than conventional forces. NATO's impressive air campaign against Yugoslavia gave him a chance to emphasize Russia's need for a secure nuclear deterrent first of all, and to claim credit for the modernization of its key ground component, which indeed was well on track. An important consequence of this reform was that the conventional forces were left to repair the damage from Chechnya on their own, with barely enough resources to pay salaries. Natural shrinking of the Ground Forces inevitably led to reductions in the Russian military presence in the "Near Abroad," and presaged complete withdrawals in a not too distant future, but Sergeyev preferred not to emphasize that perspective. He did, however, take special care to cut down the Airborne Troops in view of their questionable political loyalty.

Most of the top brass, the General Staff in particular, were strongly opposed to Sergeyev's reform course, seeing clearly the threat of a fatal deterioration of conventional forces. However, they were unable to build a convincing counter-plan, since all their proposals tended to turn into the blind alley of requests for more funds and resources. The first opportunity for the General Staff to push forward its agenda came in the summer of 1999 with the Chechen invasion into Dagestan. The political leadership in Moscow, unable to leave that provocation unanswered, ordered a restoration of the status quo ante. While this limited operation was conducted very much along the lines of the previous campaign (assembled units of paratroopers and Interior Troops with limited air support, poor coordination, and heavy losses), the military commanders soon discovered two significant differences. First, they became aware that by relying on strong support from the local population they were actually able to win. Second, they found that the war could be popular with the Russian public and that newly appointed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was attentive to their requests and arguments.

Seeking to capitalize upon these shifts, the General Staff rushed to finalize plans for a new campaign against Chechnya, at the same time intensifying political lobbying for a "military solution" of the aggravating problems in the North Caucasus. Terrorist attacks in Moscow, Buinaksk, and Volgodonsk helped to set the military machine in motion, and that, in turn, helped the top brass advance their cause in Moscow. On October 5, 1999, the military leadership presented the Security Council with a new draft military doctrine, which set the main guidelines for the buildup of the armed forces during a transitional period of unspecified length. The document contains no mention of military reform. Moreover, it is not entirely consistent with the text of the new national security concept, which was delivered simultaneously. The revised concept, approved by Acting President Putin in January 2000, places strong emphasis on nuclear forces, but also identifies terrorism as a major challenge.

The military leadership (General Aleksandr Kvashnin, the Chief of the General Staff, could perhaps be named specifically), according to all evidence, once again expects that a small war will provide for a big increase in resources available for the armed forces and thus make painful cuts and restructuring unnecessary. Indeed, the state budget for 2000, approved by the State Duma in mid-December 1999, allocates up to a third of all expenditures to defense, prescribing specifically an increase of 40 percent (up from about 15 percent) in the share of acquisitions in the military budget. But the second Chechen war has become such a drain on military resources, significantly above the average for the previous war, that the
extra funds provided by the state cannot compensate. The military machine spends more than it receives, and thus is forced to feed off of its own vital elements, which inevitably leads to further degradation. This downward spiral can hardly last through the year 2000, since the breakdown threshold within the armed forces is at a very low level.\textsuperscript{25}

The presidential election of late March 2000 marked a political watershed beyond which tough and radical decisions on reforming military structures cannot be postponed.\textsuperscript{26} One important precondition here is an end to the war, but accepting another defeat might destroy newly restored but highly fragile morale and cohesion in the armed forces. The new political leadership can enforce unpopular steps upon the top brass (one example is the abrupt dismissal of Generals Gennady Troshev and Viktor Shamanov, who had acquired high political profiles, in early January 2000; removal of Kvashnin might also be in the cards), but it needs to maintain its commitment to military reforms. The dilemma of ending an unwinnable war without accepting defeat further complicates the formula of military reform, where key variables are high costs, low resources, stubborn internal resistance, and uncertain political will.

\textbf{Geopolitics and Geo-economics of Oil}

Caspian Sea oil is widely considered to be one of the core interests, if not the main issue, driving Russia’s policies in the Caucasus. Indeed, the timing of the first Chechen war coincided so strikingly (albeit, perhaps, not as strikingly as Putin’s rise to power in Moscow) with the signing of the so-called “contract of the century” in Baku that no other evidence appears to be needed. However, while not denying the importance of energy resources, it is essential not to overplay this factor. A number of reservations can be introduced in order to avoid the trap of a singular explanation.

To start with, the oil factor was not present at the time of the shift of Russia’s policy towards proactive interventionism, and was barely visible during the consolidation of a more self-assertive course in 1993. It was certainly not taken into consideration when the decision on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Azerbaijan was made in 1992 and implemented by mid-1994. Russian diplomacy, viewing President Gaidar Aliev as an old Soviet friend, was taken by surprise by his swift dealings with the international consortium. It also found itself out of step with Russian companies such as LUKOil, who secured for themselves modest but valuable shares in the long-term concessions on oil production and transportation.\textsuperscript{27} The Russian Foreign Ministry tried to build up a legal argument about the uncertain status of the sectoral division of the Caspian Sea, but despite numerous official protests it failed to slow down efforts to exploit Caspian resources.\textsuperscript{28}

Oil was probably a consideration in the muddled decisionmaking that led up to the first Chechen war in late 1994, influencing the opinions of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.\textsuperscript{29} However, it would be a huge oversimplification to present it as the only determinant.\textsuperscript{30} What is established beyond doubt is that during the phase of most active fighting in January-May 1995, both federal forces and the Chechen
fighters did their best to spare the oil infrastructure from destruction. That allowed Russia to organize a special company (UNCO) for managing the oil sector in Chechnya, and to resume production of oil in the autumn of 1995. It also allowed the new Chechen government, immediately after the victory a year later, to proclaim a state monopoly on oil production and to re-launch the oil business.

For its own part, the Russian government immediately initiated serious bargaining over tariffs for oil transit and responsibilities for maintaining infrastructure. Back in the autumn of 1995, the international oil consortium had made the decision to transport so-called “early oil” from Azerbaijan along two routes: through Georgia to Poti, and through Chechnya to Novorossisk. The Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry, headed at that time by Sergei Kiriyenko, was eager to prove that despite losing control over Chechnya, it remained capable of honoring its commitments. What was considered to be at stake here was certainly not the profits from transporting early oil, but rather the pending decision about the construction of a strategic pipeline, which would carry the bulk of Caspian Sea oil to world markets.

In both the West and in Russia the year 1997 saw a boom of traditional geopolitical analysis, with the state-centric notions of “power” and “control,” and prescriptions concerning “balances,” applied to the Caspian area. In these perspectives on the geopolitics of oil, Russia was depicted as a declining power which would seek to exercise control by opening or closing the pipelines, thus causing major turmoil on world markets. That dramatic picture was devalued by the fact that in the second half of 1997 the world market indeed slid into turmoil, but without any help from Russia. One of the side effects of the Asian “boom to bust” cycle was a sharp decline in oil prices. The consequences were not immediately obvious, either for Moscow, which was spared the worst until August 1998, or for Azerbaijan and Georgia, where hopes for a shower of gold remained high. But the policymakers in Russia, perhaps preoccupied by non-stop government reshuffling, had visibly lost interest in constructing a geopolitical balance in the Caucasus.

As world oil prices dropped below $15 per barrel (and briefly below $10 per barrel), experts began to ponder whether the production and transportation of Caspian Sea oil was cost-effective. At that point classical geopolitics had to give way to modern geo-economics, and Moscow showed surprising responsiveness to this new logic. It was not the corrupt state bureaucrats, nor the disoriented academic experts, but the consolidated oil interest groups that advanced the new thinking. The key assumption has been that demand on world markets in the next decade would not be sufficiently high to justify the delivery of oil from the Caspian in quantities comparable to the North Sea. Supply will have to be limited, and Russia can directly influence the ways in which it will be limited. If Moscow is able to complete reasonably quickly the stumbling project for delivery of Tengiz oil from Kazakhstan to Novorossisk, the international consortium will have to put its projects for developing the Azeri oilfields and building strategic pipelines on hold.

Work on the Tengiz-Novorossisk pipeline has indeed been accelerated, and the Russian oil companies and “their” sectors of government have visibly lowered the priority of projects with Azerbaijan, though from political quarters complaints about growing U.S. penetration have continued. Although oil prices in 1999 climbed back to levels above $25 per barrel (and even
as high as $30 per barrel), the geo-economic perspective has not been significantly altered. It is all too clear that price increases have been achieved by limiting production in the OPEC countries, and that the arrival of Caspian Sea oil in significant quantities (plus the foreseeable lifting of sanctions against Iraq) will inevitably push them downward. The Russian blueprint certainly has certain weaknesses, related first of all to its reliance upon tanker traffic through chokepoints such as the Bosporus. One way to overcome this problem might be to use the pipeline system in Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Modernization in these countries would be much cheaper than high-risk new construction in eastern Turkey.

These mid-term calculations have essentially removed the oil factor from security considerations in Moscow related to the North Caucasus, and to Chechnya more specifically. Indeed, from the first days of the second Chechen war, the oil infrastructure in the republic was a priority target for Russian artillery. No one in government circles in Moscow has mentioned plans for constructing a new railway and pipeline through Dagestan (as drafted in 1997) in order to open a secure line of communications to Baku; such an investment is now perceived as unnecessary. When in the backrooms of the OSCE summit in Istanbul in early December 1999, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—embraced by President Clinton—signed an agreement on construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, Western media presented it as a crucial geopolitical defeat for Russia. Russian commentators, on the contrary, remained remarkably unmoved, pointing out that the money for the huge construction project would be hard to raise. Overall, Russia's geo-economic approach to the great game in the Caspian centers on playing Kazakh oil against Azeri oil. Unlike the war in Chechnya, this policy is not unreasonable and may well pay off, unless Moscow undercuts its own policy with bureaucratic squabbling or by failure to manage regional discontent.

**Russian Regionalism: The Military Dimension and the Caucasus**

It has become a well-established academic axiom that the growth of the political and economic weight of Russia's regions, driven by a shift of control over various resources from the center to the periphery, fundamentally changes the character of this formerly hyper-centralized state. Suffice to point out that during the December 1999 parliamentary elections all major competitors saw the key to success in support from the regional governors. The pro-government non-party called Yedinstvo (Unity) was able to collect about the same number of votes as the Communist Party precisely because most governors had chosen to embrace it. The presidential elections, however, appeared to challenge the regionalist axiom. Vladimir Putin was elected without any specific program but with the central idea of restoring a strong state, and the regional elites subscribed to that idea with few reservations. Re-centralization or "vertical integration" is certainly a key element of Putin's presidency, but the limits for implementing any specific initiative toward this end might be much more strict than the new leader would want them to be. Even a maximum concentration of political will and the mobilization of the power structures would hardly be enough to reverse the development of regionalism, which most probably will remain a dominant trend.
The military dimension of this sweeping regionalization is, however, much less certain, and its specific features in the North Caucasus in particular deserve a closer look. One important feature here is that from a regional perspective, the military is just one part of the “power structures,” which also include Interior Forces, Border Troops, and various law enforcement agencies, all of whom share the same problem of under-financed reform.

A simple juxtaposition of accelerating regionalism, on one hand, and a steady weakening of the power structures, on the other, provides grounds for the conclusion that a gradual disintegration of such structures is inevitable. Several factors facilitating the breakup of the Armed Forces and other power structures into regional elements can be listed to support this conclusion.

- Acute shortage of centrally distributed resources. The most apparent element of the problems is non-payment of salaries and accumulation of arrears. There are also others, including lack of uniforms, poor supply of food to many remote garrisons, unpaid electricity bills, deficits of spare parts, and a collapse of logistics. Obviously, it is the Army, with its technically complicated weapon systems and high consumption of material resources, that is most affected by this factor.

- Erosion of command and control systems. Most of the communication systems that secure the integrity of the power structures were built in the 1980s or before and generally rely on 1970s technology. Poor maintenance of these systems makes them increasingly unreliable, while the transport infrastructure shows increasing friction. Distances in Russia are becoming effectively longer and communications poorer. Moreover, one needs to remember that most of the power structures have absolutely no access to computer networks.

- Indigenization of personnel. In Soviet times, all power structures employed systems of cadre rotation, which were expected to guarantee weak local loyalties and firm central control. The costs of systematic rotation have now become prohibitive. Officers and bureaucrats cannot afford the costs of moving, housing remains a major problem, and even the draft is increasingly conducted locally. Russian army and Border Troops units deployed in Tajikistan, Armenia, and some other states are particularly affected, and risk turning into lost legions.

- The interests of regional leaders. By privatizing elements of the power structures located on their territories, republican presidents and regional governors can strengthen their power base and secure their domains against internal or external troubles.

The combination of all these factors inevitably poses the question: Why has the regionalization of power structures proceeded so slowly? Indeed, even before Putin’s drive towards vertical integration, not a single element had fallen completely outside central control. Even the August 1998 meltdown, which might have been expected to destroy the last integrity of the power structures, has had very little visible impact. One may refer to historical traditions of centralism, to professional ethics, and to corporate loyalties, but such
explanations do not appear to be sufficient, particularly if we take into consideration the profound and lasting identity crisis in society as a whole. In fact, in seeking to explain the slowness of regionalization, we need to look closer at the interests of the regional elites.

It is easy to identify the interests of these elites in taking control over certain elements of law enforcement, particularly those related to: (1) the personal security of the leaders; (2) the fight against hostile organized criminal elements; (3) promotion of one's own “shadow” business; and (4) influence over the outcome of elections. These interests, however, are quite limited. For instance, in the majority of regions the leaders are not confronted with any mass unrest and do not perceive it as a potential threat to stability. The governors and presidents by and large see no need to employ power instruments against their respective parliaments (unlike the crisis in Moscow in September-October 1993), since the regional elections generally tend to produce conformist legislatures.\textsuperscript{45} The regional elites so far have not contemplated any use of power in their relations with Moscow (intrigue and bribery work in most cases) or vis-à-vis one another, Chechnya being the exception that confirms the rule.

While the reasoning above might seem to be a touch theoretical, the resource factor is empirical and tangible. Even with their new political self-sufficiency, the regional leaders have diminishing financial and material resources under their control. While many of them are required to supply (and thus “domesticate”) military and other power units on their territories (some are even glad to do so), they are able to calculate that the real costs of supporting regional armies are prohibitive. This is particularly the case with technically complex military assets such as air defense or naval systems, which require sophisticated maintenance. The extreme level of complexity (plus high level of risk) that is typical of nuclear weapon systems ensures that regional leaders will dare to make references to them only in order to attract public attention.\textsuperscript{46}

Among the power structures that regional elites might find most suitable for meeting their security challenges, the Special Rapid Reaction Units (SOBR) of the Ministry of Interior should perhaps be mentioned first. These professional elite units have equipment and weapons for tactical combat operations, and have received valuable combat experience in Chechnya.\textsuperscript{47} Military SPETSNAZ units, and airborne and marine brigades may also find themselves increasingly disconnected from Moscow and involved in regional power plays. These parts of various power structures might be linked to or backed by local paramilitary formations such as Cossack units, or even to criminal groupings.

In electoral battles outside the center, a gradual merger of local political, power, and military elites is developing, particularly in heavily militarized regions (Kamchatka, Murmansk, and Kaliningrad). The North Caucasus, with its interconnected ethnic conflicts and cross-border criminality, is a particularly important area in this regard. The political elites there, facing a clear and present danger from violent conflicts inside their respective domains or in the neighborhood, focus their efforts on asserting control over the power structures and turning them into political instruments.

The two biggest and most genuinely Russian regions in this area—Krasnodar and Stavropol krai—are turning increasingly nationalistic and authoritarian in their political
orientation. By 1997-1998, Stavropol krai already had its own policy towards Chechnya, aimed at erecting a fortified border, which did not always correspond with federal preferences. In order to achieve this aim, the regional leadership invested serious efforts in rehabilitating military units withdrawn from Chechnya, often using Cossack organizations for building special relations. The leadership of North Ossetia is eager to provide facilities for military units, seeking to consolidate its status as Russia’s forward base and exploit it for building a position of power vis-à-vis Ingushetia and for advancing reunification with South Ossetia (formally a part of Georgia). In the messy elections in Karachaevo-Cherkessia in May 1999, Vladimir Semenov (a retired general and former commander of Russian Ground Forces) achieved victory not least due to his strong ties with the power structures.

Overall, the privatization of various power structures, first of all the military, by the regional elites in the North Caucasus contributes to a further growth of instability in the area and increases the risk of violent conflicts between the regions and between competing political forces and ethnic groups.

The Second Chechen War

It may be wasted effort to attempt to analyze a disaster in the making, but the exercise cannot be avoided given the topic of this chapter. What makes speculation about the possible consequences of Chechnya slightly more plausible is the obvious fact that we are now in the middle of a replay of the war of 1994-1996. As result, both observers and actors should already be familiar with the plot and the outcome. The inevitable first question is, therefore, how could Russia fall into the same trap twice?

The answer, with the same inevitability, points to the specific circumstances that gave rise to the second conflict, which for our purposes will be limited to three. First, the political leadership and, more specifically Yeltsin’s entourage, needed a patriotic war to secure the transition of power to their chosen successor. Second, the top brass desperately wanted revenge for the humiliating defeat in the first Chechen war, which undermined the integrity of the armed forces. Third, public opinion demanded punishment for terrorists and an end to the Chechen threat. Taken together, these three driving forces determined the beginning of the war and also its character, at least during the initial and middle stages.

The main causes of the war, therefore, lay outside the Caucasus. There were also, however, at least two regional dynamics that have had an impact on the character of the operation and have accounted for certain differences from the previous war. One of them is the position of Dagestan. During the first Chechen war, this republic was generally quite sympathetic towards the Chechens, helping them to keep supply routes open though without actively opposing federal forces. The end of the war, however, provoked a deep destabilization within Dagestan, partly driven by internal factors (corrupt leadership should be named specifically), but also by the cross-border activities of uncontrolled armed groupings. The intrusion of Chechen units, headed by Shamil Basaev, into Dagestan in the summer of 1999 radically changed the character of its relations with Chechnya. Dagestanis
of all ethnic groups provided every possible support for Russian troops, which, perhaps, was a major factor in their success. Dagestan has remained hostile towards its troublesome neighbor since the beginning of the second Chechen war, and has even refused to accept refugees.

Another important difference is the position of Georgia. During the first Chechen war, it was perhaps the only CIS state that openly supported the Russian invasion. Besides personal animosity between Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and Chechen leader Dzokhar Dudaev, the key consideration in Tbilisi was certainly about Abkhazia. This mutinous republic had won in the secessionist conflict of 1992-1993 with the help of Chechen fighters (headed by the same Basaev), so Georgia expected that Russia’s victory over Chechnya would pave the way to getting Abkhazia back. It did not happen that way, but in 1997-1998 Tbilisi established better relations with Chechnya, seeking to isolate Abkhazia from its key ally. With the beginning of the second Chechen war, Georgia became very critical of the Russian operation, stopping well short of providing support to the Chechens but demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from its own territory.

Russia launched military operations in the autumn of 1999 in a very different way from December 1994, when it attempted a non-violent intervention, modeled after earlier “peace” operations. It would be wrong to assume that Moscow had learned some lessons from NATO operations against Yugoslavia. What really made the massive use of firepower in the second Chechen war possible is the absence of political restrictions, which, in turn was a logical consequence of a militant shift in public opinion. It was not that difficult to keep the war on what appeared to be a victory track for a few weeks (particularly with tight controls over television broadcasting), until the December parliamentary elections. But the contours of a familiar deadlock had appeared by the end of the year, and the warmakers in the Kremlin recognized that time was working against them. Hence the surprise resignation of President Yeltsin on the last day of 1999, which permitted moving the date of the presidential elections forward by three months. A series of minor military disasters (particularly the tragic defeat of an airborne company in early March) convinced acting President Putin that even three months could be a long time. Even the most hawkish generals knew that the army did not have the stomach for a prolonged guerrilla war. Serious choices had to be made during the summer.

We can organize the options available to Putin and the top brass along two avenues: going for peace and going for victory (a middle-of-the road course, with tighter control over “liberated” Chechnya and more strikes against the defiant mountain areas would invariably lead to prolonged and increasingly unpopular guerrilla warfare that could only end in another defeat). Going for peace while the Russian troops still had the upper hand and opening negotiations with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov from a position of strength was a way to preempt this disaster and agree on a draw, which would be praised by the West. The problem with this avenue was not only that Putin’s credibility was at stake, but that the top brass would cry betrayal. Politically, the war escalated out of control. What was started as an election war, has become an existential issue of national consolidation and revival. Compromises on such matters are not only hard to achieve, they are quite often deadly for the politicians with the courage to propose them.
Going for victory was in many ways the most attractive, logical, and feasible proposition. Whatever the lessons of the 1994-1996 campaign (and, for that matter, of Afghanistan and Vietnam), the second Chechen war was not unwinnable by definition. It was just unwinnable in the existing political and military framework. Going for victory meant changing the pattern on all levels, from the bottom up.

On the tactical level, the federal forces experienced few difficulties in rolling over the plains and lower hills of Chechnya behind an artillery firewall, but stopped short before the mountains and around Grozny. Several battalion-size airborne assaults were successfully performed (including one to block the road from Chechnya to Georgia), but their sustainability in wintertime was limited. Street battles in well-fortified Grozny resulted in significant casualties and required concentration of forces, which allowed the Chechens to carry out several surprise attacks in Argun, Gudermes, and other places. At the moment of this writing, Grozny is destroyed and captured, the battles in the mountains have subsided, but the tactical deadlock is apparent. The federal forces have lost the initiative, and it can only be regained by a change of tactics going much further than the threats from Russian commanders to treat every Chechen male in the age group 10-60 as a suspect, thus coming fairly close to conducting ethnic cleansing.

Two military approaches might make a difference: carpet bombing and massive mining. So far, Russia has used its airpower in Chechnya on a much more limited scale than NATO did in Kosovo (partly due to weather conditions) and has suffered more losses. Except for some close combat support from Mi-24 helicopter gunships, bombing has had more psychological than tactical effect. The use of all-weather long-range aviation (first of all, the Tu-22M) for thorough bombing of mountain valleys could deny the Chechens any safe areas. Multi-layer mining of the openings of these valleys into the plains might deny rebel fighters freedom of maneuver. Conveniently, Russia has not signed the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention and has huge stockpiles of mines.

On the operational level, which traditionally has been the main focus in Russian military planning, certain improvements are evident compared with the previous operation. While the army again has to bring to Chechnya composite units of different divisions, it has been able to achieve a much better interoperability between its various branches and closer cooperation with the air force. While constituting only about half of the 100,000-strong grouping of federal forces, the armed forces have established a leading role for themselves, and organized an efficient interaction with Interior Troops and various other elements. The operation, although numerically twice as large as the maximum force level in mid-1995, is generally better supplied.

All these improvements, however, do not amount to a winning posture. Chechen counterattacks since early January 2000 (and particularly in March) have exposed a lack of coordination between the military and the Interior forces. The necessary rotation of personnel has brought inexperienced troops into the battles (for example, the OMON unit ambushed outside Grozny in early March had arrived in Chechnya only a few days prior). Supply has started to deteriorate. While military commanders try to present the capture of Grozny as a decisive victory and appear to be determined to chase the enemy into the
mountains again and again, such exploits will hardly bring a victorious end to the war any
closer than in mid-1996. A more promising plan might be to retreat to a defensive line along
the River Terek and turn the stretch of territory between it and the mountains into scorched
earth. All the main urban centers in Chechnya are located within this belt of land, and they
would need to be systematically destroyed, perhaps by strategic bombing. If the enemy still
controls the mountains (with the valleys heavily mined), it would not matter much, since the
fighters would hardly be able to attack Russian positions. Some 300,000 people would have
to be expelled from the territory, but in fact this job is already half done. The wider
consequences of such a “victory” (to say nothing about the international reaction) are,
however, problematic.

Through the Fog of War

The second Chechen war has become the single most important variable determining the
direction of Russia’s policy in the Caucasus and an important determinant of Russia’s own
future. There are several options available for the Russian leadership, but none of them is
low-cost and low-risk. President Putin and his new team are certainly inclined to keep the
war on the low-intensity level as long as possible, but time for making crucial choices and
space for military-political maneuver is limited. Keeping the military operation on the same
track (with minimal soft-heartedness), and promising victory, is in fact a familiar road to
disaster. Another defeat could deliver a devastating blow to the integrity of the armed forces
and provoke their fragmentation. What is worse, it might become deadly for Russia itself,
because the continuing existence of this clumsily structured, poorly governed, critically
weakened and utterly disoriented state cannot be taken for granted.

If Putin opts to turn away from the warmaking course and open negotiations with
President Maskhadov (perhaps expecting that Russia’s still solid superiority on the
battlefield would translate into a position of political strength), he might find his popular
support much diminished. One way to prevent such an outcome might be to ensure that
Shamil Basaev and “Emir” Khattab (or at least one of them) are physically eliminated,
which would be a more important counter-terrorist result than destroying Grozny. As for a
compromise formula, the question of independence for Chechnya might again be postponed
for five years, as was done in the Khasavyurt Accords. Semi-independent Chechnya would
remain weak and ruined in the medium term, and incapable of becoming a troublemaker in
the region. The top brass would probably oppose this “betrayal,” but firing Kvashnin would
not be difficult. In fact, it could be quite helpful for starting meaningful military reforms. A
much more difficult task would be to demobilize public opinion, to play down the theme of
eliminating the “nest of terrorism” without silencing patriotic enthusiasm. With all their
skills at manipulating public opinion and with all media resources under control, Putin and
his team might still find it hard to prevent deep public disappointment and disillusionment.

Putin also could opt for a real military victory by applying scorched-earth tactics and
leaving only northern Chechnya alive (perhaps returning the Shelkovsky and Naursky
districts to Stavropol krai and leaving only the Nadterechny district to Chechen
collaborationists). International pressure does not seem to have much of an effect on his policy choices, and the West does not seem to be vitally interested in making Chechnya the central issue in its uneasy relations with Russia. Taking into consideration Russia’s political re-nuclearization, Putin’s newly built image as a tough and decisive leader, and the public quest for a total victory, we cannot even exclude the option of delivering a tactical nuclear strike on Grozny as means to eradicate this symbolic center of the problem. Even without such a radical solution, Russia can achieve a military victory in Chechnya, but the inevitable result would be the wide and violent destabilization of the North Caucasus. Ingushetia, overcrowded with refugees, would become another “base of terrorism” and possibly the next target. Dagestan, with its ethnic divides and totally corrupt leadership, is ripe for internal conflict (in fact, the Chechen invasion in summer 1999 was a consolidating factor, but only a short-term one). Krasnodar and Stavropol krai, facing permanent instability at their borders, would privatize military assets on their territory and develop a proactive foreign policy on the regional level, building alliances with Ossetia, Abkhazia, and maybe even Crimea.

It is all too clear that the second Chechen war, convenient as it may be for electoral politics, praised by generals, and supported by public opinion, is a huge strategic mistake. Seeking desperately to find a road to national revival and unity, Russia has chosen not just a blind alley but a slippery slope to national catastrophe. This troubled and disoriented state cannot reinvent itself as a dynamic authoritarian power, and will have to go through many painful retreats, starting in the Caucasus.

Endnotes

1. My more detailed analysis of the features of Russia’s Caucasian policy and its evolution up to the end of 1996 can be found in Pavel Baev, Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.

2. Deploying troops to North Ossetia and Ingushetia in October 1992, the Russian commander of the North Caucasus Military District ordered one armored unit to move inside Chechnya, but no attempt to follow up on this move was undertaken when the unit was blocked near the border. See Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union. London: Sage, 1997, p. 179.


6. For a more detailed examination of this shift in Russia’s attitude, see Pavel Baev, “Russia’s Stance Against Secession: From Chechnya to Kosovo,” International Peacekeeping, vol. 6, no. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 73-94.


16. The culmination of this nuclear trajectory was the meeting of Russia’s Security Council on April 29, 1999, where three secret resolutions on development of various components of the nuclear complex were adopted. The Council, however, did not give Sergeyev carte blanche for implementing his plan for the merger of the land, naval, and air elements of the nuclear triad under one command. See Sergei Sokut, “Russia’s Priority State Interest,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, May 7-13, 1999.


20. The obvious discrepancy is that the national security concept ranks internal ethno-national conflicts as the main source of the security threat, while the military doctrine ranks them in last place. See the article by Vadim Solovyev in Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, November 26 – December 3, 1999.


24. The size of federal forces, generally estimated at about 100,000, is nearly twice as large. The use of combat supplies is far more intensive, and—a matter of no small importance—all war bonuses are paid nearly on time.


26. In my highly approximate calculations from late 1998, every month lost to the reforms necessitates an additional cut of about 30,000 in the total strength of the armed forces. Overall, that means that the economically sustainable level for 2005 now reaches as low as 500,000.


30. Such views may be found among Russian liberals, for instance, Yuri Afanasyev, “Aggression Is an Economic Category,” Moskovskie Novosti, December 25, 1994; as well as among Western experts, as in Elaine Holboff, “Oil and the Burning of Grozny,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1995, pp. 253-257.

31. Anatol Lieven begins his excellent analysis of the first Chechen war with the picture of an oil refinery outside Grozny: “The rows of gargantuan machines, entwined with huge pipes like the arms of monsters and demons, stretched away into the distance until they vanish into the December mist.” See Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: The Tombstone of Russian Power, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, pp. ix-x.


37. For a lack of such responsiveness see the series of articles by Dan Morgan and David Ottaway in the Washington Post, October 4, 5, and 6, 1998. Another typical example is Paul Goble, “New Moves on the Caucasus Chessboard,” RFE/RL Features, April 16, 1999.

38. My interpretation of this geo-economic thinking benefited from discussions with Willy Olsen, head of the planning department of STATOIL, as well as from his presentation at the conference, The Caucasus: Ethnicity Geopoliticized? Oslo, NUPI, May 1999.


40. The debates around the annual OPEC meeting in March 2000 in Vienna were centered on the issue of how to increase production in order to stabilize prices at the level of $25 per barrel. No enthusiasm for further complicating this balancing act by adding new oil streams was registered.

41. This problem, much emphasized by the Turks, was highlighted by an accident in the last days of 1999, when a Russian tanker sank nearby the Bosporus.


43. For my first attempt at analyzing this phenomenon, see the chapter “Regionalization of the Federal Power Structures,” in Tracey German, ed., Moscow, the Regions and Russia’s Foreign Policy. Conflict Studies Research Centre paper E103, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, June 1999.

44. See, for instance, Hannes Adomeit, “The Military Dimension,” in Russia’s Futures: Medium Term Scenarios, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and Conflict Prevention Network, October 1998, pp. 31-34.

45. For an excellent overview of the political trends in the regions, see Nicolai Petrov, ed., Russia’s Regions in 1998, Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1999.

46. Indeed, Alexander Lebed’s half-serious open latter to Prime Minister Kiriyenko in July 1998, in which he offered to take the ICBM base in Uzhur under Krasnoyarsk krai jurisdiction since the government had not paid the officers’ salaries for five months, made many headlines in the international media. For Lebed’s objections against the plan to integrate the nuclear triad, see “New Step in Military Reform Is Pregnant with Strategic Error,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, November 20, 1998.


48. The dramatic hostage-taking incident in Kizlyar-Pervomayskoe in early 1996 did not significantly change attitudes. The key meeting between Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov, where the agreement to end the war was reached, was held in Khasavyurt, Dagestan.


51. For my analysis of the experience of the previous war, see Pavel Baev, “Russia’s Airpower in the Chechen War: Denial, Punishment and Defeat,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, June 1997, pp. 1-18.
52. For a substantial, even if too complimentary, analysis of the operational side of the initial phase of the second Chechen war see Vladimir Bochkarev and Vladimir Komoltsev, “Russian 'Mountain Storm': Analysis of the Combat Experience in Chechnya,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, no. 7, February 25, 2000.

Russia's Strategic and Military Interests in North and South East Asia

Frank Umbach

Introduction

The evolution of Sino-Soviet/Russian relations from an antagonistic militarized standoff in the 1960s to a nascent partnership at the beginning to the 1990s to a declared "strategic partnership" today is a vitally important development in a rapidly changing East Asian environment. It has significant security implications for the region itself as well as for global affairs. It must be remembered that in 1969 (after a long series of border clashes) and the beginning of the 1970s, the Soviet political and military leadership was seriously contemplating a preemptive or even a preventive nuclear attack on China's nuclear forces and facilities. In addition, Khrushchev's successors began an expensive, long-term military buildup of Soviet conventional armed forces in the Far East, particularly along the border with China, from roughly 20 divisions to about 40 in the early 1970s to 52 in 1982. Although negotiations were held from 1969 to 1978 to improve the bilateral relationship, the general political environment remained unchanged and even deteriorated with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Beijing consistently held to three preconditions for normalizing the bilateral relationship: (1) withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; (2) reduction and withdrawal of troops from Mongolia and along the Sino-Russian border; and (3) cessation of Soviet support of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

Against that historical background, Gorbachev's strategic reassessment of the Soviet Union's status in world affairs after 1985-1986 also opened the perspective for an improvement in the bilateral relationship with China. Concrete steps for demilitarization in the Far East and the joint border followed only in 1988-1989, including the removal of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, drastic force reductions, and an agreement to hold bilateral negotiations on military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in the border region.

Since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 1990s, a radical break with the past and the historical mutual mistrust has taken place, leading to the announced strategic partnership in April 1996. A number of strategic, political, and economic factors have led both sides to strengthen further their bilateral relationship during recent years. Both sides fear a "new world order" dictated by the United States with its overwhelming military superiority and political leverage in world affairs. However, the Sino-Russian relationship, and in particular its manifestations in increased Russian arms exports and military-technology transfers to China, has also raised suspicion and mistrust in East Asia and especially in the United States.
Russia's new interest in East Asia and efforts to strengthen its relationships with India and other Asian countries were the result of a reorientation of its foreign policy in 1993 away from Kosyrev's one-sided and romantic pro-Atlantic foreign policy, which, in the view of its increasing critics in domestic affairs, did not reflect Russia's objective geopolitical national interests as a Eurasian power. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Moscow found itself isolated and excluded from such activities as the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Korean peace talks. In short, Russia had ceased to be a military and political superpower in Asia, and it was confronted with serious domestic problems and foreign policy challenges in Europe (e.g., NATO's expansion to the east).

Against this background, tendencies toward a more assertive Eurasian foreign policy were strengthened in January 1996, when Yevgenii Primakov became the new Russian Foreign Minister. Geopolitical and geostrategic challenges in its Western theater, NATO's eastward expansion, and perceived U.S. efforts to undermine Russian influence in Central Asia and other neighboring regions provided the impetus for a strategic convergence between Russia and China. Both sides promoted a multipolar world and a desire to establish a new political and economic order. They also shared, and continue to share, an interest in preventing fundamentalist Islamic groups and national separatist forces from achieving greater power and influence in their own countries or neighboring states, such as the Caucasus, Central Asia, or China's Western Xinjiang province. Furthermore, increased Russian energy exports to satisfy China's rapidly increasing consumption (by a factor of three to six) provided another strong incentive on both sides to improve the bilateral relationship—especially for China given its intent to become the next superpower. Simultaneously, Russia's Asian military presence in the post-Cold War era has diminished substantially. The old Soviet security alliances with North Korea, Vietnam, and India are now defunct and have been replaced with new cooperation and friendship treaties which do not include any automatic security and defense obligations for Russia.

As viewed from outside, Russia presently faces not so much a military threat from China or others, but is confronted with a serious socio-economic crisis in its Far East regions, with implications for its future federal system and sovereignty. The following analysis will pay special attention to a wider definition of security in the context of Russia's strategic and military interests in East Asia. Hence, the socio-economic situation in Siberia and the Far East will be analyzed in some detail, followed by discussion of Russia's relations with China politically, economically, and militarily (including its increased arms exports). Attention also will be given to the regionalization of Russia's foreign and security policies in North Asia and Southeast Asia, the latter with a special focus on Russia's arms export policies during recent years.

Regionalization, Disintegration, and the Impacts on Siberia and the Russian Far East

With the end of the Cold War, Russia has often drifted back to forms of militarism, assertive nationalism, and suspicion of the West. Historically, those tendencies are hardly
surprising. Throughout modern history, prolonged transformations of political and economic structures with decaying institutions and regime changes often have caused domestic instability, leading even to international conflicts and wars. While old institutions have collapsed, new and democratic institutions have yet to be consolidated in Russia. Moreover, Russia’s historical ambivalence toward the West and Europe as well as its latent inclination to seek its own Slavophilic “third way” are deeply rooted in her political culture.

Originally, the creeping devolution of power from the center to the periphery was a result of the unplanned decay of a hyper-centralized state rather than the product of constitutional agreement. Because such regional power is unprecedented in Russian history, the set of arrangements that produced an element of stability may now generate something quite different in the future. There is a very real danger that the decentralization, fragmentation, and regionalization processes underway will be established to such an extent that the stability of the unitary federation could be placed at risk. The risk is not so much that Russia will implode like the former Soviet Union, but rather that it would cease to function because it lacks viable institutions of both regional and central government and because of the varying vested interests of the political and economic elites in Moscow and the regions. At the same time, the division of powers between the center and the regions is so vaguely defined that it produces ongoing battles of vested interests, resulting in a continuous political crisis.

Russia’s federal structure has been a major source of political friction, leveraging, and competition over the last several years. The most contentious issue between the federal government and the regions has been the division of power between them, especially as regards tax and budgetary issues. Such disputes have been resolved mostly on an ad hoc basis, with the federal government signing more than 40 separate treaties delimiting authority between it and individual regions, in spite of constitutional provisions and laws providing for a uniform regime applying to all regions. The federal government has been largely unable to enhance its legitimacy in the competition with regional governments, a situation preventing any dramatic and sustained improvements in its revenue base and or redistribution of revenues for nationally significant purposes.

Contrary to the views of many politicians and experts in Moscow, regionalization can be seen as a normal part of the democratic evolution of Russia. This evolution dilutes the traditionally autocratic and hyper-centralized Russian power structure, which includes some constitutional arrangements and other features probably unconducive to a functioning liberal democracy. The democratization has, to some extent inevitably, produced little dictators who have in some cases seized local power through non-democratic means and then misruled. That, however, is explicable in a country with little tradition of a pluralistic democracy and a real federal structure. The great majority of Russia’s political elite (particularly in Moscow) perceives the decentralization and regionalization processes as a negative phenomenon often equated with separatism. Hence, they have paid only lip service to regional autonomy rather than genuinely accepting federalism. Both the elite in Moscow and the regions have almost no experience in creating a federalist state either from below or from the top. They largely do not see and understand the regionalization/decentralization processes as an opportunity to build a real and viable federal or confederated state from below. Furthermore, they overlook globalization trends in
economic-political affairs, which are strengthening those processes—regardless of what Russia is doing. Thus, while Russia is already on the way to a confederated state in economic affairs, politically it is quite a different situation. In this regard, there is another gap between traditional tendencies to maintain a strong unified, federal state and the economic trends of globalization, which favor further decentralization and regionalization in the future.

During the last decade, the Russian economy has become increasingly fragmented, thereby undermining the effectiveness of policies designed for nationwide effect and requiring the central government to develop highly differentiated regional policies. This is more necessary than ever because socio-economic development during recent years has resulted in increasing differences between the regions. Each has quite different characteristics in terms of its political and economic profile. The increasing diversity of decisions by regional leaders will make it even more of a challenge for the central government to devise any single policy for the entire country in the future—no matter who is governing the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, the differentiation often has become even greater between the regions than between them and Moscow. Accordingly, the impact of the Russian financial crisis has been felt in varying degrees throughout the Russian Federation, and the economic crisis has prompted a further shift in decisionmaking away from the center and toward provinces. Hence some of Russia’s 89 regions have announced various emergency plans to cope with the rapidly deteriorating situation in the absence of direction from the federal government. However, although the center-periphery relationship has been redefined by the regionalization processes, by bitter inter-clan rivalries and governmental disarray, and by “robber barons” appropriating vast assets across Russia as a by-product of the deepening crisis, most of Russia’s regions have not really become economically and politically stronger. Although most of Russia’s regions seem rather weak and are still dependent on Moscow, local power structures seem to be very strong when they are united and can count on local support.

Given the overall economic crisis and the inability of the central government to provide the regions with the means to survive, local governments have been forced to reorient their attention to more prosperous neighbors. This has been particularly true in the Russian Far East, which has been forced to create ties with neighboring states. The result so far, however, is very mixed and somewhat disappointing.

Siberia and the Far Eastern region (the latter consisting of the Primorski and Khabarovsk regions, the Sakha-Yakutia Autonomous Republic, and the provinces of Amur, Magadan and Sakhalin, totalling some 8 million population) with their core maritime provinces had for many years remained closed and isolated zones, with virtually no contact with China and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. With their political, economic, and cultural isolation, they were destined to be a military outpost fully dependent on Moscow for the supply of material resources, energy resources, and all major daily necessities. According to its status as a special restricted military zone, the Far East economy “was not integrated into the economic activity of the region, and it absolutely did not submit to any economic laws.”\textsuperscript{12} Although Siberia and the Russian Far East have enormous potential energy resources, the region has faced a severe energy and food crisis during recent years.\textsuperscript{13}
With the end of the Soviet Union and the beginning of economic reforms, both regions lost practically all the economic and financial privileges they had enjoyed during the “good” times of the Soviet era. At the beginning of the 1990s, bilateral trade with China saved the Far East from economic catastrophe, provided it with goods necessary for economic survival in turbulent times of transformation. With the economic collapse, the region returned to the economic autonomy it enjoyed after the revolution of 1917 and the beginnings of the 1930s within the “Far Eastern Republic.” Although President Boris Yeltsin initiated—in 1992—the Far East Regional Development Program, which later became part of the federal program titled “The Economic and Social Development of the Far East and Transbaikal Regions in the Years 1996-2005,” the ambitious program never materialized in a way the government promised. In 1996, real financing was just 35 percent of what was planned, and target projects were financed at only 13 percent of what was originally intended. In subsequent years, financing was further reduced. In this light, it is not surprising that political resentment in Siberia and the Far East is often directed against Moscow, the party of power, and the left opposition.

Since that time, Siberia and the Russian Far East regions have been forced to open to neighboring states and regions which provide numerous opportunities for economic and cultural cross-border relationships. However, no lasting conditions for positive cooperation and exchange with neighboring countries in Asia could be established. In addition, the percentage of unprofitable industries in the Far East increased from 22.7 percent in 1992 to 63.8 at the beginning of 1996.

During recent years, despite the enormous energy resources in the region, no significant domestic or foreign investment has been made in the region’s energy industry due to the lack of a coherent legal framework with transparent rules for domestic and foreign investment or joint ventures, the presence of widespread corruption and organized crime, and other obstacles. In 1997, foreign investment in the Far East stood at just $140 million—only 3 percent of the Russian total (Moscow has 67.4 percent). This was down from the previous figure of $191.4 million (6.8 percent). Specific Far East problems, such as local political instability, widespread organized crime and corruption, and separatist tendencies add additional dimensions to the general political instability, the absence of a rational legal base for business transactions, and high levels of crime across Russia. Although Siberia and the Far East have half of the world’s coal deposits and almost a third of its oil and gas deposits, it needs massive foreign investment not only to exploit these resources but also for the creation of a modern business infrastructure, including communications and transportation systems at international and regional levels. Against the background of failing financial resources from Moscow and the lack of substantial foreign investment, Primorski Krai experienced the most significant decline in economic activity and living standards in Russia. Vladivostok, a city of 700,000 inhabitants on the Sea of Japan, has become notorious, for instance, as a symbol of the worst of provincial poverty, isolation, and political feuds in a Russia where democracy often took a back seat during the 1990s. The controversial governor of the Primorye region, Yevgeni Nazdratenko, has taken over private business, seized control of the press and judiciary, and pumped government budgets dry, including the Vladivostok municipal budget.
At the same time, organized and institutionalized crime, including cooperation among the Russian mafia, Japanese Yakuza and Chinese Triads organizations is creating a potential security problem of regional dimensions. Moreover, this interplay is not confined to East Asia, but has security implications for Europe itself. The Russian federal government is either powerless to combat organized crime or, more often, is linked to or even part of it. This is one of many cases illustrating convincingly why the West must stop thinking only in terms of narrowly defined dimensions of European security instead of Eurasian security and even wider.

Political groups in the regions that seek to secure certain advantages for themselves in the budget, tax, and other spheres will continue to inflame tensions between regions and the federal government for their own purposes. This will inevitably aggravate political instability caused by other factors. Hence regionalization and decentralization have important consequences for the political and economic stability of Russia as well as for its prospects for a return to economic prosperity. In light of the present Chechen war, former Prime Minister Primakov—in contrast to many Russian officials associated with former President Boris Yeltsin—had already warned in 1997 that separatism remains a serious security challenge and that Russia is far from united. He argued repeatedly as foreign and prime minister that Russian diplomacy's major tasks include the maintenance of that country's territorial integrity. Russia's national security concept of December 1997, to some extent the new one of January 2000, and its new foreign policy concept (in contrast to Russia's newly published military doctrine of April 2000 to the draft military doctrine of October 1999, which focus much more on external security challenges) have stressed more than ever that Russia's main security challenges arise primarily from internal instability rather than from external security threats (despite Russia's firm opposition to NATO's extension to the east).

However, separatism as an extreme form of decentralization and regionalization still seems primarily a concrete threat in the North Caucasus rather than in other Russian regions. Most of Russia's regions are still seeking greater autonomy within a larger Russian Federation rather than independence. Nonetheless, this drive for autonomy leads to greater competition and rivalry rather than cooperation. In general, secessionist tendencies have stemmed not primarily from ethnic or historic roots but from Moscow's failure and inability to meet its obligations in the view of the regions. Against the background of the increasing diversity of Russia, there seems to be an increasing asymmetric federation which will complicate the center-periphery relationship even further. At the end of 1998, only 10 territories accounted for nearly 60 percent of Russia's total exports, and the leading 20 regions accounted for almost 40 percent of imports. Furthermore, nine regions have concluded no agreement with foreign partners, while 11 Russian regions (led by Tatarstan) have exercised their right to open representative missions abroad. Regarding taxation, only 10 regions out of 89 are self-sufficient (net donor regions) while all the others are either net recipients or “depressed regions.” However, Primorye is in fourth position (after Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kaliningrad Oblast) in the number of joint ventures with a share of foreign capital.
Whether widely discussed plans of consolidating Russia's 89 regions into 10, 12, or 25-35 bigger regional administrations might really be adequate to stop the fragmentation and disintegration remains uncertain as long as Moscow does not address the real origins of these macro processes and as long as it favors strong top-down control over the regions. Russia's present military operations in Chechnya, for instance, apparently following no mid- or long-term political design for a political and economic stabilization of the North Caucasus, might backfire and fuel an extreme “Islamization” which Moscow claims it is preventing. The rise of eight multi-regional associations or supra-regional groupings, organized by the leaders of the regions themselves, now indicate that they play a large role in both domestic and foreign affairs—a trend which will intensify further. Seen in this light, the present Chechen war might rather accelerate the fragmentation and disintegration processes under way, including those in the Russian Far East. Furthermore, it is necessary to remember that in the not-so-distant past the region was a semi-autonomous political-economic system on the periphery of both the Russian and Chinese empires. At the very least, Russia's transition to a federated or confederated system will remain a very difficult and lengthy process with inherent unpredictability for Russia and neighboring countries and regions.

Of particular concern are Russian demographic trends in general and in the Russian Far East vis-à-vis China in particular. If current Russian population trends continue, the number of teenagers in the Russian Federation will be smaller in 2001 than it was in 1959—the year in which the birth deficit from World War II casualties cast the greatest shadow over the USSR. The present mortality rate in Russia is almost twice as high as its birth rate, which is one of the lowest of the world. As a result, Russia's population is shrinking by about 2,500 every day—a decline of nearly 750,000 people per year. In 15 years, Russia's population is likely be reduced by more than 22 million people. By 2050, Russia's population may fall to between 80 and 100 million. Other factors involved include high emigration and slowing immigration, divorce, abortion (about 70 percent of all pregnancies since 1994—one of the highest rates in the world), suicide (now 40 per 100,000, again one of the highest in the world), birth defect rates, and widespread diseases, the latter owing to the lack of a basic health infrastructure and environmental catastrophes. All these factors contribute to the alarming demographic trends that have wide-ranging economic and political implications for Russia and its armed forces. Death rates in the first half of 1998 were, for instance, nearly 30 percent higher than they had been at the end of the 1980s. Overall life expectancy fell in 1997 to under 67 years, and for males to about 61 years. Similar mortality crises in the past in Germany, Spain, Japan, and South Korea were in one or another way the direct result of wars or civil wars—not peacetime phenomena. According to analytical forecasts, although the Russian Federation was the world's sixth most populous nation in the Soviet Union's final days, it will rank no higher than ninth in the world by 2020. Life expectancy then will be lower than that of 125 of the world's 188 countries. According to Russia's State Statistics Committee, in 1999 the population of the Russian Federation fell by another 716,900 (or 0.49 percent). That decline, Russia's largest since the breakup of the Soviet Union, was due to worsening economic conditions, rising rates of alcoholism, and poor medical treatment. By 2016, Russia's population may have fallen by another 8 million. At present, Russian women have on average only 1.24 children—1.11 fewer than the rate needed to maintain the population. By the middle of the century, Russia could lose half of its population, which ultimately could lead to severe political instability.
Such an outcome will also increase competition for manpower between the Russian military and the Russian economy. It creates additional difficulty (besides financial problems) for the military to maintain its current force level, and it becomes more difficult for the economy to recover from its present problems. It also means that Russia’s political elite and military establishment must learn how to make the most efficient use of and husband its scarce human resources, which Russia has never had to do in its military history.

These demographic trends may raise numerous new security challenges. The further emigration of working-age Russians from northern and eastern regions of the Russian Federation, for instance, can seriously undermine the successful exploitation of its natural resources and erode economic conditions for the socio-economic and demographic stabilization of affected regions. At the same time, the concentration of foreign immigrants in regions of high-unemployment along the border with China endangers social and political stability. According to Russian sources, the population in the Far East grew from 1.6 million in 1926 to 4.8 million in 1959, to 6.8 million in 1979, to 7.9 million in 1989, and finally to 8.057 million in 1991. After 1991, however, people in the Far East started to immigrate to Russia’s central regions. The most serious losses were registered in the Magadan region (9.9 percent) and in Chukhotka (13.4 percent) due to the sharp deterioration in the economic situation and declining living standards. As Odelia Funke has pointed out, the average lifespan in Siberia and the Far East is 16 to 18 years less than elsewhere in Russia, while the incidence of diseases such as tuberculosis and child mortality rates is significantly higher than in the rest of Russia.

Official Russian sources vary significantly on the number of Chinese living in the Russian Far East, with figures varying between 150,000 and two million. According to these official Russian sources, every year up to 500,000 Chinese laborers immigrate into the Russian Far East from China’s northern provinces. The number of foreign citizens who are illegally staying on Russian territory may have already exceeded one million. Although the cross-border flow of people has created numerous economic incentives and even though the number of illegal border crossings (e.g., attempted entries on forged passports, visa regime violations, and deportations), such as in Primorski Krai, declined from 1994 to 1998, Chinese immigration has raised security concerns and socio-economic fears among the political elite and the public in the Russian Far East. Nonetheless, according to First Deputy Interior Minister Valery Fyodorov, more than 500,000 Chinese have entered Russia in recent years, of which 350,000 entered through non-visa tourist exchanges. Most of these people do not return to China but stay in Russia. Thus, while 800,000 people—10 percent of the Khabarovsk territory population—left in recent years, they have been replaced by Chinese and Koreans. In this light, a “peaceful capture” and “peaceful invasion” seem already to be under way: “These people are already a political force to be reckoned with in the context of the territorial economy and politics.” Furthermore, cross-border smuggling of non-ferrous metals, oil, drugs, and illegal firearms have reached alarming rates, which “clearly jeopardizes national security.”

Eventually, Russia may be confronted with serious Chinese demands that it open its vast and scarcely populated Far Eastern provinces (only 8 million Russians live between Siberia’s Lake Baikal and Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan) to Chinese immigration. On the Chinese
side, the population density is already in some places ten times higher than that experienced by the 32 million Russians east of the Ural Mountains, and it is increasing 20 times faster than the population on the Russian side. Each Russian per kilometer of the mutual Russian-Chinese border is facing 63,000 Chinese nationals on the other side. The Primorski Krai region, with its 2.2 million residents, for instance, is confronted by 70 million Chinese in the neighboring Heilong-jang province. While the Russian Far Eastern population has decreased 8 percent since 1989 to 7.4 million, across the border China’s Manchurian population increased by 13 percent over the same period.

The demographic pressure from China on Russia will increase even further in the future. China’s rapidly growing active labor force (people aged between 15 and 59) will reach more than 115 million by 2010 (from 100 million today), representing nearly 70 percent of the Chinese population near the Russian border—forming an enormous pool of surplus labor. These demographic trends will add new dimensions to the excess labor pool that will increase as a result of the privatization of inefficient state-run sectors of China’s economy. At the same time, Russia’s present population in Siberia and the Far East will fall from 32 million to just 10 million if current demographic trends continue. Against this background it is not surprising that the populist governor of Primorski Krai, Yevgeni Nazdratenko, deported 9,500 Chinese in 1994-1995 and 2,000 more in 1996 as a part of “Operation Foreigner,” which boosted his popularity.

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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>China</td>
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**Table 1. Demographic Trends in Russia and China: A Comparison (2000).**

Russian mistrust of China may also be explained by the fact that the boundary between Russia and China is not merely an international border, but also an intercultural boundary, which, however, has become increasingly porous. Given the deteriorating economic situation of the last years, Chinese migration has resulted in increasing job competition. Their work quality, discipline, special skills, and lower costs of employment make them very attractive for Russian companies. Working 11 hours a day and six days a week, their employment in some cities and border districts—areas desperate for investment and job opportunities—has more than tripled during recent years. The average hourly cost of an industry employee is just 56 cents—half that of Guatemala, and even lower in comparison to the $2.69 in South Korea (1998) and $10.12 in the United States. The widespread feeling of vulnerability and insecurity on the Russian side might even increase if cross-border economic cooperation and
joint ventures (such as the Tyumen River free trade area) do not produce positive benefits for the Russians in the near future. The pressure of population and the need for arable land, raw materials, and especially energy and water resources\textsuperscript{54} may constitute powerful motives for Chinese expansion into the empty spaces of Russia's Far East. Russia, it should be recalled, seized the Far Eastern territories in 1858 and 1860 in the unequal treaties of Aigun and Beijing. Although both countries signed a border agreement in 1999, China never explicitly accepted those treaties as inviolable. Vladimir Y. Portyakov, the deputy director of the Institute of the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, stated in 1996:

There is a deeply ingrained negativist attitude in the region toward the center's policy, which apparently does not reckon with the specific conditions of the Far East and particular federation components, and is therefore not effective enough in addressing the region's problems. The feeling that the Far East is politically isolated from the rest of Russia, compounded by a weakening of day-to-day human and economic contacts with it, with a simultaneous expansion of such contacts with East Asian countries and the United States, point to the emergence of a sub-ethnic group in the Far East which is seeking maximum independence, its subordination to the center being purely formal.\textsuperscript{55}

Those existing fears are fueled by China's "undisguised aspirations" to participate in developing the resources by exporting its large workforce not just to the Russian Far East, but also to Siberia. A Chinese magazine, for instance, estimated the present manpower shortage in Siberia and the Russian Far East at 50-80 million people, with an additional workforce of 8 million needed for economic development. Against this background of worrisome Chinese reports, Vladimir Portyakov wrote:

Very indicative is China's interpretation of the 'mutual supplementarity' of Russia and China, when the northeastern part of China, with a territory of 1.9 million sq km and a population of 110 million, is assigned the 'lofty mission' to help, primarily by workforce, develop Siberia and the Far East with their 12.76 million sq km of territory and a population of less than 33 million.\textsuperscript{56}

Resettlement programs to move Russians into the region, however, are probably unrealistic. For example, Primorski Krai Governor Yevgeni Nazdratenko recently demanded the relocation of 5 million Russians from European Russia to the Far East to balance the demographic trends on both sides of the border,\textsuperscript{57} but a lack of funds and similar problems in other Russian regions mean nothing is likely to be done.

**A New “Strategic Alliance” with China vis-à-vis the West and the United States?**

In a joint statement in April 1996 at the fourth Sino-Russian summit since 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin announced their intent to build a "strategic partnership" between their countries.\textsuperscript{58} The new "equal partnership" is, as Grigori Karasin, Russia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained, "directed at strategic cooperation in the XXI century and can be characterized as long-term intergovernmental ties of a new type which is not directed against third countries, as fully satisfying the vital
interests of our nations, and as assisting peace and security in the APR [Asia-Pacific Region] and in the entire world.\textsuperscript{59}

One year later, in April 1997, another statement explained indirectly the strategic partnership as an anti-hegemony clause expressing opposition to efforts to enlarge and strengthen military blocs in Europe and East Asia such as NATO and the U.S.-Japanese security alliance.\textsuperscript{60} Officially, however, they rejected an alliance to offset growing U.S. global influence.\textsuperscript{61} They had already agreed to the Russian sale of two advanced Sovremenny guided missile destroyers (armed with modern MOSKIT anti-ship cruise missiles) and other modern high-tech weaponry to China, which raised alarm on the U.S. side.\textsuperscript{62} In the autumn of 1997, both sides reached a breakthrough in efforts to demarcate the eastern section of the Sino-Russian border for the first time in the 400-year-long history, although their short western border of just 50 kilometers remained under negotiation.\textsuperscript{63} However, it seems that Russia made far more concessions to China than vice versa. For instance, Russian members of the joint demarcation commission accused China of creating artificial sandbars on the bank of the Amur River in order to lay claim to the Bolshoi Ussuriisky and Tabarov islands.\textsuperscript{64} However, these controversial issues failed to dim the light of the overall climate of friendship and amity, and both sides also signed at their autumn 1997 meeting in Beijing a framework agreement to construct a $12 billion, 3,000 kilometer gas pipeline from Siberia to North China that would run from Irkutsk province through Mongolia and China to South Korea.\textsuperscript{65}

In 1998, with increasing frustration and suspicion towards the West, both sides issued declarations about joint commitments to a multipolar world, showing broad agreement in their opposition to economic sanctions against India and Pakistan for their development of nuclear weapons. They also made clear their opposition to any use of force against Belgrade for its policies in Kosovo. But with U.S. President Clinton's visit to Beijing, the Russian press also highlighted the huge difference and asymmetry in trade between China and Russia ($6.8 billion) and between China and the United States (roughly $60 billion).\textsuperscript{66} Furthermore, the "peaceful invasion" of Primorye and other Russian Far East territories continued. Thus a Russian article warned:

\begin{quote}
If Moscow doesn't find a way of stopping Siberian's migration, fails to supervise the cheap and skillful Chinese workforce, and fails to attract Japanese, American, and South Korean investments, Chinese will surely settle the abandoned Siberia. In absolute accordance with Den Ciaopin's theses, the Chinese people will build up its strength at first and then recall the humiliations it was subject to in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries by imperialist countries of the world (Russia included) and decide to correct the historic wrong.\textsuperscript{67}
\end{quote}

Furthermore, the catastrophic socio-economic situation during the winter 1998-99, with severe food and energy shortages, highlighted the vulnerabilities of Russia's regions in the Far East.\textsuperscript{68} In 1999, NATO's military intervention in the Kosovo conflict and the unfortunate bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade further strengthened the Sino-Russian relationship vis-à-vis the United States.\textsuperscript{69} Symbolically, the Russian armed forces were holding their biggest military exercise (West-99) since the mid-1980s, which, as Dmitri Trenin has stated, "for the first time in a decade designated NATO as the enemy." Moreover, the Russians gave a visiting high-level Chinese military delegation unprecedented access to Russian nuclear bases.\textsuperscript{70} However, as Bin Yu has argued, "Kosovo was not as significant a
unifying force between Beijing and Moscow as one might think.... China viewed the Yugoslav case as not affecting the fundamentals of China's national interests. Beijing's foreign policy community was even advising top leaders to distance China from the Milosevic regime. But the fateful embassy bombing changed the picture. Finally, the Kosovo conflict posed opportunities—challenging to be sure—for Moscow and Beijing to strengthen their bilateral relationship. It also created an opportunity for China's PLA to double almost the 1999 defense budget through additions in the summer of 1999. In August 1999, the sides signed an agreement to sell 40-60 advanced SU-30MK fighters to China after several years of difficult negotiations.

China also supported and defended Russia's indiscriminate warfare in Chechnya, while Moscow supported China's position on Taiwan and Tibet. Both sides were frustrated by their inability to stop the NATO campaign in the United Nations and declared again, in the light of their own problems with ethnic separatism, that state sovereignty, state unity, and territorial integrity were still the most important components of international law and politics. These important components had also been highlighted during their “Shanghai Five” meeting with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in August 1999 in the midst of an ongoing hostage crisis, with roughly 1,000 Islamic gunmen holding up to 100 people, including four Japanese. This event demonstrated dramatically to both sides some of the new security challenges both countries face, such as rising Islamic fundamentalism, cross-border terrorism, smuggling of firearms, and drug trafficking. Understandably, security was a key issue at the summit. The Shanghai Five leaders supported an initiative to create a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Asia and to establish a broader “conference on cooperation and confidence-building measures in Asia.” But this meeting, too, demonstrated a Russia in decline. Until 1998, Russia and Central Asian countries had formed “joint delegations” for negotiations with China. On this occasion, the Central Asian states decided to hold negotiations with Beijing independently “without looking at Russia for approval. In other words, they decided to bet on a stronger and more stable partner.” Additionally in 1999, Russia and China repeatedly warned the United States against developing BMD and TMD umbrellas (the latter together with Japan and possibly Taiwan), claiming that this development would threaten all nuclear and non-proliferation treaties (particularly the Anti-Ballistic Missile and Comprehensive Test Ban treaties).

In October 1999, the Russian and Chinese navies conducted their first joint naval activity since 1949. In the same month, both sides began the process of implementing the agreed demilitarization of their joint border by creating a 100-kilometer wide demilitarized zone on each side. A month later, they held their third round of General Staff discussions. Both sides also have increased their military and non-military cooperation, including the areas of space science and technology. Reportedly more than 1,000 Russian technology projects have been initiated since the autumn of 1999.

But even though the Moscow-Beijing axis seemed to be strengthening with each year in the light of new common regional and global interests in their foreign and security policies, they are not interested in forming a real military alliance because their positions still do not coincide perfectly. Moreover, Yeltsin felt it necessary to remind the West that Russia “has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons.” But this action only revealed again Russia's political
weakness and its international position as a faltering world power. Moscow seems desperate for China’s support to demonstrate to the United States that it is still a great power in world politics. China—itself an aspiring world power—focused a December 1999 meeting with Russian representatives on the border agreements, showing that it is capable of playing the Russian card any time it sees it advantageous.

However, Beijing was “immensely shocked,” confused, and irritated by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s resignation on New Year’s Eve 1999 after he paid a brief visit to Beijing earlier in the month. Obviously, Moscow did not inform Beijing in advance as part of their claimed “strategic partnership.” The lack of forewarning also signals a severe failure of Chinese intelligence. Meanwhile, China seemed to be concerned over Putin’s much more cautious China policy and his intention to strengthen Russia’s ties to the West, to the European Union, and even to NATO, intentions which are somewhat at odds with Russia’s former omnidirectional foreign policy. According to various Chinese and Russian sources, Putin had promised Beijing to visit China as the first of his foreign visits, but he scheduled several foreign visits to Europe and Central Asia before going to China. It was only in the summer of 2000 while on the way to the G-8 meeting in Okinawa that Putin held a real summit in Beijing, and then flew to Pyongyang to restore bilateral relations with Russia’s former ally, North Korea. In Beijing, both sides declared again their strong opposition to U.S. plans to create a national missile defense shield, instead proposing a global monitoring system for the early detection of missile launches. Reportedly, China offered Russia a long-term cooperation pact and sought Russian support for scenarios of applying military force against Taiwan. However, it is hardly in Moscow’s interest to become directly involved in this potential hotspot in the Taiwan Strait.

Furthermore, Putin has begun to modify his China and East Asia policies to the detriment of China at a time when Beijing seeks to establish closer relations with Moscow. Despite the ongoing arms flows and weapon technology transfers to China, becoming too close to China may not be in Russia’s long-term strategic interests, as Putin seems to realize. He might also have recognized the implications of China’s forthcoming admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which will draw away even more potential resources and foreign investment. China’s admission to that body will also simultaneously further strengthen China’s position in their bilateral relationship as long as Russia itself is not able to join the global trade organization. Hence it may further widen the gap between major trading partners (including China) and those countries such as Russia which are still outside the WTO.

Moreover, Putin’s unilateral proposal to develop a joint missile defense system for Europe with NATO and the United States caught Beijing by surprise. It provoked the Chinese to remind Moscow of the “common interests of all countries.” China also declared its objection to any changes to the ABM treaty, including those from the Russian side. In this light, the joint statement on ABM, issued by both presidents during their Beijing summit in July 2000, seems to be an attempt by both sides to restore rather than to deepen their strategic relationship as regards U.S. missile defense plans and a revision of the ABM treaty. This was not the first instance of such reassurances, however. Earlier, during the Moscow visit of
China’s Defense Minister Chi Haotian in January 2000, Moscow had to reassure China by confirming “unconditional adherence to all agreements reached during earlier summits.”

As important as the political and socio-economic situation in Siberia and the Russian Far East may be, the future of Russian-Chinese relations and the place of China in Russia’s strategic calculations probably depends not so much on Russian domestic developments as on the geopolitical and geostrategic evolution of China’s domestic, foreign, and security policies. This reflects the fact that Russia is already the junior partner in the Sino-Russian relationship. In both countries, socio-economic conditions and problems could create serious security challenges that extend beyond their own borders and have unpredictable consequences. Indeed, the disintegration of either of the two countries cannot be excluded, although I still believe that total collapse, for either country, is—for numerous reasons—a rather unlikely possibility. Perhaps most importantly, both states have a tradition of a strong state and center, and efforts to overcome separatism and disintegration could lead to the creation of a new and highly authoritarian state in either country, which could provoke new tensions and contradictions in their mutual relationship.

Furthermore, despite eight years of independent statehood, Russia has failed to come to terms with its reduced stature in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet superpower and failed to define a new role and identity for itself on the world stage. Its actions often seem to reflect an obsession with denying the United States the unipolar hegemony Moscow suspects it of seeking. Therefore it has favored a multipolar world by establishing a virtual strategic partnership among Moscow, Beijing, India and others. Those Russian strategies are intended to play off Western and Asian interests with the goal of increasing Russia’s influence on the world stage. Over the last year, both Russia and China also emphasized their opposition to U.S. plans for an antimissile defense system that threatens their nuclear retaliatory capabilities and could force them into a new and expensive arms race they cannot win. Nonetheless, there are a number of limitations and obstacles to a lasting strategic partnership in the 21st century. While both cooperate in Central Asia to combat Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism and to counterbalance the United States, they also compete for foreign investment and the region’s energy resources. Even in Europe and in the territory of the former Soviet Union, China follows its own strategic interests, which do not always overlap with those of Russia, as the Yugoslav conflict demonstrated in 1999. The Chinese-Ukrainian relationship is a good example of the lack of a real joint strategic agenda between Moscow and Beijing beyond the arms trade, joint energy projects, and countering the United States. Moreover, Primakov’s and Putin’s recent Eurasian orientation and the proclaimed strategic partnership between Russia and China, initiated in April 1996, is in many respects more a tactical alliance than a real military alliance, which is not in the China’s interest (the word “alliance” is not even used by China). China has repeatedly made clear that the essential quality of their bilateral relations is not of an alliance type, is not directed against any other third party, and, moreover, does not present a threat to other states. Characteristically, the Chinese side always speaks about a strategic cooperative partnership with Russia, not about a real strategic partnership. It indicates a different and ultimately narrower and more limited definition of their relationship. Furthermore, Chinese experts have also warned against “closing our eyes to the numerous difficulties...of the Sino-Russian relationship.” As a Chinese expert has admitted:
Side by side with deepening bilateral relations, there has arisen an anti-China undercurrent in Russia, which spreads such allegations against China as “population invasion,” “economic penetration,” “military challenges” and “geo-strategic contradictions.” It has affected somewhat the expansion of bilateral relations. Yet this frenzy remains, after all, only a tributary and is mixed up with many factors of Russian domestic politics. The mainstream in Russia’s China policy still considers China as a reliable partner and gives top priority in Russian foreign policy to the expansion of relations with China.  

Furthermore, current bilateral trade activity and prospects for increasing it to $20 billion by the year 2000 (as was agreed to by both sides during their April 1996 meeting in Shanghai) are rather poor. Total bilateral trade in 1996 was $6.77 billion, declining to just $5.5 billion in 1998. China’s bilateral trade with the United States and Japan, by contrast, is more than 10 times that with Russia. In several years during the 1990s, one-third of the total bilateral trade between Russia and China was related to the Russian export of high-tech weapon systems and transfers of military and dual-use technologies. Between 1991 and 1997, China spent almost $6 billion on Russian weapons. The economic investment of companies in both countries is limited. While Chinese companies invested just $140 million in Russia, Russian businessmen mobilized $220 million for investment in China. China has also not given Russia any economic preference vis-à-vis the West. Thus the Chinese awarded the tender for the famous Three Gorges dam project to French and German contractors, despite Russian offers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Volume (in $ billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>5.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Sino-Russian Trade 1993-1999.
Although Russia and China have concluded an agreement on the demarcation of their joint border, China could at some future date redirect its energies towards the north and seek revision of the boundary—particularly if the Taiwan problem is “solved,” (which is unlikely if a military “solution” is excluded). Hence, it can be argued that Russia should have a strategic interest not only in stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait but also in the independence of Taiwan—which is not the case. Arguably, China has never accepted the loss of 1.5 million square kilometers of its territory to Tsarist Russia in the 19th century by “unfair treaties.”

Even after the successful demarcation of the border with China, Russia will remain suspicious concerning China’s future intentions and the “creeping occupation” of the Far East region already underway by immigration and cross-border movement. Thus, Russian diplomats warned governor Nazdratenko not to renounce the border demarcation treaty in response to growing domestic opposition against numerous Russian concessions to China because “the Chinese might return to their old territorial claims (in all 1.5 million square kilometers)!”

Looking at then current economic, political, and demographic trends, a Japanese diplomat concluded in 1997: “China has a superior position to Russia in the region both politically and economically, and Russia must accept a junior partnership with China—a potential source of frustration for Moscow, especially given the nationalistic domestic atmosphere.”

Although both sides are interested in implementing long-term plans for the development of Russian energy projects, at the same time, Russia has become concerned about China’s increasing political, economic, and military ties to Central Asia and the Caspian region, which Moscow views as its natural sphere of influence. Here again, China in the mid- and long-term future seems to have considerable if not decisive leverage in the competition with Russia, primarily in regard to Kazakhstan. As Dmitri Trenin has argued: “So far, Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia do not collide. In the future, they might, especially if both governments continue to espouse the traditional form of geopolitical thinking with its emphasis on zero-sum gaming.” Hence, in the mid- and long-term future, Russia’s influence might decrease even in this sensitive region to the point of Russia becoming the junior partner of China, which will create numerous conflicts of interests between both sides. Thus, some Russian military officers, such as those on the General Staff, believe that China might become a threat to Central Asia within 5 to 10 years and to the Russian Federation itself within 15 to 20 years.

China has already increased its influence in Russia’s backyard, and the pipeline agreement with Kazakhstan—which does not transit Russian territory—contradicts the proclaimed strategic partnership with Russia. It reflects rather a clash of strategic interests between these two countries and the future concerns of Russia about the direction of Chinese energy and security policies. Even if no Caspian oil and gas flow through the pipeline in the near future, Chinese influence will surely grow in the coming years—to the detriment of Russia. In this perspective, it seems not unlikely that Central Asia is becoming China’s rather than Russia’s backyard.

Despite their impressive strategic convergence during the 1990s, Russia and China’s future bilateral relationship will not continue without elements of mistrust and other
problems. Russian views of China are much more mixed than their strengthened relationship would suggest at first glance. At least three schools of thought can be identified:

- Those who favor strengthening bilateral ties with China;
- Those who prefer Russia to balance between various power centers, such as between the West and China; and,
- Those, primarily Westerners and extreme nationalists, who fear a growing geopolitical and geostrategic rivalry with a rising China that has the potential to harm Russia.\textsuperscript{108}

To some extent, these different schools of thought can be identified in both the political forces that support the Chinese way of economic and political development—which they see as more effective than the Russian one—and those who reject the Chinese model either because of its inapplicability to Russia or because of its non-democratic character. It is difficult to analyze the three schools in the light of dividing lines between ideologies of Russian political groups and parties. However, it is not surprising that the Popular Patriotic Union headed by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation follows the lead of Oleg Rakhmanin, of the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the largest Moscow research center for China Studies; Rakhmanin favors a close alliance with Beijing.\textsuperscript{109}

Some extreme nationalists such as Aleksey Mitrofanov, deputy leader of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party and former chairman of the State Duma’s Geopolitical Committee, has urged Russia to “remove all impediments to China’s expansion westward and help restore China’s sovereignty over the whole of Turkestan, including South Kazakhstan,” because this would “strengthen geopolitical stability in the region” and “bring all of Western Europe under the range of China’s nuclear missiles.”\textsuperscript{110}

By contrast, in the view of the pro-Westerners China offers Russia only temporary benefits and may create long-term problems. The West, on the other hand, may offer Moscow temporary embarrassments, but it also offers significant potential for future long-term cooperation. Vasily V. Mikheev, for instance, concluded in a 1997 analysis: “Generally speaking, behind the ideas of Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation stands bluffing that is not supported by either financial resources or unity of will and action of the declared allies.”\textsuperscript{111}

Even more outspoken was former Defense Minister Igor N. Rodionov, who succeeded General Grachev in December 1996. He sowed confusion in Beijing (on the very day of Chinese Premier Li Peng’s arrival in Moscow) by listing China among “the main potential enemies of Russia” and announced plans for closer military cooperation with the United States and Japan in the Far East, which Beijing sees increasingly as a major security threat. Although Rodionov was forced to eat his words a few weeks later when he explained that closer ties with China would not compromise Russia’s own security, this episode left the lasting impression that Rodionov’s real sin was to say openly what almost all Russians think privately and discuss behind closed doors.\textsuperscript{112}

Nonetheless, given current domestic economic and political trends, for the time being it seems that close Sino-Russian relations will continue. At the same time, while the
convergence of strategic interests will continue on both sides, the relationship will not be transformed into a real strategic alliance against the West.

Decline and Decay of the Russian Armed Forces and its Implications for the Military Balance of Forces Vis-À-Vis China

If one takes a look at today's situation, one must acknowledge that the breakdown of expenses not only in the Armed Forces, but also in all power structures is hardly optimum. We cannot describe it as optimum today when despite considerable resources being committed by the state to the country's armed and power-related component, many of our units conduct no drills, no combat training. If pilots do not fly, if sailors almost never put to sea, is everything all right in terms of the structure of the Armed Forces?

—Opening remarks by President Vladimir Putin at a Security Council meeting on August 11, 2000, to discuss a new Russian strategy for military planning until 2015

By 1985 the Soviet Union had built up its ground forces in the Far East to a level of almost 500,000 men (see the following two tables). In addition, there were substantial deployments of aircraft and missiles with conventional and nuclear weapons, including SS-20s and strategic nuclear, targeted at China.

**Soviet Deployment in the East Asian Theater of War (Mid-1980s)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>480,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Forces</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Rocket Troops</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Air Defense Forces</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB Border and Other Military Units</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVD Internal Security Military Units</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Troops</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Rear Service Units, road and Railroad</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3. Soviet Armed Forces in East Asia (Mid-1980s).
Total Armed Forces | 1,200,000
---|---
Regular Troops (Army, Navy, AF, Air Defense, Strategic Rocket, KGB Border Troops) | 1,000,000
Conventional Combat Troops (Army, Navy, AF) | 730,000
Ground Forces | 500,000
Naval Forces | 130,000
Air Forces | 100,000
Strategic Rocket Forces | 90,000
Air Defense Troops | 100,000
IKGB Border and Other Troops | 110,000
MVD Troops | 50,000
Railway/Construction Troops | 150,000

* Includes troops stationed in Siberia, Transbaykal, Far Eastern MDs, Mongolia, and the Pacific Fleet.

Table 4. Numbers of Soviet Armed Forces in the Late 1980s.

At the end of 1987, in the light of the INF treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to a unilateral destruction of the 180 SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and 256 other medium- and short-range missiles deployed in East Asia. In 1989, the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of 250,000 troops from the Far East at a time when Gorbachev called for a demilitarization of the Sino-Russian border. Further reductions have continued, including the complete withdrawal of all 120,000 Russian troops from Mongolia. The three tank divisions in the Far East Military District have been withdrawn entirely, and the number of motor rifle divisions was reduced from 21 in 1989 to 10 in 1996. During the same period, Russia cut its Pacific Fleet by about 50 percent.

Over the past eight years, the Russian armed forces have experienced a continual financial crisis and a steep decline—as Russia’s defeat in Chechnya in 1996 brutally revealed. Since 1989, Russian experts have discussed genuine military reform. So far, however, only modest military reform steps have been taken, although Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev has achieved some success during the last three years. Mostly, however, the Defense Ministry, and in particular the Russian General Staff, has downgraded real military reform to a “reform of the armed forces”—and they are not the same thing. Moreover, considerable disagreement exists between Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and the Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, over the future direction and concrete particulars of Russia’s
military reform. As long as Russia’s economic decay continues, Russia’s armed forces will be largely unable to play a powerful and lasting role in the country’s foreign and security policies. Even the Ministry’s own most optimistic projections envision adequate funding beginning only in 2004, but the financial crisis that began in August 1998 makes even those earlier calculations unrealistic.

The virtual collapse of Russian state finances since that time has made any effective military reform even more doubtful. In the second quarter of 1999, the under-financing of the armed forces amounted to 200 million rubles. In the fourth quarter of 1999, it was stated that only 31 percent of the military budget had been confirmed in the summer of that year. At the same time, total debts to the Army and Navy have reached the sum of 50 billion rubles, almost half the entire annual defense budget. As a result of domestic uncertainties, details of the 1999 defense budget were classified again—for the first time since 1991.

Moreover, Russia’s recent defense budgets have never been as transparent as the defense budgets of NATO states. The 1998 defense budget, for instance, still excluded the financial resources spent on Russia’s 15 so-called “other armed forces,” such as the Ministry of Interior Forces, Border Guards, etc. If these “other armed forces” are included, Russia might still have as many as 3 million people under arms. According to a Russian source of May 2000, these military and militarized departments and their forces consume almost 50 percent of all state budget expenditures. According to Aleksei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, these often heavily armed paramilitary forces had a combined strength in 1997 of 1.2 million men and total funding in that same year of some $8 billion rubles. Furthermore, as one Russian source pointed out, Russia continues the “luxury of maintaining a total contingent of over 25,000 servicemen abroad. Even the USSR could not afford this!”

While the official overall strength of the regular Russian armed forces had been reduced to 1.2 million by January 1, 1999, and is expected to fall further, at present only about one-third or even one-fourth of that number can be considered to be genuinely operational. Without the political will to make drastic strength cuts, Moscow will instead maintain a largely non-operational military establishment that will exacerbate the severe structural weaknesses of the Russian armed forces dating back to Soviet times. As Aleksei Arbatov recently argued:

If Russia decided to bring the financing of its servicemen up to the U.S. standards, then it would have to either reduce its army from the current 1.2 million servicemen to 100,000 people or increase the military budget up to 6 trillion rubles, or seven times greater a sum than the overall total of the 2000 federal budget. Given the scarce resources, a further reduction of the regular armed forces to some 600,000 will be necessary within the next decade.

However, Russia’s General Staff still sees 1.2 to 1.3 million as the “crucial barrier below which the state cannot cross.” They feel this way because the military and political leadership, despite policy declarations to the contrary, might not resort to using even a limited number of nuclear weapons in a local war which could escalate to a full-fledged regional war, as the Chief of the Center for Strategic Forecasts of the General Staff, Colonel Vyacheslav Zubarev, argued in June 2000.
The policy guidelines on military issues as set forth in the National Security Concept of December 1997 stated that, even if all of Russia's armed forces (including those not belonging to the Defense Ministry) are mobilized, Russia could cope with at best just one regional conflict. And even that case has become more and more doubtful over the last two years. According to one military source, unless funding is increased, only 40-50 percent of Russia's air forces fleet will still be operational by 2001. At present, 50 percent of aircraft and 40 percent of antiaircraft systems and helicopters need repairs. Also according to Russian sources, largely due to a lack of fuel, flight training in Russia's air force was conducted at only 35 percent of desired levels in 1999, a decrease from 45 percent in 1998. As a result, the average number of flying hours a year was only 20 per pilot, compared to NATO figures of up to 180 hours. A U.S. State Department report of 1999 about the rapid decay in Russia's military readiness was even more graphic: in 1998, the Russian army had to cancel 65 percent of its planned regimental exercises and 27 percent of battalion-level training. Although the Russian navy officially still has 80 major warships (including one aircraft carrier), 160 minor combatants, 24 amphibious ships, and 70 mine countermeasure vessels, its current real operational readiness might be as low as 10 percent—in contrast to more than 70 percent during the Cold War. Sea duty for the Russian submarine fleet, for instance, was reduced by 25 percent, while surface ships cancelled 33 percent of their planned exercises in 1998. Although Russia's Defense Ministry lobbied for 310 billion rubles, the official defense budget in 1998 was just 81.7 billion. Of that planned defense expenditure, the military had received only 30 billion rubles by the end of November 1998. At that time, the Defense Ministry's debts totaled 60 billion rubles, including 16 billion rubles in salaries and pensions.

In the summer of 1999, only three divisions and four brigades in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus, and Siberian military districts maintained a status of “permanent readiness units,” which requires having at least 80 percent of full personnel strength with 100 percent of weapons and other equipment. Nonetheless, major military exercises such as ZAPAD-99 demonstrated a much better capability to deploy large combined-arms forces than many Western experts expected. However, as is characteristic of the navy's problems, the exercise used up its entire annual fuel reserve. Moreover, as the renewed war in Chechnya is confirming, Russia's conventional military capabilities are becoming increasingly overtaxed as a result of its lack of trained professional troops and shortages of resources for training, maintenance, and new equipment.

The system for calling up conscripts—nominally “compulsory”—has also become more and more uncertain because of the exemptions on the grounds of conscientious objection, deserters, and dedovshchina (the systematic oppression of young recruits by their older comrades). Meanwhile, in the light of the war in Dagestan/Chechnya and reports that the military is illegally using inexperienced conscripts to fight the rebels, Tatarstan has declared it will no longer send its conscripts to fight for Russia in the southern regions or any other hotspots because they have not received proper military training for those combat missions. The Defense Ministry ultimately felt compelled to compromise with the province concerning this decision because it worried that other regions would follow Tatarstan's example. According to Russian law until the end of 1998, conscripts could be used in armed conflicts only on a voluntary basis. As the realities of the new Chechen war reveal once again, Russia's conscripts generally are neither well-trained nor have the stomach for
fighting in the ethnic wars on Russia’s southern periphery—particularly the protracted conflicts in which larger numbers of soldiers die.

The latest statistics reveal that the health crisis and drug problems have also increasingly affected the armed forces. Reportedly, the number of healthy conscripts has dropped by 20 percent over the last decade. According to data of Russia’s Defense Ministry, 10 percent of conscripts in the Ground Forces and navy are drug addicts, and one of every nine crimes in the Russian armed forces is drug-related. Nearly 33 percent of all potential conscripts were either exempted or “reprieved” for health reasons by Russian draft boards during the spring-summer call-up campaign of 1999. An increasing number of prospective conscripts suffer from diseases and drug addiction, whose rates have soared by 100 percent since 1993. In 1999 alone, the number of crimes connected with illegal drug trafficking committed by servicemen increased by 32 percent. Of particular note, in the Chelyabinsk region a rise of over 300 percent since the mid-1990s had been reported. In the fall of 1999, 57 percent of those examined were regarded as unfit to serve, while 49,000 men, almost one-fifth of the total conscripted, did not report for duty. Despite the expected conscript pool of one million in the spring of 2000, the armed forces were only able to draft only 13 percent or 191,612 young men of that number.

There are other problems as well. Incidents of bribery have increased by almost 40 percent, although overall crime rates have fallen by 12.4 percent compared with the summer period of 1998. Housing is an issue, with 93,400 servicemen lacking apartments for their families at the beginning of 1999. In April 1999, the federal government owed nearly 7.5 billion rubles to Russia’s armed forces personnel. Furthermore, the socio-economic crisis of the armed forces has resulted in a growing de facto alliance between local military commanders and regional political bosses—a fact that has opened the door to patronage, widespread corruption, and weapons smuggling in the armed forces. All these negative trends have been particularly prevalent in the armed forces in Siberia and the Far East. Crime, accident rates, lack of adequate maintenance of weapons and infrastructure, and failure to make payment for the supply of energy and food, all seem to exceed the levels existing in European military districts. In July 1998, for instance, Aleksandr Lebed, governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, threatened in an open letter to Moscow to assume control of the nuclear weapons based in his region in order to force the government to pay its soldiers. However, the threat of nuclear regionalism and the possibility that regional leaders might acquire de facto control over various nuclear assets on their territories, including missile material, nuclear power stations, and ultimately nuclear weapons, seems at present rather remote.

Meanwhile, Russia’s Ground Forces have been reduced to an effective strength of 300,000-348,000 soldiers in 24 active but under-strength formations. The Ground Forces’ strength of 300,000 men is nearly as large as the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Navy’s Pacific Fleet had been cut from 333 combat vessels to just 100. Of these, just 30 to 40 percent are operational. Although the restructuring of the military districts was to be completed by the end of 1999 following the merger of the Siberian and Trans-Baikal military districts, probably not more than 100,000 troops are actually deployed in the Siberian and Far Eastern Military Districts.
Moreover, Putin’s stated policy of increasing the official defense budget by 50 percent last January has not had a real impact on the Russian armed forces and its operational readiness. By the end of May 2000, the military had received only 6.5 percent of promised funds for 2000 according Defense Ministry officials. Despite the Defense Ministry’s extremely unrealistic financial planning in recent years, it has submitted to the government another proposal to replace 50 percent of military equipment over the period 2001-2010 with new or modernized systems. According to those plans, however, the official defense budget must increase to between 6.0 and 6.6 percent of GDP—double present official defense outlays, over the next five years. But even if they receive additional financial resources, Russia’s ground forces will still be unable to cover the entire Eastern defense perimeter and vast unpopulated areas along the Russian-Chinese border.

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<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>34</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines


Seen in this light, the agreed demilitarized zone between Russia, China and the three Central Asian states discussed below has raised new defense problems. In an agreement reached in April 1996 during their Shanghai meeting, both sides declared, with three other Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—their intent to establish a model for achieving regional peace, security, and stability for confidence-building in the area of military matters in border regions. One year later, in April 1997, all five states signed an agreement providing for the mutual reduction of armed forces in their common border regions. This unique military-political document of confidence- and security-building
measures has been seen by some as a model for reducing or eliminating tensions of unresolved territorial conflicts in other parts of North and Southeast Asia.

In 1991-92, China wanted to establish a demilitarized zone extending to 300 kilometers on either side of the border. Because of Russia's traditional deployments near the border, Russian troops would have had to withdraw and relocate, requiring the construction of new infrastructure facilities Russia could not afford. Such a relocation would also have been disadvantageous from the Russian strategic point of view; in some areas Russia would have had to withdraw its troops behind the Trans-Siberian Railway, historically the key civil, military, and logistical link between Moscow and its eastern territories. Against that background, it is not surprising that there were more than 20 rounds of border and arms control negotiations over a period of seven years before a final document could be worked out at the Shanghai meeting in April 1996. The signed agreement included pledges of non-aggression, non-use of force, and pre-notification for military exercises and other types of exercises permitted within the 100-kilometer zone. Ultimately, the specifics of force reductions were included in an agreement signed in May 1997 in Moscow. This agreement focused on the reduction of regular troops only, not of border forces or strategic forces within the 100-kilometer zone. It requires that Russia and the three Central Asian republics reduce their troop levels by 15 percent to a maximum of 130,400 by May 7, 2002. They are allowed a maximum of 3,810 tanks and 4,500 armored vehicles.

At first glance China seemed to have made significant concessions by giving up its insistence on a 300 kilometer zone. However, China has deployed its ground forces roughly 400 kilometers inside the border, in accordance with its traditional strategy of luring the enemy deep into its own territory. Moreover, Russia lacks the strategic depth in the Far East that China enjoys. The majority of Russia's ground forces, other military strategic assets, and major regional population and infrastructure centers are all located near the Sino-Russian border, in accordance to the Russian military doctrine and strategy prevailing since the 1930s. In the end, Russia agreed to the Chinese proposal because of its already planned reductions, although it has been forced to relocate its ground forces into the backcountry and make them highly mobile. However, in the event of a conflict, Russian forces would have to cross over the Siberian taiga—a moist sub-arctic coniferous forest—which lacks fuel resources and has a weak infrastructure. Unfortunately, Russia does not have the financial resources for a radical relocation and restructuring of its armed forces in the Far East. Against this background of an increasing defense dilemma in the Russian Far East, only nuclear weapons appear to pose a credible deterrent against a potential Chinese threat in the future.

Russia's foremost security vulnerability and the resulting commitment to prepare forces able to fight low-intensity conflicts at home (especially on its southern flank) have been overtaken, meanwhile, by a continued determination to maintain a modern nuclear capability guaranteeing Russia's status as a nuclear world power (i.e., in the U.N. Security Council) and fulfilling a deterrence role vis-à-vis the superior conventional armed forces of NATO in Europe and China in East Asia. Russia had already dropped its 1982 no-first-use-policy on nuclear weapons in the document titled "Basic Principles of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (November 1993). It has since underlined the
increasing role of its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in defense policies.\textsuperscript{156} As Dmitri Trenin has confirmed: “Some Russian military officers privately admit that in a conflict with China the main Russian defenses along the border, including all the principal cities, will be overrun in a matter of days, leaving the General Staff with few options other than going nuclear.”\textsuperscript{157} According to James Clay Moltz, approximately 1,259 Russian nuclear warheads in 1997 were still based in the region, deployed on air-launched cruise missiles, land-based missiles, and SLBMs.\textsuperscript{158}

The new emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons was confirmed in Russia’s 1997 National Security Concept\textsuperscript{159} and in new military doctrine and strategy proposals. These suggest an overwhelming reliance on nuclear forces during virtually any military-political contingency, including the right to use them as first-strike weapons and even preemptively in ethno-political conflicts when Russia’s forces cannot realistically and effectively deal with the situation.\textsuperscript{160} Moreover, there are at least 6,000 operational warheads and thousands more in storage, indicating that these weapons were not destroyed as pledged by former President M. Gorbachev and President Boris Yeltsin in 1991 and 1992. Reinforcing the increasing role of these strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is the fact that the current restructuring of Russia’s armed forces is conducted under the slogan “Military reform under the nuclear missile umbrella,”\textsuperscript{161} instead of putting first priority on improving living conditions and raising the actual fighting capacity of Russia’s conventional troops engaged in peacemaking missions and internal conflicts. The well-known Russian military expert and journalist Pavel Felgenhauer offered this criticism of the military reforms in 1997:

Money is being spent on superfluous nuclear missiles which, in accordance with agreements on non-targeting, are aimed “nowhere.” The fairy tale of the reform “under the nuclear umbrella,” the new missiles and discussions on parity, will be paid for not only with money, but also with the blood of Russian soldiers in future local conflicts in this country’s southern regions.\textsuperscript{162}

Russia presently places too much emphasis on nuclear scenarios that are largely unrealistic and do not address any of the most important security problems on its southern flank.\textsuperscript{163} Nuclear deterrence against China might become even more questionable over the next decade, however, because Russia will have great difficulties sustaining even 900 strategic nuclear warheads after 2008-2010. Although China currently has only some 300 strategic nuclear warheads and an additional 150 tactical nuclear warheads, it seems able to expand its nuclear forces by acquiring and applying MIRV technology to some 600-900 strategic nuclear warheads within the next decade. It seems also to have an interest in modernizing and enlarging its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{164} If China does expand its strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals, Russia’s nuclear deterrent capacity automatically would become more problematic, particularly when it is part of an evolving concept of limited nuclear deterrence closely linking conventional and nuclear warfare.

In recent years, Russia’s nuclear forces, especially the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), have been given preferential treatment. According to Russian data, up to 80-90 percent of all defense budget military expenditures was spent on strategic weapons branches, primarily the RVSN, which Marshal Igor Sergeyev commanded before he became Defense Minister.\textsuperscript{165} As part of that effort, Russia has sought to procure 20-30 ICBMs a year—more than all other
nuclear powers altogether—to maintain its nuclear superpower status into the 21st century. Russia's nuclear forces are now in the process of reorganization into a single command, a step that is very much disputed in the armed forces.

Many military arguments seem at first glance understandable—particularly in light of Russia's financial constraints. However, the preferential treatment received by the newly established Strategic Deterrence Forces and its unified supreme command has provoked new controversies and debates about the use of scarce resources for building new nuclear missiles (Topol-M) instead of modernizing the conventional armed forces. Russia's abandonment in November 1993 of its no-first-use pledge has been highlighted more recently by Russia's new National Security Concept of January 2000 (and its new military doctrine of April 2000). The document states that Russia must have a potential for nuclear deterrence ensuring "the infliction of required damage to any aggressor, either state or a coalition, under any circumstances." Although the final version of the doctrine doesn't specifically mention Russia's right to the first use of nuclear weapons, the document makes clear that "the Russian Federation keeps the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear arms and other WMD against it or its allies, and in response to a large-scale aggression with the use of conventional arms in situations critical for the national security of the Russian Federation." However, the vagueness of the phrase "situations critical for [Russian] national security" enables Moscow to interpret it relatively freely, although the October 1999 draft version of the military doctrine was even more ambiguous in this regard, as skeptical Russian military experts have concluded.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, many Russian security and defense experts have advocated placing greater reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the deficiencies of conventional forces. Thus not only strategic nuclear weapons but also tactical nuclear weapons play a much more important role presently in Russia's defense posture, particularly in the Far East, for contingencies involving China. Thus Aleksei Arbatov, for instance, argued in 1997:

"The Chinese conventional buildup greatly depends on massive imports of weapons and technology from Russia. Thus, besides the nuclear threat, Moscow has an effective means of undercutting or at least seriously slowing down the emergence of this hypothetical threat. At a minimum, to deter effectively China's conventional offensive superiority at the theatre (level), Russia might rely on the option of employing tactical nuclear weapons in the border area to thwart the enemy's offensive operations while deterring China's nuclear response at the strategic level by superior (assured destruction) strategic retaliatory capabilities. Then Russia's deterrence would be credible: its nuclear capabilities would be sufficient to deny China's alleged military gains at the theatre but not threatening to its national survival and thus would not provoke its strategic nuclear pre-emption."

Moreover, Russian nuclear weapons designers are confronted with the fact that their country can no longer afford a vast nuclear weapon archipelago like that of the Soviet era. As a result, they are currently lobbying together with General Staff officers to build a new generation of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons which could be Moscow's answer to its lack of high-precision conventional weapon systems.
However, the use of Russia’s present tactical nuclear arsenal is very dubious because of
the proximity of almost all major Russian cities and military headquarters in the region
sharing a common border with China. They were vulnerable in the past, for example during
the 1960s and the times of a potential military conflict between China and Russia, and many
Russian military experts have concluded that they remain very vulnerable to a large-scale
surprise attack by the Chinese.\footnote{176} The promised use of non-strategic nuclear forces would
serve as a deterrent only if Moscow was prepared to use longer-range tactical nuclear
weapons that threatened China’s hinterland and major cities beyond the common border.
Recognizing these defense dilemmas on its potential eastern front, Russia seems set to
develop a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons and munitions with low yield and
super-low yield, obviously deliverable to targets by both strategic and tactical delivery
systems such as the newly developed ISKANDER 400 kilometer range missile system.
Beginning in 1999, Russia conducted seven sub-critical, developmental tests on Novaya
Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean, the first group in a series of tests in 2000.\footnote{177}

Furthermore, the serious ongoing debate over the use of nuclear (and chemical) weapons
in the current Chechen war seems to confirm that Moscow’s priorities tend toward a further
nuclearization of defense policy.\footnote{178} But given Russia’s economic and financials constraints,
continued modernization of its Strategic Nuclear Forces and tactical nuclear arsenal would
only exacerbate underlying problems because it would come at the expense of its conventional
forces. It would result in a continued decline in morale and operational effectiveness at a time
when Russia must cope with a lasting and extremely violent ethnic conflict in the Northern
Caucasus—a conflict that has no peaceful solution in sight. Hence, reliance on the nuclear
factor and umbrella do not necessarily guarantee Russia’s national security under all
circumstances, including dealing with potential threats posed by China. Andrei Piontkovsky,
director of the Center for National Security Research, and Vitaly Tsigichko, a leading security
specialist of the System Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences, criticized the new
military doctrine in May 2000 as follows:

As far as the Far Eastern sector is concerned, we are following a very strange tradition to avoid
an analysis of the capabilities of the Russian and Chinese armed forces.... Such analysis is a nec­
essary element for creating a system of stability. Considering Russia and China, one reaches the
conclusion that it is a classical case, when the superiority in ordinary weapons (China) can be de­
terred by the threat of nuclear weapons.

But this analysis does not take into consideration such parameters as “inadmissible damage.”....
Considering the potential Russian-Chinese conflict from this point of view, we will have to give
up the idea that a threat of nuclear weapons can frighten the enemy. If we come into conflict
with China, it has a good chance of winning, except in one instance: a total nuclear war, which
would destroy both sides.

The Russian conception, which relies on the nuclear factor, is not a guarantee of the country’s se­
curity. This conception is ineffective in all aspects as regards possible conflicts.\footnote{179}
Russia’s Arms Export Policy and Military Technology Cooperation with China

—Russia’s arms trade with China should be based not only on immediate economic profits, but first of all on all possible scenarios of the developments in Sino-Russian relations. It is very important to correlate arms exports with the prospects of Russian military reform and the modernization of Russia’s armed forces.

—Mikhail Nossov, 1997

In 1996 the Russian deputy prime minister stated while in Malaysia that Russia was willing to sell anything that its customers want, except nuclear weapons. Russia’s apparently unlimited weapons export policy has often been explained by the high dependency of Russia’s defense industry on weapon exports revenues. Indeed, the export revenues of 1997-98 accounted for as much as 62 percent of all the funding channeled into the Russian defense industry—a percentage that is unlikely to decline in the foreseeable future. Russia’s arms trade, however, is not only the key to survival for Russia’s military industrial complex, but also it is seen as one of very few foreign policy instruments available in the Asia-Pacific region. However, short-term economic benefits must be evaluated vis-à-vis the potential future consequences of Russia’s present’s economic profits—an evaluation which appears not, however, to have been made. China’s rapid economic growth has facilitated a more rapid modernization and strengthening of its armed forces than was anticipated. After the bloody events on Tianamen Square in 1989, however, Western countries drastically curtailed arms sales to China. As a result, China had no alternative but to turn to Russia. Furthermore, Russian arms are still easier to integrate into China’s armed forces because the forces of the PLA are still equipped with weapons of Soviet manufacture or design. The Chinese have much more experience in reverse engineering and retrofitting Russian weapon systems than with Western military technology. China seems particularly interested in weapon systems, technology transfers, and in technical specialists on lasers, anti-submarine warfare, air defense, and missile technology.

However, Chinese pressure to receive reduced prices (and Moscow’s unwillingness to accept partial payment in barter), to reduce its hard currency outlays, and to obtain rights for licensed production by China itself have repeatedly hampered the negotiation of new arms deals. Thus “the majority of Russian arms manufactures who fulfill Chinese orders are far from delighted with the terms and conditions of the trade,” as Pavel Felgenhauer admitted. The Chinese, too, are not always highly satisfied with the Russian technology offered. It is not interested in large-scale acquisitions of export versions of conventional arms, but rather in the most advanced technologies. Indeed, as Felgenhauer notes, “The prospect of mass production of the most modern Russian weapons in China has strong opponents in Russia. The situation would unnecessarily augment competition against Russia’s own arms export share and could pose a credible threat to Russian national security.”

In the Russian view, Western criticism aimed at its arms export policies to China and other states is often based on a double standard. As long as wealthy Western countries and particularly the United States show no restraint, why should Russia, confronted with
numerous economic problems and hungry for cash, curtail its arms exports? The Russian military—particularly the General Staff—is very much divided on this issue, but there is some consensus against an unrestricted arms export policy towards China. But Russia’s military-industrial complex does not share any of those wider security concerns. Russian civilian security experts such as Pavel Felgenhauer have become concerned, not so much about arms deliveries per se as about illegal arms technology transfers:

The “export” of technology documentation and know-how likely occurred during tours of China by Russian military and industrial experts. Apparently, several important military technology secrets were sold and revealed in this way. China will continue to probe for Russian military secrets as long as Beijing seeks to rearm its forces with a new generation of weapons.  

At the same time, Yevgeni Kokoshin confirmed the pressure for bigger arms exports and the lack for control:

Attempts are sometimes made to subject Russian foreign policy to export needs. At the same time, the view that foreign policy is above economic interests remains strong. Russia has a long way to go before it can sensibly balance its economic interests, foreign policy needs, and legal and moral imperatives. Russia is grappling with certain policy extremes, such as a super-ideological foreign policy and opportunistic pragmatism.

Arms transfers are executed by state companies; by private companies under the control of the state; or by private companies and individuals outside state control (the black market). State policy should attempt to control arms exports from infringing on other state interests on the international scene. As a rule, controls are overseen by executive bodies in the exporting state. However, confining the system of control only to governmental bureaucracy may be unwise. The opportunities for corruption and abuses of authority are markedly lower if an arms export control system involves national parliaments.

Another Russian expert, Sergei Kortunov, who was responsible for arms control policy in Russia’s Foreign Ministry from 1992 to 1994, amplifies the concern expressed above:

Russia has not resolved a fundamental question: namely, the interrelation between arms export policy and national security policy. Two instruments of control over the spread of information vital for national security (one relating to state secrets, the other to control over the export of products and services that can be used to create various arms and military equipment) operate separately and irrespective of each other. At the same time, a clear-cut linkage among several export regimes is lacking. One exists for the export of goods and services for military use, another for dual-use goods and services, and yet another for equipment, materials, and technologies used to develop missiles. This should be rectified. The process of classifying and declassifying data in the sphere of defense, economy, science, and technology, and that of exporting, transferring, or exchanging data in such fields, should be complementary and regulated within a single framework.

In other words, Russia’s arms export policy “is now guided not by ideological principle but to a great degree by pragmatic economic considerations.” That also explains Russia’s close military-technological cooperation with China despite domestic reservations registered in the light of long-term security challenges facing Russia, as well as its strategies for breaking into such new markets as those in Southeast Asia.
Reportedly, China is in the process of negotiating with Russia to buy another 40 SU-30MKK fighters to supplement its June 1999 order for 40-60 aircraft and agreement to allow China to produce up to 250 SU-30s under license.\textsuperscript{191} Beijing also seeks to acquire another two or three upgraded Kilo-class submarines and two or three more Sovremenny-class destroyers.\textsuperscript{192} However, whether China is able to finance 200 SU-27s and another 250 SU-30s under license over the next 10-15 years is to some extent still questionable. But it reveals some of the conclusions drawn by the Chinese General Staff in recent years regarding the importance of air superiority in contingency planning for the Taiwan Strait or other potential hotspots, such as the South China Sea.


Table 5. Forces Affecting Adoption of Nonproliferation Export Control in Russia.
Moreover, a Russian article of August 1997 reported that both sides agreed to work out an automatic command and control system (C2) for China's strategic nuclear forces. Russia also has sold control and guidance systems from its SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs to China for the latter's newly developed DF-31 and DF-41 ballistic missiles, and has assisted in upgrading China's conventional and nuclear submarines. Reported, China even received sensitive technology information on the SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs and is now cooperating with Russia in the field of space technologies that have at least some military implications. However, while Moscow has categorically denied reports of a planned sale of two Russian Typhoon-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines, it has sold the aircraft carrier Kiev to China as scrap metal. Although the Russian Defense Ministry provided assurances that all equipment and armament were removed from the ship, Russian experts expect that a detailed inspection of the ship will assist the Chinese navy to develop its own carrier program. Moreover, both sides reportedly have recently signed a five-year (2000-2004) military cooperation pact worth up to $20 billion U.S. dollars. It is no longer the Russian air force but the PLA-air force that has bought the most modern Russian-made combat aircraft during the 1990s. As a consequence, the military balance in East Asia might gradually change at the expense of Taiwan in the short term and of Russia itself in the long term.

However, Russia is also selling a similar amount of the latest weapon systems to India—increasingly a strategic competitor of China. But Russian political and military experts do not harbor any strategic concerns about India like those they have vis-à-vis China. The difference can be explained by the fact that India and Russia share no common border and have almost always been political allies over recent decades. India seems at present to be the perfect military partner for Putin in terms of defense-related issues and sharing of military technology. If the characterization of a mutual relationship as a “strategic partnership” applies to any bilateral relations of Russia at present, it most accurately describes the Russian-Indian relationship rather than the much more ambiguous Sino-Russian ties.

Russia's arms export policies also contradict its proclaimed national security concepts of December 1997 and January 2000 in which nonproliferation concerns—albeit primarily as regards the nuclear dimension—play a prominent role. In this light, Russia's weapon export and technology transfer policy, which amounts to selling almost anything to anyone for cash, has the capacity to reshape if not threaten Asia's delicate balance of power. At the same time, Russia still has a shaky export control system that is constantly subject to change. Although Russian high technology is generally less effective than Western, its arms are an attractive option for many countries due to their low costs—partly attributable to the relatively weak ruble. Russian military exports to China and India accounted for 75-80 percent of Russia's total military sales in the 1990s. Moscow hopes to expand its military exports to more than U.S. $4 billion in 2000 and to more than U.S. $6 billion in later years.
Russia's Regional Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia and its Relations with Japan and Korea

Even today, there is no single view on how Russia's foreign policy is shaped, how it relates to the interests of some or other groups and lobbies associated with certain sectors of the economy, productions or financial structures. In the meantime, many things suggest that such groups—usually called ‘economic groups’—play a considerable role in shaping some important Russian foreign policy directives.

—Iu. Fedorov, 1998  

The decentralization and regionalization processes have produced new actors in Russia's foreign policy. Besides economic interest groups, such as the military-industrial complex and Russia's oil and gas industry (Gazprom has often been characterized in Russia as a “state within a state,” and Boris Berezovsky claimed in late 1996 that he and six other people controlled 50 percent of Russia's gross national product), Russia's regions have also become increasingly involved in foreign policy activities. In contrast to Soviet foreign policy practices, Russia's federal government has to take into account various regional interests in a way that the Soviet leadership never did. It is explained by the fact, inter alia, that since 1991 the administrative boundaries of 27 of Soviet Russia's regions became international frontiers of the Russian Federation.

These non-traditional foreign policy actors have complicated foreign policies shaped and designed by the Foreign Ministry, the Duma, and the Yeltsin administration. Furthermore, the leading political forces and groups (or “clans”) in Russia often use foreign policy and international problems or conflicts to consolidate their own position in domestic politics (as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is demonstrating again with his “understanding” to resolve the conflict in Chechnya) rather than to resolve those foreign policy problems themselves. Russia has still not developed a system of rules by which these political conflicts can be conducted and solved. Everyone seems to play his own game with no definite rules existing for the game. Such domestic circumstances and processes often reflect a pluralist chaos involving a multiplicity of actors (representing a multitude of specific interests) in Russia's foreign policy decision-making. It has been remarked, “Soon every small village will want to open its own Foreign Affairs Ministry.”

Since the Foreign Ministry lacks mechanisms to coordinate and control different foreign policy agendas, implementation of coherent, long-term foreign policy strategies has been greatly complicated—indeed almost impossible at times, and parallel foreign policies can be identified in various regions. As a result, Russian foreign policy has been characterized more by a succession of ill-connected ad hoc responses to issues than by any long-term, unified, proactive strategies. For example, here is Aleksandr Lukin's explanation of Russia's China policy:

Foreign and especially Chinese experts who are accustomed to an orderly organization of state affairs often get confused about the current Russian lack of coordination in foreign policy and

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even the de facto existence of several foreign policy lines on the same issue. Many of them believe that this situation is a cleverly staged performance and look for a mysterious plan behind the confusing statements of brainless and uncontrolled bureaucrats. Such experts have yet to experience perestroika in their way of thinking, which is necessary to understand where authority has disintegrated to an extent that it can hardly exert control at all. As a result, Russian policy toward China as in many other areas is consistent only on paper. In practice, not only outside the leadership but also inside it, various groups are interested in different policies toward China and each is able to choose from a wide spectrum of theoretical views the ideological basis that suits its intentions.

It is thus not surprising that Russia’s regions were not only eager to promote cross-border economic ties with neighboring regions but were also interfering increasingly in Moscow’s own diplomacy with other states. Viktor Ishayev, governor of Khabarovsk Krai, and Yevgeni Nazdratenko, governor of the Primorye, have demanded all economic rights that the 20 so-called republics within Russia already enjoy, including title to all natural resources within their borders. While for the first time ever the heads of administrations (or their deputies) of districts and towns situated along the border with China have been included in the Russian delegation to the Joint Sino-Russian Demarcation Commission, Nazdratenko still heavily criticized Russia’s demarcation negotiations with China:

The demarcation plan in the eastern regions will transfer land in the Lake Khasan region to China which contains the graves of Russian soldiers; give China an outlet to the sea through the River Truman, enabling it to build a port that will diminish the freight-hauling revenues of the trans-Siberian railway; require land in the Khankaiski district that is properly Russia’s be surrendered; and that the Russian government has understated the amount of territory it will give up in the Ussuryiski district.

While this lower-level participation in foreign policy complicated Moscow’s efforts to find a political solution to a very sensitive foreign policy issue, it also highlighted Moscow’s failure to keep informed those regions affected by the diplomatic concessions made during the bilateral talks with Beijing. Similar conflicts exit between Moscow and the Sakhalin province over territorial negotiations with Japan and the Kurile Islands.

If China becomes a serious regional threat to Russia, Moscow’s position in the Asia-Pacific region will be defined by the quality of its relations with the region’s leading countries—Japan and South Korea in particular. That is one of the reasons for Moscow’s great interest in improving its relationships with these Northeast Asian powers in recent last years. Despite their continuing disagreements over the status of the Kurile Islands, Russian and Japan have improved their relationship politically, economically, and even militarily. It is in the interests of both that China does not become strong enough to constitute a regional threat. In such a case, both may perceive the need for some counterbalancing of China’s growing regional and global power. Furthermore, both have an interest in widening the Korean Four Party Negotiations to six-party meetings in which they both are included.

In July 1998, Japanese and Russian naval vessels conducted an unprecedented joint naval exercise practicing search and rescue operations. In August 1998, Defense Minister Hosei Norota made the first Japanese tour of Russian naval facilities at Vladivostok since the end of World War II. A month later, the 6,700-ton Russian missile cruiser Admiral Panteleyev
visited the port of Yokosuka, site of Japan’s fleet headquarters—a historic first visit by a Russian naval vessel to a Japanese military port. In February 2000, the Chief of Staff of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces, Admiral Hosel Fujita, made the first visit by a Japanese naval chief to Russia, underlining the growing military cooperation between the two states. Japan also granted another $120 million in financial assistance for nuclear waste cleanup in Russia’s Pacific Fleet ports as well as another $20 million for a scientific center in Moscow. However, their bilateral relationship and Russian prospects for attracting huge and much-needed Japanese investments for energy and infrastructure projects on Sakhalin and throughout the Russian Far East are still negatively affected by the Kurile Islands question and the open peace treaty issue.

When Boris Yeltsin planned his visit to Japan in the summer of 1992, he was considering offering at least the option of giving back the Kurile Islands in the future. But some Russians protested, not only in private circles but directly to the public. The Russian General Staff, the staff of the CIS armed forces, and the staff of the Russian navy all came to the conclusion in their evaluations: the Kuriles are of the highest strategic importance for Russia and therefore would not be transferred back to Japan. Yeltsin had to postpone the trip to Tokyo while disputes and debates played out over the direction and formulation of foreign policy and the future of domestic reforms.

Although in subsequent years Russo-Japanese relations improved and more Japanese investment in the Russian Far East has been made, relations are still marginal by Japanese standards. The insubstantial bilateral trade and investment, however, is not only the result of unresolved political issues such as the Kuriles but also reflects the clash of two very different business cultures. But a peace treaty, which former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Japan’s former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto agreed to achieve at the November 1997 Krasnoyarsk summit, seems, in the year 2000, very distant. Any treaty implying the loss or restriction of sovereignty over the Kurile Islands still has no chance of being ratified in the Russian Duma. Russian President Vladimir Putin made clear during his first days in office that he would not allow any fragmentation of Russia under his rule. This announcement was directed not only against separatism in Central Asia and the Caucasus but also in the Far East.

On the Japanese side, too, numerous weak coalition governments in the 1990s offered only limited room for political maneuver and change in Japanese foreign policy. In addition, the growing service sector in the 1990s, a more energy-efficient economy, and growing reliance on nuclear power made Japan less dependent on Middle Eastern oil deliveries and distracted the Japanese from developing a partnership with Russia on important Siberian energy projects. More recently, however, low-level private and economic contacts have increased, but they will have to be broadened significantly before they have any real influence on governmental relations.

Japan’s revised security treaty with the United States and its guidelines for defense cooperation also have provoked criticism on the Russian side, though the main criticism in Moscow is directed against the TMD plans of Japan. Despite those controversial issues, both sides seek to boost such economic ties as development of the four Northern and Southern
Kurile Islands. At the end of 1999, Japan was the only Western country that had kept its credit line to Russia open by offering another loan package of $1.5 billion. Nonetheless, most Russian experts see Japan as a more important partner only in the mid- and long-term. Despite being the only state extending bilateral credits to Russia through the early summer 2000, Japan has been ignored diplomatically to a large extent by Putin and his new foreign policy elite. Japan’s hope for signing an early peace treaty with Russia has not been very realistic from the very beginning. Both sides now seem to be contemplating instead an interim pact that would offer some face-saving. It would allow separation of the long-standing territorial dispute from the matter of concluding peace-treaty. Whether a visit by President Putin will lead to a substantial new beginning of their bilateral relationship remains to be seen. The somewhat stagnant character of these relations is not in the economic and foreign policy interest of either side, particularly not in Russia’s. However, Russia seems presently unwilling to improve its relations with Japan at the expense of relations with China. And it seems even more unlikely that Japan would be willing to initiate substantial new departures in its relations with Moscow—at least not at the expense of its strategic security alliance with Washington.

On the Korean peninsula, Russia has lost the leverage it had before the end of the Cold War. Since 1992, Russia and North Korea have not been particularly close—no longer good neighbors, no longer military allies. The relationship became even more strained in 1992 when Moscow demanded that North Korea unconditionally submit to nuclear inspections. Since the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994, the former emphasis on military and security issues has been reduced even more, with stress now falling on political-security and economic issues. However, Russia has continued to export weapons to North Korea, albeit on a limited scale. Symbolic of their deteriorating and Janus-faced relationship, North Korea did not participate in the 300th anniversary of the Russian Far East Fleet in Vladivostok, in contrast to South Korea, China, the United States, and even Japan.

Moscow has improved its relationship with South Korea, however. True, bilateral trade between Russia and South Korea peaked at $3.8 billion in 1996 and decreased in the following two years to $3.3 billion in 1997 and just $2.1 billion in 1998, but this was largely because of the financial and economic crisis in Russia. Moscow has also sought to export high-tech weaponry to South Korea, including submarines, long-range air defense systems, and next-generation fighters as a partial payment for $1.75 billion debt incurred shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. It has already delivered military hardware totaling some $450 million, including 33 T-80 tanks, 41 BMP-3 armored infantry vehicles, 20 BTR armored personnel carriers, METIS antitank missile systems, and IGLA portable antiaircraft missile systems. But by the end of 1999, Russia’s debt to South Korea of $1.75 billion has not been reduced. However, it is questionable whether South Korea would opt to purchase significant quantities of Russian weapon systems because of the important security alliance with the United States and the need to maintain close interoperability with U.S. forces.

The Russian military still remains concerned about the situation on the Korean peninsula in general and about North Korean efforts to develop its nuclear and missile potential, in particular. In Russia’s view, this is one of the most important problems directly affecting... Russia’s national security, as well as regional and global stability.
the decline in Russia's military efficacy registered alarms in Moscow over events in the East, for instance, the Russian armed forces' failure to detect North Korea's three-stage missile launch at the end of August 1998. According to one Russian observer, "They began worrying in Moscow only when the Japanese government expressed its 'grave concern' over the ICBM test launch organized by North Korea." Although Moscow is eager to play a more important role on the Korean peninsula such as in the four-party talks and in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), it is not involved in either at the moment. The question remains whether Moscow still retains any significant influence on North Korea.

The recent promising situation on the Korean peninsula seemed at first to give Russia new opportunities to reengage politically in the region. It could strengthen its own role while potentially weakening Beijing's as the main supporter of Pyongyang. If successful, Moscow would also increase its bargaining position with the United States because the North Korean ballistic missile program has been used as one of the main justifications for Washington's missile defense plans and the intention to revise the ABM treaty. On February 9, 2000, Moscow signed the North Korea-Russia Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation, which replaced Russia's Cold War treaty of 1961 with Pyongyang. Russia did not promise any economic assistance in this new treaty. On July 20, 2000, during Putin's two-day visit in Pyongyang, both sides also signed an 11-point joint declaration in which they agreed to actively seek cooperation in defense policy. Reportedly, Russia has exported to North Korea 10 modern MiG-29 fighters, with the potential for delivery of additional 30 fighters. The value of these 10 fighters is between $500 million and $1 billion—a significant expense for a country whose estimated state budget is not more than $1.4 billion! Whether both sides have agreed to a friendly deal allowing Pyongyang to pay much less is a question still unanswered. But the delivery, training, and maintenance of these MiG-29 fighters for North Korea's air force suggest a significant number of new Russian military advisors in North Korea in the future.

Even more dramatic was Putin's message in July 2000 that North Korea was willing to abandon its ballistic missile program and exports in return for civilian space technology and the willingness of other states to launch at least two North Korean space satellites a year. While this development apparently has given Russia considerable leverage vis-à-vis Washington's missile defense plans and efforts to revise the ABM treaty, North Korea's plan is dubious in many ways. Pyongyang cannot really expect that other countries would provide it with advanced missiles it could easily copy and use for its own secret military missile programs. Furthermore, the question is still unanswered by Russia and North Korea as to North Korea's needs for space satellites in the light of its severe economic and food crises. But in an August 2000 meeting, Kim Jong-Il clearly retreated from his offer to Putin. He is reported to have stated that he did not intend to make a serious proposal to Putin, but brought the idea up in a "passing, laughable manner." As other remarks by the North Korean leader suggest, he obviously had some thoughts about his proposal to Putin. The diplomatic insult to Putin substantially weakens Russia's future bargaining position in East Asia, possibly even neutralizing the boost it received during the last months of its reengagement policy in Northeast Asia. It also highlights the unpredictability of Kim Jong-Il, for Russia and the rest of the world.
Russia also has revived the Tumen River international development program which, when combined with the newly planned Korean-Siberian rail link, would allow direct shipment of goods between Asia and Europe. However, these projects are not realistic without Japanese and other international financial investment, including investment in Russia. While the Trans-Siberian railway in past years carried 20 percent of the container traffic between Japan and Europe, this land-based trade decreased to almost nothing in 1996 due to cuts of energy supplies by Russia’s Unified Energy System attributable to unpaid bills and frequent strikes.\(^{227}\) Russia’s new engagement on the Korean peninsula is not without risks. Developments will allow Pyongyang to play Russia and China off against each other, which may strain Sino-Russian relations and potentially risk undermining inter-Korean reconciliation and the South Korean-Russian relationship.

Another aspect of Russia’s new policies in East Asia is interest in regional integration and collaboration with regional international organizations. In 1995, Russia applied for participation in the Association of Petroleum Exporting Countries (APEC) and its committees. It is now preparing to enter the Asian Development Bank and is actively supporting the work of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).\(^{228}\) The latter, however, is very much hampered by a lack of funds and, at times, by overlooking the importance of shaping and determining the work and direction of the ARF. On the negative side, Russia is not included in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) processes established in Bangkok in 1996. Furthermore, Russia’s official admission to APEC, which had been supported strongly by China, seems the result of politics and not economics. As Stephen Blank observed, the other Asian states have bought the argument that “Russia is a superpower, not by virtue of the current reality but due to its potential.”\(^{229}\)

Since the financial and economic crisis of the summer of 1998, Northeast Asia—with a total population of nearly 300 million people and a combined annual GNP of approximately $3 trillion—has the potential to become one of the world’s most dynamic economic zones, if economic regionalization, transnational cooperation, and globalization trends continue. Despite Russia’s political declarations of intent to strengthen economic relations with the rising Asia-Pacific region, Russia’s current economic realities speak a different language. Some 40 percent of Russia’s trade is with the EU; 22.2 percent of its exports and 16.5 percent of its imports are with the other CIS countries, while the U.S. share was just 5.9 per cent and 3.3 per cent, respectively. China’s share was only 4.5 percent and 2.5 per cent, Japan’s share even less with 3.5 percent and 2.9 percent (1997).\(^{230}\) Trade with Asia is less than 20 percent of Russia’s commodity circulation, and with the wider Asia-Pacific region is less than 10 percent. Still, although trade with East Asia does not play an important role in Russia as a whole, it is of the utmost importance in Siberia and the Russian Far East—with the latter comprising 90 percent of total turnover for these regions.\(^{231}\)

Comparing 1997 with 1993, Russian imports from China shrank to almost one-third, and from Japan almost a half. Furthermore, Russia’s share of Asian-Pacific countries’ trade in 1997 was less than one percent.\(^{232}\) In the same year, the exports of more than 700 joint enterprises with foreign partners in the Far East did not exceed $200 million.\(^{233}\) Vladivostok—which has excellent port facilities, the railhead for the Trans-Siberian railroad,
and an ideal location for integration with the economies of China, Japan, and Korea— theoretically could become Russia’s window on Northeast Asia, but the forces of economic integration are restrained by the deep Russian apprehension that they may be overwhelmed by much larger non-Russian populations, widespread fear of foreign domination, ongoing political struggles, and severe shortages of energy and water supplies. As the result of the 1994 introduction of a restricted visa regime, the foreign trade of Primorye decreased 78 percent from the level of one year before, while Amur Oblast’s dropped by 81 percent over the same year. One of the very few positive indicators is the impressive expansion in trade between the Russian Far East region and the West Coast of the United States, which rose from $1 million in 1992 to $360 million in 1997. During the same period, the number of U.S.-Russian joint ventures increased from 19 to 74. Geography, extensive shipping facilities in the east versus overburdened and increasingly expensive and unreliable rail systems in western Russia, and political motivation to become more independent from Moscow have all contributed to increased economic relations with the U.S. west coast, which could also expand the community of economic and political interests in the long term. In the short term, regional elites in the Russian Far East will use this greater interdependence as leverage to increase their influence directly in Moscow and indirectly in Washington.

The financial crisis of 1998 further undermined foreign trade and investment and the few positive factors of economic revival. If no positive incentives and results are made available in the near future, the Russian Far East—already cut off from European Russia—risks becoming completely alienated from the rest of Russia as well. As Eric Hyer warned in 1996:

For 70 years the historical trend toward the natural integration of the Russian Far East into the Northeast Asian economic system was artificially prevented by political barriers. However, it now appears the historical, economic and demographic forces have reasserted themselves, and the political factors are no longer in place to prevent them from following their natural course.

Strategic trends do seem to indicate that the economic gap between the Russian regions east of the Urals and countries in Northeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region is increasing, which makes the integration of these regions into APEC and the Pacific Rim more difficult with every passing day. For example, in October 1998, 20 countries—including China, all the Central Asian and Caucasian states, Ukraine, and Belarus—opened a 27,000 kilometer fiber optic telephone line between Frankfurt and Shanghai, along the historic Silk Road. The line provides all these countries with stable communication links between Europe and Asia. Russia, however, is not participating in the project and has thereby “lost all chances to realize its claims to be a communication bridge between the two continents.” Opting for an alternative radio communication line in 1996, which is much less reliable than the fiber optic line, Russia lost a volume of communication traffic estimated at several billion minutes per year.

With regard to the widening economic gap between Siberia and the Russian Far East on one side, and the other Asian-Pacific countries on the other side, Vasilii Mikheyev of the Far East Institute posed in 1999 the fundamental preconditions for strengthening Russia’s leverage in the Asia-Pacific region:
Russia's desire to become China's strategic partner is realizable only on condition that Russia itself becomes an active and weighty participant in Asia-Pacific integration processes. To do this Russia must have its own view on globalization of the world economy and Asian regionalism, its own concept of creating a single Asia-Pacific economy, a strategy and policy of economic and financial integration of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region or at least in the northeastern portion of the Asia-Pacific region which is geographically close to the Russian Far East.

Russia's Strategic Interests in Southeast Asia

As all sides admit, relations between Russia and Southeast Asia today are very much underdeveloped. Even the former allies of the Soviet Union, such as Vietnam, Laos, and others, have redirected their economic ties towards the other ASEAN states, China, and Western countries, especially Japan. While Moscow is concerned about the impact of unipolarity on its Asia-Pacific relations, it is not taking a very active role in improving those relationships and boosting bi- and multilateral trade with this region, with one exception: arms exports. Russia also seems little concerned about unresolved conflicts and potential hotspots such as the Spratly Islands, even though its regions in the Far East and Vladivostok must have a keen interest in open sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and stability in the South China Sea. The Russian oil firm LUKoil, for instance, is producing oil in Vietnam's section of the Spratly Islands, which are also claimed by China. On the other side, the ASEAN states are also very much divided about the prospects for relations with Russia. Indeed, one can identify a "pattern of mutual disinterest," as Stephen Blank has termed it. Thus, the ASEAN countries are accounting for just one percent of Russia's foreign trade.

But while Russia seems to have diminishing strategic interests in Southeast Asia, with certain exceptions noted below, it still has a strategic interest in maintaining its military presence in Vietnam; moreover, the Russian navy leases facilities in Cam Rahn Bay, providing direct access to the South China Sea as the supply line to Northeast Asia. Presently, Russia is in tense negotiations with Hanoi to extend its leases. At the same time, the United States is also interested in access to Vietnam's ports and military bases. Russian and/or American access to Vietnam's strategic facilities would affect China's strategic interests. Here again, a more competitive future relationship between Russia and China can no longer be excluded. Furthermore, Russia has become more interested in multilateral naval cooperation within the framework of the ARF, including:

- Exchanges of information on the purpose of naval activities, structure of forces, time frame and areas of the activities, level of command;

- Notification of large-scale exercises and movements of naval forces;

- Invitation of observers to naval exercises;

- Joint exercises on search and rescue at sea, assistance to victims of natural disasters;
● Mutual renunciation of exercises and maneuvers in sea straits, fishing zones, and air-space above them.\textsuperscript{245}

However, realization of this increased Russian interest is hindered by a lack of funds for the Pacific Fleet to participate more actively in the these new multilateral security cooperation activities.

Instead of improving its economic ties to Southeast Asia and possibly promoting its own regionalization, Russia has concentrated primarily on boosting its arms exports to this important sub-region. However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 undermined the positive outlook in Russia.\textsuperscript{246} Furthermore, globalization has also its impact in this field. Declining global defense expenditures, large defense industrial overcapacities, and a shrinking global arms market since the end of the Cold War have created a buyer’s market that gives purchasing or receiving countries new flexibility to shop around for the best arms deals (which often include transfers of technology and know-how) and to play one supplier off against another. Consequently, the selling nations have resorted to all kinds of marketing and discounting devices, including, if necessary, extensive technology transfer arrangements—often as part of offset agreements, barter arrangements, and even bribes.

During the global defense industry reconfiguration, many East Asian countries have gradually shifted their procurement patterns from the initial import of large numbers of completed weapon systems to the local assembly and production of major weaponry through licenses, joint venture agreements, and technology transfers. Hence, Asian customers are no longer interested simply in receiving finished products. They are rather interested in the business of negotiating comprehensive packages involving collaboration with local industry, technology transfer, creative financial arrangements, and the creation of jobs in their countries. That explains why customers are more and more interested in long-term partnerships with suppliers that provide solutions to larger overall national requirements, possibly extending beyond defense itself.

The slowing of East Asia’s military spending and arms buildup will increase further the competition among American, European, and Russian arms makers and suppliers in the only growing arms market in the world besides the Middle East. The increasing competition might result in further reduced prices of sophisticated state-of-the-art weapon systems and increased technology transfer to the region, as Russia’s modified arms export policy to the Asia-Pacific region indicates. Russia was forced again to revise its arms export policies to become more successful in difficult times. Mikhail Timkin, First Deputy Director-General Secretary of Rosvooruzhenie, Russia’s state-run arms export company, stated in May 1997:

\begin{quote}
The results of last year give us every reason to believe that in 1998 we will overtake the US in arms exports, and we will become the world leader in arms supplies.... Asia, particularly the lucrative Southeast Asian market worth in excess of US$12 billion, is our priority target in 1997....We use three new forms of cooperation, being licensed production of arms, cooperation in the licensed production of arms, and the use offset programmes....We are also ready to lease weapons to these countries. We are also prepared to accept different types of payment, including cooperation in the use of ports of the countries, natural resources, and direct payment. So we use all types of trade which humanity invented.\textsuperscript{247}
\end{quote}
The Russian government is well aware of the impact of the Asian financial crisis on exports of Russian-made weaponry. Contracts with Indonesia have been lost for the time being. Russian experts believe (often in the context of conspiracy theories) that the United States' support for Indonesia during the financial crisis was conditional on cancellation of Indonesia's purchase of 12 Su-30K fighter bombers, 8 Mi-17 combat helicopters, and 50 BMP-3 armored personnel carriers and additional armored commando vehicles. The Sukhoi deal was a breakthrough for the company in the Southeast Asian market, just as Malaysia's purchase of MiG-29 fighter-bombers had been three years earlier. Traditional Asian buyers of Russian-made arms are primarily China, India, and Vietnam. Moscow believes that more customers in the Asia-Pacific region, which had formerly relied exclusively on American and European hardware, will follow. Russia's traditional weapon export strategy is based on its main strength—low prices for sophisticated state-of-the-art equipment (normally 65 to 70 per cent of Western product prices) at a time when their Asian customers are still focusing on the hardware costs, even though life-cycle costs such as maintenance are often overlooked. While Russia's marketing strategy has significantly improved, delivering adequate supplies of spare parts in the future remains a problem for its arms industry, a problem that ultimately undermines Russia's reputation as a reliable partner. Meanwhile, Russia has recognized the inherent and structural weaknesses in its arms export strategy and is working to overcome them.

The total export of Russian arms increased from U.S. $1.7 billion in 1994 to U.S. $3.6 billion in 1996, but dropped to about U.S. $2.6 billion in 1997. But Rosvooruzhenie earned not more than U.S. $2-2.5 billion of hard currency due to the fact that Moscow's arms export policy is to pay with weapons debts it owes to many countries in the world (such as former Warsaw Pact countries, South Korea, etc.). Also, some of the funds it did receive were non-convertible. According to a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency study, Russia obtained 36 percent of all weapons transfer agreements signed with developing nations in Asia between 1989 and 1992 and 37.4 percent between 1993 and 1996 (the United States obtained only 31.2 and 24.8 percent, respectively, in those years). Russia's share of arms deliveries to Asia was 61.9 percent in 1989-92 but declined to 20.3 percent in 1993-96 (with the United States at 17.9 percent and 34.1 percent, respectively). In 1997, Russia signed new contracts worth U.S. $7.3 billion, and in the first four months of 1998 agreements for an additional U.S. $1.5 billion, which will all be completed before 2003-2005. More than half of all Russian arms exports are accounted for by aviation equipment and 18 percent by naval hardware. Russia thus seems to have become again the world's second largest arms exporter after the United States, and it is seeking to take first place soon. It aimed to increase annual arms exports to a figure of U.S. $10 billion by the year 2000; however, this goal was set before the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in East Asia, which made it unrealistic for the time being. Foreign Relations Deputy Minister Alexander Kotelkin had already predicted in November 1997 a Russian decline in armament exports in 1997-1999.

In the wake of the financial crisis, Russia—like other major suppliers—was forced to revise its aerospace export plans and strategies after months of misplaced optimism. It hoped thus to stabilize its gains and overall position in the region for the next 2-3 years, when the situation is expected to improve.
With the kind of advanced weaponry Russia is now offering, such as the new YAKHONT and MOSKIT supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, the powerful S-300 SAMs, or the sophisticated Sukhoi fighters with the most modern air-to-air missiles (e.g., the VYMPEL R-73 or AA-11 ARCHER and VYMPEL R-77 or AA-12 ADDER, also nicknamed Amraamski—both being regarded as the best in the world), the region could acquire some of the world's most deadliest weapon systems. See the Russian arms export recapitulation at Table 6 below.

- Expansion of arms exports to India (total value of contracts signed is U.S. $8-9 billion) and to China (U.S. $6 billion) within the forthcoming new 10-year defense cooperation agreement, beginning in 2000. This agreement will shift the emphasis from outright purchases to jointly developing hardware. It encompasses the purchase of six S-300V anti-ballistic missile (ATBM) systems for nearly $1 billion and airborne early warning systems, upgrading some 125 MiG-21/FISHBED-L fighters, and key military equipment items of India's ground forces (T-72 main battle tanks), jointly developing the multi-role SU-30MK fighters (India bought 40 last year), overhauling and rearming the 44,000-ton aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshov, and jointly building the Russian-French MiG-AT advanced jet trainers. India has also announced plans to add 50 Russian-made Kh-35 antiship missiles to its already delivered 48 missiles for its three 6,700-ton INS Delhi-class destroyers.

- Development of a single seat SU-30 multi-purpose fighter for China, with 40-60 aircraft expected to be procured; overall, Russia hopes to sell more than 500 of the latest Russian fighters to China, which has to replace roughly 2,000 of its older aircraft.

- Offering a new list of military equipment such as the Su-32FN reconnaissance-strike aircraft and the S-300PMU-2 FAVORIT SAM.

- Sale of 24 Su-27 fighters before 2001 (total value $800 million) and 32-45 Kh-35 antiship missiles to Vietnam.

- In the next decade, selling 10-12 additional modern Kilo-class subs (from existing Russian navy stocks) to countries in the Asia-Pacific region for a fraction of the real cost in order to fund development of the next generation of diesel-electric submarines.

- Willingness to accept more flexible forms of payment for its military products (with increased offsets and leasing opportunities) to compensate for the consequences of the financial crisis.

- Long-term programs as the main form of military-technical cooperation with Asian countries, including the export of the latest Russian technologies.

- Coordination of export marketing activities (i.e. between its two leading combat aircraft manufactures—Sukhoi and Mikoyan—by Rosvooruzhenie) to avoid mutual competition in foreign markets; the Progress plant (producing combat helicopters and the MOSKIT supersonic antishipping missile) in Russia's Far Eastern region has acquired the right to enter directly into foreign trade activities for a period of three years (China will be the first country to receive this sophisticated state-of-the-art missile).

Table 6. Russia's New Weaponry Export Strategy of 1998 in Detail.
During a defense industry exhibition in Thailand ("Thai’ 97"), Russia made a big impression by offering even to lease submarines at “friendship prices,” which include barter trade, crew training, and maintenance programs. In 1999, Russia again increased its weapon exports to $3.4 billion and hopes to boost them to $4.3 billion in 2000. Indiscriminate weapons’ offers have highlighted its arms export policy due to narrow factional and other vested interests overriding any long-term security and non-proliferation policy on advanced conventional weapons. It is also, as pointed out above, the result of Russia’s weak or absent state control over sales of weapon and materials, of endemic corruption, and of Russia’s failed efforts to convert its military-industrial complex, a failure that ultimately will undermine its own future security, particularly in the Far East.

Conclusions and Perspectives

No permanent allies and permanent enemies exist, and there are no nations that are fated to be eternal rivals or eternal friends....The entire history of Sino-Russian relations serves as an example. While both countries were Communist, their relations from 1960-89 were much worse than today....

When formulating nuclear and foreign policy, long-term considerations and interests should always prevail over perceived short- and mid-term needs. For example: in their general foreign and “nuclear” relations from 1949-60, the Chinese were guided by their long-term interests, such as Khrushchev’s struggle in 1956-62 to maintain China as his Socialist ally at any cost. The Chinese emerged victorious because they gained the tools and knowledge necessary to build their atomic bomb. Only then did they abandon their alliance [with the Soviet Union]....

It should never be forgotten who benefited most from the Cold War. During 1949 to 1960, the Chinese obtained nuclear technology and much more from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union received virtually nothing in return. Meanwhile, the Chinese consistently exploited U.S. fears to foster U.S.-Chinese cooperation and reaped considerable economic and other benefits. While China counts its gains daily, Russia and the U.S. continue to be plagued by lingering Cold War “ghosts,” myths, and memories that heavily and often adversely influence their contemporary relations.

Finally, when considering future relationships between the three global nuclear powers, one should recognize, appreciate, and ponder the main paradox of the Cold War. This paradox is that although the U.S. and Russia (the Soviet Union) were thought to be principal rivals during the Cold War, they never engaged in real combat. The fiercest combat during the Cold War took place between Americans and Chinese and between Russians and Chinese. The historical realities must never be forgotten as statesmen try to shape a more peaceful and secure future.

—Russian historian Viktor. M. Gobarev

The most important security challenge in East Asia for Russia in the foreseeable future is its own socio-economic and environmental situation and their strategic implications for neighboring countries. Russia is no longer a power; it is in many ways simply a problem. President Putin’s recent shortsighted decision to dissolve the State Committee on the Environment and the State Committee on Forestry and to transfer their functions to the Ministry of Natural Resources, which licenses development of Russia’s oil, natural gas, and other deposits, highlighted the widespread and deep-seated belief that the environment is not
an important national security issue, but just a concern for rich states. Putin’s May 13th decree, which was approved by the Duma in July 2000, created seven federal districts, appointed federal representatives (mostly generals of secret services and the armed forces, either retired or currently serving), and established seven military districts. This action seems understandable at first glance as a means to strengthen central control and vertical authority over the regions, their policies, and their laws, which often are illegal and violate the constitution of the Russian Federation. But a recentralization policy, with more direct presidential oversight but less autonomy for the regions, is in many ways contrary to the obvious need for economic and political decentralization and regionalization as the result of and in response to globalization trends. Moreover, the seven vast new administration districts are not aligned in common with the eight interregional associations.

The future of Siberia and the Russian Far East is endangered by new economic and political recentralization policies rather than being supported by further decentralization and the application of regional as well as transnational integration strategies. Unfortunately, almost all Russian discussions of the relationship between the center and the periphery are modeled on the past Russian experience of a strong central government and weak regions. Russia has, with a brief exception at the end of the 19th century, no historical experiences with federalism as Western Europe has had. Putin himself has outlined his broader, long-term vision for the future center-periphery relations when he argued: “Russia was founded as a super-centralized state from the very start. This is inherent in its genetic code, traditions, and people’s mentality.” This statement seems fully consistent with his understanding of Russian history and his own policy concepts of a strong state and strong center.

In the meantime, Putin has also pushed through proposals to replace governors accused of violating criminal and federal law, which is understandable in many ways. However, he seems to have overlooked that federalism and political recentralization have played an important role in preventing Russia from disintegrating in the same manner as the Soviet Union did. The Russian Federation, with 81.5 percent ethnic Russians as compared to the Soviet Union with only 55 percent, has not been so ethnically homogenous since the 18th century. Although Putin’s decree may achieve some gains (such as improvement of tax collection and investment), in the mid- and long-term future it may have just the opposite effect—undermining rather than strengthening Russian territorial integrity and stability. So far, as Paul Goble has concluded: “The center and the regions struggle over power as such, dividing power rather than sharing it and thus making their contest a zero-sum game in which a victory by one is a loss by the other, rather than one in which each can benefit.”

Although secession of Siberia and the Far East from the Russian Federation seems rather unlikely due to their fears of China and several other factors, it cannot totally be excluded in the mid- and long-term future. Presently, the threat of secession is mostly used as a political instrument to get Moscow’s attention to the socio-economic plight of these regions. Thus the political elite and population might support a new “Far Eastern Republic,” but most see the future of their republic still fully in the context of the Russian Federation. And indeed, despite economic problems, unfavorable demographic trends, and increasing job competition with Chinese and other ethnic groups living on Russian territory, the greatest
reservations about a future strategic partnership with Beijing are not to be found in Moscow but in Russia's Far Eastern region itself, even though they have benefited from the cross-border trade.

Nonetheless, the Russian-Chinese relationship has undergone a remarkable transformation during the last decade, including a developing congruence of strategic agendas accompanied by congruence in strategic cultures: China supported Moscow's opposition to NATO's eastward expansion; Moscow supported China's opposition to the 1996 revised U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and its guidelines for mutual defense cooperation. Both countries oppose—but to different degrees due to their specific national defense dilemmas—Washington's plans for national and theater ballistic missile defense systems. Thus Russia is much more concerned about a NMD rather than a TMD system. That explains Putin's proposal to build a joint TMD system with the United States and Europe or even a joint NMD system with the United States, which clearly is not in China's strategic interests. Russia's concerns about a U.S. TMD system in East Asia is related to potential impacts on China's defense policies only because it might fuel (rather than just stimulate) faster modernization of China's nuclear forces (which already is under way, having begun long before the U.S. TMD and NMD plans were first discussed in the mid-1990s), including the adoption MIRVed warheads.

In recent years, Sino-Russian meetings have indicated the changing balance of power in world politics and the changing status of both powers within the international system. They clearly demonstrated that Russia needs China more than China needs Russia. They also suggest that it was China that has increasingly dictated the terms of the relationship. Given the potential for—and their history of—enmity, not only Russia and China themselves but the West and the United States as well should have a strategic interest in a stable and cooperative partnership.

However, in contrast to the Eurasian direction of Russia's foreign and security policies, the Euro-Atlantic area is the most structured, regulated, and the most stable region of which Russia is an integral part. Nowhere else is the danger of interstate conflict so low; and nowhere else is Russia directly participating in so many security agreements and obligations with its neighboring countries: Russia is a member of NACC, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, a signatory of arms control agreements such as INF, START, and CFE, and since 1997 a member of the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council.

Moreover, the European Union is Russia's most important trade and modernization partner (Russia's entire trade with the Asia-Pacific states is less than 10 percent excluding the United States, of its total). While the percentage of Russia's foreign trade with the CIS countries declined from 55 percent in 1991 to 22 percent in 1998, it has risen to 40 percent with the European Union (after the inclusion of Central and East European countries it increases to 50 percent, in contrast to 6 percent with China, 4 percent with the United States, and 3 percent with Japan). However, Russia has never really recognized the economic and, in particular the political potential of the European Union, and its policies towards the organization are characterized by many contradictions. It has also overlooked and underestimated the EU processes underway to create a common foreign and security policy.
It has failed to recognize its own real national interests and the fact that "its relations with China are not a substitute for, or a counterbalance to, relations with the West."\textsuperscript{273} Furthermore, as Steven Rosefielde reminds us, "Russia today is probably more poorly positioned to integrate itself into the global market system than it was a decade ago."\textsuperscript{274}

Russia's arms export policies, and in particular its transfers of technologies and technical know-how to China— which are even more important in the mid- and long-term than the arms exports—is another point of concern, not only for other East Asian states and the West but for Russia, too. This is because these policies have fueled the ongoing arms race in the region that is interrelated with many unresolved territorial conflicts and deep-rooted historical mistrust.\textsuperscript{275} The willingness to trade long-term strategic interests for short-term commercial benefits might backfire for Russia because of its relative weakness and the increasing power of China, which will become even more assertive in coming decades. If Russia does not recover economically and experience substantial growth in the next decade (which at present appears rather unlikely), it will not have the financial resources to modernize and rebuild its armed forces—an expectation and intention which today is used to justify high-tech arms exports and military-technology transfers to China. Russia’s technological superiority over “backward China,” historically important leverage and a source of reassurance for Moscow’ policies in Asia, is now becoming history—and it is doing so much faster than Russia’s political and military elites seem to realize. History seems not to offer any lessons for Russia. Past Soviet assistance to China in developing its own nuclear weapons, for instance, saved Beijing between 10 and 15 years.\textsuperscript{276} The strategic developments now under way already have dramatically reversed the geopolitical dynamics of Eurasia as a whole, with wide-ranging implications not only for both countries but also for regional and global affairs. Historically, it would not be the first time that Moscow and the Russian military high command have underestimated the progress China is making in modernizing its nuclear and conventional armed forces.\textsuperscript{277}

The first half of 2000 seemed to confirm previous analysis indicating the limits and barriers inherent to bilateral relations between China and Russia. Neither the Beijing summit between Jiang Zemin and Putin in July 2000,\textsuperscript{278} nor the Shanghai Five meeting the month before can change the impression that, despite all rhetoric, declarations, and their firm joint opposition to U.S. plans to build a NMD shield,\textsuperscript{279} their mutual relationship is developing in a way that both sides (particularly China) would rather not see. While their bilateral relationship is still characterized by cooperation and a convergence of interests in specific economic and foreign policy fields, it is also characterized by mistrust and strategic rivalry. In particular, Putin’s modified foreign policy has grown more cautious vis-à-vis China and, simultaneously, has become more active in Central Asia, on the Korean peninsula, and towards the United States and in Europe.\textsuperscript{280} Russia’s unofficial invitation to India to join the Shanghai Five probably will face reservations by China. Beijing might retaliate by suggesting that Pakistan also be included as a counterbalance to India, which is seen in Beijing as an increasing strategic competitor in regional and global affairs.\textsuperscript{281} Furthermore, on both sides (again, particularly in China), almost no one really believes and expects that the other strategic partner is willing to help to achieve its own national foreign policy objectives, except those where interests are identical (e.g., NATO’s extension, U.S. missile defense plans). But while even the limited common foreign policy objectives of Russia
and China do not overlap so perfectly as most observers assume, their growing disagreements under Putin seem not to have affected Russia’s weapon exports and technology transfers to China, as a newly signed five-year military cooperation pact worth up to U.S. $20 billion indicates.

Russia’s reengagement on the Korean peninsula may complicate Sino-Russian relations by making them more politically and economically competitive. However, both sides have a mutual interest in strategic stability on the Korean peninsula, particularly as regards North Korea’s ballistic missile development and exports, as well as Pyongyang’s adherence to the Agreed Framework of October 1994, according to which North Korea supposedly abandoned its nuclear ambitions because they directly affect China’s and Russia’s defense policies in the region. Looking ahead, however, the question of the future of U.S. troops in Korea might be answered very differently in Moscow and Beijing. Furthermore, as the recent retraction of Kim Jong-II’s offer to abandon its ballistic missile program and exports in exchange for launch of space satellites suggests, it will rather be difficult for Russia to regain the level of political-diplomatic leverage on the Korean peninsula, as well as in Northeast Asia, enjoyed by the Soviet Union.

Given such an ambiguous and uncertain future in the Sino-Russian relationship, Russia should concentrate on promoting its economic ties with the Northeast and Southeast Asia and strengthening regionalization and multilateral security efforts, but without boosting arms exports to the region. Only then could Russia become a more serious political partner for ASEAN and other states in East Asia. Such a course would also contribute to Russia’s own economic revival in the region, a region which might otherwise become a security challenge for Moscow on down the road. Otherwise, not only Russia will face challenges in the region, but the region as a whole as it interacts with a neurotic Russia desperately striving to stave off declining fortunes.

Endnotes

1. This analysis is based on the findings of a research project sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation, as well as on an earlier analysis for the Körber-Foundation in German.


8. The following section is partly based on my article “Russia as a ‘Virtual Great Power’: Implications for its Declining Role in European and Eurasian Security,” European Security (forthcoming Summer 2000).


11. For one of few balanced analyses of the positive and negative implications of regionalization and decentralization from a Russian perspective, see Alexander Sergunin, “Regionen contra Zentrum. Ihr Einfluß auf die russische Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 5, 2000, pp. 29-36.


20. One example is the fact that the government of Kamchatka demanded direct financing for the import of oil ($210 per ton) for heating from the federal budget, while it had rejected the delivery of domestic oil ($100 per ton) in 1998 due to considerable bribes from import companies given to government officials. See Victor Subyan, “The Economic Security of the Far East and Russia's National Interests,” p. 14.


25. See the document in NG, July 11, 2000, pp. 1, 6.


27. Krasnaia zvezda, October 9, 1999, pp. 3-4.


35. In August 1994, for instance, one of the main oil lines ruptured and 100,000 to 250,000 tons of oil poured out into the landscape near the city of Usinsk (Komi-region/Siberia). The spilled oil reached the Kolva River, and drinking water was contaminated. According to Greenpeace, the polluted area is about 700 hectares. LukOil has promised to clean up 129 hectares annually, but in reality the company is not able to manage more than 60 hectares a year. According to a medical report, 90 percent of the residents in the Komi-oil producing region got sick. See the report of Markus Wehner, FAZ, July 22, 2000, p. 3. See also the chapter by Odelia Funke, “Environmental Issues and Russian Security,” in the present book.

36. See also Theodore Gerber, “Russia’s Population Crisis: The Migration Dimension,” PNARS-Policy Memo Series, no. 118, Harvard University, October 1999; and F. Umbach, “Russia as a ‘Virtual Great Power’.”


42. Odelia Funke, “Environmental Issues and Russian Security, in the present volume.”


47. Aleksandr Babkin and Aleksandr Shinkin, Rossiiskaia gazeta, July 10, 1999, p. 4.

48. Ibid.


54. See also, for instance, Natal’ya Chudodeev, Segodnia, June 24, 1998, p. 3.


56. Ibid., p. 136.


59. Ibid., p. 25.


61. See also the declarations during their November meeting in 1997. IHT, November 11, 1997, p. 4.


83. Craig S. Smith, IHT, July 19, 2000, pp. 1, 5.

84. Straits Times, July 20, 2000; and Aleksandr Chudodeyev, Segodnia, March 2, 2000, p. 2.


86. See also Aleksandr Isaev, NG, February 29, 2000, p. 6.

87. See also Umbach, “Russia as a Virtual Great Power.”


92. See also “Can a Bear Love a Dragon?” The Economist, April 26, 1997, pp. 19, 20, 23.


94. See, for instance, Gennady Sysoev, Kommersant-daily, June 3, 1999, p. 4. For a Western view, see Jennifer Anderson, “The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership.”


98. Feng Yujun, p. 9.


103. Chikahito Harada, “Russia and North-east Asia,” p. 46.

104. See also Ross H. Munro, “China’s Waxing Spheres of Influence,” Orbis, Fall 1994, pp. 585-605.


109. These are often the same experts who a decade ago sharply criticized Deng Xiaoping for dismantling socialism and deserting to the imperialist camp. Ibid., pp. 10 ff.

110. Ibid., p. 22.


113. Quoted from the article in Krasnaia zvezda, August 16, 2000.


115. Ibid., p. 82.


118. For the background, see Vladimir Ivanov, NG, October 2, 1999, p. 11.


122. Stefan Wagstyl, FT, May 10, 2000, p. viii “Russia”.


126. For the prospects of Russia’s military reform see in particular Aleksei Arbatov, “Voennaia reforma: doktrina, vozika, finansi,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniiia (MEiMO), vol. 4, 1997, pp. 5-21; and Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia.”

128. See also Segodnia, February 14, 1998; and Franz Walter, “Zur Entwicklung der russischen Streitkräfte. Wie viele Soldaten kann sich Rußland leisten?” Alexei Arbatov, who has formerly argued for 600,000 servicemen, has recently advocated a 800,000-man Russian armed force. See Alexei Arbatov and Pyotr Romashkin, NVO, no. 8, March 3-16, 2000, pp 1, 3.

129. V. Zubarev, NVO, no. 20, June 9-15, 2000, p. 3.


137. See the chapter on Russia in The Military Balance, 1999-2000, pp. 104-118.


140. See also Alexander Alf, NVO, no. 21, 1999; and Irina Zhirnova, Krasnaia zvezda, July 8, 1999, pp. 1-2.


150. See the head of the armaments division of the Russian armed forces, Colonel-General Anatoly Sitnov in Alexander Shaburkin, Vremia MN, June 7, 2000, pp. 1, 2, in FSU 15 Nations: Policy and Security, no. 6, July 30, 2000, pp. 74 ff.
151. Nikolai Novichkov, J DW, June 14, 2000, p. 3.


155. Izvestiia, November 18, 1993, pp. 1-4. This document has modified the 1982 Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (e.g., a denuclearized Ukraine). See also Dunbar Lockwood, “Russia Revises Nuclear Policy, Ends Soviet ‘No-First-Use’ Pledge,” ACT, December 1993, p.19. The Russian Minister of Defense, Army-General Pavel Grachev, declared it in an article four months earlier. See Krasnaia Zvezda, June 9, 1995, pp.1, 5.


159. See Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 26 December 1997, pp. 4-5.


162. Ibid.

163. Umbach, “Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Co-operation—A View from Europe.”

164. Ibid., p. 106.


169. NG, April 22, 2000; and Izvestiia, April 25, 2000.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.
172. See also Umbach, “Russlands neue Militärärdoktrin und die Absenkung der nuklearen Schwelle.”

173. See, for instance, Oleg Odnokolenko, Segodnia, April 22, 2000, p. 2.


175. See Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnia, May 6, 1999, pp. 1-2; and David Hoffman, IHT, September 1, 1999.


177. Andrey Korolev, “Nuclear Test Range in Arctic to be Used Intensively,” Bellona, June 1, 2000 (via Internet: www.bellona.no/imaner?id=16950&sub=1).


186. Ibid., p. 99.


189. See the interview with Mikhail N. Timkin, p. 47.


203. Gazprom is paying a quarter of all tax to the state budget and is responsible for a quarter of Russia’s foreign currency earnings. See also Igor Khripunov and Mary Matthews, “Russia’s Oil and Gas Interest Groups and Its Foreign Policy Agenda,” Problems of Communism, no. 3, May-June 1996, pp. 38-49.


206. Quoted following E. Kuzmin, “Russia: the Center, the Regions and the Outside World,” p. 113.


209. Quoted following Rajan Menon, “The Strategic Convergence between Russia and Russia,” p. 103.


217. Ibid., p. 450.


223. Article one of the treaty of 1961, which implied an automatic intervention of Russian military forces as the main clause of their mutual alliance, had already been abolished in February 1992. See Hai-Su Youn, “Changes in DPRK-Russia Relations 1989-1999,” p. 440.


243. Ibid., p. 88.


247. Interview Mikhail N. Timkin, p. 46.


254. An example is Russia’s economic minister Yakov Urinson who believed that the crisis may result in merely changing the form of payments and delaying payments for several months without any major changes. See Nicolay Novichkov and John Marrocco, “Russia Alters Arms Export Strategy for Southeast Asia,” AW&ST, February 23, 1998, p. 65.


257. Ibid.

266. Quoted here following Mikhail Alexeev, “The Unintended Consequences of Anti-Federalist Centralization in Russia,” PONARS-Policy Memo Series, no. 117, Harvard University, April 2000.
271. For a Russian view of a U.S. TMD system in East Asia, see Michail Timofeev, NG, July 21, 2000, p. 6.
278. See also the Beijing summit declaration in Rossiiskaia gazeta, July 20, 2000, p. 7.
279. See also Dmitriy Gornostaev, NG, July 18, 2000, pp. 1, 6; and July 19, 2000, pp. 1, 6.
280. See also Dmitriy Kosyrev, NG, pp. 9, 12.


283. See Doug Struck and Joohee Cho, IHT, August 15, 2000, pp. 1, 4.
Part Four: Russian Military Initiatives

Introduction

J ames F. Holcomb

The four chapters in this part address the more esoteric aspects of Russian military art and science. Specifically, the four authors address newly developing views on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Russian views on information operations (a component of the RMA), developments in nuclear weapons, views on strategic arms control, and prospects for the future. Some basic themes appear throughout. First, Russia, or at least the Russian military and defense establishment, retain a traditional self-view of Russia as a Great Power. Second, the West in general and the United States in particular are viewed with great distrust and apprehension, if not downright hostility. Third, Russia will continue to maintain nuclear weapons as a deterrent, not only against U.S. use of its strategic systems, but also against conventional and even internal threats. Fourth, the mechanisms for analysis and development of the theoretical basis for Russian military art and science are active. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the traditional Soviet methodology of measuring security in zero-sum terms still persists in Putin’s Russia. In sum, then, current Russian views and assumptions can be seen as direct extrapolations of a Soviet legacy that somehow has managed to survive ten years of tumultuous transition.

Dr. Jacob Kipp clearly demonstrates in his chapter that Soviet-style theoretical musings by Russian strategists continued throughout the Yeltsin era. Bringing practical reality to the recommendations made, however, was impossible due to the chaos of the ten-year “Time of Troubles.” Kipp concludes that this is now changing. With the rise of Putin and the apparent resurrection of a centralized statist system, opportunities will increasingly exist for the realization of the growing Russian appreciation for RMA requirements. Kosovo has provided the latest data point in the theoretical logic chain of Russian military scientists; it has also provided a political logic within the Russian establishment supporting the notion that the threat to the Motherland is still extant and directed by the United States. This may serve as a basis for reestablishing the political, economic, and social foundations for implementing the RMA.

Timothy Thomas looks deeper into one element of the new phase of the RMA in his analysis of Russian views, as expressed in their writings, on information operations. He reaches several conclusions. First, the Russians view information operations differently than the West. Second, information operations are viewed as a significant lever, able to alter the global balance of power and serve a role fundamental to the security of the state, characteristics attributed only to nuclear weapons. Third, information operations are increasingly viewed as embodying weapons systems having physical, psychological, and even biological effects. The last point reflects traditional Soviet research into the occult, telepathy, ESP, and other psychophysical phenomena. Once again, the theoretical foundations for
current thinking have a not-so-distant Soviet legacy. Thomas strongly advocates engaging Russia in the area of information operations. It is a field fraught with potential for misunderstanding, misread messages, skewed threat perceptions, and possible catastrophe. He also makes it clear that if we in the West think we have a monopoly on understanding this developing mode of war and its technologies, then we are mistaken; Russia has a clear theoretical lead.

Dr. Christoph Bluth, in his chapter on nuclear doctrine and strategic force modernization, emphasizes the inherent paradox currently existing between Russian declaratory policy (doctrine) and the realities of current threats. The requirement to be perceived as a great power (recall Yeltsin’s question about the West at the time of the NATO Kosovo operation, “Why are they not afraid of us?”) mandates the maintenance of a strategic nuclear arsenal with a traditional balance of power paradigm as the logic for strategic arms control. At the same time, the catastrophic collapse of Russia’s conventional forces has brought nuclear weapons to the fore as the ultimate deterrent against both nuclear, conventional, and, some would maintain, internal threats. Renunciation of no-first-use in 1993 is carried forward into the 1999 draft doctrine and confirmed during Zapad 99. The perception of a threat to Russia (evidenced in Russian minds by Kosovo, NATO enlargement, and national missile defense) has also resulted in increased emphasis on nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent. The paradox is this: Russian threat analyses have conjured threats where none exist, and nuclear posturing is impractical for resolving those that do exist. The result is a requirement for continued maintenance of strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities for non-existent threats at the expense of conventional requirements to deal with the realities of Russian security today. Bluth’s analysis also points to future force structuring. It is increasingly apparent that the Russian strategic nuclear triad is fragmented. Future reliance will rest on single-warhead land-based mobile missiles at the expense of air and sea platforms. Bluth also recognizes the burden of the Soviet legacy and is not optimistic that the Russians will be able to break out of their mental glaciation and move forward dramatically in the nuclear arms control arena. Russian self-deception is increasingly becoming fixed conviction.

Dr. Stephen Cimbala’s chapter on strategic arms control confirms several of Dr. Bluth’s themes, that is, nuclear weapons as great power psychological “crutches,” Russia’s increased dependence on nuclear weapons due to the collapse of conventional capabilities, and Russia’s increasingly anti-Western and anti-U.S. orientation. He analyzes the elements of stability making up the strategic nuclear relationship and argues effectively that even with lower numbers under START II and perhaps START III, operational differences between the United States and Russia may paradoxically increase instability. He maintains that the moribund nature of Russia’s air and sea components places an increasing burden on the least stable (land) component of the triad. Cimbala argues that land-based operational requirements for launch on warning, coupled with the current environment of Russian apprehension, could result in a mistake of catastrophic proportions. From this perspective, lower numbers do not necessarily mean increased stability, especially if one party adheres to skewed threat perceptions.

These chapters deal with important issues, and it is interesting to see the common themes, independently arrived at, by authors working in different fields. These authors do not reflect
great optimism. They do embrace, however, the overwhelming need to remain engaged with Russia. The West has attempted over the ten years since the collapse of the Soviet Union to dispel Russian fears and modify their threat and security perceptions. It is increasingly apparent that we have failed, at least to any significant degree. The premise that we must keep trying is clear; how long it will take and at what cost is not.
The Russian Armed Forces, the Draft Military Doctrine, and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Oracle of Delphi and Cassandra Revisited

Dr. Jacob Kipp

Introduction: The Soviet Legacy and the Gulf War

The concept of a revolution in military affairs is not a foreign idea imported into Russia as result of the military campaigns of the last decade. Rather, the term, “revolution in military affairs” (Revolyutsiya v voyennom dele), is Soviet in origins. In the 1970s it replaced the term “military-technical revolution,” which had been used from the late 1950s to define the central role of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the military strategy of future war. A revolution in military affairs implied a new and distinct relationship in the transformation of military art brought about by the direct application of scientific and technical innovation to military art without a preceding transformation of the mode of production in the economy. Thus, nuclear weapons, computers, and ballistic missile technology emerged in the military sphere without prior direct civilian applications for the associated scientific discoveries or technical inventions. Under Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov the RMA took on a new meaning. Ogarkov spoke of a new revolution in military affairs associated with the development of advanced conventional weapons and foresaw the appearance of weapons “based upon new physical principles,” which would reshape armed conflict in the next century. In 1982 he warned: “Under these conditions an imperfect restructuring of views and stagnation in the working out and realization of new issues of military construction are fraught with serious consequences.” Such trends called into question “the most universal historical achievement of developed socialism,” i.e., “the military-strategic parity” between the United States and the Soviet Union.

To Ogarkov, the new challenge demanded a more innovative approach, reflecting the seriousness of the problem, especially in the face of the U.S. defense buildup. Strengthening Soviet defense capabilities was nothing less than “an objective, vital necessity.” The economic implications of what Ogarkov described as a new arms race into the next century, when the Soviet economy was already running into serious structural problems, were troubling. General-Colonel Makhmut Gareev, then a Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of its Directorate of Military Science, associated Ogarkov’s revolution with a “leap” in military affairs:

Now we can speak about a turning point in the development of military science and military art. In general, a new qualitative leap in the development of military affairs, connected with the modernization of nuclear weapons and especially the appearance of new types of conventional weapons, is ripening. In connection with this [process] there has arisen the need to rethink the basic military-political and operational-strategic problems of the defense of the socialist Father-land.
Gareev's call for a military-political response to this technological revolution represented a sharp break with the Brezhnev era and was a harbinger of things to come. Yet, because of the nature of the Soviet system, military forecasters focused on military-technical issues, leaving the military-political issues in the hands of the Politburo. Given the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the increasing evidence of economic decline and technological stagnation in the face of a renewed arms race with the United States, hard choices had to be made.

The Soviet political leadership during the period of stagnation and the post-Brezhnev interregnum had been slow to respond to this systemic challenge. Their failure to take timely and vigorous actions in a society, supposedly dominated by long-range, rational, central planning, revealed glaring flaws in the edifice of “mature socialism.” N. N. Moiseev, former head of the Academy of Sciences Computing Center and a leader in Soviet military simulation work, observed that ideological dogmatism, careerism, and bureaucratic inertia precluded a timely and effective response to this pressing challenge. The command system which had worked during the Stalin industrialization, the Great Patriotic War, and even the nuclear and space challenges of the Cold War, would not meet this new challenge. Perestroika, with its focus on internal reform, geopolitical disengagement from global competition, and demand for defense economies, effectively eliminated a Soviet military-technical response to the RMA.

At the same time, events in the Persian Gulf illustrated the radical transformation of military art. Recent Russian assessments of the Gulf War concur as to its importance for the development of military art. The faculty of the History of Wars and Military Art of the Academy of the General Staff saw the war as a watershed: “For [its] influence on the development of military art [this war] should be considered a major event in military affairs.” Indeed, the authors compared it with the Franco-Prussian War (which sowed the seeds of operational art), in terms of impact because of the employment of “new technology and the emergence of new forms of military actions.” The authors called for a serious review of military art and its assumptions:

Now, as never before, it is important to rapidly adopt and energetically introduce into the practice of the Russian Armed Forces all the latest [and] progressive [developments] that have arisen in military affairs under the influence of scientific-technical progress and the appearance of new weapons, to work out and employ more effective methods and means unknown to the enemy, to learn to make original and valid decisions in order to confound the enemy, subject him to our will, [and] achieve victory with the lowest loss of personnel.

Russian forecasters concluded that the Gulf War was but a “glimpse” of these capabilities that are and will continue to reshape warfare in the Information Age. The fact that this glimpse coincided with the end of the Cold War, a general reduction in forces, a radical recasting of the international environment, and the transformation of the Russian state and society has made foresight particularly difficult.
Russian Military Forecasters: Oracles of Delphi or Cassandras?

In 1995 I presented a paper at the MORS Conference in Annapolis, Maryland, devoted to the problem of Russian military forecasting and the revolution in military affairs (RMA). That study focused on the efforts of Russian military forecasters in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union to deal with the complex set of changes then reshaping the international system, Russia itself, its military and the nature of future armed conflict. In that paper, I outlined what I considered to be the arguments of leading forecasters of the revolution in military affairs and rendered a pessimistic assessment of their influence on the course of military developments in Russia during the time of troubles brought on by the collapse of the Soviet system and the contradictions of the Yeltsin transition. After reviewing the work of leading Russian military forecasters addressing various aspects of the RMA—military systemology, the theory of combat systems, precision strike weapons, automated command and control and radio-electronic combat, information warfare, sixth generation warfare, and the future contours of armed conflict—I concluded that Russian forecasters were foreseeing a radical shift in the ways and means that wars would be fought. Their arguments called for a radical transformation of the existing military system in all its aspects: raising, training, organization, equipping, and fighting the force. These forecasts, even if accurate as general predictions concerning the future of war, were totally inapplicable to Russia itself. This was because the Russian military system was in such disarray that neither the government, the Ministry of Defense, nor the General Staff were in a position to embrace any of the competing visions of the RMA and mount a coherent program to bring about the complex set of innovations necessary to transform the Russian armed forces along the lines required by the RMA. They lacked the means to leverage their ideas into a compelling strategic vision. In the absence of a clear threat and in the face of national economic decline and austere budgetary prospects, their strategic vision had limited appeal.

Five years later seems a good time to assess the arguments of the leading forecasters of the RMA and the prospects for the execution of a coherent program to transform the armed forces along those lines. A chronological survey of relevant events between 1995 and 2000 would suggest that nothing fundamentally changed to alter this assessment. Recent developments make a reexamination of the linkage between forecasting and strategic vision timely and appropriate. The Yeltsin era has ended. Yeltsin’s anointed successor, Vladimir Putin, has, as Prime Minister and President, embraced the armed forces in a manner quite distinct from that of “Boris the Reluctant.” As Prime Minister, he, much more than President Yeltsin, committed Russia to fight a war of annihilation against “terrorists and bandits” in Chechnya, promising that the military leadership would have a free hand in prosecuting that war to a victorious culmination. Riding the public support for war in Chechnya, Putin and his allies forged a pragmatic political movement called “Unity,” which in the December 1999 Duma elections emerged as one of the largest factions in the new Duma. Announcing the end of the old politics of “reformers” vs. Communists, Unity formed an alliance with the CPRF and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s LDPR to organize the new Duma, much to the consternation of those who saw Unity as a continuation of anti-Communist politics that Boris Yeltsin and his supporters had used to win the 1996 presidential election. Unity, or Medved (the Bear) as the party is popularly known, represented a victory for the power elite within the governmental apparatus. Putin, as a strong favorite, thus won the presidential election campaign that
ended on March 26, 2000. Putin placed his stamp of approval on a new national security concept, while a protracted and rambunctious debate continued over a draft military doctrine prepared under the direction of the Ministry of Defense. Putin promised a 50 percent increase in funding for military procurement, including research and development, in this year’s defense budget. Over the last five years, the threat environment for Russia has become much clearer to her political and military elites in the aftermath of military defeat in the First Chechen War, the expansion of NATO, and NATO’s military intervention against Yugoslavia over Kosovo. Both the new national security concept and the draft military doctrine address the problems of internal and external threats to Russian security and identify monopolarity in the international system as the chief threat to Russian national security. Rising energy prices and increased state revenues have enhanced the government’s ability to fund the military.

To mark the new millennium, then Acting President Putin published a New Year’s Day message setting forth his own vision of the new problems and possibilities before Russia. The language and style of this statement in the original Russian has a very distinct flavor. It combines a recognition of the costs of Russia’s experiment with totalitarianism with a criticism of the bumbling and corrupt reform process of the Yeltsin “transition period.” Ideologically, the statement is closer to the statism of the late imperial period in that it rejects slavish copying of foreign models and vain expectations that others will solve Russia’s problems. The world now faces a new division between the “golden billion” of those living in the advanced countries and the rest of humanity who are being left behind. This is not a question of competing with the United States, he goes on to say, but of restoring the national economy to the status of a major power. It is essential that Russia modernize and move forward rapidly—there can be no going back.

This was the statement of a presidential candidate using the power of incumbency to shape the debate on Russia’s future and to appeal to voters. The issues Putin addressed touch the concerns of ordinary people. His enumeration of the problems facing Russia suggests that he understands the origins of the current crisis facing Russia and is quite honest about the herculean effort that will be required to overcome it. He promises a fresh start but rules out a return to the old, failed system and any new revolutionary experiments. He is gambling that the Russian electorate will rally to support firm and determined leadership to end a decade-long time of troubles.

The sparse reference to anything touching on foreign and security policy and the overwhelming concentration on Russia’s internal problems reflect the real balance of interest of the Russian voter at all levels of society. “Russia was and will remain a great country,” notes Putin, but “in the modern world a country’s might is manifested not so much in military power as in its capacity to be a leader in creating and using high technology, in ensuring a high standard of living for its people, in its ability to ensure its security reliably, and in upholding its national interests in the international arena.” Putin was gambling on his ability to mobilize the Russian tradition of a strong central state and national patriotism to provide the leadership necessary to make a viable “transition to a post-industrial society.” In his enumeration of what he considered the keys to this transition, Putin identified these areas:
• Changes in the economic structure of society, with the diminishing weight of material production and the growing share of secondary and tertiary sectors.

• The consistent renewal and quick introduction of novel technologies and the growing output of science-intensive commodities.

• The landslide development of information science and telecommunications.

• Priority attention to management and the improvement of the system of organization and guidance of all spheres of human endeavor.

• And lastly, human leadership. It is man and high standards of his education, professional training, business and social activity that are becoming the guiding force of progress today.

These national economic priorities are in keeping with the creation of the scientific, technological, and economic infrastructure necessary to mount and sustain a national security strategy embracing the RMA. They are given prominence in the recently approved national security concept.

The concept was composed by an inter-ministerial body under the guidance of the Security Council, which Putin headed before becoming Prime Minister. It represents a distinct break with the concept formulated by the Security Council in 1997 under then-chairman Ivan Rybkin. That document emphasized the internal threat, giving it a distinctly economic tinge. The latest concept, however, speaks of the threat posed by monopolarity, Western attempts to impose solutions by threat or use of force, and various paramilitary threats within Russia and on its periphery, thereby implicitly linking Kosovo and Chechnya. Regarding the role of the Russian armed forces in national defense, the concept addresses the missions that the armed forces are expected to execute and the means available for their execution.

The Russian Federation considers the possibility of employing military force to ensure its national security based on the following principles: use of all forces and assets, including nuclear weapons, at Russia's disposal in case of a need to repel armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective; use of military force inside the country is allowed in strict conformity with the RF Constitution and with federal laws in cases of the appearance of a threat of a violent change in the constitutional system, to the country's territorial integrity, as well as to the life and health of citizens.

The concept calls for the sustainment of the Russian military-industrial complex as vital to Russian national interests: “The restructuring and conversion of the defense-industrial complex must be accomplished without detriment to the development of new technologies and S&T [science and technology] capabilities, to the modernization of arms and military and special equipment, and to a strengthening of the positions of Russian manufacturers in world arms markets.”
The Draft Military Doctrine and the RMA

The recently published draft military doctrine provides explicit guidance on the threat environment confronting Russia, linking the conflict on the Russian periphery and near abroad to the threat posed by U.S. hegemony, monopolarity, and U.S.-NATO reliance upon the threat of force to support their vital interests. The draft also identifies specific areas of needed technological improvement connected with the Russian military's understanding of the RMA. These include: “highly-effective systems of command and control of forces and weapons, communications, intelligence, strategic warning, radio-electronic combat, and precision, mobile non-nuclear means of destruction, as well as systems of information support.”

The draft also recognizes the growing capabilities of states which can employ improvements in the “means, forms, and methods” of armed struggle [vooruzhennaya bor'ba] to achieve military-goals by indirect, non-contact actions. “These capabilities, associated with the RMA, pose a “special danger of modern wars to peoples, states, and international stability in the world” and “dictate the vital necessity of taking exhaustive steps for their prevention and for peaceful settlement of contradictions at early stages of their appearance and development.”

The draft implies that there is a serious risk of uncontrolled escalation involved in such use of force, which could turn an indirect conflict into direct confrontation and local war. General Gareev made the relevance of B. H. Liddell-Hart’s “indirect approach” to post-Cold War armed conflict one of his central observations regarding the contours of future armed conflict.

Indeed, Gareev has noted that the authors of the current draft military doctrine in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff “have started to listen more to their opinion and this has been reflected in a new [draft] military doctrine.”

The Academy of Military Sciences Speaks

In the immediate aftermath of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, General Gareev, as President of the Academy of Military Sciences—a non-governmental organization closely linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff, hosted a conference on the role of military science in determining national defense requirements. Among those attending the conference were Marshal Igor Sergeyev, Minister of Defense; General of the Army Anatoliy Kvashnin, chief of General Staff; Nikolay Mikhaylov, executive secretary of the Ministry of Defense; commanders-in-chief of the armed services of the Russian Federation; and representatives of the government, the State Duma, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information, the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Natural Disasters, and other enforcement departments of the Russian Federation.

The conference marked the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Academy, which had been created in February-March 1994. Its charter included research in the following areas:

- Investigating the nature of military threats to the security of the Russian Federation and the ways of preventing wars and armed conflicts;
- Preparing proposals on providing for higher economy and effectiveness in defense missions;
- Developing the scientific principles of military doctrine, military reform, and the organization of the principles of collective defense of CIS member states;
- Strengthening scientific ties with the military-scientific organizations of CIS member states and other countries;
- Assisting in the training of qualified specialists for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and its military-industrial complex.  

Taking place in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo, the conference addressed both the geopolitical environment, i.e., the contradictions between monopolar and multipolar world order, and the contours of future armed conflict, i.e., “the main directions for development of high-tech weapons and space, informational, electronic, and other new resources of confrontation.” These two themes were linked to the study of new means of conflict instigation, i.e., “covert and veiled support to acts of terrorism and insurrection against other countries.” The conference also addressed several other key areas affecting the RMA’s impact on military art. These included the nature of a “strategy of indirect actions” and “the waging of ‘contactless’ armed struggle,” “nuclear weapons and the conditions of their use,” “informational struggle and its influence on the organization and methods of troop command and control,” and “special operations within the system of nonmilitary forms of struggle and in the course of war.”

In his remarks to the conference, Minister of Defense Sergeyev explicitly linked the study of past military experience, both Russian and foreign, to the task of formulating new concepts of military art. Sergeyev stressed the imperative of studying NATO’s campaign against Yugoslavia. “We also need to deeply and comprehensively analyze the forms and means of use of armed forces of the USA and NATO against independent Yugoslavia.” This was particularly relevant given that the Minister had noted specific shortcomings in operational and combat training during the recently-concluded strategic command-staff exercise Zapad 99. The fact that this exercise included the employment of Russian nuclear forces in a preemptive strike against an aggressor using advanced conventional forces underscored a major point made by General Gareev. Nuclear forces would retain deterrence capabilities and preclude the employment of mass formations, but they could not deter the use of advanced conventional weapons in a local armed conflict. Gareev noted:

> Considering the new nature of armed conflict, in recent years a number of countries have been laying their main emphasis in military development on qualitative improvement of conventional arms, and primarily high-precision weapons, increasing the fighting power and mobility of troops (forces), and preparing armed forces for military activities based on the use of conventional weapons, but with regard for the constant threat of use of nuclear weapons. The system of strategic actions of armed forces and other troops is changing.

Thus, there emerged an explicit linkage between the strategy of indirect actions and the waging of “contactless” armed struggle and the risks of horizontal and vertical escalation to...
regional, general, and nuclear war. Russian forecasters associated with the Academy of Military Sciences have developed a coherent interpretation of the RMA and managed to relate it to the immediate military threats before Russia.

Conclusion

Close analysis of the draft military doctrine, the continuing debate surrounding it, and the new national security concept suggest that Russia’s military forecasters may, indeed, have before them a situation where their ideas finally have some chance of being realized as part of a coherent strategic vision. It is in this context that the concepts associated with the RMA take on meaning and import for military reform in Russia. The forecasters provided only the beginnings of such a vision. Their forecasts have to be interpreted by political and military decision-makers. Much will depend on the eventual outcome of the campaign in Chechnya, Putin’s political success in creating an effective central government, and a recovery of the Russian economy sufficient to provide the necessary resources to carry military reform to its conclusion and thereby transforming the armed forces and ensuring the procurement of advanced weapons systems. The combination of the acceptance of a new threat environment and new concepts of armed struggle linked to the RMA make it clear that Russia has moved beyond the post-Cold War period and is now in the process of responding to a more dynamic interwar international environment in which the RMA is one of the key elements.

Endnotes


13. Valdimir Pirumov, “On the Concept of Russia’s National Security,” Russian Executive and Legislative Newsletter, no. 9, 1995, p. 7; and V. I. Tsymbal, “Konseptsiia ‘informatsionnoi voini,’” paper delivered at conference with the Russian Academy of State Management, Moscow, September 14, 1995. In 1992, Pirumov began to speak of the “infomatization” of warfare, which he described in the Gulf War as “the large-scale usage of various types of information complexes and systems by the Multinational forces (MNF), which were realized in the means of reconnaissance, control, and high-precision weapons, as well as by the forces and means of electronic warfare (EW).” See V. Pirumov, “Nekotorye posledstviia informatizatsii vooruzhennoi bor’by po itogam boevyh deistii v zone Persidskogo zaliva,” in Akademiia Estestvennykh Nauk Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Sektsiia Geopolitiki i Bezopasnosti, Problemi regional’noi i global’noi bezopasnosti v kontse XX-nachale XXI vekov; Vooruzhennye sily i vysshee voennoe obrazovanie (Moskva, 6-11 sentiabria 1992 goda). Vystupleniia i materialy, Moscow: AVIAR, 1993, pp. 111-113.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 5.
THE RUSSIAN VIEW OF INFORMATION WAR

Timothy L. Thomas

Introduction

This chapter highlights four basic aspects of Russian thinking on information warfare (IW): terminology and theory; military-technical and information-psychological developments; implications of information operations (IO) for Russia (and the West); and the impact of IO on military doctrine and national security policy. We begin with an explanation of the importance of information security issues to 21st century Russia.

The Growing Role of Information in Russia

On July 25, 1999, the London Sunday Times reported that American officials believed Russia may have stolen some of the United States’ most sensitive military secrets (including weapons guidance systems and naval intelligence codes) in a concerted espionage offensive. The theft, accomplished using computer hacking techniques, reportedly incited Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre to note that “we are in the middle of a cyber war.” At the same time, defense journals across America are printing a veritable endless stream of articles about the decrepit state of Russia’s armed forces. It cannot house its officers or pay them in a timely and adequate fashion, and the armed forces are crime-ridden and underfed, according to these reports. Yet Russia allegedly can successfully attack and access America’s most secret defense files? Why is there such a disparity in the apparent information age capabilities of a country with limited information technological assets and with an armed force in a poor state of readiness?

To answer that question succinctly, Russian scientists are making do in the absence of a high-technology computer industrial base, not to mention a severe shortage of money, by relying on the capabilities of a plethora of skilled mathematicians and scientists. The computer age, particularly its software aspect, comports well with a particular Soviet and now Russian strength—the ability of Russian scientists to write the programs and compose the algorithms that stable software, creative programs, and hacking require, making their abilities so attractive to Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MOD). This strength is apparent on the pages of many Russian information journals such as Questions of Protecting Information, Various Branches of Information Service, Information Technology in Plan and Production, and Information Resources of Russia, among others. The computer age has offered Russia and other economically stressed countries a rare opportunity—to be relatively weak materially and physically, yet capable of wreaking havoc not only with the military of stronger powers, but also with their societal and economic elements; all via the talents and creativity of scientists and mathematicians.
Russian thinking about potential uses of the information spectrum began long ago but existed under a cloak of extreme secrecy imposed by the Soviet communist regime. Today, Russian security specialists believe that no issue is more important or more fraught with uncertainty than the current and future information environment. There are several good reasons why this is so. First, the free-flowing, cross-border exchange of information has offered people and organizations in the former Soviet Union unstructured access to information never before available. This relatively unfettered exchange via electronic media permits citizens and decisionmakers alike a variety of ideological, political, religious, and other information sources from which to choose. Because such access was once forbidden by strict internal and external barriers, this access is coming at a time when many Russians are still searching for the values and purposes for their very existence. Under such conditions, the mass media, especially television and the press, play a much more important role than ever before.

Second, Russians perceive that information itself has developed into a very important type of national or strategic resource. The “informatization” (informatizatziia) of society through the computerization of machines sharply influences financial markets, business practices, and even the capabilities of military weapons. In the latter case, information can increase the precision and effectiveness of both traditional (missiles, rockets, etc.) and non-traditional (non-lethal, psychological, etc.) types of munitions. Russians believe that countries possessing “information superiority” may be more inclined than before to employ military force. To such countries, military objectives may seem more attainable without significant loss of life and with no apparent ecological risk. Many Russians believe that the recent NATO intervention in Kosovo was based on the alliance's possession of information superiority, thereby virtually guaranteeing victory for the NATO operation.

Third, many Russians believe that a single global “information space” is emerging, which could allow a country to exploit this space and alter the global balance of power. Specifically, a country can dominate in either an important military-political or military-technical competitive realm, or simply deny another country from doing so.

Fourth, Russians realize that few legal restraints exist that can regulate information interventions or even attacks. This factor also encourages the growth of concepts such as cyberterrorism, that is, the use by terrorists of information means to penetrate or destroy information security systems of banks, military institutions, or vital societal assets (power stations and other infrastructural facilities and systems). Finally, many Russians understand that they are far behind in the global race for information superiority and are beginning to appreciate and fear the potential consequences of not competing successfully in that race.

Such reasons as those discussed above most likely prompted recent Russian calls at the United Nations for a worldwide information security policy and limitations on development of information weaponry and operations. From a Russian perspective, information security is a vital national concern and potential state vulnerability. While Russian security specialists do not entirely understand information operations, they cannot ignore them, even in the short
term. It is for all these reasons that Russia has spent and is still spending considerable time developing an information security doctrine.

The subject of information warfare and information operations has thus become almost as significant and important to Russian military planners as the issue of nuclear proliferation. Russian theorists warned decisionmakers not to submit to external forms of coercive information diplomacy. Simultaneously, subcommittees of the State Duma commissioned studies on both information warfare and “psychotronic” warfare (more on this later), and Kremlin advisors and the security community are studying how information security issues may affect the country’s political, technical, economic, and military policies. Some members of the Russian academic community are also engaged in studying the potential impact of information operations.

The analyst E. A. Belaev, a member of the Russian State Technical Commission (under the President of the Russian Federation), believes that the informatization of society has led to the collection, processing, maintaining, and exchange of information between actors—people, organizations, and governments—in the single information space. As Belaev defines them, the most critical information technologies within this space are those that support:

- Governmental and military command and control organs;
- Financial, credit, and banking structures;
- Command and control systems of various types of transport, energy, and ecologically dangerous industries (nuclear, chemical, biological, and others); and;
- Warning systems for emergency situations and natural disasters.

Any underestimation of the information security of these systems, Belaev argues, could lead to unpredictable political, economic, ecological, and material consequences, and perhaps even turmoil. Therefore, today nations must consider their national information resources as strategic resources, and protect them accordingly, nearly on a par with nuclear resources. In addition, burgeoning access to global information networks such as the Internet only underscore the necessity for protecting information resources from manipulation, corruption, deception, or outright theft. The Internet has become an arena for potential conflict, especially with regard to unauthorized access to databases.1

Russians have been writing about information security for years now. One of the best and most complete explanations of the impact of the information age was offered by Rafael Yusupov in a 1997 article in the journal Vooruzheniye, Politika, Konversiya. Yusupov opined that information security was the basis and foundation of national security for Russia. Information security includes information resources; the rights of citizens, legal persons, and the state to receive, disseminate, and use information and protect confidential information and intellectual property; systems for forming, disseminating, and using information resources; and systems for shaping public awareness (world outlook, moral values, moral
assessments, socially permissible stereotypes of behavior, and mutual relations among people).

Information, as a result, either helps determine or strongly influences the status of economic, defense, social, political and other components of national security. Information is now the chief strategic resource. The infrastructure of the state is formed by telecommunications and computer networks and distributed data and knowledge bases. The processing, creation, distribution, and use of information is a growing sphere of the economy at large. Information technologies (IT), introduced to all other spheres of society such as science, education, military affairs, and so on, causes a cardinal change in the methods of production and in people's world outlook, style, and character. It has greatly altered their work and living place.

Information space is physical space in which information flows circulate, with circulation understood to mean perception, transmission, storage, processing, and use of information, according to Yusupov. Information becomes one of the decisive factors in the development of the individual, society, and the state. Information space has two dangers: it can be used to monitor the state's information resources (defined as the immediate product of intellectual activity of the most qualified and creatively active portion of a country's able-bodied population), thus becoming information espionage; and information disruption can destroy or disorganize the information resources of state structures. These effects can be realized in peacetime, especially if critical application systems are affected, thereby distorting or destroying information used for state management or decisionmaking. Information space has no state boundaries, no institutions to protect state interests such as border or customs checks. The border is transparent to information resources, and one day states may have to regulate the movement of information flows.

The information security problem has created such dilemmas, procedures, and concepts as IW, computer warfare, information opposition, information weapons, and information terrorism. IW is "opposition in information space." Information security problems also create a social security problem in the information sense, since the vital interests of social subjects are affected by information technologies (a new area for human rights activists?). Examples are technologies that can monitor and regulate the informational interaction of people (monitoring phones, correspondence, the Internet, creating data bases on people from bank and sales transactions, etc.), and technologies that can shape public awareness (new mass media technologies, psychotropic weapons, network technologies permitting access to various negative information such as pornography and modern computer games that can shape a child's awareness).

Thus, there are three ways that information security impacts national security. First is the security of vital state information resources and information systems, counters to which are being actively developed by countries all over the world. Second is the predominance of the information approach as the emerging primary scientific method of solving national security problems. Finally, information can have an impact on a state or person's social awareness by manipulation of reality or fact, which in turn can have a significant impact on a state's national security decisionmakers.
The recent conflict in Kosovo has done little to assuage Russian concerns about the significant role information will play in national security issues during the 21st century. For the first time the United States and NATO justified military activities by geo-strategic principles other than simply national interests. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Joseph Nye asked whether it is possible to define interests conventionally in the information age, especially in light of humanitarian concerns that, due to the impact of the mass media, divert public attention away from real strategic issues. He summed up his views as follows:

The Canadian media guru Marshall McLuhan once prophesied that communications technologies would turn the world into a global village. Instead of a single cosmopolitan community, however, they may have produced a congeries of global villages, each with all the parochial prejudices that the word implies, but with a greater awareness of global inequality, ... all in the presence of television cameras and the Internet. ⁴

Nye noted that the United States now has an interest in the use of outer space and cyberspace similar to the interests the British once expressed for freedom of the seas. Notably, both are the channels through which words and ideas pass and democratic principles can be promoted. However, the medium of cyberspace is also promoting the advancement of “democratic interests” (such as humanitarian affairs) to the level of a state interest at a startling pace. The Clinton administration clearly appeared to agree with this assessment, based on its justification for the use of force in Kosovo. In summary, Nye added, “A democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy.” ⁵ From this it is clear that new geo-political principles are beginning to emerge in response to the influence of information. And it is this interpretation that worries the Russians.

**Terminology, Elements, and Theory of Information Warfare**

Both the United States and Russia appear to have developed separate lexicons of information-related terms over the past several years. On the Russian side, one can read about the information component of the armed forces; the information resources of the state; information aggression; information subversion; information capabilities of a side; information war; information conflict; information superiority; and an information exchange, to name only a few. On the U.S. side, the terms information carousel, information assurance, information function, information grid, information differential, and information operations appear to have no Russian equivalent.

While no official (that is, approved by the MOD and government) Russian definition of information warfare is available in unclassified form to date, many different Russian organizations have defined IW from their particular perspective. As a result, several unofficial definitions are available. Some were developed by analysts, and some by high-ranking members of the various agencies, including the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), the military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the External Security Service, and the State Technical Commission.
What makes these definitions distinctive is that the Russians are careful not to copy a Western or even specific U.S. understanding of the term. Military analyst V. I. Tsymbal points out that in the Russian Federation the organs of state security (primarily FAPSI, the External Security Service [SVR], and the Federal Security Service [FSB]) are responsible for the accomplishment of IW in the broad definition of the term. Partial confirmation of this fact was recently affirmed by the attempt of the FAPSI to have the State Duma allow it to control the Internet in Russia. FAPSI, comprising the former KGB Eighth Chief Directorate and 16th Directorate, is somewhat an equivalent to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). It alleged that the CIA was creating information weapons and combat computer viruses, and, therefore, control was needed. Now, it appears that the FSB is responsible for this task.

However, all of these Russian agencies and the military have employed IW definitions that do seem to adhere to a common theme, namely, that information warfare is conducted in both peacetime and wartime. In its peacetime use, the term applies more broadly, that is, to the information security of society and the government in the psychological, scientific, cultural, and production aspects, with special emphasis on protecting state information resources and attempting to influence enemy information resources. In its wartime use, the term refers more narrowly to the attainment of superiority or the reduction of uncertainty through the use of information protection and suppression systems, to include command and control, EW, reconnaissance, and to attempts to disorganize the enemy. A look at the IW definitions of several agencies, commissions, and ministries follows.

The Sluzhba Vneshnik Razvedka Definition of IW. Information war, according to the head of the External Security Service (SVR), is a concept that includes establishing control over other states’ information resources, deterring the development of information technology in countries which are potential enemies, possibly disrupting or completely putting out of operation information networks and communication systems, and developing information weapons and systems for safeguarding the security of a country’s own information structure and information flows.

Of all the definitions of IW, this is perhaps the most impressive for its variety and inclusion of several geo-political issues (deterrence, etc.)—and the most deplorable, for it designs to establish world hegemony in this area. Disruption of enemy capabilities and development of friendly IW equipment and information weapons is just the opposite of the United Nations definition offered by the Russians in the fall of 1998. The SVR is the only service that has a clear mission outside of Russia’s borders, although FAPSI also shares some of this burden.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Definition of IW. Perhaps the most authoritative definition from a high-ranking official was offered by Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov. It was far from the most comprehensive, however. In a letter to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23, 1998, he defined information war as “actions taken by one country to damage the information resources and systems of another country while at the same time protecting its own infrastructures.” Within his definition is the object of attack as defined by the Russians: information resources.
It is extremely important to understand what the Russians mean by an information resource (IR) and its place in the overall understanding of Russian IW thinking. For military IW specialist Admiral (retired) Vladimir Pirumov, an information resource is understood to be information which is gathered and stored during the development of science, practical human activity, or the operation of special organizations or devices for the collection, processing, and presentation of information. The information is saved magnetically or in any other form which assures its delivery in time and space to its consumers in order to solve scientific, manufacturing, or management tasks. 

The Academy of Natural Sciences offered a slightly different definition of IR, defining it as “information received in the process of the life of citizens, society, and the state, and registered in the form of a document.” It is likely that this definition was purposely left vague and general to stimulate discussion in the U.N. It certainly does not go into half the detail of the other operative definitions within Russian security agencies.

Military Definitions of IW. The definitions offered by the military are more specific, as expected, and primarily address battlefield IW. Particular emphasis is placed on command and control, and reconnaissance-strike complexes. However, the Russian military is acutely aware of the potential destructiveness of peacetime IW, and addresses it as well.

Admiral Pirumov was one of the most authoritative persons to define the term so far. He is a former instructor of electronic warfare at the General Staff Academy and also former Scientific Advisor to the President of Russia. He defined information warfare as follows:

“Information warfare” is a new form of battle of two or more sides which consists of the goal-oriented use of special means and methods of influencing the enemy’s information resource, and also of protecting one’s own information resource, in order to achieve assigned goals.

His definition implies that IW is an activity that can be carried on in peacetime as well as wartime. For strict wartime scenarios, Pirumov offered a definition of IW in operations that aimed at gaining an information advantage on the battlefield:

“Information warfare in operations (combat actions)” is the aggregate of all the coordinated measures and actions of troops conducted according to a single plan in order to gain or maintain an information advantage over the enemy during the preparation or conduct of operations (combat actions). An information advantage assumes that one’s own troop and weapon command and control components are informed to a greater degree than are those of the enemy, that they possess more complete, detailed, accurate, and timely information than does the enemy, and that the condition and capabilities of one’s own command and control system make it possible to actualize this advantage in combat actions of troops (forces).

Pirumov currently is the President of the Academy of Natural Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of Russia. He played a major part in developing a dictionary of geo-political terms sponsored by his organization and edited by Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, the current First Deputy to the Minister of Defense of Russia. The dictionary defined IW as:

An inter or intrastate information struggle that involves methods which damage or completely destroy the information environment of the opposing side. It is an information influence on vari-
ous spheres of societal and governmental activity, a system of measures to capture the information resources of a state and key positions in the informatization sphere.12

Ministry of Defense civilian analyst V. I. Tsymbal, mentioned earlier, offered both a broad and narrow definition of information war (he preferred the Russian “informatsionnoya voyna,” literally, information war), noting that:

In the broad sense, information warfare is one of the varieties of the “cold war”—countermeasures between two states implemented mainly in peacetime with respect not only and not so much to the armed forces as much as to the civilian population and the people’s public/social awareness, to state administrative systems, production control systems, scientific control, cultural control, etc. It is namely in this sense that the information security of the individual, society, and state is usually understood.

In the narrow sense, information warfare is one of the varieties of military activity/operations/actions (or the immediate preparation for them) and has as its goal the achievement of overwhelming superiority over the enemy in the form of efficiency, completeness, and reliability of information upon its receipt, treatment, and use, and the working out of effective administrative decisions and their purposeful implementation so as to achieve combat superiority (victory) on the basis of this. The waging of information warfare in the narrow sense is the field of responsibility of mainly the ministers of defense of modern states.13

A final definition is offered by Colonel S. A. Komov, a Candidate of Technical Sciences and Professor. Komov wrote more about the topic of IW on the pages of Military Thought in the mid-1990s than any other analyst to date. He defines IW within the confines of one of those articles that looked only at its wartime use, as follows:

A complex of information support, information countermeasures, and information defense measures, taken according to a single design and planning, and aimed at gaining and holding information superiority over an enemy while launching and conducting a military action/battle. Interconnections between information warfare and other types of operational/combat support and activities that make up its contents should be noted as well (intelligence, information gathering, communications, etc.).14

Komov believes four issues are at stake in his definition: (1) identifying a set of measures to gain information on the opponent and on the condition of an engagement (electronic, weather, engineer, etc.), to gather information on friendly forces, and to process and exchange information between command and control echelons or sites; (2) identifying measures to block the information-gathering processes of others, and to feed deceptive information at all stages; (3) identifying friendly countermeasures; and (4) gaining information superiority over the enemy.

An information weapon is another term defined by the Russians. It is a specially selected piece of information capable of causing changes in the information processes of information systems (physical, biological, social, etc.) according to the intent of the employer of the weapon. Information weapons are aimed not only at hardware and software systems, but also at wetware or the mind. These latter weapons include acoustic weapons, drugs, light, electromagnetic weapons, and other non-lethals.
Elements of IW. Theorists differ over the elements that comprise IW. Listed here are two variants. Both are products of either theorists or practitioners who could be considered as Russian info warriors. First is the variant of former First Deputy Minister of Defense and former National Security Chief Andrei Kokoshin, who was ultimately responsible for research and development of these information systems. He divided information warfare into the following five subcategories:

- Electronic warfare;
- Intelligence;
- Communications;
- Operational command and control systems; and
- Facilities for the protection of command and control systems against enemy influence.\(^{15}\)

The second variant is that of V. I. Tsymbal. Information warfare, in his view, must be considered an integrated whole of systems working together that includes the following eight subcategories:

- Intelligence and counterintelligence gathering;
- Maskirovka and disinformation;
- Use of EW systems;
- Debilitation of communications and scrambling of enemy data;
- Determination of state to which a military objective belongs;
- Destruction of an enemy’s navigational support;
- Use of psychological pressure on the enemy; and
- Destruction of enemy computer nets and software programs.\(^{16}\)

General Theory of IW. General Major N. A. Kostin, Chairman of the Radio-Electronic Department, General Staff Academy, wrote a general theory of IW. He defined IW (using both informatsionnoy bor’boy and protivoborstvom as ways to say IW) in accordance with the definition offered at the U.N.—as “a form of struggle between sides that involves the use of special methods and means for impacting the information medium of the opposing side and protecting one’s own side in order to achieve the assigned tasks.” The goal thus is to provide information security for one’s own side and lower the information security posture of the opposing side. He noted that the battle over information is now so important that the struggle
for ore, oil, and markets could fade in comparison. Kostin added that the information struggle is a special and independent category of war, a component element of any other form of war, and that it is waged constantly in peacetime and wartime.

Kostin believes that political factors have the greatest impact on the substance of IW, and drive its goals, tasks, and issues. Political factors also determine the means, methods, and characteristics of conducting the battle, its scope, and duration, and provide the necessary material support and financial resources. Economic factors determine the scientific and technical development of the computerization of society and the state. Kostin described the information factor as determining the scope of the struggle, the procedures and methods of its conduct, and the capabilities for utilizing them when influencing the enemy's information environment. This factor depends on the level of computerization of the sides.

The logical elements forming the foundation of IW are categories, laws, patterns, and principles. Categories objectively reflect the essence and core characteristics of the most important manifestations of IW. They represent a body of military-theoretical thought that includes general terms such as information and IW, and particular terms such as protecting information and attacking information. They can reflect the structure, substance, and requirements of IW. The laws of the materialistic dialectic present themselves as well, according to Kostin, as objective laws and patterns of military activity valid for IW. These include the law of the defining role that politics plays in IW, and the laws on the course and outcome of war and IW which depend on economic, socio-political, scientific-technical, and military capabilities. Recognizing patterns that are inherent in IW is where the primary efforts are directed. This includes the pattern of dependency among goals, on the one hand, and available means and capabilities on the other. The effectiveness of IW is determined by the proportionality among the goals, tasks, systems used, and means available, taking into account the enemy's countermeasures.

Russian analysts have developed a methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of the means of counteracting threats to information security. Developed by scientists Dmitriy Chereshkin, Georgiy Smolyan, and Vitaliy Tsygichko and in 1995, the work builds on the methodological foundation provided by the information security draft. Its goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of an existing information security system plus its subsystems, components, and elements, with the understandable goal of identifying weak points in this system and substantiating the selection of the most rational ways to improve and develop it. This is accomplished through a detailed mathematical modeling process. To date, the United States has not succeeded in developing such a coefficient.

According to these scientists, the methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of information security consists of eight steps:

- Defining an information security system;
- Defining the notion of subsystems;
- Classifying subsystems and identifying features of each class;
Developing conceptual models of the classes of subsystems;

Determining a set of criteria and formulating a set of problems for evaluating the effectiveness of subsystems;

Determining a list of normative and variable information necessary for solving effectiveness evaluation problems;

Developing methods to evaluate the threat to information security as a function of the degree of protection of objects of information security, and developing methods for ranking threats; and,

Developing a practical methodology to evaluate the effectiveness as applied to different classes of information security system subsystems, and performing calculations based on this methodology.¹⁹

Obtaining this and associated information, in the scientists’ view, permits the formulation of questions for evaluating the effectiveness of existing information security systems, and for posing tasks for creating new information security systems.

Information-Psychological/ Military-Technical Aspects of Information Warfare

Information-psychological. Russian military researchers have focused on the informational and psychological stability of individuals and society as a whole for a variety of cogent reasons, but the primary one is the psychological security of Russian citizens. This is due to the striking change that has occurred in the country’s dominant ideology, a change that did not occur in the West. Understandably, therefore, the absence of a similar ideological shock has prompted less attention to this subject in Western countries. However, more general trends in the West, such as the proliferation of computer disk-driven games and the influence of the Internet on youth, are impelling increased interest in the subject. Specifically, more American researchers are now pondering the influence of information technology on the minds of its citizens, a phenomenon accelerated by the sort of youth violence that took place in Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, in April 1999.

The Russian military excels in the study of the impact of the information-psychological aspect of information warfare. To date, the United States has not conducted extensive analysis in this area except for those personnel in psychological operations. Conversely, Russian military scientists have been studying not only the ability of information warfare to affect the values, emotions, and beliefs of target audiences (traditional psychological warfare theory), but also methods to affect the objective reasoning process of soldiers. This reminds one of Andrei Kokoshin’s 1996 appeal to conduct an in-depth study of the political and social structures of various countries, systems of state control, and “psychological behavioral stereotypes.” Instead of relying on massive fires against personnel, weapons, military
hardware, and military targets, the “main efforts” should be concentrated in achieving the
destruction of the psychic components on which an enemy’s capacity for organized resistance
depends. That is, Russia should be interested in ascertaining how to affect not only the
data-processing capability of hardware and software but also the operating principles that
drive various cultures, whether they be social or economic. Here the idea of the unwillingness
of the United States to take massive casualties comes to mind as a behavioral stereotype.

Three books published in the Russian Federation during recent years serve as an example
of this fixation on behavior and on the mind itself. Endorsed by the State Duma’s Security
Committee, the first book was, appropriately enough, entitled, Informatsionnaya voina
[Information War]. This book examined how to manipulate the mind by toying with the
algorithms (to include how to model them) that define human behavior. Humans, the author
noted, like computers, can have a “virus” inserted in their information system (reasoning
process) if the proper algorithms of mental logic can be affected. The authors dubbed this
human information virus a “psycho virus,” which, according to mathematical formulas, could
perhaps be inserted as a “suggestive influence” to alter the mind’s algorithms or prevent
objective reasoning. The second book, entitled Psikhotronnoe oruzhie i bezopasnost’ rossi
[Psychotronic Weapons and the Security of Russia] bore the endorsement of the State Duma’s
Information Security Committee. It was coauthored by the Chief of the Information
Security subsection of the Security Committee of the Duma, Major (retired) Vladimir
Lopatin and V. D. Tsigankov. They defined psychotronics as an inter-disciplinary area of
scientific knowledge, which when mediated by consciousness and perceptual processes,
investigates distant (non-contiguous) interactions among living organisms and the
environment.

The third book that tackled information-psychological problems was Secret Weapons of
Information Warfare. It focused squarely on the impact on the mind of information issues.
The general content can be glimpsed from the chapter titles:

1. Basic Directions in the Development of IW under Modern Conditions
2. Understanding Phenomenology in Man and Controlling his Behavior. Education on
   the Use of Psycho-Physical Weapons
3. Methods for the Precise Orientation of Covert Effects on the Human Psyche
4. Psychotronic Means of Subconscious Effects on the Human Psyche
5. The Integral Method of Psycho-Physical Weapons

The psyche is defined in one Russian publication as an active reflection by man of the
objective [real] world, the formation of a picture of this world, and, based on this picture,
self-regulation of one’s behavior and activity. The Secret Weapons book and the Psychotronic
Weapons and the Security of Russia work by Lopatin and Tsigankov are part of a series of
books called “Informationization of Russia on the Threshold of the 21st Century.” The
foregoing three books underscore the Russian belief that informational and psychological
matters should be of concern to civilian and military leaders alike as valid subjects for close scrutiny, and that their effects both positive and negative can be experienced in peacetime and wartime.

Colonel Igor Panarin of FAPSI, speaking at a conference in 1997, stated that there is a need in Russia to develop information-psychological subunits in government and military directorates. The role of these departments would be to develop strategic and operational measures to prevent or neutralize attempts to control the psyche of Russian society (what he termed the “strategy of psychological defense”). A Main Directorate in Support of Psychological Security would ensure the psychological component of Russian national security.24

Methods of persuasion are an IW weapon specifically oriented against the psychological security of individuals. The primary Russian information weapon in this regard is a concept known as reflexive control (RC), also called “intellectual IW.” RC is defined as a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action. S. A. Komov has noted that the goals of RC are to distract, overload, paralyze, exhaust, deceive, divide, pacify, deter, provoke, suggest, or pressure an opponent with information.

Other less known but reported information-psychological related activities include:

- Military unit 10003, which studies the occult and mysticism, reportedly to understand the recruiting and “brain washing” techniques of these groups.
- Anti-ESP training in the strategic rocket forces, designed to enable missile launchers to establish mental firewalls in case someone from the outside attempts to take over their thoughts.
- Astrologers in MOD, who predict ambushes, plane crashes, and other phenomena.
- Practice with the “25th frame effect,” which tries to insert a subliminal message by adding a 25th frame to a movie or computer-generated scene (normal viewing is 24 frames a second; the 25th frame, if added, is thought of in the context of a subliminal message).
- Applying electromagnetic impulses to the head of a soldier to adjust his/her psychophysical data.
- Remote viewing and psychotronics.

For example, it has been alleged but never substantiated that during the 1996 Russian elections, a 25th frame was added with President Yeltsin’s picture on the night before the elections to some television programming. The intent was to insert a subliminal message into the heads of voters just before the elections.
Military-technical. On January 28, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would sharply increase the purchase of new weapons and equipment for its armed forces. High-tech conventional weapons were one of his priorities. Called a shift in spending priorities, Putin said the change would amount to as much as 80 percent in some categories.25

This announcement was predictable based on a speech by Marshall Igor Sergeyev, Russia’s Minister of Defense, at the end of 1999. The war in Kosovo demonstrated to Sergeyev that a new phase of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) is upon us. The United States, he noted, demonstrated a significant military-technical breakthrough in the sphere of information support of combat operations that must be countered. Putin’s changes appear to set in motion a policy designed to provide that counter. Sergeyev’s comments, in a December 1999 issue of the military newspaper Red Star devoted to military-technical issues on the eve of the 21st century, also discussed the main domestic and foreign threats to Russia, and the main missions and problems of Russia’s military-technical policy.26

Sergeyev used the term “information” 14 times in his discussion of military-technical issues. This emphasis is not surprising. Over the past five years, Russian specialists have studied and written about information issues profusely. Some of this effort was reflected in the information aspect of state security, highlighted in both the country’s draft military doctrine and approved national security concept.

Sergeyev noted that Kosovo signified the beginning of “contactless,” virtual, information-technical warfare. The biggest NATO military-technical advantage came from information-support systems such as reconnaissance platforms, which contribute mightily to the desire of the United States to break away from the rest of the civilized world in such systems. Unable to compete at the present time, Russia, in Sergeyev’s view, must look to asymmetric options. The situation is such that

in the coming years, Russia will not be able to support military-strategic and military-technical parity with the leading military powers of the West on a “symmetrical” basis, especially in the area of non-nuclear armaments...it is necessary to search for a reasonable combination of evolutionary and “revolutionary” paths and more effective asymmetrical directions for the development of weapons and military technology and technologically outfitting the Russian armed forces.27

Sergeyev listed information missions before nuclear and non-nuclear missions in his report, noting that priority for systems development would go first to information, and then to operational, rear support, and mobility systems. In the field of non-nuclear armaments, Sergeyev placed the highest priority on the development of systems, resources, and means for defending government, military, and commercial information systems. The goal is to avoid direct military-technical competition with the most developed countries by creating “asymmetrical” armed conflict means by which the most vulnerable functional elements of a potential enemy’s systems and key target infrastructure are destroyed, thereby devaluing military-technical superiority.28
Sergeyev listed the main weapons and military-technical directions for the armed forces as reconnaissance and command and control, with the latter specifically at the operational-tactical and tactical levels. The goal is to create an integrated information environment, and a single system of military standards to transmit data. Other military-technical requirements are for universal, information-oriented, and smart equipment; and for making use of miniaturization when possible and reducing the wavelength signature of equipment. Both of the latter have heavy information support requirements.

Sergeyev noted the close integration of information systems and nuclear weapons as well. He stated that information-technical developments of both support and defensive systems help guarantee the effective use of nuclear weapons, and are a “new aspect of nuclear deterrence.” In addition, destructive qualities of weapons based on new physical principles now approach those of nuclear weapons. Such new weapons signify a qualitative leap in the forms and means of armed conflict, changing the parameters of “parity.” Russia’s main priority in the field of prospective weapons will be guided and electromagnetic energy weapons (with the former highly dependent on information support, the “informatization” of weaponry), cyber-weapons, and stealth unmanned combat platforms, Sergeyev added. At the operational-tactical level, the focus will be on multi-charge systems, automated reconnaissance-information fields, and precision weapons.

Finally, Sergeyev addressed space needs. Here he called for modern satellites with increased accuracy and longer use, more navigational devices for the soldier, and a new generation of satellites for topogeodesic support of the armed forces. Sergeyev's concluding remark was that a new phase of the RMA has begun, and Russia must not lose time. Time frames are such that any further delays in starting a full-scale modernization of the armed forces could lead to a fatal, insurmountable advantage to other countries.

Much of the Russian military equipment under development now and reported in the Russian and Western press appears to stick closely to the goals and missions that Sergeyev enumerated. It is doubtful whether these systems will be as dominantly high-tech as comparable pieces of equipment in the West, but the Russian military-industrial complex is making progress. Systems currently under development and in the process of fielding include the Shkval, the M-55, X-101, X-555, the Iskander, and the Pchela, all of which are examined below. Each is highly dependent on information technologies.

With regard to reconnaissance assets, Russia is also at work on a high-altitude reconnaissance plane that will enable it to acquire real-time targets in local conflicts. Dubbed the M-55, the plane will be able to provide instant targeting for other aircraft and ground weaponry systems, and can download reconnaissance data, including map information, to command facilities. Another reconnaissance system is the UAV known as the Pchela. Operated primarily by the airborne, according to press reports, two Pchela's can be launched every 30 minutes but only two can be controlled at any one time. The current plan is to upgrade this UAV from a reconnaissance to a reconnaissance-and-attack vehicle. Efforts are underway to make the drone all-weather with night sensors, and to improve its TV's resolution. Flight endurance at present is only two hours.
In 1999 there were several military-technical improvements of note. The biggest headlines were grabbed by Academician Nikolai Guschchin, chief constructor of the Machine-Building Design Office, for his development of the Iskander-E missile complex for ground forces. It is designed for accuracy, with the ability to hit small and pin-point targets. Iskander-E was preceded by Guschchin's Tochka, Oka, and Tochka-V missile complexes. For these achievements Guschchin was named the Russian Biography Institute "man of the year."Russia will also start serial production of the X-101 and X-555 strategic cruise missiles. The X-101 reportedly can hit targets up to 5,000 kilometers away with an accuracy within 5-6 meters. Both missiles also have a reduced visibility to radar, making their detection very difficult.

In the wake of the conflict in Kosovo, Russia is trying to expand exports of its S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. Its claimed maximum engagement range is 400 kilometers. In addition, Russia is offering a new integrated command and control system known as the 45L61. The system is designed to control air defense systems, interceptors, and airborne warning and control systems over a very broad area. The export version is known as the Universal-1E, and it is being offered to CIS countries and perhaps China and India. The system can detect, identify, and track airborne targets within a range of 3,200 kilometers, which are flying at a speed of up to 6,000 kilometers per hour, and at altitudes of up to 100 kilometers, according to Russian sources. Such military-technical developments as the Pchela, the Iskander, and new command and control systems support the demands of Lieutenant General Igor Rogov, First Deputy Chief of Armaments of the Russian Armed Forces, who noted that local wars would require the modernization of existing of modern weapons, and that:

These operations are certainly possible only with full military-technical superiority over the enemy that has been achieved first and foremost through the effective employment of long-range precision-guided munitions that function in the outline of a reconnaissance-strike system with space reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and command and control elements.

The Russian navy is selling supersonic antiship missiles to Boeing, the Kh-31A missile (NATO designation, Krypton). Over a five-year period, Russia will sell the United States 100 of these missiles. The Kh-31A flies at Mach 4.5, while its closest Russian twin, the Sunburn, which the Russians sold to the Chinese, flies at Mach 3. Some believe Russia is being very clever here, selling one system to China, a superior system to the United States, and then intending to sell the next generation Sunburn to the Chinese. China and Russia, according to a British newspaper, are developing an air-to-air missile with a ram jet propulsion system that gives the missile a 50 mile range and a speed of Mach 3. Unlike traditional air-to-air missiles with only six seconds of thrust, the “ram jet” has a full minute of thrust. This capability is reportedly three years ahead of any similar class of RAF missile.

In November 1999, the Russian Navy announced the development of the Shkval missile, and an export version known as Shkval-E missile. Capable of moving at up to 200 knots, the missile is programmed by feeding speed, distance, and vector parameters into the missile's automatic pilot. The missile does not have a homing warhead but rather follows a computer-generated program, and is thus very difficult to throw off target.
An interesting source of information on Russia’s information warfare capabilities is the journal Military Parade. In a May 1996 article entitled “Information Warfare Facilities,” author Yuri Perunov discussed the Persian Gulf war and the priority for electronic and information warfare that it demonstrated. He noted that the radios, radio-engineering, radar, television, and infrared optical reconnaissance equipment located on ships, aircraft, and earth satellites provided the United States and its allies with real-time information on all activities of the Iraqi army. In Perunov’s view, the struggle for on-line information is becoming important because “virtually all armament and combat material employ electronics operating over the entire frequency range for target acquisition, transmission of data to control troops, as well as for the direction and control of the destruction means and high-precision weapons, enabling the ‘detect-fire-and-forget’ principle to be realized.”

The four tasks of the Russian electronic warfare (EW) forces are as follows: first, monitor electronic emissions and establish data banks in real time; second, jam enemy electronic means; third, use EW equipment to guide precision weapons to destroy a target; and finally, employ passive jamming and deception techniques including stealth armament, chaff, smoke screens, and aerosols, among others. This capability destroys the enemy’s information field while preventing the transfer of information from friendly sources to potential enemy weapons. The Russians believe that their EW system also can suppress aircraft reconnaissance, navigation, and weapon control radars, including high-precision ones.

The Russian military-industrial complex is busy at work producing information warfare equipment, and publicizing it for purposes of external sales. One pamphlet notes that the 122 MM Grad rocket system now has a rocket (LILIA-2) with built-in interference transmitters that are deliverable to locations of communication means and capable of introducing interference in the shortwave and FM ranges. The operational life of each transmitter is 60 minutes. In addition, the Russians believe they have developed radars that can detect stealth aircraft (such as the 55Zh6-1 and 1L13-3 radars); jammers such as the Shtora-1 that can protect aviation material from infrared homers; the Zoopark-1 reconnaissance complex, allowing for enemy firing positions to be fixed with a high degree of speed and accuracy; and the Senezh-M1E and Rubezh-Me automated air defense forces control systems.

Information technology improvements that Russia hopes will maintain a deterrent capability vis-à-vis the United States include improving ICBM capability to penetrate an ABM defense; developing EW assets that disrupt the functioning of the ABM defense; maintaining a reconnaissance, navigation, and communications satellite grouping; improving the system of command and control of Strategic Nuclear Forces to permit optimum structuring of a strike in relation to a particular Ballistic Missile Defense alignment; and placing in service long-range, low-signature strategic cruise missiles (Kh-101) which existing BMD cannot intercept. The Washington Times reported in June that Russia had resumed testing on a high-altitude weapon that fires off an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). It may be part of Moscow’s ongoing anti-satellite weapon development program to attack U.S. satellites, which U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has termed “an infringement on our sovereign rights.”
The Chechen War reportedly has helped the military-industrial complex. According to Valentin Rudenko, an arms trade expert with Moscow's Military News Agency, "The war has highlighted the necessity of developing high-precision weapons that can be used without threatening civilian lives. So the process of modernizing weapons has been intensified." In addition, the war has demonstrated the requirement to update military satellites. These satellites provide targeting data and telecommunications support, and intercept communications not only between Chechen field commanders but also between Chechen rebels and supporters abroad. Satellite imagery support is minimal, since there is only one imagery pass a day over Chechnya. According to Pavel Podvig, military space expert of the Moscow-based Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, the imagery satellite is not capable of maintaining data-link contact with Russian forces. Thus, it cannot provide current information on the movement of Chechen rebels. Communications and signal intelligence intercepts are providing much more support than the imagery bird. This intelligence limitation would seem to make satellites a priority procurement concern in the coming years. Zinovii Pak, director of the Russian federal government's ammunition agency, confirmed this fact with reporters on October 6, 1999. He noted that high-precision weaponry and satellites will be procured.

A report in early January 2000 confirmed the gravity of the situation. It was reported that Russia's early warning system could detect U.S. ICBM launches only for 17 hours a day. This is because only four of Russia's 21 satellites are still working.

Other IW Implications for Russia, The Systemology of IW

Perhaps the biggest impact of the information technology revolution has been its impact on military art. Information operations are viewed as a separate, self-contained type of conflict—as operations that make the initial period of war extremely uncertain (one doesn't know what preparations were made by a potential opponent during peacetime to alter the effectiveness of weapons or the strategic perception of the situation at hand, and thus may not realize it when war has actually started); and as operations that increase the tempo of battle, focusing on continuous attacks designed to blind an opponent by destroying his information processes and achieving information dominance. The new formula for war appears to be "acquire-shoot-jam-move-acquire-shoot-jam-move." No longer is warfare cyclical, but much more linear, according to Russian experts. There are far fewer rest periods between major battles. This will put a premium on logistics and command and control mechanisms.

In Tsymbal's view, the conduct of IW is felt at all three levels of military art: strategic, operational, and tactical. He noted that in peacetime, the goal will be to accumulate information on an enemy while developing and testing one's own IW weapons. Immediately prior to military action, and during military action, IW systems will first work to destroy all command and control systems of the enemy and any other information systems which receive, store, or process information of military significance. Alternatively, an IW operation can be run independently prior to the onset of combat actions of the traditional type. Retired Major General Vorobyev, writing in the June 1997 issue of Military Thought, noted that wars of the
next century will be highlighted by the information-psychological confrontation as much as by the information-technical. He believes that information-psychological opposition, information-psychological operations, and information-psychological pressure are three types of activities to expect.\footnote{53}

While there is a growing interest in military systemology, not only in modeling information warfare but in its implications for national security in general, there are still some who look at it as not much more than witchcraft. For example, Yuri Orfeyev, writing in Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 1996, noted that “all of the so-called ‘systems of models of optimum function’ [comprising military systemology] are nothing but ‘the emperor’s new clothes’ and are used to justify unproductive activity.”\footnote{54} His, however, appears to be a minority opinion.

Within the Russian concept of military systemology, information is viewed as the “nourishment” that gives life to all elements of the system. This applies in particular to reconnaissance, command and control, support, and strike systems. Information warfare as a system, according to one view, includes three components: information support of the functioning of one’s own combat systems; information counteraction against the functioning of the enemy’s combat systems; and information protection or defense of one’s own combat systems against the informational counteraction of a possible enemy.\footnote{55}

Under modern conditions, the skillful use of one’s information potential and information resources, including information means and systems, greatly increases the force combat potential and the effectiveness of weapons, combat equipment, and combat systems on the whole. At the same time, the vulnerability of command and control systems with respect to deliberate and random activity in the information sphere, including the programming aspect of computer systems, continues to increase. Therefore, it is necessary to protect one’s information potential. This includes protecting it everywhere and continually, in peacetime and wartime, not only from a probable enemy but also against unexpected changes in the current situation—social, economic, and diplomatic conditions—as well as from a lack of skill and/or professionalism on the part of subordinates and chiefs.\footnote{56}

**National Security Documents**

Russia’s current national security documents reflect an increased concern with information security issues compared to previous versions. The October 1999 draft military doctrine stated that the exacerbation of the information opposition/confrontation is an important feature of today’s international context, a destabilizing factor used to achieve destructive military-political goals and affect current operations and the overall security environment. The draft addressed information-technological (attacks on computers, nets, infrastructure, etc.) and information-psychological aspects of the external threat to Russia, stating that the greatest internal threat was action to disrupt or disorganize the Russian Federation’s information infrastructure. Information warfare, the document noted, must be coordinated.
Military-strategic features of the new draft doctrine focused on modern war: indirect strategic operations and means of IW, and the development of a massive information preparation (information blockades, expansion, and aggression) operation. Confusing public opinion in certain states and the world community, and achieving superiority in the information sphere either in wartime or during the initial period of war were other important missions. These goals will elevate information security to a basic military security mission, the draft indicated. Finally, in the realm of information-economic principles, the priority aim remained information support of all missions. These include science and technology issues, information technology equipment, and resource independence in the development of military products.

Also in October 1999 the Russian Security Council approved the country’s national security concept. The concept used the word information 20 times. Various sections of the concept addressed the country’s information security and technology needs. The section titled “Russia’s National Interests” included the following information-related interests: observing the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens to obtain and use information; developing modern telecommunication technologies; protecting the state information resource against unauthorized access to political, economic, science and technology, and military information; and preventing the use of information for manipulating the mass consciousness of society. The section titled “Threats to the Russian Federation’s National Security” included in the information sphere: (1) attempts by a number of countries to dominate in the world information space and to crowd Russia out of the foreign and domestic information market; and (2) development of “information warfare” concepts by a number of states envisaging the creation of means of exerting a dangerous effect on the information spheres of other countries, means of destroying the normal functioning of information and telecommunications systems, and means for the safekeeping of information resources or of gaining unauthorized access to them.

Finally, under the section titled “Ensuring the Russian Federation’s National Security,” a list of tasks included: implementing citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms for information activities; improving and protecting the domestic information infrastructure and integrating Russia into the world information domain; and countering the threat of the initiation of opposition in the information sphere.57

Conclusions

For the immediate future, no issue is of more concern to Russian security theorists and planners than the information issue. But Russia’s approach to IW differs significantly from that of the United States, particularly in its emphasis on theory, disorganization, and information-psychological subjects. Moreover, each security service has its own unique understanding of IW, and is applying it as it sees fit. Russia is continuing its efforts to develop new technologies to support Defense Minister Sergeyev’s vision of the information-technical aspect of IW. Simultaneously, efforts will continue to find a breakthrough in the
information-psychological aspect of IW. There will be increased emphasis on asymmetric efforts to counter Western advances.

Russia will also continue trying to persuade the United Nations to involve itself in various aspects of IW and to slow down progress in the West. The United Nations represents Russia’s best opportunity to assemble an international forum against the growing perception of unilateralism on the part of the United States in the IW arena.

Russia has incorporated information security thinking in all of its national security documents, reflecting the growing importance of the subject to the security apparatus in Moscow. This includes documents explaining the national security concept, the military doctrine, and the information-technical aspect of military doctrine. Numerous academies and institutes are also following the impact of the informatization of society on national security issues.

It is now time for the West to make some difficult choices. The difference in approaches between Russia and the West grows daily. In light of this fact it will be interesting to see if the West stops wondering “what” Russia wants from information discussions, and focuses instead on “why” it might be good for both sides to begin talks. Talks over something as mundane as terminology and concepts should be easy to initiate, and they will provide the cornerstone for further discussions and mutual understanding. Ignoring problems will only exacerbate the issue.

Why should the West engage Russia? Here are a few reasons:

First, the Russian approach is dictated by the logic of the dialectic, which means that it offers a unique way of visualizing and accounting for the use or misuse of information technologies and weapons. Discussion offers Westerners insights into an asymmetric IW mental logic that, when compared with Western thinking, promises to offer a new method for thinking outside the box when looking at the same problem.

Second, discussion can help Western analysts understand Russian terminology and perhaps lead to the development of a common IW vocabulary, one with which the West must be familiar if it is to learn how to negotiate over the Russian understanding of the concept. This includes different interpretations of like terms. Russia will be one of the main powers in the U.N. pushing its agenda, thus familiarity with IW concepts and terms is vital to U.S. negotiators.

Third, discussion would offer Western analysts an opportunity to perceive Russia’s emphasis on different aspects of IW (for example, behavior modification through the generation of algorithmic viruses) and other information-psychological approaches. Discussion could also focus on some areas discussed much less thoroughly by U.S. analysts (e.g., impact on military art and science, and the principles of war [Russia has 13 compared to the United States’ 9]). There is much to be learned from Russia about these processes.
Fourth, discussion can help prevent misunderstanding Russian spheres of emphasis and concern (and vice versa). Such misunderstandings could only lead to miscalculations on the part of U.S. or Russian decisionmakers. Talking with Russian IW officials may help avoid future conflict by exposing areas of anxiety or concern. The actual degree of hysteria among military officials responsible for Russia’s national security, which borders on paranoia, is grossly underestimated in the West.

Fifth, discussions with Russians can help lower the threshold of Russia’s first use nuclear policy. In order not to be misunderstood, the Russians have stated on several occasions and at all levels that they will respond with nuclear weapons if an IW attack is launched against them. And this in light of the fact that they may not be able to tell with certainty where the attack originated! Of course, it is possible that this is only a bluff on the part of the Russians, because one of their methods to get what they want is to offer a credible threat to a potential enemy. Are we willing to call a bluff of this nature? Russia in turn may make someone an example. Russia’s recent first-use nuclear policy declaration may have originated from this dilemma. Discussion can only help lower the threshold of this first-use policy.

Sixth, it is clear that there is no parity in the collection of material on IW thinking. It was broken long ago, and Russia leads the United States and the West by an extensive margin. The West’s preoccupation with blowing its own horn has offered Russia and other countries around the world a veritable treasure house of material to read and analyze, while offering in return a slow trickle of information. Discussions would help level the playing field. A conference in which ten Russians and ten Westerners offered papers would be an excellent way to start this effort. At the present time, they know a lot about us while we know precious little about them.

Many critics believe that any country developing a program with IW capabilities is not a country with whom the U.S. Should be discussing anything. This is a mistake on our part. First, everyone is developing some type of IW capability, from the terrorists to the nation state. While capabilities must be monitored, it is the intent to use this capability on which attention should be focused and which should worry us. Second, it is important to discuss IW matters with other countries to help ease the hysteria that IW has generated in some nations. Hysteria results from vulnerabilities such as a society that has lost its ideology to psychological control of a nation via the Internet. Much can be done to alleviate these potential problems by simply discussing concerns and potential areas of conflict. Further, a common lexicon of terms can be produced toward the same purpose. We talk about nuclear issues face to face with our counterparts in nations all over the globe. It is time we start the same process over information security issues well before the first crisis arises and matters get so out of hand that we can’t recover without severe losses to our information infrastructure or data banks, and to our stability as a nation.
Endnotes


2. Information space is defined by Yusupov as “the sum total of data bases and banks, of the technologies of their management and use, and of information/telecommunications systems and networks functioning on the basis of unified principles and according to general rules ensuring information interaction of organizations and citizens and satisfaction of their information needs.” See Rafael Midkhatovich Yusupov, “Information Security is the Foundation of National Security,” Vooruzheniya, Politika, Konversiya, March-April 1997, no 3-4, pp. 35-38, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS web page on September 12, 1998.

3. Ibid.


5. Ibid., p. 24.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


13. Tsymbal.


18. The “specific effectiveness of a means of counteracting a specific method of threat realization” is the central concept and starting norm which permits building a normative base of quantitative evaluations of the functioning effectiveness of information security systems, according to these scientists. Specific effectiveness $H_{(i,j,k)}$ of a means of counteraction (SP) is understood to mean the degree of effectiveness of fulfillment by the $I$-th means of its normative functions $D_{(i)}$ for counteracting the $j$-th method of realization of the $k$-th threat. For a complete explication of the mathematics, see the document, pp 13-23.

19. Ibid. To implement this process, other information is required. This includes what the Russians refer to as constant and variable information. Fixed information includes the following items: list of possible threats; methods of threat implementation; means of counteracting each method; criteria for the effectiveness of means of counteraction, as well as a list of their functional characteristics; evaluation of the effectiveness of means of counteraction as a function of the unit cost of defending any given objective or facility; criterion for the extent to which an objective is secure against a threat aggregate; criterion for the security of a complex objective/facility which consists of several objectives/facilities; and a criterion for the effectiveness of the information security system itself. Changing information includes: characteristics of the objectives (structure, relative value of the information, the features and conditions involved in using an information resource as the given objective operates, etc.); the extent to which an objective’s effective operation is dependent on the degree of its security (based on each countermeasure); normative [regulatory] restrictions on the effectiveness of an objective’s operation; an array of threats to a specific objective, as well as possible methods of their implementation; list of possible means of counteraction actually available to any given objective or facility; allocated resources; and the structure of the existing information security system.


23. Even the military has written about the subject of psychotronic weapons in its publications. For example, see L. Chernishev, “Polychat li poveliteli ‘zombi’ blast’ nad mirom,” [Can a ruler make ‘Zombies’ out of the world],” Orientir [Orienteer], February 1997, pp. 58-62.


26. Marshal Igor Sergeyev, comments in Krasnaia Zvezda [Red Star], December 9, 1999 (no page given), as translated and downloaded from the FBIS web page on December 9, 1999. All of Sergeyev’s comments in the next 8 paragraphs are from this document.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid. Geodesy is a branch of applied mathematics concerned with the determination of the size and shape of the earth and the exact positions of points on its surface and with the description of variations of its gravity field. Webster’s Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Tenth Edition, 1998, p. 487.

30. Ibid.


34. “Russian Strategic Aviation to be More Powerful Soon—Experts,” Interfax, Moscow, December 12, 1999.


39. Moscow Interfax, 1445 GMT, November 18, 1999, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS web site on November 18, 1999.


41. Ibid., p. 73.

42. Ibid., pp. 73-75.

43. Rosvooruzhenie (State Corporation for Export and Import of Armament and Military Equipment) handout.


48. Space News (Russian publication), December 6, 1999, p. 10.


50. Ibid.


52. Tsymbal, pp. 11, 12.


55. Author’s discussion with General-Major (retired) V. D. Riabchuk, Fort Leavenworth, September 1996.

56. Ibid.

Nuclear Doctrine and Strategic Force Modernization

Christoph Bluth

The national security policy of a state, which involves elements of foreign policy as well as military policy, can generally be understood to be designed to safeguard vital national interests and protect the state from external political and military threats. Russia inherited a vast military establishment from the Soviet Union which was largely designed to engage in high-intensity warfare with the West or China. This included the bulk of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the General Staff in Moscow lost control over substantial military assets that had been forward-deployed in other republics. The task for the Russian military leadership was to restructure the country's military forces on the basis of this inheritance in a radically different geopolitical environment. This required that the Russian Federation would come to terms with being an independent state and define its national interests and foreign and security policy objectives.

The lack of consensus on Russian security policy and more broadly, on what constitutes Russia's national interest has resulted in confusion and contradictions among Russian commentators on strategic arms policy and nuclear arms control. One of the few issues, however, on which there is a relatively broad consensus in Russia is that the country should remain a nuclear power for the foreseeable future. The reasons for this are complex and deep-rooted. They are based on general political considerations, as well as economic and military ones. From a political perspective, “it is believed by most members of the political elite that strategic nuclear weapons are the last remaining symbol of Russia's Great Power status.”

There is a perception that the principal reason why the West, and the United States in particular, is paying so much attention to Russia is that Russia remains a strategic nuclear power. The idea here is not that Russia should rebuild a global role. It is rather based on the fear that Russia may become marginalized. The current political leadership seeks to avoid this at all costs in order to retain and increase the potential for international economic cooperation and aid. These are perceived as essential if Russia is to reverse its sharp political and economic decline and achieve a successful transition to a modern democratic state with a strong economy based on market principles. Moreover, they are essential for the preservation of the wealth of the country's elites. There is a deep paradox inherent in the maintenance of a substantial arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons on the basis of such considerations. It results from the fact that Russia's strategic nuclear weapons are technically the principal military threat to the United States. This produces a plethora of political efforts to reduce or eliminate the nuclear weapons as a factor in relations with the West. On the other hand, a residual threat based on the mere possession of a substantial arsenal is required to ensure that the West takes Russian concerns seriously.

The political considerations which underlie the preservation of strategic nuclear forces are both important in terms of Russian foreign policy and domestic politics. Russia has absorbed
relatively peacefully the enormous shift in the geostrategic balance, which has resulted in the loss of its influence in a sizeable part of the Third World, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (and thus the loss of Russian dominance in Eastern Europe), and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. There is a fear in Russia that without its nuclear status it will lose its last vestige of international influence and respect, given the collapse of the domestic economy which at least in the short term deprives Russia of other indicators of power and influence.

The poor state of Russia's conventional armed forces is a major factor underpinning the maintenance of Russia's nuclear status. The situation in the armed forces is critical, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the lack of resources has degraded the fighting capability of the conventional forces to such an extent that they are scarcely capable of dealing with small local conflicts. Rebuilding Russia's armed forces will require the sustained deployment of substantial resources over years and remains an unlikely prospect in the foreseeable future. Modest strategic force modernization may therefore remain the only financially viable way in which Russia can maintain a military force capable of deterring major external threats.

At present, no one seems to believe that Russia will have to give up nuclear weapons altogether; the economic costs of maintaining a nuclear arsenal are balanced by the costs of arms control, dismantling nuclear weapons, and verification regimes. However, there is a strong belief in government circles that the present size of the nuclear arsenal is unsustainable and that the level of strategic nuclear forces in particular will have to be cut substantially, at a minimum in line with established arms control agreements.

**Nuclear Weapons and Military Security**

Are there still sound military reasons for Russia to retain a strategic nuclear arsenal after the Cold War? In order to assess how this question is answered by the decisionmaking elite in Russia, a brief analysis of the development of military policy since the end of the Cold War is in order. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the traditional perceptions of the international security environment that dominated the Cold War period were abandoned surprisingly quickly by the political elite. The military was somewhat slow to follow along a similar path. By mid-1992 the relevance of the “defense of the Western Perimeter was seriously questioned,” but traditional thinking still pervaded the debate until well into 1993. By the time a new military doctrine was approved in November 1993, a radical reevaluation of the security threats facing Russia had been adopted by the Russian military. The military and arms control policies of Russia since then reflect the perceptions of the security environment after the Cold War. There was widespread acceptance among the military leadership and the political elite that the security relationship with the West had changed and that the principal military threats come from the southern periphery of the Russian Federation and from Third World countries that are acquiring weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. In line with a general restructuring of the Russian military to rapid reaction and crisis intervention roles, there was a fundamental change in thinking about the role of nuclear weapons to meet the new range of threats. The utility of strategic nuclear
As far as the role of nuclear weapons is concerned, the emphasis was placed squarely on nuclear deterrence. The aim of the Russian Federation’s policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons according to the 1993 doctrine was to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring any aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. This committed Russia to a policy of extended deterrence against threats to the security of its (unspecified) allies. There was a policy of no nuclear use against non-nuclear states that acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but there was no longer such a policy vis-à-vis nuclear weapons states or non-nuclear states which enjoy a nuclear guarantee by nuclear weapons states. This constituted an abandonment of the pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, which had been a central element of Soviet declaratory policy since 1981. Some Western commentators found this alarming. But it should be pointed out that the “no first use” pledge was made in the context of the confrontation in central Europe, where the Soviet Union was determined to avoid escalation to the nuclear level in any conflict.

The new doctrine was more in line with the notion of a last-resort deterrent in the kinds of conflicts for which Russia was preparing. It could also be interpreted as a warning to Turkey against any involvement in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or to Ukraine as it considered the fate of nuclear weapons on its territory. However, as the capabilities of the Russian armed forces decline, one can detect an increasing emphasis on nuclear forces to compensate for weakness at the conventional level. At present, tactical weapons are not forward deployed, and Russia therefore lacks the instrument to implement a policy of regional nuclear deterrence in any operational sense. There had been suggestions, however, that Russia might redeploy tactical nuclear weapons if NATO expands to include countries of the former Warsaw Pact. However, this now seems precluded by the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed at the NATO summit on May 27, 1997, when NATO declared its intention not to deploy nuclear weapons in the new member states except in a crisis.

The use of the armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, their deployment outside the national territory, and the conduct of peacekeeping operations on the territories of the former Soviet republics together perhaps constituted the most important new element in Russian military doctrine. The doctrine also stated that units of the armed forces could be used in internal conflicts to support the forces of the Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation in localizing and blockading the conflict region, suppressing armed clashes, and separating the conflicting parties as well as defending strategically important objects. This part of the military doctrine was in conflict with the law on defense, which prohibits the use of regular armed forces inside the Russian Federation. The use of nuclear weapons, obviously, was not contemplated under such circumstances.

The military doctrine asserted that Russia did not consider “any state as its enemy” and would not use its armed forces or other armed formations against any state for any purposes other than individual or collective self-defense in the case of an armed attack on the Russian
The potential sources of a military threat to Russia from outside include, according to the 1993 military doctrine:

- Territorial claims against the Russian Federation from the other post-Soviet states;
- Existing and potential sources of local wars and armed conflicts, primarily those in direct proximity to the Russian borders;
- Proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the means of delivery, and modern military technologies;
- The oppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation abroad;
- The enlargement of military blocs and alliances (e.g. NATO) in such a way as to violate the military security interests of the Russian Federation.

According to the document, the greatest threat to Russia arose from armed conflicts caused by aggressive nationalism and religious intolerance. The main objective of the organizational development of the Russian Federation armed forces and other troops was to create and develop forces capable of defending the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country, the security of the citizens, and the other vitally important interests of society and state in line with the military-political and strategic situation in the world. In view of the absence of an agreed concept of the national security of Russia, it is unclear what the vital interests of the Russian Federation were considered to be. Such statements in the military doctrine, therefore, remained open to interpretation.

The military part of Russia’s military doctrine set out a view of the possible character of future conflicts. Under conditions in which the danger of global war (both nuclear and conventional) was reduced substantially though not eliminated completely, local wars and armed conflicts represented the main threat to stability and peace. Their probability in some regions was considered to be increasing.

The doctrine went on to note that combat action in local war and armed conflicts could be waged by the groups of forces deployed in the region of conflict in peacetime. If necessary, these groups of forces could be reinforced by units re-deployed from other regions. The Russian Federation needed to maintain the combat potential of the groups of forces deployed in peacetime at a level sufficient to repulse aggression on a local (regional) scale. The term “aggression on a local (regional) scale,” however, remained vague and open to a variety of interpretations.

Local wars and armed conflicts were perceived as the most likely source of military threats to Russia. The military doctrine assumed that a wide variety of forces could be engaged in
these operations, from a small number of armed units up to operational-strategic groups of forces, along with the use of all types of weapons, from small arms to modern precision-guided “smart” weapons. The priority in force design was the development of the Russian Federation armed forces and other troops intended for deterrence against aggression, as well as the mobile forces of the Russian Federation armed forces and other troops able to redeploy within a short period and mount and conduct maneuver operations in any sector (region) where a threat to the security of the Russian Federation could arise. Furthermore, Russian armed forces could be deployed outside the national territory to safeguard the security of either the Russian Federation or other former Soviet republics.

The document on military doctrine reflected a basic contradiction in the way in which force requirements are defined. On the one hand, local wars and armed conflicts were clearly presented as the principal security threat. On the other hand, the operational strategic concepts and the remarks on practical implementation had the appearance of a guide for the preparation for military operations around the globe, based on the acquisition of sea- and airlift capabilities on a global scale. This was also in contradiction to the intention asserted by the Soviet Union in the period of “new political thinking” as regards the liquidation of capabilities to launch surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations. The emphasis on the defensive nature of the military-technical aspects of military doctrine thus appears to have been lost.

One possible interpretation is that the military doctrine was designed not only to define the military contingencies with which Russia would most probably have to deal, but also to provide a rationale for the ambitious force goals of the military establishment, which sought to preserve something as close as possible to the military capabilities of the former Soviet Union. This probably also applied to strategic nuclear weapons, which have no role to play in any of the conflicts or potential conflicts that Russia is involved with.

The 1997 national security concept reaffirmed the concept of first-use introduced in the 1993 military doctrine, and the same is true for the new military doctrine developed in 1998, although its approval was postponed. The provisions on first-use remained the same, even though there had been attempts to remove some of the restrictions with regard to non-nuclear countries. The war in Kosovo had considerable impact as Russia took the threat of NATO intervention in the former Soviet Union more seriously and renewed the emphasis on nuclear deterrence, including tactical nuclear weapons. A special meeting of the Security Council in April 1999 decided to put in a place a program on the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, including new low-yield nuclear warheads. It was also reported that a redeployment of tactical nuclear warheads to land-based short-range missiles and artillery was proposed, which would have thereby ended the unilateral arms control measures put in place by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991. Large-scale exercises called Zapad conducted in June and July 1999 during the Kosovo crisis were based on the scenario of a NATO attack from Poland against Kaliningrad, involving a Russian reply with nuclear weapons when Russian forces were in difficulty.

The 1999 draft nuclear doctrine reaffirmed the importance of nuclear deterrence, especially in regional wars where nuclear powers are involved. The Russian reaction to
recent events is clearly evident in the identification of external threats. They include the actions of external powers that interfere with the internal affairs of the Russian Federation (a possible reference to the Chechnya crisis), or that ignore (or infringe on) Russian Federation interests in resolving international security problems and oppose strengthening of the Russian Federation as one of the influential centres of multipolar world. External threats are also deemed to include the action of foreign troops (without UN Security Council sanction) on the territory of contiguous states friendly with the Russian Federation (a possible reference to the Kosovo conflict). Although the West is not mentioned explicitly as a source of external threats, it is implied as the actor in some of the potential threats to the security of the Russian Federation. The new national security concept adopted by acting President Putin on January 10, 2000, is based almost verbatim on the 1999 draft doctrine. It was widely reported as "lowering the nuclear threshold." What this means in practice is that nuclear weapons are not purely reserved for last-resort use in an extreme situation, but can be used in a small-scale war that does not threaten Russia's existence. This is a reference to the kind of air campaign NATO inflicted on Serbia during the Kosovo conflict.

We can say, therefore, that despite the safety and security concerns, and despite far-reaching arms control agreements, Russia has placed renewed emphasis on its nuclear arsenal because of the virtual collapse of its conventional military capabilities and the instability and conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. However, the military doctrine, while renouncing the pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, does not specify targets or circumstances under which nuclear weapons might be used. The possibility that Russia might redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for the lack of conventional military power is troublesome because the kind of conflicts Russia is or might become involved in, such as in Chechnya or Tajikistan, are not susceptible to nuclear deterrence. In other words, a nuclear threat might result in nuclear use. Former President Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin, have resisted notions of nuclear peacekeeping, but it cannot be taken for granted that in extreme situations the nuclear option would not be reconsidered if the condition of the Russian armed forces continues to deteriorate. On the other hand, if such fears are unwarranted, it means that nuclear weapons have no role in the kinds of conflicts Russia is most likely to be involved in, either in terms of deterrence or military action. In other words, where nuclear weapons are effective, there is no threat in any event, and where there is a threat, they are not effective. This is a fundamental but unresolved contradiction in the new emphasis on nuclear weapons in military doctrine.

As noted earlier, there is a strong perception in Russia that nuclear weapons are vital to its security. It could even be argued that because nuclear weapons provide Russia with security, they obviate the need for conventional rearmament and thereby release political, economic, and financial resources for reform and development. There is some truth to this argument, but at the same time it should not be overstated, because, as we have seen, there are no realistic threats to Russian security that require or are susceptible to nuclear deterrence, whereas there are real military threats where nuclear weapons have no effect. The security nuclear weapons provide for Russia in the present is psychological, not military. This still leaves Russia with the need to find military means to address its actual security risks. Moreover, the nuclear weapons complex itself poses a substantial risk to Russia's national security. While a nuclear emphasis in the face of conventional weakness is understandable, it
is unclear that the military doctrine as it is evolving represents the most appropriate response to the national security dilemmas that Russia faces.

**Strategic Force Planning**

Military doctrine does not provide any clear guidance for strategic force planning. Here we encounter the contradiction that despite the acceptance of the political perceptions of the global security environment, strategic analysis in the General Staff is still based on the relationship between U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. The objective of strategic arms policy remains that of nuclear strategic parity, or, if that is not possible, sufficiency vis-à-vis the United States. There is, of course, an awareness that third-country nuclear arsenals, such as those of Britain, France, and China, remain in place and (in the case of China) are even augmented. For Russian strategic planners, the future relationship with China, in an environment where the military-strategic balance and the two countries’ relative economic potential are changing substantially, remains potentially the most troublesome. For all these reasons, they perceive the need to guard against nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail in the future. Nevertheless, force requirements are still defined on the basis of U.S. capabilities.

Russian military planners do not base their objectives on the notion of a “minimum deterrent,” such as has been advocated by civilian analysts. For them, strategic parity presupposes the qualitative equality of the strategic capabilities of both sides in their ability to conduct effective operations against each other’s strategic offensive forces. It also means that Russia must be sure to maintain, as a minimum, an adequate second-strike, countervalue reserve force vis-à-vis the United States.

The Soviet strategic deterrent, as it had been developed by the early 1980s, was based on a time-urgent counterforce capability configured to a launch-on-warning posture. This was based on the assumption that in the age of highly accurate counterforce systems even hardened systems could not survive a determined, large-scale first strike. Early warning and command and control systems were designed to enable such a posture to be operationalized. However, it is clear that the General Staff was acutely aware of the technical problems involved in accurately assessing a large-scale nuclear surprise attack and the very short decision-times. Although substantial resources and planning were directed towards achieving the capability for launch-on-warning (known as otvetno-vstrechii udar—a retaliatory meeting-strike), the confidence that such a response could be successfully carried out in a manner that would allow the bulk of Soviet counterforce-capable strategic nuclear forces to be launched was not very high. Thus an aide to the former First Deputy Defense Minister A. Kokoshin stated in 1993 that because of the time constraints and the technical problems involved, the threat of the otvetno-vstrechii udar during the Soviet period was unsound. Soviet military planners were acutely aware of the vulnerability of land-based ICBMs, given that 70 percent of Soviet strategic nuclear forces were in this category. The determined development and continuous improvements of a launch-on-warning capability were clear indications of this awareness. The improvements included advances in missile
technology to allow rapid launch and the development and deployment of ground- and space-based early warning systems.

Another indication was the Soviet preoccupation with the security of command and control facilities. A vast network of underground command posts, some as deep as 1,000 feet, was designed to complicate U.S. attempts to destroy Soviet command and control in a first strike. The sheer scale of the Soviet effort, and the maintenance of a ballistic missile defense system around Moscow, bore witness to the importance attached to this objective.

Still another indication was the nature and direction of their fifth generation ICBM developments. Both the SS-24 and SS-25 were to be deployed in a mobile mode. This would allow the maintenance of a second-strike reserve force equivalent to the sea-based force of the United States. However, by the time the USSR was dissolved, the deployment of mobile ICBMs was far from complete. The deployment and role of mobile missiles form one element in the current debate about the future of Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

There are several possible future lines of development for Russia's strategic nuclear forces, assuming that at least some forces will be maintained. At one end of the spectrum would be the preservation of a deterrent of last resort on the scale of British and French forces. The deployment of large-scale counterforce capabilities configured in an integrated launch-on-warning mode would be given up in favor of a small-scale residual second-strike deterrent. This option does have active supporters in the Russian political and military elite. At the other end of the spectrum would be the retention of the existing capabilities (which required extensive modernization by the turn of the century) and continuation of the previous trend in force deployments (i.e., the increased development and deployment of mobile ICBMs and sea-based systems). While this latter option is also favored by some, there is a widespread conviction in the Russian elite that such a policy would not be in conformity with the new international situation. Not only would it be unnecessarily provocative, but it would also be extremely difficult to implement given the economic problems Russia faces and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which has resulted in major missile construction facilities remaining located outside of present-day Russia. An intermediate option would be a policy to maintain parity vis-à-vis the United States in the context of large-scale reductions as envisaged by the START treaties. This is currently official policy, but the fundamental questions regarding nuclear strategy and the details of the future force posture have remained largely unresolved. In order to get a better understanding of the various options currently under discussion, it is useful to consider the various elements of the strategic nuclear force separately.

Strategic Bombers. In the final years of the Soviet Union, the strategic bomber force appeared to be emerging finally as a genuine third leg of a “strategic triad.” However, this branch of the strategic forces was most severely affected by the breakup of the Soviet Union. A substantial portion of the strategic bomber fleet was lost to Ukraine, including most of the modern TU-160 Blackjacks. Several Blackjack bombers were flown back to Russia in July 1992 by dissident pilots, but the bulk of the fleet remains in Ukraine. The Bear H bomber force has likewise been severely fragmented by the breakup of the Soviet Union; out of 88 such bombers, 40 were based in Kazakhstan and 26 in Ukraine, including five at the only repair
facility for the Bear at Belaya Tserkov in Ukraine. The only Il-78 Midas strategic tanker aircraft is also in Ukraine. Kazakhstan has proven more amenable to returning at least some of the aircraft to the Russian air force.20

Currently Russia has 63 Tu-95MS heavy bombers, which date back to the 1950s but were modernized in 1980 in order to be able to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). The bombers exist in two variants—28 that can carry six ALCMs and 35 that carry 16 ALCMs. There are six Tu-160 in Russia, carrying 12 ALCMs each. Russia was willing to buy back the 19 Tu-160s based in Ukraine, but gave up in 1997 after five years of negotiations over the price. However, in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis the Security Council decided in April 1999 to purchase the only serviceable strategic aircraft still in Ukraine (eight TU-160s and three TU-95MSs) as payment for some of Ukraine’s energy debt. An agreement was finally reached, and a number of aircraft were returned to Russia in early 2000.

Nevertheless, any expansion of the bomber force as part of a restructuring of Russian strategic forces under START appears unlikely, not least because of the cost. Production lines for strategic bombers were closed down in 1992 and are unlikely to be re-opened.21 Interviews with Russian military experts confirm that there is no substantial interest in rebuilding a strategic nuclear bomber force, even though some have voiced an interest in reviving the project for a “stealth bomber” abandoned in the early 1980s to match the American B-2. The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Vladimir Yakovlev, has publicly supported a strategic triad and the need for a heavy bomber force, possibly in response to U.S. plans to deploy a national missile defense. There is also a project for a new supersonic ALCM, the Kh-101, which can be deployed as a nuclear or conventional missile, thus possibly giving bombers a new role as aerial launchers. However, the TU-95MSs and even the TU-160s are becoming obsolete, and there seems to be little prospect for a properly funded program to develop a new strategic bomber. The most likely scenario is that despite the fact that START I favors deployment of bombers, this leg of the strategic nuclear deterrent force will be abandoned by Russia or at best maintained at a minimal level.

ICBMs. The ICBM force that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union is a mix of fourth and fifth generation Soviet strategic missiles. The fourth generation consisted mostly of the highly accurate SS-19 with six warheads (360 missiles deployed) and the heavy SS-18 (308 missiles, mostly deployed in an eight to ten warhead configuration).22 They gave the Soviet Union a substantial counterforce capability against the United States and thus radically transformed the Soviet strategic nuclear force posture. Key advances were made in fuel technology (allowing the SS-17 and SS-18 to be cold-launched), guidance systems (putting U.S. ICBM silos within reach of the SS-18 and SS-19), and multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (warheads) (MIRVs), which allowed a large expansion of the number of warheads deployed while keeping the number of launchers fixed as provided for by the 1972 SALT I agreement.23

The SS-18 (RS-20) (codenamed Satan by NATO), successor to the SS-9, is a very heavy missile. As its designation might indicate, this missile was perceived by Western analysts as the most threatening element of the Soviet strategic arsenal and is still considered the most potent weapon in the Russian ICBM force. In 1974 it was deployed with a single 24-megaton
warhead and an estimated accuracy of 0.24 nautical miles. By the late Seventies, the fourth modification of the SS-18 was carrying ten MIRVed 0.55-megaton warheads, while the accuracy had improved to 0.14 nautical miles. By 1980, 308 SS-18s were therefore in principle, capable of delivering 3,080 half-megaton warheads on the continental United States.

The SS-19 (RS-18), a hot-launched liquid-fuel missile developed by the Chelomei design bureau, is capable of carrying six 0.55 megaton MIRVed warheads or a 4.3 megaton single warhead. A total of 350 SS-19s, mostly of the MIRVed modification 3, were ultimately deployed in four silo fields. The SS-19, like the SS-11, is a missile of variable range. It has been estimated that 120 were deployed as regional weapons in the European and Far Eastern theaters, rather than in an ICBM mode. During the Soviet period the SS-18 and SS-19 were seen by Western analysts as the principal counterforce elements threatening the U.S. Minuteman ICBM force.

The structure of the Soviet fourth generation ICBM force (including the surviving elements of the third generation SS-11s and SS-13s) was such that it provided a versatile capability against a whole range of targets, including civilian and economic targets. It is quite evident, nonetheless, that the SS-18 and SS-19 force was clearly designed to attack Minuteman silos. American analysts have taken the view, based on available information about the hardening of Minuteman silos and the accuracy of the Soviet missiles, that at least two warheads would need to be targeted on a Minuteman silo to achieve a good probability of destruction. Apart from Minuteman silos, hardened command and control centers were also likely targets for this force. Important soft targets in the continental United States such as strategic bomber fields, military headquarters, and countervalue targets could be handled by single-warhead SS-17 and SS-19 missiles. The SS-11 and the SS-18 were also suitable for attacking long-range naval targets.

The fifth generation Soviet ICBMs, which emerged in the 1980s, constituted an important step toward a truly modern missile force measured by the standards of American technology. The first successful solid-fueled missile deployed by the Soviet Union was the intermediate range SS-20. Both the SS-24 and SS-25 (RS-12M) are solid-fueled, thus enabling the quick alert rate and mobility that can only be achieved with the use of solid fuels. It is also clear that the Soviets had made important advances in inertial guidance systems. The accuracy of the SS-24 and SS-25 is given by the IISS at 200 meters circular error probable (CEP)—slightly better than that of the most accurate Minuteman III (220 meters CEP), but not in the same class as the American MX Peacekeeper missile (100 meters CEP). The SS-24 was essentially the Soviet answer to the MX. Its throw-weight is estimated to be slightly higher than that of the MX, and like the MX it carries 10 MIRVed warheads. The yield of the warheads is given for the SS-24 by the IISS as 100 kilotons. It was deployed both in silos and in a rail-mobile mode in line with the current Soviet view to ensure invulnerability through mobility. The SS-25 is a single-warhead missile deployed in silos or in a road-mobile mode. Deployment began in 1985.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the START process have placed in bolder relief some old and some new weaknesses in the structure of the ICBM force that Russia has
inherited. The breakup of the Soviet Union generated doubt about Russia's ability to maintain heavy MIRVed missiles in the future. The fourth generation ICBMs reached the end of their programmed service life at the end of the century and need to be modernized. The SS-18 in particular is due for replacement, and extensions of its service life (using a variety of means, including the purchase of spare parts and missiles that were manufactured recently and not yet deployed) cannot prolong its deployment beyond 2005. Production of this missile, which was manufactured at the Yuzhny engineering works in Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine, has ceased and is unlikely to be resumed in the current climate of relations between Russia and Ukraine. The design documentation and intellectual property rights associated with the design are in the possession of the Yuzhnoe design bureau. It has therefore become difficult to provide for the technical safety of these missiles, and their modernization would require a substantial investment in missile technology and production facilities in Russia itself. This is true more generally for the production of MIRVed ICBMs. Russia is unwilling to rely on design bureaus and missile production facilities outside the Russian Federation and therefore has deliberately cut its ties with Yuzhnoe and other missile design and production centers.

The SS-24 faces similar problems since it also was assembled in Ukraine. Only the guidance systems for the SS-24 were manufactured in Russia. In 1992 plans had been made to develop and deploy a follow-on to the SS-24 in silos and in a rail-mobile mode to replace all the SS-18s and SS-24s after the year 2005. After the signing of START II, and in view of the breakdown in the links with Ukraine, these plans have been quietly shelved.

There were also severe safety problems associated with the deployment of the SS-24 in a rail-mobile mode. Large parts of the Russian rail system were simply inadequate to permit the secure transportation of the missiles. This meant that if the trains were out on patrol they occupied sections of the rail network for considerable time when they were required for civilian use. Even then, there remained a substantial risk of accidents; in one incident the missile train caught fire. The highly toxic fuel burned with an intensity that made it impossible for fire fighters to approach the scene of the accident immediately. As a consequence of these problems, the concept of rail mobility has now been all but abandoned. The existing SS-24 missiles are all deployed at fixed points (i.e. in silos), and no rail patrols are taking place. In view of these problems, there is no significant opposition to scrapping the SS-24 by way of implementation of strategic arms control agreements. The SS-24 will be taken out of service by 2010, if not before. Likewise, the SS-19 will have to be retired by 2009 at the latest, and even the SS-25 (Topol) will reach the end of its programmed service life by 2005 (although it can be extended by five years). This means that Russia has one decade in which to complete replacement of its existing ICBM force with new missiles.  

A serious problem is that there is now only one design bureau in Russia involved in missile design (the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology; all the others have reverted to civilian projects, such as space launchers. This design bureau is therefore solely responsible for the new generation of ICBMs. The only missile it has produced is the Topol-M, now commonly designated the SS-27 (although previously referred to as variant 2 of the SS-25).
It is important to recognize that the effective abandonment of MIRVed ICBMs, although to some extent forced by the breakup of the Soviet Union, is a matter of policy. The main requirements for the modern Russian ICBM force are survivability and penetration capability. This means a low number of warheads per missile (most likely one), deployment in hard silos or in road-mobile form, a hardened missile body, protection against electromagnetic pulse and other defense penetration capabilities, including an unusually low-boost trajectory to confound space-based defenses.

If the START II Treaty is not ratified and Russia decides not to implement it, then it might continue to deploy MIRVed missiles, either by putting three warheads onto the Topol M or by deploying a new MIRVed SLBM as an ersatz ICBM in silos. The concept currently being considered most actively by Russian military planners, one that has the support of some political analysts, is the creation of a new type of uniform missile to be deployed both as an SLBM and as an ICBM on land. One option is a missile having characteristics similar to the SS-27 (with a launch-weight of 40 tons), carrying 3-4 warheads. The land-based version would be developed to carry three warheads (downloaded to a single warhead configuration to conform with START II) in a road-mobile mode. The sea-based version could be deployed with four warheads. The buses (devices that enable the independent deployment of several warheads on one missile) for the MIRVed system on the land-based version would be stored, together with warheads, to provide a recovery potential of up to 2,000 warheads in the event of a break-out from the treaty regime by the United States. This procedure approaches the estimated recovery potential of the United States as a consequence of the downloading of Minuteman III ICBMs. In the event of the deployment of a national missile defense system by the United States, there may be a lot of pressure to have MIRVed ICBMs.

The principal consequence for Russian military planners is that under START II the land-based force has to consist of single-warhead ICBMs. Except for 109 downloaded SS-19s, these will all be SS-25s and SS-27s. After the retirement of older missiles, the ICBM force will consist only of SS-27s and a new dual ICBM/SLBM follow-on to the SS-27 (with one warhead if land-based), provided the plans to develop such a missile are successful (discussed below). Under START II ceilings, Russia ultimately intends to deploy 690 SS-25/27s.

The SS-25 is deployed in silos and in a road-mobile mode. Mobility, while strategically desirable, inevitably introduces safety risks. Much of the Russian road network is in poor condition, especially in the countryside where the SS-25 patrols take place in order to avoid detection. There have been a number of topple-over accidents with road-mobile launchers. Road-deployment also makes the missiles more vulnerable to attacks by terrorists or (in the event of war) foreign agents.

Nonetheless, Russian military planners remain convinced of the desirability of mobility for ICBMs. The sustained but largely fruitless effort to locate and destroy mobile missile launchers in Iraq during the Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated that mobility provides some protection even against modern space-based reconnaissance systems, thus vastly complicating any first-strike plans. For this reason most of the SS-27s will also be deployed in road-mobile mode, although all the SS-27s in service so far are in silos.
The decision to begin production of the Topol-M was made by President Yeltsin in February 1993 after design work, which began in the 1980s, was completed. The first test flight was in December 1994. In 1997 the missile was officially adopted for deployment, but initially only two missiles were deployed, in an evaluative mode. The first group of Topol-Ms was deployed with great fanfare at the end of 1998 at the Tatishchevo missile base in the Saratov region. The annual rate of deployment is projected to be 30 to 40 per year, although funding problems might reduce that number considerably. Thus by 2010, Russia may have deployed 500 missiles, but with funding at a level of only 48 percent of what is required the production rate may be much lower. To be consistent with START II levels the ultimate number of Topol-Ms must not exceed 800.

Assuming the ratification of START II, the principal focus of Russia’s strategic nuclear force posture will be a single-warhead force deployed to provide a secure second-strike force with low vulnerability. Its manner of deployment will preclude a launch-on-warning posture, but the mobility of the forces and the fact that the United states will also no longer deploy land-based missiles with multiple warheads means that this will not be seen as necessary.

Political and economic circumstances suggest that the most likely future of Russia’s ICBM force is its consolidation into a single-warhead mobile land-based second-strike force. However, other options are under consideration and may be pursued more actively if relations with the United States should deteriorate and the economy remains sufficiently stable to allow the pursuit of a strategic challenge to the United States.

The Sea-based Deterrent. The Russian leadership seems to recognize that the naval component of the strategic nuclear triad will become more important as a result of START. Russia could maintain virtually all of its most modern missile-carrying submarines, the Delta III, Delta IV, and Typhoon—while remaining under the limit of 1,750 SLBM warheads imposed by the second phase of START II—by downloading some of its MIRVed SLBMs under the agreed rules. Currently about 30 percent of Russia’s long-range ballistic missiles are deployed on submarines; under START this could increase to over 50 percent without any new missiles or nuclear submarines having to be built. Russia’s sea-based forces, however, cannot be used to execute the kind of coordinated attack on time-urgent hard targets as the currently deployed land-based force can, and such a shift would therefore require a completely different strategic doctrine and operational plans. The Russian submarine force is also plagued by communications problems, which hinder effective command control in crises. The undersea fleet is also vulnerable to American antisubmarine warfare (ASW).

A general problem is that Russia’s ballistic missile submarine fleet is currently in poor condition. There are increasing concerns about safety problems associated with the older SSBNs, and currently there are very few patrols by even the most modern boats. Ten Yankee class submarines have been decommissioned since START I was signed. The more modern boats can remain in service for another decade or so; by 2006, even the Delta IV and Typhoon boats will need to be decommissioned. To maintain its sea-based force Russia will therefore have to design and deploy a follow-on system to enter service shortly after the envisaged implementation of START II. Given that military shipbuilding in Russia has come almost to a
complete halt and the entire industry is in a state of decay, such an ambitious step would require substantial investments.

The construction of a new submarine called the Borey began in November 1996 at the Severodvinsk shipyard. The Borey could also be called the Delta V because it is essentially a modernization of that SSBN class. It marks a shift away from the larger boats of the Typhoon class. Due to funding shortages it is envisaged that by 2010 Russia will have one and at most two operational Boreys. The Borey will carry 12 SLBM. The missile apparently intended for the Borey was a project called “Bark,” a follow-on to the SS-N-20. This was a missile with a throw-weight of 3.05 tons designed to carry 10 warheads. The development of this missile continued until 1997 when it was cancelled after three failed test-flights. On July 3, 1998, at a meeting of the Security Council which adopted a strategic forces development program extending to 2010, a decision was made to procure a new solid-fueled SLBM to be jointly developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and Miass (SLBM) design bureaus. This new missile, which is to be deployed both as an ICBM and SLBM and will be called Bulava, is essentially a derivative of the Topol-M. In its SLBM configuration, the Bulava would carry three or four warheads; each Borey submarine would be able to deliver either 48 or 64 warheads as a result (assuming an increase in the number of missile tubes from 12 to 16). Nikolai Sokov points out that there are options for liquid-fueled follow-on designs based on existing SLBMs, with six warheads per missile, which could be deployed on the Borey if the Bulava is delayed or fails to materialize. As a consequence the precise configuration of warheads based on submarines in the future is quite difficult to predict, but it is clear that if current plans are implemented the share of warheads based at sea in the Russian arsenal will increase from 30 to 50 percent within the next two decades, with about 800 to 900 warheads deployed at sea. The caveat is funding; while the number of warheads based on land will certainly decrease, the ability of Russia to increase its sea-based arsenal depends on funding. It is expected that ultimately seven Boreys will be deployed. These may not be forthcoming if the economic crisis in Russia deepens during the next decade. Moreover, Russia’s surface navy, which has a key role in protecting SSBNs, would require substantial rejuvenation, thus raising the cost of rebuilding and expanding the sea-based strategic nuclear forces even more. The strategic plans of the Russian navy thus may turn out to be unrealizable.

**Conclusion**

There are influential voices in the West which argue for a commitment to cooperative de-nuclearization as the most favorable trend in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. In many respects, this would be a logical concomitant of the change in the political relationship between the two main protagonists of the Cold War.

Although both sides are taking steps in the direction of dissolving the strategic nuclear confrontation of the Cold War, the political commitment to co-operative de-nuclearization has faltered. Indeed, Russia’s strategic withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the concomitant disintegration of the Soviet military, the
implementation of conventional arms control agreements, and the economic collapse are factors which have resulted in the virtual disintegration of Russian military capabilities. As a consequence, there has been a definite shift towards greater reliance on nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. Strategic force modernization has been undertaken with great determination. Its direction is the creation of a strategic nuclear force different in structure from that which emerged in the Soviet period. The destabilizing accumulation of missiles with multiple warheads will be reversed with the deployment of survivable, mobile single-warhead systems. But it will still be a substantial force, configured to provide a reliable second-strike deterrent against U.S., Chinese, and any other forces. The direction of strategic force modernization does reflect Russia's circumstances, but it is not in accordance with normalization or even substantial in the international political environment. A constructive adaptation of nuclear weapons policies to Russia's post-Cold War relations with the West has yet to begin.

Endnotes

1. Sergei A. Karaganov, Russia: The New Foreign Policy and Security Agenda, London: Brassey's 1992, pp.24-25; it should be added that Karaganov supports the scrapping of all tactical nuclear warheads and some reductions in strategic nuclear forces.

2. Ibid., p. 28.


4. “Osnovnye polozheniia voennoi doktrini Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Voennaia mysl, Special issue, May 1992. pp. 382-3 at p. 5. Note that only a description of the basic provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation has been published. Any reference to the military doctrine in this chapter is to that description as published in Voennaia mysl'.


6. Interviews in Moscow, April 1996.

7. Voennaia Mysl, p. 16.

8. Ibid., p. 4.

9. Ibid., p.16.

10. Ibid., p. 12.


12. Ibid., p. 18.


14. Nezavisimaiia gazeta, June 30, 1999, p.2; Segodnia, July 2, 1999, p.1. For the latest draft nuclear doctrine, dated October 1999, see for a comment on the national security concept based on this doctrine and


16. This means that even in the event of a worst-case first strike by the United States, Russia would still retain sufficient nuclear weapons for use against soft targets (cities and industry) to be able to inflict what is called “unacceptable damage” to the United States.

17. The aid was Michael I. Gerasev. Interviews with various experts in Moscow in May 1994.


20. Clarke, p. 70.

21. Production of the Blackjack and the Bear H was stopped according to an announcement by President Yeltsin on January 29, 1992.


24. Analysts distinguish between counterforce, countermilitary, and countervalue targets. These refer respectively to the enemy strike forces (in particular nuclear missiles and aircraft), military installations and equipment, and civilian targets (cities, industrial centers).


27. Based on interviews with Russian experts. However, the activities of the so-called Ukrainian lobby in Moscow (led by representatives from the missile production complex in Ukraine) are directed against START because of the implications for heavy missiles produced in Ukraine.

28. Based on interviews.

29. Initial planning for the development and production of the SS-25 follow-on relied on Ukraine for 30 percent of the production and engineering inputs. These plans have since been revised for obvious reasons.

30. Petr Belov, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, November 3, 1992, p.4; this author is scathingly critical of the SS-25 for these reasons.

31. During the Gulf War of 1991, the destruction of mobile missile launchers even in conditions of complete air superiority turned out to be a much more difficult task than anticipated. See Martin Navias, Saddam’s Scud War and Ballistic Missile Proliferation, London: Brassey’s, 1991, pp. 28-35; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim


34. See the article by Yuri Maslyukov at www.rus.ru/forums/zagran; see also Sokov, p.135.

35. See Sokov, p.139.
Overview

Russia's nuclear weapons are both the mainstays of its deterrent capability and the subjects of considerable arms control negotiation. Its nuclear arsenal is seen by Russia's political and military leaders as the state's principal remaining claim to great power status. Unfortunately, Russia's main security problem is not maintaining deterrence against nuclear attack from foreign enemies, something easily accomplished with far fewer nuclear weapons than it has. Russia's principal nuclear security problems are to prevent economic meltdown and to provide reliable and stable political leadership for the armed forces. Boris Yeltsin's resignation as President of the Russian Federation on the final day of 1999 may open the door to greater success in paying for, modernizing, and controlling the armed forces than hitherto.

In the following discussion, we first consider why nuclear weapons and deterrence remain important in Russian military strategy. Second, we review force structure issues pertinent to nuclear arms control and deterrence. Third, the problems of stability and parity in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces are considered. Finally, the role that ballistic missile defenses might play in any deterrent or arms control relationship between the United States and Russia is noted.

Introduction

Nuclear weapons and arms control will continue to be important security concerns of the Russian government well into the next century. There are a number of reasons for the continuing salience of nuclear related issues. First, Russia still has many thousands of nuclear weapons, including those of intercontinental range. Second, the other acknowledged nuclear powers, in addition to the United States and Russia, show no inclination to abandon nuclear weapons as ultimate deterrents. China is by all accounts engaged in a significant modernization of its military technology base, including the base that supports improved delivery systems for nuclear weapons. A third reason for the continued importance of nuclear deterrence is the addition of India and Pakistan in 1998 to the club of acknowledged nuclear powers, and the potential for additional non-nuclear states to acquire these and other weapons of mass destruction.

Fourth, nuclear deterrence remains important because non-state actors, including terrorists, interstate criminal organizations (ICOs), and revolutionary actors of various sorts may acquire nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Although for some of their purposes nuclear weapons would be superfluous, for other objectives they would, even in small numbers and puny yields, be quite appropriate. Suppose that terrorists seized a group
of hostages in a target state, and suppose as well that these terrorists had a credible capability to detonate even a small nuclear device in the target state. This capability would greatly raise the risk, both to the hostages and the rescuers, of any hostage rescue operation contemplated by the target state.\(^1\) Terrorists allied with a state actor and equipped with nuclear weapons could gain from their ally valuable intelligence, sanctuary, and diplomatic cover.

A fifth reason for the continuing significance of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War system is, somewhat paradoxically, Russia's military and economic weakness. There are two aspects of this weakness that might contribute to nuclear deterrence failure based on failed crisis management, mistaken preemption, or inadvertent war. First, Russia's conventional military weakness makes it more reliant on nuclear weapons as weapons of first choice and first use, instead of last resort. Second, Russia's economic problems mean that it will have difficulty maintaining personnel morale and reliability. In addition, Russia's military will also be lacking in funds to modernize and properly equip its early warning and nuclear command, control, and communications systems. These weaknesses may encourage reliance on prompt launch doctrines for strategic nuclear retaliation or raise the odds in favor of a mistaken decision for preemption.

Sixth, Russia's new draft military doctrine of October 1999 reaffirmed the significance of nuclear weapons in Russian military strategy, noting that nuclear arms are an "effective factor of deterrence, guaranteeing the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, supporting international stability and peace."\(^2\) And despite the dire financial straits in which Russia's conventional military forces found themselves at century's end, civilian and military leaders reaffirmed the priority of nuclear force modernization in the face of NATO enlargement and possible U.S. deployments of ballistic missile defenses.\(^3\)

The draft military doctrine of 1999 was less significant for its military-technical aspects than for its political frame of reference. Compared to its 1993 predecessor, it was explicitly anti-Western and anti-United States. Expressing the Kremlin's obvious pique at having to swallow NATO enlargement and Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia in 1999, the draft doctrine condemned unipolarity, meaning U.S. superpower domination, while commending multipolarity, which would entail many centers of influence, including Russia.\(^4\) Nuclear weapons guarantee Russia a seat at the great power table and a claim to future status as one of the influential poles in a 21st century multipolar international system.

**Force Structures**

The United States takes the position that Russia should accept the strategic arms control obligations of the former Soviet government, undertaken in the START I and II agreements signed in 1991 and 1993, respectively. The second agreement called for the two sides to reduce their holdings of strategic nuclear weapons to the range of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, with additional limitations on launchers, especially MIRVed ICBMs (land-based missiles with multiple, independently targeted warheads). Russia finally ratified START II in the spring of 2000.
The United States and Russia concluded several agreements in 1997 with the objective of firming up START II and increasing the probability of its successful ratification in Russia. First, Washington and Moscow agreed to delay final implementation of the treaty-required reductions until December 31, 2007, instead of January 1, 2003. Related to this step, they also committed themselves to prompt negotiations on a follow-up START III agreement that would reduce each side’s strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000 - 2,500 by 2007.\(^5\)

Another reassurance for Russia was provided in bilateral agreements with regard to U.S. deployment of highly capable Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems. Both agreed to ban testing of TMD systems against ballistic missile targets with speeds above 5 kilometers/second or ranges in excess of 3,500 kilometers. The United States and Russia also agreed not to develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptors and will exchange information on theater missile defense plans and programs.\(^6\) A third agreement thought useful in expediting a Russian ratification of START II was the NATO-Russian Founding Act creating a Permanent Joint Council as a consultative forum for security issues of mutual interest. The Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council helped to assuage Russian concerns about the 1997 decisions taken on NATO enlargement to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.\(^7\)

Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) remain the backbone of its strategic retaliatory forces. At the end of 1998, 19 ICBM bases held 756 missiles of five types, including SS-18s, SS-19s, SS-24s, and SS-27s in underground silos; rail-mobile SS-24s; and road-mobile SS-25s. START II, when it goes into force, would eliminate all SS-18s and SS-24s and all SS-19s, except for 105 SS-19s: that would be downloaded to a single warhead. Some ICBM silos may be converted to accept the SS-27 Topol-M.\(^8\) General Vladimir Yakovlev, CINC of the Strategic Rocket Forces, called in 1999 for a production schedule of 20-30 Topol M becoming operational during each of the following three years, and for 30-40 per year for the three years thereafter.

With regard to ballistic missile submarines, Russia’s START exchange data of 1998 included 42 submarines of six classes, but the actual number of submarines available and fully operational is fewer than that. The Russian navy considers only 25 SSBNs to be operational, 16 in the Northern Fleet and nine in the Pacific Fleet.\(^9\) Operational tempos of the Russian SSBN fleet have been drastically reduced since the end of the Cold War, and Russia might have as few as 10-15 operational SSBNs by the end of 2003 (consisting of Delta IVs, updated Delta IIIIs, and Typhoons). Although the keel for the first Borey-class SSBN was laid in November 1996, construction was suspended in 1998 at least temporarily amid official statements that the ship was being redesigned.\(^10\) Russia in the autumn of 1998 was already below the START II ceiling for total warheads carried on SLBMs (1,750).

The modernization plans for the Russian strategic bomber force are as vague as those for the navy. Russia claimed some 70 strategic bombers at the end of 1998, but fewer were actually operational due to lack of funds. The current generation of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) is approaching the end of their programmed service lives, adding an additional modernization requirement for airborne resources already stretched. The commander in chief of the Russian air force has announced plans to replace the Tu-95MS Bear
H with a new aircraft after 2010, a rather distant date. Only two of the six Tu-160 Blackjack bombers listed as operational at the end of 1998 were actually able to take off, and plans to purchase additional Blackjacks from Ukraine fell through in 1997. The number of operational strategic bombers deployed in the next decade will surely fall below current deployments, and the possibility of Russia’s going out of the bomber business entirely cannot be discounted.\textsuperscript{11}

Compared to Russia, the United States has to undergo fewer exertions to realign its strategic nuclear forces for compliance with START II. The United States needed only to eliminate 50 Peacekeeper (MX) ICBMs, 4 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and 28 long-range bombers with air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) from its START I compliant force. U.S. plans assume the downloading of Minuteman III ICBMs and Trident II submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and conversion of B-1B bombers to conventional missions. Since the United States can meet its START II force structure requirements by downloading or mission changes, whereas Russia must build new systems and destroy many existing ones, some Russians complain that the United States has a comparative free ride. In addition, the removed U.S. warheads could be “uploaded” fairly quickly in the event that political relations between the two states deteriorated and arms reductions came to a halt. Table One, below, summarizes U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear force structures as of January 1999.

### U.S. Forces

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ICBM</strong>s</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MX/Peacekeeper</td>
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<td>Minuteman III</td>
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<td><strong>SLBM</strong>s</td>
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<td>Poseidon (C-3)</td>
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<td>Trident I (C-4)</td>
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<td>Trident II (D-5)</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal SLBMs</strong></td>
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<td>B-52 (non-ALCM)</td>
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<td>B-1</td>
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<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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**Russian Forces**

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<tr>
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<td>SS-24 (mobile)</td>
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<td>SS-27 (silo)</td>
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<td>SS-27 (mobile)</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal ICBMs</strong></td>
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<td><strong>SLBMs</strong></td>
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<td>152</td>
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<td>SS-N-18</td>
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<td>SS-N-23</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal SLBMs</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Bombers</strong></td>
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<td>Bear (non-ALCM)</td>
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<td>Blackjack (ALCM)</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal Bombers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1422</strong></td>
<td><strong>6578</strong></td>
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*Source: Arms Control Association, April 1999, provided by request and based on January 1999 Memorandum of Understanding, U.S. State Department.*

**Table 1: U.S. And Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.**

**Maintaining Parity and Stability**

Both U.S. and Russian negotiators are rightly concerned about the stability of the strategic nuclear balance at greatly reduced levels expected under START II, START III or even lower regimes if it comes to that. Stability is a tricky concept. Comparisons of force structures do not reveal some of the properties of force operations that may matter for crisis management or deterrence. For example, the United States relies more heavily on sea based ballistic missiles and bombers as parts of its retaliatory force than does Russia, which has favored land based missiles. The operational diversity of land, sea, and air forces complicates the plans of attackers. Land-based missiles are fast to react but for that reason also pose a
destabilizing threat of preemption. Sea-based missiles are the most survivable among launch platforms but require a degree of operational autonomy that unsettled commissars during the Cold War. The U.S. Air Force influence in defense planning ensures a prominent role for strategic bombers, which have been augmented by air-launched cruise missiles; Russia deploys comparatively fewer and less modern air forces.

Survivable Forces. Stability can be measured in various ways. We will first compare the numbers of “post-first-strike” surviving warheads delivered by U.S. and Soviet or Russian forces under the following conditions: (1) late (1991) Cold War forces of the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) U.S. and Russian START I forces; (3) START II compliant forces; (4) START III compliant forces. Chart 1 below displays the results of this comparison.

![Chart 1. Comparison of Number of Post-First-Strike nuclear Warheads Deliverable by United States and USSR/Russia Under Four Force Structure Regimes.](image-url)
It is apparent that even START III levels (2,500 maximum warheads for each side) provide for retaliatory strikes against a variety of target sets that meet any reasonable standard of “assured retaliation” sufficient for deterrence. Of course, this begs the question: deterrence of whom, about what? Deterrence was never a very elegant theory, only a way station proposed until theorists could come up with something better. “Better” remains a long way off, but the difficulties have more to do with the intractability of nuclear weapons (a few do enormous damage) than with the lack of ingenuity among scholars. But enough thinking was done in Moscow and in Washington during the Cold War to recognize that force sizes by themselves did not guarantee stable deterrence.

The United States and the Soviet Union approached the entire concept of deterrence-based stability from different vantage points. The Soviets never trusted deterrence as an abstraction apart from war preparedness. Soviet military theorists were also skeptical that war avoidance could be guaranteed by deterrence, stable or otherwise. Stability was a sacred concept to the U.S. arms control community. Although the Soviets understood our version of it, they did not accept the U.S. rendition as definitive. Having been tutored in war by Clausewitz through Lenin, Soviet leaders insisted that stability had as much to do with the intentions of potential adversaries as it did with their capabilities. These differences between the two strategic cultures in theorizing about stability and deterrence have carried forward into the post-Cold War world, although the Russian position is somewhat more opaque than formerly, and military doctrine in Russia remains a moveable feast.

Another difference between the U.S. and Soviet views of deterrence that has almost certainly carried forward into the 1990s is the Russian skepticism about nuclear brinkmanship or manipulation of risk. During the Cold War the Soviet view of nuclear blackmail (after Khrushchev’s nuclear adventurism led to the Cuban missile crisis) was that it was more dangerous than not regardless of policy objectives. Whereas the United States retained after 1962 a considerable degree of faith in crisis management including use of military means, the Soviet view was that crisis avoidance by political means was to be preferred. Of course, it was also the Soviet view and is arguably the Russian view now that nuclear blackmail against Russia must be deterred or resisted. Russia now regards its nuclear forces as part of its deterrent against an enemy strategic attack by conventional, as well as by nuclear, means. It has been forced into this view by the sorry state of its conventional military forces and its economy. Although some U.S. assessments have accused Russia of having adopted a nuclear first-use doctrine, the truth is that Russia’s court politics today leaves the military in considerable dark about just what would, or would not, be authorized in a given case.

Dynamic Instability. We have asserted that force operations matter as much as force structures in making deterrence secure or insecure. Accordingly, we need now to analyze several aspects of the problem of dynamic instability and its possible relationship to U.S.-Russian arms control and deterrence. One important issue is whether arms reductions will make the Russians or the Americans more reliant upon hair-trigger response in order to guarantee assured retaliation. A second issue is the extent to which the U.S. or Russia needs to have forces on generated alert (constant launch readiness) as opposed to day-to-day alert
status (only a portion of the force immediately ready to launch) in order to meet the requirements set by policymakers and planners. In general, forces that rely upon prompt launch (launch on warning or launch under attack) instead of delayed launch, or upon generated (launch-ready) day to day alert, are more prone to the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” that might cause a mistaken decision for nuclear preemption.

In Charts 2 and 3, the number of weapons surviving a first strike and arriving to retaliate is compared for Soviet or Russian and U.S. Cold War, START I, START II, and START III forces. The charts permit comparison of maximum and assured (minimum) retaliation across four force structures. Maximum and assured retaliation are defined by two parameters: whether forces are alerted (launch-ready status), or generated (day-to-day alert status), and whether they are launched on warning or ride out the attack. Chart 2 compares the maximum U.S. and Russian or Soviet retaliations: forces are on generated alert (launch-ready), and launch on warning is operational policy.

![Chart 2](image-url)

*Chart 2. Maximum Retaliation (Generated Alert, Launch on Warning.)*
Chart 2 shows that essential parity can be maintained between U.S. and Russian forces even as the force sizes are brought down from Cold War to START III levels. The parity that matters is not the equivalence in deployed forces, but in the estimated numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads that each side can bring to bear against its attacker. In addition, even at START III levels the two sides retain some 2,000 surviving warheads with which to retaliate, allowing coverage of numerous counterforce, counter-command and other military targets in addition to economic and other value targets. However, the figures in Chart 2 are based on launch on warning and highly alerted forces. What if each side’s forces attempt to ride out the attack at day-to-day alert levels? Chart 3 shows the assured or minimum possible retaliation for each force, under these more restrictive operational assumptions.

Chart 3. Assured Retaliation (Day-to-Day Alert, Ride Out Attack).

Russia’s START II and START III forces, not launch-ready and not launched promptly, can guarantee only one-fourth to one-fifth as much survivable retaliatory power as can their U.S. counterparts. Russia’s surviving and arriving START II and START III warheads
number about 300 or 200, respectively, also limiting target coverage to strictly countervalue attacks. Therefore, Russia will almost certainly generate at least some of its forces rapidly in a crisis and rely on prompt launch in order to guarantee assured retaliation. Does this matter? How dependent is Russia compared to the United States on prompt launch doctrines or on generated forces compared to day to day alert?

Effect of Force Launch Readiness. The degree of U.S. or Soviet/Russian dependency on generated alert, for Cold War, START I, START II, and START III forces, is depicted in Chart 4 as the percentage increase in arriving retaliatory weapons compared to day-to-day alert status. The degree of dependency is also shown to vary with launch on warning or a decision to ride out the attack.

![Chart 4. Retaliatory Capability Sensitivity to Generation*](image)

* "Generation" refers to the operational readiness of the force. Generated alert indicates that forces have been raised to a level of readiness above normal peacetime conditions, thereby expediting prompt response and increasing survivability. In a "day-to-day" alert status, forces remain at normal peacetime conditions of readiness. A longer period is required to be able to respond, thereby reducing survivability.
Russia’s dependency on force generation is not much greater than that of the United States if Russia launches on warning. But if not, choosing to ride out the attack creates a larger degree of dependency on force generation for Russia compared to the United States. In addition, the U.S. dependency on generation does not increase steadily as forces are reduced from Cold War through START III levels: dependency on generation remains the same for smaller force sizes. On the other hand, for Russia the opposite is the case: Russian forces increase steadily in their degree of dependency on force generation as force size is reduced.

Effect of Launch on Warning.* In addition to generation, the other operational aspect of stability is whether a state chooses to launch on warning or ride out an attack. In Chart 5, the sensitivity of each side’s forces to launch on warning is illustrated as a percentage increase in the number of surviving and retaliating warheads, compared to delayed launch status.

* Launch on warning means that retaliatory strikes are authorized after unambiguous confirmation of attack warning but before warheads have actually detonated on their assigned targets. Retaliation after ride out means that retaliation is authorized only after attacking warheads have actually reached their assigned targets.

The “good news” in Chart 5 is that Russia’s forces do not become more dependent on prompt launch as force size is reduced. Russia’s Cold War forces and START I compliant forces are more dependent on a hair trigger than either START II or START III forces would
be. This improvement is produced by Russia's elimination for START II or START III of multiple warhead (MIRVed) ICBMs in fixed silos, prompt first strike weapons that are also ideal targets for enemy preemption. Although ICBMs will still be the weapons of choice for modernization of the Russian strategic nuclear force in the near future, single warhead missiles do not pose the first-strike threat to the other side's silo-based ICBMs that multiple warhead missiles do.

It remains the case that for each force structure regime, Russia is more dependent upon force generation and upon prompt launch than the United States is, or was. The reason for this lies in differences in force structure and force operations reflecting differences between the defense postures of the two states. The United States has relied on submarine launched missiles as the key component of its retaliatory force and will undoubtedly continue to do so. The high survivability of ballistic missile submarines has made the United States less dependent upon prompt launch or upon high levels of crisis alert as is Russia. However, this finding is not necessarily reassuring to U.S. observers, nor should it be. Deterrence and war avoidance are a two-way street. If a Russia fearful of losing its deterrent were to launch promptly on an ambiguous or mistaken warning, it would have started an unprecedented catastrophe as a result of unnecessarily pessimistic expectations built into its warning and response system. Russia's modernization must now address this issue of fast trigger and high alert dependency, not only for its forces but also for its command systems.

The Clinton administration has offered to help Russia complete an unfinished radar site in Siberia and to share additional radar warning data with Russia. The U.S. interests in making these offers are twofold: to reduce the risk of misunderstanding that might lead to accidental/inadvertent war; and to help persuade Russia to rethink its opposition to amending the ABM Treaty of 1972 to permit limited national missile defenses against rogue state attacks. The United States urged the Russians in the fall of 1999 to consider their common interest in the possibility of rogue state ballistic missile launches against either America or Russia from North Korea, Iran, or other states with unpredictable regimes and growing ballistic missile capabilities. Russians of various political persuasions remain cool to linking nuclear transparency measures, of which most approved, to revision of the ABM Treaty, which many Russians regard as a cornerstone of U.S.-Russian arms control and as reinforcement for future strategic stability. The implications of any U.S. missile defense deployment receive more specific consideration in the next section.

Defenses. In the United States the issue of national missile defense (NMD) is nearing a move from the research and development stage and toward actual deployment. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced in January 1999 an adjustment in the “three plus three” program that all but committed the United States to the eventual deployment of an NMD system against rogue nation attacks. According to Cohen, the United States would commit $6.6 billion dollars to a “three plus five” program that would produce a system ready for deployment by the year 2005. A final decision on deployment of any U.S. NMD system will be made after the year 2000 by President Clinton's successor, thus permitting additional technology development and testing of proposed system components in the interim. As envisioned by DOD and BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization), these components would be space-based detectors for missile launch, long-range radars to track missile flight
paths, other radars for intercept tracking, and non-nuclear kill interceptors. In July 1999, President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act. Clinton stated that his signature did not amount to final approval for deployment. A final decision would be based on four criteria: technological readiness; the nature of rogue state ballistic missile threats; cost factors; and arms control considerations.

How much difference would defenses make in the stability of the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear relationship? During the Cold War, the prospect of a transition from deterrence based exclusively on offensive retaliation, to a mixed force structure employing both offenses and defenses, was held back by mutual suspicion in Washington and Moscow. Transition to a mixed deterrent force was also inhibited by the primitive state of defense technology compared to offense. Improved technologies and better U.S.-Russian political relations now reopen the question whether defenses mixed with offenses would improve stability, assuming mutually agreed and deployed forces.

Russia remains warily skeptical that any U.S. missile defense deployment could be consistent with stable deterrence. The commander in chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, called in January, 1999 for a global “strategic stability treaty” that would include, in addition to the U.S. and Russia, Britain, France and China. According to Yakovlev, such an agreement would include reductions in U.S and Soviet strategic nuclear warheads even to START III levels and agreement between the two states on “the inviolability of space.” He specified, in regard to space arms control, the need for a pledge not to create space vehicles capable of attacking warning systems to detect missile attacks.

Additional Russian skepticism about a U.S. limited national defense system was voiced by Ministry of Defense official Colonel-General Igor Valynkin, who contended in early February 1999 that a U.S. revision of the ABM Treaty to permit missile defenses would upset stability and that Russia would “undoubtedly respond.” Commenting on U.S. media reports on October 19, 1999, that Washington had offered to help Russia complete a radar station in Siberia in return for Russian acquiescence in amending the ABM Treaty, a Russian Foreign Ministry official rejected the reports as groundless. And on the same day, General Makhmut Gareev, president of Russia’s Academy of Military Sciences, stated that the ABM Treaty should not be used for “political bargaining” because it was an integral part of the global security system. On the other hand, the Russians have not totally closed the subject. During a Moscow meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in early February 2000, Russia’s then-Acting President Vladimir Putin indicated a willingness to discuss the possibility of amendments to the ABM Treaty permitting the United States to deploy light national missile defenses.

Defense today, even granted the assumption of better technologies than during the Cold War, is still difficult to achieve with a high assurance of effectiveness. Space-based defense interceptors are prohibited by the ABM Treaty that remains in force; the same agreement also limits the numbers of sites and the numbers of interceptors deployed. The military tasking of defenses under any revised U.S.-Russian arms control regime will thus be restricted to accidental launches or limited attacks from rogue states armed with ballistic
missiles. Even against attacks of modest scale by Cold War standards, defenses that are very good (i.e., allow very little “leakage” of attacking warheads through the system) will not preclude historically unprecedented levels of societal damage.

The kinds of Clausewitian friction that might characterize missile defense operations even against light attacks are summarized in Table 2 below. This is not a brief against missile defenses, but it does remind us of two things: (1) the Cold War gave offensive technology a substantial head start, and defenses must now play catch-up; and (2) the United States will have fewer obstacles, either political or military, in deploying national missile defenses against limited strikes if it does so cooperatively with Russia instead of against her wishes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detection</th>
<th>Detection might not take place in time for response, or it might mischaracterize an innocent event as attack. Large-scale or sneak attack might overwhelm or confuse defenses.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interception</td>
<td>Extreme accuracies and velocities are required for exo-atmospheric, nonnuclear kill. Firing doctrine must be appropriate to the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>Policymakers must react quickly and decisively to indications of attack, which might be ambiguous. C3 system must provide for feedback on intercept failures to correct follow-on forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy countermeasures</td>
<td>Chaff, decoys, and other devices might confuse detection and tracking. Enemy might use nonstandard methods of attack (e.g., low-trajectory ballistic or cruise missiles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footprint</td>
<td>Not all areas within the footprint of the defender are equally important in terms of military assets, population, or other values. Enemy method of attack may outsmart defensive firing doctrine, making some areas within the footprint vulnerable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

**Table Two: Possible Sources of Friction in Missile Defenses.**
Conclusion

Russia, barring a major financial collapse that leaves its entire defense establishment in tatters, will be able to maintain essential strategic nuclear parity with the United States during the next decade or so. This is especially so if the two states can agree on the START III levels of warhead reductions, which would be easier for cash-strained Russia to meet than START II. Lower numbers are not necessarily more stable, however. Stability also resides in the operational qualities of forces deployed and the extent to which they are sensitive to the need for early generation of launch readiness or prompt launch. Russia’s forces are more dependent on early generation and prompt launch for survivability than are their U.S. counterparts, with two parts of Russia’s triad of strategic nuclear forces having become essentially moribund by 1999. These dependencies can be made worse by deteriorating political relations between the United States and Russia, as in 1999 over the issues of NATO enlargement and the bombing of Yugoslavia. Defenses against limited strikes now have a favorable momentum in U.S. domestic policy debates, but Russia remains wary of any American unilateral or bilateral deployment of national missile defenses.

Endnotes

1. Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, former national security advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, claimed in a U.S. network television interview in September, 1997 that many portable “suitcase” nuclear weapons (atomic demolition munitions, or ADMs) created during the Cold War for use with Soviet special operations forces could not be accounted for by the Russian military now. The U.S. “60 Minutes” program of September 6 raised the possibility that missing weapons could have been sold to terrorists or states like Iraq with nuclear ambitions. Russian defense officials denied that any nuclear weapons were unaccounted for.

2. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 197, Part I, October 8 1999, <newsline@list.rferl.org>


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.
12. Except here and as otherwise noted, tables and charts in this chapter were generated by using a model developed by Dr. James Scouras, Strategy Research Group. The model’s application in this chapter is not Dr. Scouras’s responsibility, nor are any arguments or opinions herein.


15. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


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